Fighting Hunger Worldwide

Policy Evaluation

WFP's School Feeding Policy: a Policy Evaluation

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Executive Summary

Introduction

WFP Context

S1. In recent years WFP school feeding (school meals, biscuits and take home rations) has reached over 20m children annually, almost half of them girls.[1] In 2009, WFP invested around US$ 475m (14% of budget) on school feeding. The map below shows the extent of WFP SF activities in 2010.



S2. The School Feeding Policy was approved by WFP's Executive Board (EB) in November 2009. It was one of the first Policies to follow through the principles of WFP's Strategic Plan 2008–2013, and is fully consistent with its orientation towards food assistance and capacity development. Purchase for Progress (P4P) is a relevant but parallel initiative.

Evaluation objectives and approach

S3. At the time of approval, the EB also mandated an evaluation of the Policy to be presented to its first session in 2012. This independent evaluation reviews the quality of the policy and its early implementation and draws practical lessons. It is not an evaluation of the impact of school feeding (SF) per se, but it does address the Policy's

[1] WFP Annual Report for 2010.

consistency with emerging evidence of impact. The terms of reference excluded emergency SF from the evaluation, and specified a focus on the primary school level. Even so, the scope is very wide, because the Policy links school feeding to many outcomes. Challenges for the evaluators included the short period since the Policy was adopted, the complexity of its objectives, and its combination of continuity with innovation.

S4. The evaluation took place in April–November 2011, using a methodology and evaluation questions agreed during inception. It drew on document and data reviews, interviews with over 300 stakeholders, and case studies for eight countries (Afghanistan. Bhutan, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Tajikistan) selected to represent pilot and non-pilot countries, different levels of government management of SF systems, and geographical variety. A broad reference group across WFP was consulted and the final report takes account of feedback from a two-day workshop in Rome.

International Context

S5. The Policy responds to a dynamic international context as well as strategic developments within WFP. Aid effectiveness concerns are relevant: despite some progress, the challenges of country ownership and aid predictability remain. The Policy identifies multiple objectives for SF, involving social protection and local economic development as well as education, health, gender and nutrition. In all these areas, and in aid effectiveness, the international context has been evolving. In particular, international approaches to social protection now tend to consider safety nets in the wider context of the preventive, protective and promotive potential of social protection systems. SF too can have protective, preventive and promotive effects, but in each dimension it may have to compete with other possible interventions (see Figure S1 below).

Figure S1 The 3P Framework of Social Protection



Source: adapted from World Bank, 2011b.

S6. On nutrition, there is international recognition, within a life-cycle perspective, of the crucial importance of the first 1,000 days from conception. In education, it is recognised that gains in access must be complemented by quality improvements to ensure learning. And there is no doubt of the inter-generational importance of nutrition and education for girls. Linking school feeding to the promotion of agriculture – the home grown school feeding (HGSF) dimension of the Policy – is not new, but it has attracted increased attention.

Origins of the Policy

S7. The 2009 Policy had no direct predecessor, though WFP's approach to school feeding was embodied in various guidelines to staff. Different motivations for preparing the policy converged. The SF Unit saw a need to update, clarify and codify WFP's practical guidance. Several Board members felt WFP needed to provide a clearer rationale and justification for its SF activities (for example an evaluation of SF in emergencies had highlighted issues concerning handover or exit from SF operations). The 2008 food crisis spotlighted SF as a safety net that could often be rapidly scaled up, and so suggested a strengthened case for SF. It was also logical to review WFP's approach to SF in the context of the seminal 2008 Strategic Plan.

S8. A draft of the Policy was informally discussed in 2008 but was referred back for further work. The SF Unit was already collaborating with the World Bank (WB) and the Partnership for Child Development (PCD). Its response was to redouble efforts to strengthen the evidence base for the Policy. The joint publication *Rethinking School Feeding* was the centrepiece, supported by work on HGSF, a comprehensive review of WFP's SF experience, and modelling of SF's potential benefits (the "investment case").

Main Features of the Policy

S9. The Policy does not spell out WFP's objectives for SF, but its "vision" is tantamount to a goal:

> WFP's vision is to reduce hunger among schoolchildren so that it is not an obstacle to their development. (¶35)

S10. The Policy proposes social protection as an overarching framework for outcomes which can include a direct safety net (value transfer) function, educational benefits (incentives for enrolment and attendance, while also enhancing the ability to learn), and nutritional benefits (alleviating short-term hunger and improving children's nutritional status, particularly when food is fortified and accompanied by de-worming); SF's potential to support gender equality is highlighted, and SF is offered as a "platform" for pursuing wider benefits, not least opportunities to support small-scale agriculture through HGSF. It identifies roles for SF as a safety net in emergencies and protracted crises, in post-conflict, post-disaster and transition situations, and in situations of chronic hunger. SF is expected to help break the inter-generational cycle of hunger by contributing to learning and school completion.

S11. According to WFP's SF Policy Unit, the Policy had three "elements of novelty": (i) framing school feeding as a safety net intervention with multiple outcomes;

(ii) working closer with Governments (focusing on the strengthening of sustainable national SF systems); and (iii) introducing eight standards for quality and sustainability (Box S1 below).

Box S1 The Eight Quality Standards for School Feeding

1, Sustainability
2. Sound alignment with national policy framework
3. Stable funding and budgeting
4. Needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design
5. Strong institutional frameworks for implementation, monitoring and accountability
6. Strategy for local production and sourcing
7. Strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination
8. Strong community participation and ownership

S12. The Policy retains the traditional focus on educational objectives and links to the education sector, but also highlights other outcomes, with social protection as an overarching theme. The effect is to multiply the stakeholders that WFP potentially has to deal with, especially at country office (CO) level. The complexity that may result is illustrated in Figure S2 below.

Figure S2 Multiple outcomes, multiple stakeholders



Source: Authors.

Abbreviations in figure: BMGF = Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; FTI = Fast Track Initiative; GEP = Global Education Partnership; MOF = Ministry of Finance; P4P = Purchase for Progress; PCD = Partnership for Child Development; SP= Social Protection; SUN = Scaling up Nutrition.

Key Findings

Perspective

S13. The evaluation took place during the roll-out of the Policy. This ensures an early opportunity to strengthen Policy implementation, but it meant the evaluation was a review of work-in-progress, not a final assessment. There is a natural tendency to focus on aspects where improvement is possible, but this should not obscure the evaluation's positive findings.

Quality of the Policy

S14. The Policy was generally clearly written, and it was grounded in evidence. The Policy was relevant and timely in seeking to codify, and seek consensus around, good practices in SF.

S15. The Policy could have been stronger in three important respects. First, it should have distinguished more carefully between generic objectives for SF and corporate goals and objectives for WFP. It was left to later documents to explain the objectives of the Policy as (a) improved SF quality, (b) wider SF coverage, and (c) effective capacity for school feeding. Both the purpose of the policy document and its corporate implications for WFP would have been clearer if these goals and objectives, as depicted in Figure S3, had been spelled out. The Update presented to the Board in June 2011 was a helpful elaboration of the original Policy, with more attention to the practicalities of implementation. (Figure S4 below is also recent and illuminating.)

Figure S3 Policy objectives and goal of the SF Policy



Source: Concept Note (WFP, 2009zg).

Figure S4 WFP School Feeding: Vision and Objectives



Source: March 2011 workshop, document #3.

S16. Second, the Policy should have distinguished more carefully between advocacy and guidance. There is a tension between the advocacy role of the document (persuading the Board and wider stakeholders of the legitimacy of school feeding and of WFP's role in supporting it) and its role as corporate guidance for WFP (how to approach SF in practice). The advocacy tends to dominate. There was not enough recognition that the potential benefits of SF are not automatically realised, and that in practice there are usually trade-offs between objectives. By exalting all the potential benefits of SF, the Policy runs the risk of over-simplifying, providing a reference point under which all SF objectives can be justified, without emphasising that most SF operations will need to focus on a subset of the possible objectives.

S17. Third, it would have been helpful to draw more attention to the "elements of novelty" that were later highlighted.

S18. Moreover, using a social protection framework is demanding. The SF Policy focuses mainly on the "value transfer" aspect of SF, and does not adequately bring out the promotive aspects (see Figure S1 above). It does not follow through the concept of social protection as an overarching system, within which SF would be one among many possible interventions. The presentation is very WFP-centric (SF is described as the platform for other interventions) and the radical implications for WFP of a social protection approach are not brought out. The recent evaluation of WFP's role in social protection and safety nets (Majewski et al, 2011), by contrast, argues that shifting towards social protection requires fundamental changes for WFP at all levels: in how it operates, in the objectives of its programmes, and in how it works with others. Majewski et al warn that simply relabeling projects and programmes as social protection will negatively affect WFP's credibility.

S19. The Policy was strongly evidence-based, and the evidence-gathering that preceded it was very impressive. However, the Policy tends to cite positive findings about the potential benefits of SF without adequately stressing the other factors on which those benefits also depend.

S20. More recent evidence broadly confirms the evidence available when the Policy was prepared. Thus:

(a) On educational benefits: there is no doubt that SF can act as an incentive for enrolment and attendance. It can be targeted effectively on girls, through on-site feeding and THR. However, the fact that such effects have often been demonstrated does not mean that they are inevitable (this is a key finding from recent impact evaluations). Effects further along the causal chain are more controversial. Attendance may be necessary for learning to take place, but it is never sufficient. Learning depends on the presence and quality of teachers, together with other aspects of the learning environment, and there may be little return on investment if children drop out early. School feeding may have undesirable or paradoxical effects on the education system as a whole. For example, it may exacerbate overcrowding and pressure on inadequate facilities. It has been empirically demonstrated that short term hunger can impair concentration and cognitive performance, but impact evaluations have found it much more difficult to demonstrate a corresponding performance improvement attributable to school feeding. (This is not wholly surprising, in view of the complementary factors that contribute to learning.)

(b) On nutritional benefits: the Policy acknowledged the importance of the "first thousand days", which SF does not directly reach, but it highlighted potential for school feeding programmes to play an important role not only by alleviating child hunger in school, but in enhancing the nutritional status of children particularly when the food is fortified with micro-nutrients; potential cognitive and hence educational benefits are also mentioned in this context. There is indeed strong evidence that SF can have such benefits: a large number of studies agree on the direction of effects, but the scale of effects is less clear. At the same time, two threads of recent evidence have tended to strengthen the nutritional relevance of SF. These concern evidence on spill-overs (benefits of SF that spread to other members of the household), and lifecycle evidence about the potential positive influences of SF on adolescent girls. The Policy does not mention the latter even though the Strategic Plan does.

(c) Viewing school feeding as a social protection measure does not introduce new benefits so much as looking at the same effects in a different way. For example, it highlights the significance of the value transfer which provides the incentive for increased enrolment, or reduced drop-out in times of stress. The Policy drew attention to two very important pieces of "pragmatic" evidence: that countries tend to maintain SF systems as they develop, and that SF has often shown an ability for rapid scale up (a major lesson of the 2008 crisis). These factors suggest that SF should indeed be taken into account when

considering the range of available social protection measures. On the other hand, the Policy tends to understate the difficulties in the way of SF being seen as the optimal intervention. SF may be at a disadvantage in terms of high administrative costs, and limited targeting. Its strengths may include an ability to scale up, and low opportunity cost if resources are tied to food aid (though WFP is rightly seeking to make such resources more fungible).

(d) As regards HGSF, the dimension of local economic benefits is the hardest to bring within the "social protection" framework, though it can be reconciled with WFP's broader mandate. It is certainly true that food procurement can be a stimulus to local agriculture, that there are conspicuous examples (including the USA and Brazil) where this has contributed to the development of established national SF systems, and that such collateral benefits can bring political support which reinforces the sustainability of SF. However, the Policy tends to oversimplify the mechanisms through which SF may be able to contribute to local economic development, and is silent on the relationship between HGSF and P4P.

S21. The Policy presented the "investment case" for school feeding as a demonstration of its high economic returns. This was misleading, because it presented a hypothetical model as if it was an empirical finding. There is indeed evidence for each of the links in the chain of causality on which the model is based, but the overwhelming weight of evidence is that most of the links in the causality chain are rather fragile; for a low income country to achieve the results portrayed by the model would require a "perfect storm" of complementary inputs. Recent studies, including the OE evaluations of SF impact in Kenya, Cambodia, The Gambia, and Côte d'Ivoire, confirm that the interlinked benefits of school feeding cannot be taken for granted, and that the benefits vary according to the modality used (in-school meals, THR etc). Thus:

> There is one overriding conclusion that has been carefully examined and analyzed. It is that the beneficial impacts attributable to school feeding are limited if one attempts to extract school feeding from the larger context of how learning, health, and livelihood outcomes are achieved. School feeding without the appropriate learning environment and family/community support is a weak intervention and its impacts are mostly restricted to food security outcomes. (Finan et al, 2010)

S22. Most seriously, available evidence on the costs, and the cost-effectiveness, of school feeding is conspicuously weak. Given that costs are at the heart of making choices, the Policy could have been more emphatic about the importance of addressing cost issues, and of using cost-effectiveness as a criterion not only in the design of SF interventions but also in choosing between SF and other means towards achieving specific outcomes.

S23. The Policy was coherent with WFP's Strategic Plan and other key policies. It included an innovative, and commendable, effort to propagate general standards for SF systems (see Box S1 above). The Policy was also generally coherent with international standards concerning nutrition, education and aid effectiveness.

S24. By 2008 there were widely accepted criteria for good social protection systems (which had been used in *Rethinking School Feeding*). It was unfortunate that the Policy did not measure SF against these criteria, because they highlight both strengths and weaknesses of SF that should affect its role in a social protection system. The social protection theme in the Policy was thus, by international standards, rather embryonic.

S25. In general, practicability ("the extent to which a policy is workable and can be achieved") is an area of relative weakness in the Policy. In view of the complexity of the policy, and the extent of the envisaged changes in WFP approach and behaviour, the Policy would have been stronger as a practical document if it had included (a) more acknowledgement of the scale of the challenges that would be faced in adopting these new directions, and of the need for prioritisation of objectives in specific cases; (b) more systematic discussion of the realistic scope of WFP's responsibility for SF outcomes; and (c) a clear statement of WFP-specific objectives, together with an outline of the main activities envisaged to pursue those objectives.

Results of the Policy

S26. Attribution of results to the Policy is complicated. It it is too soon to expect outcomes and impacts from operations commenced since the Policy was adopted. At the same time, the Policy envisages a continuation of many long-standing approaches and of some innovations that had begun before the Policy was adopted. It is therefore relevant to consider whether subsequent practice is in line with the Policy, whether or not it is a direct result of the Policy. At this stage it is also relevant to consider whether the Policy is on course to achieve future results. Most judgments are qualitative, because it is early for data trends to emerge, but also because the effects of the Policy on WFP's portfolio are ambiguous (e.g. it could be in line with the Policy for more SF to take place but with less of it undertaken by WFP).

S27. Endorsement of the Policy allowed the policy and programme units to turn their energies to supporting its implementation. Three key documents – the Concept Note (2009), the Implementation Approach (2010) and the Implementation Update (2011) – provided successively more elaborate implementation plans, as well as, in some respects, elaborating the Policy itself. These documents have given the Policy a more practical orientation, and they have been complemented by an impressive amount of work on guidelines and tools to support policy implementation.

S28. Among stakeholders generally, WFP has a high reputation, with approval for recent strategic shifts. Against this background, the evaluation found that awareness of the Policy itself was patchy. There is limited external awareness of it beyond direct partners (and EB members). Although external stakeholders are aware of WFP's reorientation towards food assistance, many sector and thematic specialists in aid agencies remain rather sceptical of some of the Policy's principal claims (e.g. of the competitiveness of SF as a social protection intervention, or of its place in a nutrition strategy). There is also wariness linked to perceptions about WFP "mission creep" and self-promotion.

S29. Within WFP, there is no doubt that HQ staff in both the policy and programme units are highly committed to implementation of the Policy, and that it provides their main agenda. At country level, with some exceptions, there is much less familiarity with the Policy as such. However, the Policy endorses many good practices and initiatives that COs are already following, and it embodies principles, such as government ownership, that are already familiar elements of WFP's overall strategy. Thus COs are often implementing important elements of the Policy, without crediting it as a guide. But this falls short of a conscious commitment to implementation, and neglects important elements such as the eight quality standards, which are not being systematically used in monitoring and reporting on SF programmes.

S30. The evaluation found that WFP's valuable relationships with core SF partners (notably WB and PCD) have been reinforced. There has been less attention to traditional UN partners during the development and roll-out of the SF Policy. Relationships with two emerging donors, Brazil and Russia, have clearly been strengthened by the Policy.

S31. The SF Policy stated (¶33) that "WFP programmes, work plans and the Country Strategies will reflect the WFP school feeding policy and implementation approach." The evaluation found that this is beginning to happen but with room for more progress. Thus, for example, the SF Policy is reflected in the majority of CSs to some degree, but even in the ones that are more strongly aligned, there is only limited analysis of the prospects for sustainable national SF systems. Among ten operations recently approved for non-case-study countries, there is some evidence of movement in the directions advocated by the Policy, at least in the way they are described. The recent operations put more emphasis on support to capacity development for government management of SF systems; there are also more references to the importance of results-oriented monitoring and evaluation. Educational outcomes are generally the dominant justification for SF, however, and safety net/social protection dimensions do not yet come through strongly. The main change in the nutritional aspects of SF design is more prominence for micro-nutrients.

S32. There are many examples of innovations that are in line with the Policy but which preceded it: this applies to cases of working with Governments to support the development of national SF systems, or to assist in managing such systems, to the conscious use of THR for social objectives that extend beyond education, to the wider use of micro-nutrients, and to movement – usually government-led – towards seeking synergies between SF and agricultural development. There is also evidence of receptivity to some themes of the Policy. The promotion of HGSF is generally pushing at an open door (although in practice HGSF issues are more complex than the Policy implies, and WFP's efforts have focused more on the flagship P4P pilot, which the Policy does not mention). Stakeholder workshops in both Mozambique and the Dominican Republic (countries at very different stages in the development of national SF systems) have found the Policy's quality standards helpful. These standards have been used by some COs (most frequently as a communication tool), but they have not been used as a basis for systematic monitoring and reporting.

Surprisingly, the evaluation found that the energy content of rations in four of the five full case study countries was below WFP's own recommended standards.

S33. The sustainability of national SF systems is highly dependent on how deeply embedded and affordable they are for the country concerned. Thus, among the case studies, systems in Bhutan as well as Honduras and the Dominican Republic seem highly durable: their survival is not in doubt; issues are about their quality in various dimensions, including social protection. The three African cases (Mali, Malawi and Mozambique) all aspire to develop sustainable SF systems. Mali is the furthest advanced, drawing on many years of WFP support for system development; Mozambique is at the earliest stage (and therefore very receptive to guidance). Malawi's early plans are very ambitious, and in all three cases the systems must be regarded as fragile. Afghanistan and Tajikistan, for different reasons, do not see handover/transition as practical in the near-term.

S34. WFP's ability to sustain its support for the Policy will depend on following through the radical reorientation of WFP approaches that the Policy requires.

Reasons for results

S35. A number of external trends have facilitated implementation of the Policy. The changing patterns in food assistance have made it more practical to espouse a more flexible policy that is not driven by the food aid available. As the Policy correctly diagnosed, countries that achieve higher levels of income are likely to include school meals among the services they provide. The discourse on aid effectiveness continues to stress the importance of country ownership and the use of country systems. Linking school feeding to support for domestic agriculture repeatedly proves politically popular, even if not technically straightforward. In many ways, therefore, the Policy is well positioned, although the competition for funding – whether external or domestic – is usually intense, with greater financial constraints in the poorer countries.

S36. At the same time, the evaluation found a number of factors that have tended to hold back the implementation of the Policy. Thus WFP encounters some external suspicion of its motives when it advocates SF. There was a lack of consultation with WFP's field level during the preparation of the Policy, and internal dissemination was weak. There was ambiguity between rolling out the Policy across WFP and focusing on pilot countries (with pilots chosen as high-potential countries for the Policy). The paradoxical result was that some non-pilot COs who were well advanced in pursuing key elements of the Policy felt a lack of support, while some of the pilots felt that the progress they had already achieved meant that many of the offered guidance materials were redundant. Human resources for implementing the Policy were severely constrained – both in the limited numbers of professional staff at HQ, and in the hugely demanding roles implied for scarce CO staff, given the breadth of the Policy (see Figure S2 above).

S37. Above all, full implementation of the Policy depends on major changes in WFP systems, incentives and procedures. Most of the necessary changes are identified in the Strategic Plan, but their implementation is slow.

Conclusion

Overall Assessment

S38. The 2009 Policy had important strengths. It was timely. It was clearly and persuasively written. It was well aligned with the WFP strategic plan, with other key policies, and with aid effectiveness principles. It drew on an insightful stock-taking of accumulated evidence: insights included the holistic view of SF's effects – including social protection, the need to work towards sustainable government SF systems, and the possibilities for linking SF to agricultural development. Proposing quality standards for SF was an important innovation.

S39. But the Policy also had significant weaknesses. It did not distinguish clearly enough between the general case for school feeding and the specific role(s) that WFP should play in school feeding. Its treatment of social protection was too narrow (re-labelling SF is not enough). It drew on solid evidence, but it tended to overstate the case, allowing advocacy to undermine balanced guidance; this erodes WFP's credibility. The Policy should have been more emphatic about the need for focusing on a subset of objectives in a specific operation, and the importance of using cost-effectiveness as a criterion not only in the design of SF interventions but also in choosing between SF and other means towards achieving specific outcomes. Including at least a high-level implementation plan in the Policy document would have substantially enhanced the practicability of the Policy (and the quality of Board-level discussion). International thinking has been evolving quite rapidly in several of the fields to which the Policy links SF, and it is therefore a challenge to ensure that the Policy stays relevant and up to date.

What have been the results of the Policy?

S40. Attributing results to the Policy is difficult, partly because its adoption is recent, but also because it endorsed many elements of existing practice, and many of its recommended new approaches were already being tried in some countries. The evaluation noted the progress so far in implementing the Policy and sought to consider whether the Policy is on course to achieve future results.

S41. The Policy is already reflected in WFP's portfolio and activities in several positive ways, but there is room for more progress. Aggregate data on WFP's own SF activities do not reveal much because it is too soon for post-Policy trends to appear and the Policy's effects are potentially ambiguous. The majority of Country Strategy documents reflect some themes of the Policy, but there is only limited analysis of the scope for national SF systems. Recently-approved WFP SF operations give more weight to capacity development but most are firmly located (organisationally and in terms of coordination and dialogue processes) within the education sector, and safety net/social protection dimensions do not yet come through strongly.

S42. However, there are many instances where WFP is already working in the ways the Policy envisages, e.g. by supporting an emerging national SF system. There are also cases (at different stages of SF system development) where governments seem very receptive to WFP support for capacity development. In promoting HGSF, WFP is often pushing at an open door (although there is more WFP momentum behind

the P4P initiative). Although social protection/safety net concepts are increasingly being used within WFP, it can be difficult to ensure SF is included in country-level social protection dialogue, especially where leading players have already shaped the terms of the debate in other directions. There has been only limited use so far of the quality standards advocated by the Policy. Not all the SF programmes in the country cases comply fully with WFP's own nutritional guidance.

S43. Overall, the evaluation judges that experience in far tends to confirm the relevance of the Policy. There has already been some progress in aligning WFP activities with the Policy's agenda, but much remains to be done.

Why has the Policy produced the results observed?

S44. The evaluation noted many positives in the implementation of the Policy, including the energy that has gone into efforts to roll out the Policy and to support it with guidelines and tools within WFP. Inevitably, however, reporting so soon after the Policy's launch, there is a focus on why the Policy hasn't made more difference yet, and on what can be done to reinforce its future results.

S45. The evaluation notes that the Policy's implications are radical, and that radical change usually takes time. More specifically, implementation has been constrained by:

(a) Limitations in the Policy itself (¶S39 above).

(b) A relative neglect of internal consultation with field level personnel. Better consultation could have given the Policy a more practical orientation, as well as a head start in dissemination and ownership.

(c) Focus on the pilot countries which left some advanced COs unsupported, while some of the pilot countries felt they were already ahead of the materials offered by HQ.

(d) The radical change of organisational approach and culture that is embodied not just in the SF Policy but in the overall strategic transformation of WFP that it supports. Implementation depends not only on the technical advice which the school feeding and programme units at HQ can provide (though the complexity and breadth of the Policy make this in itself very demanding) but also on organisation-wide financing arrangements and incentive structures which are still being put in place.

Main Recommendations

S46. The evaluation's recommendations are consistent with the spirit and intent of the existing Policy. They are designed to reinforce the work that has already been done towards implementing it and, in many cases, build on efforts already under way. They are mutually reinforcing and presented in a logical, rather than chronological, order.

Recommendation 1: Clarify and update the policy.

S47. As this report has shown, the debates around SF (e.g. concerning social protection) are moving quite rapidly, so that there will be a regular need to refresh the SF policy; in doing so, some weaknesses and oversights in the original Policy can also be addressed. Thus, **WFP should prepare and seek EB approval (probably in June 2013[2]) for an "Update on WFP's School Feeding Policy".** The update would augment the existing Policy, not replace it.[3] The exercise should be led by the SF policy and programme units, but they should involve other HQ divisions, and also engage with regional and country-level staff, so as to maximise ownership and ensure an orientation towards the practical challenges in implementation.

S48. The Update should:

(a) **Bridge the gap between policy and implementation strategy**. In particular spell out more clearly WFP roles and the changes in WFP activity and portfolio that will result from the Policy; be more explicit about the comparative advantages of WFP, and the limits to what WFP itself can take responsibility for;[4] include a clear M&E strategy (see also recommendations 2 and 4).

(b) **Update the treatment of key themes**, facilitating practical context-specific choices and addressing the gaps identified in this evaluation (see Box S2 below).

Box S2 Themes to be addressed in the Policy Update

On **social protection** the update should reflect the new WFP social protection policy (expected mid-2012), ensuring that vocabulary and approaches are up-to-date and realistic.

On **education,** highlight the extent to which full realisation of potential educational benefits of SF depends on other elements of national education systems, which WFP and other donors should seek to support.

The update should take account of WFPs new **nutrition policy** (due early 2012), while recognising that governments may have to balance coverage against "gold standard" nutritional quality.

On **HGSF**, address the relationship between HGSF and P4P, note more of the complexities about different possible objectives and approaches to local procurement for SF, and be more realistic about WFP's ambitions for local economic development.

At the WFP workshop which reviewed the draft of this report, it was also suggested that the Update could (a) address the full continuum from pre-primary to adolescents more thoroughly; (b) address school feeding in emergencies and in protracted refugee/IDP contexts (bearing in mind that WFP does not have a comparable Policy on emergency SF).

[2] WFP management will have to consider how best to dovetail the SF Policy update with the roll-over of the Strategic Plan and other Policy revisions.

[3] The 2009 update of the capacity development policy (WFP, 2009p) took a similar approach.

[4] The concept of *comparative* advantage implies identifying also the areas in which others are better suited to take responsibility.

Recommendation 2: Operationalise the policy more effectively.

S49. Better operationalisation requires:

(a) **Strengthening staff skills and support for implementation at field level**. Ensure adequate technical support for all COs.[5] Continue work on identifying and developing the new skills that are required by WFP's new SF approaches. Wherever possible link training and staff development to wider initiatives across WFP, avoiding a narrow focus on specific instruments such as SF.

(b) **Further development of guidance material.** This should focus on *rationalisation of materials* (taking account of user feedback), more guidance on *prioritisation and addressing trade-offs* in SF design, *better links to key WFP processes*,[6] and objective *benchmarking* that can be used to track progress in national SF systems.

(c) **More attention to costs and cost-effectiveness.** Build on the very valuable analysis and data collection that have been done through the cost benchmarking exercise and insist on better monitoring of WFP's own costs. At a minimum, all strategy, programme and monitoring documents should be required to report on unit costs planned and achieved.

(d) **Strengthening relationships with external partners.** Existing core partnerships could be further strengthened (e.g. by reciprocal secondment of personnel), while ensuring traditional intra-UN partnerships are not neglected.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen the financing of the policy.

S50. Financial resources and financial and budgetary incentives are key to the operationalisation of the Policy:

(a) **Cost and ensure additional financing for the budgetary implications of Recommendation 2(a) (such as CO staff training & specialist support)** within an overall policy implementation plan to enable PSS, ODXP and Regional Bureaus to support the Policy more effectively across all COs.

(b) **Roll out WFP's new financial framework as rapidly as possible.**

(c) **Seek more predictable funding.** Developmental and capacity development work requires a strategic perspective that is undermined by very short term financing. This relates *first* to ensuring secure, multi-year funding for WFP's own professional staff work in support of the SF Policy. The EB should (continue to) press for more unrestricted and multi-year funding to

[5] This has budget implications – see Recommendation 4.

[6] As one example, the guidance for preparation of Country Strategies, currently very high-level and generic, should be more explicit about the material on national progress towards development of sustainable SF strategies that will be required.

support WFP's core analytical and policy development work. The prevalence of short-term and earmarked funding perpetuates fragmentation and makes it harder to ensure thematic coordination across WFP. *Second*, to promote a strategic perspective towards the development and financing of national school feeding strategies, country strategies should flag long term financing requirements (focused first on overall national SF requirements, and only secondarily on funding requirements for possible WFP operations).

(d) **Strengthen WFP's ability to analyse SF's budgetary implications for governments**. Those considering the nexus of school feeding, education and social protection need to understand the political economy of the budget processes involved. In particular, what funds does SF compete with in practice, and at which levels of government?[7]

Recommendation 4: Strengthen learning and further development of the policy.

S51. For near-term **strengthening of monitoring, evaluation and learning within WFP**:

- Include an explicit M&E strategy in the Policy Update.
- Document experiences and lessons from the pilot countries.
- Draw on the impact evaluation approach that OE has developed in guidance for project formulation and subsequent M&E:
    - At project formulation, spell out the anticipated paths to impact and distinguish factors which are under the control of WFP (or a national SF agency) from those which are not. This approach will help to ensure more frugal initial design that focuses on a subset of SF objectives and designs interventions accordingly.
    - Strengthen regular M&E with a better general understanding of the relevance and quality of different types of evidence.

S52. **Support applied research that is relevant to the design and management of SF operations.**[8] This is a long-term strategy – rigorous research takes time – and it is vital to ensure its credibility (see Box S3).

[7] *Rethinking School Feeding* (Bundy et al, 2009a) rightly highlighted this as an issue that requires more attention, both in research and in practice.

[8] The workshop on the draft evaluation report suggested a number of broad fields for applied research, including: 1) Conditions for feasible handover. 2) Nutrition (or broader) benefits of school feeding in particular to adolescent girls and pre-primary children. 3) School feeding in emergency and protracted situations (could include IDPs / refugees). 4) Issues surrounding cost-effectiveness of school feeding. 5) Different school feeding modalities / cash transfers.

Box S3 Ensuring the value and credibility of research

The credibility of research is all-important, particularly as WFP is not regarded as a disinterested party. Wherever possible, such research should be undertaken independently and/or in partnership with organisations that are regarded as sufficiently credible and dispassionate. In reporting on such research, and on its own studies, WFP should be more careful to distinguish between analytical work and advocacy. Analytical work should be careful to maintain balance and not to draw stronger conclusions than the evidence justifies. The credibility, as well as the quality, of WFP's internal work could be enhanced by systematic peer review, drawing on expertise external to WFP. it would be useful to develop clear protocols for the review and publication of research findings.

In order to ensure robust findings, link research to deliberate experiments – e.g. in controlled trials of different SF modalities or different approaches to targeting; more direct comparisons between SF and alternative interventions (e.g. CCTs) should be encouraged (see WFP, 2011v for planned research in Cambodia). Much can be learned from such experiments, although care is needed in interpreting the findings[9] and the extent to which they can be generalised to other contexts.

WFP should be willing to test core assumptions through such research (e.g. the assumption that within-school targeting of school meals is generally infeasible).

S53. To **promote international learning,** WFP and its partners (particularly the Brazil Centre of Excellence) should explore the establishment of a database "*on school feeding programs that describes the coverage and functioning of programs globally*" (as mentioned in *Rethinking School Feeding)* and the possibility of linking it to an annual independent report on developments and trends in school feeding.[10] What happens in the aggregate of WFP SF operations is less important than what is happening globally (whether hungry children are fed is more important than who feeds them).

[9] Not least because SF interventions may have a more complex set of benefits than the comparator.

[10] This in turn could take forward the objective benchmarking of SF systems – see Recommendation 2 on guidance materials.

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. The School Feeding Policy (WFP, 2009q)[11] was approved by WFP's Executive Board (EB) in November 2009. At the same time, the EB mandated an evaluation of the Policy to be presented to its first session in 2012. The full terms of reference (TOR) are at Annex B. The evaluation is required to:

- Assess the quality and results of the policy and activities to implement it (accountability).
- Determine the reasons behind these findings in order to draw lessons for the future (learning).

2. There is a broad diversity of stakeholders and partners in implementation of the Policy with an interest in this evaluation (see the stakeholder analysis in section 1.3). Many of these may use this evaluation, but the primary users will be WFP's Governing Body in deciding strategic priorities and WFP's Secretariat to enhance policy direction and implementation.

3. The evaluation set out to answer the main evaluation questions (EQs) shown in Box 1 below, and these questions also provide the structure for the findings reported in Section 0.

4. This is an early evaluation of policy and process, not an evaluation of the impact of school feeding per se.[12] However, EQ1 does address the Policy's consistency with emerging evidence of impact. The TOR excluded emergency school feeding from the scope of the evaluation, and specified a focus on the primary school level.[13] Even so, the range of the enquiry is very wide, because the Policy links school feeding to multiple outcomes in social protection, nutrition, education, gender and local economic development.

Box 1 Main Evaluation Questions[14]

A. To assess the **quality of the policy** the evaluation will consider:

EQ1	How relevant is the policy? Are its objectives appropriate and is it soundly based on evidence?
EQ2	Is the policy clear and internally consistent?
EQ3	Is the policy coherent with WFP's strategic plan and other relevant policies?
EQ4	Is the policy coherent with international standards?
EQ5	How practicable is the policy?

[11] The bibliography is at Annex A.

[12] The EB has subsequently adopted guidelines under which, in future, at least four years will elapse between the adoption of a policy and its evaluation (see WFP, 2011z).

[13] But it was agreed to take account of the potential benefits of keeping adolescent girls in school (Lister et al, 2011, ¶82).

[14] For the full Evaluation Matrix, see Annex E.

B. To identify and assess the **results of the policy**, the evaluation will consider:	
EQ6	Are relevant stakeholders aware of the policy, and committed to its implementation?
EQ7	How have WFP's relationships' with other stakeholders changed since the policy was introduced?
EQ8	How has WFP's portfolio changed since the policy was introduced?
EQ9	Does WFP's school feeding portfolio reflect the policy's quality standards?
EQ10	Are the observed changes a result of the policy, a continuation of pre-existing good practice, or the consequence of other WFP policy shifts?
C. To **explain the results (or absence of results) of the policy**, the evaluation will consider:	
EQ11	Was there sufficient consultation and ownership in the development of the policy?
EQ12	How well was the policy disseminated, with guidelines for its implementation?
EQ13	Were there sufficient (financial and other) resources for its implementation?
EQ14	What internal factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?
EQ15	What external factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?
EQ16	What feedback loops have been put in place and how effective have they been?
EQ17	How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy?

5. The evaluation took place between April and November 2011. Evaluation team composition reflected the broad thematic expertise required. The methodology, as agreed during the inception phase, is fully described in Annex C. A glossary of relevant terms was assembled at the inception stage, and is reproduced as Annex D.[15] The full evaluation matrix is at Annex E. Evaluation activities included:

(a) An extensive literature review (see the bibliography at Annex A; Annex F is a guide to key documents linked to the SF Policy).

(b) Interviews with over 300 global and country-level stakeholders within and beyond WFP (see Annex G).

(c) Review of data on WFP's portfolio of school feeding activities (see Annex H).

(d) Preparation of a synthesis of SF evaluations, focused particularly on recent impact evaluations of SF (see summary in Annex I).

(e) A review of all available country strategy documents, and a comparison of recently approved SF operations with earlier examples from the same countries, to check for evidence of consistency with, and influence by, the SF Policy. (See supplementary notes in Annex J on this and other topics.)

(f) Preparation of eight country case studies (with visits to Bhutan, Honduras, Malawi, Mali and Tajikistan, and desk studies for Afghanistan, the Dominican Republic and Mozambique). Executive summaries of the case

[15] As regards "impact" and "results", the evaluation follows the WFP OE preferred usage in which:

(a) "result" and "effect" are practically synonyms, and results can be at the output, outcome and/or impact levels, while

(b) "impact" refers to lasting and significant effects at the goal and outcomes level of the logical framework (results-chain).

studies are reproduced as Annex K, and case study findings against the EQs are at Annex L.

6. The evaluation approach allowed triangulation across different stakeholder perspectives, between documentary sources and interviews, and by comparing evidence broadly across the WFP portfolio and in more depth for a set of case studies (cases were selected to represent countries with different levels of government ownership of school feeding systems). The main limitations on evaluability[16] concern the short period since the Policy was adopted, the complexity of its objectives, and the fact that it combines elements of continuity with innovation. The report is careful to indicate the strength, or limitations, of the evidence on which its conclusions are based.[17]

7. The evaluation team was independent, supervised by the WFP's Office of Evaluation (OE), applying the international evaluation standards embedded in its Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS). Two external reviewers provided independent quality assurance.

1.2 Context

International Context

8. The SF Policy identifies multiple objectives for school feeding, involving social protection and local economic development as well as education, health and nutrition. The policy evaluation therefore took account of international discourse linked to those objectives, as well as the general discourse on aid effectiveness.

9. The **aid effectiveness agenda**, defined by the Paris Declaration (OECD-DAC, 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD-DAC, 2008), continues to evolve as the 4th High Level Forum in Busan (2011) approaches. This has particular implications for the use of country systems, and considerations of fiduciary risks in procurement and service delivery. The UN has responded with efforts to strengthen UN coordination globally and at country level, with the One-UN and UNDAF initiatives. There are continued emphases on country ownership and the strengthening of country systems as key to effective and sustainable development, along with increasing focus on demonstrable results. Lack of predictability in the provision of aid is recognised as a major weakness and source of inefficiency in the use of aid.[18]

10. WFP's mission statement (adopted in 1994) describes WFP as "the food aid arm of the United Nations system", but there have since been major changes in perceptions and practices concerning food aid. Crucially, WFP has become much less reliant on in-kind donations and therefore much more directly involved in procurement, while also deploying a wider range of instruments, including cash and vouchers (see discussion of WFP context below).

[16] See Annex B, §5.1.

[17] The final section of Annex C reflects on the methodology employed.

[18] See the report prepared for the Busan High Level Forum (OECD-DAC, 2011).

11. The present century began with renewed commitments to the objectives of **Education for All** (EFA), and some of the key EFA objectives were also reflected as MDG commitments. The EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI)[19] was established in furtherance of these commitments (Cambridge Education et al, 2010). Basic education has been seen as a universal right, but its practical benefits have also been stressed, both generally, in terms of the links between human capital and economic growth, and more specifically because of the wider effects of education, such as promoting gender equality, and the inter-generational benefits of educating women.

12. In many countries, education enrolments have been boosted by abolition of fees and by other demand-side measures to reduce the costs of participation or to provide positive incentives for parents to send their children to school. School feeding is well recognised as an effective incentive, especially for poor families. At the same time, it has often proved easier to expand enrolments than to ensure that children in school complete a basic education of adequate quality, and there is increasing attention to the determinants of learning outcomes.

13. UNESCO's annual EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR) tracks progress towards the EFA objectives and provides an analytical commentary. Box 2 below shows highlights from the 2011 GMR (UNESCO, 2011c). The prominent concerns with enrolment, dropout and gender confirm the relevance of school feeding, inasmuch as SF promotes enrolment and attendance, and often focuses on girls. But it is noticeable that the GMR's review of measures to encourage parents to keep their children in school pays scant attention to school feeding while highlighting evidence for the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers (CCTs).

14. There is a dynamic international aid framework for addressing the challenges of **hunger and nutrition** – encapsulated in the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) initiative and Road Map (SUN Task Team, 2010). This is driven by a humanitarian concern to meet the basic MDGs and by advances in understanding of under-nutrition and the importance of different interventions (e.g. micronutrients) at different stages of the life-cycle (e.g. increasing appreciation of the importance of "the first 1000 days" from conception, which has implications for both mother and child nutrition interventions). WFP itself has been engaged in these developments, and they also influence international stakeholders' perspectives on SF as a nutrition intervention (see for example DFID, 2009, DFID, 2010).

[19] To be known from November 2011 as the Global Partnership for Education.

Box 2 EFA – Progress and Challenges

Progress	**Challenges**
• From 1999 to 2008, an additional 52 million children enrolled in primary school. The number of children out of school was halved in South and West Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, enrolment ratios rose by one-third despite a large increase in the primary school age population.	• The number of children out of school is falling too slowly. In 2008, 67 million children were out of school. Progress towards universal enrolment has slowed. If current trends continue, there could be more children out of school in 2015 than there are today.
• Gender parity in primary enrolment has improved significantly in the regions that started the decade with the greatest gender gaps.	• Gender disparities continue to hamper progress in education. Had the world achieved gender parity at the primary level in 2008, there would have been an additional 3.6 million girls in primary school.

Analysis

- Many children drop out of school before completing a full primary cycle. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, 10 million children drop out of primary school every year.
  In most cases, children drop out because of poverty-related factors beyond their parents' control, as well as problems linked to the quality of education, or school-based factors that influence progression through grades. Lowering the risk of dropout requires a broad set of policies aimed at reducing these underlying vulnerabilities.

- The quality of education remains very low in many countries. Millions of children are emerging from primary school with reading, writing and numeracy skills far below expected levels.
  School-level factors are important in shaping learning outcomes. Key factors include: the quality of teachers, real teaching time, the classroom environment, what happens in the early grades, and schools' selection procedures.

Source: adapted from GMR 2011 (UNESCO, 2011c)

15. As noted in the WFP Social Protection evaluation (Majewski et al, 2011), **social protection** emerged in the late 1990s as a reaction to the narrower concept of 'social safety nets'. Safety nets are now seen as a component of social protection, which constitutes a basis for evolving social welfare and social security systems in low-income countries that are too poor to afford comprehensive systems.

16. The definition of social protection varies by agency and by country with a diverse range of concepts, tools, and modes of implementation – and continues to evolve. The high food price crisis of 2008 highlighted the importance of safety nets and social protection, and gave more traction to discussion of the issue. Both the IMF and the World Bank have advocated the development of social protection systems as a key tool for poverty reduction, and many host governments are now including social protection within their own poverty reduction strategies.

Figure 1 The 3P Framework of Social Protection



Source: adapted from World Bank, 2011b.

17. The World Bank's emerging social protection policy (World Bank, 2011a) reflects its current thinking and is a reasonable summary of the view held by the major social protection actors (such as the EC, DFID, UNICEF and ILO[20]). For the World Bank, effective, efficient and equitable social protection programmes directly reduce poverty and inequality, and build resilience by helping individuals and families smooth their consumption and handle shocks. They also can promote opportunity, productivity and growth. As such, they stress three inter-connected functions for social protection (prevention, promotion and protection, as shown in Figure 1 above). This perspective goes much further than the income effects of a "value transfer", since it addresses also the dynamic potential for social protection instruments to address the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty.

18. In the same vein, social protection is increasingly defined in terms of overall systems rather than individual programmes. This implies the need for strong overall coordination, prudent integration and layering of new and existing instruments. From this perspective, school feeding is one potential intervention of many within an integrated social protection system that seeks to do more than just provide a safety net.[21]

19. **Linking school feeding to the promotion of agriculture** is not new – school feeding in the USA was promoted as an agricultural development initiative – but it has attracted increased attention in recent years. In particular, the New

[20] But it should be noted that the UN agencies' concepts tend to be more rights-based, while the WB's is more oriented towards economic benefits and human capital.

[21] We note that "safety nets" are correctly defined in the school feeding (SF) policy as "sub-sets of broader social protection systems". However, "safety net" is often used loosely when "social protection" more accurately describes the overarching framework of which school feeding may form a part; we will prefer the term "social protection" when it is more appropriate.

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) identified the potential links between school feeding and agricultural development early in the evolution of its Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP, which WFP helped to design). In 2003, the United Nations (UN) Millennium Hunger Task Force, NEPAD and WFP launched a CAADP "flagship programme" for "NEPAD school feeding using increased domestic food production in rural areas". This sowed the seed for the home-grown school feeding (HGSF) activities in which WFP is involved today.[22]

20. Research and advocacy on the subject has been strongly promoted by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Partnership for Child Development (PCD). The potential links between school feeding and agricultural development remain intuitively, and politically, attractive and can play an important role in ensuring support for continuing school feeding programmes.

WFP Context

21. WFP has always had to find a balance between emergency humanitarian interventions and a role in addressing the underlying causes of hunger. Recent years have seen an important strategic shift and a change in WFP's business model. This has been facilitated by trends in WFP's resourcing: a trend away from donations in kind has increased the importance of direct WFP procurement in national and international markets, and has also facilitated the use of a broader range of instruments, including cash and vouchers.

22. The Strategic Plan adopted in 2008 (WFP, 2008d)[23] was pivotal. It embodied a shift from "food aid" to "food assistance", clarified WFP's strategic objectives, and stressed the importance of working in partnerships, of moving from a project to a strategic approach, and of promoting in-country capacity development. As noted in Annex F (key documents), implementing the new strategy has required fundamental changes to WFP systems: this has included adoption of a strategic results framework, a programme categories review, and adoption of a new financial framework (which, when operationalised, will break the link between food tonnage and operational funding, and thus facilitate the financing of advisory and capacity development activities). There is a new requirement to prepare country strategies, separate from the specific programmes through which WFP operations are financed. These developments within WFP are of direct relevance to the SF Policy's origins and implementation, and are discussed further in the context of specific evaluation questions.

23. The new business model has also facilitated the flagship "Purchase for Progress" (P4P) initiative, which has direct implications for the HGSF element of the school feeding policy. The wording of the 2008 Strategic Plan shows endorsement of a broad commitment to local procurement for economic development purposes, but

[22] WFP seconded staff to CAADP for several years; there was a gap in 2011, which swas due to be filled soon.

[23] Originally for 2008–2011, subsequently extended to 2013.

HGSF is not mentioned. In 2007–2008, WFP and the BMGF changed gear, and to some extent direction, with regard to HGSF. The balance of the BMGF funding was transferred to the P4P project, launched in September 2008 as a five year pilot. P4P covers 21 pilot countries[24] and has a budget of USD 140m, from BMGF and several other sources.[25]

24. While fully in keeping with SO5, the P4P initiative has broadened the scope beyond school feeding. P4P aims to strengthen local smallholder food production, processing and marketing capacity, systems and income by redirecting and restructuring WFP procurement, in the context of WFP's own efforts to build national ownership of many of the activities that it currently undertakes. In some countries, such as El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, and Mali the P4P unit in the WFP Country Office (CO) arranges procurement of some of the food that the organisation uses for school feeding. Overall, however, school feeding demand is relatively small, which was one reason for designing P4P to address other WFP activities too. Meanwhile, PCD and others continue to promote HGSF around the world. School feeding, and HGSF, are what P4P emerged from; but the strategic emphasis on HGSF in WFP has been overtaken by the broader, well-funded, P4P effort. In the process, the potential nutritional benefits of HGSF (which may be able to supply fresh local produce) have been given less emphasis than the economic and livelihood benefits that P4P can achieve.

1.3 WFP's School Feeding Policy and its Implementation

Origins of the SF Policy

25. The 2009 SF Policy had no direct predecessor, though WFP's approach to school feeding was embodied in guidelines to staff and a series of innovations over the years (see Box 3 below). Annex F is a summary of the key documents involved, both before and after the SF Policy itself.

26. Different motivations for preparing the policy converged over time. At a practical level, the SF unit saw a need to update, clarify and codify WFP's practical guidance on school feeding. From the perspective of several Board members, WFP needed to provide a clearer rationale and justification for its SF activities (for example the evaluation of SF in emergencies (WFP, 2007e) had highlighted issues concerning handover or exit from SF operations). The food crisis of 2008 brought SF into the spotlight as a safety net intervention that could, in many cases, be rapidly scaled up, and thus provided an opportunity to present a strengthened case for SF. And it was also logical to review WFP's approach to SF in the context of the seminal 2008 Strategic Plan.

[24] Including five of this evaluation's case studies (Afghanistan, Honduras, Mali, Malawi and Mozambique).

[25] This funding is for the technical activities and personnel of the project, and not for the actual WFP food purchases that it facilitates; the procurement itself is funded from the usual WFP budgets.

Box 3 Precursors of the School Feeding Policy

1999	A School Feeding Handbook (WFP, 2000a), jointly prepared by WFP with UNESCO and WHO. provided guiding principles on the rationale, design, implementation and evaluation of school feeding programmes. It emphasised the role of SF in promoting attendance, improving ability to concentrate, and addressing micronutrient deficiencies.
2000	WFP launched the "School Feeding Initiative" (WFP, 2000b, linked to resources from the USA McGovern/Dole initiative) to encourage governments to put in place national school feeding programmes.
2000	WFP established a School Feeding Unit (WFP, 2004f).
2001	WFP, with support from WHO, World Bank and CIDA, launched a de-worming initiative linked to school feeding.
2002	WFP partnered with UNICEF to promote an "Essential Package" of linked school-level interventions, designed to strengthen school health, hygiene and nutrition programmes. (See UNICEF & WFP 2006 and WFP, 2010d.)
2003	The Hunger Task Force proposed linking school feeding directly with agricultural development. Agreement between WFP and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to undertake pilot Home-Grown School Feeding programmes.
2005	WFP collaborated with the private sector to test acceptability and use of single-dose sachets of micronutrients in powdered form – "sprinkles".
2006	WFP organised an expert seminar on "Food for Education (FFE)" to gather and disseminate the most recent facts, figures, and solutions available. (WFP, 2006e)
2006	WFP published a guide on school feeding which reiterated the educational and nutritional objectives of school feeding. (See WFP, 2006d. This was described as a summary of the existing School Feeding Handbook.)
2007	WFP launched the FFE web-site to allow international agencies, national governments, non-governmental organizations and civil society to access and share reliable information on school feeding (see http://www.schoolsandhealth.org/sites/ffe/Pages/Default.aspx).

27. The school feeding unit had begun work on a draft SF policy in early 2006, and the first target date for submission to the Executive Board was June 2006. Preparation of the paper proved much more time-consuming, and it was not until September 2008 that a draft policy was discussed, informally, with Board members.

28. However, there was insufficient support for the 2008 draft when it was put forward. The SF unit was requested to do more work on the paper, including a more rigorous presentation of evidence and more analysis of SF's relative advantages as a safety net, to reconsider some of the claims about SF effects (it was not necessarily credible to link SF with all five Strategic Objectives), and to provide clearer guidance about which objectives should be pursued in particular operations.

29. The SF Unit was already collaborating with the WB (and PCD) and its response was to redouble efforts to strengthen the evidence base for the SF Policy – hence the documents noted in Box 4 below, which are given prominence in the 2009

Policy. According to some key interviewees. the 2009 Policy's emphasis on making the case for SF reflects the experience with the 2008 draft.

Box 4 Research and Analysis towards the SF Policy

As a platform for the 2009 SF Policy, WFP concluded various research and analysis work to enhance its knowledge base and hence improve the quality of WFP's school feeding programmes. These include:

- "Learning From Experience – Good Practices from 45 Years of School Feeding" (WFP, 2009zh).
- *Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector*, a joint publication by WFP and the World Bank Group (Bundy et al, 2009a).
- "Home-Grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production", a study conducted by WFP in 2008 and 2009, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Espejo et al, 2009).
- "An Investment Case for School Feeding" by WFP and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) which compared the monetary costs of providing school feeding with potential long-term economic benefits (WFP, 2009i).

For more details see Annex F.

Goals and objectives of the SF Policy

30. In this section we consider the purposes of the Policy, its main features, and what was new about it. The underlying question for the evaluation is "what was the Policy trying to achieve?"

31. Several distinct purposes can be disentangled from the Policy's introductory paragraphs: (a) to make the case for school feeding in general, based on a conceptual framework that draws from recent research and other evidence; (b) to describe (prescribe?) WFP's role in achieving SF objectives; (c) to serve as a guide for WFP staff in performing WFP's role(s). Purpose (c) is the least fully articulated, and it was largely left to later documents to describe the strategy for implementing the Policy (see ¶43ff below). Most of the document is in practice devoted to (a) and (b), often without distinguishing clearly between them.

32. The Policy articulates a broad case for school feeding. It offers social protection as an overarching framework for benefits which can include a direct safety net (value transfer) function, educational benefits (an incentive for enrolment and attendance, while also enhancing the ability to learn), nutritional benefits (not only alleviating short-term hunger, but improving the nutritional status of children, particularly when food is fortified with micro-nutrients and accompanied by de-worming); its potential to support gender equality in schooling is highlighted, and school feeding is offered as a "platform" for pursuit of wider benefits with the school as a focus. Among such wider benefits it highlights opportunities to support small-scale agricultural development through HGSF. It identifies roles for SF as a safety net in emergencies and protracted crises, in post-conflict, post-disaster and transition

situations, and in situations of chronic hunger. School feeding is expected to contribute to breaking the inter-generational cycle of hunger through its contribution to learning and school completion.

33. The Policy does not spell out WFP's objectives for SF, but its "vision" is tantamount to a goal:

> WFP's vision is to reduce hunger among schoolchildren so that it is not an obstacle to their development. (¶35)

34. The Policy emphasises WFP's role in supporting governments to develop sustainable school feeding strategies (with different models that may involve different degrees of decentralisation – a dimension especially relevant when considering strategies for local procurement and sourcing). It proposes guiding standards for school feeding, which seem to apply both to WFP SF operations and to the wider national SF systems of which they form part,

35. According to WFP's School Feeding Policy Unit, the Policy brought in three "elements of novelty":[26] (i) framing school feeding as a safety net intervention with multiple outcomes; (ii) working closer with Governments (headlined in the Policy as "Government Capacity Development and Transition to Government Ownership" and linked to a model of staged transition towards full government ownership and management[27]); and (iii) introducing eight standards[28] for quality and sustainability.[29] However, these three elements were intended to reflect good practices, which were in some cases already being applied, rather than to introduce elements entirely new to WFP.

36. Among the more familiar elements in the Policy were the educational objectives it identified, and its continued support for elements of the Essential Package. The eight guiding standards address both familiar and novel elements of the policy; they are in themselves quite vague but are linked to an annexed table of indicators.

---

[26] Paragraph adapted from TOR (Annex B), ¶16.

[27] "WFP will ensure that all programmes include a transition strategy that will clearly specify how WFP and the government will work towards putting in place the elements for a sustainable school feeding programme." (¶66 of the Policy)

[28] Rethinking School Feeding identified 5 standards, which the WB SABER benchmarking guidelines also use. They map onto the WFP standards as follows (World Bank, n.d.-a):

Rethinking SF standards	SF Policy Standards
1. Policy frameworks	1, Sustainability (crosscutting Rethinking standards)
2. Institutional capacity and coordination	2. Sound alignment with national policy framework (Re 1)
3. Financial capacity	3. Stable funding and budgeting (Re 3)
4. Design and implementation	4. Needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design (Re 4)
5. Community participation	5. Strong institutional frameworks for implementation, monitoring and accountability (Re 2)
	6. Strategy for local production and sourcing (Re 4)
	7. Strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination (Re 2)
	8. Strong community participation and ownership (Re 5)

[29] In the Policy, these are referred to as standards for sustainability and affordability.

37. HGSF objectives had not been articulated so directly in previous WFP guidance.

Stakeholder analysis

38. The Inception Report (Lister et al, 2011) included a stakeholder analysis which is reproduced in Annex C, Box C5. This was used as a guide in seeking a range of interviewees for the evaluation (see category analysis of interviewees in Annex G, Box G1).

39. Stakeholder analysis, drawing on interviews and documents, highlights that:

- Institutional stakeholders are not monolithic: for example, there are significant differences in perspective among the different specialist units of aid agencies, and views at field level do not necessarily echo those at HQ.
- The Policy's perspective on multiple outcomes (across education, social protection, nutrition, HGSF etc) has the effect of multiplying the number of relevant stakeholders, both globally and at country level. This has direct implications for the scale and complexity of communication and coordination tasks. At country level, in particular, this is potentially very demanding for CO staff. Figure 2 is a schematic (and simplified) illustration of this complexity.

- WFP's general reputation has risen in recent years, and there is considerable awareness of its new strategic orientations. At the same time, in some quarters, WFP is burdened with a reputation that is out of date with current practice, and is often informed by biases against food aid and a lack of understanding of WFP's current operations. Stakeholder analysis suggests that aid agencies (including WFP's funders and its peers) are sceptical of new WFP initiatives which tend to be viewed as 'mission creep' (or as the re-labelling of familiar approaches). They are aware that WFP does not have core funding and perceive it as keen to capture new funding streams.

40. Stakeholder views have informed all aspects of the evaluation, and are particularly reported against EQ6 and EQ7 in Section 2.2 below.

Figure 2 Multiple outcomes, multiple stakeholders



Source: Authors.

Abbreviations in figure: BMGF = Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; FTI = Fast Track Initiative; GEP = Global Education Partnership; MOF = Ministry of Finance; P4P = Purchase for Progress; PCD = Partnership for Child Development; SP= Social Protection; SUN = Scaling up Nutrition.

Activities to Implement the Policy

41. This section provides an overview of activities to implement the policy; the results of these activities are considered in the next chapter.

42. Responsibilities for implementation are distributed across WFP, from its senior management at HQ, to regional bureaus and country offices. However, the pivotal roles are played by the school feeding sections of the policy and programme departments at HQ (respectively designated PSS and ODXP).

43. The SF Policy itself did not include an implementation plan, although some elements were implicit. But, as Annex F shows, the Concept Note (WFP, 2009zg), the Implementation Approach (WFP, 2010p) and the Implementation Update (WFP, 2011zb) provided progressively more articulated descriptions of an implementation strategy. For clarity we describe the implementation activities through the lenses of these later documents, but it is important to remember that implementation plans were not so systematically laid out in prospect.

44. It was left to the Concept Note to spell out three objectives for the SF Policy: (a) improved SF quality, (b) wider SF coverage, and (c) effective capacity for school

feeding. The Implementation Approach links three pillars of implementation (implementation support, strategic thought leadership, and global partnership, advocacy and fund-raising) to these objectives, as shown in Figure 3 below. In practice, there are several cross-overs between the three pillars, but the broad distinction is helpful. A draft results matrix 2010-2012 was attached to the Implementation Approach, but was not referred to in the Implementation Update.

45. The Implementation Update, however, is more specific about the SF Policy objectives:

> In line with this policy, WFP seeks to support national governments with a view to achieving:
>
> a) **improved quality of school feeding** by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation: programmes must be targeted, nutritious, cost-effective and use locally produced foods to the extent possible;
>
> b) **wider coverage**, especially of girls, by scaling up school feeding to reach as many hungry schoolchildren as possible;
>
> c) **sustainability** by aiming to establish stable funding and budgeting; needs-based, nutritious, cost-effective programmes; sound implementation arrangements such as local procurement and links with agriculture and local development; and sound partnerships, coordination and community ownership. (WFP, 2011zb, emphasis added)

Figure 3 School Feeding Policy Objectives and Implementation Approach



Source: WFP, 2010p, Figure 1 "Approach to School Feeding".

Figure 4 The Four-Stage Process to Develop National SF Programmes



Source: WFP, 2011zb, Figure 2.

46. The document notes a continuing direct role for WFP in school feeding, particularly where capacity is weak, but emphasises a "new approach to create a new generation of school feeding programmes". It presents a stylised "four-stage process" for the development of such programmes (as depicted in Figure 4 above).

47. The Implementation Approach and Implementation Update describe key elements of the implementation strategy, including:

- The development of tools and guides to support the new approach (see Annex J, Note 1 for an overview).
- Consultation and dissemination within WFP.
- Support to COs through technical missions and advice at relevant stages of the programme cycle.
- Continuation of the partnerships with the World Bank and PCD.
- A programme of advocacy and fund-raising at international level.[30]
- Focus on pilot countries (in partnership with the WB and PCD[31]). The pilot countries – selected on the basis of their potential to demonstrate the new approach successfully – were Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Laos, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique. At the same time the new approach

[30] Advocacy by WFP and the World Bank seems to have influenced EFA High Level Group communiqués in 2010 and 2011 which made positive references to school feeding.

[31] Collaborating in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Mali.

would be gradually mainstreamed into WFP school feeding programmes as they are reviewed or developed.[32]

- Promotion of South-South collaboration and cross-country learning (including the establishment, in collaboration with the Government of Brazil, of a school feeding centre of excellence in Brasilia – see Box 5 below).
- Ongoing research work, including the impact evaluations managed by WFP OE (on the latter see Annex I).

Box 5 The Centre of Excellence in Brazil

The "WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger" was established in Brasilia in 2011, with initial funding from the Brazilian government. It aims to help national governments develop their capacity to run effective school feeding services by:

- supporting cross-country learning through visits to countries with mature school meal programmes;
- acting as a global source of information on school feeding;
- providing technical support to governments establishing and developing school feeding programmes.

The centre is the latest phase of cooperation between WFP and Brazil, and its first director is a former head of the Brazilian school feeding programme.

WFP's school feeding portfolio

48. In recent years WFP school feeding (school meals, biscuits and take home rations) has reached over 20m children annually, almost half of them girls.[33] In 2009, when the SF Policy was introduced, WFP invested around US$ 475m (14% of budget) on school feeding. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of SF by programme categories and by modalities (school meals, biscuits and take-home rations), while Map 1 below shows the global spread of WFP school feeding in 2010. (For additional data see Annex H.)

[32] The Implementation Approach results framework gives target numbers of countries to be brought into the new approach each year, but this is not mentioned in the Implementation Update.

[33] WFP Annual Report for 2010.

Figure 5 Operations by Programme Category and Modality





Key: B = High Energy Biscuits; M = on-site meals; T = Take Home Rations

Map 1 WFP School Feeding Beneficiaries 2010



2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Quality of the Policy

49. This section considers the quality of the Policy, as articulated, in order to understand whether it was at the outset designed to attain best results. Its implementation and results are considered subsequently.

50. As explained in section 1.3 above, the Policy approved in November 2009 has to be understood in context, as part of a policy process; Annex F notes key documents that help to explain the origins and purposes of the Policy, and its subsequent interpretation in practice.

Clarity and Internal Consistency

[EQ2 Is the policy clear and internally consistent?]

51. Throughout, we try to distinguish between the ultimate purposes of school feeding, and the more immediate purposes of the SF Policy. In many ways the SF Policy is a very articulate document. It was rightly seen by many Board members as much clearer, more cogent and more specific than the 2008 draft. But the document is not completely clear about the purposes of articulating the policy, or about what differences in WFP behaviour will be brought about by its adoption.

52. As noted in ¶31 above, most of the document serves two purposes: (a) to make the case for school feeding in general, based on a conceptual framework that draws from recent research and other evidence; (b) to describe (prescribe?) WFP's role in achieving SF objectives. More care in distinguishing between generic school feeding objectives, on the one hand, and the specific objectives of WFP's policy, on the other, would have enhanced both the clarity and the internal consistency of the document.

53. There is a tension between the advocacy role of the document (persuading the Board and wider stakeholders of the legitimacy of school feeding and of WFP's role in supporting it) and its role as corporate guidance for WFP. The advocacy tends to dominate. Thus the logic model presented is one that articulates the generic operations of school feeding. The Policy provides a "vision",[34] but it is left to the Concept Note (WFP, 2009zg) to provide the logic model that spells out the link between this vision (goal) and corporate objectives for WFP (see Figure 6 below). We understand that there was a deliberate decision to put forward detailed implementation plans at a later stage,[35] but both the purpose of the policy document and its corporate implications for WFP would have been clearer if goals and objectives as depicted in Figure 6 had been spelled out. (Figure 7 below shows a more recent, and very helpful, elaboration.)

[34] "WFP's vision is to reduce hunger among school children so that it is not an obstacle to their development." (¶35)

[35] Indeed, early drafts included an implementation plan, but the School Feeding Unit was advised to omit it. See additional discussion under "practicability", ¶85ff below, and in Section 3.2.

Figure 6 Policy objectives and goal from Concept Note logframe



Source: Concept Note (WFP, 2009zg – the full logframe is reproduced as Annex C, Box C2).

Figure 7 WFP School Feeding: Vision and Objectives



Source: March 2011 workshop, document #3

54. Similarly, the Policy attempted both to capture existing good practice and to propose new points of emphasis for WFP's future engagement with school feeding. The school feeding unit subsequently drew attention to three "elements of novelty" in the Policy: (i) framing school feeding as a safety net intervention with multiple outcomes; (ii) working closer with Governments; and (iii) introducing eight standards for quality and sustainability. Again, highlighting these points of novelty

more directly in the policy document itself would have enhanced the clarity of its messages.

Relevance: Policy Objectives

[EQ1 How relevant is the policy? Are its objectives appropriate … ?]

55. It was **relevant** to have an explicit policy (not least to promote goal alignment among stakeholders). There were good reasons to reflect on WFP's experience and practice, and to provide more systematic guidance for WFP's future engagement with SF. It was **timely** in responding to WFP's evolving corporate objectives (food assistance) and to the prominence SF attained as a response to the 2008 food crisis. It was a **useful** step towards codifying much existing good practice, as well as adapting policy to take account of new circumstances and emerging evidence.

56. The main directions mapped out by the policy were relevant (it was aligned on appropriate goals), but the policy did not address them all as well as it could have. Broadening understanding of SF roles, and in particular framing SF as a safety net intervention with multiple outcomes, was relevant, but also challenging. There is no doubt that SF can have multiple benefits, but dealing with multiple outcomes (hence multiple possible objectives for SF operations) is complex. The various potential benefits are not automatically realised in practice (this point emerges strongly from the evaluations reviewed in Annex I), and there are frequently trade-offs between objectives in the way SF operations are designed (for example, maintaining nutritional standards may limit coverage or the ability to rely on local procurement). Moreover, as noted in Section 1.2 above, international thinking has been evolving quite rapidly in several of the fields to which the Policy links SF, and it is therefore a challenge to ensure that the Policy stays relevant and up to date.

Box 6 School feeding as a social protection intervention

The idea of linking school feeding to social protection is not new, but it is demanding:

> One example of a social protection intervention that can contribute to longer-term poverty reduction goals is school feeding schemes that provide learners with free meals at school. Because school meals serve two functions – providing an immediate consumption transfer to children who are often malnourished, and encouraging children from poor households to attend school even during difficult times – school feeding schemes can be characterised as serving both protective and promotive social protection objectives. However, making this case requires demonstrating that education generates higher incomes for school-leavers, that school feeding improves educational outcomes, and that school feeding is pro-poor.

Source: Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004. The authors add that education per se is not just an investment in an individual's future, it is also an investment in a country's future – leading to higher levels of economic growth etc.

57. Framing school feeding under an overarching theme of social protection or safety nets is a case in point (see Box 6 above). The SF Policy does not follow the idea through sufficiently. It focuses mainly on the "value transfer" aspect of SF, and does not adequately bring out the promotive aspects. Nor does it link SF sufficiently to the

concept of social protection as an overarching system, within which it would be one among many possible interventions (in practice management and resourcing of SF as depicted in the Policy remain tightly linked to the education sector). It is also depicted in a very WFP-centric way (the Policy repeatedly refers to SF as the platform for other activities and benefits), and the radical implications for WFP of a social protection approach are not brought out.

58. The recent evaluation of WFP's role in social protection and safety nets (Majewski et al, 2011), by contrast, argues that shifting towards social protection requires fundamental changes for WFP at all levels: in how it operates, objectives of its programmes, and how it works with others. Majewski et al conclude that simply relabeling projects and programmes as social protection will negatively affect WFP's credibility. Because WFP capacity, consistent funding and sustainability are all problematic, partnerships are critical for WFP to contribute to national systems, and they recommend that WFP should focus its social protection efforts on comparative advantages, develop WFP organisational and staff capacity, contribute to the development of national social protection systems and continuously improve adherence to SP standards of good practice.

59. While **the broad directions of the Policy were appropriate**, additional issues are raised by the consideration of its evidence base, discussed next.

Relevance: Evidence Base for the Policy

[EQ1 How relevant is the policy? … is it soundly based on evidence?]

60. **The Policy is strongly evidence-based in its approach**. It highlights the evidential work (most notably *Rethinking School Feeding*) that fed into its preparation, and it offers evidential support for each of the school feeding outcomes it claims. Here the evaluation comments on (a) whether the policy deployed available evidence accurately and fairly; and (b) whether subsequent evidence bears out the policy.

61. The evaluation reviewed the Policy's deployment of evidence, and also surveyed more recent literature on its principal themes; stakeholder views on the Policy's claims were noted, and the evaluation also paid special attention to the impact studies and other SF evaluations that are reviewed in Annex I. There are some interesting nuances in recent findings, some of which have implications for the value and design of SF programmes, but in general they confirm previous findings (and previous caveats). However, the Policy does tend to cite positive findings about the potential benefits of SF without adequately stressing the other factors on which those benefits also depend. We illustrate this below, for each of the main themes, and then comment on the presentation of evidence as a whole.

62. Many of the potential **educational effects of school feeding** are well-documented. There is no doubt that SF can act as an incentive for enrolment and attendance. It can be targeted effectively on girls, through on-site feeding and THR. But the fact that such effects have often been demonstrated does not mean that they are inevitable (as illustrated by the contrasting findings in impact evaluations – see Box 7 below).

63. Effects further along the causal chain are more controversial. Attendance may be necessary for learning to take place, but it is never sufficient. Learning depends on the presence and quality of teachers, together with other aspects of the learning environment, and there may be little return on investment if children drop out early. School feeding may have undesirable or paradoxical effects on the education system as a whole. For example, it may exacerbate overcrowding and pressure on inadequate facilities. Those for whom the SF incentive is powerful are likely to come from educationally impoverished households, and may thus pull down average test scores.[36] It has been empirically demonstrated that short term hunger can impair concentration and cognitive performance, but impact evaluations have found it much more difficult to demonstrate a corresponding performance improvement attributable to school feeding. (This is not wholly surprising, in view of the complementary factors that contribute to learning.)

Box 7 Insights from SF Evaluations in Uganda, Burkina Faso and Laos[37]

These three impact evaluations were initiated in 2005 as part of WB and WFP collaboration. All sought to compare different SF modalities (school meals and THR) in the same context. Among their findings:

- The northern Uganda study did not find a significant effect on gross or net enrolment, although it did find small positive effects on afternoon attendance and drop-out rates.
- It also found no impact on body mass index or on the overall prevalence of anaemia. However it did find a significant reduction in anaemia prevalence amongst girls aged 10–13 and significant benefits for younger siblings from the school meals programme (there were suggestions that the latter effect arose both from pre-schoolers participating directly in the school meal and from children at home receiving more food when an older sibling was eating at school).
- The Burkina Faso study found a definite effect on girls' enrolment (for both school meals and THR) but accompanied by a complex pattern of reallocation of household labour, and no substantial effects on academic performance.
- The study in the Lao PDR[38] found very little conclusive evidence that SF affected enrolment or the nutritional status of the population. It noted more positive findings in Uganda and Burkina Faso, and speculated that there might have been more effect if there had been better targeting or fuller take-up of the SF programmes.

64. Two prominent students of school feeding recently reviewed the current state of knowledge. On educational benefits they provide a reminder that "FFE programs can only be effective in education terms if combined with quality education programs." On education and school feeding they conclude:

[36] See the Ethiopia impact evaluation (Annex I).

[37] See Annex I.

[38] This study's findings were published after the SF Policy was approved (see Buttenheim et al, 2010).

> Do the results imply that FFE is the best way to use funds for education? … the quick answer is likely no. However … the answer is …nuanced. FFE is not a substitute for a well-organized education system and teacher performance. However, there is extensive evidence that FFE can complement a good education program. So although FFE may not be the best education response it may be an important element in achieving an effective education system. (Alderman & Bundy, 2011)

65. On **nutrition**, there is a significant difference in tone between *Rethinking School Feeding* and the SF Policy. The former identifies social protection and education benefits as the primary drivers of support for school feeding[39] (citing evidence that "the most cost-effective nutrition interventions are those that target the first 24 months of life, and those that promote maternal nutrition and thus intrauterine growth" (Bundy et al, 2009a, chapter 3). The Policy does not dispute this analysis, but highlights the potential for school feeding programmes to play an important role not only by alleviating child hunger in school, but in enhancing the nutritional status of children particularly when the food is fortified with micro-nutrients (¶15–18 of the Policy); potential cognitive and hence educational benefits are also mentioned in this context.[40]

66. There is indeed strong evidence that SF can have such benefits, but, *Rethinking School Feeding* was careful to note that while a large number of studies agree on the direction of effects, their scale is less clear.[41] Kristjansson et al, 2007, comparing 18 SF studies across 9 high income and 9 lower income countries, concluded that the magnitude of benefits depends on factors such as the amount of energy and other nutrients provided by the meal/snack, baseline nutritional status, conditions for learning in the classroom, timing of meal/snack, substitution and social environment at home, age of the child, and compliance. The authors concluded that school meals may have a number of small benefits for children but that it is unrealistic to expect that school meals or any other single intervention can be a panacea for all of the deprivation of children living in poverty. Nevertheless, school meal programmes should be well-designed, and provide sufficient energy, protein, fat and micronutrient content for children's age and baseline nutritional status.[42]

67. A more recent review has explored the impact of SFPs on nutritional, health, and educational outcomes of school-age children in developing countries. It covered

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[39] "**Defining Objectives in Practice: Safety Net, Education, or Nutrition?** In today's world, the primary drivers for increased support for school feeding are the benefits for social protection and for education." (Bundy et al, 2009a, chapter 3)

[40] And *Rethinking School Feeding* acknowledges:

> Well-designed school feeding programs, which include micronutrient fortification and deworming, can provide nutritional benefits and should complement and not compete with nutrition programs for younger children, which remain a clear priority for targeting malnutrition overall. (Bundy et al, 2009a, Executive Summary)

[41] They are also rather difficult to measure routinely (because of the need for anthropometric measures and possibly invasive tests of nutritional status). The review of WFP evaluations (see Annex I) showed that in practice SF has been treated as an educational rather than a nutrition intervention.

[42] I.e. interventions should be nutrition-sensitive even if they are not nutrition-focused.

peer-reviewed journal articles and reviews published in the past 20 years. The analysis of the articles revealed relatively consistent positive effects of school feeding in its different modalities on energy intake, micronutrient status, school enrolment, and attendance of the children participating in SFPs compared to non-participants. However, the positive impact of school feeding on growth, cognition, and academic achievement of school-aged children receiving SFPs compared to non-school-fed children was less conclusive (Jomaa et al, 2011).[43]

68. Two threads of recent evidence have tended to strengthen the nutritional relevance of SF. These concern evidence on spill-overs (favourable externalities), and lifecycle evidence about the potential influence of SF on adolescent girls. Box 7 above includes an example of positive spill-overs (the northern Uganda case), and also some evidence of significant effects on girls' nutrition. This is supported by the World Bank's evaluation of social protection measures which finds, inter alia, that:

> CCTs and education fee waivers, **by keeping adolescent girls in school longer**, seem to encourage them to adopt safer sexual practices and delay early marriage and childbirth. (IEG, 2011, emphasis added)

69. Alderman and Bundy offer the following updated verdict:

> Do the results reviewed here imply that FFE is among the best investments in nutrition? Despite new evidence indicating favorable externalities to siblings of students, and the clear benefit in addressing hunger in schoolchildren, the fair answer to this question is no. While FFE can provide iron and other key micronutrients, these programs are not designed to address the most critical nutritional constraints in low income settings, simply because they are not targeted at the most vulnerable period in child development, which is between conception and two years of age. (Alderman & Bundy, 2011)

70. Viewing **school feeding as a social protection measure** does not so much bring additional benefits into play as look at the same effects in a different way (e.g. highlighting the significance of the value transfer which provides the incentive for increased enrolment, or reduced drop-out in times of stress, and investigating the pattern of consequential effects at household level).

71. The Policy drew attention to two very important pieces of "pragmatic" evidence: that countries tend to maintain SF systems as they develop, and that SF has often shown an ability for rapid scale up (a major lesson of the 2008 crisis). These factors suggest that SF should indeed be taken into account when considering the range of available social protection measures. On the other hand, the Policy tends to understate the difficulties in the way of SF being seen as the optimal intervention. SF is likely to be comparatively vulnerable because of high administrative costs, and limited targeting. Its strengths may include an ability to scale up, and low opportunity cost if resources are tied to food aid (but WFP is rightly seeking to make such resources more fungible).

72. The World Bank's evaluation of safety nets observes: "the world of safety nets is extremely dynamic, and new knowledge and new practices are constantly

[43] Although published after the Policy was adopted, this review (with its 20-year retrospective) draws mainly on material already available in 2009, and echoes the conclusions of earlier syntheses.

evolving." and "the task of comparing policy options is complicated by SSNs' multiple objectives, which rule out simple rates-of-return analyses" (IEG, 2011). Our discussion of international standards (¶82ff) includes a review of the Policy's consistency with emerging international standards for social protection (see Table 1), which is also relevant to the way in which evidence was presented in the Policy.

73. There is an important difference between regarding SF as a plausible part of a social protection system, and judging it to be an optimal social protection intervention. This is reflected in Alderman and Bundy's updated assessment:

> We review some recent evidence on school feeding and make the case that the strongest direct consequence of school feeding is best viewed as a form of an income transfer to assist low income households, although there is also a case to be made for a complementary role in education. As such, a primary role is to reduce current poverty with the additional benefit of promoting the accumulation of human capital by jointly influencing education and health.
>
> Do the results imply that FFE is a plausible candidate for a social protection investment on a par with CCTs? Here the fair answer appears to be: quite likely. FFE can increase human capital investments while also providing support to poor households. Thus they serve as a support to current poverty reduction while making the need for future transfers and assistance less likely. The dual objectives of raising current consumption while promoting investments, however, make it difficult to compare outcomes of either CCTs or FFE with direct investments. (Alderman & Bundy, 2011)

74. The dimension of **local economic benefits** is the hardest to bring within the "social protection" framework, though it can be reconciled with WFP's broader mandate. It is certainly true that food procurement can be stimulus to local agriculture, that there are conspicuous examples (including the USA and Brazil) where this has contributed to the development of established national SF systems, and that such collateral benefits can bring political support which reinforces the sustainability of SF. However, the Policy tends to oversimplify the mechanisms through which SF may be able to contribute to local economic development – a point which we develop further in the discussion of practicability (see Box 8 below).

75. On the **combined benefits of school feeding**, the SF Policy makes much of the potential for the different possible benefits of school feeding to reinforce each other. It includes the following claim:

> **School feeding, a sound investment:** A joint cost-benefit analysis undertaken in 2009 by The Boston Consulting Group and WFP has compared, in Kenya and Laos, costs related to the design, implementation and delivery of school feeding with the benefits arising from the three major school feeding outcomes: increased education, improved nutrition and health, and value transfer to the beneficiaries. Findings from this study revealed that school feeding improves enrolment, attendance and cognition, decreases drop out and morbidity and enhances disease awareness. These lead to increased wages and a longer productive life which together lead to increased lifetime earnings. School meals and take-home rations translate into savings at household level, which can result in increased returns on investment. The analysis also highlighted the reinforcing and multiplication effects between the various outcomes which make school feeding a unique intervention. The study points to two conclusions: Investing in school feeding creates significant economic value; and school feeding is a unique safety net driven by the

> interdependency between various outcomes, and combines short-, mid- and long-term benefits. (WFP, 2009q,¶32)

76. There is indeed evidence that different possible effects of school feeding can reinforce each other. However, the "Investment Case" is a hypothetical modelling exercise presented as fact ("this study revealed that…") and as such is very misleading. The authors of the Investment Case have been careful to describe it as a model, and as an advocacy tool, not as empirical research (see Annex F, Figure F1). There is indeed evidence for each of the links in the chain of causality on which it is based, but the overwhelming weight of evidence is that most of the links in the causality chain are rather fragile; for a low income country to achieve the results portrayed by the model would require a "perfect storm" of complementary inputs. Moreover, a large part of the benefit depicted comes from the "value transfer" component (for which there are other options than school feeding), while the combination of up-front costs and long term benefits means that it takes many years for the benefit/cost ratio to turn positive.

77. Presenting the model in this way also obscures two points that ought to be emphasised. First, **available evidence on the costs, and the cost-effectiveness, of school feeding is conspicuously weak**. Costs and cost-effectiveness are at the heart of making choices, and the Policy could have been more emphatic about the importance of addressing cost issues, and of using cost-effectiveness as a criterion not only in the design of SF interventions but also in choosing between SF and other means towards achieving specific outcomes. Second, **the interlinked benefits of school feeding cannot be taken for granted**. This is a key finding of the impact evaluations reviewed in Annex I. As the Kenya evaluation puts it:

> There is one overriding conclusion that has been carefully examined and analyzed. It is that the beneficial impacts attributable to school feeding are limited if one attempts to extract school feeding from the larger context of how learning, health, and livelihood outcomes are achieved. School feeding without the appropriate learning environment and family/community support is a weak intervention and its impacts are mostly restricted to food security outcomes. (Finan et al, 2010)

78. **To summarise:** there is a growing body of evidence about school feeding, and the Policy marshals fluently the evidence that indicates a range of positive effects for SF. But the Policy allows its advocacy to undermine guidance. Advocacy plays up what the positive effects can be. Guidance requires more awareness of the necessary conditions for benefits to be realised, and has to be based on carefully balanced analysis.

Coherence with WFP Strategy and Policies

[EQ3 Is the policy coherent with WFP's strategic plan and other relevant policies?]

79. The radical organisational changes implied by the Strategic Plan are still being worked through. The SF Policy is thoroughly **coherent with the Strategic Plan**, both in setting SF in a wider framework of instruments to tackle hunger in the long term, and in its alignment with SO5 – to strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger. All the main directions of the SF policy are anticipated in the strategic plan itself. It is similarly **aligned with WFP policies on capacity development** and **gender**, and with WFP commitments on **aid effectiveness**. The evaluation noted only two areas where the policy might have addressed policy coherence more fully.

80. First, in relation to gender and nutrition: the Policy highlights the gender implications and opportunities of school feeding, and it is also consistent with existing nutrition policy such as *Food for Nutrition: Mainstreaming Nutrition in WFP* (WFP, 2004d). However the Policy does not refer to the significance of school feeding for adolescent girls.[44] This point was already highlighted in the Strategic Plan which states: "Furthermore, school feeding programmes represent a long-term and sustainable solution to hunger since their impact on education levels, especially those of adolescent girls, will help break the intergenerational cycle of hunger and undernutrition" (WFP, 2008d). It is also embodied in the WFP's adoption of a life-cycle approach to nutrition. For example, a recent "Feeding Minds" publication states:

> Keeping adolescent girls in schools gives them a better education and contributes to raising the age at which they marry or have children. Teenage girls need nourishing food for themselves – and for the day they will become mothers themselves, completing the cycle. (WFP, n.d.-g)

81. Second, as noted in Section 1.2, ¶23–24, the strategic emphasis on HGSF in WFP has been overtaken by the broader, well-funded, P4P effort. The Policy should have commented directly on the relationship between P4P and HGSF, and its practical implications for the implementation of the SF Policy, but did not do so.

Coherence with International Standards

[EQ4 Is the policy coherent with international standards?]

82. Here we consider whether the Policy, as adopted, was well aligned with relevant international standards. The evaluation's principal comments concern alignment with social protection standards, but we first comment briefly on the other themes of the policy:

(a) The Policy was coherent with **aid effectiveness** standards (as codified by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action), particularly in the emphasis on supporting government-owned and managed programmes.

[44] Except for an implicit reference to secondary schools in ¶62.

(b) The Policy was also coherent with international **nutrition** standards and good practice, both in its implicit link to WFP's own guidelines on the nutritional quality of school meals, and in its advocacy of de-worming, which is in line with WHO advice.

(c) More generally, continued endorsement of the Essential Package shows awareness of complementary factors required to maximise the **education**, as well as nutrition, benefits of school feeding.

(d) There are no obvious international standards that relate to **HGSF.**

83. There was an innovative, and commendable, effort to propagate general **standards for SF systems**. Their use in practice reveals certain strengths and weaknesses in their formulation, which we discuss in the next section (under EQ9).

84. A major innovation of the Policy was to offer **social protection** as an overarching framework for school feeding. In considering the relevance of the Policy, the evaluation has already noted that this theme was not adequately followed through (see ¶56–57 above). A particular gap, is that the strengths and weaknesses of SF from a social protection perspective are not systematically discussed. International standards (criteria for what constitutes a good safety net system) were referred to in *Rethinking School Feeding*, and in Table 1 below we consider the implications of these criteria for school feeding. It is striking that the Policy itself did not address most of these points. The social protection theme in the Policy was thus, by international standards, rather embryonic. This has implications for the Policy's practicability, which is discussed next.

Table 1 The SF Policy and Standards for Social Protection

Criterion/Definition	Implications for the Policy
Appropriate The programme responds to the particular needs of a country and is customized to the context.	• The appropriateness of SF depends on the specific objectives defined for SF in a particular country, the wider objectives of the education and social protection sectors, and a direct comparison of other available instruments in each sector. This implies high levels of direct engagement with other partners and flexibility on WFP's part.
Adequate The programme should provide full coverage and meaningful benefits to the population it is trying to assist.	• The Policy does not offer any benchmarks to determine whether SF is adequate in social protection terms. There is no doubt that SF can represent a substantial value transfer for poor households, but this may be offset by direct costs and opportunity costs of sending children to school. • Targeting issues are considered as an aspect of equity, below.
Timely and predictable People know what they will receive and when, and receive benefits before or during the time of greatest need.	• Productive safety nets are built on the assumption that a predictable transfer allows the poor to take a risk on a new productive activity such as credit with the knowledge that a portion of consumption is guaranteed (i.e. that part of the budget is taken care of). Consequently, it is key for them to know how much is coming when. SF has a number of factors that threaten predictability including the challenge of maintaining a predictable supply, logistic considerations that may cause delay including the transition to government systems, and the potential variability of local supply for HGSF.

Criterion/Definition	Implications for the Policy
	• The short term nature of WFP funding and the lack of core funding makes social protection engagement a major challenge. This is also a critical challenge for systems and capacity development which, by definition, requires a medium to long term commitment. WFP's overall credibility could be damaged if it is unable to fulfil commitments. • Timing may become an issue in terms of the school year. There is no SF coverage during holidays (unless a boarding school) or "summer" months. This limits SF's effectiveness as a value transfer, especially where the summer break corresponds with the lean/hungry season.
Equitable The programme should provide the same benefits to individuals or households that are equal in all important respects (horizontal equity) and may provide more benefits to the poorest (vertical equity).	• There are inclusion and exclusion aspects to targeting which have implications for using SF as a social protection instrument. If the primary objective is to transfer value to the poorest households, covering all students through a universal SF programme will be a very expensive option compared to targeted cash transfers. There are also concerns that SF does not capture the poorest students who often do not attend school despite the presence of SF for reasons such as the opportunity cost of productive labour and additional hidden expenses such as uniforms, books and transport. And geographical targeting (SF only in the poorest or most food-insecure districts) can also lead to large exclusion errors.[45]
Cost-effective The programme should run efficiently with the minimum resources required to achieve the desired impact, but with sufficient resources to carry out all programme functions well.	• Cost-effectiveness, in comparison to other social protection instruments, is a major challenge for school feeding, given the often high administrative costs of delivering food, and the imprecision of its targeting. • Cost comparisons, though necessary, are complicated by the complex effects of SF (it may have auxiliary effects that the comparator does not have). • A further complication arises in the ways the opportunity costs of SF resources are perceived: e.g. SF will seem less attractive if competing directly within education budgets, but more attractive if external resources for SF are seen as unavailable for other uses.
Incentive-compatible The programme should avoid changing households' behaviour in a negative way, may even encourage positive changes.	• SF as a positive incentive for attendance and retention, and as a targeted incentive for girls through THRs is well articulated in the policy. However, there is little attention to potential negative outcomes such as drawing students to schools beyond their capacity (teachers and infrastructure), of the opportunity cost of investing in SF compared to other education priorities. Utilising SF as a social protection instrument requires attention to potential negative as well as positive effects, based on a good understanding of the political environment and the social protection system as a whole. • A similar point applies in the design of specific SF instruments (cf. some of the unanticipated side-effects noted in the review of evidence above).
Sustainable The programme should be politically and financially sustainable (and not dependent on indefinite donor support).	• This standard links to predictability (see above). There are challenges in ensuring that SF systems are both politically and financially sustainable, but many of the long-term benefits claimed for SF are dependent on the durability of the programme.

[45] The Policy's frequent reference to SF as a tool to reach "the most vulnerable" is problematic. Most often it is likely to reach only some of the most vulnerable.

Criterion/Definition	Implications for the Policy
Dynamic The programme should evolve over time as the economy grows.	• Implies ongoing involvement in the maintenance and adaption of social protection systems, which is much more demanding (especially on staff) than standard project-focused approaches.
Notes: With one exception, the standards in the first column are adapted from *Rethinking School Feeding* (Bundy et al, 2009a)Table 3.1, which itself credits Grosh et al, 2008. We have added "timely and predictable" – a dimension highlighted in Gentillini, 2005.	

Practicability

[EQ5 How practicable is the policy?]

85. An earlier WFP policy evaluation defines practicability as "the extent to which a policy is workable and can be achieved" (WFP, 2008a, ¶41). Clarity and internal consistency obviously contribute to the practicability of a policy (see the earlier discussion). Also: does the policy provide sufficient guidance to those responsible for its implementation? does the organisation have, or can it acquire, the competences required to implement the policy? does the policy set reasonable expectations for what the organisation can accomplish? The experience of implementing the Policy is reviewed in Section 2.2 below: at this point we discuss whether the Policy itself was sufficiently oriented towards practicability.

86. Based on observations from internal and external stakeholders, as well as from an examination of the internal logic of the Policy, the evaluation finds that **practicability is an area of relative weakness in the Policy**. Several factors contribute: (a) the inherent complexity of the Policy; (b) the extent to which the Policy requires new patterns of behaviour by WFP; (c) weaknesses in the underlying logic model; and (d) insufficient attention to the implementation strategy for the Policy.

87. While it was relevant to highlight the multiple potential outcomes of school feeding, this perspective greatly complicates the operational tasks of WFP staff, particularly at country level. It implies that, both strategically and in respect of any prospective school feeding operation, they must consider the multiple dimensions of social protection, education, nutrition and HGSF, and also the balance between direct implementation by WFP and building up the government's capacity to manage its national SF system. WFP has a long tradition of considering educational and nutrition perspectives, but other dimensions are much less familiar, and the consideration of so many dimensions multiplies the number of stakeholders with which WFP should consult and collaborate (cf. Figure 2 above). Of course, the role for a policy document is to set broad directions, on which more detailed implementation guidelines may build. However, by exalting all the potential benefits of SF, the Policy runs the risk of over-simplifying, providing a reference point under which all SF objectives can be justified, without emphasising that in most cases SF operations, if they are to be efficient and effective, will need to focus on a subset of the possible objectives.

88. Moreover, the Policy (in line with the Strategic Plan and SO5) envisages a different orientation in much of WFP's behaviour: many interviewees commented on the different skills required for advisory and capacity development work, and on the demands on staff time for participating in country level dialogues. They also noted that WFP's incentive structures and financial models have not traditionally supported such an approach, and that the Policy therefore implies radical organisational change.

89. We noted earlier that the Policy does not distinguish clearly enough between the overall potential benefits of school feeding, and the contributions towards such benefits that can reasonably be expected from WFP.[46] However, such a distinction is a vital first step towards setting practical organisational objectives for WFP. Box 8 below illustrates this point, using the example of HGSF. Similar points apply to other themes (as discussed above in relation to the evidence base).

Box 8 The Logic and Practicality of WFP support for HGSF

Conceptually, linking school feeding procurement to enhanced and sustainable incomes for small-scale farmers is an attractive but also a complex proposition. There are multiple factors, relationships and potential strategies to consider (Sumberg & Sabates-Wheeler, 2010). A stable market is an obvious advantage for producers. But it must offer an attractive price – which, conversely, WFP cannot allow to exceed prices in alternative (international) markets. Furthermore, farmers must have access to appropriately priced inputs and, in some cases, credit. Their production technologies must achieve appropriate quantities and quality of produce on an environmentally sustainable basis. If they do not, a long and complex series of interventions may be needed to achieve this. Storage and transport technologies and facilities must ensure that quantities, quality and prices are not adversely affected for producers, buyers or consumers between field and school. There is therefore no automatic connection between a decision to promote 'local' school feeding procurement (whatever 'local' is assumed to mean) and the achievement of agricultural development and enhanced smallholder livelihoods.

The policy speaks of creating "synergies between school feeding programmes and other social and agricultural programmes". This automatically makes WFP dependent on the presence and performance of other agencies for the achievement of the benefits that are claimed for local procurement strategies. Six decades of global experience have shown that agricultural development initiatives fail more often than they succeed. Efforts to intervene in agricultural marketing systems have a particularly poor record. The policy therefore appears to underestimate the practical challenges of achieving positive impacts on the local economy.

Because it says virtually nothing about them, the policy must be judged unrealistic as to timescale, the demands for resources and the required changes in behaviour by and within WFP, which has very limited resources to tackle the challenges implicit in building "synergies between school feeding programmes and other social and agricultural programmes".

[46] The logic model annexed to the Policy exemplifies this: it addresses the overall logic of school feeding, rather than the logic of WFP's engagement.

90. **To summarise:** In view of the complexity of the Policy, and the extent of the envisaged changes in WFP approach and behaviour, the Policy would have been substantially enhanced as a practical document if it had included:

- more acknowledgement of the scale of the challenges that would be faced in adopting these new directions, and of the need for prioritisation of objectives in specific cases;
- more systematic discussion of the realistic scope of WFP responsibility for SF outcomes; and
- a clear statement of WFP-specific objectives, together with an outline of the main activities envisaged to pursue those objectives.

2.2 Policy Results

What results could be expected?

91. This section identifies the results of the SF Policy, prior to discussion in Section 2.3 below of the reasons for these results. Different levels of result are possible. A first level would be the immediate effects of activities to disseminate and implement the Policy (Section 1.3 above). A second level would be the consequential changes in WFP's portfolio of SF operations. These would be linked to the objectives of improved SF quality, expanded SF coverage, and sustainable SF programmes (objectives which were made more explicit in subsequent implementation plans than in the Policy itself). Ultimately, there would be changes at the level of impact on beneficiaries of SF. It is recognised (see Annex C) that **it is too soon to expect changes at impact level to be visible, and the evaluation therefore focuses on the earlier levels of results.**

92. This section is heavily dependent on qualitative judgements, for several reasons. As we discuss below, quantitative data (e.g. on WFP's portfolio) are limited. In any case, they require qualitative interpretation, since implementation of the Policy may have an ambiguous effect on such data. For example, the policy envisages an expansion of SF – but whether there is a net increase in the number of children fed by WFP will depend also on progress in building up governments' roles in SF, another objective of the Policy. Moreover, the Policy envisages change in some areas, but continuity in others: it is important to consider both aspects. And for each EQ it is relevant to consider what results would reasonably be expected at this stage in the implementation of the Policy.

Awareness of the policy

[EQ6 Are relevant stakeholders aware of the policy, and committed to its implementation?]

93. The evaluation's findings draw heavily on its extensive interviews with stakeholders (see Annex G). The following broad patterns were apparent:

(a) Amongst **members of the Executive Board**, there was high awareness of the Policy. For many, the Implementation Update presented to the June 2011

EB meeting (WFP, 2010zb) was an important elaboration on the original Policy document, clarifying what the Policy actually means in practice. The Update appears to have reinforced support for the Policy. Some agencies acknowledge that they have become less sceptical of SF and of WFP's role in SF.

(b) Amongst **major aid agencies** (including those represented on the Board) the pattern at HQ level was mixed. People who had very direct dealings with WFP (e.g. the Board Members, and those directly collaborating with WFP over SF) were likely to be aware of the Policy in a general sense, but few of them saw it as a regular reference document. Amongst other agency staff (e.g. specialists in education and nutrition), there was much less awareness of the Policy, or of its specific messages. However, there was wide awareness of the recent strategic shifts in WFP, and its efforts to become more broadly engaged in food assistance and in capacity development. This awareness had often been reinforced by WFP advocacy in international forums. A similar pattern is apparent amongst international NGOs.

(c) **Within WFP, the pattern at HQ and at country level was very different.** At HQ there was a high level of awareness of the Policy, and it was recognised as an integral part of the strategic shift embodied in the 2008 Strategic Plan. At CO level, most interviewees had been aware of the Policy prior to the interview, as it had been announced through the usual formal channels within WFP. However, very few treated it as a practical guide to action, and several identified the Strategic Plan as their key reference document. In several cases, the March 2011 workshop was regarded as their first proper briefing on the Policy.

(d) Amongst **non-WFP stakeholders** at country level, there was minimal awareness of the Policy as such. Amongst government agencies, however, there was often good awareness of the strategic and programmatic directions for WFP that are embodied in the document. Amongst aid agency representatives, again, there tended to be a general awareness of WFP's strategic directions, but no familiarity with the Policy as such. In several cases, stakeholders who became aware of certain messages (e.g. SF as a safety net, the potential nutritional benefits of SF) were instinctively very sceptical.

94. As regards **commitment to implementation** of the Policy within WFP:

(a) There is no doubt that HQ staff in both the policy and programme units are highly committed to implementation of the Policy, and that it provides their main agenda.[47]

(b) At country level, with some exceptions,[48] there is much less familiarity with the Policy as such. However, the Policy endorses many good practices and

[47] However, the workshop that reviewed the draft of this report expressed the view that other HQ units were less aware of the Policy's requirements (e.g. its implications for procurement, finance, logistics, external relations – see WFP, 2011zf).

initiatives that COs are already following, and it embodies principles, such as government ownership, that are already familiar elements of WFP's overall strategy. Thus COs are often implementing important elements of the Policy, without crediting it as a guide. But this falls short of a conscious commitment to implementation, and neglects important elements such as the eight quality standards (see ¶111ff below).

Influence on Stakeholder Relationships

[EQ7 How have WFP's relationships with other stakeholders changed since the policy was introduced?]

95. The evaluation's interviews demonstrated that **WFP's reputation among international stakeholders has risen in recent years**. WFP has long been regarded as an exceptionally efficient and practical UN agency, and this reputation has been enhanced by its more recent strategic shifts. At the same time, it is recognised that WFP has to campaign continually to raise funding for its programmes**.** Hence, **many stakeholders view WFP's advocacy for SF with a degree of scepticism,** suspecting that WFP is partly motivated by self-interest. WFP needs to be continually alive to this issue, and careful not to undermine its own credibility (one sympathetic observer captured a widespread sentiment in recommending "less advocacy, more engagement").

96. At global level, **links with the World Bank and with PCD have been the strongest element in WFP's relations with other agencies**. The tripartite partnership continues to evolve (WFP, 2011zc). The relationship with PCD over HGSF has been influenced by the emergence of P4P as the flagship of WFP efforts to parlay its procurement power into local economic benefits. At the same time, WFP's links with FAO and IFAD remain rather weak. There has been little practical collaboration with FAO so far and hence little FAO commitment to the implementation of HGSF. While the logic of collaboration between WFP and FAO on school feeding is repeatedly endorsed in various forums (WFP, 2011zd), capacity constraints on the staff in both organisations mean that progress is slow.

97. UNICEF is a long-standing partner (cf. the Essential Package), but interviews reveal that the relationship is not always an easy one. The two organisations have very different approaches (UNICEF has many more professional staff at country level and is more accustomed to the capacity development roles that WFP is now seeking to adopt; WFP has a much stronger role in implementation), and several WFP staff voiced the view that UNICEF's attitude to collaboration is coloured by a disdain for food aid. At country level, collaboration at school level is often hampered by different targeting strategies that limit their geographical overlap.[49]

[48] In some pilot countries and/or where key CO staff have had direct previous engagement with SF at HQ.

[49] A comment on the draft of this report pointed out that WFP is frequently operating at a much larger scale than UNICEF, and this too limits the scope for collaboration at school level.

98. The evaluation found that WFP's **relationships with its traditional UN partners had been relatively neglected** during the development and roll-out of the SF Policy. WHO appears to be another case in point. Although the Policy highlights the importance of linking SF to deworming, interviews with WHO Preventive Chemotherapy and Transmission Control (PCT)/Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) revealed that that NTD is not receiving any requests for technical assistance from WFP. Nor is WFP taking advantage of WHO assistance to obtain donations for deworming drugs. Furthermore, NTD has developed a group of national experts in several countries that are available to assist when designing a new school-based deworming programme or evaluating an on-going one. This network could be made available to WFP.[50]

99. **Relationships with two emerging donors have clearly been strengthened** by the SF Policy. WFP is collaborating with the Government of Brazil to establish a school feeding centre of excellence in Brasilia (see Box 5 above), while Russian finance and technical assistance for a school feeding programme in Armenia may set a pattern for further support to Russia's neighbours.

Changes in WFP's Portfolio

[EQ8 How has WFP's portfolio changed since the policy was introduced?]

Overview

100. By portfolio we understand the existing set of WFP operations, new operations in the pipeline, and plans/intentions as reflected in country strategies etc. For the case study countries, it was possible to review the country portfolios in depth. The evaluation also reviewed aggregate data on WFP SF operations for the past two years, examined how SF is reflected in the newly-mandated country strategies, and undertook a comparison of recently approved SF operations with their predecessors. The aim was to judge how far the present portfolio is consistent with the Policy, and whether it is becoming more consistent.

101. In reviewing changes in WFP's portfolio, it is important to distinguish changes in its working approach and engagement with school feeding and related sectors, from changes in its portfolio of funded projects. There are two reasons why there may have been only limited alterations in the project portfolio so far. First, the lead time on new projects means that the first ones to be designed after the November 2009 approval of the Policy can only recently have been approved. Secondly and more significantly, slow change in the project portfolio is likely to reflect the institutional inertia and capacity lag that any major innovation like the SF Policy must overcome.

[50] Comments on the draft of this report pointed out that at country level WFP often collaborates on deworming with other WHO partners, including UNICEF and various NGOs, as well as collaborating directly with WHO. WFP-supported school feeding programmes in CAR, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zambia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chad, and Mozambique, were among those that benefitted from WHO support for deworming in 2009 and 2010. However, the need to strengthen partnership with WHO at global level was acknowledged.

102. An overview of WFP's school feeding operations was presented in Section 1.3, ¶48. More details of WFP school feeding in 2009 and 2010 are provided in Annex H (Figure H1–Figure H3). They show that WFP continues to be a major global provider of school feeding. WFP operations are dominated by general food distribution (GFD), but school feeding follows closely behind FFA/FFW in terms of tonnage distributed (although volumes have declined slightly in the last two years) and exceeds FFW/FFA in terms of total direct expenses (Figure H1). In 2009 there were 85 SF operations in 63 countries; in 2010 there were 92 operations in 62 countries. In both years the total number of beneficiaries was close to 22 million. However, as noted in ¶92 above, it is not possible to draw significant conclusions about implementation of the SF Policy from such aggregated data.

Influence of the Policy on Country Strategies

103. The SF Policy stated that "WFP programmes, work plans and the Country Strategies will reflect the WFP school feeding policy and implementation approach" (WFP, 2009q,¶33). For WFP, Country Strategies (CSs) are an innovation, introduced in 2009 "to help country offices to engage in a meaningful strategic review of what WFP should be doing to contribute to hunger solutions in a country" (WFP, 2009zd). The guidelines for preparing CSs pre-date the SF Policy, and are at a very high level (there is no specific mention of school feeding or of other elements of WFP policy).

104. By mid-2011, 19 Country Strategies had been approved. The evaluation reviewed these documents for evidence of influence by the SF Policy. The review took note of the principal justifications advanced for SF, and looked for evidence of a safety nets/social protection approach to school feeding, and for reference to supporting a national SF strategy or system. Any references to HGSF and to cost effectiveness were also noted. On the basis of this internal evidence, the strategies were assigned to three groups: those where there was substantial evidence of alignment with the SF Policy, those where there was only limited evidence of such alignment, and the remainder where there was no significant evidence of such alignment. Table 2 below shows the classification that resulted. Note 4 in Annex J provides more documentation of these judgements.

Table 2 Alignment with the SF Policy in Country Strategies

	Substantial alignment	**Moderate alignment**	**No obvious alignment**
2009	Iraq		Sudan Uganda
2010	Burkina Faso Jordan Mauritania Zambia	Burundi Egypt Tanzania	Nepal
2011	Bangladesh Ecuador Mozambique Peru	Ethiopia Lao PDR Malawi	Indonesia

105. The overall conclusion is that the SF Policy seems to be reflected in the majority of CSs to some degree. However, even in the ones classified as "substantially aligned" there is only limited analysis of the prospects for national SF systems. Country Strategies, with their perspective that extends beyond specific WFP operations, might have been seen as a particularly appropriate opportunity to address prospects for a sustainable national SF strategy and system,[51] but this is not yet systematically occurring.

106. Only two of the CSs, Malawi and Mozambique, are for countries included as case studies for the present evaluation. The Malawi CS pays considerable attention to the (long term) process of handover as Malawi develops its own SF system, but there is scant reference to the safety net dimension of SF. This evaluation's case study for Mozambique notes that the recent CP and PRRO are directly linked to the Country Strategy. The CS does refer to the concept of safety nets, and notes that WFP will support the Ministry of Education to "transition to a new school feeding model embedded in the overall national education strategy that is fiscally sustainable and relies on locally procured food" (WFP, 2011l, p24) but it does not link social protection explicitly to the SF programme:

> The CO is understandably reluctant to fully incorporate school feeding under the social protection umbrella as it means adding another level of engagement to an already taxing slate of government relationships. In practice safety nets are far from being the overarching framework for school feeding in Mozambique. (Anderson, 2011, ¶116)

Influence of the Policy on recent operations

107. The evaluation also compared WFP programme designs completed since approval of the school feeding policy with the immediately preceding designs (from before the policy was approved). This was possible for 10 (non-case-study) countries. Note 5 in Annex J shows the operations analysed, and also provides an analysis of their treatment of the local economy effects of school feeding.

108. Comparisons are impressionistic, but there is some evidence of operations moving in the directions advocated by the Policy, at least in the way they are described. In particular, recent operations put more emphasis on support to capacity development for government management of SF systems; there are also more references to the importance of results-oriented monitoring and evaluation. Educational outcomes are generally the dominant justification for SF, however, and safety net/social protection dimensions do not come through strongly. The main change in the nutritional aspects of SF design is more prominence for micro-nutrients. In only three cases – Tanzania, Ghana and Cambodia – is there prominence for HGSF objectives, and only in Tanzania has this emphasis appeared since the SF Policy was approved.

[51] Thus the Implementation Approach (WFP, 2010c) states:

> WFP will support national governments to develop a national strategy for sustainable school feeding. WFP will clearly elaborate in its programme documents how it will contribute to the national strategy, including specific milestones and capacity building activities. (¶24)

The Policy's influence in case study countries

109. In the case study countries (see Annex K and Annex L) the evaluation found only limited evidence so far of changes in WFP's portfolio (although in some cases there had been relevant changes of emphasis prior to the adoption of the policy, and in some others efforts to apply key elements of the Policy are just beginning). Thus:

(a) For the "handed-over" countries:

- There are no direct WFP operations in the Dominican Republic, but WFP's role of technical support to an existing national SF system is entirely in keeping with the Policy.
- In Honduras, again in keeping with the policy, WFP acts as an agent in managing the national SF programme, and the new Country Programme has planned the development of a handover strategy.

(b) Among the pilot countries:

- In Malawi, WFP efforts are increasingly dedicated to supporting the emergence of a national school meals programme.
- In Mali a dramatic shift towards SO5 support pre-dated the SF Policy, and means that at least half of the SF unit's time is devoted to support for the government.
- In Mozambique, where SF accounts for 70% of the country programme, the CO is now systematically seeking to apply the new approach.

(c) Among the "other" countries:

- In Afghanistan, there have been no substantive changes, although the need to improve the working relationship with government is acknowledged.
- In Bhutan, with a government already committed to SF and financing it, there was no change until recently, but there is now a renewed WFP emphasis on transition strategy.
- In Tajikistan there has been no substantive change in operations, but the CO has begun sustainability discussions with the government.

110. As regards HGSF, the strongest new feature with regard to promoting local economic benefits is P4P (see Note 5 in Annex J).

Application of the Quality Standards

[EQ9 Does WFP's school feeding portfolio reflect the policy's quality standards?]

111. The Policy proposes "Eight Standards Guiding Sustainable and Affordable School Feeding Programmes" and an annex provides indicators associated with each guiding standard. The introduction of these standards has been highlighted as one of the key "elements of novelty" in the Policy. The Policy itself stresses: "*The eight quality standards … are relevant for school feeding programmes in all contexts* [i.e. emergency and other contexts] *and should be seen as benchmarks for planning and implementing sustainable programmes*". The evaluation linked its detailed

evaluation questions for the country studies to these standards (see the subquestions under EQ9 in Annex L), and also checked whether explicit use is being made of these standards.

112. The evaluation found that these standards, and their associated indicators, are not being systematically used in monitoring and reporting on SF programmes although, in several cases, they have been useful as a communication tool (e.g. as an intuitively helpful perspective for stakeholder workshops). The evaluators' experience of using the standards as a reference point in reviewing the country cases suggests that, while the concept of benchmarking is certainly useful, considerable further work would be needed to develop a set of indicators that could be robustly used both to compare SF systems across countries and to track the development of each country's SF system over time. Thus some of the existing indicators are highly specific (e.g. "a feasibility study on connecting small farmers to markets"), while others are very high-level (including all the indicators under "needs-based cost-effective programme design").

Figure 8 Energy Content of the Rations in Case Study Countries



Note: Half-day schooling in Malawi.

113. WFP also has additional quality standards that it applies to its own SF operations, notably those that apply to the nutritional quality of the meals provided.[52] The evaluation checked SF provision in the five full case study countries against WFP's current nutrition standards. In four of the five countries, the ration appears to be below the recommended range in terms of energy (see Figure 8

[52] Although, surprisingly, project documents are often unclear in their ration specifications.

above). In several cases, rations are also below standards in terms of micronutrients (iron, iodine, Vitamin A), though there were mitigating factors in some of the cases. Frequently, the ability to meet nutritional objectives is compromised by breaks in school feeding or shortfalls in supplies (this is a well known issue across many countries besides the case studies). Detailed findings are in Annex J, Note 2.

Sustainability of Emerging Results

[EQ17 How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy?]

114. Sustainability can be considered both in terms of the durability of the school feeding systems WFP seeks to support at country level, and in terms of WFP's ability to follow through the changes in its own roles that the Policy required.

115. *Rethinking School Feeding* pointed out that countries are more able to sustain national SF systems as their per capita income increases. The country case studies illustrate the range of favourable and unfavourable contexts in which WFP works, as well as the potential fragility of recent innovations. Thus:

(a) For the "handed over cases":

- In both the Dominican Republic and Honduras, SF is already established as an element of national welfare systems; the survival of SF systems is not in doubt, the issues are about the quality and effectiveness of the programmes.

(b) Among the pilot country cases:

- In Mali, there is a foundation of five years of collaboration between government and WFP towards developing the national system that is emerging; even so it faces severe financial constraints, and could be vulnerable to (democratic) changes in political priorities.
- In Malawi, by contrast, the emerging national system is very fragile – it is not certain that the government will have the capacity or the financial means to realise its vision.
- In Mozambique, initiatives in line with the Policy are just getting under way, and are proving more demanding than anticipated.

(c) Among the non-pilot cases:

- In Bhutan there is an established national SF programme; the issue is not whether it will survive, but the scale and standards (e.g. nutritional standards) it will attain.
- In Afghanistan it is difficult to talk about sustainability in what remains an emergency context where school feeding is seen as a WFP programme rather than a government one.
- In Tajikistan, although the context is less difficult, WFP efforts to pursue the Policy are at a very early stage, and it remains to be seen whether SF will be nationally adopted as an element of social protection strategy.

116. WFP's ability to sustain its support for the Policy will depend on its ability to follow through the radical reorientation of WFP approaches that the policy requires – an issue that is taken up in the final chapter.

Are changes the result of the Policy?

[EQ10: Are the observed changes a result of the policy, a continuation of pre-existing good practice, or the consequence of other WFP policy shifts?]

117. The SF Policy was thoroughly consistent with the Strategic Plan that WFP adopted in 2008. The Policy itself was very broad, seeking to embrace all the potential benefits of school feeding. It deliberately sought to identify and propagate existing good practices. It is therefore **difficult to attribute changes specifically to the Policy, especially in view of the short elapsed time since the Policy was approved**. A less academic question is whether the Policy has helped to reinforce and accelerate changes in the directions that it mapped out.

118. The findings from the country case studies show a complex pattern:

(a) For the "handed over cases":

- In both the Dominican Republic and Honduras, governments had already taken responsibility for national school feeding systems, which were seen as part of national social welfare systems. The Policy's effect was to endorse a role that WFP was already adopting.

(b) Among the pilot country cases:

- In both Mali and Malawi, governments had already adopted the goal of establishing a national school feeding system, with HGSF as part of the rationale. Mali had taken this much further, and the relationship between the government and the CO anticipated much of the guidance that accompanied the policy. It was not a coincidence that the Mali Country Director during this formative period had worked in school feeding at WFP HQ and had been involved in the earliest stages of deliberation about a school feeding policy. The trend in Malawi is more recent and less embedded: it flows from country level developments interacting with strategic shifts in WFP which the SF Policy reflects.
- Amongst the case study countries, Mozambique is closest to following the "recipe" provided by the Policy. Although a strategic reappraisal by WFP was in any case under way, the government's adoption of a national approach to SF was in its early stages, and WFP was able to play a leading role in bringing national stakeholders together.

(c) Among the non-pilot cases:

- In Afghanistan, the CO regarded the Strategic Plan and WFP's M&E indicators as their main reference points, and did not perceive the Policy as a strong direct influence.

- In Bhutan, there was a pre-existing commitment to a transition towards government ownership and management of a national SF system. This was in line with the Policy, but the CO did not appear to receive significant additional support as a result of the Policy.[53]
- In Tajikistan, the current operation is essentially a continuation of what has worked in the past, although advice from PSS and ODX has helped to reinforce some of the themes reflected in the new phase.

119. Thus, overall, **many of the Policy's main elements had already been anticipated in WFP practice at country level, but the Policy can take some credit for the extent to which WFP practice has continued to evolve in the directions it advocates.**

120. HGSF deserves an additional comment. Many of the changes towards increased local procurement and (potential) benefits for the 'local' economy (however defined) were already under way before the policy was approved – partly as a natural result of increased national ownership of SF and partly because WFP was already starting to work in this direction.[54] However, WFP's strongest efforts to benefit local producers through its procurement are through **the P4P programme** (see ¶23-24 above), which is not mentioned in the Policy, and which **seems to have overshadowed other HGSF efforts.**

2.3 Factors Explaining Results

External Factors Affecting Implementation

[EQ15 What external factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?]

121. A number of external trends have facilitated implementation of the policy. The changing patterns in food assistance have made it more practical to espouse a more flexible policy that is not driven by the food aid available, while the 2008 food and financial crisis gave prominence to the safety net role of SF programmes. As the Policy correctly diagnosed, countries that achieve higher levels of income are likely to include school meals among the services they provide. The discourse on aid effectiveness continues to stress the importance of country ownership and the use of country systems. Linking school feeding to support for domestic agriculture repeatedly proves politically popular, if not technically straightforward. In many ways, therefore, the Policy is pushing on open doors, although the competition for funding – whether external or domestic – is usually intense, with greater financial constraints in the poorer countries.

[53] Bhutan fits well with the pattern of transition to national SF systems as countries become more developed, but, surprisingly, the evaluation team could find no evidence that this case had fed into the preparation of the Policy (for example, Bhutan is not cited in *Rethinking School Feeding*).

[54] As noted in Box 3 (on page 9), WFP collaboration with NEPAD and others had begun as early as 2003.

122. At the same time, external perceptions of WFP's proper role can hamper implementation of the Policy. Historically, WFP has sometimes oscillated in striking a balance between emergency aid and support to development that strengthens food security. The large majority of WFP's resources and efforts are devoted to emergency situations, and WFP's ability to pursue the SF Policy, with its emphasis on the developmental role for SF, depends on WFP's Board and major donors continuing to see this as strategically appropriate for WFP. Even so, WFP's traditional raison d'être drains resources from its attempts to achieve a different kind of school feeding policy.

123. At the practical level, **WFP encounters suspicion when it engages in country level dialogue around school feeding and safety nets, because it has acquired a reputation for promoting the instruments that it happens to deliver**. It is perceived to be slow to relinquish its service delivery role and content to operate business as usual. **This gives added importance to its external partnerships in making the case for school feeding.** The partnership with the World Bank, in particular, has brought vital credibility.

Consultation in developing the policy

[EQ11 Was there sufficient consultation and ownership in the development of the policy?]

124. A striking finding from the country case studies and the evaluation's other interviews is the apparent **lack of consultation with COs during policy formulation** (the findings on this EQ in Annex L are unequivocal). Apart from field personnel who had previously worked on SF at HQ, we found none who recalled being consulted in advance about the Policy. As a result there was little sense of ownership of the Policy. There was no antipathy towards the Policy, but the evaluation considers that WFP missed an opportunity for more engagement which, as discussed below, might have led to better appreciation of its demands on country offices, and perhaps a reconsideration of the piloting strategy.

125. There seem to be two explanations for the lack of downward consultation. First, such consultation is not mandatory within WFP. Second, as documented in Section 1.3 above, the Policy's authors were involved in intense collaboration with external partners (particularly the World Bank) and their primary objective was to build a Board-level consensus for the Policy. Field-level consultations seem to have been squeezed out in the process.

Dissemination and Implementation Guidelines

[EQ12 How well was the policy disseminated, with guidelines for its implementation?]

126. As noted earlier (see ¶93 above), awareness of the Policy per se was limited amongst external stakeholders not directly engaged in WFP governance or in developing the Policy itself. However, and more importantly, **external stakeholders**, including partner governments, **are generally aware of the strategic shifts in WFP approach that the Policy reflects.** The more serious

gap is the **limited familiarity with the Policy among CO staff** who are in the front line of its implementation.

127. There was very limited dissemination of the Policy internally within WFP. It was routinely announced, circulated and posted on the internal website. A number of interviewees compared the development and roll-out of the SF Policy unfavourably with other policies they had experienced in WFP. The gender policy, for example, was said: to have been based on prior consultation with various levels of WFP including the field; to have been accompanied by an action plan, supported by a budget for roll out with training for partners and WFP staff; and to have been more obviously written for an operational audience (and not primarily for a donor/external audience).[55]

128. Putting the Policy into practice requires more detailed guidance than is contained in the policy document itself. Many staff felt that the workshop in Rome in March 2011 was the first thorough explanation of the Policy. Much work went into the elaboration of guidance (including the "7 tools" – see Table 3 below and Annex J, Note 1), but PSS concentrated their assistance on the pilot countries. ODX sought to respond to requests for assistance from non-pilot countries, but have felt very stretched in doing so.

129. Tools directly inspired by the Policy have been complemented by other relevant advice, such as an update of guidance on the Essential Package (WFP, 2010d). Although not among the 7 tools, the concept of local purchase and sourcing that the policy advocates has been well disseminated by the P4P programme in its 21 pilot countries. Policy support for the HGSF concept continues to be provided from headquarters, but it is limited because of the severe constraints on advisory capacity at that level.

130. **The piloting strategy** recognised that many of the innovations in the policy would need to be refined and developed on the basis of experience. The pilots (see ¶46 above) were chosen as countries that were well placed to showcase aspects of the policy, while concentrating on the pilots was a recognition that both PSS would need to focus their limited staff resources. This approach was understandable, but there were some clear disadvantages. Non-pilot countries have felt under-assisted (and ODX feel overwhelmed by demands for support). At the same time, several pilot countries felt some of the tools were irrelevant, because they had already passed the stage the tools were aimed at.

[55] As one of the external reviewers pointed out: "The findings on too much advocacy and too little adoption at the country level are surely linked – COs saw the document as advertising, not policy direction".

Table 3 The "7 Tools" to assist Policy Implementation

Tool	Description	Main usage
1 Investment case	Assessment of monetary cost and economic benefits of recognized outcomes of school feeding	Advocacy
2 Needs and coverage	Estimation of no. children in need of school feeding, no. of children receiving school feeding and regional distribution	Advocacy
3 Cost analysis	Cost analysis for 3a • WFP school feeding programmes 3b • National school feeding programmes	Decision-making
4 Quality standards assessment	Qualitative assessment of country situation against 8 quality standards for sustainable school feeding	Decision-making
5 Stakeholder workshop	Set of generic modules on where school feeding stands in a country and what it takes to improve the quality while transitioning to sustainability using the 8 quality standards	Decision-making
6 Sustainability strategy	Guide for development of transition strategy for the government for sustainable school feeding programmes, based on quality standards, with estimated cost and timeline	Decision-making
7 School feeding model planning tool	Analysis of options – and relative tradeoffs - available for government choice among different models and modalities of school feeding programmes	Decision-making

Source: Implementation Update (WFP, 2011zb) Figure 3.

131. Much admirable work has gone into preparing **implementation tools and guidelines**. However, the guidelines are very voluminous, and it is not always clear how directly they relate to mandatory WFP processes (such as the preparation of Country Strategies and of project documents).[56] Guidance materials have lagged behind the policy and are fragmented between PSS and ODX with unclear boundaries leading to inefficiencies, potential duplication and lack of clarity in roles. COs are unsure which unit to contact for what, and so often contact both when in doubt.

132. WFP (with ODXP leading has also made a start on a **training programme** linked to the requirements of the policy. A consultant was retained to work on identifying the skills required by the new Policy; a participatory approach has been adopted, and an initial workshop involving staff from HQ, regional bureaus and country offices was held in Tanzania in July 2011.

[56] Related work is under way to update and streamline the school feeding sections of WFP's Programme Guidance Manual (PGM).

Resources for Implementing the Policy

[EQ13 Were there sufficient (financial and other) resources for its implementation?]

[EQ14 What internal factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?]

133. The units within WFP which have the main responsibility for driving implementation of the policy (the school feeding policy and programme units) are both very small, with fewer than a dozen professional staff between them. They have been able to draw on some extra-budgetary resources (including pro-bono assistance from BCG, an Australian grant, a Brazil trust fund, and some resources allocated by the Executive Director). Nevertheless, **resources for development of policy and guidelines, internal training, and advisory support to country offices are very constrained** (particularly in view of the scope and scale of the tasks the Policy implies). This partly explains the weakness in dissemination discussed above.

134. A more fundamental issue is that **the Policy tends to magnify the demands on CO staff** in their interactions with recipient countries, both by emphasising the range of issues that school feeding may influence, and by increasing WFP's commitment to provide advisory and capacity development support to governments. In the short term, limited staff resources at HQ have impeded the roll-out of the Policy across WFP. But in the long term the bigger challenge is whether WFP can deploy sufficient staff with the right skills to fulfil the roles the Policy demands.

135. Some **necessary supporting changes** have been initiated but not yet rolled out – most notably the new **financial framework** which will de-link finance for capacity development and technical assistance from the delivery of food aid (see Annex F, ¶F35ff). The scale and pace of change across WFP is itself a constraining factor (thus one of the case study countries, Mozambique, is simultaneously a pilot for school feeding, cash and vouchers, risk management and climate change initiatives). In all countries the evaluation found **CO staff overloaded** with existing and new tasks, with the latter often requiring expertise and aptitudes quite different from those applied to managing WFP's traditional operations. In some contexts (e.g. Afghanistan) the difficulty of recruiting, deploying and retaining staff multiplies the challenges. When new tasks (dialogue, advocacy) compete with the smooth running of existing operations, the latter naturally takes priority. In the long run, WFP needs to recognise **potential issues of conflicting incentives**: will staff who successfully promote government ownership and management of school feeding thereby work themselves out of a job?

Feedback and Learning during Implementation[57]

[EQ16 What feedback loops have been put in place and how effective have they been?]

136. The SF Policy's final section emphasised the importance of results-oriented M&E ("WFP will ensure that a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system is in place to measure progress and results" (¶100)) and referred to the annexed logic model[58] as the basis on which "a more detailed monitoring strategy for school feeding will be developed" (¶101)[59]. A comprehensive **monitoring strategy** has not been put in place, but there have been significant activities, including:

(a) WFP's ongoing programme of evaluations, and in particular the SF impact evaluations (see Annex I). Findings from WFP evaluations are included in the review of evidence in Section 0 above. There is a striking contrast between WFP's more routine evaluations and the recent set of impact evaluations. The former are very weak in their assessment of SF results, with claimed results relying heavily on anecdotal evidence and evidence of association rather than causality. The impact evaluations set a much higher evidential standard; they use qualitative as well as quantitative evidence, but generate much more robust insights into the performance of SF interventions through careful analysis of their programme logic.[60]

(b) Refinement of relevant indicators as part of WFP's overall Strategic Results Framework (WFP, 2009j). The current indicators collected at country level are included in the data annexes of each of the country case studies. There is still scope to strengthen them so as to ensure standard information on how WFP-supported SF operations are implemented (for example, this evaluation found that compliance with standard ration scales is not systematically monitored – cf. Annex J, Note 2).

(c) Collaboration with the WB and PCD in the pilot countries. There are ongoing efforts by WFP to document pilot country experience, but, apparently, no plans for an overall summation of lessons, although the originally agreed piloting period was two years (2010–2011). PCD has led the preparation of a series of country case studies of HGSF, but, at the time of writing, these were not yet final. When available, they should be a rich source of learning.

(d) The cross-country cost benchmarking exercise which has sought to collect and analyse cost data in more detail and more systematically than ever before; the country-level data presented in Annex H are drawn from this study. This is an important initiative, given the past lack of sufficient attention to costs.

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[57] In addition to the elements discussed below, the present evaluation was mandated by the EB as an early review of progress in implementing the Policy.

[58] Box C1 in the present report.

[59] The present evaluation has commented on the limitations of the logic model (see Section 0), and the need, for practical purposes, to distinguish between WFP's organisational objectives and the outcomes sought form SF interventions themselves.

[60] PCD is undertaking impact evaluations in Mali and Kenya that should report in 2012.,

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Overall Assessment

137. This section draws on the findings presented in the previous chapter to give the evaluation team's overall assessment against each of the three basic evaluation questions. In each case the assessment is forward looking, so as to underpin the recommendations which follow.

How Good is the Policy?

138. A good policy sets the right directions for an organisation, and it does so in a way which helps the organisation to achieve the objectives which the policy identifies. Policy documents may also have collateral functions such as explanation and advocacy, addressed to both external and internal audiences, but balancing such functions may be tricky.

139. **The 2009 Policy had important strengths:**

(a) It was **timely**. There was a need to build consensus around the roles of SF, and of WFP's involvement, to review and codify good practice and strengthen operational guidelines. The context of WFP's strategic reorientation, and the particular attention SF had attracted in the response to recent food crises, created a special opportunity to re-visit policy and practice. The Policy achieved an **unprecedented degree of consensus at EB level**.

(b) It was clearly and **persuasively written**.

(c) It was **fully aligned** with the WFP strategic plan and with other key policies, and in tune with aid effectiveness concerns for national ownership, sustainability and results orientation.

(d) It was based on a commendable **stock-taking of accumulated evidence**, and a **holistic view of SF** which provided some valid and important insights, including: the recognition that SF can contribute to multiple outcomes; that, among these, SF can contribute to social protection; that most countries, as they develop, keep and consolidate national SF systems, which WFP should seek to support; and that there are possibilities for linking SF to agricultural development (and such possibilities have political as well as economic importance).

(e) Proposing quality standards for SF was an important innovation.

140. **But the Policy also had significant weaknesses**:

(a) It drew on solid evidence, but **it tended to overstate the case**. Evidence shows that achieving SF's many potential benefits depends on specific factors in how SF is delivered, and on complementary inputs that accompany SF. For example, there is credible evidence that SF can improve short term concentration and attentiveness, but the timing as well as the nutritional content of the meal is important for this effect, and whether improved learning will result depends on many other factors in the school environment.

The Policy did not ignore such factors, but neither, in the evaluation's judgment, did it give them sufficient weight.

(b) Although WFP has an aspiration to target the "most vulnerable", the **practical limitations in targeting SF** are often a disadvantage for SF as a social protection instrument (which emphasises that SF can only be part of an overall social protection system).

(c) The Policy **did not distinguish clearly enough between the general case for school feeding and the specific role(s) that WFP should play** in school feeding. It was left to later documents to spell out WFP's objectives in relation to SF, and the activities through which WFP would pursue each of the objectives. This matters, because it is very important to distinguish in practice between the programme factors that WFP can control and the contextual factors that it cannot (this is a strength of the WFP OE impact evaluations – see Annex I). This in turn affects the extent of responsibilities that WFP ought to take: for example, is it really practical for WFP to "create synergies" between SF and agricultural development, or is a more modest role appropriate?

(d) In the same vein, the Policy tends to put SF, and WFP's own role, more at the centre of possibilities than is justified – for example in identifying SF as "a platform" for achieving complementary benefits. Much **more often**, the school, or the education system, or a system of social protection, is a platform, and **SF has a complementary rather than a fundamental role.**

(e) The link to safety nets/social protection is an important one, but the treatment in the Policy was too limited. It focused mainly on the "value transfer" aspect of SF, and did not adequately bring out the promotive aspects. Nor did it link SF sufficiently to the concept of social protection as an overarching system, within which it would be one among many possible interventions.[61] **Identifying the social protection dimension of SF is only a start,** and it has many ramifications. A social protection approach has implications for behaviour, not just the language in which SF is described.

(f) The tendency to overstate, or oversimplify, the case for SF is understandable, but it has two downsides. First, it risks undermining WFP's credibility, by conforming to a stereotype that sees WFP as always making the case for the instruments that it happens to deliver. Second, exalting all the potential benefits of SF tends obscure the need to identify trade-offs and set priorities in particular cases. In other words **the advocacy function of the Policy tends to undermine its operational function.**

141. The evaluation acknowledges that an **implementation plan** has not been regarded as mandatory for WFP policies. Nevertheless, it considers that including at least a high-level implementation plan in the Policy document submitted to the EB

[61] This conclusion is based on the detailed discussion in ¶56-58, ¶72-73, and ¶84. See also the discussion of social protection standards in Table 1.

would have substantially enhanced the practicability of the Policy (and the quality of Board-level discussion).[62] The Policy was apparently approved without any discussion of the resources that would be required to implement it.

142. **Costs and cost-effectiveness** are at the heart of making choices, and the Policy could have been more emphatic about the importance of addressing cost issues, and of using cost-effectiveness as a criterion not only in the design of SF interventions but also in choosing between SF and other means towards achieving specific outcomes. Decisions have to be tailored to context, and so it is not possible to say which outcome should always be prioritised, or that one SF modality should always be preferred to another; nonetheless the Policy could have highlighted the need to be selective about objectives, recognising that most specific SF operations are likely to be focused on a subset of the possible outcomes, not all of them.

143. Much of the analytical work behind the Policy was excellent. Subsequent evidence on SF impact offers nuances rather than radical alterations of perspective. However, such findings mainly serve to reinforce two points**: the complexity of the pathways through which SF achieves impact**, and, hence, **the need to design specific SF operations to suit a specific context and specific objectives.**

What were the results of the Policy?

144. **Attribution of results to the Policy is complicated**. On the one hand, it is too soon to expect impact from operations commenced since the Policy was adopted. On the other hand, the Policy envisages a continuation of many long-standing approaches and of some innovations that had begun before the Policy was adopted. The first consideration, therefore, is whether subsequent practice is in line with the Policy, whether or not it is a direct result of the Policy.

145. Endorsement of the Policy allowed the policy and programme units to turn their energies to supporting its implementation. Three key documents – the Concept Note, the Implementation Approach and the Implementation Update – provided successively more elaborate implementation plans, as well as, in some respects, elaborating the Policy itself. These documents have gone some way towards giving the Policy a more practical orientation; they have been complemented by an impressive amount of work on guidelines and tools to support policy implementation.

146. However, external awareness of the Policy is patchy beyond the limited circle of direct partners (and EB members). To the extent that stakeholders are nevertheless aware of the broad themes of WFP's reorientation towards food assistance, this may not matter much – especially since WFP's overall reputation has been enhanced in recent years. But many sector and thematic specialists in donor agencies remain rather sceptical of some of the principal claims of the Policy (e.g. of the competitiveness of SF as a social protection intervention, or of its place in a

[62] Post-approval, PSS proposed to submit a 5-year implementation plan to the EB, but this was not taken up (WFP, 2011zf).

nutrition strategy). For many, it seems, the "debate about whether school feeding makes sense as a way to reach the most vulnerable" is not over. And such scepticism is frequently encountered also amongst aid agencies' representatives at country level.

147. Within WFP, there is no lack of commitment to the implementation of the Policy, but there is in many countries a lack of real familiarity with the Policy and understanding of its practical implications at country level.

148. Among developing country governments, similarly, there is usually only limited awareness of the Policy as such, but this is not an obstacle to informed collaboration on matters of common interest, such as HGSF. Engagements with WFP concerning HGSF and social protection have been only partly driven by SF – but this is not a bad thing in itself.

149. The Policy has strengthened some non-traditional partnerships (e.g. with Brazil and Russia), and the core strategic partnerships (WB, PCD) remain strong. However, other traditional partnerships have not been reinforced as much as the Policy appears to require. The partnership with FAO (in relation to HGSF etc) remains rather limited, and there is room to make more use of WHO expertise and contacts in relation to micro-nutrients and de-worming.[63]

150. **The Policy is reflected in WFP's portfolio and activities in several positive ways, but there is a mixed picture overall**. It is not possible to draw much from aggregate data on WFP's own SF activities, because it is too soon for post-Policy trends to appear and, in any case, the Policy's effects are potentially ambiguous**. The evaluation's overall conclusions are:**

- The direct influence of the Policy on country strategy documents is rather limited.
- The change in language and orientation of recently-approved WFP SF operations is also rather limited. Most are firmly located (organisationally and in terms of coordination and dialogue processes) within the education sector, with a dominance of education objectives and justification.
- There are important cases (often pre-dating the Policy) where WFP is working to support an emerging national SF system (e.g. Mali, Malawi among the case studies – both of which also highlight the complexity and difficulties that can be involved). There are also cases (at different stages of SF system development) where governments seem very receptive to WFP support for capacity development (cf. stakeholder workshops in Mozambique and the Dominican Republic, and implementation support from WFP to Honduras).
- In promoting HGSF, WFP is often pushing at an open door (although there is more WFP momentum behind the P4P initiative).
- Although social protection/safety net concepts are increasingly being used within WFP, it can be difficult to ensure SF is included in country-level social

[63] The November 2011 workshop pointed out that maintaining partnerships absorbs scarce staff resources, hence the tendency to focus on the main strategic partners (see WFP, 2010zzi)

protection dialogue, especially where leading players have already shaped the terms of the debate in other directions.

- There has been only limited use so far of the quality standards advocated by the Policy. Not all the SF programmes in the country cases comply fully with WFP's own nutritional guidance.

151. **To summarise**: the evaluation judges that this pattern tends to confirm the relevance of much of the Policy's agenda, but that, at this early stage, there has not been as much tangible progress in implementing (or accelerating) that agenda as would have been hoped.

Why has the Policy produced the results observed?

152. The evaluation has noted many positives in the implementation of the Policy, including the energy that has gone into efforts to roll out the Policy and to support it with guidelines and tools within WFP. Inevitably, however, reporting so soon after the Policy's launch, there is a focus on things that might have been done better, or where future action is anyway needed (why hasn't the Policy made more difference yet? and what can be done to reinforce its future results?).

153. Radical change usually takes time. Beyond that, the evaluation considers that relatively slow progress is explained by:

(a) Limitations in the Policy itself (¶140 above), and constraints on resources available for its implementation.

(b) Liaison with external partners, and an understandable orientation towards addressing high level sceptics of school feeding, led to a relative neglect of internal consultation with field level personnel. Better consultation could have given the Policy a more practical orientation, as well as a head start in dissemination and ownership. The dissemination strategy focused on pilot countries that were judged "good prospects" for the Policy. Again, this was an understandable response to constraints on staff resources and a desire to prove the viability of the Policy's innovations. However, it meant that non-pilot countries felt insufficiently supported, even though some of them (such as Bhutan and Honduras) were well advanced in directions espoused by the Policy. Ironically, it also meant that some of the pilot countries regarded some of the tools as too late to be useful for the stage they had reached.

(c) The radical change of organisational approach and culture that is embodied not just in the SF Policy but in the overall strategic transformation that it supports. Implementing the Policy requires much more than explanation and exhortation. It widens the range of competences that WFP staff need, and the analytical, advisory and capacity development roles that it envisages may not be easy to combine with the emphasis on rapid and efficient implementation on which WFP has built its reputation. Implementation depends not only on the technical advice which the school feeding and programme units at HQ can provide (though the complexity and breadth of the Policy make this in itself

very demanding) but also on organisation-wide financing arrangements and incentive structures which are still being put in place.[64]

3.2 Wider Lessons from the Evaluation

154. The evaluation noted that the SF Policy was in many ways inspired by, and wholly consistent with, the change in organisational strategy embodied in the 2008 Strategic Plan. A corollary is that many of the factors – positive and negative – that affect the realisation of the Policy are generic across WFP. This needs to be borne in mind when considering the recommendations of this evaluation. Many of them may be best addressed as part of wider reform initiatives (such as the financing framework, the country strategy process) or in tandem with other more specific initiatives (such as the broad pursuit of social protection approaches across WFP's portfolio, or the follow-up to the mid-term evaluation of P4P – WFP, 2011ze). Here we comment on two themes: aspects of organisational culture in which the observations of this evaluation echo those of the evaluation of social protection strategy, and some broad lessons about good practice in policy development.

Changing WFP's organisational culture

155. The recent social protection evaluation (Majewski et al, 2011) has noted the extent to which adopting social protection approaches requires a change in WFP's culture. The present evaluation endorses its findings:

> **Culture.** WFP's organizational culture has both positive and limiting attributes regarding the adoption of social protection approaches. Positive traits include a "can-do" attitude, delivering with speed and at scale, problem-solving, innovation, a decentralized structure with strong country office leaders, and commitment to staff rotation. Limiting characteristics include impatience with partners, dismissal of the importance of policy engagement, a focus on outputs and standard instruments, a tendency to work in isolation and lack of experience working in urban areas. (ibid, ¶40)

156. Organisational culture is related to staff capacity, and it is certainly true for SF that "Staff have the greatest skills in instruments and modalities traditionally used by WFP" (ibid, ¶42); staff need to be provided with new skills and new organisational incentives to match the new roles they are expected to play:

> The evaluation found that WFP is already contributing to safety nets and social protection, especially in activities such as school feeding. **However, institutionalizing a safety net and social protection approach more broadly within WFP will require changes in its operations, programme objectives and collaboration.** (ibid, ¶44, emphasis added.)

157. It is not only the social protection perspective but also WFP's new orientation towards external capacity development (SO5) that requires such organisational change.

[64] It remains surprising, and unsatisfactory, that there is so little attention to cost issues in WFP analysis and reporting on SF, and that evaluations have rarely been able to access adequate records on costs.

Good practice in policy development and implementation

158. A number of interviewees compared the development and roll-out of the SF Policy unfavourably with other policies they had experienced in WFP, such as the gender policy (¶127 above).

159. WFP has recently sought to standardise and strengthen its policy development process (WFP, 2011z). Among other things, this now establishes a norm that policies will be evaluated between four to six years after approval. See key points from this guidance in Box 9 below.

160. In the light of this evaluation's findings concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the SF Policy formulation and its implementation process, it may be appropriate to review some of the sequencing set out in Box 9. While implementation might normally be worked out in full detail only after a policy's adoption, there would be merit in ensuring that any major policy put to the Board is accompanied by an outline of plans for its implementation, with particular attention to likely resource requirements and to spelling out the practical implications of the policy (what in WFP will be visibly different as a result of implementing this policy?)

Box 9 Key Points from WFP Policy Formulation Paper

7. Policies should support the Strategic Objectives and may be complemented by action plans, implementation plans and operational guidance.

13. Implementation of WFP policies includes the following activities:

- An implementation plan/strategy is prepared by the lead division with support from relevant divisions (particularly the Programme Division, whose role in developing programmes and providing guidance is strongly linked to policy implementation).
- The lead division shares the implementation plan and funding requirements with the Strategic Resource Allocation Committee (SRAC) for consideration and prioritization.
- Relevant divisions provide Regional Directors and country directors with strategic and technical guidance and support.
- The PRC (Programme Review Committee) provides policy and normative advice on the design of WFP's operational projects, including recommendations to regional bureaux and country offices on the policy, design, strategy and implementation of projects. PRC members (specifically the Chief of the Programme Design Service and Director of PS) are responsible for ensuring that a proposed programme or project conforms to WFP's policies.
- Regional Directors and country directors ensure that the policy guidance is followed in a country office's projects and Country Strategy.
- The relevant divisions monitor and support policy implementation and assess the effectiveness of policies. A review of how projects reflect a policy may reveal gaps or indicate that a policy is no longer relevant. In such cases, potential revision of a policy, or development of a new policy, is overseen by the Policy Committee Secretariat, bringing the policy cycle full circle.

14. Within four to six years of implementation, a policy is evaluated to assess its effectiveness.

Source: WFP, 2011z

3.3 Recommendations

161. The evaluation's recommendations are consistent with the spirit and intent of the existing Policy. They are designed to reinforce the work that has already been done towards implementing it and, in many cases, build on efforts already under way. They are mutually reinforcing and presented in a logical, rather than chronological, order.

Recommendation 1: Clarify and update the Policy

162. As this report has shown, the debates around SF (e.g. concerning social protection) are moving quite rapidly, so that there will be a regular need to refresh the SF policy; in doing so, some weaknesses and oversights in the original Policy can also be addressed. Thus, **WFP should prepare and seek EB approval (probably in June 2013[65]) for an "Update on WFP's School Feeding Policy".** The update would augment the existing Policy, not replace it.[66] The exercise should be led by the SF policy and programme units, but they should involve other HQ divisions, and also engage with regional and country-level staff, so as to maximise ownership and ensure an orientation towards the practical challenges in implementation.

Box 10 Themes to be addressed in the Policy Update

On **social protection** the update should reflect the new WFP social protection policy (expected mid-2012), ensuring that vocabulary and approaches are up-to-date and realistic.

On **education,** highlight the extent to which full realisation of potential educational benefits of SF depends on other elements of national education systems, which WFP and other donors should seek to support.

The update should take account of WFPs new **nutrition policy** (due early 2012), while recognising that governments may have to balance coverage against "gold standard" nutritional quality.

On **HGSF**, address the relationship between HGSF and P4P, note more of the complexities about different possible objectives and approaches to local procurement for SF, and be more realistic about WFP's ambitions for local economic development.[67]

At the WFP workshop which reviewed the draft of this report, it was also suggested that the Update could (a) address the full continuum from pre-primary to adolescents more thoroughly; (b) address school feeding in emergencies and in protracted refugee/IDP contexts (bearing in mind that WFP does not have a comparable Policy on emergency SF).

[65] WFP management will have to consider how best to dovetail the SF Policy update with the roll-over of the Strategic Plan and other Policy revisions.

[66] The 2009 update of the capacity development policy (WFP, 2009p) took a similar approach.

[67] It should draw on a systematic review of the findings of the HGSF case studies currently being finalised by PCD.

163. The Update should:

(a) **Bridge the gap between policy and implementation strategy**. In particular spell out more clearly WFP roles and the changes in WFP activity and portfolio that will result from the Policy; be more explicit about the comparative advantages of WFP, and the limits to what WFP itself can take responsibility for;[68] include a clear M&E strategy (see also recommendations 2 and 4).

(b) **Update the treatment of key themes**, facilitating practical context-specific choices and addressing the gaps identified in this evaluation (see Box 10 above).

Recommendation 2: Operationalise the Policy more effectively.

164. Better operationalisation requires:

(a) **Strengthening staff skills and support for implementation at field level**. Ensure adequate technical support for all COs.[69] Continue work on identifying and developing the new skills that are required by WFP's new SF approaches. Wherever possible link training and staff development to wider initiatives across WFP; avoiding a narrow focus on specific instruments such as SF.

(b) **Further development of guidance material.** This should focus on *rationalisation of materials* (taking account of user feedback), more guidance on *prioritisation and addressing trade-offs* in SF design, *better links to key WFP processes*,[70] and objective *benchmarking* that can be used to track progress in national SF systems.[71]

(c) **More attention to costs and cost-effectiveness.** Build on the very valuable analysis and data collection that have been done through the cost benchmarking exercise and insist on better monitoring of WFP's own costs. At a minimum, all strategy, programme and monitoring documents should be required to report on unit costs planned and achieved.

(d) **Strengthening relationships with external partners.** Existing core partnerships could be further strengthened (e.g. by reciprocal secondment of personnel), while ensuring traditional intra-UN partnerships are not neglected.

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[68] The concept of *comparative* advantage implies identifying also the areas in which others are better suited to take responsibility.

[69] This has budget implications – see Recommendation 3(a).

[70] As one example, the guidance for preparation of Country Strategies, currently very high-level and generic, should be more explicit about the material on national progress towards development of sustainable SF strategies that will be required.

[71] We understand that WFP plans to adopt the 5 SABER benchmarks (see footnote 28), in the interests of standardisation. This will be another element to address in updating the Policy and associated materials.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen the financing of the Policy.

165. Financial resources and financial and budgetary incentives are key to the operationalisation of the Policy:

(a) **Cost and ensure additional financing for the budgetary implications of Recommendation 2(a) (such as CO staff training & specialist support)** within an overall policy implementation plan to enable PSS, ODXP and Regional Bureaus to support the Policy more effectively across all COs.

(b) **Roll out WFP's new financial framework as rapidly as possible.**

(c) **Seek more predictable funding.** Development programmes and capacity development work require a strategic perspective that is undermined by very short term financing. This relates *first* to ensuring secure, multi-year funding for WFP's own professional staff work in support of the SF Policy. The EB should (continue to) press for more unrestricted and multi-year funding to support WFP's core analytical and policy development work. The prevalence of short-term and earmarked funding perpetuates fragmentation and makes it harder to ensure thematic coordination across WFP. *Second*, to promote a strategic perspective towards the development and financing of national school feeding strategies, country strategies should flag long term financing requirements (focused first on overall national SF requirements, and only secondarily on funding requirements for possible WFP operations).

(d) **Strengthen WFP's ability to analyse SF's budgetary implications for governments**. Those considering the nexus of school feeding, education and social protection need to understand the political economy of the budget processes involved. In particular, what funds does SF compete with in practice, and at which levels of government?[72]

Recommendation 4: Strengthen learning and further development of the Policy.

166. For near-term **strengthening of monitoring, evaluation and learning within WFP**:

- Include an explicit M&E strategy in the Policy Update.
- Document experiences and lessons from the pilot countries.
- Draw on the impact evaluation approach that OE has developed (see Annex I) in guidance for project formulation and subsequent M&E:
    - At project formulation, spell out the anticipated paths to impact and distinguish factors which are under the control of WFP (or a national SF agency) from those which are not. This approach will help to ensure more

[72] *Rethinking School Feeding* (Bundy et al, 2009a) rightly highlighted this as an issue that requires more attention, both in research and in practice.

frugal initial design that focuses on a subset of SF objectives and designs interventions accordingly.

- Strengthen regular M&E with a better general understanding of the relevance and quality of different types of evidence.

167. **Support applied research that is relevant to the design and management of SF operations.**[73] This is a long-term strategy – rigorous research takes time – and it is vital to ensure its credibility (see Box 11 below).

Box 11 Ensuring the value and credibility of research

The credibility of research is all-important, particularly as WFP is not regarded as a disinterested party. Wherever possible, such research should be undertaken independently and/or in partnership with organisations that are regarded as sufficiently credible and dispassionate. In reporting on such research, and on its own studies, WFP should be more careful to distinguish between analytical work and advocacy. Analytical work should be careful to maintain balance and not to draw stronger conclusions than the evidence justifies. The credibility, as well as the quality, of WFP's internal work could be enhanced by systematic peer review, drawing on expertise external to WFP. it would be useful to develop clear protocols for the review and publication of research findings.

In order to ensure robust findings, link research to deliberate experiments – e.g. in controlled trials of different SF modalities or different approaches to targeting; more direct comparisons between SF and alternative interventions (e.g. CCTs) should be encouraged (see WFP, 2011v for planned research in Cambodia). Much can be learned from such experiments, although care is needed in interpreting the findings[74] and the extent to which they can be generalised to other contexts.

WFP should be willing to test core assumptions through such research (e.g. the assumption that within-school targeting of school meals is generally infeasible).

[73] The workshop on the draft evaluation report suggested a number of broad fields for applied research, including:

1. Conditions for feasible handover.
2. Nutrition (or broader) benefits of school feeding in particular to adolescent girls and pre-primary children.
3. School feeding in emergency and protracted situations (could include IDPs / refugees).
4. Issues surrounding cost-effectiveness of school feeding.
5. Different school feeding modalities / cash transfers.

[74] Not least because SF interventions may have a more complex set of benefits than the comparator.

168. To **promote international learning,** WFP and its partners (particularly the Brazil Centre of Excellence) should explore the establishment of a database "*on school feeding programs that describes the coverage and functioning of programs globally*" (as mentioned in *Rethinking School Feeding)* and the possibility of linking it to an annual independent report on developments and trends in school feeding.[75] What happens in the aggregate of WFP SF operations is less important than what is happening globally (whether hungry children are fed is more important than who feeds them).

[75] This in turn could take forward the objective benchmarking of SF systems – see Recommendation 2 on guidance materials.

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Numbers in the final column below correspond to serial numbers in the e-library collated by OE for the evaluation.

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Annex B Terms of Reference[76]

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

1. Policy Evaluations focus on a WFP policy and the operations and activities that are in place to implement it. They evaluate the quality of the policy, its results, and seek to explain why and how these results occurred.

2. The purpose of these TOR is to inform stakeholders about the evaluation, to specify expectations and guide the evaluation team. The TOR were prepared by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OE) evaluation manager, Sally Burrows, Senior Evaluation Officer, based on a document review and discussions with stakeholders.

1.2. Context

3. **Overview.** The world community has regularly re-stated its commitment to education as a human right. Access to and quality of education are also regarded as an essential plank for poverty reduction: human capital – education, knowledge, skills, access to and understanding of information – is part of the livelihoods approach that recognizes poverty to go beyond a lack of income. Education is embedded in the Millennium Development Goals: MDG 2 (achieve universal primary education) and MDG 3 (promote gender equality and empower women, with targets for eliminating gender disparity in education). School feeding also relates to MDG 1 (eradicate poverty and hunger). A series of multilateral events since 1990 made explicit linkages between education, nutrition and health and have established action plans and special funds. Since 2009, there has been increasing affirmation of the role of school feeding as a safety net and strategy to fight global hunger[77].

4. School feeding has been cited as one of WFP's programme areas since its establishment in 1963.[78] By 1993, pre-primary and primary school feeding accounted for more than half of WFP's development commitments.[79] As at the end of 2009, when the new School Feeding Policy was introduced, WFP invested around US$ 475 million (14% of total budget) in some 70 countries, reaching around 22 million children in school, about half of whom are girls. School feeding[80] accounted for around 20% of total beneficiaries. In addition, around 730,000 pre-school children were receiving assistance in 13 countries. WFP is the largest provider of school meals

[76] Reproduced from the Inception Report, with only minor edits.

[77] E.g.G8 Summit in L'Aquila in July 2009; the high-level meeting on safety nets in Bellagio, Italy also in July 2009; the World Food Summit in November 2009 in Rome; the UNESCO Education for All meeting in Addis in February 2010; ECOSOC side event in June 2010 in New York and in a NEPAD-organised meeting of leading African and international food and nutrition experts in July 2010 prior to the 15th AU Summit in Kampala, Uganda (according to *Note to Policy Committee: Update on the Implementation of WFP School Feeding Policy*, PC23/2010/E

[78] *School Feeding Handbook*, WFP, 1999 referencing FAO Conference Resolution 1/61 of 24 Nov.1961.

[79] Ibid.

[80] *WFP Annual Performance Reports 2006 through 2009.*

in the world.[81] Annex 1 gives an overview of WFP operations immediately prior to introduction of the Policy.

5. WFP had no formal policy on school feeding until 2009. However, WFP's School Feeding Handbook 1999 recognised that there was insufficient evidence that school feeding addressed malnutrition and therefore explicitly focused on educational outcomes: increasing enrolment and attendance, including reducing gender disparity, and improving learning outcomes through enhancing ability to concentrate. Take-Home Rations, particularly, aimed to reduce the opportunity cost of sending children to school. School feeding was at the core of strategic priority/objective 4 in WFP's **Strategic Plans** 2004-2008 and 2006-2009 and was clearly aligned with MDG2 and MDG3.

6. In WFP's strategic plan (2008-2012)[82], school feeding was embedded in a broadened Strategic Objective 4, which aims to reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition to break the inter-generational cycle of chronic hunger, including by addressing micro-nutrient deficiencies. It sets a goal of increasing levels of education and foresees school feeding addressing short-term hunger, and thus improving learning abilities, providing a safety net by ensuring children attend school both through food in school and take-home rations. It re-introduces a goal of using school feeding as a platform for delivery of macro- and micro-nutrients. By using locally produced foods, school feeding is also expected to have a positive local economic impact. The Strategic Results Framework (approved in 2009), flowing from the Strategic Plan, carries forward some indicators from the Indicator Compendium (above) and introduces new ones consistent with the new Strategic Plan. It also included school feeding under Strategic Objectives 1 and 3. Strategic Objective 5 is also relevant.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

7. When approving the new WFP School Feeding Policy in November 2009, WFP's Executive Board requested OE "to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of WFP school feeding, including early implementation of the new policy, to be presented to the First Regular Session of the Board in 2012"[83].

2.2. Objectives

8. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning to inform future policy directions and implementation. As such, the immediate objective of the evaluation is to:

- Assess the quality and results of the School Feeding policy and of associated operations and activities to implement the policy (accountability); and

[81] It was pointed out during the evaluation that this is not strictly correct: Brazil, for example, feeds more schoolchildren than the WFP aggregate.

[82] Extended to 2013

[83] See Decisions & Recommendations of the Second Regular Session of the Executive Board, 2009, WFP/EB.2/2009/14

- Determine the reasons why certain changes occurred or not to draw lessons for the future (learning).

9. Since the Policy has been under implementation for only 18 months at the time of the evaluation, information on results from the new elements of the Policy may be limited (see further Section 5.1). However, the new Policy reflects to some extent practice that already existed. Therefore, the short implementation time may not be as limiting a factor as might be anticipated. In addition, the evaluation will be able to assess the degree to which the field support and organizational changes necessary for successful implementation of the new Policy have been put in place.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation

10. There is a wide range of stakeholders with a diverse range of perspectives and interests. Even with a single institution, there are often different and sometimes competing interests. The table at Annex 2 gives a preliminary overview of the roles and interests of diverse actors with a direct interest (stake) in the new school feeding policy and/or programmes and the role they will play in the evaluation. They include: WFP staff at Headquarters, Regional Bureaus and in Country Offices; WFP Executive Board members; relevant ministries in national governments with an interest in different aspects; and a wide array of global and local partners in policy development, provision of technical support and in operations, from multilateral agencies to national & local governments and NGOs (national and international). Finally, there are schools/teachers and, above all, beneficiaries and their parents. As can be seen in Annex 2, the broadening of the Policy to include multiple objectives (see Section 3.1 below) has greatly increased the number and diversity of stakeholders beyond those involved in previous school feeding programmes.

11. Indirect stakeholders include: other agencies involved in education, health and agriculture sectors and donors to these sectors.

12. During the Inception Phase, the evaluation team will develop a more detailed analysis, including of relative influence compared to interest of the diverse stakeholders. They will decide on the most appropriate means to obtain the perspective of the different stakeholders and evaluation issues to be addressed with each, bearing in mind existing secondary sources of information. The evaluation aims to generate a better understanding of diverse stakeholder perspectives in terms of assumptions and expectations that the School Feeding Policy should meet.

13. The primary users of the evaluation will be the WFP executive staff and members of the Executive Board to inform decision making on strategic organizational priorities.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

3.1. WFP's School Feeding Policy

14. The WFP School Feeding Policy 2009[84] was developed on the foundations of four studies, conducted in 2009[85]. The central one, published jointly with the World Bank, was entitled 'Re-Thinking School Feeding'[86]. Annex 3 provides an e-library of these and other documents relevant to the evaluation. The Policy sets six **objective areas,** all under the concept of safety nets, as a sub-set of broader social protection systems. The six areas are: education; nutrition; gender equality in education; value transfer to households; a platform for wider socio-economic benefits[87]; and capacity development for governments. Key indicators are established for outcomes in each of these areas. Through a positive contribution to learning results and school completion, school feeding is expected to contribute to breaking the inter-generational cycle of hunger. The value of school feeding is perceived as its simultaneous contribution to multiple objectives, rather than necessarily the intervention of choice to achieve any single one of the objectives alone. Annex 4 gives the Logic Model from the Policy.

15. In this way, school feeding is embedded in and contributes to the wider organisational transition intended through the Strategic Plan from food aid to food assistance. The School Feeding Policy links into other new policy initiatives concerning safety nets, new nutrition approaches (especially in the use of fortified foods), local procurement, and Purchase for Progress.

16. According to WFP's School Feeding Policy Unit, the Policy brought in three "elements of novelty": (i) framing school feeding as a safety net intervention with multiple outcomes; (ii) working closer with Governments; and (iii) introducing 8 standards for quality and sustainability[88]. (In the Policy, these are referred to as standards for sustainability and affordability). However, these three elements were intended to reflect good practices, which were in some cases already being applied, rather than to introduce elements entirely new to WFP.

17. The policy envisages various models for school feeding with different degrees of (de)centralization. It introduces 8 Standards Guiding Sustainable and Affordable School Feeding Programmes (with explicit indicators), that guide phased transition from programmes that rely mostly on external (WFP) funding and implementation to programmes to those that are fully owned, funded and implemented by national governments.

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[84] WFP/EB.2/2009/4-A

[85] List from p.5 of Policy

[86] Bundy, D., Burbano, C., Grosh, M., Gelli, A., Jukes, M., Drake, L., *Rethinking School Feeding. Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector*. World Bank, Washington D.C.

[87] Which includes the elements of the WFP/UNICEF, 2006, *The Essential Package: Twelve interventions in support of health and nutrition of school-age children.*

[88] Background Paper for proposed Consultation on the New Approach to School Feeding, March 2011

3.2. Overview of WFP Activities for Policy Implementation

18. At the time the Policy was approved, a Concept Note on the New Approach was issued[89]. This is in effect the top-line implementation plan and contains milestones for policy implementation. In June 2010, the Executive Policy Council issued a decision, signed by the Executive Director, affirmed school feeding as a corporate priority and endorsing the accompanying School Feeding Policy Implementation Approach[90]. The decision emphasised supporting national governments to increase coverage for the most needy, strengthen the quality of school feeding and secure sustainability. Quality is defined at 2 level. First, quality programmes as sustainable, nutritious, targeted and cost-effective, while encouraging local purchase of food and agricultural production. Second, the 8 quality standards for sustainability and affordability which refer primarily to institutional aspects[91] The Decision also stated that, "In line with the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), WFP will support the transition to national management of sustainable school feeding programmes, providing capacity building and technical support, including through South-South cooperation"[92]/ An update on implementation for the Policy Committee has been issued[93], although it is clearer on what will still be done, than on what has been done.

19. New tools have been developed or are in development to improve school feeding quality, coverage and sustainability. These include tools for: developing a transition strategy to national ownership; coverage analysis; cost benchmark analysis[94]; revisions to the Standardized School Feeding Survey; other new guidance materials for operations staff; and revisions to the M&E system. These are being incorporated in the Programme Guidance Manual, a new Handbook and a training programme is in development. A global cost-benchmark analysis of average costs by modality was completed in 2010, based on 2009 operations. Latest versions of the tools will be provided to the evaluation team at the start of the Inception Phase.

20. An operational partnership with the World Bank began in 2009 to give concrete and complementary support to governments in 9 pilot countries to implement the New Approach - primarily in mainstreaming school feeding in national policies and strategies and a research agenda[95]. The countries are: Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Laos, Malawi, Mali, and

[89] WFP, Nov. 2009. *Sustainable School Feeding: Lifting Children Out of the Hunger Trap, Concept Note.*

[90] WFP, 2010, *Note to the Executive Policy Council: School Feeding Policy Implementation Approach,* EPC11/2010/D.

[91] WFP, June 2010, *Decisions of 11th Meeting of the Executive Policy Council: School Feeding Policy Implementation Approach.*

[92] Ibid.

[93] PC23/2010/E

[94] See 2010, *WFP manual: school feeding cost tools,* entry 65 in Annex 3 E-Library

[95] For Concept Note on the partnership, see Annex 3

Mozambique. In addition, Cambodia and Sri Lanka are included in the research agenda[96].

21. Since approval of the Policy, initiatives on Home-Grown School Feeding and the link to Purchase for Progress (purchase from small-scale farmers) have developed rapidly and been added to the work of the WFP-WB partnership[97] in partnership with the Partnership for Child Development (PCD).

22. Annex 1 gives an overview of operations as at end 2009 when, the new Policy was introduced. Data on 2010 operations will be available from early March 2011 an provided to the team.

3.3. Scope of the Evaluation

23. Concerning Question 1 (see Section 4 'Evaluation Questions', below), the evaluation will assess the Policy as a whole, covering its clarity, relevance to context, appropriateness within the international context, coherence & connectedness to other relevant WFP policies.

24. Concerning Questions 2 and 3, the evaluation will focus primarily on development programmes and PRROs, as these are the types of operations which have been the primary focus for implementation of the New Approach under the Policy. In this way it will cover more stable situations and situations of sometimes prolonged instability. Emergency Operations will not be included.

25. Also for Questions 2 and 3, the evaluation will focus on school feeding for primary school children and related pre-school children.

26. The evaluation will assess changes in the overall profile of WFP's global portfolio of school feeding operations between end 2009 (date of approval of the Policy) and end 2010. A cross-section of all operations implemented between 2007 and 2010 will be examined in greater depth, taken from 3 strata: (i) operations handed over to full national ownership before 2009[98]; (ii) operations in the 9 pilot countries for the New Approach; (iii) operations in the non-pilot countries.

4. Evaluation Questions

27. The Policy Evaluation will address the following three questions. These will be detailed further in an evaluation matrix to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim to generate evaluation insights and evidence that will help policy makers make better policies and will help programme staff in the implementation of policy.

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[96] Selection based on a number of criteria that makes them 'fertile ground' for capacity development work and enhancing quality. These include government committed to school feeding, school feeding already included in PRSP or other strategies, perspectives on Home-Grown School Feeding and others. No country met all the criteria, but they were selected on the basis of the most favourable combination.

[97] Ibid.

[98] 37 countries since 1970, of which 10 in the 5 years prior to the new Policy and 1 since.

28. **Question 1: How good is the Policy?** The evaluation will compare the policy, as articulated, with international good practice and practice of comparators to understand whether the policy, from its outset, was geared towards attaining best results. It will also assess the logic of the policy and validity of the assumptions. Comparators may be taken from countries like Brazil and India and also include countries where school meals are not/have never been given (such as, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands).

29. Question 2: What have been the results of the Policy?
The evaluation will collect information and data on results (observed changes) that can plausibly be associated with the new approach and mechanisms to implement it.

30. Question 3: Why has the Policy produced the results that have been observed?
In order to draw lessons for the future, the evaluation will generate insights into key contributing/explanatory factors that have affected the level of results observed (question 2). It will look at:
(a) factors that flowed from the quality of the policy itself (question 1);
(b) the adequacy of action taken and resources dedicated to implement the Policy through adjustments to/development of WFP staff capacity and organizational systems and structures; and
(c) developments in the external environment that affect the relevance and/or ability to implement the Policy.

31. A number of key issues flow from the 'elements of novelty' in the Policy. The evaluation will give particular attention to these issues in answering the three questions above. This will include testing the assumptions (implicit and explicit) in the Policy related to these issues. They are:
i) the implications for school feeding programmes of formulating school feeding as a safety net intervention;
ii) the implications of including nutrition and value transfer objectives (e.g. changes to food baskets and cost of food fortification);
iii) the viability of the 'sustainability' strategy concerning transition to national ownership, especially in relation to cost to national governments and host communities alongside other priorities in the education, health and safety net sectors;
iv) the viability of the 'sustainability' strategy in relation to WFP's ability to provide or ensure capacity building and technical support (whether national or regional approaches);
v) the strategic implications of new models of Home-Grown School Feeding for the Policy.

5. Evaluation Approach

5.1. Evaluability Assessment

32. At global level, there is a policy document with a statement of objectives and a logic model from inputs through to expected impacts (see Section 3.1). Output and outcome indicators are defined, and some impact indicators. At the impact level, WFP would not attribute achievements to WFP alone, but considers that school feeding can make a significant contribution. Indicators for education, gender objectives and school infrastructure are not new and were already reflected in the

Strategic Results Framework and therefore in monitoring and reporting systems, including the Standardized School Feeding Survey. Indicators for all other objectives are new. The previous School Feeding Handbook provides a 'baseline' of previous Policy.

33. There are 4 recent impact evaluations of WFP-supported school feeding operations managed by WFP OE (and a fifth being completed in 2011); and 3 studies by the World Bank concerning at least education objectives[99]. There are also various other relevant OE-managed Country Portfolio and Operations Evaluations conducted in 2010 and a Strategic Evaluation of Safety Nets (report available March 2011). These will help create an understanding of results of operations immediately before the new Policy and in its first year of implementation. They will provide evidence concerning all three Evaluation Questions (above) but with varying degrees of direct pertinence (See Annex 3).

34. The extent to which the Policy objectives are shared amongst the highly diverse stakeholders is not known nor is the extent to which different interpretations and/or emphasis in priorities exist. These will need to be explored by the evaluation.

35. Data on 2010 operations will be available in early March 2011. It will be provided to the evaluation team at the start of the inception phase, together with information on other activities to implement the Policy.

5.2. Methodology

36. The evaluation will use internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness.

37. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to address the evaluation questions presented in Section 4 and present it in the inception report. This will:

- Include an evaluation matrix, showing how the methodology will address the questions and sub-questions developed by the team.
- Include data collection tools to guide the evaluation team in desk review and field work. These should be designed to enable aggregation of findings and applied consistently in desk review and field work.
- Specify the sampling technique used to impartially select stakeholders to be interviewed.
- Take into account the limitations to evaluability pointed out in 5.1 as well as budget and timing constraints.

38. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of bias by relying on a cross-section of information sources bringing perspectives from the different stakeholder groups, mentioned in Section 2.3. It will use a range of methodologies (e.g. structured literature review, secondary data analysis, surveys, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, including by telephone) and will ensure systematic triangulation of information.

[99] OE-managed: Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Kenya, and Bangladesh (reporting July 2011). World Bank: Burkina Faso, Uganda, PDR Lao, covering 2006-08

39. In order to capture the field experience, the evaluation will use a multi-country case study approach within the scope described in Section 3.3 above. Field visits will be made to five or six countries (exact number depending on budget) from the cross-section mentioned in para.26 above. The Evaluation Team will finalise the selection of cases during the Inception Phase.

40. To assess results of school feeding programmes (Question 2), the methodology should draw and build as far as possible on the body of recent secondary sources available (Section 5.1). A focused synthesis of the 8 recent impact evaluations of school feeding operations managed/supported by WFP and 17 other types of evaluation with a school feeding component is an early expected output[100]. In addition, a wider review of literature will contribute to the overall assessment and answering Question 1 in particular. Field work will focus on those questions for which further information is needed. This is likely to include field work on affordability related to cost-effectiveness and the viability of the strategies for capacity development support for transition to national engagement (issues (iii) and (iv) para 30 above)

41. All data will be disaggregated by sex and by age group. The evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance concerning different beneficiary groups as appropriate.

5.3. Quality Assurance

42. WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with built-in steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OE Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

43. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

44. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, two external reviewer(s) will provide further quality assurance to the process and will comment on the draft inception and evaluation reports.

[100] Past impact evaluations managed by OE have been undertaken only in countries where WFP still has an active programme. This was because the WFP Office of Evaluation does not have a mandate to evaluate school feeding programmes that are fully 'owned' by the government of the country concerned and, even if agreed under a joint venture, the approach and methodology would have been different to those where WFP has a large operational role.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1. Phases and Deliverables

45. The table below shows the timeline and activities for each of the five phases of the evaluation (design, inception, evaluation, reporting and follow-up).[101] The key evaluation deliverables with proposed dates are shown in red. Phases highlighted in yellow are mainly the team's responsibility. Those in white are OE's responsibility.

46. The dates of phases 4 and 5 are fixed. The dates and milestones of Phases 2 and 3 are tentative depending on availability of tem members and key informants.

	Timeline for Phases & Deliverables (updated May 2011)	Key Dates 2011
Phase 1 - Preparation		
	Quality assurance revised TOR	28 January
	Circulation of draft TOR and review	4-17 Feb
	Final TOR	**23 Feb**
	Recruitment of evaluation team (restricted tender)	24 Feb-8 April
Phase 2 - Inception		
	Meeting EM & Team Leader (by telephone)	15 April
	Team review documents	April/May
	Briefing core team at WFP HQ & team workshop	24-27 May
	Draft inception report (including methodology) & synthesis of past evaluations of WFP school feeding operations	April/May
	Submit draft inception report to OE	**Friday 3 June**
	OE quality assurance and feedback	3-10 June
	External expert reviewers comment on inception report	3-10 June
	Revise inception report	11-14 June
	Submit revised inception report to OE	**Tuesday 14 June**
	OE shares inception report with stakeholders for information	17 June
Phase 3 - Evaluation		
	Field work – 5 country visits + 3 country desk reviews	**17 June - 22 July**
	Aide memoire/In-country Debriefing	At end of each country visit
	Visit to Rome • **Interviews with HQ units** (interviewees not available will be interviewed earlier by telephone) • **Team workshop to consolidate findings**	**25-29 July**

[101] This is an updated version of the calendar included in the original TOR.

	Debriefing (global)	**29 July**
Phase 4 - Reporting		
	Draft evaluation report	1 August -16 Sept
	Submit Draft evaluation report to OE	**19 September**
	OE quality feedback	19-23 September
	Revise evaluation report	26-30 September
	Submit revised evaluation report to OE	**1 October**
	OE share evaluation report with stakeholders (working level)	**5-18 Oct.**
	Workshop at WFP HQ to discuss findings (including Expert External Reviewers)	**19-20 October**
	OE & TL consolidate comments	21 October
	Revise evaluation report	24 Oct.-2 Nov.
	Submit revised evaluation report to OE, including Executive Summary	**2 November**
	OE circulates the Executive Summary to WFP's Executive Staff	9-23 Nov
	OE consolidate comments	23 Nov
	Revise Executive Summary of evaluation report	24-25 November
	Submit final evaluation report to OE	**26 November**
Phase 5 Executive Board and follow-up		
	Editing / translation of summary report	From end Nov
	Preparation of Management response	From end Nov
	Preparation of evaluation brief and dissemination of reports	Dec 2011
	Presentation of evaluation summary report to the EB	**Feb.2012**
	Presentation of management response to the EB	**Feb.2012**

6.2. Evaluation Team

47. To ensure the independence of the evaluation and credibility of the findings, the evaluation will be conducted by a team of external consultants. The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members with an appropriate balance of expertise in evaluation methodologies, technical expertise and practical experience.

48. The Team Leader will be internationally recruited. The *team leader* for the evaluation requires strong evaluation and leadership skills and technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed below. His/her primary responsibilities will be (a) leading the development of the methodology and approach in the inception report; (b) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation phase and overseeing the preparation of working papers as necessary; (c) consolidating team members' inputs to the evaluation products; (d) representing the evaluation team in

meetings with stakeholders; (e) deliver the inception report and evaluation reports in line with agreed OE standards (EQAS) and agreed timelines.

49. The *evaluation team members* will bring together a complementary combination of technical expertise in the fields of school feeding and education, nutrition, social safety nets, food security, capacity development gender and economics. The economist will analyse cost-effectiveness of different modalities and proportionality of costs of school feeding in relation to other education and social protection investments from public expenditure. The core team members will be internationally recruited. They should be able to communicate clearly in English and at least one member in Spanish. French would be an advantage. Core team members may be complemented by specific national expertise for country cases, as necessary. The blend of technical areas across the team will depend on that of the team leader first. At least one team member should be familiar with WFP's work in school feeding.

50. The evaluation team members will contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise; undertake documentary review prior to fieldwork, conduct field work to generate additional evidence from a cross-section of stakeholders, including carrying out site visits, as necessary to collect information; participate in team meetings, including with stakeholders; prepare inputs in their technical area for the evaluation products; and contribute to the preparation of the evaluation report. The full job description is provided separately.

51. All members of the evaluation team will abide by the Code of Conduct for evaluators (attached to individual contracts), ensuring they maintain impartiality and professionalism.

6.3. Roles and Responsibilities

52. This evaluation is managed by OE. Sally Burrows has been appointed as evaluation manager. The Evaluation Manager has not worked in any other capacity in WFP in the past. She is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

53. WFP stakeholders at Country Office, Regional Bureau and Headquarters levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders; set up meetings and field visits, organise for interpretation if required, and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report.

54. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

6.4. Communication

55. The key milestones of communication are shown in the timeline above (6.1). The following points additional.

56. WFP staff at all levels (HQ, regional and country) will be invited to participate in debriefings. Depending on the location of each de-briefing (see Timeline above), some participants will be by telephone.

57. The final evaluation report will be in English. WFP will translate it into the other UN languages after finalisation. Country case studies will be conducted in the most appropriate UN language for the country concerned and an in-country debrief of preliminary findings given in that language. The draft report will be circulated for comment by country stakeholders before finalisation of the evaluation report.

58. Budget and work schedules permitting, an end-of-evaluation workshop will be organised at WFP HQ to share findings and discuss ways forward, prior to finalization of the recommendations.

6.5. Budget

59. The evaluation will be financed from OE's Programme Support and Administrative budget. The total estimated cost of the evaluation is US$xxxxxxxx. Of this, the associated remuneration (daily fees) are estimated to be around US$xxxxxxx and the cost of international and domestic travel is estimated at US$xxxxxxx, based on the team composition and travel presented above. The balance covers any travel costs of the Evaluation Manager, translation, and other contingencies.

Annexes to the TOR

Annex 1: Overview of WFP School Feeding Operations
[This has been superseded by Annex H.]

Annex 2: Analysis of Direct Stakeholders
[This was the basis of the stakeholder analysis now found at Box C5 in Annex C.]

Annex 3: E-Library of Relevant Documents and Websites
[Now incorporated in the bibliography at Annex A.]

Annex 4: Logic Model
[Now included as Box C1 in Annex C.]

Annex C Methodology

Introduction

C1. This Annex, adapted from the Inception Report, describes the methodology adopted. A concluding section (see ¶C38) reflects on experience in following the methodology.

Evaluation Approach[102]

C2. The evaluation approach is shaped by the nature of the task as a policy evaluation. Figure C1 below highlights two important features:

- First, the published policy document needs to be seen as an episode in a continuing policy process. The evaluation is thus concerned not just with the policy document, but with the process of which it forms part. This is reflected in attention to the 2009 Policy's antecedents, and to the process of implementation.
- Second, the evaluation is constrained by the fact that it is taking place rather soon after the policy was adopted (during the "policy realisation" phase depicted in Figure C1).[103] This means that it is too soon to expect significant impact of the policy itself. However, as the TOR note, it will be possible to review the intermediate results of policy implementation as it rolls out and to review additional evidence concerning the potential impact of the types of intervention advocated by the policy. The latter will be based on evidence of results of older practice, which the Policy sought to codify as good practice.

Figure C1 The Policy Cycle



[102] See Annex D for definitions of the evaluation terms used here.

[103] The timing of this evaluation was specifically mandated by the Executive Board. However, the EB has subsequently adopted guidelines under which, in future, at least four years will elapse between the adoption of a policy and its evaluation.

C3. Both the logic model and the evaluation matrix described below have been designed to reflect the nature of the exercise as an early policy evaluation.

C4. The evaluation has both summative and formative dimensions. The summative dimension of the evaluation will determine the quality of the policy, while the formative dimension will contribute towards improving its implementation and possibly refining the policy itself.

C5. The evaluation will not only look at whether anything has changed as a result of the policy but also whether the policy is likely to be able to achieve its objectives when implemented fully. This is particularly important for this policy evaluation due to the limited elapsed time since the approval of the policy. The SF policy, according to WFP, has been developed on the basis of existing best practice. Some areas of SF have been given new direction by the policy whilst others have been left at status-quo e.g. the education objectives of SF. It will be essential in answering the evaluation questions to compare the impact of the policy across the sectors encompassed by SF in terms of degree of change but also to consider whether the policy and the resultant changes have addressed the weaknesses previously identified in SF and have built on its strengths. In order to assess the potential impact of the policy, therefore, the evaluation will review the growing body of evidence on the impacts of school feeding[104] (the synthesis of recent impact evaluations specified in ¶40 of the TOR is especially relevant).

C6. The evaluation *process* is always a vital part of the methodology. Key requirements are:

- to engage systematically with the multiple and highly diverse stakeholders in a constructive way, so as to ensure recommendations are useful and used, while maintaining the independence and objectivity of the evaluation.
- to ensure the multi-disciplinary perspectives of different team members are effectively brought together.

C7. The organisation of the evaluation is designed to serve both these requirements.

C8. The distinction between findings, conclusions, and recommendations (see Annex D for definitions) will be carefully observed. This will help to facilitate comparisons across case study countries and thematic areas, and to ensure that conclusions are strongly based on accumulated findings.

C9. The evaluation will draw as much as possible on secondary sources both from within WFP and more widely, including published documents, internal and external reports and evaluations and databases. Such secondary sources will enable the evaluation team to look at the impact on beneficiaries of SF as drawn out by various evaluations and internal and external reviews. Interviews will be the main form of primary data collection.

[104] The distinction (¶C11 below) between two levels of programme logic is relevant here.

Programme theory

C10. Spelling out the programme theory on which the SF policy is based is an important step in the assessment of the SF policy (is its theory credible?) and also a systematic guide to the questions the evaluation needs to investigate.

C11. Two levels of programme theory (two logic models) are involved:

- A logic model of *school feeding* was attached as Annex II to the SF Policy (and also to the TOR). It is reproduced as Box C1 below.
- The school feeding Concept Note (WFP, 2009zg) elaborates the logic of the *school feeding policy*. Its logic model is reproduced as Box C2 below

C12. The ET has drawn particularly on the latter in preparing Box C3 below. This essentially depicts the policy logic of the Concept Note against the levels of a standard evaluation framework and highlights the generic evaluation questions and criteria most relevant at each level. This in turn is a platform for the evaluation matrix described below.

C13. The evidence for drawing conclusions about the results of the policy will be primarily qualitative, leading to judgements on “plausible association" between the policy and observed results. (WFP, 2010f)

Box C1 School Feeding Logic Model (as annexed to the Policy)




SAFETY NET
INPUT
OUTPUT
TYPE OF OBJECTIVES
OUTCOMES
IMPACTS
MICRO-NUTRIENT FORTIFIED MEALS, SNACKS, TAKE-HOME RATIONS WITH DE-WORMING
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS BENEFITING FROM SCHOOL FEEDING
Value Transfer
Increased household income
*Indicator: Monetary value of food transferred
Improved household food consumption
Indicator: Household food consumption score
Improved food security
Increased investments in HH productive assets
Improved health/nutrition status of non-school going children and other household members
Decrease in reliance on negative coping mechanisms
Decrease in child labour participation
POLICY, PLANNING AND TECHNICAL ADVICE TO GOVERNMENTS
PROVISION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRY ENTITIES INVOLVED IN SCHOOL FEEDING
Capacity Development
Strengthen government capacity to plan for and implement School Feeding
*Indicator: Action plan and milestones to reach the 8 SF quality Standards i) sustainability ii) sound alignment with national policy frameworks; iii) stable funding and budgeting; iv) needs-based, cost-effective programme design; v) strong institutional and implementation arrangements; vi) local production and sourcing vii) strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination; viii) strong community participation and ownership
Improved effectiveness of school feeding policies and programmes to reduce hunger
COMPLE-MENTARY ACTIVITIES
LOCAL PROCUREMENT
ESSENTIAL PACKAGE
SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE
School Feeding as a Platform for Complementary Activities Providing Wider Socio-Economic Benefits
Increased farmer income and marketing opportunities with local procurement and processing for school feeding
*Indicator: Food for school feeding purchased locally, as % of food distributed for school feeding in-country
Essential Package interventions at school (safe water, fuel-efficient stoves, woodlots) promoted
*Indicator: Proportion of schools with assets in place
School infrastructure (schools, school kitchens, access roads) promoted
*Indicator: Proportion of schools with school assets in place
Food assistance transformed into a productive investment in local communities - Improved local economies
Wider socio-economic benefits (reduced fuelwood consumption and carbon footprint, improved school infrastructure, improved education environment)
CYCLE OF HUNGER INTERRUPTED

Box C2 Policy Logic from the Concept Note



Box C3 Logic Model for WFP's School Feeding Policy

Logic of the SF policy	Logframe level	Generic evaluation questions
Ultimate goals: "to reduce hunger among schoolchildren so that it is not an obstacle to their development" "cycle of hunger interrupted"	Impact	**Impact**: What changes did the policy bring about? Were there any unplanned or inintended changes? **Sustainability**: Are the changes likely to be durable? Are learning feedback loops in place?
Intended Impacts of Policy: enhanced child health + nutrition, increased learning, increased access to education for girls and OVCs, decreased morbidity, increased HH food security, increased education on family planning and HIV/AIDS, decreased maternal and infant mortality rates		
Increased enrolment, increased attendance, increased retention/ decrease in drop-out, improved school achievement, short-term hunger alleviated leading to improved child cognition, completion of basic education, increased gender equity in education	Outcome	**Effectiveness**: Were the policy's objectives achieved? (or are they likely to be achieved?)
Increased WFP capacity to support transition Improved SF quality Increased government capacity to deliver school feeding Wider SF coverage esp of girls Increased WFP capacity to develop government know-how Effective capacity for SF as a safety net to fight hunger and build human capital		
enhanced WFP SF operations, advisory services to governments, and particpation with government and other partners in planing of school feeding as an element of over-arching social protection strategies	Outputs	Did the outputs lead to the intended outcomes?
7 tools to support country offices and national governments Respond to demand, enable; Assess and build knowledge Appraise and design; Launch and implement	Activities	**Efficiency**: Were activities implemented on schedule and within budget? Were activities delivered economically? **Relevance**: Were the policy's objectives consistent with beneficiaries' needs and with WFP and government strategies? Was the policy logically based on sound evidence?
The School Feeding Policy, including the 8 guiding standards for quality and sustainability. "to provide clarity and consistency of approach, rationale and intent of school feeding. It is standard-setting, clarifies the role of WFP and rpvides a benchmark for quality design and implementation" Personnel and other resources to disseminate and facilitate its implemntaiton	Inputs	

Evaluation Criteria

C14. As prescribed in the TOR:

> The evaluation will use internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness. (TOR ¶37)

C15. Our preferred definitions of all these terms are shown in Annex D.

C16. We will adopt some additional criteria in assessing the quality of policy.[105] In particular, we will assess:

- the *clarity* of the policy: is it easily and accurately understood by those to whom it is addressed?
- the *practicability* of the policy: is it feasible to implement on the anticipated timescale and with the resources likely to be available? Is it consistent with WFP management procedures and systems? Are its cost implications realistic (especially for country governments as the policy seeks to hand over SF to them)?

Issues and Themes

C17. The SF policy perceives multiple objectives, and the nature of the evaluation (policy process, institutional dynamics etc.) also shapes the issues and themes the evaluation is required to look at, viz. education, social protection and/or safety nets, nutrition, local economic development, aid effectiveness, institutional development and capacity building, etc. All these aspects have a gender dimension.

C18. The multi-disciplinary team ensures that all aspects can be knowledgeably assessed. However, there is the challenge of bringing a variety of perspectives to bear while avoiding fragmentation. This will be addressed by:

- team meetings/workshops and common protocols for research;
- common formats for data collection and reporting, so as to facilitate synthesis across themes and cases;
- overlapping roles and oversight: thematic specialists will undertake case studies, while the team leader and the research coordinator will maintain a broader perspective;
- a detailed evaluation matrix (discussed next).

Evaluation Matrix

C19. The evaluation team has drawn on the logic model and evaluation criteria to develop the evaluation matrix that is set out in Annex E. The higher levels of evaluation questions are shown in Box C4 below. They are amplified by the numerous sub-questions in the full matrix.

[105] This section has benefited from a review of other recent policy evaluations in WFP.

Box C4 Main Evaluation Questions

A. To assess the **quality of the policy** the evaluation will consider:	
EQ1	How relevant is the policy? Are its objectives appropriate and is it soundly based on evidence?
EQ2	Is the policy clear and internally consistent?
EQ3	Is the policy coherent with WFP's strategic plan and other relevant policies?
EQ4	Is the policy coherent with international standards?
EQ5	How practicable is the policy?
B. To identify and assess the **results of the policy**, the evaluation will consider:	
EQ6	Are relevant stakeholders aware of the policy, and committed to its implementation?
EQ7	How have WFP's relationships' with other stakeholders changed since the policy was introduced?
EQ8	How has WFP's portfolio changed since the policy was introduced?
EQ9	Does WFP's school feeding portfolio reflect the policy's quality standards?
EQ10	Are the observed changes a result of the policy, a continuation of pre-existing good practice, or the consequence of other WFP policy shifts?
C. To **explain the results (or absence of results) of the policy**, the evaluation will consider:	
EQ11	Was there sufficient consultation and ownership in the development of the policy?
EQ12	How well was the policy disseminated, with guidelines for its implementation?
EQ13	Were there sufficient (financial and other) resources for its implementation?
EQ14	What internal factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?
EQ15	What external factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?
EQ16	What feedback loops have been put in place and how effective have they been?
EQ17	How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy?

Note: findings under Question A (quality of the policy) will also be relevant in explaining its results, or lack of results. EQ16 and EQ17 are also relevant to Question B (results of the policy), but require judgements that will draw on the EQs which precede them.

Data Collection Methods

Secondary data collection

C20. As already noted, the evaluation will draw as much as possible on secondary data collection, both from within WFP (for which OE has taken the lead) and from other relevant sources (for which the ET is primarily responsible). This will provide important insights into the outcomes and impact of SF programmes.

C21. A special contribution will be the synthesis of impact analyses (¶40 of the TOR). In addition to the 8 SF impact evaluations cited in the TOR, the ET also proposes to incorporate in the synthesis the SF evaluation reports commissioned by country offices in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Tabular comparisons across the available studies[106] will form the basis for a narrative commentary on the key messages that emerge from the studies. A second volume will synthesise the 17+ other evaluations identified in which SF features. These are more heterogeneous, and the summary tabulations will be correspondingly lighter. An immediate value of the synthesis will be to enable team members to identify key issues and reports relevant to their fields of enquiry.

C22. As noted in TOR ¶20, the evaluation will compile and analyse data on WFP's overall portfolio, and on a cross-section of operations between 2007–2010, drawn from the three categories: (i) operations handed over to full national ownership before 2009; (ii) operations in the 9 pilot countries for the New Approach; and (iii) operations in the non-pilot countries.

C23. [At the time of preparation of the Inception Report] the ET [had] received limited information on financial flows to SF programmes or to the implementation of SF in WFP. The ET understands that extracting such data from WFP information systems requires special efforts, but it is of basic importance.

Primary data collection (stakeholder interviews)

C24. Interviews will be the main form of primary data collection. Interview notes will be systematically written up, consolidated and shared among team members on the internal team website. To respect interviewee confidentiality, the interview notes will be accessible only to team members. The consolidated file of interview notes will facilitate searches on key thematic terms, country names, and so forth. The interviews will be particularly important in documenting internal and external perceptions of the policy and of WFP.

C25. Box C5 below elaborates the stakeholder analysis included in the TOR. Internal stakeholders refer to those within WFP (Country Offices, Regional Bureaus, policy, programme and relevant technical units and senior management). External stakeholders include governments at national and sub-national levels, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations, and international (multilateral and bilateral) partners. Because this is an evaluation of a policy at a relatively early stage of development, the stakeholder analysis will have limited community level contact (beneficiaries, parents, teachers and local farmers).

[106] The Bangladesh study report is still in preparation [and was not yet available at the time of drafting the main evaluation report].

Box C5 Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder	Role in SF Operations	Role in the evaluation	Implications for the Evaluation
INTERNAL			
WFP Country Offices	Lead role in design and implementation of WFP's part in school feeding programmes.	Multiple – see TOR Section 6.3. Country Offices where case studies are being conducted will also be represented in a reference group for the evaluation, consulted on each phase of the evaluation and invited to comment on the major products (TOR, evaluation report).	• Key informants to provide context, direct experience and analysis. Important to fully understand WFP's role, its relation to other actors/sectors, how WFP operates in the specific country context, and overall progress on rolling out the policy.
WFP Regional Bureau	Key role in all stages of the programme cycle. Decision maker on regional priorities between types of programme and countries.	Key informants. Will be represented in a reference group for the evaluation, consulted on each phase of the evaluation and invited to comment on the major products (TOR, evaluation report).	• Regional bureaus provide a regional overview and the ability to compare countries, identify lessons learned, and perspective to triangulate country level findings.
WFP School Feeding Policy Unit	Author of the Policy. Also responsible for: developing tools to support implementation & global monitoring; ongoing development of strategy, research agenda and global partnerships.	Key informants. Will be represented in a reference group for the evaluation, consulted on each phase of the evaluation and invited to comment on the major products (TOR, evaluation report).	• As the authors of the policy, the Policy Unit is responsible for ensuring overall policy coherence and is a key end user of the evaluation. Important to understand the diverse experiences and opinions within the Unit and to ensure their full participation.
WFP school feeding programme design unit	Responsible for assuring policy implementation in programme design and developing tools to support implementation.	Key informants. Will be represented in a reference group for the evaluation, consulted on each phase of the evaluation and invited to comment on the major products (TOR, evaluation report).	• The programme design unit is responsible for implementing the policy including the agreed outcomes of the evaluation. Important to understand their perspective and connection to field level implementation. Understand relation between policy and programming and implications for the policy, and ensure their full participation.

Stakeholder	Role in SF Operations	Role in the evaluation	Implications for the Evaluation
Other WFP technical units	Assuring quality of programmes (e.g. VAM on targeting; Nutrition; reporting units)	Key informants. Will be represented in a reference group for the evaluation, consulted on each phase of the evaluation and invited to comment on the major products (TOR, evaluation report).	• Important to understand overall views, perceived role, and range of diverse views. Check for depth of understanding of the policy. Seek to understand how they relate to the policy in theory and in practice, and in terms of integration and coherence.
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL			
EXECUTIVE BOARD			
Recipient country EB members	Varying levels of ownership of school feeding programmes	Key informants	• Executive board members are key stakeholders who have a variety of interests and agendas. Important to approach sensitively and to probe for interests and drivers behind the official positions. Check for understanding of policy (in theory and in practice) and determine their priorities.
Donor EB members	Financial support to school feeding		
Other EB members			
EXTERNAL			
Beneficiaries and Participants			
Beneficiaries	Recipients of food	Their views will be taken into account primarily via existing secondary sources.	Beneficiaries, Parents, Teachers, Local Farmers: • The country study time frame is short and the ToRs appropriately specify that the views of these groups will primarily be taken into account through secondary sources. • However, the team will aim, if at all practical, to visit some SF operations in the case study countries. This will serve mainly as a reality-check – to give the consultants a tangible impression of SF in operation. The team will aim to conduct opportunistic interviews during scheduled field visits. The team will aim to guard against obvious bias (e.g. gender) in the
Parents	• Recipients of THR • Represented on school meals management committees to varying degrees • In most cases, contributing to the cost of the school meal in cash or kind • Key decision makers in whether or not a child attends and succeeds in school	Their views will be taken into account primarily via existing secondary sources.	
Teachers	• Overseeing day-to-day implementation of school meals • May be recipients of food	Could be consulted via national teacher unions	

Stakeholder	Role in SF Operations	Role in the evaluation	Implications for the Evaluation
Local farmers (who may also be parents & teachers)	Under some Home-grown School Feeding programmes, selling produce for school meals. In other programmes, required to contribute it voluntarily.	Their views will be taken into account primarily via existing secondary sources.	interviews, but time constraints are such that the actual number of interviews will be very limited, and the team will be careful not to make unwarranted generalisations from them.
Partner Government			
Ministry of Education – local, regional & national levels[107]	Traditionally the 'lead' ministry on school feeding programmes for policy and implementation. School Feeding units are usually located here. Budget holder.	Key informants on experience to date, successes, points for improvement and failures, WFP's role, views on future directions.	Government Officials • Government officials will be interviewed during the country visits, preferably at both the implementation and the policy levels. In the capitals, it will be important to understand the level of commitment beyond the Ministry of Education, with a focus on the Ministry of Finance and PM/President's office. If a harmonized approach/SWAP is active, the team will meet with the appropriate working groups in education and social protection. • Key informants for perceptions, levels of understanding and ownership, lessons learned, and suggestions for improvement. • Interviews of country level stakeholders
Ministry of Health	Lead ministry for improving health of school children: de-worming; water & sanitation; nutrition	Key informants on experience to date, successes, points for improvement and failures, WFP's role, views on future directions.	
Ministry of Agriculture	Responsibility for support to Home-Grown School Feeding programmes	Key informants on experience to date, successes, points for improvement and failures, WFP's role, views on future directions.	
Ministry/ies responsible for PRSP and/or social protection	*To be explored*	Key informants on perspectives for school feeding as a social safety net and/or social protection instrument.	

[107] The interests of district, regional and national levels within the same ministry differ in some respects and there may be competition for influence and resources.

Stakeholder	Role in SF Operations	Role in the evaluation	Implications for the Evaluation
Ministry of Finance and/or PM/President's office	Responsible for approval and allocation of budget for School Feeding. Key player in terms of promoting school feeding and social protection within the national agenda. MOF also has oversight of procurement and financial management issues.	Key informants on the political will and level of support behind school feeding and social protection. Key informant on country financial and procurement systems.	will be done independently to ensure independence and limit potential bias.
Provincial/District level officials (both elected and civil servants)	Responsible for oversight and implementation in the field.	Key information on implementation issues. Also on demand for SF (vis-à-vis other priorities).	• Understanding operational realities and perceptions of the policy in the field • Contact will be limited given the short duration of field visits.
Core SF Partnerships			
World Bank	Major contributor to the Policy and global partner in implementation of the New Approach and research agenda for further policy development.	Key informants	• Key partners for WFP on partnership, WFP's changing role vis-à-vis the policy, and lessons learned. • Units involved in "Rethinking School Feeding" etc. have a strong interest in the outcome of the evaluation. Aim to contact other units in the Bank to triangulate.
Partnership for Child Development	Global partner on re-working and development of HGSF under the New Approach.	Key informants	• Key partner for WFP on partnership, WFP's changing role vis-à-vis the policy, and lessons learned. Strong interest in the outcome of the evaluation.
FAO	Support to Min. of Agric and local farmers for HGSF.	Will be interviewed in the course of the evaluation field work.	• Meet in-country if possible

Stakeholder	Role in SF Operations	Role in the evaluation	Implications for the Evaluation
Aid Agencies and NGOs			
NGO operating partners	Various roles in the New Approach and school feeding programme operations	Key informants on a country case by case basis.	• Meet in-country to understand their role in implementation, understanding of the policy, and suggestions for improvement.
I-NGOs	I-NGOs that influence the direction of fields of SF and SP etc	Key informants	• Understand the major SF and SP I-NGOs' perspectives and priorities. Important to understand how the policy (and the roll out of the policy) affects their views of WFP. Understand their priorities and their suggestions for improvement.
WHO	Key partner on health and nutrition issues.	Key informant	• Global level
UNICEF	Core complementary partner in the Essential Package and through the Child Friendly Schools initiative and WASH programme	Will be interviewed in the course of the evaluation field work	• Meet in-country if possible
Donors (USDA/USAID, EC, CIDA, Brazil, DFID)	Donors to School Feeding and Social Protection in general are important in influencing the direction of school feeding, and its future viability as a social protection instrument	Key informants (donor in-country leads; donor HQ leads)	• Understand the major School Feeding donor perspectives and priorities. Important to understand how the policy (and the roll-out of the policy) affects their view of WFP. Understand their priorities and their suggestions for improvement.

Country Case Studies

Purpose of the case studies

C26. Country case studies will be a central feature of the evaluation phase. They will bring a depth and a realism to the enquiry that could not be achieved simply from documentation and interviews at HQ (and regional bureau) level. According to the typology proposed by OE in a recent draft note (WFP, 2010a) the case studies will be primarily *illustrative* and *cumulative:*

- Illustrative: The case study is descriptive in character and intended to add realism and in-depth examples to other information about a programme or policy.
- Cumulative: This brings together findings from many case studies to answer an evaluation question, whether descriptive, normative or cause-and-effect.

C27. However, in line with the evaluation matrix, there will also be a limited exploration of *programme effects* (the results of the policy).

Selection of case study countries

C28. During the inception phase, the choice of case study countries was finalised by OE in consultation with the ET (see Box C6 below). While there was an element of opportunism, the selection has also ensured that the selected countries span three key country categories and are also a reasonable cross-section in terms of the geographical distribution of WFP's entire school feeding portfolio, scale of SF operations, different modalities (wet meals, THR, biscuits etc), stage of transition and language.

C29. Desk studies will be a limited version of the case studies – unable to probe so extensively through interviews (though some telephone interviews will be crucial). However, they will consider the same issues and report according to the same format as the full case studies.

Box C6 Selected case study countries

	Handed Over	**Pilot**	**Non-pilot programmes**	**Total**
Country Visit	Honduras	Malawi Mali	Bhutan Tajikistan	5
Desk Review & telephone interviews	Dominican Republic	Mozambique	Afghanistan	3

C30. The compressed timetable doesn't allow for piloting the country case methodology, but early work on the desk studies will at least test the practicality of the EQs and the country study report format,[108] and may allow some refinement of

[108] Country reports are not a formal deliverable and will be tailored for ease of compilation and synthesis by the country study consultant and the ET. An aide memoire – most likely in powerpoint form – will be shared with in-country stakeholders prior to departure, as a preliminary report on

the instruments. The ET will endeavour to learn from the early ones and adapt the later ones to the extent possible.

Quality Assurance

C31. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents have been provided to the evaluation team.

C32. The timetable incorporated in the TOR shows the timing of inputs from the two external reviewers who will be nominated by OE.

C33. In addition, in line with Mokoro's standard quality assurance system, Mokoro's formal deliverables will be checked by an internal quality assurance panel made up of Rebecca Carter and Martin Adams.

Risks and Assumptions

C34. The limitations on evaluability are well stated in the TOR and are taken into account to the extent possible in the evaluation approach and methodology described in this chapter. It will be important, as part of the consultation and dissemination strategies, to ensure that the expectations of the evaluation's users are realistic. In particular this must be seen as an early evaluation of policy and process, not an evaluation of the impact of school feeding per se.

C35. A "light" approach has been selected for the case studies. This enables broader coverage (5 country visits and 3 desk studies), but spreads resources more thinly. The three desk studies obviously cannot contribute as much depth of insight as the country visits. In the country visits, a single international consultant will be supported by a local consultant over a visit limited to about eight working days in each case. This requires the international consultant to span the breadth of thematic issues, and limits the number of interviews and depth of document review that will be feasible. To the extent possible, this will be mitigated by cross-fertilisation among team members, including centralised support to consultants from the Team Leader, Research Coordinator and thematic leads by email and telephone, by preparation of generic formats and guidelines for data collection in advance and by systematic marshalling of available data by the central research team ahead of each country visit.

C36. The ET is very reliant upon the provision of all necessary data and information from WFP and the countries visited. Thus far [at inception stage] cooperation has been good but limited data availability or lack of responsiveness would prove problematic to the ET especially given the tight time-table for the evaluation.

country findings. Draft country reports may also be shared with key stakeholders for feedback. [Preliminary guidelines were included in the Inception Report.]

C37. The Evaluation Report will include a reflection on the evaluation process and on possible lessons for future policy evaluations. The ET will be careful to indicate the strength, or limitations, of the evidence on which its conclusions are based.

Reflections on the Evaluation Process and Methodology

C38. In summary:

(a) The evaluation team found the EQAS criteria and report templates a very valuable guide.

(b) It was important to insist on the difference between "an evaluation of SF" and "an evaluation of the SF Policy", but the confusion occasionally resurfaced.

(c) Concerning the country studies:

- These were described in the methodology as mainly descriptive and cumulative (see ¶C27–C28 above), but actually went further in exploring programme effects than might have been anticipated (see Annex L and Annex K).
- As promised, all case studies followed same format. This was extremely helpful for the synthesis (Annex K). It was difficult to obtain the same depth in the desk studies, but two of them (Mozambique and Dominican Republic) were greatly assisted by consultants' opportunistic attendance of stakeholder workshops.

(d) Interviews (see Annex G), both globally and for the case studies, were the key source of primary data. Interviews were conducted in confidence, but notes were systematically written up and shared amongst the evaluation team. The consolidated set of global interview notes, in a single searchable file, runs to 80,000 words.

(e) An important element of the exercise was to draw lessons from previous evaluations of SF. As indicated in Annex I, the OE impact evaluations were especially valuable. The scope and rigour of the treatment of SF in WFP's other evaluations was disappointing.

(f) The final workshop (November 2011 – see WFP, 2011zf) brought together a wide range of WFP stakeholders to review the draft evaluation report. This was very helpful in clarifying the report and refining its recommendations.

Annex D Definitions

This annex is reproduced from the Inception Report. It has two purposes:

- it sets out a glossary of terminology as it will be used in this evaluation;
- in some cases, it notes and comments on varying definitions that are in use.

An asterisk indicates a current OE definition, usually taken from the OE's current glossary; a few terms not included in that glossary are drawn from the earlier WFP M&E guide (from its glossary, or from elsewhere in that guide if the term does not appear in the glossary).

term	*how it is used in this evaluation*
activities*	Actions taken or work performed through which inputs are mobilised to produce specific outputs.
coherence	The consistency of policy/programme elements with each other (do they complement each other in a positive way?)
conditional transfers	Transfers to households or individuals that are conditional upon beneficiaries undertaking a certain desirable behaviour. Examples include transfers conditional on sending children to school, participating in antenatal or postnatal care, and attending training.
conclusion*	A conclusion draws on data collected and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of an operation, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results, and more generally with regard to any other strength or weakness.
connectedness*	Ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term interconnected problems into account.
effect*	Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to a WFP operation. These changes (results) can be at the output, outcome and/or impact levels.
effectiveness*	The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
efficiency*	A measure of how economically inputs are converted to outputs.
finding*	A finding is an accumulation of evidence from an assessment, review or evaluation that allows for a factual statement.
food aid / food transfers	Food transfers refer to in-kind rations of food, which can be sourced locally, regionally or internationally. The terms food transfers and food aid are here[109] used interchangeably.

[109] Source for definitions of food aid and food assistance: *Revolution: From Food Aid to Food Assistance* (Gentilini et al, 2010).

term	*how it is used in this evaluation*
food assistance	Food assistance refers to the set of interventions designed to provide access to food to vulnerable and food insecure populations. Generally included are instruments like food transfers, vouchers and cash transfers to ensure access to food of a given quantity, quality or value.
food security*	When all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Note: *This definition includes the following three key dimensions of food security: sufficient availability of food; adequate access to food; and appropriate utilisation of food.*
goal*	The highest-level result to which a WFP operation is intended to contribute. It is measured by impact indicators.
home-grown	[we note that in practice "home-grown" is used variously to refer to food grown in the country concerned, or, more narrowly, to food grown in the vicinity of the school]
impact*	Lasting and/or significant effects of the intervention – social, economic, environmental or technical – on individuals, gender and age-groups, households communities and institutions. Impact can be intended or unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household).[110]
input*	The financial, human, and material resources required to implement the WFP operation.
lessons*	Generally applicable conclusions based on evaluation or review experiences with WFP operations or policies that extrapolate from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.
logframe (logical framework)*	A management tool used to design projects and programmes. It involves identifying inputs, outputs, purpose (outcomes), and goal (impact), and their causal relationships, related performance indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a WFP operation.
local	[As with "home grown", we note that, in the context of HGSF and P4P, "local" may be used to mean in-country, or, more narrowly, the vicinity of an operation]

[110] In the current OE glossary this supersedes the earlier WFP M&E definition, which was:
Positive and negative, intended or unintended long-term results produced by a WFP operation, either directly or indirectly. Relates to the goal level of the logframe hierarchy. Note: *See definitions for goal, results and results-chain.*
The highest level to which a WPF operation is intended to contribute.

term	*how it is used in this evaluation*
outcome*	The medium-term results of an operation's outputs. Relates to the purpose level of the logframe hierarchy.
	The improved situation that a WFP operation is expected to contribute significantly to if completed successfully and on time.
outputs*	The products, capital goods and services which result from a WFP operation; includes changes resulting from the operation which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes. Relates to the output level of the logframe hierarchy.
partners*	The individuals and organisations that collaborate to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives. Note: *The concept of partnership connotes shared goals, common responsibility for outcomes, distinct accountabilities and reciprocal obligations. Partners may include governments, civil society, nongovernmental organisations, universities, professional and business associations, multi-lateral organisations, private companies, etc.*
recommendations*	Proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, relevance or efficiency of a WFP operation; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. Recommendations should be linked to conclusions.
relevance*	The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organisational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies. Note: *Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an operation or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.*
results*	The outputs, outcomes and/or impacts (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a WFP operation. [see *effect*]
	A result is a describable or measurable change in state that is derived from a cause and effect relationship.
results-chain*	The causal sequence for an operation that stipulates the necessary sequence to achieve desired objectives – beginning with inputs, moving through activities and outputs, and culminating in outcomes and impacts.
safety net[111]	Social Safety Nets are non-contributory transfer programmes targeted to the poor or those vulnerable to poverty and shocks [World Bank]

[111] As noted in the SF Policy (Box at paragraph 27), safety nets are a sub-set of broader social protection systems.

term	*how it is used in this evaluation*
social protection[111]	Public interventions to assist individuals, households and communities to manage risk better and that provide support to the critically poor. [World Bank]
sustainability *	The continuation of benefits from a WFP operation after major assistance has been completed.

Annex E Evaluation Matrix

A. Quality of the Policy

To assess the quality of the policy the evaluation will consider:

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ1 How relevant is the policy? Are its objectives appropriate and is it soundly based on evidence?		
Relevance to WFP's mandate – does it explicitly contribute to WFP's objective of finding long-term solutions to hunger?	• Evidence in the policy addressing WFP mandate	• SF Policy, WFP Strategic Plans, and supporting documentation
Relevance to UN Reform and the One UN initiative.	• Reference to joint UN mandate and relevant global policy priorities	• UN reform documentation and interviews
Coherence to and relevance within the international policy context: • Food security and nutrition • Education • Social Protection • Inclusive Economic Growth/Pro-poor growth • Aid effectiveness	• Consistency with international discourse on social protection and other components of the policy • Consistency with international discourse on aid effectiveness	• other external publications and policy documents • stakeholder interviews
Policy supported by credible evidence, including that of cost-effectiveness of SF vis-à-vis other safety nets (questions apply to the policy as a whole and to each of its main thematic components)	• Validity of inferences from evidence available when the policy was prepared • Was evidence of the cost-effectiveness of SF sought when drawing up the policy? • Consistency of policy with evidence that has since become available	• review of key documents on which the policy was explicitly based • review of financial data provided by WFP • review of Return on Investment document • review of subsequent evidence (with special attention to the SF impact studies, and other evaluations in which SF features) in terms of benefits to beneficiaries

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ2 Is the policy clear and internally consistent?		
How clearly stated and logical is the policy as a whole?	Is the policy based on an internally consistent logic model? Are the sector components/objectives logically integrated within the logic model? Are the inputs sufficient to achieve the outputs and the outcomes?	• SF policy
To what degree is social protection a coherent overarching framework?	• Internal consistency of the policy and logic model • Clear statements of policy intent • Clear summary of justification and evidence base for relevant policy elements, including the cost effectiveness of SF vis-à-vis other potential safety nets • Clear statements of strategy and (potential) resourcing for relevant policy elements. • Valid and logical performance indicators for relevant policy elements. • Degree of internal coherence amongst SF policy objectives • Evidence of prioritization of objectives with analysis of trade-offs • Indicators for quality standard 4	• SF policy • document review of past and present country strategies and project documents, internal communications on the policy especially related to roll-out, review of internal evaluations and papers linked to the main thematic elements of the policy • interviews particularly with WFP staff at HQ and in country (including country case studies)
How clear and logical are the other main elements of the policy: • education • nutrition • gender • HGSF?		
Are trade-offs adequately addressed?		
EQ3 Is the policy coherent with WFP's strategic plan and other relevant policies?		
Consistency with the strategic plan	• Consistency with related WFP policies and strategies and evidence of linkage both in policy and implementation	• policy documents • interviews – WFP internal interviews both country level and HQ, perception of external stakeholders particularly those with whom WFP has a partnership MoU
Consistency with other WFP policies		

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ4 Is the policy coherent with international standards?		
Is it convergent with other national/multilateral policies on (school feeding and): ○ social protection ○ education ○ nutrition ○ gender ○ economic growth and agricultural development?	• Summary of points of difference and convergence (substantive or superficial?) • Is the policy coherent in practice? • Evidence of adjusting the policy to changing international standards	• WFP's and other agencies' SF and related policies • international policies and standards on component themes of the SF policy • aid effectiveness standards (e.g. Paris Declaration etc, One UN reform, etc • interviews (particularly with external stakeholders)
Is it coherent with international aid effectiveness standards and the UN reform agenda?		
Is it aligned with the national policy framework?	• Indicators for quality standard 2 • Is it aligned correctly in relation to policy objectives?	• documents (mainly country level) • interviews • country case studies – particularly in terms of how policy is inter-linked with national policy and country strategy

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ5 How practicable is the policy?		
Does it provide an adequate guidance framework for implementation? Is it realistic as to timescale, demands for resources and required changes in behaviour? Is implementation proving to be practicable at country level?	• Clear implementation strategy for the policy • Quality, consistency and clarity of guidance materials • Understanding of potential trade-offs between objectives • Valid and logical performance indicators for relevant policy element(s). • Cost tools to assist country offices and partners • Accurate capture of implementation costs in design and ability to adjust based on experience • Clear and convincing statement and assessment of potential and risks for WFP and other stakeholders. • Level of capacity development required for WFP staff and partners • Indicators for quality standard 5 [where possible, benchmark against other WFP, or other agencies', policy roll-outs]	• SF policy • related guidance materials • interviews (WFP staff, particularly those in country offices and working at field level with schools and governments, views of other actors working in the field e.g. donors, INGOs, NGOs, government ministries) • country case studies

B. Results of the policy

To identify and assess the results of the policy, the evaluation will consider:

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ6 Are relevant stakeholders aware of the policy, and committed to its implementation?		

How was the policy disseminated to different stakeholders?
How well is the policy understood?
Are WFP staff committed to its implementation?
	• Level of understanding and evidence of use of the policy within WFP
	  ○ Have people understood the 'three areas of novelty' and is there evidence of this in practice?
	  ○ What do people understand as being the key shifts resulting from the policy?
	• Policy roll-out experience (globally and in study countries)
	  ○ Effectiveness of information transmission to regional and field offices, and to partners
	  ○ Levels of awareness and demonstrated actions following from awareness
	  ○ Quality and frequency of staffing and training in relation to new skill-set
		• Documents – produced at country level and HQ whether they show evidence of understanding of the policy and indicate degree of implementation e.g. country strategy, project and programme design documents, internal evaluations/ reviews, internal guidelines
		• interviews: all levels internal to WFP and external interviews to triangulate data gained

EQ7 How have WFP's relationships with other stakeholders changed since the policy was introduced?		
Changes in relations with partners at global level Changes in relations with partners at country level	• Level of engagement in national and international forums (social protection, school feeding, education, school health and nutrition initiatives such as FRESH) • Reputational assessment through stakeholder analysis • Degree of WFP's integration within wider Social Protection/education/local economy initiatives and with partner policies in country	• documents – MoUs and country project and programme documents • interviews – WFP country office staff, external partners both at national level and global level • country studies

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ8 How has WFP's portfolio changed since the policy was introduced?		
Changes in WFP's SF portfolio globally Changes at the level of country strategies Changes at the level of specific operations	• Changes in the level, share and main design features of SF operations	• financial and other performance data available from WFP records • programme and project documents • minutes and records of decision-making bodies • interviews – according to WFP staff but also has the portfolio changed according to Governments at country level, donors, other implementing actors
EQ9 Does WFP's school feeding portfolio reflect the policy's quality standards?		
• To what degree do the SF activities designed after introduction of the policy conform to the quality standards proposed by the policy as compared to those designed before the policy?	1. sustainability 2. alignment with national policy framework 3. stable funding and budgeting 4. needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design 5. strong institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and accountability 6. strategy for local production and sourcing 7. strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination 8. strong community participation and ownership 9. [include SF policy indicators as criteria]	• WFP internal assessments when available • project and programme documentation • interviews – with WFP country staff, HQ policy and programme office

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
• To what degree do the SF activities designed after the policy conform to other relevant international standards as compared to those designed before the policy?	e.g. re social protection, are activities: ○ Adequate: full coverage and meaningful benefits to the subset of population they are mean to assist ○ Timely and predictable: people know what they will receive and when, and receive benefits before or during the time of greatest need. ○ Appropriate: fit with circumstance ○ Equitable: same benefits to HH that are equal in important respects (horizontal) and more generous to poorest (vertical). ○ Cost effective: avoiding fragmentation and duplication; efficient (minimum resources for impact) ○ Incentive compatible: recognize that SNs can affect behaviour for better or for worse. Do SF activities maximise the positive and minimize negative ○ Sustainable: financially and politically ○ Dynamic: should evolve over time with changing circumstances	• Documents – project/ programme documentation before and after the policy enabling comparison, evaluations internal and external • interviews – review of policy by external experts at global level concerning contribution of SF to thematic areas, HQ level policy and programmes departments, country office staff (awareness of policy in design process)
	e.g. re HGSF: • Extent to which WFP and governments are achieving local sourcing of SF commodities (and what does 'local' mean in the different contexts?). • Extent to which WFP and governments are achieving use of SF commodities produced in country. • Extent to which WFP and governments are maintaining stability of supply of SF commodities. • Extent to which in-country procurement of SF commodities increasing without negative impacts on other supply chains.	

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
	e.g. re nutrition and Essential Package (EP): • Adequacy of the nutritive value of the ration as designed – with particular emphasis on micronutrients – in relation to the documented nutritional situation among school-age children. • Are nutritional inputs provided appropriate for the context? • Extent to which the EP has been/is implemented at country level. • Achievements and constraints in relation to the above (e.g. commodity pipeline breakdowns which have impeded provision of the ration as designed; failure of partners to provide necessary inputs, such as de-worming tablets, etc.)	• Documents – project/ programme documentation before and after the policy enabling comparison • interviews – review of policy by external experts at global level concerning contribution of SF to thematic areas, HQ level policy and programmes departments, country office staff (awareness of policy in design process)
	e.g. re education: • Does SF improve access to education – education for all (gender/socio-economic/learning disabilities/ethnic minorities)? • How does SF programme encourage girls into school/ keep them in school (EFA aim of achieving gender equity in schools by 2015)? • Extent to which SF is found to have a positive effect on children's learning? • Effect on access rates and completion rates?	
• Existence and implementation of a transition strategy	Transition/handover strategy exists including capacity development needs assessment and capacity development activities carried out Indicators for quality standard 1	

C. Explanations for the results

To explain the results (or absence of results) of the policy, the evaluation will consider:

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ10 Are the observed changes a result of the policy, a continuation of pre-existing good practice, or the consequence of other WFP policy shifts?		
Reasons for change	• Whether shifts have happened since policy issued • Field and headquarter perceptions regarding reason for change • Stakeholder perceptions of reasons for change	• Interviews – WFP staff (field and HQ), external actors (donors, implementing actors, government officials close to SF programmes), teachers and parents • review of programme documents
EQ11 Was there sufficient consultation and ownership in the development of the policy?		
With other agencies?	• Which agencies involved? Appropriate agencies involved? • Nature of consultation and perceptions of participants • Indicators for quality standard 7	• documentary record of policy preparation • interviews with internal and external stakeholders
Within WFP?	• Which units within WFP involved? • Adequate communication with regional and country offices? • Adequate peer review and challenge of the policy as it was developed?	
EQ12 How well was the policy disseminated, with guidelines for its implementation?		
Quality of the guidelines?	• Clarity, credibility, accuracy • Responsiveness to users' needs	• review of guidelines • records of dissemination events • interviews – WFP staff particularly those at country level; also other agencies' knowledge and understanding of the policy
Process of dissemination?	• Timeliness, appropriate targeting and follow-up • Nature of consultation and perceptions of participants in the consultation process	

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ13 Were there sufficient (financial and other) resources for its implementation?		
Resources for dissemination and support to the policy? Resources for substantive implementation of the policy?	• Have WFP resourcing flows changed and can they be attributed to the new policy? (Increase in resources provided to SF from national Government?) • Budget allocation; in relation to other programmes and amongst SFP objectives • Indicators for quality standard 3	• documents/financial records • interviews – WFP staff country level and HQ • country case studies?
EQ14 What internal factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?		

Other incentives/resources for implementing the policy	• Does senior management demonstrate an understanding of and commitment to the new policy?
	• Has adequate internal capacity been built, are adequate staff in place? Do staff have:
	  ○ New and appropriate skills and knowledge specific to social protection and school feeding
	  ○ Are new skills reflected in hiring and performance management practices?
	• Have incentive structures shifted in the light of the policy?
	  ○ Incentives for WFP staff in light of potential of losing employment through handover
	  ○ Performance assessments reflect new priorities?
	  ○ Financing structure
	  ○ Reporting requirements
		• Documents – if possible internal communications to staff, review of incentive structures within WFP, financial breakdowns for COs and at HQ level for SF
		• interviews – WFP staff at HQ level and country level particularly those with an overview of programming, policy and staffing e.g. Country Directors, HR managers, project managers, senior management at HQ, finance and HR departments

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ15 What external factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?		
Relevant changes in WFP's external environment	• Impact of droughts, natural disasters, local or international economic trends, political events, etc.	• Documents published since the policy concerning relationships with partners, e.g. MoUs, joint project documentation, evaluations or comment from external actors (e.g. NGOs, donors, FAO, Unicef) • interviews – WFP staff, donors, core WFP partners, those who implement in country (government/ INGOs)
Relevant changes in relationships with partners, partners' behaviour and partners' perceptions of WFP	• e.g. dynamics of international aid architecture • Donor priorities and perceptions – provision of incentives to national government? • Is there 'additional' funding for SF that otherwise would not be available for other safety nets, particularly with in-kind donations? • Country level government priorities and perceptions • Perceptions of implementing partners	
EQ16 What feedback loops have been put in place and how effective have they been?		
Is WFP able to adequately measure and learn from the implementation of the policy?	• What M&E is in place? • Are suitable indicators being used to measure results? • Is there an appropriate research agenda? • Is there a process for lesson learning and is it being used? Does it draw on other partners' experience and research as well as WFP's? • How has implementation influenced practice – is there a link/feedback loop? Degree of connectedness?	• Documents – details on M&E processes, indicators used in project documents, M&E process and documentation related to policy implementation, evidence of lesson learning in WFP staff outputs and HQ review processes • interviews: (at field level and in HQ) what M&E procedures are in place? any specific to SF? examples where feedback issues have arisen, and what actions resulted? • country studies – evidence of M&E feeding into lesson learning and changes in practice

Key Questions/sub-questions	Analysis/indicators	Sources of Information
EQ17 How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy?		
What are the main threats to sustainability?	• record of similar operations/interventions in the past • likely effects of factors and risks identified under previous EQs • implications of the changing international context on social protection and nutrition for future cost-effectiveness – e.g. Possible shift to more THR for teenage girls	• Documents – review of project/programme documentation: is sustainability being considered in project design and review? • interviews – according to WFP staff, other implementing actors (NGOs, INGOs), national governments, teachers and parents • country case studies

Note: findings under Question A (quality of the policy) will also be relevant in explaining its results, or lack of results. EQ16 and EQ17are also relevant to Question B (results of the policy), but require judgements that will draw on the EQs which precede them.

Annex F SF Policy Origins and Implementation: Key Documents

Introduction

F1. This annex provides a brief review of key documents that are relevant to the origins and then the implementation of the SF Policy that was adopted in 2009. As well as documents that directly address school feeding, it notes some key WFP strategy and management documents that shaped the context for SF Policy implementation.

F2. The documents are presented chronologically (but the sequence is only approximate, since several went through many drafts and many were actually developed in parallel).

The School Feeding Handbook (1999/2000)

F3. WFP had no formal SF policy prior to 2009, but in 1999, WFP, UNESCO and the WHO jointly elaborated a comprehensive School Feeding Handbook which provided guiding principles on the rationale, design, implementation and evaluation of school feeding programmes. The Handbook outlines the objectives and role of school feeding programmes as follows:

> As food alone cannot be expected to address the full range of factors affecting school enrolment and attendance as well as children's scholastic performance, WFP-assisted SFPs can contribute only to: a) improvements in school enrolment and attendance rates; b) improvements in the children's capacity to concentrate and assimilate information by alleviating short-term hunger; and c) a reduction in the prevalence of some micronutrient deficiencies through the provision of fortified foods. (WFP, 2000a)

F4. Food was expected to play primarily a role of "incentive" for parents to enrol/maintain their children – particularly girls – in schools, but also to act as a "nutritional supplement" to alleviate short-term hunger and a "vehicle for micro-nutrients" in countries where micronutrient deficiencies are a significant public health problem and school children are affected and/or at high risk of developing micronutrient deficiencies.

The Essential Package (2002)

F5. In 2002, WFP entered into partnership with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on an integrated package of interventions – the Essential Package (EP) – to improve the nutritional status and health of schoolchildren. The EP is a multi-agency initiative, based on the Focusing Resources on Effective School Health (FRESH) framework and designed to strengthen school health, hygiene and nutrition programmes (UNICEF & WFP 2006). The EP constitutes supplementary guidance for SF programmes, and updated EP guidelines for use in WFP were published in 2010 (WFP, 2010d).

F6. The partnership with UNICEF was formalized in 2005 through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) *"Accelerating Primary Education – The Essential Package"*. (UNICEF/WFP, 2005)

Expert Seminar on FFE (2006)

F7. In 2006, WFP organized a seminar on "Food for Education (FFE)" to gather and disseminate the most recent facts, figures, and solutions available on the subject. The seminar highlighted the importance of:

- Ensuring well-designed, adequate nutrient content food.
- Ensuring food is appealing, locally available and culturally appropriate.
- Encouraging full participation and measuring consumption.
- Ensuring a good educational environment.
- Applying school meals as a part of a multi-faceted intervention. (WFP, 2006e)

Basic Guide to School Feeding (2006)

F8. In 2006, WFP published a guide on school feeding which reiterated the educational and nutritional objectives of school feeding: "increasing access and attendance", "Improving learning" and "improving health and nutrition". (See WFP, 2006d. This was described as a more accessible summary of the existing School Feeding Handbook.)

Food for Education web-site (2007)

F9. In 2007, WFP launched the Food for Education (FFE) web-site (http://www.schoolsandhealth.org/sites/ffe/Pages/Default.aspx) to allow international agencies, national governments, non-governmental organizations and the civil society to access and share reliable information on school feeding. Data are provided and updated by agencies operating school feeding programmes, and PCD is now involved in data management. School feeding assessment and cost issues are addressed and examples provided of how food assistance can support education. Various documents are available for download.

Evaluation of School Feeding in Emergencies (2007)

F10. Emergency SF is outside the remit of the present evaluation. However, several informants mentioned that this evaluation (WFP, 2007e) added to the impetus for a clarification of WFP's overall SF policy. (For example, it evoked a desire for clearer definition of the objectives of all forms of SF.)

F11. Among the evaluation's key points:

> The evaluation identified locally driven programme planning as a key element for responding to these emergency-related implementation challenges.
>
> ... the targeting of school feeding projects has to be based not only on an understanding of the nutritional needs but, more importantly, the educational needs of the affected population.
>
> Governments tend to play a more limited role in the implementation of school feeding projects in emergencies compared to their implementation in development situations. Nevertheless, it remains important for WFP to seek as much government cooperation as possible.
>
> Ultimately, there is no definitive line between school feeding as implemented in emergency or development contexts; both contexts may have many similar challenges. WFP rather should recognize that in addition to specific emergency-related challenges,

> constraints present in development situations will almost inevitably be exacerbated in emergencies. Thus, in order to fully support school feeding in emergencies, WFP will need to provide comprehensive guidance to staff members managing ESF projects.

WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2011)

F12. This strategic plan (WFP, 2008d, since extended to 2013) has set new directions for WFP, designed to consolidate its shift from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency. It sets five strategic objectives:

SO1	save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
SO2	prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures
SO3	restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations
SO4	reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition
SO5	strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase

F13. As noted in the TOR, this strategic plan embedded school feeding in a broadened Strategic Objective 4, which aims to reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition to break the inter-generational cycle of chronic hunger, including by addressing micro-nutrient deficiencies. It sets a goal of increasing levels of education and foresees school feeding addressing short-term hunger, and thus improving learning abilities, providing a safety net by ensuring children attend school both through food in school and take-home rations. It re-introduces a goal of using school feeding as a platform for delivery of macro- and micro-nutrients. By using locally produced foods, school feeding is also expected to have a positive local economic impact. SO5 was also highly relevant, by implying more direct support to countries' own SF strategies and capacities.

F14. The *Strategic Results Framework* (WFP, 2009j) and subsequent refinements (e.g. WFP, 2011x) serves as the basis for aligning country-level monitoring and reporting to the 5 SOs. The 2009 Framework notes:

> School enrolment is reported in relation to two distinct outcomes. Under Strategic Objective 3 (post-crisis situations) the intended outcome is to stabilize enrolment at pre-crisis levels; “retention rate” is used as a proxy for school feeding’s contribution to that outcome. Under Strategic Objective 4 (chronic hunger and undernutrition), the intended outcome of school feeding is to increase access to education and develop human capital. These two distinct outcomes require indicators with different calculation methods.

Draft School Feeding Policy 2008

F15. A draft SF policy entitled "School Feeding – A Hunger Safety Net That Supports Learning, Health and Community Development" was intended for submission to the EB's annual session in October 2008. It was the subject of an informal consultation on 4 September 2008, from which it became clear there was not sufficient support for the draft. The SF unit was requested to do more work on

the paper, including a more rigorous presentation of evidence, more analysis of SF's relative advantages as a safety net, to reconsider some of the claims about SF effects (it was not necessarily credible to link SF with all 5 Strategic Objectives), and to provide clearer guidance about which objectives should be pursued in particular operations.

Learning from Experience (published 2009)

F16. This included a summary report WFP, 2009zh) along with a number of country illustrations. It was based on an internal review that used programme evaluations and other documents to draw good practices and lessons learned from WFP's extensive SF experience. It makes use of the "8 quality standards" which later featured in the SF Policy (but the scoring system for the checkboxes presented is not precisely explained). This study is one of the supporting analyses cited in the 2009 SF Policy.

Home-Grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production

F17. See Espejo et al, 2009, also cited in the 2009 SF Policy, as:

> a study conducted by WFP in 2008 and 2009, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation [which] explores the feasibility of linking school feeding programmes with local agricultural production in developing countries.

An Investment Case for School Feeding

F18. Cited thus in the 2009 SF Policy:

> "An Investment Case for School Feeding" by WFP and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has compared the monetary costs of providing school feeding with long-term economic benefits, assessing the benefit/cost ratio and total economic value created by school feeding

Figure F1 Objectives of the Investment Case



F19. This has been through several iterations and refinements. A version entitled: *School Feeding: A Sound Investment – Results from investment case study*, is dated February 2009. The latest version available to the Evaluation Team was *Investment Case Presentation, School Feeding Consultation, 1-4th March 2011* (WFP & BCG, 2011), which begins with a very useful summary of what the exercise does and does not purport to do (see Figure F1 above).

Rethinking School Feeding (July 2009)

F20. See Bundy et al, 2009a. This was a collaborative effort by WFP and the World Bank, and the most important underpinning of the SF Policy 2009, which describes it as:

> a comprehensive review of the evidence of best practice [which] provides guidance on how to develop and implement effective school feeding programmes. (WFP, 2009q, ¶4)

F21. It has played a prominent role in subsequent advocacy. According to the Background Note (WFP, 2009za), cooperation on the book began in June 2008, and:

> The final version of the WFP/World Bank publication *Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector* was jointly launched in late November 2009, with a Brookings event on the same day providing an opportunity for Josette Sheeran and Robert Zoellick to promote the findings of the book. It has been widely disseminated in Washington DC among relevant members of Congress and the USG, as well as NGOs and school feeding advocates.

The Bellagio Forum (July 2009)

F22. The Bellagio meeting (16-17 July) was intended to follow up on the food security commitments of the immediately preceding G8 meeting. According to its "Outcomes" document WFP, 2009zc), it focused on the role of social protection and food-based safety nets, and points of consensus included:

- Food and nutrition safety nets are a critical tool to tackle hunger, malnutrition and ensure food access.
- Food safety nets, such as school meals and mother and child nutrition programs can help end hunger and stunting in vulnerable and hungry children, from conception throughout their school-age years, so they can realize the fullness of their potential.
- In times of crisis or shock, food and nutrition safety nets act as a platform to scale up to reach the neediest.
- Protecting children from social shocks through food and nutrition safety nets help to maintain social stability, combat radicalism and prevent child labour.
- Food and nutrition safety nets lay the foundation for a better future for nations by creating significant economic returns on investment, stimulating local economy through local purchase and value-added production of items like high energy biscuits.
- Agricultural production efficiently linked to stable markets such as food and nutrition safety-net programmes, serve as a stimulus to agricultural and market development.

F23. Among other topics, there was a discussion of advocacy, which included the following suggestions:

> Brand safety nets and school feeding as:
> - An investment that brings economic incentives for all involved;
> - A catalyst for economic development rather [than] a hand-out cost;
> - Involving production cycle and local purchase as supporting economy;
> - Positioned as an investment of local economy as a stabilizing mechanism;
> - Providing strategic competitive advantage as a key component in nation-building;
> - Recognizing school's attractive alternative to radicalism;
> - Language of "School meals" better than "School feeding";
> - Feed Minds, Change Lives.

The approved School Feeding Policy (2009)

F24. The subject of this evaluation (WFP, 2009q) is dated 8 October 2009, and was discussed and approved at the EB Meeting 9-13 November 2009. See section 1.3 of this evaluation report for commentary.

SF Concept Note 2009

F25. A Concept Note: *Sustainable school feeding: lifting school children out of the hunger trap* (WFP, 2009zg) was issued at the same time as the 2009 SF Policy. It expands on some of the thinking that went into the SF Policy, and is described in the TOR as " in effect the top-line implementation plan" (Annex B, ¶18). It includes milestones for activities at corporate and country level to implement the policy, and a demarcation of major roles among partners.

F26. The Concept Note is more explicit about policy objectives than the SF Policy itself . Thus it includes the SF policy logical framework that is reproduced as Box C3 in Annex C, with the following objectives clearly depicted:

- Improved SF Quality
- Wider SF coverage
- Effective capacity for school feeding.

Tools and Guides for Implementation of the SF Policy

F27. The SF Policy has been followed by considerable and ongoing work on tools and guides for its implementation (see Annex J, Note 1 of this report).

School Feeding: Background Note on New Directions (2010)

F28. This is a briefing note (marked "Internal Use Only") which:

> .. is intended to help foster a common vision, understanding and approach to WFP's new directions on school feeding. (WFP, 2010za)

F29. It is a useful compendium – 46 pages – of key points from the Policy, Bellagio, what the 8 standards are, and so forth. (Like the Bellagio document (WFP, 2009zc) it urges "school meals" rather than "school feeding" as a preferred usage.)

School Feeding Policy Implementation Approach (June 2010)

F30. This document was submitted to the Executive Policy Council and approved by the ED on 30 June 2010 (WFP, 2010p). It was submitted by the SF Policy Unit (PSS) noting " this document was prepared with inputs from the Programme Division (ODX)". The intention is to "transform WFP's SF policy into operational reality" (WFP, 2010p). It is generally consistent with the Concept Note, but introduces the "three pillars" of the implementation approach:

> namely 1) implementation support, 2) strategic thought leadership, and 3) advocacy, partnerships and fundraising.

F31. The document includes include a draft Results Matrix 2010–2012. It reiterates many of WFP's broad commitments on SF, but also includes more specific undertakings under the heading of implementation support:

> 23. WFP headquarters will provide regular communication and support to WFP Country Offices, through the Programme Review Committee and the Country Strategy Development processes and throughout the programme cycle in terms of guidance, advice and technical missions in order to ensure programmes are in line with the new school feeding policy (and logic model) and that they are sustainable, nutritious, targeted and cost-effective and encourage local procurement and links to agriculture (including through P4P) and local development to the extent possible.
>
> 25. WFP at country level will provide advice and support to national governments in terms of appraisal, design, targeting (or re-targeting), funding, management, logistics, procurement, monitoring or other support and services required.
>
> 32. Programme staff at WFP country offices and Headquarters/regional bureaux will be provided with training on the school feeding policy, the implementation approach and processes, tools and frameworks to ensure quality planning, implementation and monitoring of school feeding programmes. …
>
> 33. WFP programmes, work plans and the Country Strategies will reflect the WFP school feeding policy and implementation approach.

WFP Programme Category Review (2010)

F32. See WFP, 2010t which notes that:

> The approval of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013 prompted a review of WFP's financial framework and programme categories to ensure that they allowed flexibility to respond effectively to varying contexts and needs, including through greater predictability and less earmarking, while providing accountability and transparency in the allocation of WFP resources.

F33. The financial framework review is discussed below. The programme category review sought to clarify the distinction between humanitarian and developmental interventions, and to ensure greater consistency in the future. It noted:

> The protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) category faced particular scrutiny, with some donor members expressing concern that it increasingly included activities that would better be accommodated in the development category. (ibid ¶2)
>
> WFP has been criticized by some members for using PRROs as vehicles to attract funds intended to address urgent humanitarian action and then using the funds for longer-term objectives that would benefit from more sustained planning and support. (ibid ¶22)

F34. The effect of the resulting programme category guidance is that action towards SO4 – which (along with SO5) is the usual objective for non-emergency SF – should normally be implemented through development programmes (the CP and DEV categories).

WFP Financial Framework Review (2010)

F35. The Financial Framework Review was considered by the EB in November 2010 (WFP, 2010zu); options had been analysed in an earlier paper (WFP, 2010g).

F36. A legacy of WFP's food aid operations has been a "tonnage model" that links support costs to volumes of food involved. This became increasingly inappropriate as WFP received fewer in-kind donations and sought to increase its use of cash-based instruments and its role in advisory and capacity development activities. As the 2009 Annual Evaluation Report (AER) noted,

> The [tonnage] model provides incentives to look for tonnage-based solutions, because other solutions – even if equally relevant – do not generate the resources necessary to implement them. The model also involves associating all expenditure directly with the operation for which the funds were contributed. This arrangement means that operations take place in isolation from each other. Valuable opportunities to create synergies between programme activities or learning from one to the other operation are lost. (WFP, 2009a)

F37. The two key recommendations of the review are:

> 1. Segregate non-commodity activities within projects and – exceptionally – allow separate funding streams
>
> 2. Modify the current DSC [Direct Support Cost] funding model to a percentage of the operational budget rather than a rate per metric ton.

F38. WFP is working to put these changes into effect from 2012 onwards. The Financial Framework Review notes:

> The changes outlined here are fundamental for implementation of the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013). A clear, simple and transparent way of costing and funding non-commodity activities will provide the foundation for the shift from a food aid to a food assistance model of service provision. The change to the funding model for support costs will ensure an equitable cost apportionment for donors and a more stable provision of support to country offices. (WFP, 2010h ¶25)

SF Consultation Workshop, Rome March 2011[112]

F39. WFP held an internal workshop in Rome, 1–4 March 2011. For many country-level participants it was seen as the first major dissemination exercise for the SF Policy. The event is described thus in the Implementation Update:

> WFP recently held a four-day internal consultation in Rome on school feeding and nutrition to take stock of innovations in school feeding in order to: i) provide a learning opportunity for country offices and Headquarters staff to share experiences and lessons learned; ii) identify major issues and challenges that need to be overcome in coming

[112] The e-library prepared by OE for the Evaluation Team included a whole sub-folder (at #104) for documents from this workshop.

years to fully implement and update the policy; and iii) interact with WFP's main school feeding partners to identify opportunities for collaboration. (WFP, 2011zb, ¶14)

F40. Among the workshop documents is the depiction of vision and objectives shown in Figure F2 below.

Figure F2 WFP School Feeding: Vision and Objectives



Source: March 2011 workshop, document #3

Implementation Update 2011

F41. The 2010 Implementation Approach (described earlier) was endorsed by the Executive Policy Council, but the Implementation Update (WFP, 2011zb; dated 21 April 2011, for EB meeting 6–10 June 2011) was the first major follow-up to the policy to be presented to the EB. It describes the implementation approach and progress in implementing the SF policy. It makes a clearer link between goal, objectives and implementation strategy than previous documents submitted to the Board, for example in the diagram reproduced as Figure F3 below.

Figure F3 Approach to SF from Implementation Update 2011



F42. The document also enumerates various implementation activities, including work on partnerships, the development and roll-out of guidance materials, and steps to strengthen performance measurement. It does not specifically report against the results matrix that was attached to the Implementation Approach document.

F43. A number of EB members found the Update to be a very helpful elaboration and operationalisation of the SF Policy.

Annex G List of People Consulted

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Abdurahimov	Ibrohim	School Feeding Focal Point, Education Department of Bokhtar district	TJ	GOV-Local	M
Abduvahobov	Parviz	Program Officer, Early Learning	TJ	AID AG-UNICEF, TJ	M
Adriano	Denis Orlando	District Director for the Municipality of Ceguapa. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Agoya	Mark	Reports Officer, P4P (PS)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Aguilar	Mario Margarito	Assistant Teacher (6th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Aguilar	Dora	School Meal Parents' Committee	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Aguilera	Jaime Luis	District Director for the Municipality of Siguatepeque, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Alcerro	Javier Aníbal	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Alderman	Harold	World Bank Development Research Group	G	AID AG- World Bank	M
Allison	Gaia	Livelihood Advisor	TJ	AID AG-DFID, TJ	F
Alonso	Juan Diego	Education Officer	HN	AID AG-World Bank	M
Alvarado	Wendy	Monitoring	HN	WFP-CO	F
Alvarado	Maura Mireya	School Meal Parents' Committee	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Amgay	Ugyen	Planning Officer, PPD, Ministry of Education	BT	GOV-Central	M
Aranda da Silva	Manuel	Director, Policy Planning and Strategy Division (PS)	G	WFP-HQ	M

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Argentina Madrid	Miriam	District Director for the Municipality of Las Vegas. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Arriaga	Valentina	Member of the School Meal Committee	HN	School: Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Asdrúbal Lara	Renán	District Director for the Municipalities of Lamaní, San Sebastián and Humuya, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Asliddin	Jurakhonov	Deputy Head Of Financial Department, Financial Department of Yovon District	TJ	GOV-Local	M
Asrorov	Sharof	Headmaster	TJ	School-#4 (Parchasoy village of Yovon district, Khatlon region)	M
Assefa	Abébéch	Program Manager, Education and Health	MA	AID AG-CIDA	F
Avelar	Ramón (boy)	2nd Grade President	HN	School-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Avelar	Carmen Suyapa	Helper at the School Meal Committee	HN	School-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Avelar	José Arnold	Mayor of the Municipality of Arada, Santa Barbara	HN	GOV-Local	M
Ávila	Alejandro	Technical Assistant for the "Escuela Saludable" (Healthy School) Programme (PES), Ministry for Social Development	HN	GOV-Central	M
Avilar	René	Assistant Teacher (3rd Grade)	HN	School- Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Avilar	Martha Isabel	Assistant Teacher (4th Grade)	HN	School- Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Ayestes	Gerardo	Programme Assistant, ME	HN	WFP-CO	M
Aylieff	John	WFP Regional Bureau Bangkok	G	WFP-RB	M
Azizi	Sarwar	Chief of Staff, Ministry of Education	AF	GOV-Central	M

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Badejo	Adeyinka	Programme Officer, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Bahodur	Eshboev	Head of Department Monitoring Of Implementation Of Projects, Ministry of Economy and Trade Development RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Bahorov	Azam	Senior Program Assistant, School Feeding Focal Point	TJ	WFP -CO	M
Banegas	Karen	Coordinator PREAL-FEREMA	HN	NGO- FEREMA Foundation	F
Barahona	Juvencio	SFP Monitor, Santa Barbara	HN	SFP	M
Barclay	Bill	South Africa Regional Team	G	WFP-RB	M
Barnes	Joseph	IOD PARC consultant (contracted by WFP)	G	PRIV -IOD PARC	M
Barreto	Miguel	WFP Honduras Representative	HN	WFP-CO	M
Bertoli	Sandra	Program Analyst – Education Data - USAID Economic Growth and Trade (EGAT)/ Office of Education (ED)	G	AID AG-USAID	F
Bhatia	Rita	WFP Regional Bureau Bangkok	G	WFP-RB	F
Bidault	Nicolas	Consultant, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Bidha	Gyem	Laboratory Officer, Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests	BT	GOV-Central	F
Bidha	Tandin	Planning Officer, Gross National Happiness Commission	BT	GOV-Central	F
Bloem	Martin	Chief, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS Service (PSN)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Bower	Trudy	Grants Manager	G	WFP-HQ	F
Bozoriev	Nurmuhammad	Methodologist, Education department of Bokhtar district	TJ	GOV-Local	M

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Brannaman	John	Division Chief, Food for Peace, Food for Peace.	G	AID AG-USAID	M
Brevé	Marlen	Food and Nutrition	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Brown	Lynn	Acting Chief, Food Security and Safety Nets Service (PSF)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Brudzynski	Robert	Task Manager, Social Protection	TJ	AID AG-European Commission	M
Buani	Christiani	Brazil SF Centre of Excellence, National Fund for Educational Development/Ministry of Education	BR	GOV-Central	F
Buffard	Paul	Senior Regional Programme Adviser	TJ	WFP - RB	M
Bundy	Don	Program Leader for Reproductive Health, Nutrition and Population (AFTHE- Africa Region Technical Health Unit)	G	AID AG-World Bank	M
Burbano	Carmen	Policy Officer, School Feeding Service (PSS)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Burrows	Sally	Senior Evaluation Officer, Office of Evaluation (OE)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Caballero	Senia	Assistant Teacher (2nd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Caballero	José Antonio	Assistant Teacher (3rd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Caballero	Wilmer	School Headmaster	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Cabrera	Juan (boy)	Health Committee Coordinator (4th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Cabrera	Milagros Esperanza	School Meal Parents' Committee	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Cáceres	Sandra	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	F

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Canales	Gladis	Fiscal at the School Meal Committee	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Cardona Pineda	Edwin (boy)	Discipline Committee Coordinator (5th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Caruso	Sylvia	Country Office Deputy Director	MZ	WFP-CO	F
Castañeda	Luis Enrique	District Director for the Municipality of Siguatepeque, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Castañeda	Sulma Dinora	District Director for the Municipality of Taulabé, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Castellanos	Fani Alejandra	1st Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Castellanos	Rosa	Assistant Teacher (3rd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Castillo	Karen (girl)	3rd Grade President	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Castillo	Cesar	Monitoring	HN	WFP-CO	M
Castillo	José	Regional School Feeding Officer	DO	WFP-RB	M
Castillo	Lilian	WFP La Paz Monitor	HN	WFP-CO	F
Castro	Lola	Country Office Director	MZ	WFP-CO	F
Castro	Carlos Adalberto	School Headmaster	HN	SCHOOL-Dionisio de Herrera (La Paz)	M
Cespedes	Angela	Nutrition Adviser, ODXP	G	WFP-HQ	F
Chambers	Alison	Education Team	G	AID-AG AusAID/ EB-Australia	F
Chávez	Rita María	Assistant Teacher (3rd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F

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Chhetri	Tek B.	Liaison Office of Denmark	BT	AID AG-Danida	M
Chidumu	M.	Nutrition Officer, Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS , Office of the President and Cabinet	MW	GOV-Central	
Chinchilla	Enrique	Honduras Country Manager	HN	AID AG-BCIE/CABEI	M
Chirinos	Raquel	SFP Regional Coordinator, Centre & South.	HN	SFP	F
Chitule	N.	HIV/AIDS Specialist	MW	AID AG-USAID	
Chizimba	L.	Vulnerability Adviser	MW	AID AG-Irish Aid	
Chonjur	Tashi	District Education Officer, Chukha Dzonghag	BT	GOV-Local	M
Colindres	Héctor	Coordinator of La Paz Area	HN	WFP-CO	M
Contreras	Maribel	Technical Assistant for the Municipality of Taulabé, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Corrales	Héctor	Junior Professional	HN	AID AG-World Bank, HN	M
Cortés Mejía	Milton Rolando	District Director for the Municipality of San Vicente. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Coulibaly	Makiyou	National Coordinator FFW FFT, Ministry of Agriculture	MA	GOV-Central	M
Coulibaly	M.	School Feeding Coordinator	MA	CAP Kayes Rive Gauche	M
Cruz	Héctor	Monitoring	HN	WFP-CO	M
Cruz	Iris Rosalina	National Coordinator for Food and Nutrition Safety	HN	GOV-Central	F
Dardano	Carmen	Nutrition Officer	G	AID AG-FAO	F
De la Cruz Pineda	José	District Director for the Municipality of Santa Rita. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	Government	M
Dean	Kevin	Deputy Country Office Director Of USAID Tajikistan	TJ	AID AG-USAID, TJ	M

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Degernier	Philippe-Serge	Regional Office South Africa	G	WFP-RB	M
Dema	Karma	Principal	BT	SCHOOL-Yangchen Gatshel LSS	F
Dettori	Ilaria	Chief, School Feeding, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Dhap	Dorji	Dept. of Public Accounts, Ministry of Finance	BT	GOV-Central	M
Dhima	Giorgio	Deputy Director	MA	AID AG-Swiss Cooperation	M
Di Sirio	Paqualina	West African Regional Bureau	G	WFP-RB	F
Diakité	Issa	Field Officer Manager (Kayes)	MA	WFP-CO	M
Díaz	Raúl	School Feeding Service Coordinator (SAEH-Servicio de Alimentación Escolar), Ministry of Education (Secretaría de Educación)	HN	GOV-Central	M
Dinor Padilla	Tirso	Technical Assistant for Comayagua, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Diop	A.	Country Director	MW	WFP-CO	M
Diskin	Patrick	Regional FFPO East Africa, Food for Peace.	G	AID AG-USAID	M
Djioze	Valérie	Education Officer	MA	AID AG-UNESCO	F
Domith Godinho	Renato	Brazil Executive Board	G	EB-Brazil	M
Dorji	Karma	Executive Director, Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests	BT	GOV-Central	M
Dorji	Dago	WFP Focal Point, Ministry of Education	BT	GOV-Central	M
Dougnon	Denis	Secretary General, Ministry of Education, Literacy and National Languages	MA	GOV-Central	M
Doumbia	Mamadou	National Coordinator for SF, Ministry of Education	MA	GOV-Cnetral	M

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Drake	Lesley	Chief Nutrition, MCH and HIV/AIDS, Programme Design Service OMXD	G	WFP-HQ	F
Drukpa	Dungkar	Officer in charge	BT	WFP- CO	M
Dubón Dubón	Belinda	District Director for the Municipality of El Níspero. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Due	Torben	Director of Operations, Operations Department (OD)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Echevarrieta	Blanca	Senior Programme Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	F
Elder	Leslie K.	Senior Nutrition Specialist– Health, Nutrition & Population– Human Development Network	G	AID AG-World Bank	F
Elkhuizen	Ronald	Netherlands Executive Board	G	EB-Netherlands	M
Ergashevich	Doniyorov Tilovmurod	Head of International Relations Department, Ministry of Agriculture RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Espejo	Francisco	Ombudsman	G	WFP-HQ	M
Espinal	Miriam Suyapa	4th Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Esposito	Dina	Director Office of Food for Peace	G	AID AG-USAID	F
Fanlo	Jorge	Sr. Programme Adviser, P4P	G	WFP-HQ	M
Faure	Elisabeth	Programme Adviser , Handover and Partnership Branch (ODXH)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Fearnley-Sander	Mary	Education Adviser	G	AIG AG-AusAid/ EB-Australia	F
Ferreira	Alzira	Representative/Country Director	TJ	WFP -CO	F
Feustel	Dorothy	Deputy Director, Food Assistance Division, Office of Capacity Building and Development, Foreign Agricultural Service.	G	AID AG-USDA/ EB-U.S.A	F

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Fleuren	Joan	Chief, Handover and Partnership Branch (ODXH)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Flores	Jaime	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Flores	Rosa María	Executive Country Portfolio Management	HN	AIG AG-BCIE/CABEI	F
Friis	J.	Basic Education Programme: Principal Sector Adviser	MW	AID AG-GIZ	M
Fukami	Takaho	Chief, Basic Education And Gender Equality Programme	TJ	AID AG-UNICEF, TJ	M
García Castellanos	Felipe	District Director for the Municipality of Concepción del Sur. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
García Domínguez	Giovanni	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Gelli	Aulo	Senior Research manager at the Partnership for Child development & Deputy Director of the Home Grown School Feeding Programme	G	NGO-Partnership for Child Development, Imperial College	M
Giannini	Leonel	President of FICOHSA Foundation	HN	NGO- FICOHSA Foundation	M
Gill	Kristina		G	AID AG-AusAid/ EB-Australia	F
Gonani	L.	Programme Director	MW	WFP-CO	M
Granados Serna	Francisco	Departmental Director, Comayagua, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Grant	Rachel	Policy Team Leader PTD, Food for Peace.	G	AID AG-USAID	F
Guarnieri	Valerie	Director, Programme Division (ODX)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Guindo	Abou	SF Programme Officer	MA	WFP-CO	M
Gurung	Meghraj	WFP Officer In-charge, Food Corporation of Bhutan	BT	WFP-CO	M

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Guzmán	Mercy Dili	School Meal Parents' Committee	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Gyeltshen	Pemba T	Assistant District Education Officer, Chukha Dzonghag	BT	GOV-Local	M
Habibov	Tohir	Specialist from the International Relationship Department, Ministry of Economy and Trade Development RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Hamai	M.	Purchase for Progress (P4P)	MW	WFP-HQ	
Harvey	James	UK Executive Board	G	EB-United Kingdom	M
Heider	Caroline	Director, Office of Evaluation (OE)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Heines	Edith	Programme Adviser, MCH (Mother & Child Health), Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Hernández	Nolvia Liseth	President of the Parents' Board	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Hernández	Cintia (girl)	Student Body Treasurer (6TH Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Hill	Heather	Deputy Country Director	TJ	WFP -CO	F
Hingst	Dr Gepke	Country Director	BT	AID AG-UNICEF	F
Hollema	Siemon	Sr. Programme Adviser, Food Security Analysis Service (ODXF)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Howard	Shannon	PO, ODXP	G	WFP-HQ	F
Husain	Arif	Deputy Chief, Food Security Analysis Service (ODXF)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Ismonov	Fathiddin	Head Of Planning Department, Ministry of Education RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Jallow	Isatou	Gender Unit Chief	G	WFP-HQ	F
Jawad	Nassim	Coordinator – FAO Coordination Office For Tajikistan	TJ	AID AG-FAO, TJ	M

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Jemu	S.	National Programme Manager, Schistosomiasis and Soil Transmitted Helminths Programme, Community Health Sciences Unit, Ministry of Health	MW	GOV-Central	
Jiménez	Mariano	Coordinator for the "Unidad Técnica de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional" UTSAN (Food and Nutrition Safety Technical Unit). Department of State for the Presidential Office.	HN	GOV-Central	M
Jiménez	Mariano Lara	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Johnson	Brad	Programme Officer, Office of the Executive Director	G	WFP-HQ	M
Kamano	Pierre	Senior Education Specialist	MA	AID AG-World Bank	M
Kanarine	Nury (girl)	Member of the student body (1st Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Kankhande	S.	National Programme Officer	MW	AID AG-FAO	
Karomatullo	Karimov	Headmaster	TJ	SCHOOL-Lenin (Yovon district, Khatlon Region)	M
Kasiya	F.	District School Feeding Co-ordinator (Kasungu)	MW	GOV-Local	
Kawaguchi	Kiyomi	WFP staffer, Brazil SF Centre of Excellence	BR	WFP-CO	F
Kaye	Chris	Director, Performance and Accountability Management Division (RMP)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Kazembe	T.	Human Development Officer	MW	AID AG-World Bank	
Khairiddin	Karimov	Head Of Methodology Department, Education department of Bokhtar district	TJ	GOV-Local	M
King	Elizabeth	Director of Education – World Bank	G	AID AG-World Bank	F
Kumikundi	C.	District Education Manager (Kasungu)	MW	GOV-Local	
Ky	Abdoulaye	Education Advisor	MA	AID AG-CIDA	M

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Lalatta Cotserbosa	Federico	Partner and Managing Director	G	PRIV- Boston Consulting Group	M
LaPrairie	Mark	Country Representative	BT	AID AG-World Bank	M
Lara Pineda	Alex Narciso	District Director for the Municipality of Zacapa. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Laureano	Claudia	SFP Regional Coordinator, North-Western Zone.	HN	SFP	F
Leiva	Michelle Fabiola (girl)	Member of the student body (2nd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Leiva Madrid	Jesús	Assistant Teacher (2nd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL- Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Lewis	Neryl	Director, Humanitarian Policy Section	G	AID AG-AusAid/ EB-Australia	F
Licina	Jelena	Consultant, School Feeding Service (PSS)	G	WFP-HQ	F
López	Debbie Vanessa (girl)	Student Body President (6th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Machado	Hugo Ramón	School Headmaster	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Madariaga Varela	Efrén	District Director for the Municipality ofVilla de San Antonio, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Madrid	Martha Lidia	Assistant Teacher (1st Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Mahmadrasul	Kalonov	Headmaster	TJ	SCHOOL- #45, Ghairat village	M
Maiga	Ousmane	PO	MA	NGO-Catholic Relief Services	M
Maiga	Ismalia	Programme Officer FFT FFW	MA	AID AG-Swiss Cooperation	F

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Maiga	Bonaventure	Technical Advisor, Ministry of Education	MA	GOV-Central	M
Makhalira	G.	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	MW	WFP-CO	
Malangwe	Martin	Malawi Oggice	MA	WFP-CO	M
Maldonado	Rodolfo Antonio	School Deputy Headmaster	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	M
Martin-Daihirou	Alice	Country Director	MA	WFP-CO	F
Mazinga	C.	Deputy Director, School Health, Nutrition, HIV and AIDS, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology	MW	GOV-Central	
McClements	Tania	CIDA Development Officer	HN	AID AG-CIDA	F
McGroarty	Mary-Ellen	Sr. Programme Adviser, P4P	G	WFP-HQ	F
McLaughlin	Robert	Consultant	AF	WFP-	M
McRae	Tim	Country Backstop Officer, Food for Peace.	G	AID AG- USAID	M
Medina	Elmer Augusto	2nd Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	M
Medina	Gabriela	Senior Procurement Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	F
Meir	Ute	Ex SF unit, now Iraq programme, based in Jordan.	G	WFP-CO	F
Mejía	Suyapa	Senior Logistics Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	F
Meky	M.	Human Development Specialist	MW	World Bank	
Melo	Laura	Programme Adviser, P4P	G	WFP-HQ	F
Menjivar	Gloria	General Director for Education Services, Secretaría de Educación (Ministry of Education)	HN	GOV-Central	F
Menza	Valerie	Nutrition Officer	G	FAO	F
Mersch	Céline	SF JPO	MA	WFP-CO	F

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Michel	Susana	Vice-Minister and Director, Dirección General de Bienestar Estudiantil (Student Welfare General Directorate) , Ministry of Education	DO	Government	F
Mirabele	Mariana	Consultant	DO	WFP-HQ	F
Mirzoev	Mirzo	Head Of District Education Department, Yovon district's Education department	TJ	GOV-Local	M
Mitchell	Arlene	Senior Program Officer	G	NGO-Gates Foundation	F
Molinas	Luca	Consultant PSS	G & DO	WFP-HQ	M
Montes	Gloria Robertina	1st Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Montoya	Esmilda	Education Specialist	HN	AID AG-UNICEF	F
Montresor	Dr. Antonio	Division of Control of Neglected Diseases (De-worming)	G	AID AG-WHO	M
Moreno	Silvia Patricia	District Technical Assistant. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Moshi	Magdalena	Regional Program Advisor	TJ	WFP - RB	F
Moyo	W.	District Education Co-ordinator (Kasungu)	MW	GOV-Local	
Mphangwe	M.	School Feeding Officer	MW	WFP-CO	M
Mtalo	Calister	Education Specialist	AF	AID AG-UNICEF	F
Muhamadieva	Gulnora	Deputy Program Manager	TJ	AID AG-DFID, TJ	F
Munthali	M.	Pipeline Officer	MW	WFP-	
Munthali	F.	Social Sector Adviser	MW	AID AG-DFID	
Murodova	Zuhro	Area Program Manager	TJ	NGO-Save the Children, Kurghonteppa	F
Mutamba	Carolyn	East Africa/Horn Team Leader, Food for Peace	G	AID AG-USAID	F

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Mwalima	H.	Director, Poverty Reduction and Social Protection, Ministry of Development Planning and Co-operation	MW	GOV-Central	
Mwenda	L.	Learning Adviser	MW	Plan Malawi	
N/A	N/A	Cooks and WFP in charge	BT	Yangchengatshel LSS	
N/A	N/A	Cooks, students and WFP in charge	BT	Chapcha MSS	
N/A	N/A	Members of the Parents Teacher Association (PTA)	TJ	School #45, Ghairat village	
N/A	N/A	Members of the Parents Teacher Association (PTA)	TJ	Lenin school of Yovon district, Khatlon Region	
N/A	N/A	Members of the Parents Teacher Association (PTA)	TJ	School # 4 Parchasoy village of Yovon district, Khatlon Region	
N/A	N/A	Members of the School Management Committee, Niamiga PS, Kayes region	MA	Government	
N/A	N/A	Members of the School Management Committee, Wali Kompe Diawara PS, Kayes region	MA	Government	
N/A	N/A	Representatives from local NGOs Stop Sahel, ADR, Kayes region	MA	Local NGO's	
N/A	N/A	Students, Parents, Cooks and WFP in Charge	BT	Sinchula Primary School	
N/A	Megan	Volunteer Teacher	BT	N/A	F
Nabieva	Sharofat	Food Aid Monitor, School Feeding Focal Point In Sughd Region	TJ	WFP-CO	F
Nadazdin	Natasha	Programme Adviser, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Naumann	Milica	Manager of the Food Assistance Unit (previously, Senior Programme Officer, focusing on WFP work)	G	AID AG-CIDA/ EB-Canada	F
Neve	Nicole	Consultant, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Nidup	Tshewang	Headmaster	BT	SCHOOL-Sinchula Primary	M

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Nkhoma	A.	Deputy Headmaster	MW	SCHOOL-Mawango Primary, Kasungu	
Noble	Ruby	Program Manager	BT	AID AG-UNICEF	F
Nordin	S.	School Health and Nutrition Adviser	MW	AID AG-GIZ	
Nthembwa	N.	Headmaster	MW	SCHOOL-Mawango Primary, Kasungu	
O'Brien	Sean	Director, RMB, Budget and Programming Division	G	WFP-HQ	M
Oliver	Robert	Deputy Country Director	MA	WFP-CO	M
Oppusunggu	Kartini	Programme Adviser, KM & Performance Reporting, Performance and Accountability Management Division (RMP)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Orchardson	V.	Nutrition Specialist	MW	AID AG-USAID	
Ormonov	Muhammadi	Head of Industrial Crops Department, Ministry of Agriculture RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Ortega	Luis	Senior Programme P4P Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	M
Oshidari	Kenro	WFP Regional Bureau Bangkok	G& BT	WFP-RB	
Pacheco	Mabel	Accountant for the "Escuela Saludable" (Healthy School) Programme (PES) , Ministry for Social Development	HN	GOV-Central	F
Padilla Rendón	Diomed	District Director for the Municipality of Ajuterique, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Palden	Tshering	Senior Admin./HR Assistant	BT	WFP-	M
Palomeque	Marta	Education Officer	MA	AID AG-UNICEF	F
Palomo	Martha Sara	3rd Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Paredes	Rony Francisco	Assistant Teacher (1st Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M

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Pattanayak	S.K.	India Executive Board (Also represents India to FAO and IFAD, from Indian Embassy in Rome)	G	EB-India	M
Pavón	Héctor Arturo	Technical Assistant for the Municipality of Taulabé, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Perdomo	Olba Gloria	Fiscal at the School Meal Committee	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Perdomo	Carol (girl)	Secretary of the Student Body (4th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Pérez	Giovanni	Director DICTA, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería)	HN	GOV-Central	M
Pérez Chica	Marco Antonio	No 1. District Director, Departmental Directorate of Education, La Paz	HN	GOV-Local	M
Phentsho	Jamyang	Chief Lab Officer, Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests	BT	GOV-Central	M
Phiri	S.	District School Feeding Co-ordinator (Kasungu)	MW	GOV-Local	
Pineda	Claudia María	Assistant Teacher (2nd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL- Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Pineda Pacheco	José{e Antonio	District Director for the Municipality of Arada. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Pineda Pérez	Benedicto	District Director for the Municipality of San Francisco de Ojuera. Departmental Directorate of Education, Santa Barbara.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Portillo	Sandra Patricia	6th Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL- María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Pradhan	Kailash	Senior Research Officer, Council of RNR Research of Bhutan, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests	BT	GOV-Central	M

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Pripur	Diane	Evaluation Officer, OE	G	WFP-HQ	F
Proscini	Elvita	Mozambique CO	MZ	WFP-CO	F
Prouty	Robert	Head of EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Secretariat	G	AID AG- FTI Secretariat	M
Pruscini	Elvira	Head of Operations, SF contact	MZ	WFP-CO	F
Qurbonzoda	Kh.	Head of Regional Education Department, Regional Education Department of Khatlon region	TJ	GOV-Local	
Rahimjonova	Mohira	Head of Poultry, Fish Breeding and Bee Keeping Department, Ministry of Agriculture RT	TJ	GOV-Central	F
Rahmatuloev	Sherali	Head Of Mother Child Health Service, Ministry of Health RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Rastogi	Tanuja	Nutrition Coordinator, Office of the Executive Director (EDD)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Raudales	Julio	Vice Minister for External Planning and Cooperation. Department for International Planning and Cooperation.	HN	GOV-Central	M
Razmara	Setareh	Lead Social Protection Specialist – Human Development – Africa Region, Social Protection Unit	G	AID AG-World Bank	F
Read	Marion	OE	G	WFP-HQ	F
Regnault de la Mothe	Marc	Policy Officer, School Feeding Service (PSS)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Reyes	María Luisa	Assistant Teacher (5th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona l	F
Reyes	Waldina Lizeth	Assistant Teacher (6th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Ritualo	Amy	M&E specialist, Food Assistance Division, Office of Capacity Building and Development, Foreign Agricultural Service.	G	AID AG-USDA	F

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Rivera	Elvia Marina	5th Grade Teacher	HN	SCHOOL- María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	F
Rivera Molina	Floridalma	Assistant Teacher (4th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Rodriguez	Edith	Country Representative	DO	WFP-CO	F
Rodríguez	Lisbeth (girl)	Environment Coordinator (3rd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Rodríguez	Dora Erlinda	President of the School Meal Committee	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Rodríguez	Adriana	Programme Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	F
Rodríguez	Desy Rubí	Secretary of the School Meal Committee	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Rodríguez	Henry (boy)	Student Body Secretary (6th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Rodríguez	Carlos (boy)	Student Body Vice-President (5th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL-Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Romero	Giomara	Supervision Coordinator, Departmental Directorate of Education, La Paz.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Saidov	Safarkhon	Head Of Bakery Factory	TJ	LOCAL BS-Bakery factory (Yovon district)	M
Saiga	Daisuke	Alternate Permanent Representative to FAO&WFP, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Italy	G	EB-Japan	M
Salha	Haladou	Director, Office of Hunger Solutions (HS)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Salinas	José Francisco	Head of Programme Unit	HN	WFP-CO	M
Sankei	Keton	Programme Officer, Food for Education (FFE)	AF	WFP-	M

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Santos	Alex	Director for the "Escuela Saludable" (Healthy School) Programme (PES) , Ministry for Social Development	HN	GOV-Central	M
Santos	César Augusto	District Director for Comayagua. Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	M
Sattorov	Jurabek	Coordinator Of Monitoring And Evaluation Of Strategy For Reducing Level Of Vulnerability, Ministry of Economy and Trade Development RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Saurí Toro	Brerni (girl)	Member of the Environment Committee (3rd Grade)	HN	SCHOOL- Miguel Paz Barahona	F
Scalpalli	Dom	Deputy Director, ERD	G	WFP-HQ	
Seim	Olav	Director ED/EFA, Education for All Global Partnerships Team	G	AID AG-UNESCO	M
Sekko Diallo	Amadou	Programme Manager, PCD (Programme Communautaire de Développement)	MA	AID AG-ECOWAS	M
Sharma	Udaya	Senior Programme Assistant	BT	WFP-CO	M
Shokirov	Emomali	Head Of Investment Department, Ministry of Education RT	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Sidaner	Emilie	Programme Officer, School Feeding Service (PSS)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Silva	Lorena	Development Officer	HN	AID AG-CIDA	F
Sisulu	Sheila	Deputy Executive Director, Office of Hunger Solutions (HS)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Snow	Michelle	Policy Coordinator PTD, Food for Peace.	G	USAID	F
Spanos	Harriet	USAID Supervisory Program Specialist / Humanitarian Advisor (Rome)	G	AID AG-USAID/ EB U.S.A	F
Sukrat	Dr.	Nutritionist	BT	AID AG- UNICEF	M

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Taktuk	Miguelina	Joint project coordinator	DO	WFP-CO	F
Taylor	D.	Education Adviser	MW	AID AG-DFID	M
Tchaptchet	Ngassam	Policy Officer PSG (gender)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Tejeda	Emiliana	Departmental Secretary, Departmental Directorate of Education, La Paz.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Tenzin	Chadho	Assistant Representative	BT	AID AG-FAO	M
Tenzin	Namgay	Senior Logistics Assistant	BT	WFP-	M
Tesliuc	Cornelia	Nutrition Project Manager	HN	AID AG-World Bank	F
Toe	Chris	Consultant	AF	WFP-	M
Traoré	Zakarya	Headmaster	MA	SCHOOL- Académie d'Enseignement, Kayes	M
Troches Cardona	Martín	Assistant Teacher (5th Grade)	HN	SCHOOL- Miguel Paz Barahona	M
Tshering	Rinchen	Chief Planning Officer, Gross National Happiness Commission	BT	GOV-Central	M
Turcios	Wilmer Reynaldo	Senior Programme Assistant	HN	WFP-CO	M
Turnbull	Paul	Sr. Programme Coordinator, Project Cycle, Programme Design Service (ODXP)	G	WFP-HQ	M
Tuttinghoff	Hildegard	Head of Programme	AF	WFP-CO	F
Uclés	Rommel	SFP Comayagua Monitor	HN	WFP-CO	M
Vachon	Kent	Former Alternate Permanent Representative of Canada to the Food and Agricultural Agencies of the U.N (2 years) and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the Food and Agricultural Agencies of the U.N (2 years)	G	EB-Canada	M

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Valiev	Davron	Head of Social Protection Department, Ministry of Labour, Social protection, Employment and Migration of population of Tajikistan	TJ	GOV-Central	M
Van Bommel	Joris	First Secretary	MA	EB-Netherlands, Embassy of the Netherlands	M
Van der Velden	Margot	WFP Regional Bureau Bangkok	G	WFP-RB	F
Vartanyan	Arsen	Russia Executive Board	G	EB-Russia	M
Vaupel	Natalie	Donor Relations Officer; Private Partnerships, Communications, Public Policy and Private Partnerships Division.	G	WFP-HQ	F
Velázquez	Nolberto	4th Grade Teacher	HN	School-María Teresa Argueta (Comayagua)	M
Velázquez	Rita Patricia	District Director for the Municipality of Villa de San Antonio, Departmental Directorate of Education, Comayagua.	HN	GOV-Local	F
Velis	Jean-Pierre	Consultant	G	Other-	M
Ventura	Alejandro	Secretary of State for the Education Office, Ministry of Education (Secretaría de Educación)	HN	GOV-Central	M
Walters	Nancy	Chief, School Feeding Service (PSS)	G	WFP-HQ	F
Wangchuk	Namgyel	Chief Budget Officer, Dept. National Budget, Ministry of Finance	BT	GOV-Central	M
Wangchuk	Choiten	Director, Dept. National Budget, Ministry of Finance.	BT	GOV-Central	M
Wangdi	Chhador	Chief Program Officer, Ministry of Education	BT	GOV-Central	M
Wangmo	Kencho	Programme Assistant	BT	WFP-CO	
Ward	Marianne	Operational Reporting and Analysis-Programme	G	WFP-HQ	F
Warren	K.	Education Officer, Basic Education Sector	MW	AID AG-UNICEF	

Name (last)	Name (first)	Position	Relevance	Organisation	Gender
Warren	David	Human Development Sector Leader - Caribbean Country Unit	G	AID AG-World Bank	M
Watts	Jamie	SO Evaluation Officer, OE	G	WFP-HQ	M
White	Gene	President of the Global Child Nutrition Foundation	G	NGO-Global Child Nutrition Foundation	M
Wills	Genevieve	PO, ODXP	G	WFP-HQ	F
Yaganagi	Medon	Deputy Chief Research Officer, Council of RNR Research of Bhutan, Ministry of Agriculture &Forests	BT	GOV-Central	F
Yamada	Mr.	Japan Executive Board Member	G	EB-Japan	M
Yanes	Herbert	Programme Officer VAM- Planning	HN	WFP-CO	M
Yangchen	Pemba	Nutritionist, Ministry of Health	BT	GOV-Central	F
Yangden	Tshering	District Education Officer, Thimpu District	BT	GOV-Local	F
Yemtsov	Ruslan	Nets Team Leader in Social Protection & Labor - Human Development Network Social Protection, Social Protection Unit.	G	AID AG-World Bank	M
Zam	Dechen	Chief Planning Officer, Ministry of Education	BT	GOV-Central	F
Zangmo	Pelden	Headmaster	BT	School-Chapcha MSS	F
Zangmo	Ugyen	Program Officer, Nutrition Program, Ministry of Health	BT	GOV-Central	F

Box G1 Category Analysis of Interviewees

ORGANISATION	Afghanistan	Bhutan	Dominican Republic	Honduras	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Tajikistan	Global Relevance	TOTAL
1. **AID AG**- Aid Agencies	1	6	-	8	11	9	-	7	28	**70**
2. **EB**- Executive Board	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	**8**
3. **GOV-Central**	1	16	1	10	4	4	-	10	1	**47**
4. **GOV-Local**	-	3	-	31	4	2	-	6	-	**46**
5. **LOCAL Bs** (Businesses)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	**1**
6. **NGOs**	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	1	3	**8**
7. **PRIV** (Private Companies)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	**2**
8. **SCHOOL**	-	7	-	52	2	1	-	6	-	**68**
9. **WFP-CO** (Country OfficeS)	1	4	2	16	5	6	4	4	2	**44**
10. **WFP-HQ** (Headquarters)	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	48	**51**
11. **WFP-RB** (Regional Bureau)	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	6	**10**
12. **Unknown/ Other**	3	2	-	3	1	1	-	-	1	**11**
TOTAL	**6**	**39**	**6**	**122**	**28**	**25**	**4**	**37**	**99**	**366**

Annex H Data

Overview of WFP School Feeding

Sources: WFP's profile (Annual Performance Report. 2010 figures pre-final); SF beneficiaries, modalities, handed over countries (School Feeding Policy Unit). Map and charts compiled by WFP OE.

Notes: in 2009, there were 63 countries and 85 operations; in 2010, there were 62 countries and 92 operations.

1. MCHN includes suppl. Feeding & micronutrient supplementation (since 2010); HIV/AIDS &OVC includes care and treatment(ART,TB,PMTCT, & HBC) (since 2009); Other includes settlement/resettlement & cash & vouchers (since 2010).

2. MCHN & HIV/AIDS as above; Others include settlement/resettlement; common service (2007,2008), infrastructure rehabilitation (2007,08); capacity development (2009,10); SO (2009,10); Cash & Vouchers (since 2010); Other (2007,08)

3. SF Modalities→Modality: M: on-site Meals, B: Biscuits only, T: Take home (TH), MT: on-site Meals+TH, BT: Biscuits+TH. Many 2009 operations are ongoing in 2010, modality unchanged.

SF programmes handed to governments: info only available for 7 countries listed.

Map H1 WFP School Feeding Beneficiaries 2010



Figure H1 Profile of WFP's Global Portfolio





Figure H2 School Feeding Beneficiaries





Key:
ODS = Sudan; ODP = Panama (Latin America and Caribbean);
ODJ = Johannesburg (Southern Africa); ODD = Dakar (West Africa);
ODC = Cairo (Middle East); ODB = Bangkok (Asia).

Figure H3 Programme Categories and Modality





Figure H4 Handover of SF Programmes (44 countries)





Figure H5 School Feeding Modalities by Regional Bureau

Key:
ODS = Sudan; ODP = Panama (Latin America and Caribbean);
ODJ = Johannesburg (Southern Africa); ODD = Dakar (West Africa);
ODC = Cairo (Middle East); ODB = Bangkok (Asia).

2009



2010



Case Study Countries: School Feeding Project Data in 2010

Afghanistan PRRO 10427.0

Beneficiaries

Project Title	Tot net SF Beneficiaries	Children receiving school meals	Children receiving THRs	Of whom: Receiving both THRs and school meals
Post-conflict relief and rehabilitation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	**134,841**	**129,598**	**137,107**	**131,864**

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered tot project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered - SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
MT	31.8	3.5	11%

SF costs (US$ Million)

Total Project cost	School feeding costs only	School Feeding Cost structure				
		Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
44.5	13.1	6.0	1.0	2.3	0.2	3.6

Cost per recipient (US$)	***97.45***
Cost/ton (US$)	***3755***



Afghanistan PRRO 200063

Beneficiaries

Project Title	Tot net SF Beneficiaries	Children receiving school meals	Children receiving THRs	Of whom: Receiving both THRs and school meals
Enhancing resilience and food security in Afghanistan	1,095,625	1,085,757	417,156	407,288

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered tot project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered - SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
MT	113.5	17.0	15%

SF costs (US$ Million)

Total Project cost	School feeding costs only	School Feeding Cost structure				
		Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
100.1	16.3	6.9	0.5	2.9	0.7	5.2

Cost per recipient (US$)	***14.88***
Cost/ton (US$)	***958***



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Note: Project 10427.0 was excluded from the sample of the 2010 Cost Analysis

Bhutan DEV 10579.0

Beneficiaries

Project Title	Tot net SF Beneficiaries	Children receiving school meals	Children receiving THRs
Improving Rural Children's Access to Basic Education with a Focus on Primary Education	35,408	35,408	-

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered tot project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered - SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
M	2.8	2.8	100%

Net Beneficiaries



Food tonnage delivered



SF costs structure

(US$ Millions)

Total costs	3.1
Commodity	1.4
Transport	0.5
LTSH	0.4
ODOC	0.5
Support	0.2

Cost per recipient (US$)	87.18
Cost/ton (US$)	1092



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Note: SF costs= WFP costs + Government contribution to School Feeding

Honduras CP 10538.0

Project Info

Project Title	Tot SF beneficiaries	Honduras Trust Fund Beneficiaries	WFP Project
Country Programme - Honduras (2008-2011)	1,349,800	1, 200,000	149,800

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
Meal	5.4	2.7	51%

School Feeding costs (US$)

SF costs total (thousands)	School Feeding Cost structure (thousands)				
	Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
226.7	37.4	42.3	113.3	19.9	13.8

Cost per recipient (US$)	***0.17***
Cost/ton (US$)	***83***





School Feeding Costs structure



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Note: SF costs= WFP costs + Government contribution to School Feeding

Malawi DEV 10581.0

Beneficiaries

Project Title	School Feeding - NET Beneficiaries	Children Receiving School meals (SM)	Children receiving TH ration	Of whom: Receiving both THRs & SM
Strategic Focus of the WFP Development Project: Support to Education	735,857	735,857	176,679	176,679

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered tot project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered - SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
MT	11.8	11.8	100%

School Feeding Costs (US$ Million)

	School Feeding Cost structure				
Total cost	Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
7.1	3.8	0.001	0.8	0.4	2.2

Cost per recipient (US$)	***9.63***
Cost/ton (US$)	***599***



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Note: SF costs= WFP costs + Government contribution to School Feeding

Mali CP 10583.0

Beneficiaries

Project Title	Tot SF beneficiaries	Children receiving SM	Children receiving THRs
Country Programme - Mali (2008-2012)	138,379	125,633	12,746

Food Distributed

Food Modality	Actual food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
MT	**6.1**	**5.2**	**87%**

School Feeding Costs (US$ Millions)

SF Tot costs	School Feeding Cost structure				
	Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
6.8	2.1	0.02	0.8	3.0	0.9

Cost per recipient (US$)	***48.81***
Cost/ton (US$)	***1290***

Food tonnage delivered (actual)





School Feeding Costs structure



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Note: SF costs= WFP costs + Government contribution to School Feeding

Mozambique CP 10446.0

Beneficiaries

Project Title	Children receiving school meals	Girls receiving school meals	Boys receiving school meals	Children receiving THRs
Country Programme - Mozambique (2007-2011)	159,922	73,438	86,484	-

SF Beneficiaries



Food tonnage delivered

Food Modality	Meal
Actual food tonnage delivered Tot project (000)	5.0
Actual food tonnage delivered - SF only (000)	5.0
% of food tonnage related to SF	100%

SF costs structure

(US$ Millions)

Total costs	4.8
Commodity	3.0
Transport	0.2
LTSH	0.8
ODOC	0.02
Support	0.7

Cost per recipient (US$)	29.80
Cost/ton (US$)	957



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)

Tajikistan PRRO 10603.0

Project info

Project Title	Food Modality	Tot SF Beneficiaries
Restoring sustainable livelihoods for food-insecure people	M	174,457

Food Distributed

Actual food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Planned food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
9.8	15.7	5.9	60%

School Feeding costs (US$ Million)

Total School feeding costs	School Feeding Cost structure				
	Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
4.8	2.4	0.04	1.2	0.08	1.2

Cost per recipient (US$)	***27.77***
Cost/ton (US$)	***827***

Food tonnage delivered





School Feeding costs structure



Tajikistan DEV 200120

Project Info

Project Title	Food Modality	Tot School Feeding beneficiaries
Supporting Access to Education for vulnerable Children	Meal	160,000

Food Distributed

Actual food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Planned food tonnage delivered TOT project (000)	Actual food tonnage delivered SF only (000)	% of food tonnage related to SF
5.4	**5.5**	**5.4**	**100%**

School Feeding costs (US$ Million)

Tot School feeding costs	School Feeding Cost structure				
	Commodity	Transport	LTSH	ODOC	Support
3.3	2.6	-	0.6	0.02	0.1

Cost per recipient (US$)	***20.84***
Cost/ton (US$)	***618***

Food tonnage delivered



School Feeding costs structure



Sources: 2010 School Feeding Cost Analysis - School Feeding Service (PSS)
Notes: 1) Project DEV 200120 was excluded from the sample of the 2010 Cost Analysis
2) SF costs= WFP costs + Government contribution

Annex I Learning from Evaluations of School Feeding

Introduction

I1. The evaluations reviewed in this Annex comprise, first, a set of studies which explicitly aim at rigorous impact evaluation of SF interventions. This set includes:

- Three studies initiated in 2005, as part of a collaboration between the WFP and the WB, and managed by the WB (Burkina Faso, Uganda and Lao PDR). These were conceived, and fieldwork undertaken, before the adoption of the WFP SF Policy in 2009.
- Five studies managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OE). These were launched after adoption of the SF Policy, and the Policy explicitly influenced the design of the evaluations, although the SF interventions evaluated had been conceived and almost entirely implemented prior to the Policy's adoption (Kenya, Cambodia, The Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire and Bangladesh[113]).
- Two studies commissioned by WFP COs (Ethiopia and Tanzania).

I2. Secondly, the present evaluation reviewed a further 20 WFP evaluation reports which focused on particular operations, country programmes or country portfolios, all of which included a significant school feeding component.

I3. A full synthesis of these evaluations has been prepared separately. The present Annex provides thumbnails of the key points from each of the impact studies, and an overview of conclusions drawn from the other evaluations.

School Feeding Impact Evaluations

Northern Uganda (Alderman et al 2008 and Adelman et al, 2008a)

I4. This was the first of the impact evaluations to report, and its findings were cited in *Rethinking School Feeding (*Bundy et al, 2009a*)*. Two parallel studies investigated education and nutrition aspects of SF interventions serving IDPs in Northern Uganda. The aim was to enable rigorous comparison of school meals vs. THR operating in the same context. A baseline survey in late 2005 preceded the interventions and was followed up in 2007.

I5. The education study found no impact of either SF intervention on net or gross primary school enrolment, but there was a small effect of school meals in terms of children enrolling at a younger age than they might otherwise have done. The school meals programme did have a significant effect on attendance in the afternoons. No effect was found in terms of encouraging progression from primary to secondary school, but school feeding seemed to have a positive effect in reducing drop-out from primary school.

I6. The nutrition study, noting that SF is seen primarily as an incentive to attend school, looked for secondary nutritional effects (which might not be present if the

[113] The draft report of the Bangladesh study was not yet available at time the present evaluation report was drafted.

incentive were provided in non-food form). It used anthropometric measures and included younger siblings within the survey. It found no impact of either school meals or THR on body mass index or anaemia of children aged 6-13 on average. However, it did find a significant reduction in anaemia prevalence amongst girls aged 10-13, and significant benefits for younger siblings from the school meals programme (there were suggestions that the latter effect arose both from pre-schoolers participating directly in the school meal, and from children at home receiving more food when an older sibling was eating at school).

Burkina Faso (Kazianga et al, 2009)

I7. This study also used a randomised experiment to compare SF schemes (on-site meals and THR) in northern Burkina Faso, using baseline and follow-up surveys to estimate the effect of the programme after one academic year. Significant incentive effects of SF were expected in the context of poverty, frequent food shortages and low primary school participation rates. The study explored nutritional impacts of SF on both school-age and younger, un-enrolled children.

I8. Principal findings were that both school meals and THR had a positive effect on enrolment and, in particular, increased new enrolment for girls by 5-6 percentage points. There were also effects on household labour allocations; children, especially girls, with access to school meals were shifted to more domestic tasks (possibly more compatible with school attendance). The only cognitive impact detected was a small increase in time-adjusted scores (but not raw scores) for mathematics for girls. There was an unexpected increase in absenteeism: this was shown to originate in households with a constrained supply of child labour, and is likely also to have affected the impacts on learning outcomes. THR had a clear positive effect on the nutrition of younger children.

I9. The study concludes:

> Overall, our results show that school feeding programs in this specific context of agricultural households without an active labor market can increase enrollment, but may fail to improve attendance and academic performance for a larger number of children. This calls for more investigation of the circumstances under which school feeding programs could increase enrollment and improve academic performance, and a more direct comparison of this type of conditional "in kind" transfer with conditional cash transfers.

Lao PDR (Buttenheim et al, 2010)

I10. The study was undertaken in two northern provinces of Lao PDR. A baseline survey in 2006 preceded the roll-out of SF interventions, and a follow-up survey took place in 2008. The intention was to conduct a quasi-experimental longitudinal comparison of different SF modalities (on-site school feeding vs. THR).

I11. For practical reasons different modalities had to be offered at district level, so the comparison was between three districts in one province, respectively offering on-site feeding, on-site feeding plus THR, and just THR. A control district, with no SF intervention had to be drawn from a neighbouring province. Sampling was at household level, so as to include children not in school, including the younger siblings of pupils. An added complication was that villages in each province could

choose to take-up the SF interventions, so the study had to attempt to control for characteristic differences between take-up and non-take-up villages.

I12. The study found very little conclusive evidence that SF affected enrolment or the nutritional status of the population. On enrolment, there was a secular trend increase in enrolment across the country, and the take-up villages had higher baseline enrolments than the non-take-up villages. Against this background, it was not possible to determine a conclusive and significant effect of SF on enrolments.

I13. On nutrition, the study examined weight-for-age, height-for-age and anaemia. Here too, the study failed to find evidence of positive effect of school feeding on children's nutritional status.

I14. The study speculates that effects might have been greater if there had been full take-up of the interventions, or if they had been targeted on more disadvantaged villages (given that more advantaged villages tended to select into the programme). It notes the more positive findings from the Uganda and Burkina Faso studies, and draws attention to the high costs and other implementation challenges of school feeding in Laos.

Tanzania (WFP/MoEVT, 2009)

I15. This study was based on a retrospective cross-sectional sample of schools in four drought-prone and pastoralist inhabited regions of Tanzania. A sample of rural schools included in WFP-supported FFE programmes were compared with a sample of non-included rural schools. Quantitative analysis was supported by qualitative methods such as stakeholder interviews and a questionnaire about perceptions of the SF programme.

I16. The methodology was not statistically rigorous, and the study notes limitations in the quality of administrative data used, along with the possibility that respondents from non-participating schools may have sought to give the "right" answer to secure participation in future. It was not possible to draw any conclusions about educational outcomes, such as pass rates. The study finds a positive effect of FFE on attendance and drop-out rates. In particular it notes that seasonal absenteeism was much greater in non-FFE schools, suggesting that SF is an effective incentive to keep children in school even when seasonal demand for labour is high.

Ethiopia (Haile et al, 2011)

I17. The study is described as a partnership research project between the WFP CO in Ethiopia and the econometrics department of Mannheim University. It targeted 200 schools drawn from four major regions of Ethiopia, with a mixture of highland and pastoralist food-insecure districts. The sampling procedure was designed to yield three groups of schools: (a) schools currently on the School Meals Programme; (b) schools recently phased out of the programme; and (c) schools never involved in the programme. The study sampled households, including un-enrolled children, in the school catchments, and administered questionnaires together with simple physiological and cognitive tests. It acknowledged the inherent weaknesses of an ex-post impact evaluation design, and also that the logistics of the survey (with only a day per village) were very demanding (so that, for example, the concentration span test could not be administered to all children at the same time of day).

I18. The reported views of participants and key informants towards the programme were generally positive in their assessment of its effects as an incentive for enrolment and attendance, and in enabling children to perform better at school.

I19. However, the more rigorous econometric findings are more nuanced. For example, it suggests that pastoralists may have withdrawn boys from school in response to the programme (possibly as a result of the greater incentive to enrol girls embodied in the THR scheme). An apparent reduction in reading and writing test scores for 7–10 year olds is found (conjectured to be due to the effect of expanding enrolments from households with less advantaged backgrounds). And where the SF programme had been phased out, there was a clear adverse effect on attendance and enrolment. The authors highlight the importance of considering phase-out and the importance both of continuity and of other influences on schooling quality if the potential benefits of SF programmes are to be sustained.

Kenya (Finan et al, 2010)

I20. This is the first of the suite of impact evaluations commissioned by WFP OE. These have certain common features: they are designed to be relevant in addressing issues raised by the SF Policy; they focus on an extended period of WFP involvement with SF (which obviously preceded the SF Policy) and are retrospective rather than experimental; they endeavour to use both quantitative and qualitative approaches; and they seek an holistic understanding of WFP's role in creating impact through SF.

I21. The Kenya evaluation's objectives were (a) to evaluate outcomes and impacts from various SF modalities in relation to their stated education, gender and nutritional objectives; (b) to evaluate outcomes and impact in relation to WFP's new safety net objectives; and (c) to identify changes needed in order to contribute optimally to Government of Kenya (GoK) objectives and those of WFP's new strategic plan and SF policy.

I22. The quantitative element was a survey used in arid and semi-arid areas and in Nairobi slums. There was no baseline, but a control group was constructed from schools which had been handed over from WFP to GoK, and which had consequently experienced an interruption in school feeding. Surveys, at school and household level, were supplemented by a Participatory Impact Assessment exercise in a sub-set of the sampled schools.

I23. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, the evaluation concluded that the school meal had a significant positive effect on education indicators such as attendance rates, primary completion rates, continuation to secondary schools and exam scores. However, the school meal does not suffice to overcome contextual factors that continue to result in high attrition rates, with girls remaining less likely to complete primary school or continue to secondary school.

I24. Based on qualitative interviews and the analysis of 24-hour diet recall, the evaluation concluded that the school meal made a significant positive contribution to reducing hunger and to nutritional intake. The school meal was found to be the largest meal of the day and frequently the only meal. Staff and parents considered that the meals contributed to better health and increased attentiveness among the

children, but the meal does not fully compensate for the inadequate diet of poor children.

I25. The evaluation found multiple levels of safety-net effect. The direct value transfer (cash saving on food purchase) represented between 4% and 9% of annual household income. A second-level effect was that leaving children in school freed up time that about one third of households used for productive activities. In the longer term "tracer studies" showed that children who benefited from education were likely to provide subsequent assistance to their stem households.

I26. Although confirming positive effects of SF, the evaluation also identified factors inhibiting greater and more durable results from the programme. In particular, it noted the absence of complementary inputs (such as those envisaged in the Essential Package). A poor learning environment (large classes, poor student-teacher ratios, lack of materials) persists – and may be exacerbated by the effect of SF in attracting more pupils. The evaluation also saw more scope for community involvement with the schools. The GoK strategy of HGSF anticipates such involvement, and is key to the long term sustainability of SF, but will require a higher level of inter-sector collaboration.

I27. The evaluation also analysed the "impact chain" through which SF is expected to achieve multiple effects, and concludes:

> There is one overriding conclusion that has been carefully examined and analyzed. It is that the beneficial impacts attributable to school feeding are limited if one attempts to extract school feeding from the larger context of how learning, health, and livelihood outcomes are achieved. School feeding without the appropriate learning environment and family/community support is a weak intervention and its impacts are mostly restricted to food security outcomes. It follows, therefore, that a school feeding programme which does not systematically incorporate other strategic programmatic interventions that reduce the economic, social, and cultural constraints to health and learning will not generate the stated goals and objectives that substantiate and justify school feeding investments, such as the WFP Country Programme. On the other hand, with inter-institutional and inter-sectoral cooperation and coordination, the "value" of food in school meals can be significantly increased in terms of the desired impacts.

I28. In line with this analysis, the evaluation makes a number of specific recommendations for WFP, and a further set of recommendations that would require collaboration amongst wider stakeholders.

Cambodia (Nielsen et al, 2011)

I29. This evaluation focused on 3 PRROs between 2001–2010. Its sample was 108 schools, of which 30 were controls and others designed to represent different SF approaches (school meals and THR) as well as child-friendly schools. Pupils from each school were randomly selected and just over 2,000 household surveys were carried out in their homes. The surveys included anthropometry measures and haemoglobin measurement, as well as asset scores and food security assessments. In the absence of a baseline assessment, the study was limited to comparisons amongst different strata of the sample.

I30. The evaluation found a significant effect on enrolment, with a stronger effect on girls' enrolment. However, the positive effect was only sustained while the school remained in the programme. Only THR had a positive effect on attendance. There

were small significant effects on promotion, repetition and drop-out. The evaluation could not demonstrate a significant effect on learning, and conjectured that this could be due to contextual factors in school quality.

I31. On nutrition, the anthropometric survey found striking effects on girls with girls benefiting from the school meals programme approximately 1kg heavier than those not involved. However, there were no significant differences for boys, and the evaluation conjectured that this could be due to the school meal enabling girls to take advantage of their natural pre-pubertal growth spurt. Both school meals and THR seemed to lead to a reduction in illness-related absences for girls, but not for boys. No effects were found on iron-deficiency anaemia, but since the rations were not fortified this was not surprising.

I32. The evaluation compared the value transfer effects of school meals and THR. It found that THR represented a higher proportion of household income than the meal taken at school (an expected finding since THR are targeted on poorer households). For the poorest asset group, THR represented up to 26% of household income; for school meals the figure was 14% for the same group.

I33. Additional safety net effects were found in terms of time savings, particularly for women, and increased household resilience during the lean season (more pronounced in the case of THR).

I34. In analysing how SF (potentially) creates impact, the evaluation highlighted poor quality of education (including poor quality and absenteeism amongst teachers) as militating against SF impact. (The evaluation considered that the failure to detect a performance differential in the child-friendly schools could also be due to contextual factors.) There was scope for more effective targeting of the programme on the poorest and most vulnerable groups.

I35. The evaluation highlighted the differences in effect between school meals and THR, and recommended WFP to take more account of such differences in further programme design.

The Gambia (Capper et al, 2011)

I36. This evaluation used mixed methods to compare a treatment group of 21 schools benefitting from SF with 23 schools not included in the programme. Survey instruments included in-depth interviews with 335 school feeding households and 189 households not receiving school feeding.

I37. However, "Poor data collection, management and use at the school level, and significant data losses by the Government preclude the drawing of any definitive conclusions about the impact of school feeding on enrolment, attendance and completion."

I38. On nutrition, data problems undermined accurate assessment of the nutritional adequacy of the school meal. However, the evaluation found "clear evidence that the school meal contributed to students' minimum daily nutritional requirements when they were in school and able to contribute. However, there is also substantial evidence that certain school-based practices [requirements for payments or in-kind contributions, and staff participation in the meals] negatively influenced participation in the school meal for some children. There were indications that students were more attentive and energetic

because of the meal." Moreover, the project did not attract as much funding as anticipated, and this led to reductions in the ration.

I39. On safety net aspects, the evaluation found the value transfer varied by level of household vulnerability and was influenced by resource shortfalls and pipeline breaks, The value transfer through school meals was close to the cost of education for the most vulnerable households. The evaluation noted that the school feeding programme was "the only social safety net operating in the country, and the only organised mechanism offering a feasible platform for systematically reaching the entire country".

I40. Analysing the mechanisms through which SF could create impact, the evaluation noted significant contextual constraints (outside WFP's control), particularly related to the poor quality of education. Safety net objectives were affected by the fact that school holidays fall in the "hungry" season.

Côte d'Ivoire (Cadrin et al, 2011)

I41. The evaluation in Côte d'Ivoire was unable to carry out its work programme as planned because of political upheavals that interrupted fieldwork. This "significantly limited the scope and rigour of the evaluation compared with the original design". It was not possible to draw any rigorous conclusions about the effects of school meals on education or nutrition, or to calculate the value of food transferred. There was qualitative evidence, from participants, that both the "value transfer" effect and an effect in freeing up adults' time for productive activities were significant. The incidence of effects was compromised by charges for meals, which offset the benefits and which disproportionately reduced participation by poorer households.

I42. The evaluation did analysis of the mechanisms through which SF can create impact, with a careful distinction between contextual factors (outside WFP's control) and implementation factors (within WFP's control). The chaotic economic, political and security situation in Côte d'Ivoire obviously militated against realisation of many of the educational benefits of SF. It also undermined the government's efforts to develop a national SF programme. Resource and logistic constraints prevented WFP from realising the extent or continuity of provision that would have been desirable.

Other WFP Evaluations

I43. The TOR mentioned "17 other types of evaluation with a school feeding component". The number expanded to 20[114], which reported between March 2009 and September 2010, as shown in Box I1 below. Note that the evaluations were of operations conceived and mostly implemented prior to the adoption of the SF Policy. However, the 9 reports delivered in 2010 could have been influenced by the perspectives of the SF Policy, and in one or two cases there is a direct reference (the Ghana study, for example, does refer to WFP's strategic plan and SF policy, linked to its recommendations on capacity development).

Box I1 Recent WFP Evaluations with a SF Component

Operation	**Evaluation Date**	**Reference**
1. Afghanistan PRRO	October 2009	(Metz et al, 2009)
2. Bangladesh Country Programme	October 2009	(WFP, 2009s)
3. Bolivia Sustainable School Feeding Project	September 2009	(Crespo Valdivia et al, 2009)
4. Chad Country Portfolio	June 2010	(WFP, 2010zl)
5. Colombia PRRO	May 2010	(WFP, 2010zm)
6. Côte d'Ivoire PRRO	October 2009	(WFP, 2009u)
7. Democratic Republic of the Congo PRRO	October 2009	(WFP, 2009t)
8. Egypt Country Programme	February 2010	(WFP, 2010zs)
9. Ethiopia Country Programme	September 2009	(WFP, 2009w)
10. Ghana Country Programme	April 2010	(WFP, 2010zw)
11. Laos Country Portfolio	August 2009	(WFP, 2009x)
12. Liberia PRRO	March 2009	(WFP, 2009y)
13. Malawi Country Portfolio	September 2009	(WFP, 2009z)
14. Mali Country Portfolio	September 2010	(WFP, 2010zy)
15. Mozambique Country Portfolio	March 2009	(WFP, 2009za)
16. Nepal Country Portfolio	July 2010	(WFP, 2010zz)
17. Occupied Palestinian Territory PRRO	March 2010	(WFP, 2010zza)
18. Sudan EMOP	July 2010	(WFP, 2010zzc)
19. Timor Leste PRRO	November 2009	(WFP, 2010zzf)
20. Tanzania Country Programme	July 2010	(Downen et al, 2010)

[114] Although references to SF in the Sudan report are negligible.

I44. The Evaluation Team prepared a volume of systematic summaries of each evaluation's findings and recommendations as they relate to SF, with special attention to the main themes of the present evaluation. In general, these evaluations provided useful insights into how SF is deployed by WFP, but the evaluations are, not surprisingly, much less rigorous in their methodology than the impact evaluations discussed above, and they do not add significantly to the quantum of evidence about the effects of SF.

I45. Some general observations based on an overview of these studies:

(a) Very few of the studies, even as late as 2010, assessed the nutritional impacts of SF. SF was generally considered an education initiative, rather than a nutritional one. Generally it was the initiatives which targeted preschool children and babies such as therapeutic feeding centres which were classed as nutritional initiatives.

(b) These studies were evaluating programmes which began and mostly took place before the SF Policy; therefore it is not surprising that there are very few references to the safety net characteristics of FFE elements (winter food distribution in Afghanistan is one exception).

(c) All the evaluations faced problems of a lack of data and data quality issues (to take one example, the Afghanistan study was forced to rely on qualitative and anecdotal evidence because outcome data were absent and output data of doubtful validity). None of the studies can be described as rigorous in the sense of constructing a counterfactual, rather tending to offer association as evidence of causality (but showing that enrolment increases in SF schools were above a national average is not proof that SF was responsible). There is frequent anecdotal, but not scientific, evidence of SF effects on concentration and attention span.

(d) However, the limits of what can be achieved by SF per se are often recognised. There are frequent references to the need for education quality measures to accompany SF (otherwise, as the Bangladesh evaluation puts it: *"performance of the programme in terms of educational achievement is beyond the control of the programme"*).

(e) With SF particularly, beneficiary numbers often do not take into account inconsistent supplies of school meals, so are often misleadingly high. Some studies do highlight pipeline breaks (e.g. Afghanistan again). Conclusive proof of SF effects is very difficult, as it involves eliminating other possible explanations mostly outside WFP control. But WFP could set higher standards in monitoring its actual inputs against those planned.

(f) There is a dearth of cost data (frequently there is not even an estimate of the total cost of the SF component). The main exceptions are:
   - Bangladesh, which gives SF share as 22% of programme; refers to average cost for HEB of USD 10.86 per child per year; notes that Gelli finds HEB a highly cost-efficient SF modality in 2006.
   - Chad – reference to generally high transport costs for this landlocked country.

- Ethiopia, which notes that the local operating costs of the school meal programme are extremely low – less than USD 100 per month per school which is deemed very cost effective.
- Ghana, which compares unit SF costs for WFP and the government programme, finding WFP as significantly less costly.
- Laos does include an analysis of cost per child fed, compares it to global averages, and considers scope for cost reduction.
- Mozambique concludes that the unit costs of its interventions are so high as to be unsustainable.
- Timor Leste includes unit cost figures, and expresses concern that government will not be able to sustain the (joint) SF programme alone because of budgetary constraints.

(g) One theme of the SF Policy that is identifiable is capacity development: there are frequent references to work on and need for capacitating governments.

(h) On HGSF:

- Bolivia is a HGSF-oriented project (which provides an example of the potential trade-off between a local economy objective and standards for nutrition and food safety).
- Côte d'Ivoire supported women's groups to supply school canteens.
- Ghana CP also had a HGSF orientation (and mentions P4P).
- In several other cases, evaluation comments on sourcing focus on the avoidance of harm (that food aid is not distorting markets or substituting for local produce).

Annex J Supplementary Notes

Note 1 Tools and Guidance for Implementing the Policy

1. *Rethinking School Feeding* (Bundy et al, 2009a) noted the need for "toolkits to design and update school feeding programs" and itself included versions of some toolkits (e.g. its Appendix 3 is a design checklist for setting up a SF programme, and its Appendix 4 is a design checklist for revisiting a SF programme). WFP has taken this further, developing the suite of tools shown in Table J1 below.

Table J1 Implementation Toolkit

	Tool	Description	Main usage
1	Investment case	Assessment of monetary cost and economic benefits of recognized outcomes of school feeding	Advocacy
2	Needs and coverage	Estimation of no. children in need of school feeding, no. of children receiving school feeding and regional distribution	Advocacy
3	Cost analysis	Cost analysis for 3a • WFP school feeding programmes 3b • National school feeding programmes	Decision-making
4	Quality standards assessment	Qualitative assessment of country situation against 8 quality standards for sustainable school feeding	Decision-making
5	Stakeholder workshop	Set of generic modules on where school feeding stands in a country and what it takes to improve the quality while transitioning to sustainability using the 8 quality standards	Decision-making
6	Sustainability strategy	Guide for development of transition strategy for the government for sustainable school feeding programmes, based on quality standards, with estimated cost and timeline	Decision-making
7	School feeding model planning tool	Analysis of options – and relative tradeoffs - available for government choice among different models and modalities of school feeding programmes	Decision-making

Source: Implementation Update, WFP, 2011zb, Figure 3.

2. These tools have been through several drafts, and most, although substantially complete and in use, are regarded as still under development. (On the Investment Case, see Annex F, ¶F18–F19 and Figure F1.) Table J2 below illustrates their deployment.

3. The 7 Tools are not exhaustive – other guidance has also been updated, including:

- Guidelines on the Essential Package (WFP, 2010d). See Annex F, ¶F5-F6, and, on the use of the EP in case study countries, see Note 3 below.

- Guidance on nutrition standards for SF rations (WFP, 2010zi), and separate guidance on how to take nutrition into account in SF programmes ("School Feeding and Nutrition", draft dated September 2010, which focuses on when and how to address micro-nutrient deficiencies). Note 2 below reviews the application of nutrition standards in five case study countries.

Table J2 Application of Tools in Selected Countries

Pilot country	1 Investment case	2 Needs and coverage	3a WFP cost analysis	3b Govt cost analysis	4 Quality Std Assm't	5 Stakeholders workshop	6 Sustainability strategy	7 School feeding model decision tool
Ghana	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
Kenya	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lao People's Democratic Republic	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
Bangladesh	✓	✓	✓					
Mozambique	✓	✓	✓			✓		
Malawi	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓
Côte d'Ivoire		✓	✓	✓				
Haiti			✓		✓	✓		
Mali			✓		✓	✓		

Source: Implementation Update, WFP, 2011zb, Figure 4.

4. Other guidance under development includes monitoring and evaluation guidelines, guidance on SF context analysis and targeting, and guidelines on choosing between SF modalities (biscuits, meals, take home rations). Guidance on SF in emergencies is also currently under revision.

Note 2 Nutrition Standards in the Case Study Countries

1. This note reviews the nutritional value of rations in the 5 full case study countries.

2. WFP's guidance on the energy content of school feeding rations and the number and timing of meals are summarized in Table J3 and Table J4 (WFP, 2010zi and WFP's Programme Guidance Manual).

Table J3 WFP's Guidance on Energy and Micronutrients Content of SF Rations

Type of School	Energy			Micronutrients	
	Range (Kcal) Primary Schools (6-12 years)	Range (Kcal) Pre-Primary Schools (3-6 years)	% of Requirement	% of Requirement for any SF Ration	Nutrition Objective
Half day school	555-830	390-585	30-45%	30-45%	At least 70%
Full day school	1,110-1,390	780-975	60-75%	60-75%	At least 80%
Boarding school	1,570-1665		85-90%	100%	100%

Table J4 WFP Guidance on Number and Timing of Meals

Duration of School	Suggested number of servings	Suggested timing
Half day school	1 serving (snack or meal)	As early as possible (early-mid morning, or mid afternoon for afternoon shifts)
Full day school	2 servings: 1 snack, 1 meal	Early-mid morning and mid day
Boarding school	3 servings: 3 main meals	Morning, mid day and evening

3. The rations provided in the five case study countries, Bhutan, Honduras, Mali, Malawi and Tajikistan, are presented in Table J6 below. According to WFP guidance, the ration should provide between 1,110 and 1,390 Kcal in full day schools and between 555 and 830 Kcal in half-day schools for primary school-age children. Except in Bhutan, the ration is below the recommended range in terms of energy.

4. In terms of micronutrients, estimated Daily Recommended Nutrient Intakes (RNI) are summarized in Table J5 (taken from WFP, 2010zi). As can be seen in Table J6 below, except in Honduras, SF rations are below standards in terms of iron content. Iodine and vitamin A levels are according to recommended levels only in Tajikistan and Honduras respectively.

5. In some cases these findings are qualified by the comments reported by team members who undertook the country visits, which follow Table J6.

6. It was surprisingly difficult to verify this information: the length of the school day, and the number and timing of meals should be clearly stated in future SF project documents.

Table J5 Recommended Micronutrient Intakes

Recommended Safe Level of Intake					**Estimates of Daily RNI for planning school feeding rations**		
Age Groups (years)	*Iron based on bioavailability mg/day*		*Iodine µg/day*	*Vitamin A µg RE/day*	*Iron mg*	*Iodine µg*	*Vitamin A µg RE*
	Low	*Very Low*					
Pre-Primary							
1-3	*5.8*	*11.6*	*90*	*400*	12 (6)	90	450
4-6	*6.3*	*12.6*	*90*	*450*			
Primary							
7-10	*8.9*	*18.8*	*120*	*500*	19 (9)	120	500
Lower Secondary							
10-18	*14*	*28*	*150*	*600*	29 (15)	150	600
Females 11-14	*14.6*	*29.2*					
Males 11-14							

Table J6 Composition and Nutritive Value of the SF Ration in Case Study Countries

	Bhutan	Honduras	Mali	Malawi	Tajikistan
Operation	CP 2008-2012	CP 2008-2011	Project 10583 2008-2012	Project 10581 2008-2011	Project 200120 2010-2015
Nutrition-related objective(s)	Alleviate short-term hunger	None explicit, but short-term hunger implicit	None	None	Continued access to education and nutritious meals
Length of school sessions	Boarding or Day	Not specified	Not specified	Half-day	Not specified
Number & timing of meals	*Boarding Schools:* Breakfast, Mid-Morning Snack (MMS) and Mid-Day Meal (MDM) *Day schools:* MMS & MDM	"Early enough meal"	Lunch at noon	1 meal as soon as possible	1 meal mid-day
Ration composition					
Whole Wheat Flour (WHF)					150
Corn (g)		60			
Rice (g)	275	30	150		
Maize meal (g)	25				
Fortified Blended Food (FBF) (g)		30		100	
Pulses (g)	40	30	30		30
Vegetable Oil (g)	20	10	10		15
Salt (g)					3
Nutritive Value					
Energy (Kcal)	1317.0	658.0	734.0	396.0	758.0
Protein (g)	29.2	25.4	17.6	16.0	24.3
Fat (g)	23.5	15.8	11.0	7.7	17.5
Iodine (µg)	0	0	0	NA	180.0
Iron (mg)	6.6	14.4	4.3	NA	8.6
Vitamin A (µg RE)	186.0	542.0	91.0	NA	136

7. In **Bhutan**, students in boarding schools at primary, lower secondary, middle secondary, and higher secondary schools receive breakfast, a mid-morning snack and lunch, in line with WFP guidance. Day students, mainly in pre-primary schools, identified by vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) as having to walk a long way to school receive a mid-morning snack and a midday meal.

8. While it appears that micronutrients are not adequately covered by the ration, it should be noted that the Government has a standard programme of Vitamin A and Iron supplementation in schools. Furthermore, the oil included in the basket has been fortified with both Vitamin A and D. The launch of the iron supplementation programme was in direct response to a study which found iron deficiency amongst school age children. While this activity is carried out directly by the Ministry of Health (MOH) with support from UNICEF, it does indicate a joined-up approach to addressing health and nutrition in schools.

9. In many of the schools supported by WFP, the School Management Team (composed of teachers and parents) have decided on a parental contribution towards the cost of school meals to allow the inclusion of fresh vegetables, spices and food items (eggs, tofu, and sometimes meat). Such items likely also enhance the nutritional content of meals.

10. In **Honduras**, the food basket varies according to specific needs of rural, urban and Atlantic coast populations and is based on cultural and ethnic preferences. The rations for rural areas consist of maize, beans, corn soya blend (CSB) and oil; the food basket for urban areas includes corn flour instead of maize, and the ration for the Atlantic coast includes rice instead of maize. In the majority of the schools, parents and communities contribute with fresh vegetables, spices and sometimes animal products (eggs, meat) to improve the quality of school meals, enhancing the nutritional content.

11. In **Malawi**, the project document states that a nutrition baseline survey conducted by the Ministry of Education in 2006 found that 70% of children in do not eat breakfast before going to school, mostly owing to lack of food in the household. The ration consisting of *likuni phala* a fortified blended food (FBF) or CSB is to be provided "as soon as possible". While the ration seems small (around half of the ration in the other four countries in terms of energy content), it is in line with WFP guidance to provide one meal in half-day schools.

12. In **Mali**, the daily ration which is made up of 150g fortified cereals, 30g pulses, and 10g oil, provides 729kcal. Beneficiaries receive 180 hot meals per school year. The *Programme des Cantines Intégrées (PCI)* which is the Government's SF programme, uses the same ration, even if neither of the programmes have strong nutrition focused objectives (respectively, education; and education and local economy objectives).

13. A Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) raised concerns over WFP's capacity to monitor nutritional delivery, and suggested that beneficiaries may not always receive the required nutritional rations, either through mismanagement, wastage, theft or unchecked attendance, which have led to smaller individual portions. Likewise, the PCI, with a largely unaccountable decentralised model of delivery, has seen instances in its first year of greatly reduced rations for beneficiaries, to the point where the nutritional impact is minimal. A PCI canteen in Kayes region, which the evaluation mission visited, had been limited to providing 3 hot meals per week for only 5

months of the school year due to untransparent financial transfers, and poor local management of stocks and procurement.

14. In **Tajikistan**, nutrition is not used as part of the targeting process. The objective of the project is to improve the enrolment/attendance rate. Yet the WFP daily food ration provides 758kcal per day.

15. In conclusion:

- ➔ *In the five case study countries, the ration – as conceived – is below the recommended energy level. Micronutrients content is variable and is adequate for vitamin A and iron only in Honduras, and in iodine only in Tajikistan.*
- ➔ *The number and timing of meals are adequate in Bhutan and Malawi.*
- ➔ *Disruptions in commodity distribution to schools often result in reduced amounts per day and reduced feeding days, hence jeopardizing educational/nutritional benefits.*
- ➔ *The length of the school day, and the number and timing of meals should be clearly stated in future SF project documents and should adhere to WFP guidance.*

Note 3 The Essential Package in the Case Study Countries

1. The Essential Package (EP) predates the SF Policy (UNICEF & WFP 2006), but continues to be endorsed by the Policy as part of WFP's approach to school feeding. The EP constitutes supplementary guidance for SF programmes, and updated EP guidelines for use in WFP were published in 2010 (WFP, 2010d) Comments on the EP reported by team members who undertook the country visits are summarized in the following paragraphs.

2. In **Bhutan**, health-related activities include efforts to ensure the provision of potable water in school and (with WFP support) the training of cooks which includes advice on hygiene and sanitation and cooking approaches which will retain vitamin content of foods including vegetables. While MOH staff do not mention the 'EP' approach, programming is consistent with this approach.

3. In **Honduras**, the Country Programme (CP) document states that if funding permits, delivery of the WFP/UNICEF School EP will ensure that services such as deworming, latrine and kitchen construction, drinking water and school gardens are provided. Funding has indeed been a main constraint to expanding the provision of the EP.

4. Nutrition training for parents and teachers mostly focuses on the appropriate use of the food items provided in the SF, particularly Corn Soya Blend (CSB). Linkages with primary school nutrition education programmes supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to promote healthy eating habits and prevent emerging problems such as obesity (particularly in urban areas) remain weak.

5. In **Malawi**, there is very little awareness in the Country Office of the EP advocated by WFP and endorsed in the policy. However, deworming activities were foreseen in the CP as intestinal worms are a leading cause of morbidity among school-age children. But WFP has had to withdraw from deworming activities in Malawi because of financial constraints.

6. In **Mali**, additional activities are proposed alongside implementation of the WFP SFP, as part of the EP. Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) deliver training on hygiene and hand-washing. According to the Standard Project Report (SPR) for 2010, deworming was undertaken alongside the SFP in 94% of schools; school gardens were planted; 80 fuel-efficient stoves were distributed; tree planting is being promoted; mills have been distributed to communes, and WFP tries to ensure the availability of a water point near each canteen.

7. In **Tajikistan**, WFP assisted 360,000 schoolchildren with deworming tablets during spring 2009. The main WFP role is the provision of tablets and resources for implementation. The National Tropical Disease Centre is the WFP partner for implementation of deworming in WFP assisted schools. During 2011 and 2013, WFP will undertake two more rounds of deworming in assisted schools. This activity pre-dates the SF Policy. WFP has assessed and addressed various elements of the EP. While reviewing Food for Work (FFW) proposals from partners for the construction of drinking water supply systems, WFP requested that the new projects delivered water distribution taps in nearby schools as well. However, due to non-availability of non-food items (NFIs) and strong partners with expertise and non-food resources, WFP has limited activities in this sector. For similar reasons, WFP is not providing fuel efficient stoves. Again, efforts to provide the EP are consistent with the policy, but predate it (as does the EP itself).

8. Summary:

- ➔ *Support to deworming by WFP and/or other partners is mentioned in all five study case countries. In some of the countries, implementation of deworming and of other EP elements such as provision of a safe water point or fuel-efficient stoves has been hampered by financial constraints faced by WFP and/or partners.*

Note 4 Reflection of School Feeding Policy in Country Strategies

1. The following table provides background to the evaluation's assessment of alignment between country strategies and the SF policy. The second column shows a crude score awarded, with brief reasoning. The third column provides more background to the judgment. Note(a) that the judgment is informal, and based purely on evidence internal to the country strategy documents; and (b) early country strategies appeared in 2009, prepared before the SF Policy was formally adopted in November 2009.

2. The categories used were:

++ key themes of the SF policy substantially reflected

\+ key themes of the SF policy somewhat reflected

= little or no reflection of SF policy key themes, *or* SF not a significant feature

Country	**Score**	**Comments**
1. Bangladesh (2011)	++ strong on support to government SF system	"Strengthen government systems to facilitate the launch of the national SF system" New national social protection policy, in preparation, is intended to include school feeding and nutrition programmes as safety nets. Described squarely in terms of education goals, but also: In line with WFP's new school feeding policy, increased emphasis will be placed on understanding the additional benefits that can be derived from school feeding. This includes better learning outcomes arising from both better attendance and improved nutrition, especially in reducing prevalence of anaemia, and the value of school feeding as a safety net. Measuring, understanding and enhancing the value of all the benefits derived from school feeding will be a focus of the strategy. (WFP, 2011a, pp. 14) HGSF: not mentioned. Cost effectiveness: SF the largest component of expenditure (but will decline as government takes over); need for specific attention to cost effectiveness of alternative SF approaches.

Country	Score	Comments
2. Burkina Faso (2010)	++ strong on support to government SF system	Support to strengthen government SF programme, Overarching strategic priority is human capital through social protection: Strategic Priority 2: Support the development of the human capital through social protection programmes. … Goal 5: Increase the enrolment and completion of primary education especially for girls, and improve the nutritional status of pupils. HGSF: mentions need to strengthen demand side of agric value chain; not specifically linked to SF. Cost effectiveness: no specific mention.
3. Burundi (2010)	+ no obvious shift from primarily education perspective	Mentions support to government capacity, but squarely focused in education objectives and need to embed SF in the education system Priority one: *Food and Nutrition Security* – Objective 1.2: *to address hunger in school-aged children and to support their education*. *School Meals* will provide assistance to targeted schools and reinforce the capacity of Government and the communities to take over the programme. To advocate with government for the formulation of a safety net programme. And: The World Bank is a strategic partner for WFP given the joint interest in School Meals Programmes as an effective vehicle and option in the development of National Safety Net Programmes. HGSF: no direct mention Cost effectiveness: no specific mention

Country	Score	Comments
4. Ecuador (2011)	++ SF programme already government-run, and oriented towards social protection	'*School Feeding* Programmes: School feeding has been a strong component of the GoE's social protection programmes. [school lunch discontinued; school breakfast expanded in coverage and quality; need to reinstate school lunch in poorest areas, to support nutrition and ensure continued attendance] 'Strategic Priority 2: Contribute to the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people in Ecuador with an integrated approach at local level in support of food sovereignty and security – … 2.2 Strengthen local safety net programmes: WFP will work closely with MCDS [Ministry for the Coordination of Social Development] to evaluate national safety net and food-based social protection programmes, in particular a SWOT analysis of Aliméntate Ecuador and an evaluation of the impact of Ecuador's Programma de Alimentación Escolar (PAE). HGSF: WFP to work with government (MoA etc) to strengthen capacity of local producers, e.g. for school meals. Cost effectiveness: no specific mention.
5. Egypt (2010)	+ main focus on food fortification, nutrition etc	'Strategic Priority 2: Influence policy and improve impact by mainstreaming inclusive models of food-based best practices in targeted communities – Mainstream tested FFE models: WFP will continue to support FFE to improve girls' school enrolment, provide nutritional supplementation to poor households, and improve education quality, with the ultimate goal of improving and enhancing the national school feeding programme and of handing over to a willing national partner. But SF is seen as part of government goal of "raising social equity and fighting poverty" WFP first priority is: Priority 1: Develop institutional capacity to improve the quality and effectiveness of the safety net system. HGSF: no specific mention Cost effectiveness: no specific mention.

Country	Score	Comments
6. Ethiopia (2011)	+ strongly education focus	Squarely linked to the issue of providing equitable access to education, but : Linkages to MERET [Land rehabilitation] and the PSNP [Productive Safety Net Programme] will be strengthened in order to capture synergies between access to education, community awareness, disaster risk reduction and hunger reduction. HGSF [high profile for P4P] Cost effectiveness: plans for cost-efficiency appraisal of cash and voucher programmes.
7. Indonesia (2011)	= limited focus on SF	All 3 strategic priorities of Country Strategy 2011-15 relate to capacity strengthening of Government rather than implementing any programmes itself e.g. school feeding. WFP SF programme suspended (funding shortfall) HGSF: no mention. Cost effectiveness: mention of some cost-efficiency problems, and need for more cost-sharing in view of shortage of resources.

Country	Score	Comments
8. Iraq (2009)	++ design/description reflects key elements of SF policy	Overarching aim (and diagram) for linking social protection sector to the productive sector. Thus: This country strategy does not envisage a traditional WB role of providing food aid. The timing of this intervention is in line with the new direction that the organization has taken to support governments in strengthening domestic food security through effective safety nets. WB can support this process through its technical abilities, drawing on its operational experience in areas such as VAM, school feeding, supply chain management, early warning mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation and combine this with the expertise of it strategic partners, including the WB, sister UN agencies, and local and community based organisations. HGSF: not specifically mentioned, but strong emphasis on supporting local procurement rather than WFP provisions. Cost effectiveness; not directly mentioned, but overall integrity and efficiency of national public food distribution system is a concern.
9. Jordan (2010)	++ design/description reflects key elements of SF policy	WFP's food aid projects have already been handed over and closed. 'The Government of Jordan has requested WFP to continue to provide support for improving the targeting and efficiency of national food based safety nets, including the national school feeding programme. WFP 'Priority intervention 4: Support to education through enhanced Government capacities in school feeding.' Govt-run SF programme with only technical support from WFP. HGSF: no direct mention. Cost effectiveness: "'School feeding management is also very important for maximising cost efficiency and therefore sustainability of the Government's national programme, and WFP has unique expertise there too."

Country	Score	Comments
10. Lao PDR (2011)	+ early stages in reflection of SF policy	Identified strongly as an education sector intervention. Government said to be beginning to develop a national school meals programme. HGSF: no specific mention. Cost effectiveness: no specific mention.
11. Malawi (2011)	+ early stages in reflection of SF policy	Notes government is developing a national SF programme linked to HGSF approach; seeking support from WFP. Only passing reference to school feeding in the context of safety nets/social protection. HGSF is part of government approach; also a P4P pilot. Cost effectiveness: acknowledgement that perceived high cost of SF as an option is something which needs to be addressed.
12. Mauritania (2010)	++ design/description reflects key elements of SF policy	Locates SF under an overall social protection objective, and refers to planned hand-over of WFP SF programme to government in the next CP. ("WFP was requested to contribute to the preparation of the national School Feeding Policy; this policy will set the steps to follow for the preparation of the hand-over of the school canteens to the Government.") HGSF: mention of local purchase when possible but no direct HGSF mention. Cost effectiveness: Government won't be able to fund entire school canteen system in the foreseeable future.
13. Mozambique (2011)	++ clear attempt to follow SF policy	CS envisages a deliberate shift towards an approach that views SF as part of social protection and based on local procurement, and seeks to build national capacity, HGSF: Government proposes to adopt home-grown food assistance programme Cost effectiveness: no direct mention.

Country	Score	Comments
14. Nepal (2010)	= no clear evidence of SF policy influence	FFE depicted as support to education objectives, including girls' enrolment HGSF: mention of a possible future local agriculture purchase initiative, but not specifically linked to SF. Cost effectiveness: no direct mention.
15. Peru (2011)	++ clear SO5 orientation of WFP strategy	Peru has an established social safety net framework which includes the national SF programme. Under WFP Priority Area 1: Nutrition, Activity 1.2: Support Government's food and nutritional programmes to better invest in social safety nets through strengthening their institutional capacity – 'WFP will engage in advocacy and policy dialogue with the government, UN Agencies and civil society with respect to nutrition, micronutrients, and food security policies. And support the implementation of the proposed National Reform of Food and nutrition Assistance Programmes, in order to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.' HGSF: no specific mention. Cost effectiveness: importance of cost-efficiency in social programmes is mentioned.
16. Sudan (2009)	= no clear evidence of SF policy influence	SF a small part of a mainly emergency programme, with its objectives linked to enrolment and retention. HGSF: no mention. Cost effectiveness: no specific mention.

Country	Score	Comments
17. Tanzania (2010)	+ in line with some aspects of SF Policy, but doesn't seem strongly reflected	Envisages increased efforts at handover of SF: In some ways this country strategy is a refinement and up-scaling of many successful interventions that WFP is currently implementing but nuanced to underpin government efforts in agriculture and food security. Key differences from the current approach include: … Concentration of both geographic and programmatic focus for some programmes (e.g., food for assets), and expansion of others programmes and tools (e.g., school feeding and 'purchase for progress') … Increased efforts at capacity building and hand-over of various activities to the government, partners and national institutions (e.g., school feeding, vulnerability analysis, food for work, and others) HGSF: mention of P4P initiative, but no specific link to SF. Cost effectiveness: no direct mention.
18. Uganda (2009)	= no clear evidence of SF Policy influence	Strongly nutrition-focused strategy , little reference to SF as such. HGSF: mentions strategic importance of WFP's local purchase activities, but no mention of link to SF. Cost effectiveness: no direct mention.
19. Zambia (2010)	++ reflects key elements of SF Policy	The primary goal of WFP's current work in Zambia is to strengthen the capability of the GRZ to provide social safety nets to assist hungry poor households, particularly those affected by HIV and AIDS. All activities contribute to three main outcomes: 1) enhanced national capacity to manage national food-assistance programs for on-site school feeding, improved health and nutrition, and disaster management and mitigation; … Uses safety net perspective and advocates HGSF approach. School Meals focus: In the short term, **school feeding is recognized as a key food safety net for social protection against crises and shocks**. In the long term, school feeding contributes to improved nutrition, improved education performance, gender equality, and income transfer for poor families. HGSF: -specific mention of P4P . Cost effectiveness: no direct mention.

Note 5 Local Economy Elements in Recent Operations

1. This note summarises findings on how local economy issues (e.g. use of school feeding to promote local agricultural development) feature in recently approved WFP SF operations, as well as in the evaluation's eight case study countries.

2. As part of this evaluation, comparisons were made of WFP programme designs completed since approval of the school feeding policy with the immediately preceding design (from before the Policy was approved). This was done for 10 countries: mostly comparing Country Programmes (CPs), but in some cases looking back at earlier Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) and in one case a Development Project (DEV). The local economy findings are shown Table J7 below.

Table J7 Programming changes regarding local economy since school feeding policy approved

Country	Previous programme	Recent programme	Change with regard to impact on local economy
Bangladesh	CP 2007 – 2010	CP 2012 - 2016	No link to local economy benefits in either CP.
Cambodia	PRRO 2008 – 2010	CP 2011 – 2016	Local purchase and sourcing, with aim of benefits to local economy, mentioned in both.
Ethiopia	CP 2007 – 2011	CP 2012 – 2015	Focus on local purchase and sourcing in both, with second programme reporting good progress in this regard. Seen as a positive externality rather than a stated objective.
Ghana	CP 2006 – 2010	CP 2012 – 2016	Emphasis on benefits to local economy in both, with P4P mentioned as means of steadily increasing school feeding procurement from local farmers in 2012 – 2016.
Indonesia	PRRO 2008 – 2010	CP 2012 – 2015	Treated in both as a positive externality which is not central to project aims.
Laos	DEV 2005 – 2010	CP 2012 – 2015	Implicit reference only in 2012 – 2015; no specific mention of local benefits in previous programme.[115]
Mauritania	CP 2003 – 2008	CP 2012 - 2016	Not mentioned in either CP.
Senegal	CP 2007 – 2011	CP 2012 - 2016	Both CPs commit to local purchase, provided not at higher price. No further focus on benefits to local economy.
Tanzania	CP 2007 – 2010	CP 2011 – 2015	Earlier programme expected to buy 70% of all WFP commodities locally. Recent one commits to supporting small-scale farmers through their supply of school feeding commodities.
Timor Leste	PRRO 2008 – 2010	CP 2011 – 2013	Documentation is not clear on whether there has been change.

[115] However, PSS reports that there is active support to the government HGSF programme which is not reflected in the project documents.

3. In only one of these 10 cases, Tanzania, has there been a change in programming emphasis on local economic benefits since the approval of the school feeding policy. In two others – Cambodia and Ghana – such benefits were stated as an objective in both the earlier and the recent plans, implying that the school feeding Policy itself has not made a significant difference to the country programming approach.

4. The eight country case studies undertaken for this evaluation have also assessed the changes, if any, that have occurred in WFP's school feeding activities with regard to impact on the local economy since the approval of the new Policy. Table J8 below sums up the findings of these studies.

Table J8 Findings of country case studies with regard to local economic benefits

Country case study	Findings
Afghanistan	One of the P4P pilot countries; WFP is engaged in a number of P4P activities that relate to school feeding. These include support to the local production of high energy biscuits; support to the local production of fortified flour; and local procurement of wheat. However, quantities purchased remain small at this point.
Bhutan	WFP tested local procurement of *kharang* (maize grits). However, there were quality issues and the *kharang* cost more than Indian rice. This was a normal local purchase, rather than using P4P modalities. It should be noted that Bhutan is heavily dependent on imported food. Government uses decentralised procurement approach under stipend. But major commodities are of Indian origin.
Dominican Republic	Local purchase, but at central level, so does not guarantee participation of small farmers.
Honduras	Local procurement is a key policy for the government. WFP started local procurement in 2000 and gradually increased. From 2009, linkages with small farmers through P4P. Increasing numbers of small farmers engaged with school feeding. Challenges remain to ensure timely delivery of commodities by farmers (post-harvest techniques, stocks), need for more flexible payment and procurement process within WFP. High exposure to natural hazards adds uncertainty about harvest.
Malawi	Through P4P, WFP has analysed, and will continue to study, issues and options around local procurement in Malawi, and is procuring all the maize for its take home school feeding rations locally. Through P4P, WFP focuses on promoting local commodity production and market systems (not specifically for school feeding), and is making useful progress. But WFP has been left behind by rapid (though perhaps inadequately planned) HGSF pilots by government – prompted, ironically, by a 2010 WFP pipeline break. It is not clear that WFP has much to offer on HGSF as a community/school-based approach, which is what is being promoted in some quarters of government.
Mali	A P4P pilot country. The initiative is working well but at very early stages, and no direct link to school feeding programme (although purchased cereals contribute to school feeding stocks). The government programme is HGSF, involving cash transfers to schools and local procurement of food. Government hopes WFP and other partners will assist in strengthening local agricultural capacity which is currently weak. WFP has not yet figured out how best to assist government in linking local production and school feeding.

Country case study	Findings
Mozambique	Strong links with P4P and strategy in place to pursue HGSF although CO pointed out that it is a process with many operational details still to be worked out. More complex in practice than in theory (and more time consuming).
Tajikistan	CO has just completed a market analysis of local purchasing potential although it is unclear if Russia as the major donor will relax its tied aid requirements.

5. The table shows that the strongest new feature with regard to local economic benefit in the case study countries is P4P. However, P4P does not constitute a direct link between the school feeding Policy and WFP's efforts to develop smallholder production and marketing through its procurement strategy. It can also be seen from the table that WFP is working actively with the governments of Honduras, Mali, Malawi and Mozambique to promote local economic benefits through HGSF in these governments' own programmes, although not necessarily in its own.

Annex K Country Cases – Executive Summaries

Afghanistan Executive Summary

Reproduced from Sandford, 2011.

Context

S1. Life in Afghanistan is heavily coloured by on-going insecurity and military interventions. This affects every aspect of development:

- Staff of government, donor partners, UN agencies and NGOs are at risk and large parts of Afghanistan are no-go areas.
- The majority of government expenditure is financed by donors. However, most donor funding does not go through mainstream government channels but is instead implemented through separate bilateral projects. A significant portion of donor funds are spent by military actors through Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
- The Afghanistan Government acknowledges that this situation is partially the consequence of the high levels of corruption within government systems, although corruption is also a risk to non-government channels.
- Interventions are a matter for dispute: education, particularly education of girls, is not universally accepted by society, with the result that schools, teachers and students are all targets of violence.
- The perpetual state of conflict in Afghanistan for the past thirty years has largely halted development with most indicators of progress deteriorating between the 1970s and early 2000. Although there has been some progress since 2001, the situation in Afghanistan is one of extremely high levels of malnutrition (59% stunting), low levels of literacy (37.6%), low life expectancy (44 years) and low per capita GDP ($517) .

S2. The objective of WFP's Food for Education Programme (both in documentation and according to interviews) is to improve enrolment and retention of children in basic education, and to reduce the gender gap. The programme is primarily seen as an education intervention. The exact wording used in the most recent PRRO is 'this PRRO supports regular school attendance, of children – especially among girls, – through-on site school feeding and a take-home rations incentive for girls'.

S3. WFP's core programme is made up of on-site feeding of high-energy biscuits (in 5,656 schools) and a take home ration of oil for girls. On-site school feeding is provided in selected schools for all children attending basic education (Grades 1-9).

S4. A standard take home ration of oil is provided for girls in Grades 1-9, and a double ration is provided for girls in grades 10-12. This additional ration has the objective of encouraging girls to complete secondary school and potentially going on to undertake teacher training and to become teachers (helping to fill the gap in the number of much needed female teachers).

S5. WFP is also piloting a wet feeding programme in 54 schools with 39,000 beneficiaries. The educational objectives of the wet feeding pilot remain the same as the core dry feeding programme.

Key Findings

How good and relevant is the policy?

S6. The concept of school feeding as a safety net with multiple outcomes means that the policy can be shown to fit almost any existing school feeding programme without requiring much adjustment. This is interpreted by WFP staff to mean that the policy is relevant. However, staff have varying opinions as to what are the main objectives of the policy.

S7. The challenging operational environment in Afghanistan means that it is extremely difficult to implement anything to a standard. This has affected all aspects of school feeding implementation and affects how possible it is to implement the policy. Furthermore, a lack of capacity in government, the insecurity of government, and the lack of high-level buy-in means that it is currently very challenging to talk about increasing government ownership of the programme.

What have been the results?

S8. WFP staff have some knowledge and awareness of the policy and believe their programme is in line with it. However, the main factors driving implementation are the PRRO (and strategic plan), the operating environment in Afghanistan, and the funding constraints. None of the non-WFP staff interviewed have any knowledge of the policy.

S9. Within WFP, awareness of the existence of WFP's School Feeding Policy has yet to filter through into impact on in-country programming. There has been some recent thinking about the implications of the policy on the Afghan programme, but this has yet to be converted to any actual changes.

S10. This does not mean that programme implementation in Afghanistan runs counter to the policy, but rather that there is no direct link between the policy and programming. Consistency with policy elements is explored in the paragraphs below.

S11. In terms of compliance with the idea of framing school feeding as a safety net with multiple outcomes, WFP in Afghanistan has tried to incorporate education, gender, nutrition and purchase for progress concepts into the programme. Still, the greatest contribution is seen to be improving girls' enrolment in schools.

S12. The programme is focused on improving school participation, particularly of girls, based on low enrolment rates. The programme is targeted using a combination of criteria including food insecurity, low enrolment and gender ratio. Dry rations have good micro-nutrient content (but fall short of WFP nutrition standards with regards to the percentage of kilo-calories they meet). The wet rations meet both macro- and micro-nutrient requirements. However, there is no evidence of a full analysis of the range of supply and demand side constraints to people's access to education, and therefore how best to position WFP's intervention in a response.

S13. There has been some effort to assess relative cost-efficiency of wet rations compared to dry rations. Overall cost-effectiveness compared to other approaches to increase attendance has not been assessed.

S14. School feeding is implemented in collaboration with government, with school staff engaged in delivering school meals and Provincial Education Department Directors playing a key role in managing programme resources. However, it is widely agreed that more needs to be done to enhance government ownership of the

programme, to improve the policy base for the intervention, and to develop systems and procedures in government. No transition strategy currently exists.

S15. The programme in Afghanistan has made little use of the eight standards to inform programme design and application. Although the standards have not been used, this does not mean that no progress has been made in any of the areas outlined. Table 10 in Chapter 5 of [the Afghanistan case study] report highlights key areas of progress.

S16. There is some evidence that WFP is making an increased effort to coordinate activities. Progress includes joint programming with UNICEF, participation in Education Cluster Meetings and attempts to enhance and use government reporting mechanisms. There is an acknowledgement by both WFP and government that there needs to be an improvement in their collaboration, and greater ownership of the programme by the government.

What has caused the results?

S17. There is no evidence that the policy informed the design of the new PRRO (which was finalised only two months after the policy was issued). Likely the policy will have more impact influencing up-coming changes to the programme as the Country Office seeks to adjust the programme in response to funding constraints and to improve the working relationship with government.

S18. Other processes and documents, rather than the school feeding policy, have been the cause of these shifts in implementation: WFP's Strategic Plan, Afghanistan's selection as a P4P programme, and a general trend for improving coordination with partners including government.

S19. For staff in Afghanistan there was no guidance or roll-out plan to accompany the new policy, instead they were notified of the new policy through a round-robin email.

S20. Actual programme implementation cannot be looked at in isolation from the context of Afghanistan. Problems of corruption and poor government capacity are recognised by the government as well as donors, and are exacerbated by interruptions in programming because of conflict, limited ability to supervise, and difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff. These factors all combine to make Afghanistan an extremely challenging environment to work in. Consequently, the room for manoeuvre in programming is limited. What kind of programme can be delivered in this kind of environment is a bigger question for local staff than the more normal question of what type of programme can deliver the biggest impacts.

Bhutan Executive Summary

Reproduced from Sandford & Tobgay, 2011.

Context

S1. The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small, mountainous, landlocked country found at the eastern end of the Himalayas. Subsistence farming is the main livelihood for 69% of the population, and agriculture along with tourism and, particularly, hydro-electricity are important components of the economy. Despite the importance of agriculture as a livelihood strategy, Bhutan does rely on a significant level of imports of staple food.

S2. Bhutan recently transitioned to a democracy, with the King continuing to play an important role as constitutional monarch. Bhutan's development philosophy stresses the importance of equitable and sustainable development focused on many factors, not just economic growth. This philosophy is known as Gross National Happiness. All development, whether financed by the Government or by Development Partners. is coordinated by the Gross National Happiness Commission. Bhutan's mechanisms for donor coordination, and the strength and accountability of government systems mean that it is often quoted as an example of good aid effectiveness practice.

S3. Bhutan has made rapid progress in development since it began opening up to the outside world in the 1960s. Key examples of progress include:

- Reduction in % of population living below food poverty line from 36.3% in 2000 to 23.2% in 2007.
- % of children under five suffering from stunting reduced from 56% in 1990 to 33.5% in 2010.
- Increase in net enrolment rate from 62% in 2000 to 93.1% in 2010.
- Increase in the number of schools from approximately 10 in 1961 to 603 in 2010.
- Improvement in the ratio of girls to boys in primary education from 69% in 1991 to 99.5% in 2007.
- Transition from being a less developed country to a middle income country.

S4. WFP began operations in Bhutan in 1975 and since then has had a continuous engagement with school feeding. The current development programme, launched in 2008, focuses entirely on school feeding and other education interventions. The goal of the programme is:

> to contribute to the UNDAF outcome of providing access to quality education for all with gender equality; priority will be given to people in remote food-insecure areas. A secondary aim is to enhance the technical capacity of the Government to manage the school feeding programme

S5. The objectives of WFP assistance are to:

> (i) increase school enrolment, particularly among girls, for children in poor, food insecure rural communities; (ii) maintain regular school attendance, particularly among girls; (iii) reduce gender disparity; (iv) alleviate short-term hunger and help children to concentrate in class; and (v) enhance the capacities of the Government to manage the FFE programme.

S6. WFP provides breakfast and lunch to all children up to and including grade 8 in targeted schools. These schools include all boarding schools and targeted day schools operating in areas considered to be food insecure, remote, and where enrolment rates are lower and gender disparities higher. WFP provides food in kind with a food basket comprised of rice, chickpeas, lentils and oil. WFP is providing support to approximately 36,000 children in 221 schools.

S7. The WFP supported programme is co-financed by the government, which provides funding for cooks, cooking fuel, 50% of Internal Transport Handling and Storage Costs (ITSC) and the transport of food from the final distribution points to the off-road schools (by pack animal). The Government also provides a stipend for children in selected schools who are grade 9 and above, and for the third meal for all children in all grades at boarding school. The Government stipend is provided in cash.

S8. In addition to support to school feeding, WFP also supports the construction and rehabilitation of key school infrastructure and provides fuel-efficient stoves (when resources are available); supports regular training programmes for cooks and the teacher in each school nominated to manage WFP resources; and supports the Government of Bhutan's school agriculture programme. During this Development Project, WFP piloted the local purchase of maize grits (kharang). High prices, later delivery and quality issues mean that local procurement has currently been discontinued.

Key Findings

How good and relevant is the policy?

S9. Given the current focus on transition in Bhutan, the policy's focus on 'sustainable and affordable' school feeding has a particular relevance. This is an issue that both the country team and the national government are currently reviewing and will need to make progress on in the coming years.

S10. Although the country team (and the government, to a lesser extent) is aware of the policy, they are expressing a need for additional support and guidance as they try to take forward the transition process. This indicates that the policy is not providing all the support and guidance needed, although it seems unlikely that a policy document by itself could. However, while WFP in Rome have developed tools to support the policy, in particular transition processes, these tools have not reached Bhutan. The usefulness and relevance of these tools to Bhutan could not, therefore, be assessed.

What have been the results?'

S11. WFP staff are aware of the existence of the policy and its content. However, this knowledge of the content largely focused on the role of school feeding in addressing hunger and increasing enrolment, and working with government; it did not include an acquaintance with the eight standards of sustainable and affordable school feeding. The WFP country office staff expressed a commitment to the transition process, although there are concerns as to the government's financial and human capacity to deliver the programme at the current scale and standard.

S12. Bhutan is not one of the pilot countries where the policy has been rolled out in a systematic way. This means that they have not received the support, in the form of frequent visits or the distribution of guidance materials that pilot countries such as Mali have received. This would not be a significant fact (only 12 countries were selected as pilot countries), apart from the fact that Bhutan is currently heavily focused on transitioning school feeding to government ownership but have not received or heard of any of the tools which have been developed to support such a process.

S13. There was also some knowledge of the policy by non-WFP staff. This was partly because it had been shared in preparation for this evaluation, but also because it had been shared with government to enable them to prepare their school feeding policy. However, it was only UNICEF staff who demonstrated an understanding of its contents. Government staff expressed a commitment to the Government taking over increasing responsibility for the programme and to ensuring school feeding's continuation once WFP withdraw. While Ministry of Education staff strongly state that it should continue at the same scale, they express concern as to whether there will be sufficient resources.

S14. In terms of compliance with the idea of framing school feeding as a safety net: the Bhutan programme focuses on improving enrolment and attendance in schools, ensuring that the programme is nutrition sensitive, and has strong links to wider programming both in the field of school health and with the school agriculture programme. They also piloted a local purchase programme, although this has currently been suspended.

S15. In terms of compliance with relevant international standards: the programme does respond to an analysis of demand and supply side constraints to education, monitoring data is gender disaggregated (although there is very little specific gender focused programming) and the strength of the food supply chain means that WFP-provided school meals are predictable. The focus on constraints to accessing education, however, means that the programme does not always target the poorest as there is not necessarily an overlap between poverty and areas where scattered settlement means large numbers of children are remote from school.

S16. Many of today's civil servants (and most of those interviewed in the course of this assessment) benefited from school feeding as children. They warmly remember the programme and credit it with improving their education opportunities. As a consequence there is huge buy-in by key stakeholders into the concept of school feeding and a strong commitment to ensure its continuation.

S17. School feeding existed prior to WFP's arrival in Bhutan, although it was substantially scaled up subsequently as a consequence of WFP's involvement and an increase in schools, and therefore has always been part of the government's programme to increase school enrolment. The programme is implemented in close collaboration between WFP and the government; with a focal person in place at the Ministry of Education since WFP support was launched (and the involvement of District Education Officers (DEOs) as well as 'WFP in Charges' in each of the schools).

S18. The Government has co-financed WFP's involvement since it started. It finances a number of items to accompany WFP provided foodstuffs (cooks' salaries, fuel, half of the within=Bhutan transportation costs, as well as any final

transportation which needs to be undertaken by porters or pack-animals). They also provide a stipend for the evening meal for all children in boarding schools, and breakfast and lunch meals for children in grade 9 and above in eligible schools. This represents an increase in co-financing since 2007.

S19. While WFP has provided training, it is focused on day-to-day management of school feeding logistics and meal provision. There has been less effort in establishing the systems and procedures with the Ministry of Education and District or National level to provide the sort of management of school feeding that WFP currently undertakes.

S20. The transition of school feeding to government ownership has been on the agenda since 2002, and has been more seriously discussed since 2007. The above increases in government co-financing reflect this increased focus. However, there is not yet a transition strategy in place. Both the WFP Country Office and Ministry of Education staff understand the need to develop a plan which focuses both on financing and on technical capacity; however they are seeking guidance on how best to take this forward.

S21. The Bhutan programme has made no use of the eight standards for sustainable and affordable school feeding. Although the standards have not been used, this does not mean that no progress has been made in any of the areas outlined. Table 11 [in the full case study report] highlights key areas of progress.

S22. With the exception of the increased co-financing of school feeding by government, there has not been any recent change in the relationship between WFP and Government. Government–development partner relations are well coordinated by the Gross National Happiness Commission (with all development partners, not just WFP). There is, however, the expectation that the relationship will change in the coming years as the transition takes place. The recent visit by the WFP Regional Director has renewed emphasis on transition and gained commitments from government that school feeding will be factored into new education policy. WFP has made a commitment to provide capacity building support to this transition process, including the development of the school feeding section of the new education strategy.

S23. The only recent significant change in how WFP relates to other partners has been the strength of the UN's Delivering as One model since 2008. With regards to other donor partners, WFP continues to be an active participant in relevant forums.

What has caused the results?

S24. The WFP staff in Bhutan do not attribute the current programme design, subsequent amendments or the focus on transition to the School Feeding Policy. The current Development Programme in Bhutan was developed prior to the new School Feeding Policy being issued and therefore cannot have been directly influenced by it. The current Development Programme largely represents a continuation of activities from the previous school feeding programme. The few changes, including the move towards WFP phasing out and a simplified food basket, appear to be the consequence of the evaluation of the previous development project.

S25. There is a strong perception in country that the focus on transition is the result of resourcing constraints rather than motivations outlined in policy. "WFP is a

humanitarian agency, it's mainly for disasters, it's where it can get funds. But for Development Projects like school feedings it's more challenging to raise funds. We cannot convince donors".

S26. Although staff do not attribute changes to the policy, there is consistency in the direction of shifts in WFP programming and some of the ideas outlined in the policy. There may, therefore, be an indirect link with both the policy and the programming in Bhutan influenced by the same trends in thinking. Furthermore, the policy may have influenced some of the recent discussions between the WFP Regional Director and the government in ways this assessment could not detect because of its in-country focus.

S27. There was no special effort to roll out the policy in Bhutan. Staff were aware that a new policy had been issued because of a general email, but did not receive any additional support or guidance materials. As mentioned above, they have not heard of or received any of the tools that have been developed in support of the policy.

S28. Specific resources have been secured to support capacity development of government to support the transition. WFP is expecting to provide support to the Ministry of Education, the Food Corporation of Bhutan and the Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Authority (BAFRA). However, the country office team, comprised of only a small number of national staff (most of whom have been with WFP for less than 3 years), state the need for additional WFP technical support to reinforce efforts to help the Ministry of Education develop appropriate policies, strategies and systems.

S29. The policy and operational environment in Bhutan is generally enabling in terms of the transition of school feeding to Government management and financing. The Bhutan government is open to evidence-based programming, perceptions regarding school feeding are overwhelmingly positive, school feeding is already part of government policies and strategies, and WFP has already secured some funding for the transition process. However, there are a number of obstacles which need to be addressed or areas where further support is needed: WFP's phase out coincides with the withdrawal of a number of donor partners resulting in competing additional demands on government budgets; potential increases in government income from hydro-electricity will not be significant while outstanding debts remain which need servicing; as yet the government is not adequately sharing the burden for the management of school feeding particularly in relation to setting quality standards or monitoring; and the decision to nationalise all positions within the WFP Country Office was not accompanied by active mentoring or capacity building to help staff to develop the knowledge and skills needed to support the transition process.

S30. School feeding in Bhutan was initiated by the government prior to WFP's arrival in Bhutan and there remains a supportive policy environment for the intervention. The question is, therefore, not whether school feeding will continue but at what scale and to what standard.

Dominican Republic Executive Summary

Reproduced from Lovon 2011.

Context

S1. The Dominican Republic is the second largest country in the Caribbean. According to the most recent estimates, the country's population is about 10.1 million. With an annual per capita income of $4,576, the Dominican Republic is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country.

S2. Despite its economic growth, the country continues to display enormous disparities in the level of economic and social indicators across regions and population groups. According to UNDP, the country ranks 88th in the 2010 Human Development Index ranking, while the ECLAC statistics indicate that the proportion of Dominicans living in poverty (using a national poverty line) in 2009, reached 41%, while 21% were living in extreme poverty.

S3. In the education sector, the Dominican Republic has achieved important goals in the past decades, but progress has slowed in recent years compared to other countries. This is reflected in the stagnant (or even decreasing) education indicators, where the pre-primary enrolment rate (37%) is only slightly higher in 2009 than the level in 1999 (31%), while the gross primary enrolment rate in 2009 is similar to 1999 level. This is a result of the numerous factors that hamper the education system, such as insufficient classrooms, inadequately trained teachers, out-dated teaching methods and irrelevant curricula, among others.

S4. A school feeding programme has existed in the country since 1943 and was always co-funded by public funds. Currently the programme is the largest and most important social protection scheme implemented by the Government of the Dominican Republic (GoDR). The programme is completely funded by the government and reaches 1.6 million school children (80% of the total), with an investment of more than US$ 10 million per month. The main objectives of the programme are: i) to increase school attendance and continuity, reducing drop-outs and non-attendance rates; ii) to increase learning capacity and iii) to improve nutrition and health conditions of school children and promote a healthy school environment. The SF operated three modalities: PAE urbano, PAE Real and PAE fronterizo (SF in peri-urban, rural and border areas respectively). All three modalities provide one on-site snack (in urban areas) or complete meals (rural and border areas). Food commodities are procured in country, suppliers are national or local, but the procurement process is centralised.

S5. WFP began its operations in the country in 1967, providing food assistance to people affected by emergencies. In 1994, WFP started its support to school feeding, signing a cooperation agreement with the government to implement school feeding in the areas bordering Haiti. WFP's intervention brought important changes to the programme in terms of community participation, more active involvement of governmental institutions and a hand-over strategy. In 2005 WFP finalised its direct operations, handing over the management of School Feeding (SF) to the government and assuming a role as a technical assistance agency in the fields of nutrition, food security, logistics and emergency response. To date WFP has made important contributions to the development of institutional and policy frameworks to address

nutrition deficiencies and food insecurity, and since 2010 has been providing more active technical assistance for the improvement of the SF programme.

Findings

How good and relevant is the policy?

S6. The SF policy is seen as an appropriate and comprehensive tool to guide the process of improving the SF programme, in which the GoDR is already embarked. The eight quality standards are considered as the most practical elements of the policy and as appropriate for assessing the current status of the programme from different angles.

S7. The methodology of the programme analysis, and the workshop with the participation of a wide range of stakeholders involved in the SF programme, were positively valued as a systematic process of formative evaluation that permitted the identification of strengths and opportunities for improvement. The workshop was considered also as an important opportunity for stakeholders to interact, share information and establish connections, harmonising different visions and proposals in a consensual action plan to improve the SF programme.

S8. In terms of coherence with national policy frameworks, the policy objectives are coherent with the national policies in particular with the "Ten Year Education Plan (2008 –2018)" that establishes "school feeding as a means to achieve the goal of quality education for all".

What have been the results?

S9. The dissemination of the policy in the country has started with the HQ/RB, SF programme analysis mission and the stakeholder workshop undertaken between May and June 2011. The workshop was undertaken in June 2011, with the participation of more than 120 people representing a wide range of actors involved in the SF programme, and allowed a better understanding of these elements, as all the participants were able to apply the eight quality standards to analyse the national SF programme and prepare an action plan for improvement.

S10. Both WFP and government staff showed a high level of commitment to implement the policy. The government considers the policy to be an opportunity to guide the process of improving the quality and impact of its SF programme. UNDP and UNICEF are also involved in the process of policy implementation under the joint project "improving quality and impact of the SF programme".

S11. The comprehensive analysis of the current status of the programme and the action plan and recommendations for improvement, which include clear goals, actions, responsible institutions and timeframes for each quality standard, can be considered as one of the first results of the application of the policy in the country.

S12. The implementation of the action plan will depend on government commitment and capacities. In relation to this, continuous monitoring and technical assistance will be needed by WFP. For this purpose, the country office will require more continuous support from the RB and/or HQ, as its capacity is very low in terms of staff and resources. The regional programme capacity building project for quality SF would be an opportunity to enhance the country office's capacity for technical assistance.

S13. In terms of achieving educational objectives, the SF programme aims to increase enrolment and attendance and reduce drop-out rates, in particular in rural and border areas. There is a widely held opinion that the SF programme is contributing to decreased drop-out rates and increased attendance and school enrolment particularly in the poorest regions bordering Haiti and in the rural areas. SF is also acknowledged to relieve short-term hunger, but there is no a monitoring and evaluation system to measure the intermediate outcomes and final effects of the programme.

S14. The education sector is still hampered by both supply side and demand side limitations (quality, efficiency, poverty, marginalisation, etc.) which have led to stagnation in the progress of access indicators in recent decades. SF is part of a broader strategy to improve the education system and has a role as a universal demand-side incentive. However, its potential to improve access to education cannot be fully attained if the other factors limiting supply or demand sides are not addressed with the same emphasis or priority given to SF.

S15. As regards nutrition aspects, although the Strategic Plan (2008-2011) of the Ministry of Education establishes that one of the aims of SF is contributing to meeting the nutritional requirements of school children as a means to improve learning capacities, not all the modalities serve rations that meet nutritional standards. While rations in PAE Real and PAE Fronterizo fulfil the standards in terms of macronutrient content, rations in the PAE urbano do not meet these standards. There have been no evaluations of the effects of SF on the nutritional status or food consumption of the students. In terms of food safety, currently, government's priority is to strengthen the normative and operational procedures to guarantee food safety across the whole SF chain

S16. Emerging issues such as overweight and obesity are not taken into account in the design of the rations. The SF policy is biased towards consumption and food access deficiencies, which are not applicable in the case of universal programmes in countries with increasing levels of over-nutrition and chronic diseases such as the Dominican Republic. The action plan for SF improvement drawn up in the stakeholder workshop recommends conducting a nutritional survey in schools which is a very good starting point to improve the design of SF based on the nutritional situation. Similarly, linkages with primary school nutrition education programmes to promote healthy eating habits remain weak.

S17. With regards to local economic development, most of the food items are purchased in the country, under a centralised procurement process which does not guarantee the involvement of local farmers. In this context, what can be learnt from the Dominican Republic experience is that the promotion of local procurement and linkages with local producers should be linked to the design of rations including local products. If the rations do not include local products, as is the case of the urban SF, the possibilities of purchasing locally or promoting local economies are less.

S18. The promotion of local economies is more feasible with more decentralised programmes, where the procurement processes and logistics are under the responsibility of local institutions, and the rations are also tailored to include locally available products. Hence an important point emerging from the Dominican Republic experience is that strong decentralised institutions and/or local governments and established mechanisms to guarantee timely and continuous flow of resources and information between local and central levels are among the

conditions that enable local procurement and/or SF linkages with local economies. In countries such as the Dominican Republic with a highly centralised public administration, this approach would not work easily, as was learnt from the pilot experience in Sabana del Mar (1997 to 1999)which failed because of delays in the transfer of funds from central level to the districts.

S19. In terms of compliance with the idea of framing school feeding as a safety net, according to DR education policies SF should be targeted to lower-income families. However, in practice, the SF programme is almost universal, reaching about 80% of school children, which could lead to inclusion errors. The needs-based approach would be an important contribution of the SF policy to refine targeting criteria.

S20. With regards to the value transfer which SF enables, there have been no evaluations to assess whether such transfers are meaningful and attractive enough to encourage the poorest households to send their children to school. Similarly, linkages with other social protection mechanisms currently in place, such as the school attendance incentive component (ILAE) of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme "Solidaridad", aiming at the same educational goals, are still not clear. Issues such as what are the added value or the main advantages of both programmes in facilitating access of the poorest children to schools, need to be analysed to better understand the real role of SF under the social protection umbrella.

S21. In terms of sustainability, the government SF programme existed since 1943, long before WFP's arrival in the country, as an initiative to improve access to education of the poorest. WFP operated SF in the border and rural areas from 1995 until 2005, when it decided to end its direct operations in the country mainly because of resource constraints and its new policy to concentrate in countries affected by humanitarian crises and emergencies, assuming a technical assistance role.

S22. WFP has contributed substantially to refining the SF programme, particularly in the early stages of the PAE Fronterizo (between 2000– 2005) when important changes were brought about in terms of enhancing the role of the Ministry of Education as programme "owner", encouraging community participation and establishing a hand-over strategy with clear targets. All these changes were critical in facilitating the hand-over process of the programme to the government that was finalised in 2005. Currently WFP has resumed its capacity-building role in school feeding by promoting the application of its new SF policy to help government to improve the programme. In this context, the new SF policy is seen as a very appropriate and systematic tool to guide WFP's technical assistance.

What has caused the results?

S23. The SF programme has evolved over time. Key innovations occurred in the period with WFP's direct involvement (1995–2005), when aspects such as community participation, phase-out strategy and nutritional considerations were introduced. Currently, school feeding is considered as a key government strategy to improve access to education and has continuous government funding with an established budget line. However, all these changes have been driven, among other things, by changes in WFP's role in the country, the government policy and institutional framework, lessons learnt, and the need for new implementation procedures which are feasible and appropriate to government resources.

S24. The policy has guided comprehensive analysis and the preparation of an action plan to improve the quality and impact of SF, undertaken in May-June 2011, with the participation of high-level government officials, WFP HQ and RB staff, and UNICEF and UNDP. This process, funded by the government, is considered as a key first step in the implementation of the SF policy in the country, and will permit the assessment of its results in the future.

Honduras Executive Summary

Reproduced from Lovon & Torres, 2011.

Context

S1. Honduras is the second largest country in Central America, currently classified by the World Bank as a lower middle income country with an average per capita annual income of US$ 1,690. It is one of the most impoverished countries in Latin America, with more than half of its population living under the poverty line. Honduras ranks 106th out of 169 countries in the 2010 Human Development Index.

S2. The country has made progress in terms of socio-economic indicators in the last two decades: primary school net enrolment rate increased from 83.8% in 1990 to 89.5% in 2009, drop-out rates decreased from 2.3% in 2003 to 0.8% in 2009. Gender disparities in access to basic education have been reduced, and school attendance is higher among women than men. Chronic malnutrition prevalence also decreased from 34.5% in 2001 to 30.1% in 2005.

S3. Nevertheless large disparities in income distribution and socio-economic development across regions and population groups persist, with the rural areas and indigenous populations those most deprived. Some examples of this situation are the great differences in the rates of chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, schooling years, and extreme poverty between rural and urban areas:

	Rural	Urban
Illiteracy rate (adults)	24.4	7.0
Years of schooling (adults)	4.3	7.0
Chronic malnutrition (under five children)	38.5	17.7
Percentage of HH in extreme poverty	49.5	22.8

S4. WFP's assistance in the country began in 1970, and played a key role in the rehabilitation of the country's livelihoods devastated by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. The WFP's support to school feeding started in 1999, as part of the rehabilitation strategy for people affected by Hurricane Mitch. Currently WFP's school feeding programme (SFP) covers around 297,000 primary and pre-basic students in the most food insecure communities mainly in the western and south regions.

S5. School feeding (SF) existed in the country prior to WFP's arrival, and has always been part of the government's strategy to increase school enrolment, particularly among the poorest segments of the population, aiming also at reducing gender disparities in access to education. As mentioned above, WFP's support began in 1999. In 2004, the Government of Honduras (GoH) committed itself to the scale up of SF at a national level to cover the majority of the schools, and substantially increased its financial contribution. The first trust fund agreement with WFP was signed, under which WFP became responsible for the administration and management of the SFP at national and regional levels.

S6. The current government school feeding programme, supported by WFP, provides one meal a day to around 1.5 million children aged 3 to 12. The programme is largely resourced by the government (85%) with WFP providing support for around 15% of the caseload. Management of procurements, logistics and M&E at a

central and regional level is subcontracted to WFP by the government. Day-to-day administration is undertaken by schools with support from local authorities, local education supervisors and Healthy School programme field monitors and to a lesser extent WFP field monitors.

Findings

How good and relevant is the policy?

S7. Although the policy itself did not guide the evolution of the SFP in Honduras, the fact that many of its elements have been applied during the life of the programme, demonstrates that the policy is relevant, coherent and applicable to the country context. In this regard, key policy elements have been proved to be critical factors to achieve the high level of national and community ownership and sustainability that characterized the SFP in Honduras. Some of these elements are: inclusion of SF within the framework of national development, food security and education policies; active community participation; local purchase and links with small farmers; strategic alliances with a wide range of stakeholders (including private sector); and development of a strong institutional platform to manage SF especially at local levels.

S8. The policy is also highly coherent with national policies and strategies. Policy elements such as positioning school feeding within a broader social protection umbrella, promotion of the local economy by linking school feeding with local farmers, community participation and gender equity are in line with the national food and nutrition security, poverty reduction and education policies and plans.

What have been the results?

S9. Honduras is not one of the pilot countries where the policy has been rolled out in a systematic way. This means the policy was not adequately disseminated, among the WFP staff and external stakeholders. The roll-out process in this case was non-existent and the country has not received support or the guidance materials for the implementation of the policy.

S10. However, the country office and the government are highly committed and interested in applying the new policy, particularly to develop government capacity for a complete handover of the management of the SFP to national institutions. The elaboration of a road map as a first step towards a transition strategy is already planned with the support of the Regional Bureau, under the Regional Capacity Building Project for quality SF (Development Project 200141).[116]

S11. The Honduras SFP has made no use of the eight standards for sustainable and affordable school feeding, but this does not mean that no progress has been made in any of the areas outlined. On the contrary, SFP has achieved substantial progress towards the eight standards with very favourable results in terms of sustainability, accountability and ownership.

S12. The national SFP already has a significant base in terms of handover, and sustainability, not only in terms of financial contributions from the government, but also due to the wide support the SFP has from within communities and

[116] WFP (2010). Development Project 200141: School Feeding Capacity Development Project for Latin America and the Caribbean.

municipalities. However, there are still some key issues that need to be addressed, including procurement, transport and food monitoring. At present these activities are performed by WFP.

S13. School feeding has long been considered by GoH a key approach to increasing enrolment particularly in the poorest communities. It is mentioned in the Food and Nutrition Security Policy, PRSP and education plans. There is a legal framework that established the School Feeding Day. This has resulted in political sustainability and a stable budget line.

S14. The SFP in Honduras has developed strong and stable institutional arrangements with participation from a broad range of stakeholders, particularly at local level. This is one of the pillars that guarantee transparency, accountability and satisfactory implementation of the SFP in Honduras, demonstrating that it is a fundamental SF policy element to achieve sustainability.

S15. Community participation has led to strong levels of ownership and accountability. This in turn has led to increasing community contributions to the programme (labour, complementary food, cooking fuel and utensils); more active women's participation in the decisions and implementation processes; and social control which guarantee transparency, appropriate distribution of rations and reduction of losses and diversion of commodities to other uses.

S16. With regards local economy development, a major achievement of WFP in Honduras is the local purchase of most of the food that makes up the school lunch. The local procurement strategy in Honduras was driven mainly by the government policies that prioritized local purchase of commodities for its national SFP.

S17. From 2009, elements of school meals were purchased from local associations of small producers using Purchase for Progress (P4P) approaches. The experience in the first two years was very favourable: resulting in better quality and culturally adapted food items, contributing to local food price stabilization, and preventing speculation and hoarding of quality grains. Challenges remain to ensure timely delivery of products by farmers and the need for more flexible payment and procurement process within WFP. Given the relatively short life of the experience it is too early to assess its impact on the local economy. However, local stakeholders are of the opinion that the concept of developing local economies and linking local farmers with SF is much more feasible if purchases are made locally, with more decentralized programmes.

S18. In terms of compliance with the idea of framing school feeding as a safety net: the Honduras programme focuses on improving enrolment and attendance in schools with emphasis on the poorest regions; reducing gender disparities; ensuring that the programme complies with international standards in terms of nutrition; and has strong links to wider programming in the field of school health (de-worming and preventive health).

S19. The experience in Honduras has demonstrated that SF is a valuable safety net for the poorest. As frequently mentioned by different stakeholders contacted, SF alleviates the cost of feeding children by poor households, and preventing dropout rates due to need for child labour. SF also plays a key role on helping households to feed children while they migrate to other locations seeking for jobs. Nevertheless, the conceptual and operational implications of considering SF a Safety Net, particularly

in the framework of the new Social Protection strategy being developed, are still unclear. There is the need to rethink aspects such as: complementarities with other social protection schemes such as "Bono Diez Mil" (a conditional cash transfer programme) to build synergies and to improve its effectiveness and targeting by reducing the likely exclusion and inclusion errors.

S20. In terms of achieving education objectives, there is a general opinion that SF contributed substantially to increased enrolment and decreased drop-out rates and teachers also describe children being better able to participate in class because they have eaten well. Yet there are no robust evaluations that measure the extent to which SF contributes to the improvement in education indicators. However, it is recognized that SF alone cannot attain its maximum potential to improve education indicators because of the complexity of factors that continue inhibiting access to education and student's learning capacity. The SF policy should put more emphasis on the need to pay more or equal attention to the other factors that hamper the education sector to enhance the role of SF as a vehicle for improving the internal and external efficiency of the education system.

S21. Concerning the influence of the policy on the new WFP operations, the SF policy was explicitly considered in the design of the new Country Programme. The SF component is aligned with the policy and the development of a handover strategy under a joint WFP/Government institutional development plan is emphasized. The new CP also states that the progress of the SFP will be measured according to the eight school feeding quality standards.

S22. The Government and WFP have already started discussions on transition; and, with the support of the Regional Bureau it was agreed, under the Regional Capacity Building Project for quality SF, to develop a roadmap with high level national authorities. Further support from HQ and RB is needed to help develop the transition strategy.

S23. However, in light of SFP's transition, a major challenge will be related to the institutional capacity of the Honduran government to take over the whole process of procurement, distribution and logistics at central level. In this direction, there is a need for WFP to ensure that capacity development efforts target institutional issues particularly at central level. Likewise, according to government officials, WFP's procurement and logistics procedures would need to be adapted to fit national/local institutions' capacities, regulations and resources.

What has caused the results?

S24. The main changes and improvements of the SFP across its life were mainly driven by the experience and its own lessons learnt. Other WFP policies such as the new Strategic framework, P4P and gender policy, as well as changes in the government policies and priorities, lead to improvements in key aspects such as: accountability, linking to local farmers, local purchase and community participation.

S25. While Honduras SFP is the second largest SFP administered by WFP in the world, and has important lessons learned and good practices that would contribute to the policy, the CO was not actively involved in the process of formulation of the policy.

S26. The whole process to achieve the current stage involved: capacity building, sensitization and advocacy at all levels during the whole life of the programme, visibility and resource mobilization campaigns ("SF Day" or *Catrachilandia*) and partnering with the government, private sector and local institutions.

S27. The experience in Honduras is very rich and has important lessons learnt and good practices to share that would be very valuable to guide the process of implementing the policy in other countries. It is strongly recommended to systematize and disseminate the country's SF experience.

Malawi Executive Summary

Reproduced from Turner & Kumwenda, 2011.

Context

S1. In 2010, Malawi ranked 153rd out of 169 countries on the Human Development Index. Poverty is widespread, and food insecurity a constant concern. Despite strong agricultural performance and good economic growth in recent years, the country remains highly prone to periodic flooding and drought, and the apparently adequate food security of the majority of the population continues to depend on ongoing subsidies and adequate rainfall.

S2. The learning results from Malawi's education sector are the worst in southern Africa. Although access to the first year of primary education is almost universal, only 35% of children complete primary education. Overall, Malawi has the highest rate of malnutrition in the SADC region. Stunting is significantly worse in Malawi than the continental average. The lean season is still an important feature of rural livelihoods. Only one third of children always eat breakfast before going to school.

S3. WFP began operations in Malawi in January 1965. Over the decades it has mounted major relief operations to help Malawi cope with droughts, famines, floods, agricultural pest attacks and huge influxes of Mozambican refugees. The CO's largest operation was in 2006, when it was feeding over three million people. In 2010, by contrast, funding shortfalls meant that many staff had to be laid off and various activities suspended or cut back. Over the last decade, WFP has engaged more intensively in national policy and monitoring processes, including development of government's National School Meals Programme (NSMP), due to start in January 2012.

S4. WFP's support for school feeding began in 1999. The programme, carried out on behalf of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST), now supports 683,000 children in 681 primary schools across 13 districts, representing 12% of the state primary schools in Malawi. Districts and areas for school feeding are targeted on the basis of food insecurity data. The basic ration is corn soya blend (CSB) porridge. Take home rations of maize are provided in the lean season to girls in the higher classes of primary school and to orphan boys, on condition of attendance on at least three quarters of school days. Irregular funding and pipeline breaks are a recurring problem for WFP's school feeding programme in Malawi. Its Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot programme is strengthening its local procurement systems, with benefits for small farmer associations and grain trading platforms.

Findings

S5. The WFP school feeding policy has had little direct impact in Malawi, partly because awareness of it is limited. Even within the Country Office (CO) it has a low profile. The office has experienced little effort by headquarters to disseminate, explain or monitor the implementation of the new policy. Nor did the CO experience consultation or the building of local ownership during the preparation of the policy. One key issue is its resourcing implications for a CO – which again, it is argued, should have been addressed before the policy was launched. Malawi is one of the nine countries in which WFP, in collaboration with the World Bank, is piloting the

new approach that the school feeding policy promotes. This pilot status seems to have made little difference to the CO. It is acknowledged that there has been additional support and attention on policy issues from headquarters. But for the Malawi CO there is so far little substance to being a school feeding pilot country – there has been little explanation or planning about what they are supposed to be piloting, or how.

S6. Despite this apparent lack of engagement with the new policy, WFP Malawi is clearly in tune with its principles and emphases, most notably in its support to government in developing a NSMP to which WFP activities will ultimately be handed over. The CO's supportive engagement with enhanced school health and nutrition (SHN) in Malawi also reflects the provisions of the policy.

S7. Few other agencies in Malawi are aware that WFP has a new school feeding policy. Fewer still have seen or read it. The lack of any real effort to introduce the policy to stakeholders in Malawi means that many retain the traditional image of WFP as a supplier – and often advocate - of food aid. These misapprehensions mean that the consequences of failure to explain and advocate the new policy are worse than neutral for WFP.

S8. WFP's approach to school feeding is grounded in the educational benefits that it is believed to deliver. Government takes the same view. Both WFP and MOEST refer to the increased enrolment and enhanced attendance that school feeding achieves. The objectives of the current WFP school feeding programme in Malawi are mainly stated in educational terms: indeed, the 'strategic focus' of this project is described as 'support to education'. Proposed work for 2012–2016 adds the objective of helping government develop the NSMP. Overall, the new policy has had little effect on the educational emphasis of WFP's school feeding work in Malawi.

S9. Some development partners are critical of school feeding, and of WFP's approach to it, on educational, nutritional and cost grounds. They argue that adequate cognitive development depends mainly on proper nutrition during a child's first 1,000 days, and that if school feeding is offered, there are cheaper ways to achieve at least as much nutritional benefit than the CSB porridge offered by WFP. Not having been introduced to WFP's new school feeding policy and its more nuanced approach to these issues, they continue, understandably, to assume that WFP focuses just on enhancing enrolment, attendance and concentration in class.

S10. WFP's school feeding work in Malawi makes no direct or analytical reference to nutritional benefits, either in terms of the proportion of children's total nutritional requirements that is being met or in terms of the debates outlined above about the value of enhanced nutrition during the school years compared to the earliest period of childhood. While participating in the SHN process and promoting home grown school feeding (HGSF), WFP does not emphasise the nutrition dimension.

S11. WFP Malawi has been working to increase its local procurement since some years before the new school feeding policy was introduced. In 2010, it obtained 45% of the CSB and all of the maize and maize meal it used for school feeding inside the country. The balance of the CSB was supplied by the United States through the McGovern-Dole programme. P4P is not specifically focused on school feeding, although in Malawi much of its procurement is for WFP's school feeding programme. As in other countries, the relationship between local procurement and home grown school feeding is a matter of debate and some uncertainty. Ironically, it was WFP's

2010 pipeline break that stimulated direct action by MOEST to establish HGSF in Kasungu district. The NSMP is planned to begin in January with central procurement of CSB from Malawian millers who will deliver it straight to schools. Later, the intention is to move to a model of much more school-centred production, procurement and management, akin to the Ghanaian and Kenyan approaches. This is in line with WFP's school feeding policy; but, operationally in Malawi, WFP is not ready to make much direct contribution to such a strategy, however helpfully it may be working in the background with MOEST to launch the new government programme. Despite WFP's global commitment to HGSF, it is far from leading the trend in Malawi. It aims to provide technical support for the realisation of HGSF approaches – even though these are approaches that it does not itself practise.

S12. There is an element of social protection implicit in WFP's targeted approach to school feeding in Malawi. However, these social protection and safety net principles remain below the surface in the school feeding programme. There is no explicit reference to social protection or poverty reduction as objectives of the current programme, nor is school feeding framed in such terms in the draft Country Programme (CP) for 2012–2016. WFP has, nevertheless, contributed to government's development of its National Social Support Policy and Programme. The wording of WFP's own 2009 school feeding policy on the issue has had no direct influence on current debates in Malawi about school feeding as a safety net.

S13. There is a long-standing consensus in Malawi that school feeding has an important gender role in encouraging families to keep their daughters in education, instead of withdrawing them for food production and other duties during times of hardship. WFP Malawi's school feeding programme has been designed on this basis for many years.

S14. The Malawi CO works closely with government and is seen as an active and constructive partner. It is praised in MOEST for its committed engagement in development of the NSMP. It works closely with government on SHN matters. It sits on the Social Protection Technical Committee. But WFP has reached out less in the design and implementation of its own school feeding operations. Overall, WFP's school feeding policy is well aligned with Malawian national policy frameworks. The draft country strategy for 2012 – 2106 sets out five years of work towards transition to government ownership and management of school feeding through the NSMP.

S15. However, there are two ways in which WFP in Malawi is unable to keep up with its policy commitments on school feeding. First, events in 2010–2011 have meant that government is moving towards HGSF more vigorously than the CO, whose own planning for school feeding from 2012–2016 still envisages conventional modalities. Secondly, WFP is unable to deploy the advisory resources for which MOEST is calling. Meanwhile, government funding for school feeding is not yet assured or stable; and WFP itself is engaged in constant monitoring and advocacy to try to maintain adequate donor funding for its school feeding programme from year to year.

S16. There has been much debate in Malawi about the cost effectiveness of WFP's school feeding approach. The headline figure that is quoted by WFP is USD 22 per child per year. On this basis, it would appear that the cost per child of school feeding as undertaken by WFP is about the same as that of all the rest of the primary school education process. The mission reviewed budget and expenditure data provided by WFP and reached the tentative conclusion that the USD 22 figure could be a

miscalculation. The actual cost might be as low as USD 12 per child per year. It is possible that WFP is doing itself a disservice by giving prominence to a figure that is too high and exposing itself to criticism that may therefore be misdirected.

S17. Overall, WFP's school feeding policy is very much in line with Malawi's intentions, and from this perspective can be called a 'good' policy. Specifically, the policy's reference to enhancing nutrition, education and social protection resonates with Malawi priorities and plans. Its principle of supporting transition to national ownership and management of school feeding is completely in harmony with Malawi government intentions. The policy accommodates what Malawi wants to do with school feeding – and indeed its emphases are easier to find in emerging government policy than they are in current or planned WFP operations

S18. That the policy has such a low profile can be seen as a bad thing – WFP has done little to disseminate, explain or advocate it. An organisation that operates without much apparent reference to its policy can be seen as deficient in direction and/or management. Like the rest of WFP, the CO does not report school feeding activities or results with any reference to the eight guiding standards and associated indicators set out in the policy. Alternatively, the low visibility of the policy in Malawi can be seen as an endorsement of the way that WFP and Malawian thinking about school feeding have been running together, both before and since the preparation and approval of the policy.

S19. Although advisory inputs and related support from headquarters on the transition to a national programme are acknowledged, Malawi's status as a pilot country has yet to become an operational reality in the country. This highlights the aspirational nature of the policy, and perhaps questions whether it is a 'good' policy after all. If there is so little sign of a policy's implementation, even in a special pilot country, is it a realistic policy? Perhaps if the policy were accompanied by an implementation plan – even just for the pilot countries, in the first instance – it would be clearer to all concerned how its execution should unfold and what difference that should make.

Mali Executive Summary

Reproduced from Graham & Sidibé, 2011.

Context

S1. Mali is a vast country, half of which is desert. It is landlocked, and travel off the main roads is difficult. Democratic elections have been held in a peaceful political atmosphere since 1992. Mali faces significant challenges in key development sectors and is ranked 160th out of 169 countries in the 2010 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). Some 69% of the population lives below the national poverty line and more than one fifth of school age children do not attend school, three quarters of whom are girls. More than 80% of the rural population is dependent on subsistence farming and livestock herding.

S2. Similar to other countries in the region, Mali is highly vulnerable to a variety of shocks (environmental, social and economic) and has been hit by the rising prices of basic foodstuffs, fuel and the general cost of living following the global economic crisis of 2008-9. Drought and poor harvests are common. However, Mali has significant development potential in agriculture, forestry, fishery and pastoralist activities. Nevertheless, Malian crop yields are among the lowest in the world often running at about 1/10 to 1/5 of global averages for major crops like maize, millet, rice, and sorghum. Low productivity is a major constraint to the local purchase of food in drought-prone areas.

S3. School Feeding is the key activity for WFP in Mali. The Country Office is implementing a SF programme in 824 schools in school year 2010-11, whereby hot meals are served to over 200,000 children 180 days a year in the country's most food insecure regions and take home rations (THRs) are provided to 9,000 girls as a reward for 80%+ attendance rates. WFP also supports the Government of Mali's own fledgling school feeding programme, the *Programme des Cantines Intégrées* (PCI). WFP's work in Mali on school feeding is characterised under this "dual role".

S4. The quality of the delivery of support to the 824 schools is recognised by the Government of Mali, development partners, and relevant evaluations. WFP provides a nutritious meal in schools which are targeted through inclusive and logical criteria. Enrolment and retention rates have improved particularly for girls who are targeted through THRs. Programmatic weaknesses exist, particularly with regard to monitoring activities, but these are not major impediments to the programme as a whole.

How good and relevant is the policy?

S5. WFP's School Feeding Policy's main headlines are highly relevant to the context in Mali, where the Government was receptive to a national programme and has relied on the expertise and support of WFP and other development partners to formulate, and develop their own national school feeding programme. The School Feeding Policy builds upon the momentum established by WFP's shift from "food aid to food assistance", Strategic Objective 5 (SO5), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and other international commitments which have formed the backdrop to WFP's increasing focus on creating and strengthening national systems for basic service delivery.

S6. However, largely because of progress that had already been made in Mali, the Policy was only of limited use to the Mali Country Office (CO). There was little of novelty in the Policy which the Mali CO was able to appropriate. The tools which accompany the Policy were not deemed sufficiently relevant to warrant the time needed to adapt and implement them. The rethinking of school feeding as a social safety net was not appropriate in the Malian context, where the window for such a dialogue had closed in favour of focusing on implementation of a national programme and the development of a National Centre for School Feeding, with the collaboration of line ministries.

S7. There are further weaknesses in the Policy in terms of its implementation which are highlighted by the Mali case study. Whilst the Policy vigorously promotes the 'dual role' of 'classic' WFP school feeding implementation and support to national programmes and systems, the Policy does not consider the numerous challenges which this imposes on WFP in country. 'Transition' to nationally-owned and managed school feeding is not fully defined in the Policy, which, whilst being sympathetic to local contexts and needs, ignores important questions about how to manage the dual role in a fluid context. The Policy does not reconsider the methods for programme financing for school feeding. As a result the funding for technical support is contingent on running a 'classic' school feeding programme financed by traditional tonnage-based calculations. Similarly, resource mobilisation betrays contradictions between HQ level fundraising and country-level wishes. Finally, implementing a transition strategy requires more work, different skill sets and new ways of working, very little of which is addressed directly in the Policy.

S8. WFP in Mali has been ahead of the curve in terms of implementing a transition strategy which provides for a sustainable national school feeding programme in Mali. The work which the CO has undertaken to achieve the progress towards this has been considerable, and of a high quality. The WFP Policy fits neatly into the current dynamic, but it does not add value, either in the sense of politico-technical clout, or practical technical support for the WFP staff currently working towards these goals. In order to encourage the implementation of the Policy in Mali WFP HQ needs to identify more closely how the policy can bring added value to the work of the CO without imposing unwieldy administrative burdens on an already overworked staff.

What have been the results?

S9. WFP played a central role in the process of collaboration with government and other partners which, led to the adoption and establishment of a national school feeding policy and programme. WFP provided technical, political and administrative support to the 3 year process, which began in 2006, shortly after the arrival of a new WFP Country Director. The national school feeding policy was approved in November 2009, shortly before the WFP School Feeding Policy was approved in Rome. Given the focus in the WFP School Feeding Policy on establishing support to a national programme, it is clear that the Policy's role in Mali was to build on existing work, rather than to promote a change of direction.

S10. The new direction which the Policy espouses fails to consider the expectation on the part of Government and donors that, in the event of a large scale food crisis, WFP will retain the capacity and expertise to implement humanitarian interventions. Such a response is more akin to bygone project implementation, and is expected even in school feeding.

S11. The partnership between WFP, the World Bank and Partnership for Child Development (PCD) was a priority in Mali. Although it has yet to bring concrete results at a country level, it has allowed important collaboration between HQs, and it can help WFP assume new responsibilities and play an appropriate role in a field of work which is largely novel to the agency – providing direct technical assistance to the Ministry of Education.

S12. S12. It is difficult to attribute results to the WFP Policy, not only because it is so early in its implementation, but also because WFP Mali have not taken new initiatives on the basis of the Policy – thus the results documented in this report are not direct results of the implementation of the SF Policy.

S13. The implementation of the Policy in Mali is seen as a relative success from a HQ perspective, but a burden from the country perspective.

What caused the results?

S14. The results described in this report were caused by a dynamic and innovative country team which has been well led and directed by a succession of Country Directors who have been passionate about SF and making it sustainable. In the Malian context, the government was very receptive to SF and this, combined with Country Directors who were keen to work with government, has been a catalyst for the results seen. Mali is therefore, more an example of how the policy developed out of existing good practice. The challenge is how to now integrate the WFP SF Policy into what has already been put in place by Government in terms of a nationally owned SF Policy.

S15. Therefore, although the approval of the WFP SF policy in 2009 will have further encouraged the country office along the path they were already following they do not seem to have been greatly influenced by it. For example new elements found in the WFP policy such as the social protection/ safety nets have not been incorporated in Mali. This is understandable as the Malian government has already adopted a policy that is focused upon education and benefits to the local economy. In the case of Mali perhaps one of the key questions to HQ is what needs to be done to usefully engage countries which are already ahead of the curve in terms of implementation.

Mozambique Executive Summary

Reproduced from Anderson, 2011.

Context

S1. Mozambique has been independent since 1975 but the subsequent war which lasted until 1992 seriously set back development efforts. Since then it has enjoyed relative political stability and has been making significant progress in both macroeconomic stability and socioeconomic development.

S2. Despite its impressive record in economic growth, Mozambique continues to rank amongst the world's poorest countries with inequalities across wealth groups and between rural and urban dwellers. Recent unrest due to high food and fuel prices and the devaluation of their currency have revealed underlying political tensions and inequalities.

S3. The current Country Programme (CP 2006-2011) has two components: 1) education and child development through school feeding, take home rations for girls, boarding school feeding, and support for a national school feeding programme; and 2) support for a community safety-net system through food for orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs). Take home rations were phased out in 2008, and responsibility for the boarding school feeding was handed over to the government in 2009. The second component was closed in 2008. In January 2010 the government requested a 12 month extension to enable a more smooth handover of the school meals programme. A new nutrition component was added to prevent stunting and under-nutrition in children under 2 and a more detailed transition plan will be developed.

S4. WFP Mozambique's new Country Strategy (2012–2015) provided the framework for the new CP and PRRO. It prioritises three areas: human and social development, market access and disaster risk management, and. Under the first category, the Country Programme (2012–2015) addresses education/SF and child development, and nutrition for chronically malnourished children. The CP also incorporates market access issues through the P4P pilot. Capacity building efforts for disaster risk management are under the CP, with relief assistance and early recovery needs addressed in the PRRO which runs from 2011-2014.

S5. The outcomes for WFP's school feeding programme are to increase access to education in assisted schools (increase enrolment and attendance rates, and increase ratio of girls enrolled), and to develop and implement a hand-over strategy.

How good and relevant is the policy?

S6. School feeding is highly relevant to Mozambique given the overall levels of poverty, inequalities in access to education, and the government's policy framework. The policy effectively captures the main school feeding issues relevant to Mozambique, particularly in relation to Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF) –given a smallholder-dominated agriculture sector – and the focus on handover to government.

S7. The policy does a good job of encompassing relevant international issues that are important in debates within Mozambique. It signals that WFP is aware of the most recent international developments and is responsive.

S8. Overall, the policy is conceptually relevant to Mozambique but is weak in terms of practicality. It is in this area that the true relevancy of the policy is determined. Relevancy comes at a cost – a cost that hasn't been adequately taken into account by the policy and falls on the country office. As a consequence, the policy has improved the CO's ability to engage in the big debates in-country; but it has done less to equip them on the practical side. As a result the CO is effectively penalised: they are on the leading edge of the new thinking but without the tools which they are having to make up as they go along. This is particularly true regarding implementation modalities such as how to conduct decentralised procurement; the use of new food products and preparation, the use of canteens. An additional complication is that existing corporate rules and regulations (for example on procurement) have not kept pace and can be a barrier to change.

S9. The multi-sector approach with multiple objectives is difficult to deal with (is education or social protection the focus?) and it is very complicated conceptually from the government's perspective. A further challenge is how to measure all of the objectives. Multiple objectives also make the prioritisation of human resources challenging. WFP Mozambique has many competing demands on its time and resources with 4 pilots ongoing, and increasing demands due to the dynamic nature of the aid environment. The CO struggles to find the human resources to meet all of the demands.

What have been the results?

S10. Mozambique is a pilot country for the SF policy and as a result has received additional technical support, but also additional demands. The policy roll-out process began with an email from PSS explaining the how and why of the policy with a link to the document on WFP Go and an invitation to consult. As a consequence of being a pilot country, a number of the tools have been operationalised in country. These include the needs and gap analysis, the investment case and the stakeholder workshop.

S11. The CO are well aware of the policy and its main themes but this is more a function of the piloting process than of a systematic policy roll out. No policy specific training events were held other than a consultative workshop for pilot countries in March 2011. However, they see the policy more as a tool to communicate to the Executive Board rather than an operational document. As one staff member commented "we tend to read the policy once and then focus on the operational side." Their real focus is on programme guidance and manuals which have lagged behind the policy. Consequently, the CO have been forced to improvise on the implementation side which has consumed time and resources, yet additional resources have not been provided.

S12. Other key stakeholders, including the government, also have some knowledge of the policy. A workshop was held in May 2011 that effectively brought together high profile international partners from the World Bank, PCD and the Brazilian government with high level WFP representation. Government buy-in was evident by the level of representation such as the Minister of Education.

S13. In many ways, WFP Mozambique has been ahead of the policy in its approach to education and school feeding in general. The SF programme which ran from 2007-2009 focused on improving enrolment, attendance and completion rates in primary education with a focus on girls and OVCs. Sustainability and handover were addressed clearly with an emphasis on the development of the national education strategy for school feeding, building government capacity, a new emphasis on nutrition and developing new models for cash based school feeding including HGSF. Safety nets were also a theme of the 2007 Country Programme document although not in relation to school feeding.[117] These are clearly in line with the policy.

S14. In terms of compliance with the education component, the SF programme focuses on improving enrolment, attendance and completion rates in primary education with a focus on girls and OVCs. However, one of the difficulties with the new policy for the CO is that the education objectives are not prioritised, but in practice there is a need to prioritise. In addition there is a key focus on supporting the development of the national education strategy for school feeding.

S15. In terms of nutrition, the CP that ran from 2001-2009 did not explicitly address nutrition, and there is no stated output in the logical framework for the school feeding component. Current school feeding rations are a cooked meal (rice, beans, oil and salt); but because schools have a half-day format (with any on double shift) the meal conforms to WFP nutrition standards for half-day rations. Nevertheless, the CO perceives nutrition to be an area of weakness in the policy because they are not truly addressing nutrition in SF other than providing kcals and micronutrients. Having a nutrition objective would require a more holistic approach that addresses root causes in an integrated manner, including areas such as access to water and sanitation, health, awareness creation, etc.

S16. In terms of a platform for wider socio-economic benefits and the local economy, WFP Mozambique has been particularly strong and innovative in this area. Mozambique's P4P initiative assists farmers' organisations and small and medium traders to develop their capacity to compete with larger buyers for smallholders' crops. However, there is a fundamental contradiction between the objectives of P4P to support smallholder productivity and group marketing, and the need for SF to provide an affordable, consistent, safe and nutritious supply of food to schools. The two programmes have fundamentally different objectives that are not proving easy to reconcile. Issues around the scale of operation, price objectives, and differing operational partners add to the complexity.

S17. In terms of compliance with the idea of framing school feeding as a safety net, the CO has attempted to address safety nets within its CS but has not made the explicit connection to school feeding. It is an area that the CO struggles with and points to the difference between labelling school feeding as a safety nets, and making this happen in practice. The CO is understandably reluctant to fully incorporate school feeding under the social protection umbrella as it means adding another level of engagement to an already taxing slate of government relationships. In practice safety nets are far from being the overarching framework for school feeding in Mozambique. No analysis has been done to measure the size of the effective value transfer of school feeding, but there is evidence that it reduces drop-outs.

[117] Component 2: Support to Community Safety-Net Systems was in relation to OVCs and HIV/AIDS.

S18. The 8 quality standards outlined in the policy document were incorporated into the budget revision for the SF project (CP 104460) through 6 "benchmarks of quality standards" for a National School Meals Programme:

1. Sound alignment with national policy frameworks;
2. Stable funding and cost efficiency;
3. Evidence-based programme design;
4. Strong institutional and implementation arrangements;
5. Strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination; and
6. Strong community participation and ownership.

S19. Good progress has been made against all standards, although further advancement is anticipated. A summary of progress against standards can be found in the conclusions.

S20. While the quality standards have been useful to the CO and are in active use, they are struggling to make the overall feedback loops more systematic. The current reporting system does not capture the type of lessons learned that they are looking for from other countries. The CO wants to hear about the practical experiences of implementation and how other COs addressed them.

S21. There has been a substantial recent change in the relationship between WFP and Government, some of which can be attributed to the new policy, some of which was ongoing based on the earlier policy shifts of WFP's global Strategic Plan. The CP evaluation indicated that MEC needed to take more ownership of operations and that WFP move from in-kind aid towards a model based on technical assistance and an advisory role. The transition of school feeding to government ownership has been on the agenda since the beginning of the CP (2007) which predates the policy.

S22. There has been a change in how WFP relates to other partners but it is unclear how much to ascribe to the policy and how much is down to personal initiative of the CD and staff. National engagement in SF issues has increased significantly. Engagement in social protection has increased over the same period but independently of school feeding (this may not be a bad thing in terms of avoiding a supply led approach which can potentially affect credibility in the eyes of partners). A key relationship with Brazil and its SF programme has encouraged south-south cooperation and should help increase the impact of WFP's efforts at sustainability.

S23. Reputational assessment: a stakeholder analysis was not done but anecdotal evidence suggests that the CO has been effective in building a credible reputation that is open, flexible, and not supply led.[118] The CO appears to have built strong partnerships with UNICEF and DFID in particular.

S24. Ways of working: Anecdotal observations point to a very heavy work-load of the senior staff as the implications of pursuing a forward-looking multi-sector programme become clear. As one CO staff member observed, "every step we take reveals multiple repercussions that all require our time and attention". This appears to be especially true for school feeding because the options have increased but the 'how' is lacking.

[118] The consultant had informal discussions with several UN and donor representatives during a separate assignment in Mozambique in May 2011.

What has caused the results?

S25. The observed changes can be attributed to the spirit of the policy, but many of the changes were already in process prior to the policy being finalised and disseminated to the country office. Many of the actual changes are based on CO initiative and the proactive nature of the CD, responding to and building on both local practice and the local operating environment, and based on the overall WFP strategic plan.

S26. However, the new policy was a rational extension of the direction the CO was already heading and complemented these efforts despite being very challenging to implement in practice.

S27. There are some specific examples of interventions that can be attributed to the policy or general directions that were strengthened:

- The stakeholder workshop conducted in May 2011.
- Use of tools that were developed to support policy implementation (for example the needs and gap analysis and investment case tools).
- Increased levels of technical support from Rome, including a number of visits by technical experts.
- Strengthening of engagement with Government and other stakeholders (transition has been on the agenda since 2007, but the policy has helped to inform how this is taken forward).
- The use of the quality standards.

S28. Internal factors that have facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy include:

(a) Facilitating factors:

- Strong dynamic leadership in-country which has effectively positioned WFP in the major debates.
- Extra support from Rome due to the "luxury" of being a pilot country which many other countries did not have access to.

(b) Hindering factors:

- Pilot country overload: Mozambique is also piloting P4P, climate change, cash/vouchers and Delivery as One.
- The rapidity of evolution of policy. Although the CO appreciates the responsiveness to new ways of thinking and emerging global issues which finally gives them a seat at the table with agencies such as UNICEF and enables them to participate at the same level, it has come at a high cost. For example it is a hard fought advantage that the government now sees WFP as more than just food and logistics, and considers WFP a preferred partner. However, the Ministry of Education now requests much more technical assistance to develop terms of reference, budgets, strategies, action plans, etc. Increased engagement comes with increased demands.

- Staff capacity in the face of these demands is limited. The CO has one D1, one P5, three P4s, two P3s, two P2s and two JPOs while UNICEF Mozambique has over 50 international staff.
- Taking on new areas of work such as systems development is very challenging in the face of ongoing operations. The core operational work is still there which can cause a huge tension in the face of all the new demands. The CO staff appear to be working extremely hard. As one manager said, "I have just come back from the field and realised that we have to pause all of our engagement with district authorities and focus on distributing the food".

S29. External factors that have facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy include:

(a) Facilitating factors:

- Strong government buy-in to school feeding.
- Strong partnerships within the UN and with key development partners, and innovative new partnerships such as the MoU signed with GoM and Brazilian government.
- Clear Country Strategy document that signals a new approach for WFP in-country.

(b) Hindering factors:

- Complex interface with social protection that has not been resolved.
- Nutritional issues are complex and require further clarification.
- Lack of capacity within government and the challenges to find fiscal space for school feeding amidst the competing demands, yet push back on the government request for universal coverage.
- Need to align WFP procedures to GoM and not the other way around. This requires adapting WFP procedures which can be very time consuming.

S30. **Were there sufficient resources for implementation?** Implementation of the policy is more complex than was first envisioned and requires a substantial increase in both financial and human resources. The CO (and WFP in general) needs a new internal architecture to deal with the policy that had not been thought through when the policy was written. They are understaffed for the many demands they face and still have all of the operational challenges of normal programming in addition to dramatically increased engagement and capacity development demands.

S31. **How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy**? This is an area that requires careful attention as the weight of the process is heavier than they realised. The CO feels sustainability is used casually in the policy and requires much more analysis of what it means in practice. "Whose capacity do we build, what do we do, who does what, what system do we build and where, how much will it cost, how do we train our staff and in what? These issues are consuming most of our time and are very complex." For example, the issue of decentralisation alone is complex and

requires analysis about where WFP is most effective in building a sustainable system (the CO is focusing on district/provincial level capacity development).

Tajikistan Executive Summary

Reproduced from Anderson & Teshaev, 2011.

S1. Tajikistan, the poorest of the 15 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is a landlocked country in Central Asia. It ranked 112th among 169 countries in the 2010 Human Development Report, and has the lowest human development index (HDI) among the CIS countries. The majority of people live in rural areas with approximately 53.5% of the total population of 7.2 million living below the poverty line. Weak institutions and poor governance are serious constraints on development. These include deficiencies in the legal framework and the judicial system, as well as weak public administration and an undeveloped financial sector.

S2. WFP is the largest humanitarian agency in Tajikistan targeting 750,000 people through four field offices and a Country Office in Dushanbe. WFP has been present in Tajikistan since 1993, when it launched an Emergency Operation during the Civil War. Since then, WFP has been working in emergencies and recovery through a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), and in development through its TB and SF programmes. The overall WFP goal is to help vulnerable people recover from shocks, improve household food security and nutrition, preserve/rehabilitate assets, increase food production and promote investment in human capital.

S3. The first WFP school feeding intervention in Tajikistan took place in 1999 and has since expanded to all regions of the country. The current SF programme runs until 2015 with two objectives: i) continued access to education and nutritious meals for children of vulnerable and food-insecure families; and ii) progress towards a nationally-owned school feeding programme. The outputs are: i) school meals for 370,000 primary schoolchildren in rural areas, plus their teachers and school assistants; and ii) a strategy for a sustainable and nationally-managed school feeding programme, including capacity development assessment. Teachers and support staff in assisted schools will continue to receive the same school meal as students, in view of low salaries and general poverty and food insecurity. SF is WFP's largest project in Tajikistan.

Key Findings

How good and relevant is the policy?

S4. Relevance to Tajikistan: School feeding is highly valued by the government officials and communities interviewed. It is seen as an essential component of the education system although lower in the priority list compared to other urgent needs such as infrastructure. Tajikistan did have universal school feeding in the Soviet era and they understand its educational and health benefits. The idea that SF is a safety net or part of a social protection system has not been considered in Tajikistan. The concept of sustainability and handover is seen as a medium to long term objective on the basis that they do not have the funds or the capacity.

S5. The policy is relevant to many of the issues faced by Tajikistan in terms of education, health and local purchase, but as it is currently formulated it remains at the theoretical level. It is unlikely to be relevant to the emerging social protection

debate as it stands because it does not address the concerns of others in that sector. Those in the social protection debate want to see the local evidence base for school feeding and comparisons specifically to conditional cash transfers.

S6. Relevance to WFP Tajikistan: Many of the issues and themes raised in the new policy are relevant to WFP Tajikistan such as local purchase and the emphasis on sustainability. However, the policy itself has had limited impact on Tajikistan because it has not been properly rolled out, nor have the tools, training or funding been provided to implement the new approach. Several themes of the new policy that have been incorporated by WFP Tajikistan are a result of interaction with the Programme Division (ODX) and the School Feeding Service (PSS) rather than as a direct result of using the policy itself. They are therefore as an indirect result of the policy. It may be that working through ODX/PSS is an effective way to introduce a policy. However, in the case of Tajikistan it has not been enough to provide them with the means to act on the policy recommendations beyond some initial steps.

What have been the results?

S7. The direct results of the policy have been limited to the themes translated through ODX and PSS to the CO during project formulation. The CO has been proactive in trying to engage further in the policy process, and Rome and Cairo WFP offices have worked to be responsive to these efforts. However, the current SF programme design is based on the lessons learned from local experience and on the local context. All of the initiatives that could be attributed to the new policy are also evident in the WFP overall Strategic Plan such as sustainability/capacity development and local purchase and therefore could also be a result of the organisation's overall change in direction.

What has caused the results?

S8. The results, or rather lack of results can be traced to a number of factors:

- The policy is too theoretical and not practical enough for the CO to take action on. The COs need specific tools and techniques plus associated training.
- There is not enough focus in the policy, nor the tools to help COs make difficult choices and trade-offs.
- The full implications of complex issues such as local purchase/HGSF, social protection, sustainability and capacity development are glossed over.
- The shift from an implementation role to a capacity development/systems approach is unknown territory and requires technical advice and direction.
- There is a lack of positive incentives for staff to effectively work themselves out of a job through handover to national government, and a need for training for staff to move in the new policy direction.
- Consistent funding to pursue the new approaches has not been provided which limits the ability of COs to introduce the policy and to implement the concepts.

Annex L Country Cases: Summary Responses to Evaluation Questions

This Annex consolidates the responses to each EQ from the country case studies. (EQs 2, 3, and 4 are omitted, as they were not primarily applicable at the country case level.)

EQ1 How relevant is the policy? Are its objectives appropriate?	
Afghanistan	The concept of school feeding as a safety net with multiple outcomes, means that the policy can be shown to fit almost any existing school feeding programme without requiring much adjustment. This is interpreted by WFP staff to mean that the policy is relevant. However, staff have varying opinions as to what are the main objectives of the policy.
Bhutan	Given the current focus on transition in Bhutan, the policy's focus on 'sustainable and affordable' school feeding has a particular relevance.
Dominican Republic	Key elements of the policy, such as sustainability, community participation, accountability, strong monitoring and supervision and quality control, are highly relevant in the process of improving the national SFP.
Honduras	Key elements of the policy were already implemented in the SFP showing that the policy is highly relevant to achieve ownership, accountability, sustainability: • Increasing and continuous government funding (85% of the program currently funded by the government, 1.2 million children) • Budget line established, sustainability: • SF is key strategy to improve access to education under the national development policy, Food and nutrition security national plan, education law. There is a law on the "School Feeding Day" • Strong ownership at all levels: national, local and community • Active participation and strong community ownership • Local purchase (since 2004), linkages with P4P since 2009 • Strategic alliances with private sector • The whole process to achieve the current stage involved: Capacity building and advocacy, Visibility and resource mobilization campaigns ("SF Day") • Partnering with the government, and private sector

Malawi	The policy does not explicitly state objectives. Its reference to enhancing nutrition, education and social protection resonates with Malawi priorities, including the School Health and Nutrition policy and the draft National Social Support policy, and its principle of supporting transition to national ownership and management of SF is strongly in line with Malawi government intentions. (Malawi has no formal SF policy statement yet, and may conclude that the NSSP and SHN policies suffice.) There is debate in the donor community about whether WFP-style SF is appropriate or unsustainably expensive, and whether the evidence for it is sound. DFID, in particular, contests the WFP approach and what it perceives to be government's adoption of it. World Bank also very focused on perceived high cost and lack of evidence about trade-offs, cost-effectiveness. In fact, WFP Malawi is open to alternative approaches, and government does not intend to pursue a strategy similar to that of WFP. WFP planning is integrated in and harmonised with the UNDAF.
Mali	The policy aligns with and builds on the current environment in Mali, where a national SF policy has been in place since 2009. Of the 3 elements of novelty, transition/SO5 is relevant, less so the broad safety net argument and the Quality Standards are "logical", and build on the RSF standards and SABER work already in use. It is relevant, but it is more difficult to identify what if anything the policy adds in value.
Mozambique	School feeding is highly relevant to Mozambique given the overall levels of poverty, inequalities in access to education, and the government's policy framework. The policy effectively captures the main school feeding issues relevant to Mozambique Particularly relevant is the focus on HGSF (in a country with a smallholder dominated agriculture sector) and handover to government (which was already part of WFP's school feeding strategy). The multi-sector approach with multiple objectives is difficult to deal with (education or social protection as the focus?) and it is very complicated conceptually from the government's perspective. There is too much room to deviate from the start. However, the real challenge is how to measure all of the objectives. International standards: policy does a good job encompassing other issues/debates such as safety nets. A major step forward conceptually but practically very far to go.
Tajikistan	Because the SF project was primarily developed before the policy, some policy themes have been incorporated at the national level (opening sustainability discussions, using the investment case tool, exploring local purchase) but changes are not yet apparent in the field. The many objectives in the policy makes finding focus difficult and it can be too complex/conceptual for general staff to grasp.
EQ5 How practicable is the policy?	
Afghanistan	The challenging operational environment in Afghanistan means that it is extremely difficult to implement anything to a standard. This has affected all aspects of school feeding implementation. Furthermore, a lack of capacity in government, the insecurity of government, and the lack of high-level buy-in means that it is currently very challenging to talk about increasing government ownership of the programme.
Bhutan	Because Bhutan is not one of the pilot countries and has not received the associated technical support, there is limited understanding about what is required to implement the transition process. Instead in-country staff feel that TA needs to be brought in from other parts of WFP to support the process.

Dominican Republic	Eight quality standards were perceived to be the most practicable elements of the policy by non-WFP stakeholders. The SFP has already achieved some of them: strong policy and normative framework, sustainable funding, equity (more caloric content in the most vulnerable areas), community participation in rural areas and areas bordering Haiti. During the stakeholder workshop, 8 standards were demonstrated to be effective tools to guide programme quality analysis in a more comprehensive way, involving a wide range of stakeholders, including those that are usually not consulted, such as: suppliers, industry, agricultural sector, and parents, and providing inputs for an action plan to improve the programme Further understanding of key objectives and core aspects such as "elements of novelty" still limited.
Honduras	The fact that many elements of the policy have been already applied (see EQ1) demonstrates that the policy is applicable to the country context. Important lessons can be learnt from the SFP in Honduras, that could be used to guide the implementation of the policy in other countries. Needs systematization and dissemination.
Malawi	WFP Malawi has little written guidance available on implementation of the policy, although WFP HQ and WB have supported and advised on development of its implementation strategy for 2012-2016. Malawi's status as a pilot SF country has helped in this regard. Outcome and output indicators have been developed for 2012-2016 programme, although risk statements are rather broad. Overall, whether policy is practicable depends on government capacity and WFP capacity. In Malawi, neither is adequate. WFP Malawi 2012-16 plan now anticipates hand over of 15% of WFP-supported schools by the end of the five year period (reduced from original intention of 30%). WFP Malawi lacks human resources to engage fully in the necessary interactions between WFP SF policy and evolving government SF policy and to monitor implementation of the expanded objectives. Indicators for Quality Standard 5: 1, 2: satisfactory. 3: not applicable in Malawi. 4 and 5: partial. 6: partial on government side, but government SF implementation is only beginning. Some existing systems may be adaptable. 7: not yet satisfied, but there is some progress in this direction.
Mali	Mali is a pilot country for implementation of the policy, but implementation support has lacked precision and context. Policy was not particularly well received in country, by staff who saw it as an administrative burden rather than an asset. The 7 tools are in various stages of completion, and none has yet been found to be of worth to the Mali CO – this is mainly because a national SF programme was in existence prior to the WFP policy, and tools 1-5 all target the national programme development process. Development of the WFP-WB-PCD partnership in Mali has largely taken place through HQ and is active, but not currently effective in country, although it should gain in stature once the national SF programme takes more shape.
Mozambique	Overall, the policy is conceptually relevant to Mozambique but is weak in terms of practicality. It is in this area that the true relevancy of the policy is determined. Relevancy comes at a cost – a cost that hasn't been adequately taken into account by the policy and falls on the country office. As a consequence the policy has improved the CO's ability to engage in the big debates in-country; but it has done less to equip them on the practical side. As a result the CO feels penalised – they are on the leading edge of the new thinking but without the tools which they are having to make up as they go along. Policy and design should be much more linked together as in practice there is no dichotomy between policy and programming. It is not a sequential process but rather woven in with a live process which includes many political dimensions.

Tajikistan	As a non-pilot country, the CO does not feel they have the tools to understand the practical implications of the policy including the trade-offs required. The capacity to implement is a major challenge, especially given the "small office syndrome" with limited senior staff, competing demands of heaving implementation role, fundraising pressures, and same demands of corporate compliance as large offices.
EQ6 Are relevant stakeholders aware of the policy, and committed to its implementation?	
Afghanistan	WFP staff have some knowledge and awareness of the policy, believe their programme is in line with it, but the main factors driving implementation are the PRRO (and strategic plan), the operating environment in Afghanistan, and the funding constraints. None of the non-WFP staff interviewed had any knowledge of the policy.
Bhutan	WFP staff have knowledge of the policy and referred to it recently because of renewed discussions with government regarding transition. Staff express commitment to implementing transition. However, no use of 8 standards and no knowledge of tools.
Dominican Republic	In practice, dissemination of the policy has started with the HQ/RB, SFP programme analysis mission and the stakeholder workshop (May-June 2011). Thus, both WFP staff and other stakeholders were informed about the objectives and key elements of the policy. The workshop also allowed a better understanding of these elements, as all the participants were able to apply for instance the eight quality standards to analyse the national SF programme and prepare an action plan for improvement based on the results of that analysis. Both WFP and government staff showed commitment to implement the policy. Government finds it an opportunity to guide the process of improving quality and impact of its SFP. UNDP and UNICEF are also involved in the process of policy implementation under the joint project "improving quality and impact of SFP"
Honduras	Only a few WFP staff were aware of the policy, none of the external stakeholders knew it. Nevertheless, all of them expressed commitment and interest to implement it, to further improve the SF process, in particular to move towards a complete handover.
Malawi	Within WFP Malawi, only modest acquaintance with SF policy, but strong commitment to implementing the principles and approaches that it contains. No sign of systematic briefing or training on policy contents or required skills. Externally, few people have read it or even know it exists; there seems to have been no concerted effort to proselytise. In DFID's case, not having seen the policy exacerbates misapprehensions about WFP's SF approach. They did scan it in preparation for their meeting with the mission, which led them immediately to question the initial assertion that there can be no argument about SF being a good thing.
Mali	WFP staff are aware of the policy, the CD made comments on its draft. Few partners or other stakeholders are aware of the WFP policy, mainly because the national SF policy appeared at the same time. WFP staff are committed to implementing a transition and strong national programme, but have not yet been found a way to use the WFP policy in support of that aim.

Mozambique	The CO is well aware of the policy and its main themes. The CO has been active engaging with government stakeholders focusing on MoE and MoA. A workshop was held in May 2011 that effectively brought together high profile international partners (Bundy from the WB, PCD, and Brazilian SF reps) with high level WFP representation. Government buy-in was evident by the level of representation (the Minister of Education spoke) and senior MoA staff. CO very strong in terms of engagement but it comes at a high cost of senior staff time with very many competing demands, e.g. they are the pilot country for 4 separate processes. "This is a huge area that takes 70% of our time. Despite having a CD who is committed to maintaining relevance, to try new things, to deliver as one, to make ourselves partner of choice for the government, we need support to develop a step-by-step strategy for effective engagement, and to develop communications strategy." Learning from other countries is very useful but is now done on a personal basis as there is no repository for this information.
Tajikistan	The senior staff are aware of the policy primarily through the regional workshop and interaction with PSS and ODX in the re-submission of the SF Dev project – other staff have not read the policy. Stakeholders in-country are not aware of the policy although the CD uses the 8 standards as a tool in discussions with stakeholders. Cairo Regional Bureau: "Another element is that, sharing experiences and organising visits for the government officials is crucial and this will not only promote south to south cooperation, but provide the opportunity for the government officials to learn from the other countries. The reasoning behind this is that there are many different school feeding models within the region, consisting of different food baskets."
EQ7 How have WFP's relationships with other stakeholders changed since the policy was introduced?	
Afghanistan	Some evidence of change. Staff do not attribute it to the policy, but more to general shifts in WFP's approach to partnerships.
Bhutan	No change. There is the expectation that relationships with government will change over the coming years; but this has not significantly happened to date. Yes government is paying stipend for an increased number of children since 2008, but this has built on an existing practice and has not resulted in the creation of new systems and procedures.
Dominican Republic	The stakeholder workshop was an important starting point for improving relationships, not only between WFP and other actors but among all the stakeholders. As an early step, the workshop allowed actors to meet, exchange information and inform others of their role, which is a first step towards improved relationships and inter-sectoral coordination. How the relationships will change as a result of this process will be only seen in the short or medium term.
Honduras	WFP's relationship with other actors has evolved during the life of the programme, based on the own practice, government and national policy changes. WFP always promoted strong linkages with health and agriculture, as well as private sector. All not driven by the policy.

Malawi	No radical change; rather, a gradual intensification of commitment and action to work with government to develop a feasible and sustainable National School Meals Programme, while recognising that WFP's own SF operations are likely to continue for many years (resources permitting). WFP lack of funds precluded continuing implementation of de-worming at WFP-fed schools and this affected relationship with Ministry of Health. There is a range of donor views as regards WFP's SF policy. Some dispute its basic tenets, others regret WFP lack of capacity to implement its policy more thoroughly. Many outsiders still see WFP as an emergency agency and/or agency for food deliveries; WFP's own local publicity on SF does not help to dispel this image, does not fully reflect emphases of new SF policy.
Mali	No change. However WFP's relationship with stakeholders has changed significantly since they began implementing the "dual role" (SO5) and bringing technical assistance to the MoE, working at policy dialogue level, chairing coordination structures. The policy hasn't offered WFP staff many indications of how to execute this new role successfully.
Mozambique	National engagement in SF issues has increased significantly. Engagement in social protection has increased over the same period but independently of school feeding (this may not be a bad thing in terms of avoiding a supply led approach which can potentially affect credibility in the eyes of partners). A key relationship with Brazil and its SF programme has encouraged south-south cooperation and increased the impact of WFP's efforts at sustainability. CO very effective at pro-active approach seizing opportunities (examples?) Reputational assessment: a stakeholder analysis was not done but anecdotal evidence suggests that the CO has been effective in building a credible reputation that is open, flexible, and not supply led. The CO appears to have built strong partnerships with UNICEF and DFID in particular.
Tajikistan	Discussions have opened up with central level government on sustainability (although this was an initiative of the CD begun prior to the policy rather than because of the policy). Otherwise no change.
EQ8 How has WFP's portfolio changed since the policy was introduced?	
Afghanistan	No change. Some discussions about need to improve working relationship with government and a belief that they need to improve policy profile of school feeding.
Bhutan	No change until recently. Government has always provided financial support to SF and demonstrated ownership of it, and recent decisions to increase government financing pre-date policy. Recent visit from Regional Director, however, has placed a renewed emphasis on transition and gained commitments from government that school feeding will be factored into new education policy (with WFP financing providing support for School feeding strategy development, and other capacity building initiatives).

Dominican Republic	Given that WFP has no direct operations in the country (since 2004), but rather has a role in institutional strengthening and capacity-building, it is difficult to assess the possible influence of the policy on this. Some elements were considered in the Joint Capacity Development Project: quality, supervision, community participation, but the question as to what extent the policy informed this remains unclear. In this case, policy is seen as a very valuable technical tool to guide WFP's advocacy and technical assistance work in a more systematic manner.
Honduras	The new Country Programme has planned the development of a handover strategy. RB and HQ support is needed to help with this process. Government and WFP have started discussions on transition, policy is seen as relevant tool to guide this process in a more systematic manner. Transfer would need some adaptation in the WFP procurement, logistics processes to fit with the national/local institutions capacities, regulations, and resources: "Not all that works in WFP would work in the public or local institutions".
Malawi	No significant SF implementation change. Introduction of P4P significant, though not directly linked to SF. But WFP's programmatic emphasis is increasingly developmental – significant reduction in emergency work (no large-scale food crises in the country recently) and increasingly dedicated to supporting emergence of a National School Meals Programme.
Mali	No change at the point of policy introduction. However within the context of their transition/SO5 dual role, the portfolio has changed dramatically – at least 50% of SF unit time is spent with GoM. WFP canteens have stayed the same, but with less M&E. An innovative project with the Dutch government involved WFP providing SF in 100 schools in 1 year and transitioning to government of Mali programme the next.
Mozambique	Increased emphasis on handover with specific timelines within a transition plan. The new Country Strategy reflects the new policy direction with SF as the second component linked to a multi-sectoral approach. SF accounts for 70% of the new Country Programme. HGSF is being linked to P4P. As a pilot country, they have many basic questions: on what basis were they chosen as a pilot country, what are they piloting for, for how long, what are they demonstrating and against which standards, will there be an evaluation of the pilot?
Tajikistan	No change at the field level. At the national level the CO has begun sustainability discussions with the central government, has conducted a market assessment for local purchase, and has used the investment tool.
EQ9 Does SF portfolio reflect quality standards?	
	9.1 Sustainability: transition strategy including timing, targets and benchmarks
Afghanistan	No transition strategy.

Bhutan	Commitment to a transition by both government and WFP. Timetable for WFP's departure already agreed (recently extended from 2015 to 2018). However, detail including targets, benchmarks and what actually needs to be done, yet to be worked out.
Dominican Republic	SFP is already a government programme, in process of improvement towards quality SFP. Action plan using 8 quality standards recently developed.
Honduras	SFP already funded 85% by the government. Management at local level assumed by local education authorities, communities, teachers. What needs to be transferred is the whole procurement, logistic and accountability process at central level, which remains WFP's responsibility. WFP started discussing hand-over strategy with the government (not done before, due to the political crisis in Honduras).
Malawi	Draft country strategy 2012-2016 sets out five years of work towards transition to government ownership and management of SF through National School Meals Programme, together with performance indicators (targets but not milestones). At the end of the five years, however, it anticipates that only 15% of WFP SF schools will have been handed over to government
Mali	There has been no transition strategy in Mali, work has focused more on providing TA to the government SF programme. Sustainability is a challenge but WFP plans to transition completely by 2021.
Mozambique	CO has clear transition strategy in place including a timetable (although arguably too ambitious). Many questions remain in terms of how to operationalise in practice.
Tajikistan	There is no transition strategy at present but the CO has begun discussions with MoE about sustainability.
9.2 Sound alignment with national policy frameworks	
Afghanistan	There is mention of school feeding in education and nutrition policy documents, but not always in a positive manner.
Bhutan	School feeding long been considered (since 60s) a key approach to increasing enrolment particularly in rural remote communities. Mentioned in overarching government document (Tenth five year plan). Commitment to including a school feeding strategy in up-coming Education Policy (not clear whether or not this will include school feeding beyond boarding schools).

Dominican Republic	School feeding has long been considered a key intervention for increasing enrolment and attendance particularly in rural and border communities.
Honduras	School feeding is a priority national strategy to increase enrolment, attendance and reduce drop-out rates, particularly among poorest children. Programme is coherent with national policy framework (Development plan, PRSP; Food security) in terms of equity, sustainability, community participation and development of local economies.
Malawi	Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2006-2011 commits to (and budgets for) targeted SF for the most vulnerable. Draft MGDS 2011-2016 commits to 'providing access to at least one nutritious meal and related health and nutrition services for the school-going children'. There is no national SF policy (which may not be needed as a separate document), but SF is a component of the draft National Social Support Policy, justified in terms of education, nutrition and health status of primary school children. National School Health and Nutrition (SHN) Strategic Plan includes strategic objective 'improve nutrition of school-aged children', referring to food from home, food on sale at school, or free SF. SHN guidelines (2010) outline government's Targeted Support to School Meals Programme, developed in response to 2007 presidential directive for universal SF in primary schools. National School Meals Programme is now in preparation, for launch in January 2012 (postponed from September 2011). Overall, WFP SF policy is well aligned with these national policy frameworks.
Mali	SF is considered a key intervention in educational outcomes, and recently in local economy ones too. SF is mentioned in 10 year Education Plan, sector strategy, there is a national SF policy, and a budget line in MoE for SF programme and another for a National Centre for SF.
Mozambique	The CO has aligned SF with the new education policy and to a lesser extent with the social action (protection) policy. For the first time, SF is reflected in the MoE Strategic Plan. The CO very active in relevant national fora in education and nutrition, and to a lesser degree in social protection.
Tajikistan	The CO lobbied to have SF included in both the PRSP and the new education policy. It is essentially a one-line mention in each case although it does state the Government's commitment to SF overall. In discussions, MoE said it will be a priority into its new strategic plan.
	9.3 Stable funding and budgeting
Afghanistan	There is no co-financing of school feeding by the government, and limited scope in the near future for co-financing (92% of budget goes on salaries and only 1-2% is available for operations). Stable funding is a challenge to WFP's PRRO-financed school feeding operation; with the result that there have been occasional pipeline breaks and the programme is likely to be scaled back. This also impacts on relationship with government: "Sometimes they invite people from the districts when they want to write the PRRO or do the annual plan. But I don't think voices are heard. WFP is run on donations, and if they don't have enough they can't implement what's been agreed."

Bhutan	Already government provides some funding for school feeding, budgeted in annual district plans on the basis of which schools are eligible to provide school meals and the number of students in these schools. No strategy yet on how increased resources will be mobilised following WFP's withdrawal. Potential challenges given Government's commitment to not take loans for recurrent budget items
Dominican Republic	SFP operates with government funding from public budget or loans. The government investment in SF was growing and continuous since the beginning of the programme in 1943.
Honduras	Government budget allocations substantially increased since 2004 reaching US$ 29 million in 2011, accounting for around 85% of the total cost. Government funds permitted expansion of the program. WFP CP SF, is targeted to the most vulnerable areas.
Malawi	Government funding for SF is not yet assured or stable. Original proposal for MK 1.5bn for 2011-2012 launch of National School Meals Programme has been scaled back to MK 0.5bn; implementers confident this will be forthcoming. SF is not eligible for funding from the donors' pool fund for education. District, regional and national level structures do not yet include SF in their annual budgets and plans. Donor funding to WFP is multi-annual (USDA to 2012), but bureaucratic and logistical problems can still cause pipeline breaks, as in 2008 and late 2010. WFP engaged in constant monitoring and advocacy to try to maintain adequate donor funding from year to year. Funding for staff and administrative costs of P4P is stable, but it must use regular WFP resources for its local procurement.
Mali	Govt committed $5m in first year of national programme (2009) and $5.8m in 2010. Funds are programmed for 2011 and verbal commitments are strong after that, however education sector depends on FTI and there is pressure on resources. But SF is strong GoM priority.
Mozambique	The development of a national school feeding strategy is in its early stages, and stable funding and budgeting is not yet assured.
Tajikistan	No. Counterpart funding for SF has come predominately from local district administration and parent contributions. Overall fiscal space is very tight although the IMF is pushing to increase core spending as a percentage on education and the social sector. Education policy issues dominated by UNICEF who support SF but far down in the priority list. Social protection fiscal space dominated by conditional cash transfers pushed by EU and WB. Government wants WFP to expand coverage rather than hand over operations which they view as medium to long term issue "we don't have the resources or capacity". Cairo regional bureau: "Monitoring and showing results and justifying continuous budgeting (preventing budgetary cuts) of the national school feeding programmes is a constant battle faced by the relevant ministries (across the countries in the region)."

	9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [a. Education]
Afghanistan	Programme aimed at increasing enrolment and attendance, particularly of girls. Less attention is given to alleviating short-term hunger; but partly because this is perceived to be difficult to measure. Limited analysis of current obstacles on accessing education, and positioning WFP programme within response.
Bhutan	Programme targeted towards food insecure, rural, remote areas. The focus on children who cannot easily access education because of remoteness is good reflection of real needs.
Dominican Republic	Programme aimed at increasing enrolment and attendance in particular in rural and bordering regions. The education sector in the country is still hampered by both supply side and demand side limitations (quality, efficiency, poverty, marginalisation, etc.) which are leading to the stagnation in the progress of access indicators in the last decades. SF is part of a broader strategy to improve the education system in the country, but its potential to improve access to education cannot be fully attained if the other factors limiting supply or demand sides are not addressed with the same emphasis or priority given to SF.
Honduras	Programme aims to increase enrolment, attendance and access to education with particular emphasis on the poorest regions. There is evidence of favourable trends in the access to education indicators through the years, and the general opinion is that SF contributed substantially to these achievements. However, there are no systematic evaluations demonstrating on what extend changes in indicators are attributable to SF. There is a feeling that SF is a unique intervention to achieve education goals, tending to neglect other important aspects such as: infrastructure, quality of educations, limited number of pre-school centres, materials, equipment, etc. that are equally or most relevant to improve education in Honduras. Policy does not give a proper emphasis on these aspects and does not give a real dimension and limitations of school feeding ("seems that SF is the perfect solution" to overcome access to education).
Malawi	SF in Malawi is widely recognised as increasing enrolment and attendance, sometimes overburdening schools and causing pupils to bypass nearer ones without SF to attend further ones with SF. Draft National School Meals Programme document refers to survey data on enhanced performance of primary school leavers who have received SF. Objective 1 of the NSMP is therefore 'learning performance and cognitive capacity of children improved'. Current WFP SF document (2008-2011) refers to data on enhanced attendance. Primary objectives are stated largely in terms of enrolment and attendance. Draft CP for 2012-2016 again focuses on enrolment, attendance and learning objectives of SF. DFID agrees with enrolment/attendance arguments, but says that SF not the way to optimise children's cognitive development, which depends much more on first 1,000 days.
Mali	WFP canteens are targeted in the most food insecure regions, where enrolment is low, based on CFSVA and agreed with education authorities.

Mozambique	In terms of compliance with the education component, the SF programme focuses on improving enrolment, attendance and completion rates in primary education with a focus on girls and OVCs. New targeting approach will overlay education data on food security data, giving educational need a strong emphasis.
Tajikistan	Targeted based on food security data combined with low enrolment levels, drop-out rates. Operations are in the most food insecure areas.
	9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [b. Nutrition]
Afghanistan	Strong focus on micro-nutrients. However, does not meet kcal standards.
Bhutan	Reasonable attention to nutrition re WFP's ration; no evidence of guidance regarding government resourcing. As a result nutrition quality often watered down.
Dominican Republic	Strategic Plan (2008-2011) of the Ministry of Education establishes that one of the aims of SF is contributing to meet the nutritional requirements of school children as a means to improve learning capacities. However, rations delivered in the PAE urbano do not meet the nutritional standards especially in terms of micronutrients. Improvements were seen in the operation plan 2011-2012, with the inclusion of micronutrient supplementation, as a result of WFP's technical assistance and advocacy work. Emerging issues such as overweight and obesity are not taken into account in the design of the rations. The policy is biased towards consumption and food access deficiencies, which is not applicable in cases of universal programmes in countries with increasing levels of over-nutrition and chronic diseases such as Dominican Republic.
Honduras	Rations meet international standards. Different types of rations for rural, urban and Atlantic coast, based on cultural and ethnic preferences. Integrated approach including deworming and provision of essential micronutrients through fortified blended food or supplementation, to address the main micronutrient deficiencies. Training of teachers and parents in basic nutrition and appropriate practices in food handling, storage and preparation of SF foods to guarantee food safety. Measuring progress and impact on the reduction of micronutrient deficiencies linked to school meals or micronutrient supplementation remains as challenge and should be revised on the M&E system. Emerging issues (overweight) need to be considered particularly in urban areas.

Malawi	Nutritional role and impacts of SF are more debated in Malawi than educational ones. Many agencies give increasing emphasis to the first 1,000 days. Strong cultural preference for wet feeding (fortified CSB porridge) rather than dry rations that might be at least as nutritious. WFP ration is 100 g/child/day CSB (providing 396 kcal, 16 g protein, 7.7g fat; sometimes reduced to 75g due to commodity shortages, e.g. June 2010 – March 2011) and THR of 12.5 kg maize/child/month in lean season (January – April) for girls in Standards 5 – 8 as well as orphan boys. Draft NSMP proposes same CSB ration but no THR. National SHN Guidelines recommend use of 'Malawi Six Food Groups' in choice of SM contents, with each meal to provide at least 350 kcal, 13 g protein and micronutrients. SHN workers interviewed emphasised opportunities for broader range of ingredients if/when Malawi moves towards HGSF and local procurement. Guidelines urge sourcing food as close to the schools as possible.
Mali	WFP ration follows international nutrition standards and provides 730kcal per meal. Government programme plans same ration but resources frequently don't allow it.
Mozambique	There is no stated output in the logical framework for the school feeding component. The CO perceives nutrition to be an area of weakness in the policy.
Tajikistan	Nutrition is not an objective nor used as part of the targeting process. The ration provides 1/3 of the daily nutrition needs. De-worming conducted every two years. Cairo regional bureau "Some of the national school feeding programmes tend to have nutrition objectives, but the government officials face many challenges in ensuring that the food basket is actually addressing micronutrient deficiencies."
	9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [c. Gender]
Afghanistan	Strong effort to address gender imbalances by both increasing girls' enrolment and increasing potential number of female teachers through oil take-home ration.
Bhutan	No specific girl focused programming
Dominican Republic	No mention of gender disparities in policies and operational programming.

Honduras	WFP SF, aimed at reducing gender imbalances in enrolment. Priority is given to girls and participation of women in the SF committees, driven mainly by the WFP gender policy.
Malawi	Consensus in Malawi around gender rationale of SF as particularly effective in retaining girls at school. WFP THR focuses on girls in upper levels of primary school. Draft NSMP refers to this benefit but does not commit to THR for girls due to budgetary constraints. Current WFP SF programme document emphasises educational benefits for girls and says that Malawi Growth and Development Strategy is the basis for the UNDAF objective of increasing the proportion of girls at primary school. (Percentage of girls who complete primary education is an UNDAF indicator.) Draft CP 2012-2016 plans to continue THR for girls in lean season. Performance indicators are gender disaggregated, with mostly slightly higher targets for girls.
Mali	THR for girls in years 5 and 6 have some effect on retention, although WFP is not wholly satisfied with results. Gender balance in WFP schools does appear to have improved as a result of THR. Recent portfolio evaluation criticizes lack of strategic gender approach.
Mozambique	While gender 'informs everything we do' they are not doing THR. They implemented THR in the past but in addition to being very difficult operationally, they did not find sufficient evidence that it increased girls' enrolment. The issue is attendance which requires different approaches.
Tajikistan	Gender integrated through facilitation of girls' access to education, equal participation of women in PTAs, hiring of female support staff such as cooks, and hiring of women monitors. THRs were implemented in the last phase to increase the participation of girls and were viewed positively by government and partners. However, it was seen as too expensive and not retained in the new development project.
	9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [d. Value Transfer/Safety net]
Afghanistan	Apart from the decision to use food insecurity as one of the targeting criteria when selecting districts and schools for inclusion in the school feeding programme, there is little mention of any safety net/value transfer objectives in relation to school feeding in Afghanistan. Take-home wheat ration to address difficult winters discontinued. Huge challenges in delivering predictable rations (because of both funding and logistic constraints).
Bhutan	No analysis of role of SF as a value transfer, nor assessment of whether SF helps to address costs of accessing education. Recognition that SF can help prevent long-term consequences of shocks, e.g. limited drop-out following earthquake in east attributed to school feeding. No pipeline breaks reported.
Dominican Republic	The ten-year education strategy 2008–2018 considers school feeding as part of a social protection strategy for the most vulnerable populations. The policy No. 7 draws attention to the fact that social assistance such as SF should be targeted to lower income families to increase school enrolment and retention rates. However, in practice, the SF programme is almost universal, reaching about 80% of the target population. Positive discrimination in favour of the most vulnerable is seen in the different types of ration (equity: complete meal for rural and border areas vs. glass of milk with biscuit/bread in urban areas).

Honduras	National Social protection strategy is being developed with the World Bank support. Policy would be a key tool for positioning SF within this framework. No clear understanding on the conceptual and operational implications of considering SF as Safety Net, under the framework of the new social protection strategy. There would be the need to rethink aspects such as: complementarities with other social protection schemes like CCT Bono Diez Mil to enhance synergies rather than duplications.
Malawi	There is criticism in social protection circles of WFP reluctance to consider cash transfers, although WFP did undertake a pilot comparison of food, cash and food + cash arrangements (not related to SF). National Social Support Programme gives rationale for SF as education and long-term human capital development, 'not designed as a short-term poverty reduction instrument'. However, 'reduce poverty and act as a means for social protection' is one of the four objectives of the draft NSMP. Social protection and poverty reduction are not stated as objectives of the current WFP SF programme; nor does the draft 2012-2016 CP, although, as before, WFP plans to target chronically food insecure districts for SF.
Mali	Very little recognition of SF as appropriate asset transfer mechanism. There is a strong political affinity for SF in Mali which helped broker a national policy without, apparently, any broader discussion on safety nets.
Mozambique	[Social protection] Social protection "is haunting us". The PRS uses social protection concepts/language with emphasis on access with poverty a critical barrier. Education is part of the "social action pillar" tied to a more social protection approach which makes sense in a country performing well overall in enrolment but with gaps for the poor. Does the CO invest in social protection and focus on another ministry and set of relationships or stay with MoE, or do both? In practice it has the potential to become very complicated and time consuming. In practice, social protection is not the coherent overarching framework for school feeding in Mozambique, and moving to this has huge implications. [Value transfer] No analysis has been done to measure the size of the effective value transfer of school feeding, (although some effort to look at % of nutritional needs met) but there is evidence that it reduces drop-outs.
Tajikistan	In the new SF project document, safety nets are not referenced and social protection is only noted as part of an UNDAF outcome. It represents a new area for the CO in which they feel they need the knowledge and tools to properly engage. CO feels difficult to engage in new area without training, TA and stable funding SF as a value transfer is not an explicit objective nor has it been analysed in terms of impact. The CO understands it is an entry point to social protection discussions but has not taken this further.
9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [e. Platform for wider interventions (for P4P see EQ9.6 below)]	
Afghanistan	Some joint programming with UNICEF: potable water, de-worming.

Bhutan	Joined up programming with UNICEF/MoH regarding potable water, importance of sanitation and nutrition in SF schools. Also standard MoH support (deworming, Vitamin A and iron supplementation) in all schools (not just SF schools). Some WFP support to government School Agriculture Programme. Link between school gardens and school feeding recognised (although actual integration more complicated).
Dominican Republic	Joint project "improvement of quality and impact of SFP" together with UNDP and UNICEF, opportunity to intervene from different angles: human rights, development perspective, safety nets, etc. Operational plan (2011) includes a health component: de-worming and supplementation in close collaboration with health sector.
Honduras	Link between school gardens and school feeding recognized although actual integration more complicated, due to limited resources to promote school gardens. Collaboration agreements with UNICEF, Friendly School initiative, but very limited coverage (only 100 schools). Partnership with UNICEF, PAHO/WHO to provide the essential package, but depends on funding.
Malawi	Interviews in Lilongwe reveal little or no acquaintance with the Essential Package concept, even among WFP and UNICEF staff. The draft NSMP has a broad range of objectives: (1) education; (2) nutrition and health; (3) poverty reduction and social protection; (4) agricultural development. It recognises need for various ministries to play complementary roles, e.g. in school water and sanitation, deworming, hygiene. Current WFP SF programme document presents a table of the complementary responsibilities of the various agencies. WFP's draft 2012-2016 CP refers to collaboration with Ministries of Health and Education and with UNICEF 'to provide complementary services such as de-worming, improvement of school infrastructure, school gardens, and learning materials in schools.' For WFP and most other stakeholders, however, EP-like concepts and approaches remain somewhat peripheral. Government's SHN Strategy and Guidelines, published by Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health, provide the most integrated outlook.
Mali	GoM is very insistent that the school should become the "lever for local economic development" through its SF programme, which is HGSF – however there is a lot of work to do to realize these broader goals (e.g. smallholder capacity is weak). Coordination with implementing partners is weak, although there are attempts to deliver essential package with UNICEF in some schools.
Mozambique	SF is seen by the CO as a wider platform for wider interventions. New country strategy and country programme make strong sectoral linkages but overall link to social protection still problematic. WFP Mozambique has been particularly strong and innovative in P4P. Mozambique's P4P initiative assists farmers' organisations and small and medium traders to develop their capacity to compete with larger buyers for smallholders' crops.
Tajikistan	SF has been implemented relatively independently although an effort was made to make internal linkages by ensuring new FFW water projects focused on schools. Work with WHO and UNICEF on de-worming but otherwise not on Essential Package.

	9.4 needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design [f. cost-effectiveness]
Afghanistan	Some effort to assess relative cost-effectiveness of wet ration vs. dry ration. However, overall cost-effectiveness vs. any other approach to increase attendance not yet assessed.
Bhutan	No analysis undertaken on cost-effectiveness.
Dominican Republic	Cost-effectiveness analysis of SF done by UNDP. But limitations in assessing effects and impacts on enrolment, attendance, and drop-out rates limited the analysis of "effectiveness", thus more emphasis on the costs.
Honduras	Mention of investment case for Honduras, done by Boston Consulting Group, but no document available. World Bank raised the question on whether SF is the most effective way to increase access to education of the poorest. Cost effectiveness analysis comparing SF vs. conditional cash transfers or any other approach to increase enrolment and attendance is missing.
Malawi	WFP is criticised in some quarters (especially DFID, also WB) for the unsustainably high cost of its SF (the headline rate is $22/child/year), which means substantial adjustments in strategy as the programme is taken over by government. However, mission calculations suggest that WFP may have miscalculated the cost of its SF operations, which may be as low as $12. The draft NSMP currently estimates year 1 recurrent costs as about $13.50/child/year. The 2010 draft National Social Support Programme estimates the cost of the Targeted Support to School Meals Programme (i.e. NSMP) at $42/child/year, but not clear how they calculated this – not repeated in a June 2011 draft. Discussion of enhanced efficiency focuses on (1) alternative delivery strategies, e.g. Mary's Meals which contracts with a major processor/supplier to deliver fortified CSB direct to schools; (2) alternative rations, although there is strong local support for CSB porridge rather than dry rations; (3) a shift to HGSF. But WFP's focus remains on its current methods and cost structure.
Mali	No analysis undertaken on CE at the time of the national policy, dubious rigour awarded to calculations of per child per day cost of national SF programme. WFP's highly centralized model not great assistance to Mali's highly decentralized administration.
Mozambique	Although the CO did pilot the investment case tool with the support of BCG, they have not looked at the cost effectiveness of SF in comparison to other social protection instruments, nor do they feel they have the in-house capacity to do so.

Tajikistan	CO has done some analysis but limited to cost calculations for the project doc. They requested assistance to use the investment tool but otherwise unsure how to go about the issue. The central question for the CO will be the cost effectiveness of SF vis-à-vis other instruments that occupy the same fiscal space. In the education sector this means a comparison to other fundamental educational inputs such as infrastructure, teacher training, etc. In the social protection sector, this means a comparison to other social protection instruments, especially the EC/WB supported conditional cash transfers.
	9.5 Strong institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and accountability
Afghanistan	School feeding is implemented in cooperation with government. However, there are parallel and weak financial systems and no comprehensive approach to building capacity. Currently trying to transition to government reporting on key result areas (e.g. attendance) using Education Management Information System. Security issues limit ability for WFP to monitor and result in an over-reliance on district office of education directors to account for WFP resources (with little to no oversight either by WFP or by government).
Bhutan	SF unit within government. Government staff accompany WFP on monitoring visits (most of the time). However, focus is more on WFP systems rather than development of government systems. As a consequence, limited tracking of quality of government stipend operation. While WFP relies on government data (on number of children enrolled etc.), often have to receive it directly from schools rather than through government channels because of delays. Furthermore, updates on attendance come through WFP specific reports.
Dominican Republic	• According to the Education Law, 66-97, the institution responsible for programme implementation is the Student Wellbeing Institute, which is a decentralised organisation with its own independent budget line. However, currently the Department of Student Wellbeing (Dirección General de Bienestar Estudiantil, DGBE) is in charge of the SF and does not have budgetary autonomy. In addition the budget does not include management cost resulting in weak monitoring and supervision. • Coordination between Education sector and other Ministries is weak and there are no inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms established for the SF programme. There are some joint actions with the Ministry of Health in the context of the SF programme, such as deworming, micronutrient supplementation and eye and dental health campaigns, which were only considered in the 2011 operational plans. Linkages with Agriculture sector are not established although some ad hoc coordination occurs in rural areas.
Honduras	No clear institutional framework for SF at central level: Education is the operational arm, but Social Protection is responsible for budgeting, First Lady's Office also has some roles. Changing political environment weakened institutional framework. High staff turnover in public institutions affects capacity building and ownership, more visible at central levels. On the contrary, strong and stable institutional arrangements at local levels: local authorities, local education supervisors, teachers, parents, communities. WFP improved its reporting, to ensure more transparency, responding to government request. Web based monitoring system already in place within education sector.

Malawi	National arrangements for SF are only just emerging, but the mandated national institution is the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and its SHN, HIV and AIDS Unit. Staff, resources and knowledge for implementation, monitoring and accountability are not yet in place at any level of government, although the office of the District Education Manager in Kasungu has shown strong initiative in arranging HGSF around 108 schools in 2010-2011. There is no adequately resourced M&E system in place for the emerging NSMP (although MOEST does employ School Feeding Co-ordinators at district level), and WFP's own M&E resources are inadequate. WFP and Mary's Meals procurement and logistics arrangements appear largely efficient (although WFP still suffers pipeline breaks). The NSMP is likely to experience many teething problems in this regard.
Mali	WFP's implementation is strong (based on strong institutional tools and experience and expertise), but M&E is weak, costly. WFP contracts local NGOs to do regular M&E, but security is a concern and quality. Government programme implementation is very weak (it's only 1.5 years old), fiscal transfers not making it to schools in entirety, schools and their committees and mayors not sufficiently trained to know how to spend the money/implement the programme. M&E of government programme currently non-existent, some local education authorities do not even know which schools are receiving money from D/Finance.
Mozambique	Building the evidence base is an acknowledged weakness – "WFP needs to build the evidence to demonstrate the impact in educational performance and at the household level". It requires a more structured M&E system and the capacity to compare results, but all within an active system that produces results in real time. The CO is hopeful the WB/PCD partnership will help build new instruments. The recent budget extension placed more emphasis on building stronger government capacity to enable a transition to full SF implementation. WFP and MEC will focus particularly on the long-term objective of working towards a national school feeding programme. They are developing a strategy to define: (1) scope and objectives; (ii) national geographic and target group priorities; (iii) funding and budgeting frameworks; (iv) programme design and modalities; and (v) required institutional and implementation arrangements.
Tajikistan	MoE is the focal institution but questions remain about where to best position (MoE, MoH, or social protection ministry?). No specific unit has been identified as national level discussions have just been initiated.
9.6 Strategy for local production and resourcing	
Afghanistan	WFP is one of the P4P pilot countries and is engaged in a number of P4P activities which relate to school feeding. These include: support to the local production of High Energy Biscuits; support to the local production of fortified flour; local procurement of wheat. However, quantities purchased remain small at this point.
Bhutan	WFP tested local procurement of kharang (maize grits). • However, there were quality issues and kharang costs more than Indian rice • Was a normal local purchase, rather than using P4P modalities. • Should be noted Bhutan heavily dependent on imported food. Government uses decentralised procurement approach under stipend. But major commodities are of Indian origin.

Dominican Republic	Local purchase, but at central level, does not guarantee participation of small farmers.
Honduras	Local procurement is a key policy for the government. WFP started local procurement in 2000 and gradually increased. From 2009, linkages with small farmers through P4P. Increasing numbers of small farmers engaged with SF. Challenges remain to ensure timely delivery of commodities by farmers (post-harvest techniques, stocks), need for more flexible payment and procurement process within WFP, high exposure to natural hazards adds uncertainty about harvest.
Malawi	Through P4P, WFP has analysed, and will continue to study, issues and options around local procurement in Malawi. WFP continues to depend on US shipments for the CSB used in SF, but procures all the maize used in THR locally (via P4P). It makes appropriate arrangements to ensure food quality and safety, but its various procurement and logistics systems have been unable to preclude pipeline breaks, as in late 2010 when SF had to be suspended in ten of the 13 districts it supports and CSB ration in remaining districts cut from 100g/child/day to 75g. Through P4P, WFP focuses on promoting local commodity production and market systems, and is making useful progress. But WFP has been left behind by rapid (though perhaps inadequately planned) HGSF pilots by government – prompted, ironically, by the 2010 WFP pipeline break. It is not clear that WFP has much to offer on HGSF as a community/school,
Mali	Mali is a P4P pilot, initiative is working well but very early stages, and no direct link to SF programme (although purchased cereals contribute to SF stocks). GoM programme is HGSF involving cash transfers to schools and local procurement of food. GoM hopes WFP and other partners will assist in strengthening local agricultural capacity which is currently weak. WFP hasn't yet figured out how best to assist GoM in linking local production and SF.
Mozambique	Strong links with P4P and strategy in place to pursue HGSF although CO pointed out that it is a process with many operational details still to be worked out. Again, more complex in practice than in theory (and more time consuming).
Tajikistan	CO has just completed a market analysis of local purchasing potential although it is unclear if Russia as the major donor will relax its tied aid requirements.
	9.7 Strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination.
Afghanistan	Some coordination with UNICEF (potable water provision, de-worming), but perception that WFP and UNICEF do not coordinate as well in Afghanistan as they do elsewhere. UNICEF lead education cluster (started in 2008). Growing participation from key stakeholders, including WFP, since last year. However, security context makes it difficult to make regular contact with existing or potential partners.

Bhutan	Very strong emphasis on 'Delivering as One' in Bhutan – although it was not one of the focus countries. The UNDAF is the guiding framework, and each year a country programme annual plan is agreed with the Government's Gross National Happiness Commission. Disbursements to government use the Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers. WFP an active member of the UN Management Team. WFP have sought to build partnerships with relevant government institutions (not just MoE). These include: Food Corporation of Bhutan (for food logistics); CoRRB (for the school agricultural programme); Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Agency (to develop in-country capacity to monitor food standards and provide hygiene and sanitation training); and the Ministry of Education (who provide health and nutrition interventions in all schools, and participate in training programmes on health and nutrition aspects).
Dominican Republic	Coordination with health sector to provide de-worming, preventive health, including visual and oral health, micronutrient supplementation (2011). Relationship with agriculture support programmes more ad hoc than systematic.
Honduras	Link between school gardens and school feeding recognized although actual integration more complicated, due to limited resources to promote school gardens. Collaboration agreements with UNICEF, Friendly School initiative, but very limited coverage (only 100 schools). Partnership with UNICEF, PAHO/WHO to provide the essential package, but depends on funding.
Malawi	WFP co-ordinates with other UN agencies through UNDAF. It is a member of the Social Protection Technical Committee and development partners' education group, and collaborates actively with government and NGOs on SHN and on development of the NSMP. The SHN Strategy and Guidelines provide a sound basis for linking SF to other nutrition and educational initiatives, although linkages with social protection are not so strongly developed. The Ministry of Health reports that earlier collaboration with WFP on deworming at WFP SF schools has ended due to a lack of funds. The Ministry of Education, responsible for the NSMP, reports good partnership with WFP and a proactive attitude by WFP to developing a nationally owned and managed SF programme. Despite these various strengths, there is no formal inter-sector co-ordination mechanism for SF in place, and WFP has reached out less in the design and implementation of its own SF operations – although this may change when detailed planning is done for the next SF project. In many quarters, despite the interactions, WFP is still seen primarily as an emergency relief organisation engaged mainly in the delivery of food aid.
Mali	WFP provides secretariat for cadre de concertation, monthly stakeholder coordination meetings on SF chaired by MoE. Several line ministries attend (agriculture, health, social development). Partnership with WB and PCD subject of an April 2011 mission which identified weaknesses in national programme and divided labour over how to address them. However partnership is more between SF actors in Washington DC, Rome and London for the time being – not much coordination going on on the ground. Coordination with UNICEF on EP is poor – not all of the intervention areas overlap, but where they do, joint working is haphazard – no great enthusiasm for joint programming despite One UN from 2012.

Mozambique	CO very strong in terms of building partnerships both on the national level and in the field. CD very proactive and skilled despite the relative lack of senior staffing resources. CO demonstrates a clear commitment to inter-sectoral coordination and is actively engaged in Delivering as One (a pilot country), is aligned with the UNDAF, and is aligned with the Mozambique policy environment (the PRSP (PARP), the education policies and the social protection policies).
Tajikistan	Field level partnerships have been limited due to a lack of implementing partners resulting in WFP dealing directly with district administrations and PTAs. WFP participates in the education cluster and in the Education Donor Coordination Group. No engagement in social protection coordination to date. CO has a good relationship with UNICEF and while current collaboration is weak in practice, UNICEF sees many opportunities for increasing partnership especially in terms of the next FTI funding. Generally, the partnerships required to pursue a multi-sectoral approach are not adequately in place.
	9.8 Strong community participation and ownership
Afghanistan	PTAs largely exist, but few function strongly and only some have any involvement in School Feeding. WFP stated need for stronger community ownership a) to improve accountability of SF programming and b) in order to enhance buy-in for the need to education children. Also mentioned was the role communities could play in reducing security risks at school (because of enhanced buy-in).
Bhutan	Most schools have functioning school management committees. Don't have a specific mandate re school feeding. But in a number of schools parents agree to provide supplementary financing for school meals (to allow purchase of vegetables etc. to complement WFP rations). No systematic information kept.
Dominican Republic	Active community participation only in rural and border areas. Getting parents to commit to participation in urban areas was challenging.
Honduras	One of the key elements for sustainability of the SF programme is the strong ownership and active community participation. Parents, teachers, local education supervisors, and local authorities are responsible for the whole management of SF at municipal and community level: control, reporting, local transport of food, storage, distribution, preparation, etc. with little WFP supervision: "Communities and local authorities are responsible for the whole process of SF since food arrives to the municipality".
Malawi	Communities have not participated in the design of SF programmes in Malawi, except in the current HGSF pilot by the Ministry of Education in Kasungu district, where they had to mobilise land and food production at short notice late in 2010. Community/parent Canteen Committees (sub-committee of School Management Committee) at each school do play a major role in meal preparation (including firewood supply), which is normally done by rotating teams of volunteers. Communities and parents are, not surprisingly, strongly committed to SF as a benefit for their children. Despite promising early experience in Kasungu, there is consensus that voluntary production of commodities for SF is not sustainable.

Mali	All WFP canteens have school management committees, and strong ones are prioritized for WFP intervention. Communities are obliged to contribute condiments and cooks, and most do. National programme is heavily dependent on community participation, which needs work, training and more presence to function better.
Mozambique	Reports from the May 2011 stakeholder workshop indicate that this is an aspiration for the future more than a description of current programmes.
Tajikistan	This is one of the strengths of the CO. PTAs are very active, contribute labour, management time and complementary inputs such as vegetables and firewood. PTA also have strong oversight role. One concern in handover process is that engagement with central authorities may damage an effective decentralized operation (although central funding is probably essential for sustainability).
EQ10. Are the observed changes a result of the policy, a continuation of pre-existing good practice, or the consequence of other WFP policy shifts?	
Afghanistan	The CO regard the Strategic Plan and the M&E indicators as their main reference point, used to shape the programme and report on it, and do not explicitly use the SF policy as a guideline. There is a suggestion that there might be a stronger focus on government ownership in the future, and that the SF Policy might inform this.
Bhutan	While its possible to discern some influence from policy, observed changes are more a continuation of a pre-existing commitment to transition. And Bhutan's shift from an LDC to a MIC seems to be a key driver of this commitment (the need to prioritise resourcing for poorer countries is reported as a key justification for WFP withdrawal in WFP–Government discussions). This justification is part of an overall emphasis of the resourcing aspects of the transition, rather than the development of systems.
Dominican Republic	Most of the changes in the SF programme were driven by changes in the national policies, good practices, need for more flexible procedures. In the early stages (2001), WFP made substantial changes in the implementation process: promoting community participation, developing a phase-out strategy and improving nutritional quality of rations in rural and border areas.
Honduras	Most of the changes in the SF programme were driven by changes in the national policies, good practices, lessons learnt, other WFP policies (new strategic framework, gender, P4P).

Malawi	The observed changes cannot be ascribed to the policy itself, although there is concordance between the strategic emphases of the policy and of WFP Malawi in working towards hand over of SF programmes to government. The SF policy and WFP Malawi SF practice are parts of the same flow of change in the organisation. For example, the draft CP for 2012-2016 states that 'WFP is clearly aligned to and working in the context of government's systems. Programming needs to adapt to the rise of non-emergency trends and include capacity development measures to facilitate hand-over. WFP needs to engage more at the policy level, requiring strengthened technical and advocacy capacity'. In the context of SF, it goes on to say that 'WFP will work with UN agencies and other partners, including the Government, to identify and provide needed investments and implement school feeding as part of broader education strategies'.
Mali	The policy document itself hasn't changed anything for WFP in Mali. However the fact of working towards transition/SO5 since 2006 has changed a lot for WFP, in their ways of working, the required skills, their time management and priorities. Policy has not added value to the good practice already under way – the tools haven't been of use, implementation from HQ hasn't yet been sufficiently targeted, there has been little recognition of the extra and different workload requirements.
Mozambique	The observed changes can be attributed in spirit to the policy but many of the changes were already in process based on local CO initiative, proactive nature of CD, responding to and building on both local practice and the local operating environment, and based on the overall WFP strategic plan. Difficult to disentangle. However, new policy was a rational extension of the direction they were already heading and complemented these efforts despite being very challenging to implement in practice.
Tajikistan	While some of the policy themes are evident in the new SF project, the current operation is essentially a continuation of what has worked in the past. All of the initiatives that can be attributed to the new policy are also evident in the WFP overall Strategic Plan such as sustainability/capacity development and local purchase. By admission, the policy had little impact on the new SF project. The caveat is that some of the themes were introduced by PSS and ODX during project formulation.
EQ11 Was there sufficient consultation and ownership in the development of the policy?	
Afghanistan	None of staff currently in-country were involved in consultations during policy development.
Bhutan	None of staff currently in-country involved in consultations during policy development.
Dominican Republic	None of staff currently in country involved in consultations during policy development.

Honduras	Although Honduras SFP is the second largest SF programme, and has very important lessons learnt and good practices to share, the CO was not involved nor consulted during policy development.
Malawi	There was no consultation with WFP Malawi on development of the SF policy. Fairly strong feelings in the CO that COs should be consulted before policies are finalised.
Mali	Consultation with CO was limited (and linked to the CD's previous involvement in the SF unit in Rome).
Mozambique	There was no consultation with CO staff in the policy development although none were in-country at the time. They were aware of other consultations such as in Sudan.
Tajikistan	There was no consultation with CO staff in the policy development.
EQ12 How well was the policy disseminated, with guidelines for its implementation?	
Afghanistan	Received standard email providing information that new policy had been issued. No dissemination of guidelines for implementation.
Bhutan	Received standard email providing information that new policy had been issued. No dissemination of guidelines for implementation. Focus on transition means that team have been encouraged by regional office to refer more thoroughly to policy.
Dominican Republic	Policy was recently disseminated: HQ/RB programme assessment mission and stakeholder workshop.
Honduras	Received standard email providing information that new policy had been issued. No dissemination of guidelines for implementation. Staff had to refer more thoroughly to policy, during the preparation of the new CP.

Malawi	Very few people outside WFP are aware of the SF policy, although some checked it before our meetings. Not all those inside WFP have read it either. There is no WFP reporting so far in terms of the indicators for the eight Quality Standards. WFP Malawi does not use any guidelines for implementation of the policy. So far, the draft 2012-2016 CP does not refer to the SF policy.
Mali	Mali agreed to be a pilot for policy implementation, but contact has so far not been sufficiently targeted to be useful – telecons with HQ on several occasions, the mission in April 2011, SF Programme Officer went to Rome in March 2011 for training on policy, but so far HQ haven't been able to find a way to get Mali interested enough in the policy to use it or its tools.
Mozambique	Roll-out began with an email from PSS explaining the how and why of the policy with a link to the document on WFP Go and an invitation to consult. The piloting process started in a "natural way" as their current CP was extended for another year in response to Govt request for more time before handover. At the same time, the Brazilian partnership came on line, P4P was being piloted, NEPAD linked SF to local production, and CO willing to test new approaches. However, no specific training events for roll out other than consultative workshop for pilot counties in March 2011. CO tends to view policy once and see it as a tool to communicate to executive board. Their focus is on programme guidance and manuals which have lagged behind policy.
Tajikistan	Roll out was through a regional meeting in Cairo with a focus on sustainability and the 8 quality standards. CO requested to attend a pilot country workshop which was useful. The CO perception is that they are not getting the tools to implement the policy that pilot countries are, which is frustrating. Suggestion from Cairo regional bureau: V important to have thorough understanding of policy at all levels, not just the technical. Suggest bring all CDs and D1/D2's together to ensure a common understanding (Bangkok regional bureau observed how UNICEF CDs are out of the country every 2 months being drilled on key policies, messages and new approaches which means they speak very authoritatively).
EQ13 Were there sufficient (financial and other) resources for its implementation?	
Afghanistan	The Afghanistan programme, including school feeding, is being severely hit by funding constraints which is leading to a re-prioritisation of activities and a likely cut in the extent of the school feeding programme. A number of informants raised the issue of a lack of staff capacity to effectively engage in policy discussions.
Bhutan	Country office has recently secured some funding for capacity development, and recognised need for further resources. In-country team comprised of national staff only, and technical staff are all recent recruits (<3 years). While capable do not have the familiarity with WFP procedures, and tend to follow letter rather than spirit of programme (don't feel empowered to question the direction they have been given or to reinterpret it). When staff other than 'Officer in charge' attend external meetings, they lack the confidence to share thoughts and push agendas.
Dominican Republic	Very limited human resources at country office, therefore need for permanent support from RB and HQ.

Honduras	Lack of clarity on the resources needed for policy implementation. Need for staff capacity development in areas e.g.: social protection, coordination, partnering. Need for strategic vision on the capacity building role of WFP. Although the new strategic framework and policies emphasize on capacity building, the concept and operational implications remain unclear. (What exactly does capacity building of others mean ? how should this be done?, which tools could be used?, etc.)
Malawi	The SF policy means a move upstream for the organisation. In Malawi, WFP lacks the human resources for this. Now that government is accelerating towards an NSMP, WFP finds that it also lacks resources at HQ to back up the CO in supporting government planning. The best-resourced part of the CO for SF is (indirectly) P4P, but that team does not seem to be directly engaged in support to government on the transition.
Mali	Too early to say, because there has not yet been any resource mobilization for policy implementation for staff in Mali, but it is apparently to come. Staff need training on how to engage in policy dialogue, how to bring TA to the government, more tools on how to work at a sector coordination level, tools on how to support national SF programmes, money which is not linked to tonnage to accomplish SO5 activities, and probably more staff numbers now that WFP has to do programme implementation and technical assistance (the dual role).
Mozambique	Implementation of the policy is more complex than was first envisioned and requires a substantial increase in both financial and human resources. The CO (and WFP in general) needs a new internal architecture to deal with the new policy that has not been thought through when the policy was written. They are understaffed for the many demands they face and still have all of the operational challenges of normal programming in addition to dramatically increased engagement and capacity development demands.
Tajikistan	Lack of funding for implementation seen as a major constraint. There is a lack of senior staff to engage in partnerships and coordination, staff lack the skill set to become advisors and institution builders, no incentives to handover operations. Implementation, corporate compliance and fundraising already overtax capacity – especially problematic for small offices "small CO syndrome".
EQ14 What internal factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?	
Afghanistan	*Hindering factors:* Perception that organisational culture has constrained shift in new ways of working, difficult to persuade staff to prioritise attendance of coordination and policy meetings. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining skilled staff (only 1/3 positions filled, and those staff recruited often not experienced and knowledgeable in SF/education field).
Bhutan	Facilitating factors: • Understanding that there needs to be funding for transition activities • The fact that some resources have already been found from a private donor. Hindering factors: • Not clear that decision to nationalise staff was informed by recognition of new skills required for transition • Decision to nationalise all positions (with staff who were recently put in post), not accompanied by active mentoring to help them develop knowledge and skills.

Dominican Republic	Facilitating factors: • WFP is recognized and it is well positioned in its capacity building and advocacy role, particularly to influence nutrition and food security policies. • The regional capacity building project towards quality SF will facilitate backstopping to CO, and resources for some activities. Hindering factors: • Staff could be overloaded with new tasks.
Honduras	Facilitating factors: • Resources mobilization capacity of the office • Experience of the staff, lesson learnt • WFP is very well positioned and has strong influence on the food security, nutrition and social policies • The regional capacity building project towards quality SF will facilitate backstopping to CO, resources for some activities. Elaboration of route map for transition with high level authorities already planned Hindering factors: • Perception that transfer of the SF will reduce WFP staff
Malawi	The CD and the single officer responsible for SF are committed to collaboration with government and other partners in developing a national programme to which WFP can hand over in the context of a broader platform of support for SHN; they are respected in government and the development community for this. However, they lack the resources to deliver these elements of the SF policy adequately. Implementation of the policy is also, arguably, impeded by poor dissemination and low awareness of what it says. WFP's June 2011 publicity pamphlet on SF in Malawi still presents gives a very conventional impression of its SF efforts – although there is ample reference to partnerships and to WFP's role in SHN work. However, few would argue with the policy's principal messages if they did know what it says (although some would certainly criticise its structure and argumentation). Furthermore, WFP and its partners are already moving in the same broad direction as that advocated by the policy.
Mali	Ability of the Mali CO to anticipate the SF policy's directions was facilitated by capable staff with strong SF experience. As yet, the predominantly tonnage-based model of financing hinders acquisition of resources for SO5 activities.

Mozambique	Facilitating factors: • Strong dynamic leadership in-country critical for positioning WFP in the major debates. • Extra support from Rome due to luxury of being a pilot country that other countries would not enjoy. Hindering factors: • Pilot country overload. Mozambique is also piloting P4P, climate change, cash/vouchers and Delivery as One. • The evolution of policy is too fast. Although the CO appreciates the responsiveness to new ways of thinking and emerging global issues which finally gives them a seat at the table with agencies such as UNICEF and enables them to participate at the same level, it has come at a high cost. For example it is a hard fought advantage that the government now sees them as more than just food and logistics, and really does consider them a preferred partner. However, the Ministry of Education will now request much more assistance to develop terms of reference, budgets, strategies, and action plans. Increased engagement comes with multiple demands. • Staff capacity in the face of these demands is very limited. The have a D1, 1 P5, 3 P4s, 2P3s, 2 P2s and 2 JPOs while UNICEF has over 50 international staff. • The core operational business is still there which can cause a huge tension in the face of all the new demands with the staff all working extremely hard. "I have just come back from the field and realised that we have to pause all of our engagement with district authorities and focus on distributing the food".
Tajikistan	Facilitating factors: • CD's personal relations and knowledge of HQ allowed her to facilitate extra exposure to tools. • CD already working to engage national MoE on sustainability. • Strong SF tradition in-country with experienced local staff could help facilitate policy. Hindering factors: • Budgetary and HR constraints (EQ 13). Consistent funding to pursue the new approaches has not been provided which limits the ability to introduce the policy and to implement the concepts. • Lack of understanding of the full operational implications of the policy. CO has sense that the policy underestimates the challenges being both an implementation agency and a systems development agency without the structure/staff/funds to support. • Not enough technical support to implement or to understand trade-offs. • Too many objectives makes finding focus difficult. • Lack of positive incentives for staff to effectively work themselves out of a job, and a need for training for staff to move in the new policy direction.
EQ15 What external factors facilitated or obstructed implementation of the policy?	
Afghanistan	*Hindering factors:* - Security situation - Government capacity - Difficult to liaise with other development actors (a by-product of security situation) - Concerns about government corruption - Funding constraints - Tendency for donor financing to by-pass mainstream government systems.

Bhutan	Facilitating factors: • SF a key part of government approach even before WFP came involved • SF's role in education in Bhutan means that many government technical staff and decision makers were beneficiaries of SF when at school. Hindering factors: • Government capacity and lack of demand to take responsibility for day-to-day SF management • Bhutan's graduation from being a LDC to being a MIC means that many donors are pulling out at the same time. • But increased income largely a result of hydro-electric development, much of the income from which is being used to service loans and is not available to finance government services.
Dominican Republic	Facilitating factors • WFP is recognized and it is well positioned in its capacity building and advocacy role, particularly to influence nutrition and food security policies. • The regional capacity building project towards quality SF will facilitate backstopping to CO, and resources for some activities. • High interest from the government to improve quality and impact of SF. Already allocated funds for the Joint UN project "improving quality and impact of SF". • UN Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF and FAO) are already involved in the policy implementation process through the UN- GoDR project. Hindering factors: • Very limited human and financial resources at the country office. • WFP staff at the CO could be overloaded with new tasks. • Government capacity. • Funding constraints (national budget deficit).
Honduras	Facilitating factors: • Funds available from different sources, ODOC could be used for the implementation of the policy. Need for guidelines and operational plan for policy implementation. • Strong community ownership. • Decentralization process has started. Hindering factors: • Low credibility of government institutions, great concerns about corruption and inefficiency. • No clear institutional framework for SF at central level. • New social protection initiatives such as CCT and glass of milk would put pressure on public funds.
Malawi	The principal external challenge is government's lack of resources, although the amounts that have been committed are arguably an impetus to implementation of WFP's vision for SF. WFP's 2012-2016 CP has now scaled back expectations of transfer to government to just 15% of WFP-fed schools by 2016. Unless major domestic or external resources are mobilised for the NSMP, WFP's SF policy will remain largely a statement of good intentions in the short to medium term. A secondary external challenge is scepticism or misunderstanding among some donors about what WFP is trying to achieve – linked to poor dissemination and explanation of the new policy by WFP.

Mali	Context in Mali was highly receptive to the concept of national SF policy; capacity and financial resources will be constraints on its implementation.
Mozambique	Facilitating factors: • Strong government buy-in to SF. • Strong partnerships within the UN and with key development partners. MoU signed with GoM and Brazilian government. • Clear Country Strategy document that signals a new approach for WFP in-country. Hindering factors: • Complex interface with social protection that has not been resolved. • Nutritional issues complex. • Lack of capacity within government and challenges to finding fiscal space, yet push from government for universal coverage. • Need to align WFP procedures to GoM and not the other way around. This presents a big challenge.
Tajikistan	Hindering factors: • Poor governance with high levels of corruption means central level involvement an issue. • limited fiscal space for SF. • limited engagement with Govt at central level. • poor capacity within Govt and reluctance to take on implementation role. • Lack of funds to pursue issues beyond current operations. Facilitating factors: • Strong demand for SF at all levels of govt and recognition of its importance. • strong PTA involvement and county level demand for SF. • UNICEF keen to explore SF partnership under FTI. • Strong operational field based presence could be leveraged. For example, Social Protection Ministry wants field staff field staff trained which could be an opportunity to train field monitors in ToT role for capacity development.
EQ16 What feedback loops have been put in place and how effective have they been?	
Afghanistan	Very little use of 8 quality standards (some effort made during recent evaluation and also when Afghanistan was case study for 'learning from experience) and SO indicators don't reflect all key aspects of policy. WFP staff don't report opportunities to feedback on aspects of the policy.
Bhutan	Quality standards haven't been used, but SO5 indicators have been emphasised. No obvious feedback loops, but team are aware that Bhutan is seen as one of the countries more advanced in the transition process. Staff find it difficult to express opinions regarding quality of policy and roll-out even when asked, let alone where there aren't strong forums for such discussion.

Dominican Republic	Close coordination and feedback loops with RB and HQ. Programme assessment mission has initiated the process of policy implementation with success.
Honduras	Weak coordination and feedback from HQ, more with RB.
Malawi	There seems to be no reference to the indicators associated with the eight Quality Standards in the policy. Routine M&E of WFP SF is handled by the single M&E officer in the CO (recently joined by an assistant), supported by a now reduced number of field SF co-ordinators, most of whom handle more than one district and work in varying degrees of collaboration with Ministry of Education SF Co-ordinators. WFP aims to visit each supported school at least once per term. WFP implementation reporting and accounting continue to be expressed largely as tonnage. The CO's M&E capacity is unstable – all M&E staff were retrenched for some months in 2010. However, an SF baseline survey was done in 2007, and the CO hopes to do an update survey in 2011. CO M&E staff report no special feedback in the context of Malawi's status as a WFP-WB pilot SF country; indeed, the pilot status has a low profile across the CO as a whole, with some bemusement as to what it is supposed to mean for them. WFP is represented on the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee, but the CO no longer has a VAM unit. There is little research contact with other investigators, and PCD is not yet operational in the country.
Mali	It's too early to say how the national SF programme will evolve – plans are that all schools in Mali should have functioning canteens and the political will is there – and so is, for the moment, the money. However the programme is perilously weak, results would be poor but there is little chance of a competent mechanism to monitor them any time soon, money transfers from treasury to school are a real concern and beginning to raise donor eyebrows, in a sector where money is tight due to enormous needs. Also the programme relies on HGSF but the context and current agricultural environment may not allow it. Therefore sustainability cannot be guaranteed, and Mali is a fully functioning democracy where ministerial – and thus priority – changes are a regular occurrence.
Mozambique	Quality standards used in practice but overall feedback loops are more ad hoc than systematic. Current reporting system doesn't capture the type of lessons learned that they are looking for from other countries.
Tajikistan	CD uses 8 quality standards as a communication tool but not used in practice in SF operations. Otherwise, no evidence of any feedback requested or initiated by CO on the policy.

EQ17 How sustainable are the emerging results of the SF policy?	
Afghanistan	It is difficult to make any clear statements on sustainability in Afghanistan given extremely challenging operational environment. In addition school feeding is very much seen as WFP's programme rather than core to the government. "There is very little in our [the Ministry of Education] strategic plan on school feeding. The reason for this is that WFP is responsible for food insecurity in the country. We have too many other things in our budget."
Bhutan	School feeding in Bhutan was initiated by the government prior to WFP's arrival in Bhutan. With support from WFP school feeding was significantly expanded, but government was always a key owner of the process and has continued to provide financial (as well as human) resources to the programme. The question is therefore not whether school feeding will continue but at what scale and to what standard. To date, there has not been much work on sustainable resourcing of school feeding although there is growing recognition that this is needed (but a perception that school feeding will not be able to operate at the same scale after WFP's departure). There has also little emphasis on developing key systems in government to ensure minimum standards of interventions. For example, there is no standard against which school menus are assessed for nutritional completeness, and limited 'government owned' monitoring of school feeding (instead government accompanies WFP monitoring).
Dominican Republic	The SF programme existed prior to WFP's arrival in the country and was always co-funded by the government. Currently, the SF programme is entirely funded by public funds and has an established budget line under the Ministry of Education. In terms of the sustainability of the policy results, this will depend on the extent that the government will implement the action plan developed in the stakeholder workshop and maintain its commitment to improve the quality and sustainability of its SF programme. SFP has a stable budget line.
Honduras	School feeding programme has sustainable budget lines, is a priority strategy and it is already institutionalized.
Malawi	The SF policy has no directly attributable results in Malawi yet. If the CO's commitment to a nationally owned and managed programme is taken as an indirect or emerging result, its sustainability remains far from assured due to budgetary and capacity constraints in government. If active WFP engagement in national SF policy processes and related efforts around SHN and the (little known) Essential Package are seen as indirect results, their sustainability is jeopardised by lack of HQ and CO capacity.
Mali	The development of, and then existence of a national SF policy and programme in a process dating to 2006 took the focus away from WFP's policy and its implementation. Implementation of the policy is hugely facilitated by the fact that WFP Mali has been doing this work for nearly 5 years already, staff are competent, government relationship is excellent. Hindered by the fact that the policy didn't offer up the tools or support which Mali CO could really have used.

Mozambique	This is an area that requires much more operationalisation as the weight of the process is much heavier than they realised. The CO feels sustainability is used casually in the policy and requires much more analysis of what it means in practice. "Whose capacity do we build, what do we do, who does what, what system do we build and where, how much will it cost, how do we train our staff and in what? These issues are consuming most of our time and are very complex." For example, the issue of decentralisation alone is complex and requires analysis about where WFP is most effective in building a sustainable system (the CO is focusing on district/provincial level capacity development).
Tajikistan	Many of the issues and themes raised in the new policy are relevant to WFP Tajikistan such as local purchase and the emphasis on sustainability. However, the policy itself has had limited impact on Tajikistan because it has not been rolled out, nor have the tools, training or funding been provided to implement the new approach. Consequently, there are not enough emerging results to discuss sustainability. On the wider issue of overall sustainability of SF, the CO has begun discussions with MoE and has used the investment case tool but acknowledges little done to date. CO feels this is a medium term issue for Tajikistan because of lack of funds and capacity. CO needs tools, staff capacity and funding to pursue.

Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ART	Anti-Retroviral Treatment
BCG	The Boston Consulting Group
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CCTs	Conditional Cash Transfers
CD	Country Director
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CO	Country Office
CP	Country Programme
CS	Country Strategy
CSB	corn soya blend
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DEV	Development Project
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DSC	Direct Support Cost
EB	Executive Board
EC	European Commission
ED	Executive Director
EFA	Education for All
EM	Evaluation Manager
EP	Essential Package
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
ESF	Emergency School Feeding
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FBF	fortified blended food
FFA	Food for Assets
FFE	Food for Education
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FRESH	Focusing Resources on Effective School Health
FTI	(Education For All) Fast Track Initiative
GFD	General Food Distribution
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
HBC	Home Based Care
HEB	High Energy Biscuits
HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
HH	Household

HQ	Headquarters
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-NGO	International NGO
ILO	International Labour Organization
IR	Inception Report
LP	local purchase
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCHN	Mother and Child Health and Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
n.d.	no date
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NTD	Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases (WHO)
OE	Office of Evaluation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PCD	Partnership for Child Development
PCT	Preventive Chemotherapy and Transmission Control (WHO)
PM	Prime Minister
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission
PRC	Programme Review Committee
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RB	Regional Bureau
RE	Retinol Equivalent
SABER	System Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results
SF	School Feeding
RSF	Rethinking School Feeding
SFP	School Feeding Policy
SO	Strategic Objective
SP	Social Protection
SRAC	Strategic Resource Allocation Committee
SSN	School Safety Net
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TB	Tuberculosis
THR	Take-Home Rations
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference

UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (UNICEF programme)
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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