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COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

Timor Leste: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2008 - 2012)

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Prepared by Mokoro Limited
Stephen Lister, Team Leader
Jane Keylock
Trish Silkin

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Evaluation Management

Director, Office of Evaluation:	Helen Wedgwood
Evaluation Manager:	Marian Read, Senior Evaluation Officer
Lorraine de Limelette	Junior Professional Officer

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Fact Sheet

Timeline and funding level of Timor Leste portfolio (2008-2012)

Operations	Time Frame	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRRO 10388.1	Sept 2008 Aug 2011		Req: $50.9 M Contrib: $ 25.1 M			
SO 107970	April 2009 Aug 2011			Req: $1.9 M Contrib:$1.1 M		
DEV 200185	Sept 2011 Dec 2013					Req: $22.5 M Contrib: $12.3 M

LEGEND Funding Level
> 75 %
Between 50 and 75%
Less than 50 %
2013

Food Distributed (MT)	7,730*		6,834		5,146		3,984		3,632	
Direct expenses (US$, millions)	$8.1*		$10.8		$5.9		$7.5		$9.6***	
% Direct Expenses: Timor Leste vs. World	0.2%		0.3%		0.1%		0.2%		n.a.	
Beneficiaries (actual)	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
	123,887	135,073	182,177	186,357	155,775	158,885	152,397**	170,558**	n.a.	n.a.
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)	258,960		368,534		314,660		322,955		102,000***	

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situations (4 March 2012, and 10 February 2013), Annual Performance Report 2008 - 2011 , CO Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US$ millions

* These figures take into account the PRRO10388.0 that ended in August 2008 but which is not included in the evaluation portfolio

** The MCHN beneficiaries were double-counted (in PRRO SPR 2011 and in CP SPR 2011). The figures in this table correct this mistake and as a result do not correspond to total number of beneficiaries indicated in SPR 2011

*** Data from the Executive Brief: Timor leste cleared on 10 September 2012

Distribution of portfolio activities by beneficiaries 2008–2011

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW / FFA
DEV 200185		x		
PRRO 10388.1	x	x	x	x
Conditional cash transfer*				x
SO 107970				
Planned % of beneficiaries	**61%****	**32%**	**5%**	**3%**
Actual % of beneficiaries	**75%****	**19%**	**5%**	**2%**

Source: Dacota ; Approval of cash pilot project under Spanish trust fund

*No information is registered concerning the actual beneficiaries, information was obtained by the CO

** Data are inconsistent with the text of SPR. Need to be verified

Principal donors 2008–2013

	US$	%
Australia	7,373,692	17.6%
USA	5,497,640	13.1%
Japan	4,642,119	11.1%
Spain	4,446,351	10.6%
Private Donors	2,771,137	6.6%
Timor Leste	2,050,000	4.9%
Ireland	1,029,627	2.5%
UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF)	719,515	1.7%
Brazil	656,809	1.6%
Korea, Rep. of	550,000	1.3%
European Commission	324,963	0.8%
Germany	35,800	0.1%
Carryover from previous operations	6,350,120	15.2%
Multilateral	5,432,732	13.0%
TOTAL	**41,880,716**	**100%**

Executive Summary

Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation covers operations in Timor-Leste from 2008 to 2012. Serving the dual objectives of accountability and learning, the evaluation considered all WFP activities in the country focussing on: i) portfolio alignment and strategic positioning; ii) factors that drove WFP's strategic decision-making, including its intended hand-over and exit by the end of 2013; and iii) performance and results. The Timor-Leste country office was selected because it has a small WFP portfolio and, unusually, the current country programme (CP) anticipates withdrawal at the end of 2013, following the hand-over of all WFP activities to the Government. The evaluation, therefore, gave special attention to capacity development and transition, and drew lessons that may have wider relevance for WFP. In view of the proposed exit date, the country office and regional bureau requested presentation of the evaluation at the 2013 Annual Session of the Executive Board.

2. The evaluation was conducted by an independent team of one national and three international consultants, with fieldwork in Timor-Leste during November and December 2012. Assessment of capacity development is inherently difficult, and the evaluation was also challenged by a scarcity of reliable quantitative data. In particular, WFP did no post-distribution monitoring and there were virtually no outcome data for the supplementary feeding programmes. The team augmented available data and document review with extensive interviews and focus group discussions[1] in three districts. It drew on international evidence about the effectiveness of nutrition and capacity development interventions. A 2009 evaluation of the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO)[2] provided a valuable assessment of relief, food-for-work/assets (FFW/A) and school feeding components.

Context

3. Timor-Leste is a young and fragile state with 1.2 million inhabitants. After four centuries as a Portuguese colony and 25 years of Indonesian occupation, in 1999 its people voted for independence, which arrived in 2002, after a period of United Nations administration. Following further turmoil in 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste provided administrative support and police services, withdrawing in 2012 after successful national and local elections. Throughout the evaluation period, Timor-Leste was seeking to establish and consolidate the institutions of a functioning state. The Government is prominent among the G7+ group of fragile states seeking aid relationships that are appropriate to their special circumstances.

4. The prevalence of undernutrition in Timor-Leste is among the highest in the world (see Table 1). Between 2003 and 2009, demographic and health surveys (DHS) levels of stunting and wasting rose, and underweight rates did not improve significantly (see Table 2). One gender dimension is the intergenerational effect of small mothers giving birth to small babies, but the full gender dimensions of

[1] More than 100 key informant interviews and seven focus group discussions were conducted: two men-only, three women-only and two mixed.
[2] WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E.

undernutrition are not well understood.[3] Indicators are worse in some districts than others, but undernutrition is a serious problem countrywide, including in urban settings. Timor-Leste registers 27.3 in the International Food Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI) Global Hunger Index 2012, putting it into the second-worst category of "alarming".

Table 1: International Ranking on Nutrition Indicators

Stunting (%)		**Underweight (%)**		**Wasting (%)**	
Afghanistan	59.3	Timor-Leste	45.3	Djibouti	26
Burundi	57.7	India	43.5	Sudan	21
Timor-Leste	57.7	Yemen	43.1	India	20
Yemen	57.7	Bangladesh	41.3	Timor-Leste	18.9
Niger	54.8	Niger	39.9	Bangladesh	17.5

Note: Five countries with the highest severity in each category.
Source: World Health Organization, 2012.

Table 2: Nutriton Indicators, 2003 and 2009

DHS survey year	**Stunting (height-for-age, %)**	**Underweight (weight-for-age, %)**	**Wasting (weight-for-height, %)**
2003	49.4	45.8	12.4
2009	57.7	45.3	18.9

Sources: Government of Timor-Leste, 2004, 2010.

5. The most recent comprehensive food security and living standards surveys were in 2006 and 2007. At the national level, based on food access and dietary diversity indicators, WFP[4] assessed 20 percent of households as food-insecure, 23 percent as highly vulnerable, 21 percent as moderately vulnerable, and 36 percent as food-secure with severe stress on food availability during the lean season. Analyses show very little variance in undernutrition between food-secure and food-insecure groups, indicating that the causes of chronic undernutrition are complex, with traditional beliefs and nutrition practices playing a role alongside such factors as water, sanitation and caring practices.

6. However, surveys show substantial improvements in health indicators (see Table 3), reflecting well on government efforts to ensure nationwide coverage of primary health care services, with clinics and health posts augmented by mobile monthly clinics known as Integrated Health Services at the Community Level (*Serviço Integradu da Saúde Comunitária* – SISCa).

[3] Recent analysis of 2009 DHS data found that throughout the country boys were significantly more likely to be stunted than girls, but this appears to be a novel finding that needs more investigation. UNICEF, 2011. *Determinants of Chronic Undernutrition among Under-Five Children.* Draft.
[4] WFP, 2006. *Timor-Leste: Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment*. Rome.

Table 3: Health Indicators, 2003 and 2009

Indicators	DHS 2003	DHS 2009
Total fertility rate	7.8	5.7
Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	10	20
Maternal mortality rate	420–800/100 000	557/100 000
Neonatal mortality rate	42/1 000	33/1 000
Infant mortality rate	60/1 000	44/1 000
Under-5 mortality rate	107/1 000	83/1 000
% of children 12–23 months immunized against DPT3	51	79

Note: DTP3 = diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus.
Source: Government of Timor-Leste, 2010.

7. Timor-Leste has experienced rapid economic growth, mainly from the exploitation of offshore oil. Based on per capita gross national income, Timor-Leste now qualifies as a middle-income country, with rapid growth in government revenue and expenditures. By law, oil revenues are kept in a petroleum fund, from which only a sustainable level of income may be allocated to support the annual budget. Stability and economic growth are making it more difficult to attract international aid, although the country faces substantial educational and institutional capacity constraints, and social indicators – including those for health and nutrition – are very poor. Timor-Leste ranked 147 out of 187 countries in the 2011 Human Development Index. Significant progress in primary education led to an increase in the net enrolment rate from 68 percent to more than 90 percent between 2004/2005 and 2010/2011. The gender balance is fairly even for primary education, but becomes progressively less so at higher levels of education. At least 10 percent of the population benefits from cash transfer programmes targeting vulnerable groups.[5]

8. International aid in 2012 financed about 10 percent (US$190 million) of the government budget and was dwarfed by oil revenues; aid flows remain important for the technical and institutional support they provide as much as for their financial input.

WFP Portfolio and Strategy

9. As shown in Table 4, the portfolio comprised three main operations, with a total planned budget of US$75.4 million, of which US$38.6 million was contributed: a PRRO from 2008; a special operation (SO) from 2009, focusing on capacity development; and a CP begun in 2011 and expected to finish in 2013. Smaller grants and trust funds contributed a further US$3.4 million to the portfolio, and WFP participated in two joint United Nations programmes addressing nutrition and food security. As shown in Table 5, the annual average of 312,428 beneficiaries – of whom 51 percent were women/girls – receiving assistance under the PRRO declined to 48,542, with 66 percent women/girls under the CP. Figure 1 shows the shares of beneficiaries by activity, with school feeding (education) accounting for three quarters and MCHN (nutrition) almost one fifth of the total.

[5] Robles, Andrea, 2011. *Timor-Leste: Innovative Approaches for Developing Effectiveness of Safety Nets*. World Bank, Washington.

Table 4: Country Portfolio by Programme Category, 2008 - 2012

	Number of operations	Requirements (*US$ millions*)	Share of requirement (%)	Actual received* (*US$ millions*)	Received as % of requirement
CP 200185**	1	22.5	30	12.3	55
PRRO 103881	1	50.9	68	25.1	49
SO 107790	1	2.0	3	1.2	59
TOTAL	**3**	**75.4**	**100**	**38.6**	**51**

Sources: WFP database, resource situations (4 March 2012 and 10 February 2013), standard project reports.
* These figures take into account the carry-over.
** The project is ongoing, so figures are subject to change; requirement is until December 2013.

Table 5: Beneficiaries by Programme Category

Operation	Timeframe	Annual average			
		Planned		Actual	
		Men/boys	Women/girls	Men/boys	Women/girls
CP 200185	Sept. 2011–Dec. 2012	25 500	49 500	16 492	32 050
		75 000		48 542	
PRRO 103881	Sept. 2008–Aug. 2011	183 205	193 345	153 524	158 904
		376 550		312 428	

Source: WFP.

Figure 1: Percentage of beneficiaries (actual) by activity, 2008 - 2012



Source: WFP.

10. As Table 4 shows, all the main operations were substantially underfunded. Financing was from a variety of sources, but the funding base narrowed: six bilateral agencies provided funds for the PRRO, but only four for the CP. Of these four, Ireland

has since exited Timor-Leste, and Australia remains heavily engaged but is seeking to work directly with the Government in the future. Significantly, the Timor-Leste Government became a contributor, providing more than US$2 million towards the local production of a fortified blended food (FBF).

11. There was no overarching country strategy document, but there were strong common threads between the PRRO and the CP that followed it. The high-level strategic objectives of the portfolio were summarized in the CP as:

- to improve the food and nutrition security of the most vulnerable groups in ways that build longer-term human and physical assets;
- to enhance the capacity of the Government to design, implement and manage tools, policies and systems for reducing food insecurity; and
- to hand over food-based programmes to the Government in a responsible manner.

12. The main thematic components of the portfolio were emergency relief using general food distribution (GFD), FFW/A, school feeding, supplementary feeding to support mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) and capacity development. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the changing balance of the portfolio in terms of food distributions for different activities.

Figure 2: Food distributed, by activity and year, 2008–2012 (*mt*)



Source: WFP.

Figure 3: Food planned versus distributed, by activity, 2008 – 2013 (mt)



13. The portfolio evolved from a short-term emergency and post-conflict focus of WFP Strategic Objectives 1 and 3 to the longer-term focus of Strategic Objectives 4 and 5.

14. Overall, the largest portfolio components were school feeding and supplementary feeding linked to the MCHN programme. FFW/A tended to be squeezed out by funding shortfalls and the need for continuity in supplementary and school feeding. However, there were FFW/A activities under a joint United Nations programme in two districts. Two additional districts were part of a five-country WFP research programme into conditional cash transfers, but management difficulties meant that this research was not completed. Other activities included support to the development of a food security information and early warning system and capacity development in warehousing and supply chain management for several ministries. Capacity development was also an explicit objective of food-based activities; the *Timor Vita* project to promote the local production of FBF was a particularly high-profile effort to develop national capacity.

Evaluation Findings

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

15. The portfolio was well aligned with the needs of women and men, as well as with government policies and priorities. It focused on direct responses to undernutrition, especially through MCHN, rather than on addressing underlying food security issues linked to rural livelihood systems, reflecting WFP's comparative strengths and the availability of partners for funding and implementation. WFP's strategy of supporting and working through government systems for the delivery of basic services was appropriate and was aligned with international standards for engagement in fragile contexts. The United Nations is prominent in Timor-Leste, and WFP coordinated well with other United Nations agencies. However, in the joint programmes in which WFP participated, alignment of United Nations agencies with each other and with government was quite shallow. The portfolio was well aligned

with WFP's strategic objectives and its evolution, including its increased attention to capacity development, was consistent with WFP's global strategy.

Strategic Choices

16. The country office's space for strategic decision-making was limited by both internal and external constraints. The improving post-emergency context for Timor-Leste represented a different complex challenge for WFP, making it more difficult to raise funds for food assistance. Developmental and capacity-development work require longer-term approaches and additional skill sets, which are not easy to pursue under WFP's internal constraints – its food-based funding model and short-term horizon – which are especially constricting for small country offices, which are further disadvantaged by their own capacity constraints, limited funds for staffing and difficulties in ensuring sufficient staff continuity and seniority.

17. Given this background, the evaluation judged that the Timor-Leste country office was commendably proactive, innovative, diligent and adaptable. It was appropriate for WFP to focus on nutrition issues, on the Government as its key partner and on capacity development as a primary objective. In doing so, WFP contributed to state-building and supported countrywide delivery. It was also pragmatic for the country office to adjust ongoing operations to focus on where there was most chance of making a difference. However, both the country office and Headquarters misjudged the intensive management requirements for the conditional cash transfers research programme, which made Timor-Leste unsuitable as a participant. The country office was energetic in seeking supplementary funding and trying to maintain adequate country office staffing, but a heavy reliance on relatively junior staff and an inability to offer job security were disadvantages. For example, the low capacity available in Timor-Leste forced the country office to recruit internationally for posts that in other middle-income countries would be filled by nationals.

18. One of the main signs of overstretched WFP capacity was the neglect of basic monitoring, with inadequate tracking of programme delivery and negligible attention to outcomes. Recently, there were commendable attempts to address this gap, but it weakened WFP's position in seeking continued MCHN funding. The programme's insufficient data on performance, and its use of inadequate formats and databases for measuring and reporting on outcomes reflect weaknesses in supervision and support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. As a result, the conclusions of the evaluation are not as firmly grounded as they might have been.

19. The crowding out of monitoring by other concerns may be linked to a general tendency to assume that programmes work as intended, without testing the assumptions on which WFP interventions are based. However, it is particularly important for WFP to carry out such checks, because its ability to raise funds depends on demonstrating effectiveness and meeting needs as planned.

Portfolio Performance and Results

Relief

20. In 2008 and 2009, WFP assisted the return home of internally displaced persons (IDPs), with about 30,000 beneficiaries each year. In 2009, WFP collaborated with the Ministry of Social Solidarity in supporting 4,000 households requiring short-term emergency relief. After 2009, the Ministry took full responsibility for responding to natural emergencies, and there was no further need for WFP support to the reintegration of IDPs. An evaluation of the PRRO found that WFP had managed its relief activities pragmatically and effectively.[2]

School feeding

21. School feeding – providing cooked meals for grades 1–6 – started in 2005 as part of efforts to encourage school enrolment and attendance and support the strengthening of basic public services. WFP managed school feeding in five (later six) of the most vulnerable districts. In 2008, the Government began a school feeding programme in the seven districts not covered by WFP. In April 2009, at the Government's request, the two programmes were merged to ensure the same standards of service across the country. WFP's programme was always under considerable financial stress, and the ration was reduced from 30 to 20 percent of estimated daily requirements. School feeding reached up to 250,000 beneficiaries, almost evenly divided between boys and girls (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: School feeding beneficiaries by gender, actual versus planned, 2008–2011



Source: WFP.

22. WFP was keen to continue working with the Ministry of Education on strengthening the national system, but the Government chose to take over full responsibility, and WFP's involvement in the school feeding programme ended in August 2011. The Government has adopted a different approach, supplementing a basic ration of rice with locally purchased complementary foods, for which schools

are supposed to receive a cash allowance. The programme remains seriously underfunded and is experiencing implementation difficulties.[6]

Food for work/assets

23. Assets created under FFW/A included the construction/rehabilitation of 440 km of rural roads, 27 schools, more than 200 reservoirs, and 24 km of irrigation canals, along with agricultural improvements such as forestry, fencing and land reclamation. Figure 5 shows levels of participation. The PRRO evaluation included a comprehensive review of the FFW/A programme and assessed it very positively, making suggestions for technical improvements; the joint United Nations 2011 mid-term evaluation found that FFW/A activities were relevant, implemented in a timely fashion, and likely to be effective.[7]

Figure 5: FFW/A participants (workers only) by gender,actual versus planned, 2008–2011



Source: WFP.

Blanket and targeted supplementary feeding for children and women

24. WFP support focused on blanket feeding for children aged 6–23 months, and targeted feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children aged 24–59 months, all delivered through government health services during mobile monthly clinics (SISCa) at health facilities and outreach centres. During the evaluation period there was considerable expansion of food deliveries and facilities covered, while beneficiary numbers varied, reaching their highest levels in 2009 at just above 49,000 (see Table 6). Throughout the period, reviews and assessments found that sharing of rations tended to undermine the programme. However, the food component of MCHN was considered a strong incentive for drawing mothers and children to primary health-care services.

[6] Lenci, S. 2012. MDG-F Joint Programme: Promoting Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security in Timor Leste – Final Evaluation, Dili; and evaluation interviews.

[7] Summary Evaluation Report, Timor-Leste PRRO 103881 (WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E) and Beasca, J. 2011. *Community Mobilisation for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery (COMPASIS) Mid-Term Evaluation: Evaluation Report*. New York.

Table 6: MCHN Food Deliveries and Beneficiary Number 2008 - 2012

Year	Planned food (*mt*)	Delivered food (*mt*)	Delivery rate (*%*)	Planned beneficiaries	Reached beneficiaries	Access rate (*%*)
2008	2 416.00	1 868.59	77	51 650	44 317	86
2009	5 415.00	2 672.97	49	61 000	49 245	81
2010	3 010.00	2 236.37	74	64 200	32 534	51
2011	5 129.00	2 746.25	54	75 000	48 542	65
2012	8 161.00	3 419.38	42			

Source: WFP.

25. WFP also supported the establishment of a factory to produce an FBF known as *Timor Vita*. There were considerable start-up problems and unanticipated costs; for example, the machinery required additional generating capacity, and a full-time food technologist had to be recruited to supervise production. All ingredients were imported and production levels were much lower than planned. In 2012, *Timor Vita* covered 22 percent of MCHN food requirements.

Capacity development

26. The aim of capacity-development interventions was to contribute to the achievement of nationally owned hunger solutions by establishing effective national capacity in logistics and supply chain management, and in school feeding and nutrition programmes. The SO had some notable successes (see Box 1), but systematic capacity development and hand-over strategies for health and education were more problematic. The Ministry of Education took over the school feeding programme abruptly. WFP had a much more satisfactory relationship with the Ministry of Health, but joint planning for hand-over and exit was not launched until late 2012 and could not plausibly be completed during the remainder of the CP.

Box 1: Successful capacity development – support to theMinistry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry

The Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry is responsible for managing Timor-Leste's rice reserves and rice intervention policy. The evaluation found that WFP support to the Ministry's logistics capacity was successful for the following reasons:

- The Ministry was a willing partner that approached WFP for help in solving an urgent logistics problem.
- WFP's swift and effective response to this problem encouraged the Ministry to request a longer-term programme of capacity development.
- WFP adopted a systematic approach, with identified individual and organizational learning objectives, to put in place the necessary skills, systems and infrastructure.
- WFP focused on developing logistics capacity, in which it excels.

Overall Assessment

27. The main components of the portfolio were all broadly relevant at the time the PRRO was launched in 2008. The subsequent challenge for the country office was balancing and adapting these different components in a dynamic and constrained environment. WFP also deserves credit for the connectedness of its "working with Government" approach.

28. As regards efficiency and alignment, working with nationwide government systems limited WFP's ability to target specific groups or geographical areas. However, the evaluation considered that WFP made appropriate trade-offs in seeking to work through, and to influence, government systems, while respecting government ownership. A more serious constraint to efficiency was the chronic underfunding of the portfolio. WFP mitigated this by prioritizing school feeding and MCHN over FFW/A.[8] By working with the Ministries of Education and Health – both with nationwide coverage – WFP aligned with local priorities, supported state building and avoided pockets of exclusion, consistent with the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. Restoration and maintenance of the education system is seen as an important part of post-conflict recovery, and a way of supporting state legitimacy through effective service delivery. Local production of *Timor Vita* was intended to increase efficiency by simplifying logistics and reducing the sharing of food. It was also intended to increase government ownership, thus making supplementary feeding programmes more sustainable. This initiative may have been justified, but there should have been a more rigorous assessment of its cost-effectiveness against the alternative of an imported FBF.

29. Regarding effectiveness, in most respects, WFP appears to have implemented the portfolio components competently, and its FFW/A activities and emergency support were broadly effective in providing targeted support to food-insecure communities. The Government has adopted a similar modality to support rural road works. The PRRO evaluation assessed the school feeding programme as effective, but after the Government's takeover it experienced implementation difficulties and

[8] The PRRO evaluation recommended the expansion of FFW/A as a food security intervention. However, it also supported the country office's decision to prioritize the school feeding programme over FFW/A when funds were scarce, because continuity of delivery is more critical for school feeding.

remained seriously underfunded, compromising its effectiveness. There is strong evidence that the food component of the MCHN programme provided an incentive for increased attendance at health services, but much less evidence that it achieved its primary aim of improving the nutritional status of intended beneficiaries. There were some notable successes in capacity development, such as in the SO's support to warehouse management by the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry, but the challenges of achieving sustainable capacity improvement across service delivery sectors remained enormous. The unplanned transition in 2011 from a school feeding programme assisted by WFP to one run solely by the Ministry of Education prevented a satisfactory hand-over process. A systematic hand-over of the MCHN programme to the Ministry of Health was initiated late, and cannot plausibly be completed before the CP's end date of December 2013. The requirements for satisfactory hand-over are a recurring theme in the evaluation's recommendations.

30. The portfolio's capacity-development objectives are central to its sustainability and long-term impact. This is an area that all agencies have found difficult – the debate in Timor-Leste echoes a global one. For WFP, the following lessons can be drawn from the Timor-Leste experience: i) it is more effective to work on areas such as logistics where WFP has acknowledged expertise; ii) effectiveness depends on having a willing partner; and, iii) even in favourable contexts, there are endemic difficulties linked to WFP's funding model, the constraints on its staff and staff aptitude for capacity-development work.

31. The evaluation's overall assessment is that the country office's incorporation of gender in its work was weak. The evaluation found little evidence that WFP's corporate commitments on gender were incorporated into programme design, monitoring and reporting, or advocacy.[9] This deficiency was linked to the relatively small size of the country office – and the associated limited staff capacity – and to a lack of support for gender mainstreaming from the regional bureau and Headquarters.

Recommendations

32. Recommendations are linked to WFP's prospects in Timor-Leste. The prevalence of undernutrition is among the highest in the world, making a strong case for WFP to remain engaged in the country. However, any WFP involvement has to be funded and based on demand as well as need. The primary demand for any future WFP presence has to come from the Government. The Ministry of Health is currently WFP's principal partner, but the Ministry of Finance should also be involved, to assure the necessary medium-term funding for the Ministry of Health's strategy, with or without WFP involvement. The Ministry of Health's strategy should be linked to the government's medium-term expenditure planning based on sustainable commitments of petroleum fund revenues. WFP's existing and potential short-term funders should also be engaged in reviewing WFP's trajectory. WFP programmes are, rightly, intertwined with those of the Government and other development partners in relevant sectors. Recommendations are therefore addressed to the Government and other stakeholders as well as to the different levels of WFP.

[9] Based on this evaluation's overall gender assessment against WFP corporate commitments for capacity development, accountability, partnerships, advocacy and research and gender mainstreaming in operations.

On the Immediate Transition Strategy for Timor-Leste (WFP Headquarters, Regional Bureau and Country Office)

33. **Recommendation 1: WFP should extend the CP so as to enable the country office to follow up on the transition strategy set out in the Concept Note of November 2012**. A systematic approach to hand-over of MCHN responsibilities, based on joint WFP-Ministry of Health assessments of financial and capacity requirements, was only recently put forward. Satisfactory hand-over will require engagement by the Ministry and other main stakeholders. The present CP was itself intended to allow a hand-over period, but the necessary planning has only recently begun, and a responsible exit – or a properly planned continuation of WFP support – therefore requires more time. An orderly exit that minimizes reputational damage to WFP will require an extension of the CP by at least a year beyond the current end date of December 2013; a more effective transition will require more time (see recommendation 2).

On Hand-Over/Exit Strategies in General (WFP Headquarters)

34. **Recommendation 2: WFP should ensure that hand-over strategies are developed in a timely fashion, recognizing that effective hand-over requires a timeframe of at least two to three years.** Hand-over strategies should include relevant benchmarks and milestones against which progress will be measured, and WFP Headquarters must engage the country office in a realistic assessment of the internal capacity required to ensure that a responsible and sustainable hand-over process is implemented and, where necessary, should develop a strategy for building the internal capacity required for this.

35. WFP will face similar hand-over situations in other countries in the future. Ideally, therefore, WFP Headquarters should use Timor-Leste as a pilot for the development of a credible exit strategy. To do this satisfactorily would imply securing predictable and flexible non-food-based funding to support an extension of the CP for at least two years, with associated commitment from the regional bureau and Headquarters to ensure that the country office has the internal capacity required for a credible transition/exit. The transition process should involve increased engagement with other development partners supporting the Ministry of Health and should build in lesson learning for wider consumption.

On Strategy for MCHN In Timor-Leste (Ministry of Health and other Health and Nutrition Stakeholders Including WFP)

36. **Recommendation 3a: There is urgent need for a joint review of SISCa's role in health service delivery and its corresponding requirements for support.** Health stakeholders should jointly draw up plans to tackle the issues facing SISCa in a sustainable manner.

37. **Recommendation 3b: The Ministry of Health and WFP should discontinue targeted supplementary feeding for children aged 24–59 months and provide targeted supplementary feeding for children aged 6–23 months and pregnant and lactating women.** This is linked to the SISCa review and echoes earlier recommendations, such as those of the PRRO evaluation,[2] based on current understanding of effective practice in such nutrition interventions. If supplementary feeding is to continue and be effective, it must be on a scale that the Ministry of Health can sustain, both financially and in terms of organizational demands on scarce capacity. Sustainability on both criteria is more likely if the

programme is able to rely – wholly or predominantly – on the domestic production of FBF (see recommendation 4) and if the programme design is as straightforward as possible.

38. **Recommendation 3c: Improve the quality of monitoring and evaluation, both of programme delivery and of its results, to meet the minimum standards required for assessing programme delivery and results.** The evaluation has provided detailed comments on gaps in existing data collection, but there must be resolve at all levels of WFP to ensure that basic monitoring – including post-distribution monitoring – is treated as essential, even when capacity gaps make this more difficult.

39. **Recommendation 3d: There is need to support longer-term, country-specific nutrition research such as a nutrition causality study and analysis;** this is a joint responsibility of all stakeholders and should be adequately reflected in the forthcoming (revised) national nutrition strategy.

On Local Production of Fortified Blended Food (WFP, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance)

40. **Recommendation 4: WFP and the Government should jointly undertake a rigorous strategic review of the future role for *Timor Vita***. At present, the country office plays a crucial role in supervising production of *Timor Vita* on behalf of the Government. The review should include analysis of the medium- and long-term viability of the factory, and the cost and logistics implications if more targeted supplementary feeding is linked to provision of *Timor Vita*. It should include attention to future responsibilities for the monitoring and technical support currently provided by WFP, as well as the independent audit of performance.

On Timor-Leste's School Feeding Strategy (Timor-Leste Government with its Partners in Social Protection and Education)

41. **Recommendation 5: A comprehensive strategic review of the school feeding programme should be undertaken to map out a sustainable approach**. It would be appropriate for the Government to lead this review, in collaboration with partners who support the education and social protection sector strategies of Timor-Leste. It is not appropriate for WFP to lead such a review because WFP is not seen as a disinterested party, but it is important to adopt an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach so as to map out a sustainable approach that partners can buy into.

On Capacity Development (WFP Headquarters)

42. **Recommendation 6: WFP Headquarters needs to do further work on developing indicators and practical guidance to assist country offices in designing and implementing effective capacity development strategies.** WFP Headquarters needs to consider how it can also provide more hands-on support to country offices' design and implementation of capacity development strategies. As part of this focus, WFP Headquarters must engage country offices in a realistic assessment of the internal capacity required for effective capacity development initiatives and, where necessary, should develop a strategy for building the internal capacity required for this.

On Gender (WFP Headquarters)

43. **Recommendation 7: WFP Headquarters needs to do further work on developing indicators and practical guidance to country offices for implementing effective gender mainstreaming strategies.** WFP Headquarters also needs to consider how it can provide more hands-on support to country offices to enhance gender analysis and implement gender mainstreaming. WFP Headquarters should focus, in particular, on the needs of country offices without dedicated gender staff.

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation covers operations in Timor-Leste from 2008 to 2012. Country portfolio evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning, and evaluate the entirety of WFP activities in a country against three key evaluation questions: i) portfolio alignment and strategic positioning; ii) factors that have driven WFP's strategic decision-making, including its intended handover and exit by the end of 2013; and iii) performance and results. For Timor-Leste, these questions have been elaborated with special attention to exit and handover, as shown in the full Terms of Reference at Annex I.

2. Timor-Leste was selected as a country office which manages a small WFP portfolio and, unusually, anticipates that WFP will withdraw in the near future, having handed over all its activities to the government. The evaluation therefore includes special attention to capacity development and transition, and draws lessons that may have wider relevance for WFP. The tentative exit date for WFP is the end of 2013, and the country office (CO) and regional bureau (RB) therefore requested that the evaluation be timed for presentation to the 2013 Annual Session of the Executive Board.

3. The evaluation was conducted by an independent team of one local and three international consultants.[10] The team included expertise in health and nutrition, food security, education and school feeding, aid effectiveness and partnerships, and capacity development. Fieldwork in Timor-Leste took place during November and December 2012. Methodology was elaborated in the Inception Report (Lister et al 2012), and is summarised in Annex II. The evaluation matrix, which elaborates the key questions, is at Annex I.

4. Any assessment of capacity development is inherently difficult, and the evaluation was also challenging because reliable quantitative data were exceptionally scarce. The team augmented available data and document review with extensive interviews. More than 100 people connected with the programme were systematically interviewed, and evaluation team members visited and held focus group discussions (FGDs) in three districts (Bobonaro, Baucau and Oecusse). Annex IV lists those consulted, and provides details of the field visits, including a gender and institutional breakdown of interviewees and FGD participants.[11] In order to focus the CPE's resources where they could add value, the CPE built as much as possible on earlier evaluations and reviews, especially the evaluation of the most recent PRRO (Kirkby et al 2009[12]); it also reviewed other available literature on Timor-Leste and drew on international evidence about the effectiveness of interventions in nutrition, school feeding and capacity development (see the bibliography at Annex XVIII). Annex II, as well as describing the planned methodology, reports on the experience of following it and how constraints were addressed.

[10] Because of illness, the local consultant was unable to play a full part in drafting this report.
[11] Seven focus group discussions (2 male-only, 3 female-only and 2 mixed groups) were conducted, with 68 participants in total.
[12] All of the relief activities and most of the food for work activities within the portfolio took place during the period reviewed by the PRRO evaluation.

1.2 Context[13]

An emerging fragile state

5. Timor-Leste, with a population of 1.2 million, is not only a fragile state, but one where, for historical reasons, levels of capacity are particularly low. As highlighted in a recent paper prepared for the National Directorate of Aid Effectiveness:

> The problem in Timor Leste is thus not just the critical shortages of staff. It is the combination of huge gaps in the number of people available combined with a lack of basic absorptive capacity even in those staff who are available for work (NDAE 2011?b; for more detail see Box 5 in Annex V).

6. Timor-Leste has only a short and turbulent experience of independence. Four hundred years of Portuguese colonial rule, during which relatively little development took place, were followed by 25 years of repressive Indonesian occupation, before Timor-Leste chose independence in a referendum in 1999. This choice prompted large-scale violence by the departing Indonesians and their supporters. Timor-Leste was administered by the United Nations from 1999 until formal independence in 2002. UNMISET (the UN Mission of Support in East Timor) was wound up in 2005, but violence in 2006 initiated by protesting soldiers led to another UN intervention, with the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) providing administrative support and police services. On both occasions, UN intervention was backstopped by an Australian-led military contingent. After successful national and local elections[14] UNMIT finally withdrew in late 2012. Throughout the evaluation period, therefore, Timor-Leste was seeking to establish and consolidate the institutions of a functioning state. The government has recognised the challenges it faces and has been prominent amongst the g7+ group of fragile states[15] seeking aid relationships that are appropriate for their special circumstances.

Economic progress and underlying poverty

7. The economy has grown rapidly since independence (see Figure 1 below), and on the basis of per capita national income, Timor-Leste is now classified as a middle-income country. However, growth has been dominated by the exploitation of offshore oil and gas; this has boosted government revenue, but has yet to transform the living standards of most Timorese.[16] Although (in constant 2000 US$) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased from $300 in 2006 to $452 in 2011, 37% of the population live on less than $1.25 a day and 73% live on less than $2 a day (WB 2012c). The services sector is estimated to contribute 56% of GDP with agriculture contributing 27% and industry contributing 18%. The contribution of agriculture to these figures underlines the low productivity and relative poverty of the 72% of the population who live in rural conditions. Timor-Leste is ranked 147 in the Human Development Index out of 187 (UNDP 2011a). Continued economic growth is forecast

[13] See Annex V for additional background information to support this section.
[14] The national elections led to a democratic change of government.
[15] The g7+ group is the country-owned and country-led global mechanism to monitor, report and draw attention to the unique challenges faced by fragile states – see http://www.g7plus.org/.
[16] In June 2005, a Petroleum Fund was established to serve as a repository for all petroleum revenues and to preserve the value of Timor-Leste's petroleum wealth. The Fund held assets of US$11 billion as of September 2012 (CBTL 2012).

(EIU 2012) although petroleum revenues are expected to decline steadily from their peak of US$2.5 billion in 2011 (GoTL 2012a). By law, petroleum revenues are kept in a Petroleum Fund (PF), from which only a sustainable level of income may be allocated to support the annual budget.

Figure 1 GNI per capita 2002–2010 (US$)



Source: WB 2012c

Government plans and priorities

8. The Government's ability to orchestrate Timor-Leste's development has been affected by its turbulent history and lack of capacity. During most of the CPE period, priorities were set through an annual planning and prioritisation process. The programme of the 2007–2012 government is retrospectively summarised in '*Goodbye conflict, welcome development*' (GoTL 2012b); its title is a motto that was adopted in 2009. In 2010 a Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030 set out the government's long term agenda (its goals stress poverty reduction and the rights of citizens to education and to basic services – see Annex V, Box 6). There is also a Transition Plan prepared jointly by GoTL and development partners (GoTL & UNMIT 2011).

9. A number of sector policy papers are also directly relevant to WFP's engagement. These include a national nutrition strategy (GoTL 2004), a national food security policy (GoTL 2005a), a strategy to achieve universal basic education (GoTL 2005b), a national education strategic plan (NESP) – see GPE 2011, a health sector strategic plan (GoTL 2007b), and a strategic programme for promoting agricultural growth and sustainable food security (GoTL 2010b).

10. Timor-Leste is divided into 13 districts, including the enclave of Oecusse which has special administrative status (see Map 2 in Annex V). Political and administrative decentralisation is a faltering process, with legislation and its implementation held up by the political turbulence Timor-Leste has experienced (Butterworth & Dale 2010).

International aid

11. Timor-Leste's emergence and survival as an independent state depended on international assistance. Figure 2 below shows the official development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian assistance to Timor-Leste from 2004 to 2011. Table 1 below shows the top ten donors to Timor-Leste between 2006 and 2010. About US$190m

from development partners (DPs) was expected to finance just under 10% of the 2012 budget (GoTL 2012a), with additional flows bypassing the government. Although aid flows are dwarfed by petroleum revenues (US$ 2.5 billion in 2012 – ¶7 above), they are important as much for technical and institutional support as for the financial transfers that they embody.

Figure 2 ODA and humanitarian assistance 2004–2011



Source: OECD DAC and UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (UNOCHA 2012).

Table 1 Top ten ODA donors 2006–2010

Country / agency donors	ODA 2006-2010 USD m
Australia	389.35
Portugal	192.43
United States	134.85
EU institutions	117.35
Japan	100.9
Norway	51.97
Spain	43
Ireland	42
Germany	33.33
New Zealand	25.13

Source: OECD.

Food security

12. Despite most of the rural population being involved in agriculture, Timor-Leste is a food deficit country. A Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) conducted in 2006 (WFP 2006c) is still the most recent such analysis. Nationally, based on indicators of access and dietary diversity, 20% of households were considered to be food insecure, 23% to be highly vulnerable, 21% to be moderately vulnerable, and 36% to be food secure. The CFSVA found the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition to be: general isolation and lack of infrastructure, particularly in the case of Oecusse; poor access to adequate farmland, particularly irrigated; poor access to income sources outside of agriculture; low purchasing power, related to livelihood methods; food taboos and dietary practices leading to poor diets; poor access to healthcare, which is particularly linked to poor health status of children; and inadequate sanitation and hygiene practices.

13. The findings from the Timor Leste Living Standards Survey (GoTL 2007a) show severe stress in food availability during December and January (this period is referred to as the lapar biasa, or the normally recurring hunger period) for a greater majority of the population. These are the lean months preceding the harvesting of maize and rice, the major food crops, with significant stress also during November and February.

14. In IFPRI's Global Hunger Index (GHI[17]) 2012 GHI Timor-Leste has the worst figures out of 129 countries for child underweight, and on the overall GHI score, Timor-Leste registers 27.3 – putting it into the second-worst category of "alarming" (IFPRI 2012b).

15. The National Food Security Policy (GoTL 2005a – currently being revised) aims to: promote agriculture and food production; promote agricultural support service and infrastructure; promote complementary measures in other sectors; improve food security information; develop systems for prevention and management of disaster; provide safety nets for specific vulnerable groups; and improve food utilisation and nutrition.

Health and nutrition

16. The Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 2008–2012 (GoTL 2007b) sets priorities which include health services delivery, behavioural change/health promotion, quality improvement, human resource development, health financing, asset management, institutional development, a health management information system (HMIS), and research. Recognising the impact of poor maternal health, gender equity is a priority area for the HSSP.[18] Box 8 in Annex V gives an overview of the health service structure, while key health indicators are shown in Annex V, Table 17.

17. Three quarters of under-five deaths are due to three causes: almost a third are due to neonatal causes,[19] which are increasing as a proportion, while approximately 20% are attributable to diarrhoea and 20% to acute respiratory infections (ARIs). The high prevalence of stunting (57.7%), wasting (18.9%) and underweight (45.3%) in children under 5 years in Timor-Leste (NSD & ICF Macro 2010) puts the country amongst the bottom five countries globally for each of these nutrition indicators. (see Table 2 below).

[17] The GHI combines three equally weighted indicators in one index:

1. **Undernourishment**: the proportion of undernourished people as a percentage of the population (reflecting the share of the population with insufficient caloric intake).
2. **Child underweight**: the proportion of children younger than age five who are underweight (that is, have low weight for their age, reflecting wasting, stunted growth, or both), which is one indicator of child undernutrition.
3. **Child mortality:** the mortality rate of children younger than age five (partially reflecting the fatal synergy of inadequate caloric intake and unhealthy environments).

[18] The HSSP notes that, by contrast with international experience, women are under-represented in the Timor-Leste health service, with male staff outnumbering female by approximately 2:1. Gender equity is one of 17 priority cross-cutting strategies in the HSSP, the aim of which is to work towards a gender proportional representation of women in decision-making in the various tiers of the health system. The strategies to be adopted towards this include promotion of gender mainstreaming, awareness-raising on gender issues throughout the health workforce, affirmative action, and gender-sensitive improvement in access to and provision of services.

[19] Deaths within 28 days of birth. For trends in early childhood mortality see Annex V, Table 18.

Table 2 Timor-Leste international ranking on nutrition indicators

In each case the worst 5 countries are shown

Stunting (%)		Underweight (%)		Wasting (%)	
Afghanistan	59.3	**Timor-Leste**	**45.3**	Djibouti	26
Burundi	57.7	India	43.5	Sudan	21
Timor-Leste	**57.7**	Yemen	43.1	India	20
Yemen	57.7	Bangladesh	41.3	**Timor-Leste**	**18.9**
Niger	54.8	Niger	39.9	Bangladesh	17.5

Source: World Health Organisation 2012.

Table 3 Nutrition indicators in Timor-Leste in 2003 and 2009

DHS Survey Year	Stunting % (height-for-age)	Underweight % (weight-for-age)	Wasting % (weight-for-height)
2003	49.4	45.8	12.4
2009	57.7	45.3	18.9

Source: GoTL 2004, NSD & ICF Macro 2010.

18. The 2009 demographic and health survey (DHS) indicated that the prevalence of underweight is nearly the same as in 2003, but stunting and wasting were worse (see Table 3 above). The data also indicate that, although the situation is worse in rural than urban settings, there is a need to target both. Similarly, indicators are worse in some districts than others, but undernutrition is a serious problem across the whole country (see Annex V, Table 19 and Table 20).

19. Analyses of food security show very little difference in nutritional status between different food security groups (food insecure, highly vulnerable, moderately vulnerable and food secure).[20] It is therefore clear that the causes of chronic undernutrition are complex; in addition to factors such as caring practices and water and sanitation issues, traditional beliefs and nutrition practices (which vary across Timor-Leste's diverse ethnic groups) also play a role.

20. A key gender dimension of undernutrition is the inter-generational effect of small mothers giving birth to small babies. The 2009 DHS found 27% of women were malnourished (body mass index <18.5), and 15% of women shorter than 145 centimetres, indicating increased risk of a difficult delivery and/or a low birth-weight baby (NSD & ICF Macro 2010). A recent analysis of the 2009 DHS data has found evidence that boys may be nutritionally disadvantaged:

> Independent of area of residence and other factors, boys were significantly more likely to be stunted than girls throughout the entire country. Controlling for other factors included in the models, the odds of stunting were consistently 40% higher in boys than girls. (UNICEF 2011)[21]

Education

21. As in health, human development outcomes for Timorese in education remain among the weakest in the East Asia Pacific region, and rapid population growth

[20] The CFSVA found "There is no significant difference in wasting, stunting, or underweight status of children 6 to 59 months between groups" (WFP 2006c).

[21] This appears to be a novel finding; more in-depth analysis of the nutritional differences according to gender is required.

(estimated at 2.4% p.a.) is expanding demands on the school system (about 45% of population are under 15). Nevertheless, change and growth in the education sector have been significant since independence in 2002. The net enrolment rate in primary education increased from 68% to more than 90% from 2004/05 to 2011. There were rapid reductions in grade-to-grade dropout from 11-12% in 2008-09 to 3-4% in 2010. (For an extensive review, see the Timor-Leste Human Development Report – UNDP 2011b.) As identified in key sector diagnostics such as the Early Grade Reading Assessment (Amorim et al 2010) and the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) itself, the sector continues to face major challenges in the quality and efficiency of education.

22. Historic inequalities are reflected in adult literacy rates; the 2007 living standards survey found that only 43% of adult women could read and write competently, compared to 59% of men. Gender parity in access and management by 2015 is one of the three core goals of the NESP. The gender balance is quite even for primary education, but becomes progressively less so at higher levels of education and in the professional world.

23. Education spending has remained constant at 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the total amount of education spending is increasing given the fast pace of GDP growth. Despite average year-to-year enrolment growth in basic and secondary education at around 9-10% a year, per student expenditures have increased.[22] The education sector is supported by a number of Timor-Leste's main donors; strengthening of management capacity in the sector is the focus of funding recently approved by the Global Partnership for Education (WB 2012a).

Social protection and safety nets.

24. The Strategic Development Plan states that by 2015 a social safety net package will have been developed for vulnerable families covering health, education, housing and employment opportunities. Already, the government, overseen by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), implements various cash transfer programmes for the elderly, people with disabilities, veterans, and other groups. According to Robles 2011, social protection is the second biggest expenditure following infrastructure, and at least 10% of the population and half of households benefit from these programmes. During 2012 the World Bank undertook a public expenditure review focused on social protection spending, but it was not yet available for the evaluation team.

WFP context

25. During the period of this evaluation, the WFP strategies and policies that guide country office work were themselves changing, as WFP adapted to an evolving international aid climate and changing perspectives on food security and nutrition. Key developments included:

[22] It is estimated that per student public spending was about US$120 in 2006/07, rising to around US$190 in 2010.

(a) The aid effectiveness agenda, defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD-DAC 2005, OECD-DAC 2008), continued to evolve through the 4th High Level Forum in Busan. The increased focus on fragility that was reinforced in Busan is highly relevant to Timor-Leste (OECD 2011).

(b) WFP's strategic plan (WFP 2008a) recognised changing perspectives on food aid, and the need to situate food aid (or more broadly food assistance) within broader approaches to social protection.

(c) There was a dynamic international aid framework for addressing the challenges of hunger and nutrition – encapsulated in the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) initiative (FAO et al 2011) and Road Map (SUN Task Team 2010). This is driven both by a humanitarian concern to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and by advances in understanding of undernutrition and the importance of different interventions (e.g. micronutrients) at different stages of the life-cycle (e.g. increasing appreciation of the importance of "the first 1000 days" from conception, which has implications for both mother and child nutrition interventions).

(d) In order to operate more flexibly, WFP recognised the need to adapt its internal financing model and incentives, proposing a new financing model to the board in 2010. This would make it easier for COs to obtain finance for their administrative and technical activities (e.g. in relation to capacity development) that was not rigidly linked to volumes of food delivered. However, the new procedures have yet to roll out effectively to country level.

1.3 WFP's Portfolio

Overview and components of the portfolio

26. WFP has been present in Timor-Leste since 1999 when the country office (CO) was first set up. For a period after 2002, it was run as a sub-office from the Jakarta CO, but a full CO was re-established in 2005. WFP has had eight operations from 1999 to 2013, budgeted at US$135 million, including emergency operations (EMOPs), protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), special operations and, since 2011, a country programme[23] (CP) which is ongoing. WFP is active in all districts and currently has sub-offices in Oecusse, Bobonaro and Baucau. (For the full list of operations in Timor-Leste, see Annex VI, Table 22.)

27. For the purpose of this evaluation the WFP Timor-Leste portfolio embraces the three operations implemented in the country since September 2008: PRRO 10388.1 (2008 to August 2011[24]), Special Operation 107970 (2009 to mid-2011) and the first ever Country Programme in Timor-Leste – DEV 200185 (September 2011 to December 2013). The planned budget for these three operations from 2008 to

[23] A "Country Programme" in WFP usage is a particular development operation; we therefore use "country portfolio" when referring to the entirety of WFP operations, of which the Country Programme is part.
[24] Original timescale extended by a year. PRRO 10388.1 commenced in September 2008; thus the first 8 months of 2008 saw expenditure and food distribution under its predecessor (PRRO 10388), and its unexpended funds were then carried over into the new PRRO.

December 2013 was US$75.4m; by mid-2012 $38.6m or about half of the total needs had been funded, although one year is still pending for the Country Programme (see Table 4 below).

Table 4 Timor-Leste Portfolio 2008–2012 by Programme Category

	No. of operations	Requirements (US$, millions)	Share of requirement	Actual received* (US$, millions)	Received as % of requirement
Development 200185**	1	22.5	30%	12.3	55%
Relief and Recovery 10388.1	1	50.9	68%	25.1	49%
Special operation 107790	1	2.0	3%	1.2	59%
Total	3	75.4	100%	38.6	51%

Source: WFP database, resource situations (4 March 2012 and 10 February 2013), SPRs.
* These figures take into account the carry-over.

**The project is ongoing therefore figures are subject to change; requirement is until December 2013.

28. A number of activities complemented the operations noted above, funded through grants and trust funds totalling US$3.4 million, see Annex VI, Table 23. Annex VI provides overviews of all the operations covered in the portfolio including the activities, beneficiaries, funding level, donors and partners for the three main operations (see Table 24, Table 25 and Table 26 in Annex VI).

29. WFP participated in two UN joint programmes: a joint programme "*promoting sustainable food and nutrition security in Timor-Leste*" which was financed by Spain's Millennium Development Goal Fund, and known as MDG-F (see Annex IX) and a joint programme financed by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) – "community mobilization for poverty alleviation and social inclusion in service delivery", known as COMPASIS (Annex X). These provided additional funding for WFP activities; in the case of COMPASIS, this funding was incorporated within the budget frame of the CP.

WFP strategy in Timor-Leste

30. There is no overarching strategy document that guided the Timor-Leste portfolio during the evaluation period. However, the PRRO and the CP were consecutive, and each proposed strategic directions for WFP in Timor-Leste – see Annex XI. These (and the CO's other initiatives) reflect some strong common threads. Throughout the period, WFP has emphasised working with the government as its principal partner, with the explicit aim of supporting and strengthening national systems. Thus capacity development has been a strong theme throughout. It was mentioned alongside the other objectives spelt out in the PRRO, while the Special Operation initiated in 2009 was unusual for WFP in focusing mainly on practical steps to strengthen the government's logistic and food assistance management capacity, some of which were carried forward into the country programme. Capacity development was also an explicit objective within the food-based activities; the Timor Vita project (to instigate local production of fortified blended food) was a particularly high profile effort to build national capacity, while

WFP has also supported joint efforts to strengthen food security monitoring, disaster preparedness and early warning systems.

31. Capacity development became an even more prominent theme in the CP, with, for the first time an explicit handover objective and an implied exit date for WFP as early as the end of 2013. There was thus a distinct change of emphasis in the treatment of handover between the PRRO and CP project documents:

> PRRO activities will be handed over to the Government as soon as government capacity is adequate to implement nationwide school feeding and MCHN programmes to meet its national policy objectives. (WFP 2008f)
>
> Capacity development and hand-over to government partners are a major focus of the CP, and government achievements will be reviewed throughout the CP. The need for additional WFP support beyond the CP will be based on a review of government capacity and the availability of resources. (WFP 2011b)

Thematic Components and Evolution of the Portfolio

32. The main thematic components of the portfolio have been emergency relief (using general food distribution, GFD), FFW/A, school feeding, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) and targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) to support maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN), and capacity development. Figure 3 below illustrates the changing balance of the portfolio in terms of food distributions for different activities.[25]

Figure 3 Food distributed by activity and by year 2008–2012 (MT)



Source: SPR, Data received from CO for 2012, Year 2008 takes into account the total distribution (PRRO 10388.0 and 10388.1)

33. Table 5 below shows how WFP's strategic objectives have been addressed by different elements of the portfolio. This mapping is based on the project documents, and is inevitably crude: many activities could be seen as supporting more than one strategic objective (for example, none of the portfolio's activities is currently linked with SO2, but support for the national food security information system, which is linked to SO5 in project documents, could equally be seen as responding to SO2).

[25] Shares of food distribution are the best available illustration of how the balance of the portfolio has changed. A breakdown of beneficiaries by activity for 2012 was not yet available at the time of report preparation.

The balance of the portfolio has evolved from a shorter-term emergency and post-conflict focus (WFP SO1 and SO3) to the longer-term focus of SO4 (reducing chronic hunger and undernutrition) and SO5 (strengthening country capacities).

Table 5 Portfolio vs. WFP Strategic Objectives

WFP Strategic Objectives[26]	Activities supporting the Strategic Objective	Operations funding the activities
SO1: save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	GFD – emergency feeding for IDPs	PRRO
SO2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation	(Food security system etc assigned to SO5)	
SO3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	Food for Work/ Assets (including CCT)	PRRO, COMPASIS (included in CP as component 2b), cash pilot project (Spain)
SO4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition	MCHN (targeted and blanket supplementary feeding), including local production of FBF	PRRO, USAID grant for MCHN, MDG-F, CP
	School feeding programme (school feeding, plus nutrition education, improved stoves)	PRRO, Brazil trust funds, MDG-F,
SO5: Strengthen countries' capacities to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase	Capacity development work with partner government agencies	PRRO, Special Operation, CP (component 2a)
	Development of food security information system	CP, MDG-F
	Local production of FBF	PRRO, CP, MDG-F

Source: based on Strategic Objectives identified in project documents.

34. The PRRO approved in 2008 scaled up an earlier PRRO; as the emergency receded and displaced people returned home, it focused more on its two largest elements, school feeding and maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN). By the time the current country programme was started (in September 2011), the Ministry of Education had taken over the entire responsibility for school feeding. In contrast, the Ministry of Health (MoH) was keen to retain WFP involvement in the MCHN programme, which became the main focus of the CP. The Timor-Leste MoH made a substantial financial contribution to the programme (reflected in Annex VI, Table 24). This was linked to the local production of a fortified blended food (Timor Vita) which WFP helped to establish as part of efforts to strengthen national capacity.

35. Over the evaluation period, school feeding and supplementary feeding linked to the MCHN programme were the largest components of the portfolio, but FFA[27] activities continued throughout the period. The FFA component of the PRRO tapered off, but there was a discrete FFA component for two districts (Ermera and Oecusse) as part of the COMPASIS joint programme (see Annex X), and FFA activities were

[26] Strategic Objectives from WFP's Strategic Plan 2008–13. The PRRO was prepared using the previous set of SOs, but its logical framework was adjusted to the new SOs in 2009.

[27] The FFA (food for assets) designation was increasingly preferred to "FFW" (food for work), reflecting an increased emphasis on linking FFW activities (undertaken during the "lean season" and targeting food insecure households) to the creation or rehabilitation of durable rural assets. Often FFW/A is used to cover both forms.

implemented in two further districts (Bobonaro and Baucau) under the auspices of a 5-country WFP research programme into conditional cash transfers (CCT) financed by Spain.

36. In the course of providing support to national programmes for school feeding and MCHN, as well as the more focused elements of FFW/A , WFP has been active in all 13 of Timor-Leste's districts. Map 3 in Annex VI shows the spread of WFP activities in 2012.

37. Table 6 below shows annual average beneficiary numbers for food-based activities under the successive programmes. There are many fewer beneficiaries under the country programme because of the cessation of support to school feeding. Figure 4 below shows the breakdown of actual beneficiary figures by activity; however the breakdown is not available for 2012 (when school feeding had ceased) and in any case Figure 3 above gives a better picture of the relative importance of different activities in the portfolio.

Table 6 Beneficiaries in Timor-Leste

Operation Number and Type	Time Frame	Annual Average Beneficiaries			
		Planned		Actual	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
CP 200185	Sept 2011 Dec 2012	25,500	49,500	16,492	32,050
		75,000		48,542	
PRRO 10388.1	Sept 2008 Aug 2011	183,205	193,345	153,524	158,904
		376,550		312,428	

Source: WFP

38. As regards WFP's own analytical work in Timor-Leste, the CFSVA conducted in 2006 (WFP 2006c) was a foundation for planning during the evaluation period. An evaluation of the PRRO was conducted in 2009 (Kirkby et al 2009), there has been a mid-term evaluation of COMPASIS (Beasca 2011), and both mid-term and final evaluations of the UNICEF-WFP Joint food security and nutrition programme (Noij 2011, Lenci 2012).[28] WFP carried out a rapid assessment of the MCHN programme in late 2012 (WFP/TL 2012a). A logistics capacity assessment was also conducted in 2009 (WFP 2009g). A baseline survey was conducted by IFPRI prior to the start of the cash transfer project (IFPRI 2012a).

[28] These evaluations were managed by the respective joint programme lead agencies – UNDP for COMPASIS and UNICEF for MDG-F.

Figure 4 Share of Beneficiaries by Activity (%)



39. More detail on all portfolio components is provided in section 2.3, where their performance is assessed.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Alignment and Strategic Positioning

Alignment with men's and women's needs

40. By international standards, Timor-Leste has an extraordinarily high prevalence of undernutrition (Table 2 above), and there is clear evidence of a "lean season" that affects many rural dwellers every year (see ¶17 above). As emergency needs receded, WFP's activities in Timor-Leste focused on FFW/A, MCHN and school feeding. Each of these activities addressed evident needs: supplementary feeding under the MCHN programme aimed to address undernutrition directly for vulnerable children and their mothers; school feeding sought to address educational needs as well as poverty and nutrition; and FFW/A was designed to increase food availability during the lean season, while also building rural assets to strengthen the productive base in some of the more food insecure districts. The balance of the portfolio is discussed in section 2.2, and the design and effectiveness of all components are assessed in section 2.3, but it is safe to say the WFP programme has been addressing people's needs. Moreover, all components have taken appropriate account of men's and women's needs. MCHN has focused on the special nutritional needs of mothers and young children; school feeding has not discriminated between genders (there is no apparent need at present for extra incentives to encourage girls' attendance at primary school); FFW/A was designed to respond to community priorities, and sought to provide work opportunities for women as well as men.

Alignment with government policies, priorities and systems

41. WFP's portfolio in Timor-Leste has been well aligned with government policies and priorities. The CO consulted with the government in drawing up its main operations, and they clearly responded to government preferences. This applies both to the general orientation of the portfolio and to the configuration of specific elements within it. Thus: the portfolio was initially responsive to emergency requirements and support to internally displaced people (IDPs); the MCHN

component has followed government policies and sought to strengthen the nutrition component within the government's primary health care system. WFP's support to the school meals programme was similarly responsive to government preferences in merging WFP efforts with government's and supporting a nation-wide programme. The portfolio has been consistent with government's annual priorities, with the National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) and with food security policies; the recent Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030 also recognises the importance of addressing Timor-Leste's chronic nutrition problems.

42. The portfolio is also in step with the deeper rationale for alignment, in terms of supporting state legitimacy and performance. The OECD principles for good engagement in fragile states (Box 1 below), were adopted before the 2008 PRRO was formulated. Several of the principles are reflected in the strategic orientation of the portfolio. Thus, in working with and through government systems (see section 2.3 for detail on how MCHN and school feeding have done this) WFP has aligned with local priorities, supported state-building and avoided pocket of exclusion.

Box 1 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations

1. Take context as the starting point.
2. Do no harm.
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective.
4. Prioritise prevention.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.
9. Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Source: OECD-DAC 2007

43. However, state fragility has implications for the strength of alignment. Limits on government capacity also constrain government ownership (a) because of weak guidance from policy documents, which are often vague and donor-driven; (b) because of limited government capacity to engage in the detailed design and implementation of operations. Limited capacity also increases DP perceptions of the costs and risks of working through government systems. As a fragile state, Timor-Leste does not, and would not be expected to, provide the strong enabling environment for alignment (medium term perspective, active aid management by government, strong prioritisation) that would be ideal. There is a particular challenge for capacity development objectives.

44. There has been little opportunity for WFP to align its capacity development interventions with Government priorities because, until recently, there has been no Government-defined framework or strategy for capacity development with which WFPs' interventions could be aligned.[29] Further, the aid coordination mechanisms in

[29] A policy on Technical Assistance has now (2012) been drafted by the Ministry of Finance and is pending formal government approval.

place[30] have not proved effective forums for discussing Timor-Leste's specific capacity requirements and reaching agreement on how best to respond to these (see Annex XII). Although these issues are also commonplace in countries with much more established and capable institutions than Timor-Leste's, the need for more effective coordination is greater in Timor-Leste because the challenges to capacity development are greater than in many other places. (WFP's capacity development efforts are reviewed in section 2.3.)

Alignment with other development partners

45. WFP has fostered relations with bilateral funding agencies although these tend to be inevitably skewed towards their funding priorities, for example relations with AusAID are based on their strong focus on nutrition. Nonetheless, WFP have worked hard in-country to broaden the perceptions of WFP capabilities and garner support from agencies active in-country, such as with Irish Aid. The challenge has become more difficult as the number of active bilateral agencies has declined. Six bilateral agencies provided funds for the PRRO, but only four for the CP (see Annex VI, Table 24); of the latter, Ireland has now ended its programme, and Australia, although it remains heavily engaged, is seeking to work directly with the government as much as possible, and is therefore less inclined to fund WFP in future.

46. Concentrating on the government as WFP's main partner has implied a lesser role for NGOs as direct partners for WFP (and, like bilateral donors, the pool of international NGOs active in Timor-Leste has been shrinking in recent years). WFP's NGO "partners" have tended to serve as contracted implementing agencies (although WFP has sought to work through and strengthen local NGOs when feasible – e.g. for school kitchens, see section 2.3).

47. At the same time, as the PRRO evaluation noted (Kirkby et al 2009), the limited number of potential NGO partners, the limitations on funding and the practical problems of working in a testing environment with a fledgling government required WFP to develop strong partnerships with other UN institutions. Indeed UN cross-collaboration has been especially important in Timor-Leste and deserves special consideration, particularly since UN agencies have played a very prominent role in Timor-Leste governance and administration (see Annex XIII). This meant *de facto* that UN agencies rather than the GoTL have taken the lead on many issues, and the high profile of the UN made intra-UN coordination relatively more important. At the same time, there is a sentiment within the government, that this strong UN alliance has overshadowed the government itself and hence the government is keen to reassert its leadership of the agenda.

48. There has been strong UN collaboration around the UNDAF, and WFP has aligned its portfolio accordingly.[31] There are generally harmonious relations with fellow UN agencies and the inter-UN rivalries that can be observed in other countries

[30] These include the Quarterly Development Partners Meeting, the Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting and sector working groups.

[31] The PRRO document notes:

> This PRRO has been planned jointly with other United Nations agencies through the thematic working groups and will form an integral part of the revised UNDAF (2008–2013). (WFP 2008f)

are not apparent; but alignment within UN joint programmes has been superficial, with simultaneous rather than integrated implementation of the activities of different agencies, and only limited government ownership (see the relevant joint programme evaluations – Noij 2011, Lenci 2012, Beasca 2011). WFP's implementation of its components of COMPASIS and the MDG-F joint programme is reviewed in section 2.3 below.

49. There has been a broad division of labour in nutrition between WFP, UNICEF and WHO, with WFP focusing on moderate malnutrition and UNICEF and WHO focusing on severe malnutrition, but there is also considerable scope for stronger collaboration between these agencies. As noted in section 2.3, UNICEF's support to community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) and WFP's blanket and targeted supplementary feeding programmes have been only weakly integrated. However, recently, dialogue on forging a closer working relationship between WFP and UNICEF has taken place.

Alignment with WFP objectives and policies

50. Table 5 above shows that all of WFP's activities were oriented towards WFP's Strategic Objectives. Moreover, the evolution of the Timor-Leste portfolio is highly consistent with WFP's global strategy. The shift in focus of the Strategic Objectives has already been noted (see section 1.3 above) while the trend towards food assistance approaches was reflected in the CCT experiment (the caveats in practice are discussed under section 2.3). Most significantly, the portfolio embodies a shift towards the capacity development objectives and approaches discussed in ¶148 below. Again, providing support to system development within the Timor-Leste environment is not easy (Annex XII) and translating capacity development intentions into effective practice can be challenging (again, see section 2.3).

51. Since SO5 promotes alignment with the government, this closes off some other choices for WFP. Thus both the school feeding and the MCHN programmes deferred to government's preference for a single national system operating across all districts, rather than the more targeted approach WFP might have followed. For both programmes it became clear that a two-tier system would not be politically acceptable, more especially if the public perceived the WFP programme as out-performing the government one.[32] WFP chose options that were clearly in line with the fragile states principles (Box 1 above) as well as WFP's SO5.

Consistency with international good practice

52. As already noted (Box 1 above) the principles for good international engagement in fragile states are a key reference point. These require, in particular, that donors should:

- locate support in an understanding of Timor-Leste's starting point in 1999 and the pattern of progress and setbacks since then;

[32] Thus Kirkby et al 2009 noted "For political reasons it is important that there is no perception of a WFP realm as opposed to the Ministry of Health. if there is a possibility of a different quality of service." Also: "According to interviews in the Ministry of Education, the Government was enthusiastic to merge with WFP as '*it* [the SMP] *will help repair the Government's image*'."

- build strong and accountable institutions that can provide security and deliver services; and
- recognise the long-term/slow pace of change and be willing to stay engaged over the long-term.

53. WFP has demonstrated a good appreciation of these requirements, but, as we discuss in section 2.2, WFP country offices face constraints which make it difficult to operate with the long-term horizon that the most effective engagement requires.

54. As noted in ¶51 above, close alignment with government delivery systems may require compromises. A salient issue is the extent to which the MCHN supplementary feeding strategy and its practical implementation sufficiently reflect international good practice standards; this is reviewed in section 2.3.

2.2 Making Strategic Choices

Space for strategic decision-making

55. The scope for strategic decision making by the Timor-Leste CO is affected by both internal and external constraints, and it makes sense to consider these constraints before passing judgement on the decisions made.[33]

External constraints

56. There has been steady improvement in security and governance over the evaluation period. However, an improving situation for Timor-Leste is also a more difficult one for WFP. During an emergency, priorities tend to be simpler and more obvious, and WFP's operational strengths are generally recognised. Post-emergency the criteria for intervention are more difficult: there is more scope for comparison of WFP's standard interventions with other, and longer-term, approaches;[34] there are more stakeholders to work with; and working with government in a capacity-development mode requires a different set of CO skills, and needs resources that are more predictable over the medium term.

57. The CO has been constrained in its ability to make strategic choices by the fact that funding has become much more difficult. At the same time as the emergency in Timor-Leste receded, aid became globally less abundant and Timor-Leste's increasing revenues led a number of bilateral donors and NGOs to cut back or withdraw their programmes, while some of WFP's previous funders – notably Australia – are emulating WFP's preference for working directly with the government rather than through intermediaries.

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[33] In relation to the main questions in the evaluation matrix (see Annex II, Box 2) this section thus reviews EQ11, followed by EQ8 and EQ9 (under "analysis and advocacy"), and EQ12 ("learning from experience"), Our assessment of EQ10 (WFP as a strategic partner) is considered along with coherence of the portfolio, at the end of Section 2.3.

[34] For example, in the longer term efforts to improve rural infrastructure and strengthen agricultural technology become more relevant to achieving food security and are more likely to crowd out the direct provision of food; food-based aid may be seen as just part of a spectrum of social protection measures, etc.

Internal constraints

58. The CO is also constrained by some aspects of WFP's business model. For good historical reasons, WFP developed a business model in which the operating costs available to COs were mechanically linked to the tonnage of food handled. WFP's new strategic plan in 2008 (WFP 2008d) recognised the need to adopt a broader approach ("food assistance" not food aid), and is rolling out a new financing framework under which there will be more scope to obtain operating finance that is not so directly linked to food volumes; however the new framework did not take effect at country level during the period under review. It is also standard WFP practice to approve operations for which full funding has not been secured, leaving COs to seek additional funding during implementation, and to trim the programme to match funds available if full funding is not forthcoming.

59. A short-term funding horizon and dependence on voluntary funding, together with a funding model that remains predominantly food-based, means an inevitable tendency for COs to be reactive and ad hoc. A small CO is further disadvantaged by its own capacity constraints, limited funds for staffing and the difficulty of ensuring sufficient staff continuity and seniority. COs are used to living from hand to mouth, but the constraints this involves are arguably greater for a relatively small CO,[35] and in Timor-Leste they are exacerbated by a low-capacity context which means, for example, that the CO has had to recruit internationally (e.g. UN volunteers) for posts that in other middle-income countries would be filled by nationals.

60. There are other limitations on the CO's room for manoeuvre. Some key strategic choices by WFP have closed off others. Thus, for example, deciding to work with and through the government MCHN programme meant following the government decision to run a nationwide programme, so WFP did not have the targeting choices that feature in other countries where the WFP programme is more autonomous. A similar point applied to WFP's involvement in school feeding. Equally, WFP has only limited control over the joint UN programmes in which it has participated. In some countries, operating through NGOs offers access to more capable institutions for delivery, but in Timor-Leste the decision to strengthen government itself has closed off this option, while the pool of international NGOs has, in any case, been shrinking.

Strategic choices

61. The main strategic shifts in the portfolio have been described in section 1.3. They have been a mixture of deliberate adaptation to Timor-Leste's needs and pragmatic adjustment on account of external and internal constraints on decision-making. The main deliberate (pro-active) choices have been to focus on direct support to government service delivery, and to make MCHN WFP's first priority. On the other hand, WFP's exit from the school meals programme (SMP) was reactive (the Ministry of Education decided to do without further support from WFP).

[35] With average annual direct support costs of US$ 1.3m, Timor-Leste is categorised as one of 16 "small" COs – see Annex VI, Table 21.

62. There appear to be two drivers of WFP's decision to invest in developing government capacity: WFP's corporate commitment to this in its Strategic Plan was matched by the priority being given by the Government of Timor-Leste and its development partners (DPs) to state-building in light of the urgent need to build institutions capable of delivering both security and services. As already noted (see section 1.3), development of government capacity was already a strong theme in the PRRO (2008), but received additional emphasis in the CP (2011), which made handover of food-based programmes to the government a central concern, and was non-committal about continuing WFP activities beyond the CP end-date of December 2013. From the evaluation team's interviews with key WFP personnel, it is clear that the CO and RB were very conscious of the declining prospects for WFP funding in Timor-Leste, but considered that an abrupt cessation of WFP activities would not allow an effective transition to wholly government-run programmes, and would not be good for WFP's reputation. The CP was thus seen as enabling a more acceptable transition. However, continued shortfalls in funding (see Table 4 above), have left the CO with a dilemma over transition: on the one hand there is a risk that funding may not last until the mooted end-2013 exit date; on the other there are doubts whether the government would be able to sustain the MCHN programme after 2013 without further support.

Assessment

63. Shortage of funding, exacerbated by its unpredictability, has had a dual impact on the CO's ability to make and then to follow through on strategic choices. First, the CO has lacked funds to implement all the decisions that it has taken. Table 4 above shows a reduced funding base for the CP compared with the previous PRRO (along with persistent underfunding of both operations), which, for example, forced the CO to cut back on its plans to provide capacity development inputs to several different ministries. Second, the lack of a secure, longer-term financing framework has limited the ability of the CO to attract and then retain sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified staff, particularly staff with skills that are more relevant to capacity development than to direct implementation of WFP programmes.

64. Despite these limitations, the CO has taken some key strategic decisions and, associated with these, has established some important strategic partnerships. These include: addressing Timor-Leste's persistently high levels of malnutrition by partnering with MoH; supporting local production of supplementary food through a partnership with MoH and Timor Global; and prioritising capacity development through partnership, most successfully with MTCI (all assessed in detail in section 2.3).

65. Given the difficulties in securing appropriate funding, implementing these strategic choices has involved the CO in an entrepreneurial pursuit of potential funding opportunities. For example, the CO obtained remaining funds from the tsunami appeal to launch the Special Operation. The CO has also leveraged partnerships with UN agencies, which has helped to raise funds for implementation and for management of the CP (although the UN joint programmes have systemic

weaknesses, ¶48 above). By contrast, the pursuit of funding through participation in the CCT research did not open up space for more strategic engagement and in this, as in other respects, it proved to be a misjudgement (see the review of FFW/A in section 2.3).

Analysis and advocacy

66. The design of the PRRO was directly informed by the findings of the CFSVA (WFP 2006c) and other analytical work in which WFP was involved, such as the WFP *Market Profile for Emergency Food Security Assessments* (WFP 2006a), the *Timor-Leste Emergency Food Security Assessment* (WFP 2006b), *Dili Emergency Food Security Assessment* (EFSA) (WFP 2007c) and the *FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Timor-Leste* (FAO & WFP 2007). These studies (and others by agencies such as Oxfam Australia – Oxfam 2007) highlighted high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity linked to low yield subsistence agriculture and a lack of off-farm employment, and also showed that food scarcity and general insecurity were closely linked. The components of the PRRO reflected this analysis (Kirkby et al 2009).

67. WFP has not initiated analytical work similar to the CFSVA since 2006, choosing rather to prioritise programme implementation (which has included elements of supporting government capacity to do food security monitoring; this is covered in our review of capacity development in section 2.3). This prioritisation is understandable where resources are constrained, but continuing high levels of malnutrition indicate a strategic need to deepen understanding of the factors explaining poor nutritional outcomes, which appear related neither to absolute poverty nor to absolute food shortages. The need to carry out deeper analysis may be seen as a collective responsibility of government and its DPs, and is not just an issue for WFP. WFP may also not be the most appropriate agency to undertake research into the causes of persistent malnutrition. However, WFP does have a responsibility to inform such analysis by carrying out more effective monitoring of its programmes (see in particular the discussion of MCHN monitoring in section 2.3). Throughout the period under review, WFP monitoring has focused mainly on tracking tonnages and estimating numbers of beneficiaries. We discuss later the reasons for this and for the overall weakness of WFP's monitoring systems, but it is clear that a lack of attention to outcomes has compromised the effectiveness of WFP's MCHN interventions.

68. The CP presents a mixed picture on whether analysis has informed WFP's approaches to developing government capacity. In this, WFP's experience has not been markedly different from that of most other DPs, who typically have embarked on capacity development initiatives without analysing the significant ways in which Timor-Leste differs from other fragile states. Similarly, WFP's decision to work towards a handover of programmes to the MoE and MoH was not accompanied by a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the specific capacity gaps in those ministries and of what was required for handover, nor by an analysis of where WFP could make the most effective contribution relative to support to capacity development being provided by other DPs. By contrast, the Special Operation was

based on a detailed assessment of the respective ministries' existing logistics capacity and of the most effective ways of addressing capacity gaps.

69. Timor-Leste's DPs have succeeded in raising the profile of nutrition issues, working alongside government policy makers. The Comoro Declaration (see Annex XIV) illustrates this, as does the preparation of successive National Nutrition Strategies (with the second version currently in draft). WFP has been among the group of concerned donors, but others (notably UNICEF) appear to have taken more of a lead in advocacy and policy support. WFP can claim more direct influence in securing an enhanced budget for the MoH nutrition department, and MoH's part-financing of the MCHN programme and the Timor Vita project. WFP also played a part in developing the Food Security Information and Early Warning System (FSIEWS).

Gender analysis and advocacy

70. As regards gender, there appears to be little available analysis of how Timor-Leste ethnic heterogeneity is reflected in gender relations in ways that are relevant to the design of development programmes, including those concerned with nutrition and food security. Nor is there analysis of how women's lack of access to productive resources or men's lack of involvement in nutrition issues may be a factor in rates of malnutrition or levels of food insecurity. As the nutrition programme already targets pregnant and lactating women as well as children, and because DHS data on the nutritional status of girls and boys do not indicate that girls are discriminated against in feeding,[36] WFP has not felt the need to adopt a gender-mainstreaming approach in programme design, implementation or monitoring.[37] However, the lack of Post Distribution Monitoring during the period under review means that WFP has not been able to assess whether there are gender-relevant differences in the way that CSB and Timor Vita are being consumed within households and whether this is affecting programme effectiveness. Similarly, the monitoring systems used by WFP during the period under review would be unlikely to pick up if there were a change in comparative nutrition levels between boys and girls within the supplementary feeding programme, so as to enable follow-up and possible adaptation of the programme.

71. WFP has not played an active role in placing gender issues on the national agenda. Gender issues in Timor-Leste have been taken forward through the UNMIT Gender Affairs Unit which provides advice on how to integrate gender into policies and programmes. UN Women/UNIFEM focused on issues of security and gender based violence and on women's political and legal representation. In order to facilitate coordination amongst these and other UN agencies concerned with gender, UNMIT established a Gender Thematic Working Group where priorities and methodologies for gender were discussed. The CO has not participated significantly in the activities of these groups mainly because of staffing constraints.

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[36] Evidence, drawing on the DHS, of some nutritional bias in favour of girls (UNICEF 2011) suggests that WFP should perhaps consider whether measures are required to ensure that boys' nutritional needs are adequately addressed within the MCHN programme. However, this evidence has only recently been publicised.

[37] The CO has also not received explicit encouragement to mainstream gender in the programme and the evaluation of PRRO 10388.1 (Kirkby et al 2009) contained no recommendations related to gender.

72. In Annex VIII we assess CO performance against the corporate standards (capacity development; accountability; partnerships, advocacy and research; and gender mainstreaming in operations) articulated in WFP's Gender Policy and Action Plan (WFP 2009b and WFP 2009h). The evaluation's overall assessment is that the CO's incorporation of gender in its work has been weak. The evaluation found little evidence that WFP's corporate commitments on gender have been systematically incorporated into programme design, monitoring and reporting or that these commitments have been promoted through advocacy with partners. However, the main reasons for this appear to lie in the relatively small size of the CO (and associated limited staff capacity) and in a lack of support for gender-mainstreaming from the Regional Bureau and from Rome. The evaluation was unable to find evidence that CO staff have received gender training or that WFP tools for gender analysis and evaluation have been transmitted to the CO in 'user-friendly' ways. In addition, WFP's standard programme documents, monitoring systems and SPRs do not appear to have been adapted to reflect a stronger gender focus in light of WFP's commitments on gender.

Learning from experience

73. Some innovations were a reaction to experience: in particular, the local production of FBF was an attempt to address the logistical difficulties of managing separate commodities and the problem of food being shared. But the evaluation found little evidence of systematic monitoring being used to improve programme performance. WFP's planning, monitoring and reporting systems appear ill-adapted to assessing performance in non-emergency programmes, but in any case, on grounds of weak capacity, programme monitoring standards in Timor-Leste were set very low for most of the evaluation period. As a result, the CO lacks knowledge and understanding of the results of programme interventions, of whether and where progress has been made, and of the reasons for any lack of progress. This has undermined WFP's ability to learn from past work and to adjust programme implementation in order to improve future performance. Moreover, WFP's inability to provide evidence on performance has undermined its ability to raise funding from partner agencies.

74. On top of this, demands on staff to comply with implementation deadlines leave little time for reflection on what is happening in programmes or for follow-up on programmatic aspects not directly related to meeting these deadlines. This is particularly the case for front line field staff who should be a key resource for learning from the programme but whose day-to-day routines leave little scope for other less immediate demands on their time. The PRRO evaluation, with field work in 2009 (Kirkby et al 2009) found that most food aid monitors lacked the skills to implement other than the most basic monitoring but also that all monitors were too over-burdened with other tasks to undertake anything more. Thus, while WFP committed itself in the PRRO to recording household perceptions of WFP interventions and their impact, this had not happened. The CPE found a similar situation in 2012.

75. Monitoring of the main UN joint programmes in which WFP participated has also been very weak (Beasca 2011, Noij 2011, Lenci 2012).

2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results

Overview and approach

76. We consider performance and results in a sequence that follows the logic of the portfolio. We address in turn: relief, school feeding and related education sector activities; the series of discrete FFA activities included in the portfolio; support to MCHN, followed by a special discussion of Timor Vita. We then provide a review of capacity development which covers the mainstreaming of capacity development within other activities as well as discrete interventions that were labelled as capacity development. We use the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria in assessing each set of activities. Finally, we consider the internal and external coherence of the portfolio.

Relief

The intended programme and its rationale

77. Relief activities, using the General Food Distribution (GFD) modality, took place only in the early years of the evaluation period (see Figure 3 in section 1.3 above). There were two elements, described as follows in the PRRO project document (WFP 2008f):

(a) *Return packages*: the Government has made it a priority to resettle and reintegrate in their places of origin the remaining 40,000 IDPs in Timor-Leste. WFP plans to support this effort through a return package to assist the IDPs in facing food shortages, reintegrating into their communities and restoring their livelihoods.

(b) The *relief assistance* activity will allow a rapid response to mitigate the effects of natural and human-induced disasters, as was the case in April 2006 when WFP was able to immediately provide food assistance to IDPs by drawing food from the stock held for relief. WFP will maintain a 550-mt relief contingency stock for responding to disasters.

Programme delivery and assessment[38]

78. Return packages: by the time PRRO 10388.1 began, WFP had already ceased distributions to IDPs in camps, and WFP planned to supply food to help IDPs with the process of reintegrating in their communities. In the event, the programme was pragmatically adjusted, in collaborating with MSS, to allow for a slower than anticipated rate of return, and also to provide some support to host communities, to avoid resentment at perceived favouritism towards returnees. In 2008 and 2009 WFP assisted around 30,000 beneficiaries (IDPs and host communities) in each year. Kirkby et al judged that the PRRO objective "*To support the return and*

[38] It was agreed at inception stage that the CPE would rely on the PRRO evaluation's assessment of this component (Kirkby et al 2009).

resettlement of IDPs" had been partially achieved, and that WFP's adaptation of the programme had been well-judged, thus: "WFP's agreement to provide food for host populations was an appropriate pragmatic action helping to maintain stability".

79. No needs arose under the relief assistance activity in 2008. In 2009, in partnership with MSS, WFP delivered relief (rice) to 2,202 households affected by floods in Oecusse, and to 2,111 households in seven other districts, in response to the political emergency in February–March. Again, the PRRO evaluation's assessment was favourable. In subsequent years, MSS has managed responses to natural emergencies without WFP support.

School Feeding

The intended programme and its rationale

80. School feeding was part of the WFP portfolio from its initiation in 2005 until all responsibility for the school meals programme was taken over by the Ministry of Education in August 2011. During that period, there has been considerable evolution in international thinking about school feeding (see Bundy et al, 2009a and Lister et al 2011). It has come to be seen less as a nutrition intervention per se, with its potential education benefits (in promoting attendance and learning) seen as a more important justification, and recognition also of potential wider benefits, as part of national systems for social protection and as a stimulus to agricultural production ("home grown school feeding").

81. The rationale for school feeding in Timor-Leste has had three main elements:

(a) to improve the enrolment and attendance of boys and girls in primary schools and increase their attention spans (a stated objective of the PRRO);

(b) to develop an institutional framework for a nationwide school feeding programme (also a stated objective of the PRRO); this can be seen as part of WFP's SO5 capacity development agenda, but there is also a fragile state rationale – the restoration and maintenance of the education system is seen as an important part of post-conflict recovery, and a way of supporting state legitimacy through effective service delivery;

(c) the government has increasingly advocated for a "home grown school feeding" approach to secure wider economic benefits. This has been encouraged by exchange visits to, and technical assistance from, Brazil, with Timor-Leste seeking to emulate aspects of the Brazilian school feeding system.

Programme delivery and results

82. WFP began by supporting a limited SMP in selected districts. School feeding (described as a mid-morning snack) was included in the government's 2005 *Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion by 2015* (SPUPC – GoTL 2005b), and the initial programme was focused on 5 (later 6) districts selected on the basis of vulnerability, targeting children in grades 1–6. By the time of PRRO 10388.1, there was an additional intention to provide technical support and resources to set up a national school feeding programme.

83. In 2008 the government began a SMP in the 7 districts not covered by WFP. In April 2009, at the government's request, the two programmes were merged. Part of the government's motivation (according to Kirkby et al 2009) was to avoid invidious comparisons between the quality of service in the WFP and the government-served districts. The intention was that WFP and the MoE would jointly manage the SMP: WFP was responsible for daily management, including delivery of food items, monitoring and training; MoE took over responsibility for paying the cooks (in cash).

84. The programme was always under considerable financial stress. As noted in section 1.3 above, the PRRO was seriously underfunded, and the donor base has been shrinking. Although the government also pledged a financial contribution from 2008 onwards, the PRRO evaluation estimated that the programme received only a third of its financial requirements in 2008 and 2009 (Kirkby et al 2009). More recent estimates (Lenci 2012) suggest that the current government-only programme is underfunded by a similar order of magnitude. While WFP was still involved, the planned ration was reduced from 30% to 20% of estimated daily requirements (to 426 kcal, from a cooked meal of rice, beans, oil and salt). Plans to extend the service to grades 7–9 were dropped.

85. The government has adopted a different approach: in which a basic ration of rice is to be supplemented by locally purchased complementary foods, for which schools are supposed to receive an allowance of 15 cents per pupil per day. The present budget and costing of the SMP is not very transparent, e.g. because the rice is provided in kind by MTCI. The World Bank has recently led a public expenditure review focused on social protection, which includes an analysis of the school feeding programme; however its findings were not yet available at the time of the present evaluation.

86. The ending of WFP involvement in SMP management reflected a breakdown in the relationship between WFP and the MoE: WFP was keen to remain involved and to work with MoE on strengthening the national system, but the MoE decided that it did not want to channel its food resources through WFP.[39] A detailed review of the current government SMP was beyond the scope of this evaluation, but there is considerable evidence that MoE is experiencing serious difficulty in delivering the service as intended. The CP document estimated that in 2011 50% of schools were not receiving food in time or at all. The present evaluation found much anecdotal evidence of breaks in SMP provision and/or of meals consisting of nothing but rice. MoE has experienced considerable difficulty in ensuring that the cash for local purchases reaches schools, and there has not yet been a systematic assessment of the new system's performance. Knowledgeable informants spoke of MoE's difficulties in managing the logistics involved (for example, the use of large lorries was said to prevent supplies getting all the way to the more inaccessible schools, requiring the schools to organise collection from an intermediate delivery point).

[39] Correspondence between WFP RB and the Minister of Education, April 2010. (Note the contrast with MoH providing funds to WFP to procure Timor Vita.)

87. The CP's provision for technical support to MoE was not taken up. WFP involvement in school feeding continued in a minor way through the MDG-F joint programme (see Annex IX), which includes a school feeding theme, with FAO supporting school gardens and WFP developing nutrition education materials, and supporting local NGOs in a programme to install school kitchens using fuel-efficient stoves. These are among the school feeding outputs recorded in the SPRs, as summarised in Annex VII, Table 33.

Assessment

88. Inclusion of school feeding in the portfolio was **relevant.** It was identified as such, on food security grounds, in the 2006 CFSVA (WFP 2006c); there is also growing evidence of the importance of restoring education services, both as a necessary investment in human capital and as a contribution to stability and state-building. This evidence is reinforced by recent research in Timor-Leste (Justino et al 2011) which confirms the educational damage that has been caused by conflict (including its disproportional effect on males). The importance that government has attached to school feeding also indicates that it is valued as an important social benefit.

89. The PRRO evaluation (Kirkby et al 2009) found the SMP had been **effective** in promoting enrolment and attendance. It also argued (based on teachers' and parents' opinions) that concentration was improved, but a significant impact in terms of learning outcomes depends on many parallel factors in the school environment; evidence shows that learning outcomes in Timor-Leste remain poor (see e.g. Amorim et al 2010).

90. Although WFP has maintained a high reputation for the quality of its logistics, the overall **efficiency** of the joint WFP/government programme was compromised by its nationwide approach with inadequate funding; this meant patchy coverage even with reduced rations.

91. On **sustainability**, the rupture between WFP and MoE undermined the objective of enabling the government to run a national programme efficiently and effectively. There was not a systematic handover linked to a programme of capacity development. There are question marks whether the government's current SMP model is sustainable. As currently configured, it requires a much higher level of funding, along with further capacitation of the MoE. Its current objectives are not necessarily coherent (e.g. the balance and possible trade-offs between educational, social protection and rural development objectives does not appear to have been systematically appraised) – a conclusion which underpins one of our recommendations in section 3.3 below.

92. The MDG-F project documents presented exaggerated expectations for its school feeding component; there was no basis for the assumptions that it might lead to a 20% increase in school access or a 25% higher completion rate (Lenci 2012, p25). International experience also suggests that school gardens should be regarded as an educational activity (which links appropriately to WFP's development of nutrition education materials), not a viable source of significant amounts of school food.

93. WFP's support to school kitchens with fuel-efficient stoves appears to be a relevant initiative that may have a demonstration effect, and, by contracting local NGOs, has helped to strengthen implementation capacity in the sector. More broadly, there is need to draw up an exit strategy for this activity in view of WFP's likely departure from Timor-Leste.

FFW/A (including CCT)

The intended programme and its rationale

94. WFP's Timor-Leste portfolio has included three separate streams of FFW/A[40] activity.

(a) The PRRO aimed to target communities where food security was at critical levels and alternative sources of income were particularly scarce, and to increase such communities' ability to meet their food needs through food-for-work activities aimed at increasing food production and asset creation.[41] The PRRO included a substantial FFW/A component, but this was a principal casualty of funding shortfalls (e.g. there was an seven-month hiatus until August 2009, and it then ceased altogether in early 2010).

(b) WFP is undertaking FFA projects in two districts, Ermera and Oecusse, as a contribution to a multi-agency effort under the COMPASIS joint project, which began in March 2010 and was scheduled to end in February 2013 (see Annex X). As described in the CP document:

> WFP's contribution will use FFA activities to improve the food security situation of 3,000 households – 15,000 beneficiaries – in the two districts of Ermera and Oecusse, which have high food insecurity, limited market access and high numbers of returnees. Activities will include agricultural land terracing or reclamation, land clearance, feeder road rehabilitation, and small irrigation construction. (WFP 2011b)[42]

(c) FFA activities have been implemented in two further districts (Bobonaro and Baucau) under the auspices of a 5-country WFP research programme into conditional cash transfers (CCT) financed by Spain.

Programme delivery and results

95. Planned and actual FFW/A outputs are shown in Annex VII, Table 35. The assets created included the construction/rehabilitation of 440km of rural roads, 27 schools, over 200 hundred reservoirs, and 24km of irrigation canals, along with other agricultural improvements, such as forestry, fencing and land reclamation.

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[40] The FFA designation was increasingly preferred to "FFW", reflecting an increased emphasis on linking FFW activities (undertaken during the "lean season" and targeting food insecure households) to the creation or rehabilitation of durable rural assets.

[41] The PRRO logframe Outcome 2.1 was "Targeted communities have increased access to assets created through FFW/A (Strategic Objective 3)" linked to twin outputs : "Output 2.1.1 Targeted communities participate in food-supported asset-creation activities." and "Output 2.1.2 Household/community assets created". It noted as a principal risk/assumption "Sufficient donor contribution for the activity".

[42] The COMPASIS logframe is similar to the PRRO's:

> Objective 1: To reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support.
> Output 1: Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilization.
> WFP Activity : Rural assets created through 76 schemes of food-for-work.

96. The PRRO evaluation (Kirkby et al 2009) included a comprehensive review of the FFA programme. Its assessments were very positive, though with some suggestions for technical improvements. It recommended a future expansion of FFA as a food security intervention. At the same time it also supported the CO's decision to prioritise the school meals programme ahead of FFA when funds were scarce, since continuity of delivery is more critical for the SMP. In the event, continuing shortage of resources meant that the PRRO's FFA programme was allowed to lapse. (this is evident from the food distribution figures shown in Figure 3 in section 1.3 above, as well as from the numbers of participants shown in Figure 5 below). Although WFP encouraged communities to offer FFW/A activities to women as well as men, women comprised only 43% of the 14,500 beneficiaries between 2008–2011.

Figure 5 FFW/FFA participants (workers only) 2008–2011 actual vs. planned, by gender



Source: SPR 2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1

2008 data are only related to PRRO 10388.1 and do not take into account the previous PRRO 10388.0, which ended in August 2008.

97. Oecusse was included in the field visits for the present evaluation, and the mid-term evaluation of COMPASIS (Beasca 2011) reviews FFA along with its other components. That evaluation is quite critical of the limited integration of different UN agency components of COMPASIS, and of the failure to ensure a budget for, or proper implementation of, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. Apart from being targeted on the same sucos/aldeias as the rest of COMPASIS, there is limited integration with other initiatives, largely because FFA does not lend itself to working with self-help groups in the same way as other COMPASIS interventions. Nonetheless, Beasca finds that the FFA activities were relevant, implemented in a timely fashion, and likely to be effective.

98. The CCT experiment[43] is more problematic. It was originally intended as part of a multi-country research programme on cash vs. food for work; WFP HQ (the

[43] The planned research was, literally, an experiment, intended to test hypotheses in a controlled way; it was not a pilot for a larger future programme (although described as a pilot in the CP document).

Cash for Change unit) collaborated with IFPRI on the research. WFP Timor-Leste worked with FAO as the implementing partner in Baucau, and with SEFOPE (the government's vocational training agency) as its partner in Bobonaro.[44] Neither HQ nor the CO seems to have sufficiently thought through the implications of working in Timor-Leste. The CO, always short of resources, was naturally keen to attract funding but had not appreciated the nature of the research: it argued that operating two different modalities in parallel would be politically unacceptable, so the experimental design was changed to use cash in both districts and research whether cash was put to different uses if payment was accompanied by messages on ways to improve family nutrition. A rigorous impact-evaluation approach was meant to be followed.

99. IFPRI supervised a base-line survey, but problems and delays in implementation meant that the opportunity for a meaningful measurement and comparison of outcomes was lost. Contributing factors included the difficulties of handling cash in a country with only limited banking services, while the officer who was recruited to supervise the impact evaluation was distracted by other assigned tasks, and then lost to WFP, at least partly as a result of WFP's practice of limiting temporary contracts to 11 months at a stretch. It was not sufficiently appreciated that impact evaluation research needs skilled, dedicated, continuous supervision and adherence to timetables. A programme of remedial action was identified by a HQ field support mission, but the CO, largely due to capacity constraints, was unable to implement the programme in a way that allowed for the final end-line study to be undertaken.

100. However, the consequences of the research failure were mitigated: the project was intended to benefit up to 25,000 vulnerable households exposed to natural disasters and food insecurity, and to contribute to community asset-building and disaster mitigation (WFP 2011b), and the community asset work went ahead as planned, albeit with some delays, and the community projects appear to have been of benefit in themselves, even though the research objective was lost. Meanwhile HQ was able to substitute another country in the 5-country research programme

Assessment

101. The FFA activities appear to have been broadly relevant and effective in providing targeted support to food insecure communities (the government itself has adopted a similar modality to support rural road works). WFP practice ensured that projects were selected in consultation with communities, and that participants in the work were chosen on criteria of need, including opportunities for women. The CCT experiment demonstrated that cash-for-work is feasible, and there is some evidence that cash was preferred to food. There were interesting indications from our focus group discussions (FGDs) that cash may be used differently by male than by female recipients: both men and women mentioned educational expenses as an important use for cash, but men were much more likely to mention construction and home improvements, while women mentioned food and medical costs.

[44] CPE evaluators visited a sample FFA project in each district and held FGDs with participants.

102. The CCT experience was frustrating for the CO as well as HQ; it suggests that more realism is needed about the management and supervision requirements for experimental impact evaluations, and more care in selecting suitable participant countries.

MCHN – blanket and targeted supplementary feeding

The intended programme and its rationale

103. Essentially the same MCHN strategy and activities have been continued through two successive PRROs and the present Country Programme. MCHN activities have also been supported in four districts by the MDG-F Joint Programme (see Annex IX). WFP support has focused on supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children under the age of 5, with increasing emphasis on integrating this with the delivery of government health services.

104. The rationale for the MCHN programme has had the following elements, repeated with varying degrees of emphasis in successive documents and reports:

(a) *To directly improve the nutritional status of mothers and young children:* it is expected that supplementary feeding will improve nutritional status both through additional energy (Kcal) and micronutrients; blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) is expected to prevent and reduce malnutrition in children aged 6–23 months, while the targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) aims to treat moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) in children aged 24–59 months and in malnourished pregnant and lactating women.

(b) *To increase their access to health services:* the supplementary feeding programme (SFP) is delivered through the national health system and is also seen as having secondary health and nutrition benefits by attracting targeted beneficiaries to key health services (increase access to immunization, vitamin A supplementation, de-worming, health promotion, etc). This objective was strongly stated in the PRRO (Annex XI) and is reiterated in SPRs; although it is less explicit in the CP it remains a major part of the rationale as explained to the team in interviews by all stakeholders.

(c) *To support the strengthening of government health service delivery:* by working through the public health system, WFP aims to help strengthen it; in Timor-Leste's context this can also be a state-building objective.

105. The MCHN programme is delivered through the government's health system with screening and food distribution held once a month at health centres, health posts or through mobile clinics (targeting suco level) at Integrated Community Health Services known as SISCa (*Servisu Integradu de Saude Comunitária)*. TSF and BSF are delivered simultaneously. WFP transports supplementary food rations from Dili to the districts and delivers them to the health centres and health posts while the health centre or health post staff who implement the mobile outreach service transport the food from their health facility. During the rainy season many of

the health facilities become inaccessible and WFP therefore pre-positions stock at health facilities.[45] WFP also supported the establishment of a factory to produce a pre-mixed ration known as Timor Vita, which now meets part of the food requirement. (The Timor Vita project is separately assessed below – see ¶136.)

Programme delivery and results

106. **Geographical coverage:** The CP aimed to expand the MCHN programme to reach all 13 districts. It was seen as important that WFP and MoH should collaborate on a single national programme.[46] By working through the government health system this has been possible; the programme is also delivered in both rural and urban settings. At the same time, this approach has stretched WFP's monitoring and logistics capacities, and it is accepted that 100% coverage is impractical. The MoH proposes facilities for incorporation in the programme.

107. Under the PRRO 132 locations in 12 districts were covered, but this has been expanded to reach all 13 districts, in line with the recommendation of the PRRO evaluation.[47] According to the CP document (WFP 2011b), the target of the CP was gradually to reach 80% of health centres by 2013, from the level at the start of the CP of 48% (137 sites). By the end of 2012 WFP was supporting the implementation of the MCHN through 179 facilities.[48] Table 7 below shows the number of facilities and the number of districts supported over the evaluation period.

Table 7 Facilities included in supplementary feeding programme 2008–2012

	No of facilities	No of districts
2008	109	12
2009	134	12
2010	132	12
2011	154	12
2012	179	13

N.B. 2008 concerns only data for PRRO 10388.1 which succeeded PRRO 10388 in August 2008. (Source: CO data)

108. According to WHO, there are 66 Community Health Centres (CHC), 211 health posts, and 475 mobile clinics, 5 referral hospitals and 1 national hospital that does not implement community nutrition interventions, a total of 757 sites (excluding the national hospital). This would mean that the WFP-supported MCHN programme currently covers about 65% of health facilities. Given that more remote sites may often serve fewer people, it is likely that coverage as a proportion of potential beneficiaries is higher, but these figures do not record how well each facility covers the mobile clinics (SISCa) within its catchment area.

[45] In Oecusse 80-90% of the health facilities are accessed by crossing a river bed which is impassable in the rainy season.

[46] The PRRO evaluation noted:

> for political reasons it is important that there is no perception of a WFP realm as opposed to the Ministry of Health, if there is a possibility of a different quality of service. It is also politically essential that there are no distinctions between different groups such as eastern and western. (Kirkby et al 2009, ¶48)

[47] Viqueque, a relatively food secure district, was the last to join the programme.

[48] Data set from CO. Slight discrepancy with figures, also from CO, in Annex V o

109. **Targeting**, **eligibility** and **beneficiary identification**: the combination of blanket and targeted supplementary feeding described in ¶104(a) above has continued throughout the evaluation period. (The PRRO evaluation recommended a focus on children under 24 months, but the MoH has preferred to continue a broader approach, see ¶117 below.) The targeted programme did change its admission criteria from using weight-for-age and body mass index (BMI)[49] to mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) solely. Not only is MUAC a better measure for acute malnutrition than weight-for-age, this move reflects international good practice since MUAC is a better predictor of mortality in children and is easier for health staff to implement; also, the errors associated with measuring weight-for-height (an alternative measure of acute malnutrition) are greater than when measuring MUAC (Myatt et al 2006). Currently those children enrolled in blanket feeding (6-23 months) are not screened for moderate or severe acute malnutrition but WFP are about to change this.

110. **Ration**: Under the PRRO, the food basket for the MCHN programme consisted of corn soya blend (CSB), sugar, vegetable oil and iodized salt (this last one for the entire family). These four commodities were provided separately to the beneficiaries at the distribution moment. Under the CP, the food basket was adapted to new products: previous CSB was replaced by super cereal (CSB+) already mixed with sugar, whilst the vegetable oil continued to be distributed separately. There was a period after the beginning of the CP where sugar was still distributed to finish carryover stocks. After Timor Vita production began (in mid-2010), this blended food was delivered instead of unmixed rations when available.

111. Under the PRRO the monthly ration size for BSF and TSF was 6kg of CSB, 600ml of oil, 500 grams of salt and 500 grams of sugar.[50] Under the CP, it was planned to maintain a monthly ration of 6kg for the prevention of malnutrition in children 6–23 months; for treatment of malnutrition of pregnant and lactating women and children 24–59 months, an increased monthly ration of 9kg was planned. However, this increased ration never took effect, as the MoH preferred to keep the 6kg ration for both BSF and TSF.

112. **Support to BSF and TSF delivery**: Programme delivery involves WFP staff, MoH staff, family health promoters and volunteers. WFP food monitors have a supervisory role but they have numerous sites to visit and in practice spend little time at each site. Supervisory tasks mainly include checking whether there is food and collecting reports. They are not directly involved with implementing the programme. Staff from the health centre or health post are responsible for implementing the monthly SISCa. Although there are nutrition officers in place,– for example the MOH took over payment of the district nutritionists from January 2011 (Noij 2011), WFP have correctly perceived a gap in skilled staff dedicated for nutrition in the health system and as such have funded the MoH to recruit 29 nutrition officers allocated to five districts (Aileu, Baucau, Ermera, Manatuto and Oecusse) that are employed for 16 months from October 2012. MoH staff are assisted

[49] Malnourished lactating women were admitted with a body-mass index below 18.5.

[50] The MOU concerning Timor Vita that was signed between WFP and government in 2008, estimated required production on the basis of "providing a ration of 3kg fortified food per month, not 6kg as provided now to allow for sharing". (WFP 2008g)

by Promotor Saude Familia (PSF) or Family Health Promoters who are also responsible for community mobilisation. The PSF receive USD 5 per month for community mobilisation through the Health Sector Support Programme, which is supported by a multi-donor trust fund.[51] PSF have been supported by other NGOs such as Oxfam, Hadiak or the USAID-funded Timor-Leste *Asisténsia Integrada Saúde (*TAIS) programme. WFP has also enlisted volunteers to aid the PSF and, although unsalaried, they do receive rice as an incentive. PSF do not receive rice.

113. **Monitoring and reporting** has been rudimentary for most of the evaluation period. Until the start of 2012, reporting on the MCHN programme was simplified to a point where only the numbers of admissions and of those leaving the programme were reported. This made it impossible to judge whether the programme is effective since data on programme indicators such as cure rate, death rate and defaulter rate were not collected. Reporting was over-simplified because of perceptions of very low staff capacity, especially where numeracy is required. Reporting on the SFP activities, as well as the other components of CMAM, is not yet integrated in the government's Health Management Information system (HMIS). Reporting for both moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) is collected in a different format that is sent to MoH and WFP together with the HMIS format. WFP has been working with MoH, UNICEF and WHO to have an integrated monthly reporting format that integrates all the indicators, including the SFP's under the HMIS database. In the meantime, WFP has revised the SFP monthly reporting format and is already starting to have access to more relevant information on the programme indicators. A large part of the field monitors' time is spent collecting these reports, the data from which are entered into a database and sent to WFP in Dili.[52] So far WFP has not carried out any post-distribution monitoring (PDM) although a Terms of Reference and format were drawn up for this in the second half of 2012. PDM would complement the fundamental programme performance data and add to the understanding of the programme.

114. **Training** and **capacity development** are also part of the programme design. Capacity development is reviewed specifically in a later section, but the CO's summary of CP implementation (Annex VII, 0) indicates the scale of such activities, while Annex VII, Table 30 shows available data on planned versus actual MCHN outputs over the full evaluation period.

115. **Implementation issues**: WFP delivers food up to health facility level however it is the responsibility of the MoH to transport food for the mobile clinics. Breaks in supply frequently occur when the MoH vehicle is used for other purposes or there is not enough space in the vehicle for the food. In some cases, this means that mothers attending the SISCa are then required to walk to a separate location (e.g. the health post itself), to collect their rations. Transport problems may also lead to cancellation of SISCas or unpredictable changes in their timing. The evaluation

[51] Though often referred to as a World Bank project.
[52] Data from mobile clinics are included in health post or health centre reports.

team's conversations with staff and beneficiaries yielded many examples of such issues, and also cases where parts of the ration (e.g. oil or sugar) were not available for significant periods. There were also reports of cases where the available rations were exhausted before all beneficiaries had received their entitlement; conversely, we saw examples where a large proportion of the food brought to a SISCa was unclaimed, indicating patchy attendance by beneficiaries. The limitations in monitoring already referred to (¶113 above) mean that these problems cannot be quantified, and there is only anecdotal evidence as to whether performance is improving.

Assessment

116. As regards **relevance**, based on international evidence, there is considerable doubt about the effectiveness of supplementary feeding programmes (Navarro-Colorado et al 2008); the Lancet Series found feeding programmes targeting children over 24 months of age to be ineffective (Bryce et al 2008) and the Scaling Up Nutrition initiative recommends focusing interventions on the first two years of life (SUN Task Team 2010 and FAO et al 2011). At the same time there are international standards (Sphere Project 2011) for the delivery of targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFPs) which are relevant in assessing the likely effectiveness of a particular intervention. There are currently no international standards for blanket supplementary feeding programmes (BSFPs).

117. The PRRO evaluation recommended a focus on children under 24 months,[53] but the MoH preferred to continue a broader approach and WFP accepted MoH's choice on the basis that **MOH ownership** is key for the effective implementation of the programme and for successful handover and implementation thereafter. There does seem to be significant ownership of the programme as reflected in the request to continue a broad approach, the fact that it is government staff that are implementing the programme and the government is contributing to the cost of Timor Vita (see next section).

118. Our ability to evaluate the MCHN performance is constrained by weaknesses in its monitoring and reporting. For a programme that has been running for several years, it is alarming that there are no data on performance of the TSFP through indicators such as cure rate, death rate, defaulter rate, all of which are required to determine whether Sphere standards for TSFPs are being met (see Annex VII, Table 34 below).

119. Efforts are now being made to address this, but to date it is impossible accurately to quantify the effectiveness of the programme. The fact that the programme has been unable to provide acceptable data on programme performance and still uses reporting formats and databases that are inadequate, implies inadequate technical support and supervision from either the Regional Bureau or HQ. Undoubtedly there are exceptional difficulties in regard to the capacity of

[53] The PRRO evaluation recommended:

> Align the MCHN programme with the actions proposed in *The Lancet* Maternal and Child Undernutrition Series, Paper 4: National Efforts to *Address Maternal and Child Undernutrition, (2008).* In particular, discontinue SFP for Children aged 24-59 months. (Kirkby et al 2009)

national staff, and we acknowledge that WFP staff themselves are very stretched; nonetheless any SFP must incorporate sufficient staff training, mentoring and supervision to ensure basic standards of record keeping.

120. We reviewed the changes in data collection being introduced in 2012. Although the WFP report and the database have evolved and improved, there are further changes that need to be made. Some examples: for TSF there is a category termed 'leaving' for those children who reach 59 months or for those women whose child is older than 2 years, which is not recommended practice; data on weight gain or average length of stay in the programme for targeted supplementary feeding are not collected; there is no 'non-responder' category, and the denominator used to calculate cure rate included admissions and those continuing in the programme as well as discharges (although in the updated 2013 database the denominator is the total number of discharged only).

121. Although conclusive data on performance are lacking, it is still possible to review each of the main factors likely to influence the efficiency and the effectiveness of the MCHN programme. We first address its direct nutritional objectives, then its intended wider benefits.

122. As regards **coverage**: we have noted the (limited) information available on facilities covered (¶106–108 above). The SISCa system was established in response to the health system not reaching remote areas and as highlighted in a USAID case study, "*the SISCa program is noteworthy for providing health services to communities less likely to access health services*" (Wells Brown & Hafiz 2012). However there is still criticism that very remote areas are not being reached by the SISCa system, which would in turn affect MCHN programme coverage, although there are scant data to show to what extent this is the case.

Figure 6 MCHN food distributed vs. planned (MT) 2008–2012



Source: SPRs, data received from CO for 2012 and for planned by CO.
Year 2008 takes into account the total distribution (PRRO 10388.0 and 10388.1).

123. WFP SPRs include some figures on actual coverage as a percentage of planned, but such figures are not very robust (e.g. because underlying population

figures may be out of date); this was also noted in the PRRO evaluation.[54] Figure 6 above shows the planned versus actual distribution of food 2008–2012 while Table 8 below shows targeted and delivered food and targeted and reached beneficiaries.

Table 8 MCHN: Targeted and Delivered Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries 2008–2012

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered food (mt)	Delivery rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	2,416.00	1,868.59	77%	51,650	44,317	86%
2009	5,415.00	2,672.97	49%	61,000	49,245	81%
2010	3,010.00	2,236.37	74%	64,200	32,534	51%
2011	5,129.00	2,746.25	54%	75,000	48,542	65%
2012	8,161.00	3,419.38	42%			

Sources : SPR 2009, 2009, 2010, 2011 of PRRO 10388.1 and SPR 2011 of CP 200185; 2012 data from CO.
2008 data take into account only PRRO 10388.1.

124. More attention is needed to the question whether all eligible beneficiaries within a catchment are participating in the programme. A more robust method of determining coverage of selective feeding programmes, such as the Semi-Quantitative Evaluation of Access and Coverage (SQUEAC) and Simplified LQAS Evaluation of Access and Coverage (SLEAC) – see Valid International n.d., would be required to determine programme coverage more accurately. The SQUEAC/SLEAC method uses a mixture of quantitative (numerical) data, collected from routine programme monitoring activities and small-area surveys, and qualitative (anecdotal) data collected using informal group discussions and interviews with a variety of informants. It will identify areas of low and high coverage as well as reasons for coverage failure. The UNICEF-supported CMAM programme plans to use the SQUEAC analysis to determine coverage in 2014/2015, which could provide scope for the MCHN programme to learn from the experience.

125. A transect walk through an aldeia in Oecusse, which also included visiting a remote cluster of households approximately 6km from the health post in a mountainous area, found the community knew about the MCHN programme, which is consistent with FGDs with mothers who suggested that a large proportion of mothers attend. At the same time, occasional uncollected food is evidence that not all beneficiaries always attend; in our FGDs there was a tendency to paint a rosy picture of attendance, but, when pressed, beneficiaries acknowledged that remote households may not visit the MCHN programme every month if there are other activities with a higher priority, more especially during the rainy season. Furthermore, as highlighted in SPR 2011, many PLW do not attend the government-sponsored SISCa health service every month; reasons include accessibility to SISCa (long distance, weather and road conditions, private reasons), cancellation of SISCa without any prior notice, and eventual loss of confidence towards SISCa due to consecutive cancellations.

[54] See Kirkby et al 2009,¶46 and Table 9; coverage exceeding 100% in one district was taken as a symptom of the data problems.

126. Effectiveness of a SFP depends on **the right people eating** the food. The PRRO evaluation in 2009 found overwhelming evidence that, in practice, food is shared with other children and/or other members of the household, and our own conversations with staff and beneficiaries found this still to be the case. Sharing the food also seems to occur throughout the year, not just during the lean season. However, we found no evidence of rations being sold, and feeding to animals is mentioned only in cases of CSB that was spoiled. In the recent "rapid assessment" (Annex VII, Box 10 below), the supplementary food for the TSFP was found to last between 2–3 weeks in almost half of the households while, from the evaluation's interviews and FGDs in Oecusse, supplementary food for both BSF and TSF appeared to last between 3 and 7 days depending on the size of the household. The extent of sharing would suggest that the effectiveness of the MCHN programme is seriously compromised. Although the ration is meant to provide 787kcal per day, and there is a provision for sharing (WFP 2012f), the intended benefits will not be achieved if beneficiaries are consuming only a proportion of this for part of the time. One of the proposed benefits of Timor Vita was to discourage sharing (by pre-mixing the ration and making it appear more therapeutic), but there has been no research to establish whether, and to what extent, Timor Vita makes a difference.

127. The core effectiveness question is: does the supplementary food improve the **nutritional status of beneficiaries**? We have already noted that data gaps do not allow firm quantitative conclusions on the impact of the programme. However, the extent of sharing is likely to undermine the treatment or prevention of malnutrition. Given the apparent far-reaching extent of sharing, expanding the ration size would most likely have little effect particularly if the perspectives around the use of the ration remain unchanged.

128. There is some sporadic quantitative evidence available. This includes a Joint Rapid Assessment outlined in Annex VII, Box 10 and programme data from 2012 which, whilst still not reliable (see M&E discussion), is a step towards better understanding the programme. The emerging programme data need to be treated with great caution. It is clear in Timor-Leste that there are still significant challenges with staff correctly completing the reporting formats, and that the recorded categorisation of discharges from the programme may considerably vary from the reality. Even so, the preliminary programme data show results to be less than acceptable, either because the reporting is poor, or because the programme effectiveness is questionable, or both. For example, the proportion of defaulters[55] from the BSFP is higher than those that reach the upper age limit, and furthermore the recovery rate from the TSFP is drastically below the Sphere standards (see Annex VII, Table 34). The Rapid Assessment focused on targeted feeding; with a very small sample, it did find a high recovery rate. Interestingly, the investigation involved de facto in-home follow-up of cases, which may have been a factor in the results. The strongest conclusion, at this stage, is that the MCHN programme needs to maintain and strengthen its efforts to collect, and to follow up on, its results data.

[55] The term is used in the database although it is not common BSFP terminology.

129. In summary, although it is not possible to be definitive about the effectiveness of the programme, there are many reasons (besides the patchy data now emerging) why its effectiveness in its central objective (improving nutritional status of the vulnerable) cannot be presumed and is likely to be considerably sub-optimal: these include limitations in coverage and participation, and the extensive sharing of the food. Many of the additional challenges described above such as transport issues, poor supervision, weak community outreach and errors in implementation will also tend to undermine the effectiveness of the programme.

130. However, compromised nutritional effectiveness does not rule out collateral benefits, such as encouraging access to health services and supporting state legitimacy for example. Given the worrying nutritional indicators in the country, the MCHN programme has also helped to keep nutrition on the agenda and it may provide a platform on which to develop more effective initiatives.

131. Does the MCHN programme succeed in **promoting access** to health services? The PRRO evaluation found that clinic attendance increased as a result of the MCHN programme since key health informants at district and field level reported an increased uptake in healthcare services by pregnant and lactating women as a result of the provision of WFP food. The present evaluation confirmed this finding: FGDs with beneficiaries and interviews with health staff did confirm that the MCHN programme is a significant factor in attracting mothers to attend the SISCa. There is further corroboration from the rapid assessment (Annex VII, Box 10). It is impossible to quantify such an effect, but it is very plausible that the improved health indicators shown in Table 9 below are in part a reflection of improved coverage of health services, to which the MCHN programme may to some extent have contributed

Table 9 Health Indicators 2003 and 2009/10

Indicators	DHS 2003	DHS 2009-2010
Total Fertility Rate	7.8	5.7
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate	10%	20%
Maternal Mortality Ratio	420-800/100,000	557/100,000
Neonatal Mortality Rate	42/1000	33/1000
Infant Mortality Rate	60/1000	44/1000
Under Five Mortality Rate	107/1000	83/1000
% of children (12 -23) immunized for DPT3	51%	79%

Source: NSD & ICF Macro 2010

132. It remains important to take a holistic view of nutrition and health initiatives. There is potential scope for strengthening health **outreach and communication** linked to the MCHN programme, which could involve strengthening the PSF role as long as it remains embedded within the overall system and not an ad-hoc fix to facilitate a project-based approach. At present the role of PSFs is to assist with activities on the day of the SISCa, to inform the community about the SISCa and to

send cases of serious illness to health facilities. As they are not paid (apart from the $5 allowance for attending the SISCa), only a certain amount of work each month can be expected. In effect, therefore, their workload involves assisting with activities on the day of the SISCa and announcing the SISCa scheduling the day before. They do not work the rest of the month and as such do not conduct household visits; there is no active case finding, more targeted and rigorous community mobilisation, or follow-up of beneficiaries, for example those that have defaulted from the programme. The PRRO evaluation found that "the health education/behaviour change communication (BCC) element of the programme is essential to add impact and sustainability to health activities but as yet it is not rigorously being applied" (Kirkby et al 2009). Currently there appears to be a strong emphasis on cooking demonstrations but the same rigour is not being applied to other BCC elements.

133. There is also scope for better coordination with the CMAM programme in which UNICEF plays a leading role.[56] CMAM has the same basic rationale of operating through government health systems down to community level. In principle, supplementary feeding is part of the CMAM approach. CMAM includes four major components: (1) community education and social mobilisation for active case finding and treatment seeking, (2) prevention and treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) through supplementary feeding (3) treatment of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) through out-patient care with therapeutic feeding, (4) treatment of SAM with medical complications through in-patient care with therapeutic feeding and medical interventions (FANTA 2008). The 1st and 3rd components are supported by UNICEF while the 4th component is supported by WHO and UNICEF. The 2nd component is addressed through the WFP supported MCHN programme.

134. In practice, however, the MCHN programme and the CMAM programme have been seen as two distinct initiatives with UNICEF and WFP working fairly independently.[57] However, this is starting to improve and there are strong areas of overlap and areas where collaboration and mutual benefit can occur.

135. Our recommendations concerning MCHN (in section 3.3 below) take as a starting point that problems should be addressed in system-wide way that involves all the main health sector stakeholders.

[56] Strengthening CMAM is the main focus of the MDG-F joint programme which UNICEF leads (see Annex IX).
[57] Generally references to the CMAM programme do not include any SFP component.

Timor Vita[58]

The intended programme and its rationale

136. WFP has supported local production of "Timor Vita" a fortified blended food (FBF) which is used exclusively for the MCHN supplementary feeding programmes described above. Its current formulation is shown in Annex VII, Box 11.

137. The expected benefits of this project[59] fall into four main categories:

(a) *increased effectiveness of SFP results:* improving targeting (ensuring the right people eat the right food) by premixing the ration and discouraging sharing;
(b) *increased efficiency of SFP delivery:* simplifying the transport of rations to delivery points and the distribution to beneficiaries and reducing wastage;
(c) *capacity development:* creation of in-country production capacity;
(d) *wider economic benefits* (with implication of enhanced food security too), derived from generating local employment at the factory and a market for local produce as inputs.

Programme delivery and results

138. The Timor-Leste CO played an active and entrepreneurial role. A local FBF factory was mooted (drawing partly on WFP experience elsewhere, especially in Laos) as early as 2005, when a feasibility study cast doubt on the ability of local commercial farmers to provide reliable supplies of inputs and also questioned the availability of a suitable private sector partner (WFP/TL 2005). But by 2008 a suitable company had been identified – Timor Global Lda (TG), an enterprise engaged in coffee export and other trade in local agricultural products. PRRO 10388.1 included an intention to establish a local FBF factory, and in the same year WFP signed MOUs with relevant government ministries, on the one hand, and with TG on the other.

139. WFP's role included exploring the availability of suitable machinery, mobilising finance (this came from the Timor-Leste government as well as international donors, and financing for Timor Vita was included in the MDG-F joint project – see Annex IX – as well as the CP), and acting as the intermediary between the government and TG. Government funding for the equipment and initial raw materials was passed to WFP who organised procurement of the machinery, and supervised its installation and the testing of alternative FBF formulas to ensure palatability according to local tastes. TG took on the project partly as an aspect of corporate social responsibility, but the pricing agreement with WFP allowed a 10% profit margin above production costs; however, the price was to include a discount factor to allow "amortisation" of the machinery, for which TG paid no up-front costs. The CO had to obtain a waiver in order to purchase Timor Vita, since it was significantly more expensive than the un-mixed imported alternative; WFP HQ

[58] This section owes much to the investigations and insights of Robrecht Renard, who accompanied the evaluation team in the course of a related consultancy to review WFP OE's methods for evaluating efficiency.
[59] As described in project documentation and interviews.

granted the waiver on the basis of the expected benefits (as summarised in ¶137 above).

140. Procurement, construction and installation of the machinery took much longer than planned; one source of delay was that the adjustment of the recipe to suit local tastes required modifications to the equipment already ordered. Eventually, full production commenced in August 2010 (with an inauguration ceremony organised by MoH to showcase the factory). However, there were a number of further problems which increased costs and curtailed outputs. It proved necessary to install a more powerful back-up generator, there were difficulties in obtaining labour locally, and it became clear that neither the labour force nor the machinery was robust enough to support 24-hour working.

141. As the 2005 study had foreseen, it proved impractical to source corn or soya locally. Local farmers were not used to producing according to demanding quality standards, and an attempt to use some locally-sourced corn resulted in an aflotoxin-contaminated batch of product which led to an interruption of several months while the plant was decontaminated.[60] Difficulties were compounded by the lack of food testing laboratory services in Timor-Leste, as product samples had to be sent to Singapore or Bangkok for testing. Having already committed to deploying a full time project manager, WFP also had to recruit (from Indonesia) a full time food technologist to oversee staff training and production on a daily basis.

142. The product itself appears quite popular, and there is considerable pride in a pioneering enterprise. However, sustainable production levels from the existing equipment are significantly lower than originally estimated. Figure 7 below shows monthly production of Timor Vita and illustrates the interruptions to production that were caused by the need for decontamination and other problems experienced.

Figure 7 Monthly Deliveries of Timor Vita[61]



*Source:*CO Dili. Deliveries from Timor Global to WFP. (Figures in Annex VII, Table 31.)

[60] WFP established and co-chaired a committee between MoH, MAF, TG and MTCI to consider how to improve the quantity and quality of local produce so that eventually it could be used for Timor Vita rather than imported produce.

[61] The reasons for non-delivery of Timor Vita to WFP: insufficient production capacity of the factory due to maintenance and repairs of machinery and fumigation exercises, to having stocks available yet awaiting clearance of lab results prior to distributions.

143. Average monthly production from July 2010 to January 2013 was just under 55 MT, and total production was almost 1,700 MT. The CO estimates that the current maximum output lies between 60–120 MT, stable at 80 MT a month (see Annex VII, 0); this contrasts with anticipated deliveries from TG to WFP of up to 250 MT per month in the 2010 purchase order, and of up to 180 MT per month in the local purchase contract dated May 2012. The MDG-F joint programme set a target of 1,500 MT for 2011 (see Annex VI, Table 27), while the CP project document refers (a) to a 60% increase in the production of FBF in 2011, and (b) to a target of 5,000 MT (presumably over the duration of the CP).

144. Table 10 below shows Timor Vita's contribution to total food distribution for MCHN. At project preparation stage it was hoped the TG would deliver Timor Vita around the country to where it was needed, but in practice TG delivers to the WFP warehouse in Dili, and WFP remains responsible for subsequent distribution. Annex VII, Table 32 shows how Timor Vita was distributed across districts. Ermera (25%) and Aileu (18%) have received the largest shares of the Timor Vita available, but all districts have received some, and there has never been enough to allow Timor Vita to replace CSB completely in any area. The initial strategy was to distribute it to all districts as per requirements and availability. Later, this strategy changed and the distribution of Timor Vita was prioritised to those areas where training on food utilisation and cooking demonstrations had already taken place, so as to improve the acceptability of the commodity. Shelf life and the rotation of stocks (both for Timor Vita and CSB) are criteria that WFP also has to take into account when preparing its monthly delivery plans.

Table 10 Share of Timor Vita in food distribution for MCHN

	MT	o/w TV	% TV
2008	1,869		0%
2009	2,673		0%
2010	2,236	513	23%
2011	2,746	390	14%
2012	3,419	741	22%

Source: SPRs and information from CO. 2008 figure includes PRRO 103881.

Assessment

145. The Timor Vita was *relevant* in principle – for the Timor-Leste government in terms of supporting local enterprise, and for WFP in terms of SO5's intended strengthening of domestic capacities; for both parties it appeared relevant also as a way of strengthening the MCHN programme. However, it may be argued that relevance requires that good intentions be matched with a realistic assessment of risks. Many of the risks which have reduced the benefits from this project in practice were or should have been foreseen and taken more seriously.

146. In terms of realising the anticipated benefits:

(a) *Increased effectiveness of SFP results?* The arguments for Timor Vita are appealing: premixing the ingredients makes it impossible for sugar or oil to be used separately; the packaging was intended to promote a "medicinal image" and featured a pregnant woman; however, there has been no follow-up to establish whether, and by how much, the use of Timor Vita reduces sharing.

(b) *Increased efficiency of SFP delivery?* Timor Vita is simpler to transport and to distribute at the SFP venues and seems likely to reduce waste. However, for the time being Timor Vita meets only a small fraction of requirements (less than a quarter, see Table 10 above), and WFP and MoH are operating a dual system with both unmixed and pre-mixed rations. The FBF producer did not, as anticipated, also take on the logistics of delivering FBF around the country.

(c) *Capacity development?* Several nodes of capacity are required: TG has proved capable of managing the production process, and has undoubtedly learned from experience in doing so. The CO has also learned considerably from the exercise. However, as spelt out in the CP document,[62] sustainability after WFP's expected exit depends on the MoH being able to take over WFP's managerial role by the end of 2013 (as well as funding all purchases). That MoH capacity is not yet in place.

(d) *Wider economic benefits?* Assumptions about the ability to purchase inputs locally proved unrealistic. In the longer term, local producers capable of meeting demanding quality standards may start to emerge. TG has tentative plans for establishing a local food testing laboratory which might have wider benefits for Timor-Leste. However, as we discuss below, the claims of wider economic benefits should have been much more rigorously considered at appraisal stage.

147. Detailed data are not available to allow a retrospective cost-benefit analysis. However, Timor Vita production has been subsidised directly (through initial contributions to physical and working capital, and some operating subsidies, such as the provision of a food technologist) and indirectly, through buying the product at a substantially higher cost than the imported equivalent. The PRRO evaluation (Kirkby et al 2009) estimated that the anticipated price in 2009 was 80% above the landed cost of international purchase. The compensating benefits from a locally-produced pre-mix would have to be very substantial to make this a sound investment, but there was never any realistic effort to quantify the assumed benefits ex ante, or to demonstrate them ex post. The comparisons used to argue that Timor Vita was an

[62] According to the CP:

> The Ministry is expected to be able to allocate its own budget to Timor Vita production by the end of 2012. From 2013, it will manage the entire supply chain, including planning, budgeting, purchasing, delivery and final distribution. WFP will provide technical assistance and on-the-job training to Ministry staff.. (WFP 2011b,¶30)
>
> WFP will support MCHN until 2012; from 2013 the Government will purchase and distribute 50 percent – 4,500 mt – of the local fortified blended food requirement using its own budget and capacity. (¶39)

optimal solution, were inappropriate: Timor Vita's anticipated costs should also have been carefully compared against the cost of importing a similar FBF. The CO should not be censured for its enthusiastic promotion of Timor Vita, but the proposal should have been subjected to more rigorous review at higher levels in WFP.

Capacity development

The intended programme and its rationale

148. Capacity development for partners (and for its own staff) has been a core WFP value since the mid-1990s, reflected in strategic plans, operations and programmes. Although many capacity development initiatives have been carried out since that period, WFP acknowledges that to date these have been somewhat ad hoc and limited in the main to ensuring more efficient delivery of WFP-managed programmes. Monitoring and evaluation of capacity development interventions has also been weak. The shift in the 2008–2013 Strategic Plan from food aid to food assistance led WFP to redefine capacity development as the means by which governments can be facilitated to assume ownership of national hunger solutions in terms of analysis, policy formulation, programme design and implementation, and logistics. This redefinition is expressed in Strategic Objective 5 as: *Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase*, with outputs in terms of (i) increased marketing opportunities at national level with cost-effective WFP local purchases and (ii) progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions.

149. The Timor-Leste capacity development context has been described in section 1.2 (and in Annex V, Box 5); see also section 2.1 and Annex XII, on capacity development experiences in Timor-Leste. WFP uses the OECD/DAC definition of capacity as: *the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully*. In other words, capacity is not just about individual skill-sets but also, and importantly, about organisational capacities and the institutional environment in which individuals and organisations operate. Similarly, capacity is developed not just through training but through a range of interventions that support the development of policies, systems, procedures, and effective management.

150. Capacity development has been a key theme in the portfolio all along, but has become more prominent over time (see Annex XI and the strategy discussion in section 1.3 above). Under this heading we review the identifiable components that had a capacity development objective,[63] but also the capacity development orientation and approach of other main components of the programme. We deal in turn with the Special Operation, support to food security monitoring, and support to government service delivery (especially for MCHN).

151. The PRRO had elements of capacity development support to the MoE and MoH, and this focus was significantly strengthened in the Country Programme through the formulation of a "Component 2", which included specific plans for developing capacity in four key ministries. These were the Ministry of Social

[63] Apart from Timor Vita, already reviewed separately above.

Solidarity (MSS) whose portfolio included emergency relief, disaster preparedness and social protection, the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry (MTCI),[64] which was responsible for the subsidised rice programme, and the Ministries of Education and Health. However, these plans could not be fully implemented – budgetary constraints meant that a decision had to be made to exclude the proposed work with MSS and MTCI from the Country Programme, while, as already noted, MoE did not take up the offered support.

152. Tables in Annex VII provide results against planned outcomes and outputs for each of the programmes in WFP's Timor Leste portfolio with a capacity development component. The aim of the interventions has been to establish effective national capacity in logistics and supply chain management, and in school feeding and nutrition programmes as a contribution to the achievement of nationally owned hunger solutions. To support these aims a relatively wide range of initiatives has been undertaken with a number of partners (MSS, MTCI, MoH and MoE at central and local levels, and the private sector).

Programme delivery and results: the Special Operation

153. We start with the Special Operation because it helps to illustrate some key points that are relevant to the more complex context of the PRRO and CP. The CO was able to access funds left over from the tsunami response, and to take advantage of the presence in Dili of an international expert able to lead the operation.

154. The outcomes for the Special Operation were defined as (i) increased government capacity in logistics planning and implementation and (ii) improved data base of rehabilitation needs. Associated outputs were (i) a functioning Logistics Cell at the Ministry of Social Solidarity and (ii) an updated assessment of the logistics infrastructure in Timor Leste.

155. The MTCI subsequently approached WFP with a request for support to logistics and was included in the operation because it has responsibility for the distribution of subsidised rice in the country. In practice, the MTCI became WFP's main partner in the Special Operation because the MSS was already receiving significant logistics support from another agency. Planned outputs for the MSS and MTCI were fully achieved (see Annex VII, Table 37). In terms of physical infrastructure, this included warehouse rehabilitation for the MSS and warehouse establishment for the MTCI. Results delivered in skills and systems development included design of a logistics system, development of operational procedures, identification of staffing requirements and an organisational structure, and formal and on-the-job training. A logistics operations manual was developed for each ministry.

156. It was beyond the remit of the evaluation team to make a formal or comprehensive assessment of the extent to which the Special Operation had increased government capacity in logistics planning and implementation. However, the team conducted interviews with MTCI warehouse and management staff in Dili

[64] MTCI later became the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and the Environment; to avoid confusion , this report refers to MTCI throughout.

and Oecusse and found generally positive results: the logistics manual was in place and was being used, warehouses appeared properly managed, and staff reported that they were applying the skills that they had acquired during training. In Oecusse, discussions with government officials indicated that local expectations of the ministry's performance were high and that this was at least in part attributable to the effect of WFP's inputs. However, national-level factors beyond WFP's remit had meant that MTCI had not released subsidised rice onto the Oecusse market for several months.

157. The evidence that the Special Operation had significantly increased logistics capacity in MSS was less substantial, and the WFP consultant who had led the Special Operation also felt that, from WFP's perspective, this had been a less successful intervention. This was explained as being because much of MSS's logistics requirements were being handled by another international agency and because storage and distribution of food is a minor part of the MSS's operations.[65] Interviews with MSS staff in Dili and outside tended to support the WFP consultant's view that WFP had a fairly small role in building MSS's logistics capacity. In terms of technical capacity, it appeared at the time of the evaluation that both ministries were able to handle the tasks and functions necessary for logistics management, although for MSS it appeared that this was only partly attributable to WFP.

158. The Special Operation also included limited support to the MoE and the MoH. Outputs for the MoE and MoH were partially achieved under the Special Operation. The MoE's storage capacity was assessed and designs made for a logistics unit but the planned systems and skills development were cut short by the MoE's takeover of the programme. Similarly, an assessment was made of the MoH's existing storage capacity and designs were made for additional storage capacity but the planned construction of storage and training in logistics were carried forward into the CP.

159. We show in Table 11 below our assessment of results from the Special Operation against the criteria of development of capacity in individuals, organisations and in society (cf. the definition in ¶149 above).

[65] MSS has a wide remit for social protection, including financial support to pensioners, veterans and others in receipt of social security benefits. Other international agencies commented favourably on MSS's capacity to handle these functions.

Table 11 Assessment of capacity development under the Special Operation

	Rating		
	People	**Organisation**	**Society**
Ministry			
Social Solidarity	Mixed. Staff applying logistics and warehouse management skills but not all attributable to WFP inputs.	Mixed. Logistics and warehouse management systems developed by WFP appear to be in place but main support to organisational logistics capacity provided by another international agency.	Elements of social protection under ministry's remit reported to be functioning well, but food distribution a small part of this and WFP contribution commensurately limited.
Tourism, Commerce and Industry	Good. Staff applying logistics and warehouse management skills acquired in WFP training.	Good. Logistics and warehouse management systems developed by WFP in place and being used.	Mixed. Evidence that stakeholders now expect MTCI to make subsidised rice available when needed but that factors beyond WFP's remit have led to interruptions in supply.
Health	No MoH-specific inputs under Special Operation.	Partial achievement. Development of storage management handbook.	No effect.
Education	No MoE-specific inputs under Special Operation.	Partial achievement. Development of storage management handbook.	No effect.

Programme delivery and results: food security monitoring

160. The PRRO and CP both set out plans for support to the government's own capacity to undertake food security monitoring linked to early warning of emergencies. In the CP this was linked to the MDG-F joint programme (see Annex IX), in which WFP is the lead agency for the establishment of a Food Security Information and Early Warning System (FSIEWS).

161. Progress has been slow, but an agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF) was signed in 2010. In the same year an Inter-ministerial Food and Nutrition Security Task Force was established and reports to the Council of Ministers quarterly. The Food Security Unit in MAF is in charge of development of the FSIEWS. MAF makes use of the extension workers at the sub-district level who gather data on selected aspects. Additional support from the EU has allowed FSIEWS to be expanded nationwide. Quarterly reports are being published, but of course it remains to be seen how much use is made of the system, and whether the government will be able to sustain it beyond the period of strong technical assistance.

Programme delivery and results: government service delivery

162. Originally (in the PRRO document) WFP sought to help MoE establish a national school feeding system and to reinforce MoH capacity to run nutrition programmes. Activities to support the MoE included seconding an adviser to the MoE and support to an exposure visit to Brazil. The objective to support the establishment of a school feeding system was carried through to the CP, but MoE did not take up the offer of capacity development support after it took sole charge of the school meals programme; accordingly, this review focuses more on MCHN and MoH.

163. In both the PRRO and CP, outcomes for the MoH were expressed as 'progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions'. Outputs for this outcome under the PRRO are a handover strategy agreed with the MoH and local production of a

blended food (discussed under Timor Vita, above). Under the CP, the main output was also agreement on a handover strategy but there are other outputs that address enhancement of MoH logistics capacity, raised MCHN implementation capacity and awareness, and MCHN 100% resourced and managed by the government. At the time of the evaluation WFP had drafted a handover plan for discussion with the MoH and so it is clear that neither the outcome nor the primary output had been achieved. Progress towards their achievement is difficult to assess as programme documents do not define or report on relevant bench-marks or milestones. The main focus of reporting is on enhancement of logistics capacity and numbers of people trained in implementation modalities. These address only some of the outputs in the CP logframe and make a necessary but only partial contribution to building national capacity to manage a nutrition programme

Table 12 Planned and actual MCHN training, 2008–2012

Types of training and trainee	2008			2009			2010			2011			2012		
	P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%
Nurses and midwives trained in MCHN	18	16	89												
Participants in nutrition and health training				286	108	38									
Staff /community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution							300	203	68	220	119	54			
Health staff and or volunteers trained in MCHN													364	324	90
Government technical staff trained in safety net programme design, implementation and in M&E and reporting													289[a]	100	35
													332[b]	155	47

Source: SPRs and CO. Planning figures are taken from WFP reporting and differ slightly from planning figures in logframes.
Notes: (a) Training in M&E. (b) Training in logistics.

164. Storage construction, brought forward into the CP from the Special Operation, has increased the MoH's storage capacity and facilitated pre-positioning of stocks in advance of the rains.[66] The logistics manual developed under the Special Operation has been used in training under the CP. Planned and actual training by year is shown in Table 12 above. Reports on training show that numbers of trainees were below target in each of the years under review, which appears mainly due to budgetary constraints. The main focus of training has been on implementation of MCHN, with some attention under the CP to M&E and to logistics.

165. A lack of benchmarks and weak reporting mean that evaluation findings are largely based on the perceptions of CO staff and of some external stakeholders. These

[66] Storage construction included 29 Storerooms built; 1 planned to be completed by the end of 2012: 2 warehouses under construction or planned. When completed these will provide a country-wide storage network for MCHN.

indicate that the results of capacity development inputs have been mixed at best. Most WFP staff interviewed consider that, despite training, health staff and volunteers still require constant supervision in implementing MCHN activities. Some of the reported results from advisory support are more positive and include that WFP has influenced the government's new nutrition strategy and that some MoH staff are now able to carry out independently tasks that they were previously able to do only under supervision. However, the CO's broad assessment is that much remains to be done for the ministry to be able to run a nutrition programme without support. This is summarised in Table 13 below.

Table 13 Assessment of MCHN-related capacity development in MoH[67]

Rating		
People	**Organisation**	**Society**
Mixed. Some evidence of improvement in specific individuals but overall level of skills at all tiers of the system reported to be low.	Mixed. Significant increase in storage capacity and management. No significant investment yet in development of other organisational systems and procedures.	Very limited. Some evidence of influence on strategy formulation in partnership with other Development Partners.

166. The recognised lack of progress in developing MoH capacity to manage MCHN is reflected in recent moves towards planning the handover of responsibilities to MoH. In November 2012, the CO shared with MoH a brief (5 page) Concept Note for the development of a joint transition and handover strategy (WFP/TL 2012c). This outlined the anticipated steps required for an orderly transition that would address MoH capacity and budgetary requirements for taking over full responsibility for the MCHN programme (see summary in Annex XV).

Assessment

167. Although WFP's capacity development aspirations have been clear, it has not spelt out a set of cause-effect relations by which its interventions will enhance partners' capacity. Available evaluation reports have similarly focused more on WFP's performance in implementing programmes than on progress made in developing counterparts' capacity, and there is an absence of baseline assessments against which to assess progress. However, the CPE evaluation team believes that there is enough evidence – mostly qualitative – to draw some lessons from the contrasting experience of the Special Operation and the much more demanding efforts to enhance government service delivery through the PRRO and CP.

168. WFP's decision to work towards a handover of programmes to the MoE and MoH was not accompanied by a comprehensive and systematic analysis of specific capacity gaps and what was required for handover, nor by an analysis of where WFP could make the most effective contribution relative to support to capacity

[67] The unsystematic approach followed in developing MoH capacity and the associated limited progress made means that assessment against WFP's recently developed National Capacity Index would not be meaningful (this is further discussed in Annex II, on methodology).

development being provided by other DPs. This is in contrast to the Special Operation, where the intervention was based on a detailed assessment of logistics capacity and where WFP's recognised expertise in logistics made it the obvious partner of choice, in particular for the MTCI. Other success factors for the work with MTCI are highlighted in Annex XVI.

169. Despite the positive results achieved under the Special Operation, there have been interruptions in the availability of subsidised rice for consumers. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess the indirect impact of this support, in terms of whether MTCI's rice market interventions have all been effective and positive. Of course, the MTCI support was less complex and ambitious than capacity development support to education and health systems. However, the greater complexity of these systems argues for an approach to capacity development that is at least as systematic as that used in the Special Operation. In reality the approaches adopted towards the MoE and MoH were less systematic.

170. As discussed under context (section 1.2), Timor-Leste is not only a fragile state but one where, for historical reasons, levels of capacity are particularly low, and conventional donor approaches to capacity development have shown poor results, so that donors (such as the World Bank) are now considering how to adapt these approaches to specific conditions in Timor-Leste. WFP staff point to external factors including low levels of existing knowledge and skills and limited capacity to absorb new knowledge and skills as reasons that the results of training have been less than expected. For example, the generally poor numeracy skills of PSFs and other volunteers mean that inaccurate recording of data is common.[68] Another important factor is the high turnover and frequent redeployment of government staff which hampers the institutionalisation of learning.

171. However, there have also been internal constraints on WFP's capacity development efforts vis-à-vis the MoH which are both more significant and more within WFP's control to change. The primary factor is that no assessment of the MoH's capacity was made and no strategy was articulated to address capacity gaps. Associated with this was a lack of defined learning objectives and of benchmarks against which progress could be measured. While several staff have capacity development in their job descriptions,[69] these staff were also involved in implementing programmes (and their skills lay chiefly in this direction) so that activities related to developing capacity inevitably took a back seat. No support or on-the-job training was provided to staff to enable them to be more effective developers of other people's capacity. Training courses for staff and counterparts appear to have been run according to a predetermined schedule, rather than being adapted and tailored to what was being learned from the programme about where more investment needed to be made (for example, in developing numeracy skills).

[68] Training of enumerators for the CCT baseline survey is reported to have required twice as long as would be allowed in other countries.
[69] These include the Nutrition Adviser, the Heads of Sub-Offices and Field Monitor Assistants.

172. These are not constraints that can be solved at the CO level.[70] As a small CO, Timor-Leste has lacked both the numbers of staff and the range of staff skills to translate SO5 into a meaningful programme of work and there is no evidence of additional technical or other support being provided either from the RB or from Rome. WFP has developed guidance for COs on incorporating SO5 into their work, but budgetary constraints have limited the extent to which it has been possible to provide hands-on practical follow-up and support to implement this guidance. WFP also does not appear to have amended its planning, budgeting and reporting systems to accommodate the longer-term, more process-oriented approaches that are required to institutionalise SO5.

173. The proposed handover strategy (Annex XV) is a logical and appropriate approach to working with MoH and seeking their buy-in to a transition plan, while also involving other key stakeholders (notably potential financiers of any future supplementary feeding programme). However it has been initiated very late in the day (half-way through CP period, and barely a year before WFP's expected exit). This does not allow enough time for formulating the plan, let alone carrying it out step by step. For example it requires (a) securing staff positions and finance within the government budget and (b) piloting handover in one district and then applying lessons in others; in both cases this would normally require at least a complete annual budget cycle, and the preparation period for the 2013 government budget is already past. Similarly, past experience cautions against expecting investment planning for Timor Vita to be both rapid and rigorous. It would have been preferable to build the concept note process into the CP itself,[71] although even beginning a year earlier would have been a tight schedule. At the same time, the delay reflects some of the constraints we have alluded to, including the pressure on the CO and MoH staff simply to keep the MCHN programme going, and the preoccupation of senior government officials with elections and the subsequent change of administration.

Coherence of the portfolio – internal and external synergies

Internal synergies

174. For most of the evaluation period the WFP portfolio has comprised three main food-based activities (FFW/A, school feeding and MCHN), with capacity development as a common and cross-cutting theme. These activities have distinct characteristics and involve working with different main partners in the government. At a broad level, the most important synergy is that all draw on the same platform of analytical work and the CO's accumulated knowledge of country context; more particularly they all draw on the CO's logistics expertise and its established capacity to manage the food supply chain to all districts in the country. There are obvious economies of scale in running a larger programme; conversely, the CO has struggled to remain adequately staffed as the volume of food-based activities has diminished. We consider the implications further in section 3.

[70] The findings outlined here echo several of the findings from the evaluation of COs' adaptation to change. (WFP 2012a)
[71] The CP itself was an effort to buy time for an orderly exit, and it did at least put an exit date on the table.

175. There have also been other internal synergies within main activities (e.g. support to school kitchens/stoves to complement the main SMP) and across activities (e.g. the construction of schools as part of the FFW/A programme, inclusion of a nutrition education element under the rubric of support to school feeding), and the CO has been active in pursuing such opportunities, with its pursuit of funds for the special operation and for the CCT research as prime examples.

External synergies and strategic partnerships

176. The two joint programmes (MDG-F and COMPASIS) represented a simultaneous pursuit of internal synergies (e.g. augmented resources for FFW/A under COMPASIS, resources for Timor Vita under the MDG-F) and external synergies (e.g. the complements to the school feeding programme under MDG-F already cited). Again, the CO has been adept in pursuing such opportunities, and we have already noted that the WFP components of the joint programmes have been implemented well, although the synergy amongst different UN contributions to both programmes has been significantly less than intended (see section 2.1, ¶45–49).

177. Both school feeding and MCHN were designed to maximise synergies within a government programme of basic service delivery, with WFP activities merged into the national programme, and WFP offering itself as a strategic partner both for programme implementation and for development of the government's capacity to run the programme autonomously in the future. In the school feeding case, the ministry chose not to continue the strategic partnership, but the partnership with the MoH was reinforced by the ministry's corporate and financial contributions to the Timor Vita project, and by continuing close collaboration in delivery of the supplementary feeding programmes. The review of MCHN performance has noted that some of the potential synergies across nutrition programmes have not been fully realised (links with the UNICEF- supported CMAM programme were not as strong as they might be); on the other hand there is persuasive evidence that the supplementary feeding programmes have had wider benefits in encouraging the uptake of basic health services.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Overall Assessment

178. There was not an explicit country strategy document to guide the portfolio during the evaluation period, but, in practice there was strategic continuity between the PRRO which commenced in 2008 and the CP which succeeded it in 2011 (see ¶30–31 in section 1.3 above).[72] The CP expressed this strategy well (see Annex XI) in terms of three high level strategic objectives:

[72] In practice, the absence of a formal country strategy document did not matter. The portfolio was quite simple and the core strategy was clear. There would have been considerable transaction costs in preparing a strategy document, and it would probably have made little difference to WFP's more fundamental challenge: that the short-horizon business configuration of WFP makes it difficult for COs to follow through their strategic intentions.

- [Objective 1] improve the food and nutrition security of the most vulnerable groups in ways that build longer-term human and physical assets;
- [Objective 2] strengthen the Government's capacity to design, implement and manage tools, policies and systems for reducing food insecurity, and
- [Objective 3] hand over food-based programmes to the Government in a responsible manner.

179. In this section we draw the evaluation's findings together for an overall assessment of the portfolio, bearing in mind these strategic objectives.

Alignment and strategic positioning

180. The portfolio has been well aligned with men's and women's needs. In practice it has focused more on direct responses to undernutrition (especially through MCHN) than on addressing underlying food security issues linked to rural livelihood systems, but this has reflected WFP's comparative strengths as well as the availability of partners for finance and implementation of the programme. Its programme has been well-aligned with government policies and priorities, and WFP's strategy of supporting and working through government systems for delivery of basic services has been highly appropriate for the fragile state context of Timor-Leste. It has reflected well the international standards for engagement in fragile contexts. WFP has coordinated well with other UN agencies in a context where the UN has had an exceptionally prominent role (although, in the joint programmes in which WFP participated, alignment of UN agencies with each other and with government was quite shallow). All of the portfolio activities were appropriately oriented towards WFP's strategic objectives (as shown in section 1.3, Table 5) and the evolution of the Timor-Leste portfolio, including its increased attention to capacity development, has been highly consistent with WFP's global strategy.

Strategic choices

181. As we demonstrated in section 2.2 (¶55–60), the CO's space for strategic decision-making is limited by both internal and external constraints, while an improving post-emergency context for Timor-Leste is also a more complex and challenging one for WFP. It has become more difficult to raise aid funds, yet developmental and capacity-building work requires longer-term approaches and additional skill-sets, which are not easy to pursue in the light of WFP's internal constraints, which are especially constricting for a small CO.

182. Against this background, our overall assessment is that the Timor-Leste CO has been commendably opportunistic, innovative, diligent and adaptable. It was right to focus on nutrition issues, on government as its key partner and on capacity development as a key objective. In doing so, it has contributed to state-building and supported country-wide delivery. It has been pragmatic in adjusting ongoing operations to focus where there was most chance of making a difference (e.g. changing the focus of the Special Operation). However, embarking on the CCT research programme was a misjudgement for which HQ shares responsibility (¶98–

99 and ¶102 above). The CO has been energetic in seeking supplementary funding, and in seeking to maintain adequate CO staffing but a heavy reliance on low cost and relatively junior staff, and an inability to offer job security, has disadvantages.

183. One of the main signs of overstretched WFP capacity was the neglect of basic monitoring, with inadequate tracking of programme delivery and hardly any attention to outcomes. There have recently been commendable attempts to address this gap, but it has weakened WFP's position in seeking continued MCHN funding. The fact that the programme has been unable to provide sufficient data on programme performance and still uses formats and databases that are inadequate for measuring and reporting on outcomes, reflects inadequate supervision and support from either the Regional Bureau or Head Office. It means, inevitably, that the conclusions of the present evaluation are not as firmly grounded as they might have been.

184. Allowing monitoring to be crowded out may be linked to a more general weakness – a tendency to assume that programmes work as intended, without testing the assumptions on which WFP interventions are based. In practice, it is particularly important for WFP to carry out such checks, because its own ability to raise funds depends on demonstrating effectiveness and meeting needs as planned, while third parties tend to assume that WFP is biased towards food delivery solutions. WFP's wishful thinking about the local sourcing of ingredients for Timor Vita is another example of this tendency.

Portfolio performance and results

185. As discussed in more detail in section 2.3, the main original components of the portfolio were all broadly **relevant** at the time the PRRO was prepared (a judgement shared with the PRRO evaluation – see Kirkby et al 2009). The subsequent challenge for the CO has been to balance and adapt these different components in a dynamic and constrained situation. WFP also deserves credit for the **connectedness** of its "working with government" approach.

186. As regards **efficiency**: we have noted that working with nationwide government systems limits WFP's ability to target specific groups or geographical areas; however, we consider that WFP made the right trade-offs in seeking to work through, and to influence, government systems, while respecting government ownership. A more serious constraint on efficiency was the chronic under-funding of the portfolio. WFP was right to mitigate this constraint by prioritising school feeding and MCHN over FFW/A. Local production of Timor Vita was intended to increase efficiency, by simplifying logistics and reducing the sharing of food (and was also intended to increase government ownership and thus make the supplementary feeding programmes more sustainable). This initiative may have been justified, but there should have been a more rigorous assessment of its cost-effectiveness against the alternative of an imported FBF.

187. On **effectiveness**: (a) in most respects WFP appears to have implemented the portfolio components competently, and, as described in section 2.3, we would share the PRRO evaluation's judgement that its FFW/A activities and emergency

support have been broadly effective; (b) the PRRO evaluation also assessed the school feeding programme as effective; however, following the government's takeover of the programme it has experienced implementation difficulties, and remains seriously underfunded, which must compromise its current effectiveness; (c) there is strong evidence that the food component of the MCHN programme acts as an incentive for increased access to health services, but there is much less evidence that it achieves its primary aim of improving the nutritional status of its intended beneficiaries; (d) there have been some notable successes in capacity development – Objective 2 in ¶178 above, (e.g. in the Special Operation's support to MTCI warehouse management), but the challenges of achieving sustainable capacity improvement across service delivery sectors remain enormous; (e) on Objective 3 – successful handover – the breakdown in relationship with the MoE prevented a satisfactory handover of the school feeding programme, while a systematic approach to handover of the MCHN programme to MoH has only recently been initiated, and could not plausibly be carried through before the CP's current end-date of December 2013. The requirements for satisfactory handover are a strong theme of our recommendations in section 3.3 below.

188. The capacity development objectives (2 and 3 in ¶178 above) are the key to **sustainability** and long term **impact** of the portfolio. This is an area that all agencies have found difficult – the general debate in Timor-Leste echoes a global one. For WFP, the lessons of Timor-Leste experience are: that it is more straightforward to work on areas such as logistics where WFP has acknowledged expertise (thus warehouse management per se is more straightforward than operating a whole supply chain, as in SISCa support for MCHN); that effectiveness depends on a willing partner; and even when the context is favourable, there are still endemic difficulties for WFP, linked to its own funding model and the constraints on its own staff and their aptitude for capacity development work.

189. The evaluation's overall assessment is that the CO's incorporation of **gender** in its work has been weak. As noted in section 2.2 above (¶70–72), the evaluation found little evidence that WFP's corporate commitments on gender have been incorporated into programme design, monitoring and reporting or that these commitments have been promoted through advocacy with partners. However, the main reasons for this appear to lie in the relatively small size of the CO (and associated limited staff capacity) and in a lack of support for gender-mainstreaming from the Regional Bureau and from Rome.

3.2 Wider Lessons from the Evaluation

190. Under this heading we note some findings from Timor-Leste that should resonate more widely across WFP. On **capacity development**, Timor-Leste's experience suggests that capacity development is more likely to be successful when (a) it draws on WFP's distinctive competences (the Special Operation in Timor-Leste played on WFP's strengths in supply chain management; in other contexts WFP may have a comparative advantage in supporting food security analysis); (b) there is engagement and coordination with other donors as well as the recipient government agency; (c) the approach is focused: setting realistic objectives, being patient,

working at the pace of the partner and taking time; (d) there is adequate resourcing (finance; appropriately skilled human resources; time).

191. As regards **transition strategies**, it seems likely that, as a programme tapers off, the proportional demand for capacity development activities and expenditures will increase. The operating model of WFP means that support for capacity development is likely to become more meagre, problematic and unpredictable exactly when the opposite is required. Small COs are the ones most likely to need extra support.

192. In order to operate more flexibly, WFP has recognised the need to adapt its **internal financing model and incentives**, proposing a new financing model to the board in 2010. However, this has yet to roll out effectively to country level. although it is crucial in enabling WFP to deploy advisory and capacity development resources that are not linked to food distribution as they are in WFP's traditional budgeting/financial framework.

193. If Timor-Leste's experience in relation to the capacity development policy, and also the gender policy, is typical, **policy-making from HQ** seems to run well ahead of the development of strategies and provision of practical support for policy implementation at country level.

194. Our review of decision-making around Timor Vita reveals weaknesses in WFP **corporate review/assessment processes**. The decision to support Timor Vita may have been justified, but there was not a realistic comparison of alternatives, nor a properly quantified assessment of the costs of domestic production compared with imports of a FBF.

195. The frustrating experience with the CCT experiment suggests that HQ needs to be more realistic about the management and supervision **requirements for experimental impact evaluations**, and more careful in selecting suitable participant countries, especially in fragile contexts.

196. The Timor-Leste experience of **UN joint programmes** reinforces OE's point (in the guidelines for CPEs) that alignment per se (in this case amongst UN agencies) should not be considered a self-evident benefit. Especially in contexts where the government itself is a viable partner for service delivery, the costs of joint UN implementation may outweigh the benefits. (This does not lessen the relevance of UN coordination at policy level.)

3.3 Recommendations

197. Recommendations have to be linked to a view of WFP's prospects in Timor-Leste. The country's nutrition indicators are among the most severe in the world, and there is thus a strong *prima facie* case for WFP to remain engaged. At the same time, any WFP engagement has to be funded and has to be based on demand as well as need. The primary demand for any future WFP presence has to come from government; the Ministry of Health is currently WFP's principal partner, but the Ministry of Finance also needs to be involved, because the MoH strategy (with or without WFP involvement) needs assured medium term funding; it should connect to the development of medium term expenditure planning by government, in the

context of making sustainable commitments of Petroleum Fund revenues. WFP's existing and potential near-term funders also need to be engaged in reviewing WFP's trajectory. And WFP programmes are, rightly, intertwined with those of government and of other development partners in the sectors where WFP is engaged. Accordingly, recommendations are addressed to government and other key stakeholders as well as to the different corporate levels of WFP.

On the Immediate Transition Strategy for Timor-Leste (WFP Headquarters, Regional Bureau and Country Office)

198. **Recommendation 1: WFP should extend the CP so as to enable the country office to follow up on the transition strategy set out in the Concept Note of November 2012**. A systematic approach to hand-over of MCHN responsibilities, based on joint WFP-Ministry of Health assessments of financial and capacity requirements, was only recently put forward. Satisfactory hand-over will require engagement by the Ministry and other main stakeholders. The present CP was itself intended to allow a hand-over period, but the necessary planning has only recently begun, and a responsible exit – or a properly planned continuation of WFP support – therefore requires more time. An orderly exit that minimizes reputational damage to WFP will require an extension of the CP by at least a year beyond the current end date of December 2013; a more effective transition will require more time (see recommendation 2).

On Hand-Over/Exit Strategies in General (WFP Headquarters)

199. **Recommendation 2: WFP should ensure that hand-over strategies are developed in a timely fashion, recognizing that effective hand-over requires a timeframe of at least two to three years.** Hand-over strategies should include relevant benchmarks and milestones against which progress will be measured, and WFP Headquarters must engage the country office in a realistic assessment of the internal capacity required to ensure that a responsible and sustainable hand-over process is implemented and, where necessary, should develop a strategy for building the internal capacity required for this.

200. WFP will face similar hand-over situations in other countries in the future. Ideally, therefore, WFP Headquarters should use Timor-Leste as a pilot for the development of a credible exit strategy. To do this satisfactorily would imply securing predictable and flexible non-food-based funding to support an extension of the CP for at least two years, with associated commitment from the regional bureau and Headquarters to ensure that the country office has the internal capacity required for a credible transition/exit. The transition process should involve increased engagement with other development partners supporting the Ministry of Health and should build in lesson learning for wider consumption.

On Strategy for MCHN In Timor-Leste (Ministry of Health and other Health and Nutrition Stakeholders Including WFP)

201. **Recommendation 3a: There is urgent need for a joint review of SISCa's role in health service delivery and its corresponding requirements for support.** Health stakeholders should jointly draw up plans to tackle the issues facing SISCa in a sustainable manner.

202. **Recommendation 3b: The Ministry of Health and WFP should discontinue targeted supplementary feeding for children aged 24–59 months and provide targeted supplementary feeding for children aged 6–23 months and pregnant and lactating women.** This is linked to the SISCa review and echoes earlier recommendations, such as those of the PRRO evaluation,[2] based on current understanding of effective practice in such nutrition interventions. If supplementary feeding is to continue and be effective, it must be on a scale that the Ministry of Health can sustain, both financially and in terms of organizational demands on scarce capacity. Sustainability on both criteria is more likely if the programme is able to rely – wholly or predominantly – on the domestic production of FBF (see recommendation 4) and if the programme design is as straightforward as possible.

203. **Recommendation 3c: Improve the quality of monitoring and evaluation, both of programme delivery and of its results, to meet the minimum standards required for assessing programme delivery and results.** The evaluation has provided detailed comments on gaps in existing data collection, but there must be resolve at all levels of WFP to ensure that basic monitoring – including post-distribution monitoring – is treated as essential, even when capacity gaps make this more difficult.

204. **Recommendation 3d: There is need to support longer-term, country-specific nutrition research such as a nutrition causality study and analysis;** this is a joint responsibility of all stakeholders and should be adequately reflected in the forthcoming (revised) national nutrition strategy.

On Local Production of Fortified Blended Food (WFP, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance)

205. **Recommendation 4: WFP and the Government should jointly undertake a rigorous strategic review of the future role for *Timor Vita***. At present, the country office plays a crucial role in supervising production of *Timor Vita* on behalf of the Government. The review should include analysis of the medium- and long-term viability of the factory, and the cost and logistics implications if more targeted supplementary feeding is linked to provision of *Timor Vita*. It should include attention to future responsibilities for the monitoring and technical support currently provided by WFP, as well as the independent audit of performance.

On Timor-Leste's School Feeding Strategy (Timor-Leste Government with its Partners in Social Protection and Education)

206. **Recommendation 5: A comprehensive strategic review of the school feeding programme should be undertaken to map out a sustainable approach**. It would be appropriate for the Government to lead this review, in collaboration with partners who support the education and social protection sector strategies of Timor-Leste. It is not appropriate for WFP to lead such a review because WFP is not seen as a disinterested party, but it is important to adopt an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach so as to map out a sustainable approach that partners can buy into.

On Capacity Development (WFP Headquarters)

207. **Recommendation 6: WFP Headquarters needs to do further work on developing indicators and practical guidance to assist country offices**

in designing and implementing effective capacity development strategies. WFP Headquarters needs to consider how it can also provide more hands-on support to country offices' design and implementation of capacity development strategies. As part of this focus, WFP Headquarters must engage country offices in a realistic assessment of the internal capacity required for effective capacity development initiatives and, where necessary, should develop a strategy for building the internal capacity required for this.

On Gender (WFP Headquarters)

208. **Recommendation 7: WFP Headquarters needs to do further work on developing indicators and practical guidance to country offices for implementing effective gender mainstreaming strategies.** WFP Headquarters also needs to consider how it can provide more hands-on support to country offices to enhance gender analysis and implement gender mainstreaming. WFP Headquarters should focus, in particular, on the needs of country offices without dedicated gender staff.

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Annex I Terms of Reference

COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION – TIMOR-LESTE (2008-2012)

[Terms of Reference dated 26 September 2012]

1. Background

1. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the key issues; Chapter 5 spells out the evaluation approach; and Chapter 6 indicates how the evaluation will be organized.

1.1. Introduction

2. A Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) encompasses the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period in a particular country. It evaluates the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provides evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation.

1.2. Country Context

3. Timor-Leste achieved its independence in 2002 following four hundred years of colonization, 24 years of occupation and three years UN administration. Traditionally, Timor-Leste has been largely a subsistence agriculture economy, with a dispersed rural population living near the poverty line. Small cash-crop sectors, such as coffee, have provided some households with monetary incomes in rural areas. Most households produce for their own consumption and lack any steady or predictable cash incomes. Moreover, infrastructure has been weak, compounded by the difficulties of transport and communications in a mountainous topography.[73]

4. Timor-Leste's economic situation is extraordinary because of its newly developed oil-and-gas income. Oil and gas earnings of Timor-Leste jumped from around $141 million in 2004 to around $2,280 million in 2008. As a result, the Gross National Product rose from approximately $460 million in 2004 to $2,900 million in 2008 and to $2,500 million in 2010. [74] GNI per capita rose from US$330 in 2002 to US$2730 in 2010. [75]

5. Despite oil revenues, the majority of Timor-Leste's population of 1.2 million [76] is still vulnerable to poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition. Timor-Leste ranks 147 out of 187 countries in UNDP's 2011 Human Development report. Half of the

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73 Office of the Prime Minister, Timor-Leste, 2010. On Road to Peace and Prosperity, Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan, 2011 – 2030, Summary. Dili.

74 Ibid.

75 World Bank MDG Indicators http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/TableView.aspx accessed Sept 2012.

76 World Bank MDG Indicators http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/TableView.aspx accessed Sept 2012.

population lives below the national official poverty line of US$0.88 per capita per day (2007).[77]

6. Food Security. According to a WFP-assisted food security analysis conducted in 2006 about 20% of the population is food insecure, and an additional 23% is highly vulnerable to becoming food-insecure [78]. Food insecurity is most severe in the country's lean season, from October to March, and in upland areas, among subsistence farmers, female-headed households and households with sudden crisis.[79]

7. Nutrition. Malnutrition and under-nutrition remain at a high level. Fifty-eight % of children <5 are stunted, 19% are acutely malnourished and the prevalence of underweight is very high at 45%, comparable to Bangladesh and India. [80] [81] Although under-nutrition of women has decreased in the past decade, it remains high with 27% of non-pregnant women aged 15 to 49 chronically underweight (Body Mass Index below 18.5).[82] Under-nutrition of young women is an important determinant of maternal and child health.

8. Education. Overall net enrolment rates at the primary level have increased over the past decade (65% in 2001 to 83.2% in 2009). At pre-secondary level net enrolment rates remain low (25% in 2009) and they are even lower at secondary levels (12% in 2009). [83] These rates are substantially below the East Asia and Pacific average rates of 97.5% for primary and 66% for secondary (2005-2009).[84] In Timor-Leste gross enrolment rates are much higher than net rates: 114% for primary school, 69% for pre-secondary school, and 38% for secondary school. The marked difference between the gross and net rates is because children start school late and may spend more than one year in the same grade.[85]

9. Infrastructure and communication. Roads are vital for the rural economy with 90% of passenger traffic and 70% of freight movement moved by road. However, road connectivity is poor and the quality of the roads is also sub-standard. Access to telecommunications services in the countryside is extremely limited and expensive.[86].

10. Shocks. Droughts, floods, high food prices, political and economic uncertainty and civil unrest have all been experienced in the previous decade and continue to be risks. Table 1 below shows the main natural disasters and the number of people affected. In 2008-2007 conflict resulted in displacement of between 150,000 to 178,000 people; most were resettled by the end of 2009.

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77 UNDP, 2011. Timor-Leste National Human Development Report 2011, Dili.

78 WFP. 2006. Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CSFVA), Rome.

79 Noij, Frank, 2011. Mid-term Evaluation: UNICEF-WFP joint Project on children food security and nutrition in Timor-Leste, MDG Achievement Fund, Dili.

80 Noij, Frank, Ibid. refers to Figures from DHS 2009-10 and DHS 2004 respectively, making use of WHO child growth standards

81 Noij, Frank, Ibid. refers to National Statistics Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009-10, November 2010

82 IFPRI, 2011 Global hunger index. The challenge of hunger: taming price spikes and excessive food price volatility, Bonn.

83 Timor-Leste Human Development Report 2011-Data taken from Ministry of Education, Timor-Leste Government, EMIS Report, 2009.

84 UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2011, Adolescence an age of opportunity, NY.

85 Timor-Leste Human Development Report 2011

86 Timor-Leste Human Development Report 2011 Information from Budde.com.au: Timor-Leste: key telecom parameters, 2008-9. MDG Booklet 2010, Government of Timor-Leste, p. 47.

Table 1: Main natural disasters in Timor Leste (2001-2012)

Year	Natural disasters	People affected
2007	flood	947
2006	storm	8,730
2005	epidemics	336
2003	flood	1,050
2001	flood	2,508

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED international disaster database

11. Government Strategy. Timor-Leste launched its first National Development Plan in 2002 and, in 2010, a new Strategic Development Plan (2011-2030) was developed with the long-term economic vision. According to the plan, by 2030, Timor-Leste will have joined the ranks of upper-middle-income countries, having ended extreme poverty, eliminated the economic gap with the emerging economies of ASEAN, and fostered a democratic and environmentally sustainable society.[87]

12. The Government's Strategic Development Plan includes a framework for action encompassing human capital investment (including health and nutrition, education and research); infrastructure investments (roads, power, telecommunication, etc.); and agriculture, petroleum and tourism sector investment. The Government has introduced several nationwide programmes explicitly tackling food insecurity and under-nutrition in vulnerable groups. The Government's targeted programmes comprise mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN), food and cash transfers to veterans and disabled people, emergency food assistance in times of natural disasters and other shocks, subsidized rice sales to increase rice availability, school feeding, and an agricultural extension programme to bolster production at the community and household levels.

13. Official Development Assistance (ODA). Of the $1260 million of ODA provided from 2006 to 2010 (OECD website), almost three-quarters (74%) was from five countries/organizations: Australia, Japan, Portugal, US and European Union. The value of ODA compared with GNP has ranged from 17% of GNP in 2006 to 9.3% in 2010.88 As shown in Figure1, international humanitarian aid ended in 2009 and total development assistance has ranged from US$209 in 2006 to $292 million in 2010. WFP contribution to humanitarian aid was highest in 2007 when it reached US$ 13.3 million or 59% of the total. At the phase out stage in 2009 WFP's US$0.10 million represented 100% of total humanitarian aid. In contrast, WFP's contribution to ODA in 2009 represented about 5% and it reduced to 2% in 2010.89

[87] Republic Democratica de Timor-Leste, Office of the Prime Minister, 2010. Timor-Leste's Strategic Development plan 2011-2030, Summary. Dili.

[88] ODA figures from Figure 1 compared to GNP from World Bank dataset.

[89] Calculations: direct expenses (see Annex 2) for 2009 = US$10.8 m less US$ 0.1(humanitarian) / US$216 m and for 2010 US$5.9 m / US$ 292 m.

Figure 1: Trends in Total External Assistance Timor-Leste (2005-2012)



2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

14. Timor-Leste has been selected by the Office of Evaluation (OE) as part of an on-going series of CPEs that provide systematic evaluation coverage of WFP's country presence. Countries are selected based on criteria ensuring a balance of regional representation and portfolio size. The Timor-Leste country office is representative of a small WFP portfolio, and one intended for handover to the Government in the near future.

15. The current country programme (September 2011 to December 2013) states WFP's intention to handover all components to Government partners. Any possible extension of assistance beyond December 2013 will "depend on the Government's achievements, results from monitoring and evaluation, and the availability of resources."[90] The evaluation is intended to contribute to decisions regarding handover completion and WFP's exit strategy and the country office and regional bureau requested for the evaluation to be timed for presentation to the 2013 Annual Session of the Executive Board.

2.2. Objectives

16. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to development challenges in Timor-Leste (accountability); and

- Determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience (learning), especially on the topics of readiness for handover and

[90] Country Programme. WFP/EB.A/2011/9/2

country office closure that will contribute to both the country office's handover and exit and WFP's corporate understanding of handover and exit strategy.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

17. The main stakeholders and users of this evaluation are the WFP country office, Government of Timor-Leste, WFP Regional Bureau and Senior management, UN country team, NGOs, donors and the Executive Board. The list of stakeholders at project level is available in Annex 2[91] while their interest in the evaluation is summarised in Table 2 below. The evaluation team will build on this preliminary analysis at the inception stage to map the main strategic and operational partners to better understand priority issues and interests.

Table 2: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
Internal stakeholders	
Country Office	-Primary stakeholder of this evaluation. Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, it has a direct stake in the evaluation and will be a primary user of its results to complete the envisaged handover and exit or to reposition WFP in the country context.
Regional Bureaux and Senior Management	-WFP Senior Management, and the entire Regional Bureau, have an interest in learning from the evaluation results to pursue WFP's current strategy to handover and phase out of the country office or to develop an alternative approach for 2014 and beyond.
WFP Executive Board	-Presentation of the evaluation results at the June 2013 session to inform Board members about the performance and outcome of WFP activities in Timor-Leste. and consider the effectiveness of WFP's approach to handover and exit
External stakeholders	
Government (mainly Ministry of Health, Nutrition Department, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, Ministry of Social Solidarity, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.	-The Government of Timor-Leste (also a contributor to WFP-supported activities) has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities and meet the expected results. Furthermore the extent to which WFP has handed over responsibility and built capacity mainly of Government Ministries thereby permitting country office closure will be of interest. Various Ministries are direct partners of WFP activities at project level.
Beneficiaries (mainly malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women, school children)	-As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. They will be consulted during the field mission.

[91] [Annex 2 of the TOR was superseded by the stakeholder analysis in the Inception Report (Lister et al 2012).]

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
NGOs (mainly CARE International, World Vision International and Oxfam as well as a number of national NGOs.)	-NGOs are WFP partners for most of its operations in the country while at the same time having their own activities. The results of the evaluation might affect the plan to handover and close the WFP office in 2013 and therefore affect the partnerships.
Donors (Australia, Timor-Leste, Rep. of Korea, Brazil, UN common funds, private donors, USA, Japan, EC, Ireland, Spain, etc.)	-WFP activities are supported by a number of donors. They all have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work is effective in alleviating food insecurity of the most vulnerable.
UN Country team (mainly UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNDP and UNFPA)	-WFP is partnering with various UN Agencies, including a joint UNICEF-WFP project, to implement its activities. The findings of the evaluation could be used as inputs in the preparation of the next UNDAF and of extensions to joint activities.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

3.1. WFP's Portfolio in Timor-Leste

18. WFP has been present in Timor-Leste since 1999. WFP had eight operations from 1999 to 2013, budgeted at US$120 million, including emergency, protracted relief and recovery (PRRO), special operations and, since 2011, a country programme which is ongoing. (For details see Annex 1.)[92]

19. For the purpose of this evaluation the WFP Timor-Leste portfolio is defined as the three operations implemented in the country since September 2008: PRRO 103381 (2008 to mid-2011), Special Operation 107970 (2009 to mid-2011) and first ever Country Programme in Timor-Leste- Dev 200185 (2011-2013). The planned budget for these three operations from 2008 to December 2013 was US$74.8 million; by mid-2012 $37.4 million or about half of the total needs had been funded, although one year is still pending for the country programme. Annex 2[93] provides an overview of the operations covered in the portfolio including their type, activities, beneficiaries, funding level, donors and partners.

20. The portfolio operations can be grouped in five categories, showing a transition from relief and recovery activities to development with a focus on nutrition and capacity development of governmental institutions, as follows:

a) Support to MCHN which has been continuous throughout the period (32% of actual beneficiaries).

b) Support to capacity development of the Ministries of Health, Education, Tourism, Trade and Industry and Social Solidarity with objectives including developing policies and systems for monitoring food security; in Government institutions: establishing food assistance systems for MCHN and primary school meals; and enhancing supply chain/logistics capacity and disaster

[92] [Annex 1 of the TOR has been superseded by the portfolio analysis in Section 1.3 of the present report.]
[93] [Annex 2 of the TOR has been superseded by the portfolio analysis in Section 1.3 of the present report.]

preparedness and response systems. In addition, WFP has provided technical assistance to the private sector and the Government in the establishment and operation for a food processing plant for fortified blended food.

c) Support to primary school meals which was handed over to the Government in 2011 (61% of actual beneficiaries).

d) Support to community assets development and rural road improvements through food-for-work/food-for-assets/conditional cash transfers (3% of actual beneficiaries).

e) Relief and recovery oriented support, including some resettlement of displaced people in 2008 (5% of actual beneficiaries).

21. A number of activities complemented the operations noted above, funded through grants and trust funds totalling US$3.9 million, see Table 3.

Table 3: Main additional activities supported by grants/trust funds

Donor	Contribution Year	Current budget	Activities funded
Brazil	2008	125,378	Support WFP capacity development regarding school feeding programme: to strengthen mechanisms for legal, institutional and financial frameworks. Emphasis is placed on engaging civil society participation, promoting local purchase of commodities and integrating inter-sectoral approaches
Brazil	2009	173,670	FFW/Assets, VAM and capacity development for the National School feeding Programme
Germany	2009	35,800	Project for Enhanced Synergy between FFW/Assets & VAM in Timor-Leste
USAID	2009	313,240	Transition Opportunity Grant for the MCHN Programme
Spain	2009	673,500	Multi donor trust fund (Children food security and nutrition)
UN trust fund	2010	535,000	COMPASIS project (CP : US$ 172,444 and PRRO: US$ 327,556)
Spain	2011	2,082,600	Cash pilot project in 2 districts (Bobonaro and Baucau). Activities of cash for work (disaster preparedness and mitigation activities)
Total		3,939,188	

Source: RMBG and ERD departments, Country office, SPA, Brazilian trust fund briefing of November 2009

22. The OE-commissioned evaluation of PRRO 103881 conducted in 2009 [94] found the operation to be relevant, its targeting appropriate, and generally it was meeting targets for supplying food and accessing beneficiaries. It found that WFP had developed government capacity for planning and implementation of food-based programmes as part of a food security strategy. However, the evaluation concluded that shortages of food, high logistics costs, limited human capacity, competition with other agencies for staff, the need to import services and equipment and the limited number of non-governmental partners restricted the efficiency of the operation and added to its cost. The evaluation made ten recommendations covering operations,

94 WFP, Office of Evaluation 2009. Evaluation of WFP-Timor-Leste PRRO 10388.1 Assistance to Vulnerable Populations (September 2008 – August 2010) Final Report. Rome

advocacy, capacity development, logistics, monitoring and evaluation, and handover strategy which were all agreed or partially agreed in the management response.[95]

3.2. Scope of the Evaluation

23. The reference period time frame for this CPE is 2008-2012. An initial timeline setting out WFP and UN operations, main events in the country and food security analysis has been included as Annex 4.[96]

24. In light of the strategic nature of this evaluation, the focus is not on assessing individual operations but rather to evaluate the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performance, and the strategic roles played by WFP (both regional bureau and country office staff) in Timor-Leste. The evaluation will assess the portfolio of WFP operations and activities as noted in section 3.1 above. The five main types of activities to be analysed across operations are also set out in section 3.1 above although these categories of activities should be refined by the team in the inception mission following further examination of secondary sources.

25. The geographic scope of the evaluation covers all areas in the country as some activities are national in scope. The actual geographic areas that have been targeted and reached by portfolio activities will be analysed in detail during the inception phase and the information used to inform plans for fieldwork.

4. Key Questions

26. The CPE will address the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in an evaluation matrix to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the main results and lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which will inform future strategic and operational decisions, including the handover of the programme by the end of 2013.

27. Evaluation Question One : To what extent have WFP portfolio's objectives and strategy been aligned, coherent and harmonised with: a) the people's needs, b) the Government's national agenda and policies, including sector policies, and c) partners' policies and strategies, including those of donors and UN agencies? To what extent:

- has WFP positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?
- have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies, on the one hand, and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies, on the other hand?

28. Evaluation Question Two : What has driven the key strategic decisions which have oriented the portfolio including the explicit plans for handover by the end of 2013? To what extent:

- has WFP: a) analysed the national hunger, food security, nutrition, livelihoods, social protection and gender issues to understand the hunger-

[99] WFP, 2010 Management Response to the Summary Evaluation Report Timor-Leste WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E/Add.1
[96] [Now see Chapter 1 of the present report.]

related challenges in the country? b) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues? and c) positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas?

- did other factors, both external and internal, determine the choices made? External factors include: national political and economic factors, donor-Government strategies etc.; and, internal factors include perceived comparative advantage, WFP corporate strategies, resources, regional bureau and country office structures and capacities, monitoring information, etc.

29. Evaluation Question Three: How has the portfolio performed, and what were the results achieved? What has been: a) the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control)? b) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and c) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level.

5. Evaluation Approach

5.1. Evaluability Assessment

30. The following provides a preliminary evaluability assessment which will be updated by the evaluation team at inception stage. OE has prepared an initial analysis of the portfolio and a library of documents from various sources which will assist the team with the initial desk review.

31. The framing of the WFP operations and activities funded by trust funds as a 'portfolio' does not necessarily reflect how WFP staff and partners view the work of the country office, nor is it commonly used in WFP. Generally each operation and trust fund is managed and accounted for separately. To overcome this challenge, the evaluation team at inception stage will consolidate the existing logical frameworks (PRRO 10388.1 v2, CP 200185 and Timor-Leste Joint Program MDG-F 2009) and to supplement or adjust the consolidated results framework with information from trust fund, special operation and other documentation. Done at inception stage, this will allow for a clearer statement of: overall strategy; intended outcomes/outputs; indicators used to measure changes, performance and results; and present defined time frames related to some intended results.

32. The CPE will build upon the range of secondary data available on the situation and operations in Timor-Leste. The Government, WFP country office and joint programme partners collect regular data on operational indicators that provide significant information of WFP-supported interventions and beneficiaries. WFP, FAO, European Union and others support an Inter-Ministerial Food and Nutrition Security Task Force that produces Quarterly Situation Assessment Reports. The Government has also completed a census with reports in 2010, a Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards 2007 and a Demographic and Health Survey (2009-10). WFP/IFPRI completed a household survey in three districts as a baseline for the

"Impact evaluation of Cash Transfers and Cash-Use Messaging for Public Works Participation" in 2011-12.

33. Significant data gaps are to be anticipated, given the context. For example, in the food security and nutrition area, the mid-term evaluation of the UNICEF-WFP joint project in 2011, evaluating a sub-activity in support of MCHN within the WFP country programme, found that a lack of data gathering on outcome and impact levels, and the data available came from the DHS 2009-10 meant that no changes were identifiable or attributable to the project. For several of the indicators information proved not to be available and for others neither baseline data was provided nor targets set.[97]

34. Another example of data constraints is illustrated by review of indicators of efficiency in the OE Timor-Leste PRRO Evaluation of 2009[98]. Very limited cost/resource data was available, especially disaggregated (less than the total operation/year level). While relatively more information was available on MCHN and School Meals Programme (SMP) no quantifiable information was presented on timeliness. Little comparable data was presented on systems and procedures efficiency, and in most cases data presented was at whole-operation level, sourced from the annual project reports.

35. At inception stage the evaluation team will review and analyse the existing programme and secondary data and determine the data and information gaps that need to be addressed in order to fully answer the evaluation questions.

36. The methods to be used to mitigate the information gaps for evaluation purposes will be included in the inception report's method section. To support this, the country office will be requested to provide available data and information to the team, including datasets collected for studies or monitoring purposes, at inception and fieldwork stages. Additionally some financial datasets may be available from WFP's corporate systems, which will be sourced from the regional bureau, or headquarters, if not available at the country level, and the regional bureau will be requested to provide such data or information in the first instance.

5.2. Methodology

37. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team and validated by OE during the inception phase. It should:

- Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

- Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases, by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.), and use a mixed-methods approach (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. The sampling technique to select field sites will demonstrate impartiality.

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[97] Noij, Frank, 2011. Mid-term Evaluation: UNICEF-WFP joint Project on children food security and nutrition in Timor-Leste, MDG Achievement Fund, Dili.

[98] WFP, 2010. Summary Evaluation Report Timor-Leste PRRO 103881 WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E

- Be based on an analysis of the logic of the portfolio and the common objectives arising across operations and trust fund activities and on a thorough stakeholder analysis.

- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions/sub-questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, budget and timing constraints.

- Be synthesized in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation, and for evaluation question three, clearly setting out the proposed data sources and analyses to address the Evaluation Questions in full.

- Participate in testing efficiency analysis methods for which draft guidance will be developed by a consultant working on developing guidance materials for OE evaluation managers and independent evaluation teams for which a separate TOR is being developed.

- The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the OE-commissioned evaluation of PRRO 10388 [99] [100] will be used as a secondary source to cover the 2008 to November 2009 period, permitting greater focus for new data collection and analysis from mid-2009 to the last quarter-2012. [101]

5.3. Quality Assurance

38. WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the United Nations Evaluation Group's norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community. It sets out steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OE Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

39. The evaluation team will ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. The evaluation report will be written in an evidence-based manner such that all observations, conclusions, recommendations, etc. are supported by evidence and analysis.

[99] WFP, 2010. Summary Evaluation Report Timor-Leste PRRO 103881 WFP/EB.A/2010/7-E

[100] WFP, Office of Evaluation 2009. Evaluation of WFP-Timor-Leste PRRO 10388.1 Assistance to Vulnerable Populations (September 2008 – August 2010) Final Report. Rome

[101] Annexes 5a and 5b provide a list of indicators relevant to the evaluation sectors from international and national references.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1. Phases and Deliverables

	Country Portfolio Evaluation – Phases, Deliverables and Timeline[102]	Key Dates 2012-13
Phase 1 - Preparation		
	Desk review, first draft of TOR, prepare budget	27 Aug-17 Sep
	Draft TOR/Budget (T+B) submitted to OE Dir.	17 Sept
	Circulation of TOR and revision	26 Sep - 3 Oct
	Solicit and obtain proposals from firm for team	18 – 25 Sep
	Contract firm	26 Sep-5 Oct
	Final TOR, Budget and Team Final Approval by OE Director	5 Oct
Phase 2 - Inception		
	Review documents and draft inception report including methodology.	15 Oct-9 Nov
	Briefing core team at via teleconference	*30 Oct*
	Team Leader and Evaluation Manager to Timor-Leste Junior Professional Officer-Research Analyst to accompany	5-8 Nov
	Submit draft inception report to OE	**15 Nov**
	OE quality assurance and feedback	15-19 Nov
	Revise inception report	20-21 Nov
	Submit revised inception report to OE*	**21 Nov**
	Inception Report finalized	23 Nov
Phase 3 - Evaluation Mission		
	Field work	**26 Nov – 14 Dec**
	Debriefing	11-12 Dec
	Aide memoire/In-country Debriefing	**12 Dec**
Phase 4 - Reporting		
	Evaluation analysis and report preparation	17 Dec – 05 Jan
	Draft evaluation report (Zero-1)	7-11 Jan
	Submit Draft Zero – 1 (Do -1) evaluation report to OE	**13 Jan**
	OE quality feedback	16 Jan
	Revise evaluation report	17-20 Jan
	Submit Draft Zero (Do) evaluation report to OE	**21 Jan**
	Draft (Do) of Evaluation Report submitted to OE Dir.	22 Jan
	Revision by team as necessary	28 Jan – 1 Feb
	Submit revised evaluation report to OE	4 Feb
	Do ER cleared by OE Dir. for distribution for comment as Draft 1 (D1)	5 Feb
	OE share evaluation report D1 with stakeholders	5 Feb
	Optional Stakeholder validation workshop in Timor-Leste with Team Leader – to be assessed after the inception mission by OE Director	11 -13 Feb
	OE consolidate comments	14-16 Feb
	Team revises evaluation report	18 Feb – 8 March
	Submit revised D1 evaluation report to OE	**8 March**

[102] *denotes approval of document permitting instalment payment

	Country Portfolio Evaluation – Phases, Deliverables and Timeline[102]	Key Dates 2012-13
	Revised D1.X ER submitted + major changes discussed with OE Dir.	11 March
	Summary Evaluation Report (SER) cleared by OE Dir. for distribution for Executive Management Group (EMG) comment as D2 *	12-20 March
	OE circulates the Summary Evaluation Report (D2) to EMG	20 - 29 March
	OE consolidate comments	29 March
	Revise Summary evaluation report	2 April
	Submit final summary evaluation report (D2) to OE	**3 April**
	D2.X ER (including revised SER) submitted to OE Dir.	4 April
	Approval of Evaluation Report by OE Dir. as FINAL APPROVED*	5 April
Phase 5 Executive Board and follow-up		
	Editing / translation of summary report	5 -15 April
	Preparation of Management response	March-April
	Preparation of evaluation brief and dissemination of reports	April
	Presentation of evaluation summary report to the EB	**3-7 June**
	Presentation of management response to the EB	**3-7 June**

40. Details regarding the deliverables are available on www.wfp.org/about/evaluation/evaluation-types/country-portfolio-evaluations and report templates will be provided to the team along with the evaluation bibliography at the outset. The inception report and evaluation reports shall be written in English. The evaluation team will produce written work that is of very high standard, evidence based, and free of errors. Following the quality control and stakeholder commenting process, the evaluation reports (full and summary) will be public documents and will be made available on the WFP website. The inception report will remain an internal document.

6.2. Evaluation Team

41. The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants who have not been significantly involved in work for the WFP Timor-Leste country office or have conflicts of interest. The team will include both international and national/regional consultants and is likely to be limited to two or three members. The combined expertise of the team leader and members will be in the following fields:

- Strategic planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes to enhance sustainable development, national ownership and capacity development for government institutions especially in food security, nutrition and social protection sectors.
- Strategic planning, implementation and evaluation of partnerships for food assistance programmes.
- Specific technical knowledge in food assistance for MCHN programmes, food security information systems, blended food production, supply chain management for food aid in-kind, conditional cash transfer management, food-for-work community/asset and infrastructure, and primary school meals programmes.

- Knowledge of Timor-Leste from first-hand experience and familiarity with similar small countries in rapid economic transition.

42. The evaluation team will include the following:

- A team leader with the following profile: Strong experience in strategic positioning and planning related to development and food security, and in leading evaluation teams. Strong analytical, communication, English writing skills, ability to conceptualize the evaluation and to understand the strategic implications of findings of the team. Experience in validating evaluation findings and recommendations through workshops with stakeholders.

- Team members with a with strong experience at either practical and/or strategic levels in the required technical fields, good interpersonal skills, ability to work effectively as part of a team and good drafting skills in English. The team will include (a) local translator(s) to assist in meetings and document review.

- Evaluators will act impartially and respect the code of conduct of the profession.

43. The team leader will be responsible to the evaluation manager for consolidating the team members' inputs, for the timely submission of the various reports and for the content of the evaluation full and summary reports. The team leader will be expected to travel to Timor-Leste two times for the inception and fieldwork stages and as an option a third time for the proposed stakeholder workshop. The need for a stakeholder workshop will be assessed and approved by the OE Director after the inception mission is completed.

44. The following specific qualifications are required for the team leader:

- Post-graduate degree in a relevant area with demonstrated knowledge and experience in strategic planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes to enhance sustainable development, national ownership and capacity development for government institutions especially in the food security sector.

- At least 10 years of experience managing applied development-related research and evaluations and experience in complex evaluations.

- Demonstrable skills, through prior work and professional education or accreditation, in evaluation methodology.

- A track record of publication and excellent English language writing and presentation skills.

45. The following specific qualifications are required for the team member(s):

- At least 5 years of demonstrable expertise through work experience in one or more areas of expertise required

- At least three years of experience in applied development-related research or evaluation

- A track record of written work in English language on similar assignments.

6.3. Roles and Responsibilities

46. Ms Marian Read (Evaluation Manager) and Ms Lorraine de Limelette (Junior Professional Officer) from WFP's Office of Evaluation will manage this evaluation. The Evaluation Manager (EM) is responsible for drafting the TOR; reviewing and finalizing proposals for selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; liaising with the reference group; organizing the team briefing in headquarters and coordinating field missions/stakeholder workshops with the country office; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and gathering and consolidating comments from stakeholders. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

47. WFP stakeholders at regional bureau (via teleconference) and country office levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Timor-Leste; set up meetings and field visits, assist the evaluation firm to organise for translators and provide logistic support during the inception mission and for the fieldwork stage. A detailed consultation schedule for fieldwork will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP country office staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

48. Relevant other internal stakeholders (technical units at headquarters levels and WFP informants no longer in Timor-Leste but who worked there during the period of review) and external stakeholders are expected to be available for interviews/meetings with the evaluation team; to participate in the evaluation debriefing and stakeholder workshops and to comment on the evaluation reports.

6.4. Communication

49. In order for this evaluation process to be an effective learning process the evaluation management and team will emphasize transparent and open communication with stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone communications between the evaluation team, the evaluation manager, and the country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues. OE will also make use of data sharing software to assist in communication and file transfer with the evaluation team and the country office. All significant documents related to the evaluation progress will be posted on OE's internal website in the "evaluations in progress" section. [103]

6.5. Budget

50. The evaluation will be financed from OE's Programme Support and Administrative budget. OE will cover: the remuneration of the evaluation team, international travel of the team and evaluation manager and Junior Professional Officer, domestic travel, and reasonable costs incurred by the country office to

[103] http://go.wfp.org/web/evaluation/evaluations-in-progress

provide transport and workshop venues for the team's fieldwork and stakeholder workshops.

Annex II Methodology

Introduction

1. The methodology for this CPE was fully set out in the Inception Report (Lister et al 2012). This Annex summarises the methodology adopted and comments on the team's experience in conducting the evaluation.

Evaluation guidelines and standards

2. WFP OE's EQAS guidelines for country portfolio evaluations provided a strong procedural and methodological framework. Their clear templates for the inception report and evaluation report were very helpful. The OECD DAC and UNEG evaluation standards were adhered to. The evaluation employed the standard DAC evaluation criteria, and agreed definitions of evaluation terms (in line with OE usage) were included in the inception report (Lister et al 2012 Annex P).

Evaluation Matrix

3. The evaluation team developed the key questions from the TOR (see Annex I above) into the main evaluation questions (EQs) shown in Box 2 below. These were further developed into the full evaluation matrix that is set out in Annex I below, showing additional subquestions, indicators and information sources. The EQs guided the enquiry and also provided a logical structure, consistent with the EQAS template, for presenting findings and conclusions in the evaluation report.

Box 2 Main Evaluation Questions

Key Question 1: **Strategic positioning.** Considering WFP's mandate, capacities and comparative advantage locally, to what extent has the portfolio been strategically positioned?	
EQ1.	What is the strategic context of food security and aid in Timor-Leste?
EQ2.	How relevant have WFP interventions been to men's and women's needs in Timor-Leste?
EQ3.	To what extent have the WFP portfolio's objectives and strategy been aligned, coherent and harmonised with the Government's national agenda and policies, including sector policies?
EQ4.	To what extent have the WFP portfolio's objectives and strategy been aligned, coherent and harmonised with partners' policies and strategies, including those of donors and UN agencies?
EQ5.	Have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies, on the one hand, and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies, on the other hand?
EQ6.	To what extent has WFP positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?
EQ7.	How well have WFP interventions reflected international good practice?
Key Question 2: What has driven the **key strategic decisions**, which have oriented the portfolio, including the explicit plans for handover by the end of 2013?	
EQ8.	To what extent has WFP analysed the national hunger, food security, nutrition, livelihoods, social protection and gender issues to understand the hunger-related challenges in the country?
EQ9.	To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?

EQ10. To what extent has WFP positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas?
EQ11. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?
EQ12. To what extent has WFP in Timor-Leste been able to learn from experience and to adapt to changing contexts?
Key Question 3: What have been the **performance and results** of the WFP portfolio? What are the explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control)?
EQ13. What have been the outcomes and impacts of WFP interventions?
EQ14. How efficient and effective have they been?
EQ15. How sustainable have they been?
EQ16. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?
EQ17. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?

Methodology and data collection instruments

Mixed methods

4. The evaluation team used a pragmatic mixed methods approach in addressing the evaluation questions. This section explains the different instruments employed and the approach to triangulating evidence from different sources. As envisaged in the Inception Report:

> We will seek both triangulation and complementarity between methods (see Box 3 below). Assessment of data availability shows that the coverage and quality of much key data is very weak. … Moreover, some of the key issues for the evaluation do not easily lend themselves to quantitative assessment. This reinforces the case for careful combination of methods, linked to an elucidation of the theories of change underlying the different main interventions in which WFP has been involved. By understanding *how* WFP and its partners expected to achieve results, the evaluation team will be able to assess the quality and credibility of the WFP portfolio, drawing on international evidence of what works, and international standards of good practice, to supplement the limited evidence that may be available on direct outputs and outcomes in Timor-Leste.

Box 3 Triangulation and Complementarity

Methods can be combined in different ways:

> **'Triangulation'**: confirming and corroborating results reached by one method with other results reached by another method. For instance, when beneficiaries of a project's services state that they judge it good (or bad); this can be cross-checked by collecting quantitative data on coverage and accessibility of the service.
>
> **'Complementarity'**: results obtained by a method help better understand those obtained by another method. In-depth theory-based approaches may help understand reasons why a project led to unexpected results; qualitative methods may help clarify concepts and define variables; and large-scale data sets may be analysed by multivariate and case-based methods.

Source: Stern et al 2012

Data Collection/Instruments

5. The main instruments were as follows (*with comments in italics on the evaluation team's experience in practice*).

(a) **Document/ literature review**. The bibliography [now at Annex XVIII] is drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered with the support of OE and the Timor-Leste CO.

(b) **Review of secondary data**. The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of WFP's internal data, including SPRs and annual work plans, together with country-level data on performance in the various sectors in which WFP is engaged. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to collect additional quantitative primary data, but we will draw systematically on earlier studies, including the evaluations summarised in [Inception Report Annex G].

Earlier evaluations of particular relevance were Kirkby et al 2009*,* Noij 2011*,* Beasca 2011 *and* Lenci 2012. *Data constraints were even more serious than anticipated. It is not unusual. in developing and post-conflict countries, to find that desired data (whether from administrative reporting or surveys) are unavailable, untimely or unreliable. However, for Timor-Leste the most recent substantial food security and living standards surveys predated the evaluation period (see main report ¶12–13 and ¶66–67) and had not been updated during it. Most seriously, as described in the main report (¶113), monitoring of the supplementary feeding programmes was at best rudimentary, and post distribution monitoring was not undertaken.*

(c) **Key informant and stakeholder interviews** were the main form of primary data collection. The range of interview targets was indicated in the stakeholder analysis. *See Annex IV for the list of interviewees; this included substantive interviews prior to the main evaluation visit and subsequently; a breakdown of interviewees is given in Table 14 below*. By default, interviews were treated as confidential; they were systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. *The compendium runs to almost 200 pages of notes on about 80 separate interviews/FGDs. The compendium enabled interview notes to be easily searched by topic, and facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives. Interviewees were very helpful in indicating additional key documents and data sources.*

(d) **Field visits.** During the inception mission, the evaluation team leader and evaluation manager undertook a two-day visit to Bobonaro and also visited the Timor Vita factory. This was helpful in assessing the feasibility of the field visits planned for the main evaluation mission; visits to Oecusse and Baucau were designed to provide a sample of all main types of WFP intervention, in two contrasting district contexts. *Field visits were used to gather more interviews and focus group discussions and also, to the extent possible, to mitigate some of the known gaps in available data, especially in relation to nutrition programmes. They helped in the assessment of capacity issues, not least through observation of service delivery at local level.*

(e) **Focus group discussions (FGDs)**. The field work included focus group discussions with beneficiaries (with separate groups for women) and with

WFP, government and other staff involved in delivering programmes. To gain the opinions and views of as many members of the focus group as possible, participatory approaches were used when feasible. *See the note on FGD participants in* Annex IV*, and gender breakdown in Table 14 below.*

(f) **Workshops/seminars**. The inception mission held an introductory workshop with staff drawn from all sections of the CO. The evaluation mission will similarly hold a workshop drawing on this IR at the start of its mission. At the end, there will be feedback presentations, based on a PowerPoint summary of the team's tentative findings and conclusions. A first workshop session will be held for the WFP CO. A subsequent debriefing will be held for core stakeholders from government and aid agencies, to be identified in consultation with the CO. The RB will be included in the CO workshop debriefing, and/or offered a separate telephone debriefing before the evaluation team leaves Dili (and the same will apply to the OE evaluation manager). These events will strengthen the team's understanding of the programme as well as promoting CO ownership of the evaluation, ensuring engagement with core stakeholders, and thus enhancing its utility.

These workshops/seminars were carried out as envisaged. A senior RB staff member participated in the wrap-up debriefings. As well as the separate debriefing with government and donor representatives, before leaving Dili the team held a telephone conference debriefing with OE and other reference group members in Rome and elsewhere.

6. WFP has recently undertaken a number of key strategic evaluations/reviews which provide general insights into issues faced at country level. These include the mid-term review of the strategic plan's implementation (WFP 2012c), an evaluation of CO adaptation to change (WFP 2012a) and three additional strategic evaluations concerning WFP's role in social protection and safety nets, partnerships in the transition from food aid to food assistance, and WFP's role in ending long-term hunger (WFP 2012b). These all describe the (evolving) context in which COs have to operate. The change evaluation, in particular, describes the challenges COs face and draws general conclusions about progress and obstacles in adapting to WFP's new strategic directions and processes; the present evaluation checked these conclusions against the Timor-Leste CO experience (Lister et al 2012, Annex D).

Evaluation process, feedback and validation

7. The evaluation *process* is always a vital part of the methodology. Key requirements are:

- to engage systematically with the multiple and highly diverse stakeholders in a constructive way, so as to ensure recommendations are useful and used, while maintaining the independence and objectivity of the evaluation;
- to ensure the multi-disciplinary perspectives of different team members are effectively brought together.

8. The organisation of the evaluation was designed to serve both these requirements. The generic process for CPEs is well described in the EQAS guidelines (and in the TOR at Annex I above).

9. The development of methodology during the **inception phase** was linked to extensive work on the country context and on initial analysis of the portfolio. An inception mission, comprising the Team Leader and the OE Evaluation Manager, supported by the OE research officer, visited Timor-Leste between 4–10 November 2012, and included exploratory visits to Bobonaro district and to the Timor Vita factory. It also allowed confirmation of the stakeholder analysis, initial contacts with key non-WFP stakeholders, and planning of the main evaluation timetable, including the WFP and stakeholder feedback sessions described above.

10. The full team participated in the **fieldwork phase**, between 27 November and 13 December 2012. This included parallel field trips to Oecusse and Baucau. As well as the team member who was a national consultant, additional interpreters were engaged to ensure that the international team members could conduct interviews separately. A number of national holidays (some of them unanticipated) made it more difficult to schedule interviews, but there were no major gaps in the interviews secured. Also, fortunately, there were no weather interruptions to the field trips.

Evaluability constraints and mitigation

11. The IR anticipated a number of evaluability constraints, as summarised below (*with retrospective comments in italics*).

Evaluating a portfolio vs. evaluating its components

12. The IR noted that:

> The requirement is to evaluate the portfolio as a whole, not the separate operations that comporise it. At the same time, an assessment of the portfolio's main components is a required step towards assessing the portfolio as a whole. In order to strike the right balance between "macro" and "micro" perspectives:
>
> (a) We will view the portfolio's components thematically: i.e. we will review school feeding, MCHN/supplementary feeding, FFW/A, cash for work and relief as the main thematic components of the portfolio; each will be appraised holistically over the evaluation time period.
>
> *This is reflected in the structure of this ER, especially section 2.3.*
>
> (b) Capacity development has had some dedicated funding, it has also been a theme within most portfolio components; we will address it systematically both as a component in its own right and as an issue that cuts across all components. We will follow the perspective of the evaluation of WFP's capacity development policy (WFP 2008b) in seeking a transparent assessment of progress at organisational and institutional levels as well as in the capacitation of individuals.
>
> *Reflected in the capacity development component of section 2.3; as noted there, however, evaluation was constrained by the general absence of specific outcome targets or baseline assessments.*
>
> (c) We will similarly address *gender* systematically as a cross-cutting issue. The four dimensions of WFP's gender policy (gender mainstreaming in operations, capacity development, accountability, and partnerships, advocacy and

research) provide a relevant framework for assessing WFP Timor-Leste's performance in relation to gender.

Reflected in the main text, and also in Annex VIII of this report.

(d) The evaluation matrix and our detailed evaluation questions [Annex I below] ensure that we will also explore the interconnections between different elements of the portfolio, in terms of its overall coherence and the potential synergies or trade-offs between its components.

Theory of change for portfolio analysis

13. The Inception Report also noted that:

> The "portfolio" is an analytical construct that may not correspond well with how WFP operates in practice. There has not been an explicit country strategy document for Timor-Leste, and the extent of CO discretion to operate strategically is limited (e.g. by its dependence on raising funds serially from external agencies and by the short-term planning horizon this entails). The evaluation will investigate the extent to which WFP has managed, or could manage, its Timor-Leste operations as a coherent portfolio.
>
> The portfolio has been built up rationally, and there is considerable documentary and oral evidence of the reasons for the portfolio choices that have been made, and the assumptions made about Timor-Leste's needs, WFP's capabilities, and the way in which particular interventions may achieve desired short- and longer-term objectives. But there is no documented overarching "theory of change" (ToC) for the portfolio as a whole, and the theories of change that underlie its various components are also largely implicit. The team will need to deduce and draw out a sense of what these objectives and strategy would have looked like had they been articulated at the time, and how these might have changed as operations unfolded and experience was gained in the country. Discussions with key WFP staff members will be essential to this process, as will discussions with other stakeholders such as government, donors, other UN partners and NGOs, and civil society representatives as well as with beneficiaries. There may be challenges in going back in time to try to capture initial overall strategic beliefs, if these have not been documented, but this process will be made easier by strong analysis of contemporary programme reports and interviews with those most involved at the time.

14. *The evaluation team reviewed the various logical frameworks attached to (some of) the different operations that comprised the portfolio, and concluded that attempting to consolidate them would not be meaningful (it would not, even in retrospect, usefully describe WFP intentions) or of practical help (in terms of yielding indicators for measuring the performance of the portfolio as a whole). However, the team was careful to assess, and if necessary reconstruct, the essential intervention logic of WFP's various component activities; this is reflected in the sub-structure for section 2.3, which follows each programme activity through from "intended programme and its rationale" to "programme delivery and results" followed by "assessment".*

Evaluating joint programmes

15. Most of WFP's operations are joint programmes, in the sense that WFP resources are being combined with those of GoTL and other partners towards common objectives. Results beyond the output level cannot be separately attributed to WFP; accordingly the evaluation will seek to assess WFP's contribution to joint results.

Sensitivity to context

16. The evaluation will be sensitive to the country and institutional context in which the CO has operated. Thus:

- The evolution of international standards and WFP policies has been noted. These standards and policies are a valid reference point in assessing the portfolio's quality and performance, but we will take care to recognise that decisions had to be made in the context of the time and with the knowledge then available.

- In addressing the strategic decisions that were made (whether deliberately or by default), it will be important to understand the real effective discretion available to the CO or other decision-makers at the time, taking account, for example, of the urgency of action at the time, the preferences of funding agencies and implementing agencies, the context of CO and GoTL capacities, and so forth. Exploring the issues and testing the hypotheses set out [in Inception Report Annex D, drawn from the evaluation of COs' adaptation to change] will be especially relevant here.

17. *As the ER makes clear, Timor-Leste's context as a fragile state is seen as key; and section 2.2 provides a careful discussion of the CO's space for strategic decision-making.*

Limited evaluation resources and need to focus.

18. The evaluation's resources are limited (and it is operating to a tight schedule). There are serious data limitations …. The evaluation team will seek to mitigate these constraints, and maximise the utility of the evaluation by:

- Building as much as possible on work that has been done already [cf. Inception Report Annex G] on previous evaluations,[104] and the bibliography [at Annex XVIII].
- Using our field work, to the extent possible, to address gaps in available information.
- Taking account of key stakeholder interests in determining areas of focus.

19. *As noted in ¶5(b) above, data limitations – most seriously in relation to the MCHN programme – proved even more serious than anticipated..*

20. *Areas of focus agreed with OE included in particular the handover and capacity development lessons that can be derived from experiences with school feeding and nutrition programmes, the effectiveness of other capacity development*

[104] Although their findings are a starting point, not to be accepted uncritically.

*efforts, and the relevance and effectiveness of the current MCHN programme. In order to concentrate the evaluation's resources, it was agreed not to go over ground already well covered in the PRRO evaluation (*Kirkby et al 2009*), notably their assessments of relief operations, of FFW/A under the PRRO, and of the effectiveness of the SMP.*

Evaluating capacity development

21. In the Inception Report the CPE team drew attention to the absence of an explicit WFP capacity development strategy in Timor Leste and to a general lack of reporting on capacity development outcomes achieved under successive WFP programmes and on how WFP was coordinating with other agencies providing technical assistance. The Inception Report noted that this would present difficulties for the CPE in making a systematic assessment of WFP's contribution to developing partners' capacity. The Inception Report proposed to address this by drawing on and adapting a framework developed by AusAid for measuring results from advisory support. WFP CO staff were to be key informants in providing information to populate the framework to show the levels of and changes in the capacity of partners. The framework is shown in Box 4 below.

22. In the event, the lack of dedicated capacity development staff in the CO and the unsystematic approach that had been taken to capacity development meant that the CPE team was over-ambitious in expecting that it would be possible to populate this framework in a meaningful way. (Similar observations could be made of WFP's National Capacity Index framework, as outlined in WFP's Capacity Development Kit – WFP 2012g, Section IIIB). Instead, the CPE has adopted a simpler framework that corresponds to WFP's definition of capacity as a quality that accrues to people, organisations and society. The CPE has drawn on WFP reports and key informant interviews with WFP staff and partners to reach judgements on outcomes for each of the partner ministries (Ministries of Social Solidarity, of Tourism, Commerce and Industry, of Health, and of Education). The assessment addresses the extent to which staff competences have been developed, the extent to which ministries (as organisations) function more effectively, and wider societal effects from increased capacity. For the Ministries of Social Solidarity and of Tourism, Commerce and Industry the CPE was also able to make a qualitative assessment of what WFP's contribution had been to improved capacity compared with inputs by other agencies.

Box 4 A Possible Framework for the Assessment of Capacity

From Dixon 2009, Annex E –in the context of developing guidelines for technical assistance (TA)

	Dependent	Supported	Guided	Independent
Task The conduct of all necessary processes and activities	Task requires adviser to perform an operational role	National staff requires strong support and assistance from an adviser	National staff can complete the task with some coaching or mentoring	No adviser input required for the task t be completed
Quality Ensuring that the task is done well enough to meet its purpose	Advisers must check every part of the work and usually must redo a substantial part	Adviser will do part of the task with the national staff in order to meet quality standards	National staff are able to complete the task to required quality standards with some guidance from the adviser	No adviser input required for the task t be completed at the required quality standard
Follow through Once started the extent to which all aspects of the task are completed. Are obstructions "pushed through"?	The tasks will not be completed unless an adviser is driving it	Advisers need to constantly check progress, and prompt action by the national staff in order for the task to be completed	The adviser's input is to assist national staff to plan the activity and to be involved in routine monitoring of progress	No adviser input required for the task t be completed
Development Design and implementation of required process or system change.	No change will occur unless the adviser manages the change	Adviser has significant input to design and implementation of the change	Adviser advises and inputs to the change design but it is undertaken and implemented mostly by national staff	No adviser input is required for a change to be effected.

Annex III Evaluation Matrix

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
KEY QUESTION 1: *Strategic positioning*. Considering WFP's mandate, capacities and comparative advantage locally, to what extent has the portfolio been strategically positioned?			
Strategic positioning	**EQ1. What is the strategic context of food security and aid in Timor-Leste?**		
	▪ Political and institutional context of Timor-Leste ▪ Economic characteristics and trends ▪ Key elements of TL's international relationships, including aid ▪ Significant changes in the international context during the evaluation period ▪ In what ways is the context affected by state capacity and fragility?	Standard international comparisons on economic, social and governance data, linked to Timor-Leste-specific assessments	International data sets Regular analytical work on TL (e.g. by EIU, WB, IMF, AsDB) TL-specific studies (e.g. reporting on fragile states and Paris principles, analytical and project documents from other agencies) Interviews
	EQ2. How relevant have WFP interventions been to men's and women's needs in Timor-Leste??		

	What are the needs? In particular:
	▪ What are the need in terms of food security and nutrition (and what are the characteristics of vulnerability)?
	  ○ Which are the most vulnerable groups and why?
	  ○ Which geographical areas are most vulnerable and why?
	  ○ Trends over time – situation getting worse or better?
	▪ To what extent does the WFP programme/ portfolio assess the real needs of the most vulnerable, including the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
	▪ How is need disaggregated by gender, and what are WFP efforts to address this?
	▪ What efforts does WFP make to ensure that its interventions are culturally sensitive?
	▪ How are data on needs regularly gathered? i.e. how are needs monitored over time?
	▪ How has the changing context during the evaluation period affected the nature of needs in Timor-Leste?
		Nutritional and food security status of population, morbidity and mortality, other relevant social indicators, and policy makers' perceptions.	Key surveys, including DHS and CFSVA and related analytical work.
			GoTL national and sector planning documents.
			WFP project documents and reporting.
			Analytical and projects documents from other agencies
			Interviews

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
	EQ3. To what extent have the WFP portfolio's objectives and strategy been aligned, coherent and harmonised with the Government's national agenda and policies, including sector policies?		
	In particular: ▪ Alignment with GoTL policies ▪ Alignment with GoTL systems Extent to which GoTL documents have provided a clear and comprehensive framework to align with. Quality of government systems. Mechanisms for mutual accountability.	Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with those set out in GoTL national and sector policy and planning documents, and with government and national systems (to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio, with reference to Paris/Busan/fragile states indicators)	GoTL policy and planning documents, at national and sector level. WFP programme documents. Aid effectiveness reviews. Informant perspectives (especially GoTL) on alignment.
	EQ4. To what extent have the WFP portfolio's objectives and strategy been aligned, coherent and harmonised with partners' policies and strategies, including those of donors and UN agencies?		
	How effective are WFP partnerships? In particular: ▪ How WFP works collaboratively within UN, and other donors, on a strategic policy level and at an implementation level. ▪ How well partnerships are managed and the quality of these.	To consider whether partnerships have been efficient and effective in practice (cf. EQ14) as well as relevant in principle (to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio, with reference to Paris/Busan/fragile states indicators)	Planning documents and performance information, including available MTRs/evaluations on WFP interventions, with special attention to joint interventions. GoTL, other partner and beneficiary perspectives.
	EQ5. Have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies, on the one hand, and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies, on the other hand?		
	Extent to which WFP policies and standards have been modified (or not) in the formulation and implementation of WFP's Timor-Leste portfolio and its components. Has modification of WFP policies/standards shown benefits in terms of the effectiveness and sustainability of the policies and programmes WFP has supported? (cf. EQ13,EQ14,EQ15) Has failure to modify WFP policies/standards shown disbenefits in terms of the effectiveness and sustainability of the policies and programmes WFP has supported?	Extent to which WFP has responded to national strategies and adapted to needs of context (e.g. in the standards applied for MCHN and SMP, including issues of targeting vs. national coverage). How this may have affected adherence to international standards or WFP corporate standards for specific interventions (cf. EQ7 below)	Documentation on WFP corporate strategy and thematic polices and standards. Project documents and performance informant on WFP interventions. Key informant interviews.

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
	EQ6. To what extent has WFP positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?		
	Who are the other key players in addressing food insecurity in Timor-Leste? How has WFP positioned itself vis-à-vis these players, and/or actively collaborated with them? Has WFP (or GoTL) explicitly identified the comparative advantages of different players in analytical work, service delivery, capacity development, and acted accordingly?	Context analysis (EQ1), and analysis of alignment (EQ4,EQ5). Operation of joint forums with GoTL and other partners addressing food security, nutrition, disaster preparedness, etc and WFP's role in these.	Documentation of policy and planning process in Timor-Leste (e.g. coordinating committees' membership, record of meetings and decision making, analytical and policy documents resulting). Key informant perceptions of these processes, their quality, and WFP's contributions to them.
	EQ7. How well have WFP interventions reflected international good practice?		
	Degree to which WFP portfolio and its components meet international standards of good practice, concerning: ○ Circumstances in which interventions are likely to be appropriate, effective ○ Design standards for interventions ○ Standards of M&E, and relevant performance indicators Are there potential (shot-term or long-term) conflicts between different international standards (e.g. aid effectiveness standards vs. programme delivery standards?)	Relevant international standards include: ▪ Sphere ▪ Paris/Busan and the fragile states guidelines on aid effectiveness ▪ WFP corporate policies and guidelines on food security, nutrition, gender, capacity development etc ▪ Other relevant international standards and good practice guidance (e.g. WHO re nutrition) NB. Judgment on WFP performance to take account of policy guidance and international standards available at the time strategic decision were made.	Documentation on the relevant international standards. WFP project documents and performance reports, plus other performance reports which indicate what standards have been applied (by design, and in practice) in WFP-supported interventions.

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
KEY QUESTION 2: What has driven the *key strategic decisions*, which have oriented the portfolio, including the explicit plans for handover by the end of 2013?			
Strategic decision making	**EQ8. To what extent has WFP analysed the national hunger, food security, nutrition, livelihoods, social protection and gender issues to understand the hunger-related challenges in the country?**		
	For each of its interventions, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular: ▪ Use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others for strategy formulation, and for influencing others. ▪ Analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods and gender context, and how this is used for effective targeting.	Analysis of programme direction against need set out in CFSVA and other key analytical instruments (cf. EQ2 above)	Analytical work undertaken directly by WFP or in collaboration with partners. Other relevant analytical work to which WFP had access.
	EQ9. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?		
	What explicit efforts has WFP made: o in advocacy on hunger-related issues? o towards developing national capacity for monitoring, analysis and decision-making? Is there evidence that WFP has o influenced GoTL and/or other partners, or public perceptions? o strengthened national capacity for analysis and decision-making?	Analysis of documentary record and participant perceptions. Assessment of effectiveness of capacity development efforts (EQ13, EQ14)	Cf. EQ6 above. Documents on the evolution of strategy and capacity. Key informant perceptions.
	EQ10. To what extent has WFP positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas?		
	In what areas is WFP positioned? and with which partners? How strategic (durable, long-term) does WFP role appear?	To draw conclusions from the findings under EQ3,EQ4,EQ8,EQ9 on the de facto positioning of WFP, how this is perceived by partners, and hence the prospects for sustained influence.	As for EQ3,EQ4,EQ8,EQ9.
	EQ11. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?		

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
	External factors to consider include: ○ Changing economic, budgetary and capacity context in Timor-Leste (EQ1) ○ Changing international context for WFP, including its financing environment Internal factors to consider include: ○ Staffing and capacity of the WFP CO and support from RB and HQ ○ Roll-out of WFP strategic and financial reforms, and the extent to which these have (in practice) increased flexibility and scope for strategic decision-making	Reconstruct the influences at play in WFP's decision-making processes, with particular attention to factors that constrain or enhance the real effective discretion of the CO in determining the what, when, how and where of its component activities. Assess against international good practice on strategic decision-making, with special attention to the importance of predictability in facilitating strategic approaches.	Documentation of decisions on programme components, their design, implementation and the perceived trade-offs between them. Key informant interviews with participants. International perspectives on strategic decision-making.
	EQ12. To what extent has WFP in Timor-Leste been able to learn from experience and to adapt to changing contexts?		
	What (systematic or ad hoc) efforts has WFP made to learn from experience in WFP, including adaptations to the changing Timor-Leste context (cf. EQ1 above) How has WFP responded to developments in international understanding of food insecurity, nutrition, school feeding, etc (including the developing context of WFP;'s global strategy and policies? Do WFP's (and GoTL's) monitoring systems provide feedback loops from beneficiaries 9individuals and communities)? To whom is WFP accountable, at portfolio and component level?	Documentary and oral record of WFP decision-making vis-à-vis Timor-Leste. Ways in which this reflects, or fails to reflect, (explicit or implicit) adaptation to lessons learned in Timor-Leste or internationally.	Findings on needs monitoring under EQ2 above. Key informant interviews within WFP. Perspectives of WFP partners, including GoTL. FGDs on accountabilities.

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
KEY QUESTION 3: What have been the *performance and results* of the WFP portfolio? What are the explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control)?			
Performance and results	**EQ13. What have been the outcomes and impacts of WFP interventions?**		
	How have outputs attributable to WFP contributed to outcomes and (to the extent data are available) impacts at the levels of joint intervention performance and sector performance?	Health and nutrition outcomes, progress towards relevant MDGs, etc. linked to assessment of plausible WFP contribution. (to be considered separately for relief, FFW/A, MCHN, SMP)	Data and existing analyses/reports on sectors in which WFP is engaged. Interviews and FGDs with key informants, including beneficiaries.
	Have there been unintended effects, e.g.: ○ on domestic food markets? ○ on GoTL capacity?	Effects of WFP supported interventions (and parallel GoTL policies) on domestic food markets, consumer preferences, distributional effects of explicit or implicit subsidies. Effect of WFP (and other agencies') competition for Timorese staff.	WFP and other monitoring information. Economic data and studies on prices, production, trade etc. Reports on GoTL performance and aid effectiveness issues (cf. EQ3, EQ7) Interviews, FGDs.
	EQ14. How efficient and effective have they been?		
	To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?	Cf. EQ13, assessment of actual outcomes vs. stated objectives and targets. (to be considered separately for relief, FFW/A, MCHN, SMP)	WFP project docs and reporting. GoTL and any other available data on programme delivery and results. Interviews and FGDs.
	To what extent have WFP interventions (successfully) targeted the most vulnerable?	Analysis of ex ante and ex post targeting.	Data on programme coverage. Interviews and FGDs.
	How efficient has WFP been in terms of logistics, systems and delivery and the degree to which this represents value for money?	Analysis of selected unit costs Comparison of cost, quality and timeliness in relation to other actors and/or WFP in other settings.	WFP records from CO and HQ systems. Available comparative data.
	EQ15. How sustainable have they been?		

Area of enquiry	Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information
	To what extent are the benefits of WFP assistance likely to be continuing, in terms of: ▪ Enduring benefits for individual beneficiaries? ▪ Maintenance of assets created with WFP assistance?	Experience of interventions already completed; design quality (including GoTL and beneficiary ownership of those under way) (to be considered separately for relief, FFW/A, MCHN, SMP, and for othe specific capacity development activities)	Project reports and evaluations. Interviews and FGDs.
	▪ Development of partners' (especially GoTL) capacity to operate systems for analysis, decision-making and service delivery? o How has capacity been conceived and measured? o How have capacity requirements been identified and addressed? o How have capacity interventions been coordinated (or not) with other partners, and with what implications for sustainability?	Capacity at individual, organisational and institutional levels.	Independent commentary. Interviews.
	EQ16. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?		
	Degree to which WFP's operations and its other activities (analysis, monitoring, advocacy etc) have complemented each other	Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ15.	Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.
	EQ17. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?		
	To what extent have WFP's operations (to be considered according to thematic area) and the portfolio as a whole complemented GoTL and other agencies' activities?	Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ15.	Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.

Annex IV People Consulted

The evaluation team interviewed over 100 people connected with the programme – see gender and institutional breakdown in Table 14 below. Interviewees are listed in Table 15 below. Table 14 also provides the gender breakdown of the focus group discussions, and Table 16 below provides additional details of the team's site visits.

Table 14 Interviewees and FGDs by affiliation and gender

INTERVIEWS	Male	Female	Total
WFP Timor-Leste	21	9	30
WFP RB and HQ	7	8	15
Government of Timor-Leste	28	1	29
Aid Agencies	8	10	18
NGOs / other	7	3	10
Total	71	31	102

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS					
Male only		Female only		Mixed	
groups	individuals	groups	individuals	groups	individuals
2	16	3	29	2	15m 8f

Table 15 List of Interviewees

Note: WFP personnel who worked in Timor-Leste during the evaluation period are listed under WFP Timor-Leste, along with their current designation.

Name	Role
WFP Timor-Leste	
Abel F. Boavida da Silva	Field Monitor Assistant, Baucau
Alberto Mendes	Country Director
Anastacio Soriano	Programme assistant
Antonio Avella	Deputy Country Director
Anusara Singhkumarwong	Nutrition Officer (now at WFP BKK)
Cesario Barreto Tilman	Programme Assistant, Maliana
David Sengonzi	Consultant for pipeline
Diana Borges	Programme officer (nutrition)
Diana Syafitri	Programme Officer - Head of Oecusse sub-office
Elias Sarmento	Programme Officer (nutrition)

Name	Role
Ermino da Costa	Staff Assistant / Administrative Assistant, Baucau
Joan Fleuren	Former Country Director, WFP TL; Chief of Programme Design Unit, WFP
Jose Marcal	National Programme officer (operation/government liaison)
Julio da C. Oliveira Pinto	Programme Assistant, Baucau
Kennedy Maupa	Logistics officer
Lizette Karlsson	Programme Adviser (Consultant)
Louis Colo	Field Monitor Assistant, Oecusse
Maarten van Driel	Consultant (Logistics Officer) 2008-2010; Programme Adviser, 2011-2012
Mamo Getahun	Programme officer (M&E)
Manuel Alves Barbosa	National Programme officer (CCTs)
Monica Apondi Arara	Head of sub–offices Dili & Bobonaro
Nelia Fatinha Maria Lu	Field Monitor Assistant, Baucau
Octavio Sequeira	Field Monitor Assistant, Baucau
Pedro Antonio Boavida	Field Monitor Assistant, Baucau
Raul de Oliveira	Programme Assistant (biogas project)
Ria Angeline Liem Saunoah	Administrative Assistant, Oecusse
Rita Leite	Logistics Officer
Roberto Bras Freitas	Field Monitor Assistant, Baucau
Sharofat Nabieva	Head of sub-office, Baucau
Soce Ndaye	Finance and Admin officer
WFP RB and HQ	
Carlos Centeno	Prevention and Recovery Unit, WFP
Elizabeth Faure	Programme Adviser, Handover and Partnerships, WFP
Emilie Sidaner	Programme Officer, School Feeding Policy, WFP Rome
Heiko Knoch	NGO relations, WFP Rome
Kenro Oshidari	Regional Director, BKK
Kimberly Deni	Humanitarian Transition Services, WFP Rome
Levan Tchatchua	Field Support Officer, Cash for Change Unit, WFP HQ

Name	Role
Lynn Brown	Economic Analysis Service
Maria Sfarra	UN relations, Multilateral and NGO Relations Division
Parvathy Ramaswami	Head of Strategic Plan and Implementation Branch, WFP
Sahar Nejat	Nutritionist, Nutrition Department, WFP Rome
Samir Wanmali	Senior Regional Programme Adviser, BKK
Simon Clements	Field Support Officer, Cash for Change Unit, WFP HQ
Victor Tsang	Gender Consultant, WFP Gender Unit
Yvonne Forsen	Head of VAM and Nutrition, Kenya; Ex- Regional Emergency Assessment Officer, Bangkok
Government of Timor-Leste	
Agustinho da Costa Ximenes	Food Security Consultant, MAF
Adelino A M do E Santo	Head of CHC, Uailili, Baucau
Fredelino Jose da Cruz Bena Sila "Lafu"	Warehouse Manager, District Office MTCI (MCIA), Oecusse
Carlito Mota	National Director, School Action, MoE
Carlitos Correia Freitas	Head of CDC Department and Deputy Director of Community Health Directorate, MoH
Damiao da Costa	Head of Administration, District Office of Education, Oecusse
Dr Francis	Doctor at Maliana Hospital (Bobonaro)
Dulce de Jesus Soares	Vice Minister of Education for Basic Education
Feliciano G.F.	Programme officer MoH
Fredelino Jose da Cruz	Head of District Office MTCI (MCIA), Oecusse
Guido Ricardo Belo	Head, District Office of MSS, Oecusse
Joao Bosco	Chief of Nutrition Department, MoH
Joao Cardoso	Deputy director DHS Bobonaro
Jose Antonio Fatima Abilo	Director of Aid Effectiveness, Ministry of Finance
Jose Anuno	District Administrator, Oecusse
Juliano Freitas Gusmao	Chief of Social Education Section, DoE office, Baucau
Justinho ...	Nutrition Officer, District Health Service, MoH Oecusse
Luis de Jesus Neno	Director of the Oesilo CHC, Oecusse
Manuel Lamberto Vitor	Chief of Department of Food Security, MAF

Name	Role
Mario Moreira dos Reis	Food security officer, MoH
Mario Soares	Food Security officer, MoH
Lourenco ...	Head of Department, Disaster Operations Centre, National Disaster Management Committee
Sabino Pinto	Chief, Department of Tecnico Agricolo, MAF Oecusse
Sancho Ximenes da Silva	Manager, Food Security Unit, MTCI Warehouse
Sebastiao ...	School Meals Coordinator, District Office of Education, Oecusse
Sebastiao ...	Chief, Department of Planning and Finance ,MAF Oecusse
Victor Manuel dos Reis da Costa	Deputy Director, MoH Oecusse
??	District Nutrition Officer, CHC Sub-district Oesilo, Oecusse
??	Head of District Health Department, Baucau
Aid Agencies	
Dr Domingas Angela Mica	National Professional Officer (MCHN), WHO
Dr. Carla Quintao	MCHN focal point, UNICEF
Elsty Davidz-Morato	Social Development Officer, AsDB, Dili
Finn Reske-Nielsen	UN, Special Representative of the Secretary General
Fredrick Okwayo	UNFPA statistician
Gerard Cheong	Assistant Director, Infrastructure and Rural Development, AusAID, Dili
Julio dos Santos	M&E officer for MDG-F (UNICEF)
Luis dos Reis	National Professional Officer (Planning), WHO
Mary Ann Maglipon	UNICEF, Dili
Mayang Sari	Nutrition specialist, UNICEF
Miriam Smith	Senior Officer, Health and Education, AusAID, Dili
Pamela Dale	Head of Social Protection, World Bank Dili
Peter Maher	Head of Development Cooperation, EU Delegation, Dili
Rafiqul Haider	Joint Programme Coordinator MDG-F, UNICEF
Ruben Flamarique Urdin	MDGF & COMPASIS Project Manager Emergency and Rehabilitation Unit in Timor-Leste, FAO
Sarah Lendon	Director, Health and Education, AusAID, Dili

Name	Role
Sonia Godinho	Legal and Financial Manager, EU Delegation, Dili
Yi-Kyoung Lee	Senior Health Specialist, World Bank, Dili
NGOs / other	
Bobby Lay	Managing Director Timor Global
Denny A. Kurniawan	Food Technologist (Timor Global)
Egidio Corbafo	Health Promotion Officer, Hadiak NGO
Gashaw Dagnew Kebede	Resource Mobilisation Manager, PLAN, Timor-Leste
Geraldo Soares Ribeiro	School Director (Cassait)
Joao Tarciso Vaj	School Director, Maquelab EPP, Oecusse
Kathryn Robertson Marcal	Country Representative, Trocaire, Dili
Kerry Brogan	Program Manager, The Asia Foundation, Dili
Lamberto Gusmao Freitas	Grupu Hadia Futuru, (NGO building school kitchens in Baucau)
Pascoela ...	District Coordinator, Breastfeeding Programme, Alola Foundation, Oecusse

Table 16 Field Site Visits

Bobonaro	
Maliana, 7 November 2012	Site of SISCa: observation and discussions with staff, volunteers, beneficiaries
Guda suco, 8 November 2012	Site of CCT (road) project; meeting with Suco chief and about 20 others involved in the CCT project; on-site discussions.
Oecusse	
Bobmeto Health Centre, Oesilo sub-district, 3 December 2012	FGD with 11 female beneficiaries
Oenunu Health Post, Oecusse, 4 December 2012	FGD discussion with 8 men FGD discussion with 6 PSF (3m, 3f) FGD discussion with 10 female beneficiaries
Suni-Ife FFW/A project	Villagers who have been involved in FFW/A under COMPASIS (FGD with 8 men, 8 women)
Oenunu aldeia, Oecusse, 5 December 2012	Transect walk

Baucau	
Osso-Hula sub-village, Venilale subdistrict, 4 December 2012	Site of SISCa: separate group discussions with beneficiaries, staff, volunteers/PSFs; two house visits
Uailili village – Baucau Subdistrict, 6 December 2012	Site of SISCa: individual interviews with staff, 6 beneficiaries, 5 volunteers, nutrition assistant, 2 house visits.
Bualale Village, Quelicai Subdistrict, 5 December 2012	Site of CCT (irrigation project): interviews with key personnel (e.g. Suco chief, two sub-chiefs) plus FGD with c12 female workers, 5 male workers, 2 household visits. Also walked and talked the length of the irrigation channel constructed.
Other	
Cassait school, Bazartete, Liquica District, 8 November 2012	Site of biogas stove installation
Railaco, Ermera District, 3 December 2012	Timor Vita Factory

Annex V Timor-Leste Background Information

Geography and Administration

Map 1 Timor-Leste and its neighbours

Map 2 Timor-Leste District Map

The island of Timor is the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sunda Islands at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago (see Map 1 above). Timor-Leste includes the eastern half of the island of Timor, the Oecusse (Ambeno) region on the northwest portion of the island of Timor, and the islands of Pulau Atauro and Pulau Jaco.

Timor-Leste is divided into thirteen administrative districts, shown in Map 2 above. The districts are subdivided into 65 subdistricts, 442 sucos (villages) and 2,225 aldeias (hamlets).

It has a population of 1.2 million, the majority of whom are Roman Catholic. Tetum and Portuguese are the official languages and Indonesian and English are also

spoken along with numerous indigenous languages (the 2004 population census[105] identified over 30 "mother tongues", with about half of them spoken by several thousand people).

Institutions and Capacity

Box 5 below, which draws on a paper prepared for the National Directorate of Aid Effectiveness (NDAE) highlights the significance of Timor-Leste's historical legacy and the pervasive capacity issues that arise at all levels.

Box 5 Fragility and Capacity in Timor-Leste

- Timor Leste is one of the smallest of the current group of fragile states in terms of population (about 1,200,000). But it is still complex and opaque in its political and social systems, many of which are still emerging. Many of the modern forms of capacity that we would expect to see in a functioning government (in terms of public sector organizations, buildings, even policies) that have emerged in recent years remain ungrounded in the social and cultural realities faced by Timor-Leste.
- The foundations of capacity in any country, e.g. the levels of basic literacy and numeracy, the effectiveness of the education system, the degree of social capital and cohesion, the attitudes to the state, the legacy of historical events, the intensity of personal trauma, all critically influence the way capabilities emerge especially at the individual level. Many Timorese during their lifetimes have not had the benefit of much positive professional or organizational experience. As a direct result, many do not have the basic skills and aptitudes to absorb complex skills and knowledge and to manage modern institutions. The problem in Timor Leste is thus not just the critical shortages of staff. It is the combination of huge gaps in the number of people available combined with a lack of basic absorptive capacity even in those staff who are available for work.
- The nearly five centuries of colonial rule have left very little behind in the way of effective, sustainable institutions. Institutional memories which still exist in countries such as Zimbabwe or Liberia appear to have no counterpart in Timor Leste where professionals with relevant institutional experience are very scarce..
- Timor-Leste has a complex language heritage. Only a minority of GoTL civil servants, for example, understand Portuguese, the language of law and justice and the constitution. Few teachers have enough fluency to comply with its use as teaching language. Very few government officials can speak and read the main language of TA, i.e. English. There are at least 16 main indigenous languages, with Tetum emerging as a national lingua franca, but Bahasa Indonesia is still also widely used.
- Assuming that the task of stabilizing a fragile, post-conflict state can take twenty to thirty years, Timor Leste should be seen as only part way into the process.

Source: adapted from NDAE 2011?b

The most recent World Bank Survey, *Doing Business 2011*, ranks the country at number 174 of 183 reporting countries, in terms of ease of conducting business. (UNDP 2011b)

[105] Available at http://dne.mof.gov.tl/census/tables/index.htm.

The country ranks 143 out of 182 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2011).

Currency and fiscal year

Timor-Leste uses the United States Dollar (USD).

After 2007 the fiscal year was changed: formerly July–June, now January–December.

National Objectives

Box 6 Goals of the Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030

a) Every child has access to free, compulsory and mandatory education through Grade 12;
b) All Timorese are literate;
c) All citizens have access to primary health care;
d) No child perishes because of inadequate water supply, malnutrition, or lack of health care.
e) Every citizen has the opportunity to acquire new skills based on 21st-century technologies, such as wireless broadband, high-yield agriculture, and cutting edge health care delivery.
f) Extreme poverty is eradicated through universal access to public services, ample job opportunities, and economic development in all regions.

Source: : GoTL 2010a

Human Development Index

Box 7 Timor-Leste's human development ranking in context

Timor-Leste's HDI value for 2010 is 0.502, placing it in the medium human development category, with a ranking of 120 of the 169 countries reporting in the 2010 Global HDR.

Based on 2010 data, Timor-Leste's HDI ranking is above other countries in the Southeast Asian region such as the Lao People's Democratic Republic (122), Cambodia (124), Myanmar (132) and Papua New Guinea (137). Timor-Leste is also ranked higher than most Sub-Saharan African countries, notably Kenya (128), Nigeria (142), Angola (146) and Mozambique (165). Within the medium human development category, Timor-Leste's 2010 HDI of 0.502 is below the average of 0.650, but its overall ranking indicates substantial progress since 2005, when its HDI value of 0.428 placed it within the low human development category. Its ranking at independence, in 2002, was 0.3753..Much of this progress is attributable to increases in per capita income boosted largely by oil revenues, and to a lesser extent to the other, non-income areas of the HDI.

Source: HDR report for Timor-Leste (UNDP 2011b).

Box 8 Structure of Health Services

The Basic Services Package (BSP) for Primary Health care and hospitals was launched in 2007. This includes antenatal care, newborn care, breastfeeding and complementary feeding education and promotion, micronutrient supplementation, treatment of severe malnutrition, immunisation of children and mothers, treatment of pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria, and distribution of insecticide treated bednets,

The entry points into the public health service are the Health Posts (HPs), situated at strategic Sucos (the main administrative sub-division in rural areas) within the sub-districts, serving 1,000–5,000 people (200–1,000 households). Health posts provide the BSP and health promotion. They provide links to higher level of referral and emergency services (through the radio communication system) and to the Family Health Promoter programme through community committees. There will normally be at least four health posts managed by the subdistrict Health Centre (SDHC) that function as a unit to provide services to a subdistrict. Where there is no health post available, a mobile clinic will provide Suco-level services on a regular basis to ensure adequate coverage of the sub-district.

The hospital services package supports and complements the BSP and provides referral services as part of the overall continuum of care starting in the community. It is governed by the Health Policy Framework and by specific legislation that recognizes two levels of hospital services: five referral hospitals and the Guido Valadares National Hospital (GVNH) of Dili as the national referral hospital. At present there is no private sector hospital, though this is envisaged as part of the public-private mix in the future.

The District Health Management Team usually consists of five or six District Public Health Officers (DPHOs) covering Communicable Disease Control; Maternal and Child Health; Non-communicable Diseases; Environmental Health, Nutrition and Health Promotion; Health Management Information System; and Logistics.

Table 17 Health Indicators for Timor-Leste

Indicator	Year	Data	Source
< 5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	1990	169	UNICEF SOWC 12
	2010	55	
Maternal Mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)	2008	370	UNICEF SOWC 12
Population not using improved water source (%)	2004	42	UNDP HDR 2008/2007
	2006	_	UNDP HDR 2009
Life expectancy at birth	2000-2005	58.3	UNDP HDR 2008/2007
	2011	62.5	UNDP HDR 2011
People living with HIV - Adults + Children (estimate)	2001	_	UNAIDS Global AIDS Epidemic Report 2010
	2007	_	
Public expenditures on health (% of government expenditures)	2009	12.3	UNDP HDR 2011

Table 18 Trends in childhood mortality

Table 9 Early childhood mortality rates

Neonatal, postneonatal, infant, child, and under-five mortality rates for five-year periods preceding the survey, Timor-Leste 2009-2010

Years preceding the survey	Approximate calendar years	Neonatal mortality (NN)	Postneonatal mortality (PNN)[1]	Infant mortality ($_1q_0$)	Child mortality ($_4q_1$)	Under-five mortality ($_5q_0$)
0-4	2004/2005-2008/2009	22	22	44	20	64
5-9	1998/1999-2002/2003	30	38	68	32	98
10-14	1992/1993-1996/1997	35	47	82	36	115

[1] Computed as the difference between the infant and neonatal mortality rates

Source: NSD & ICF Macro 2010.

Table 19 Nutrition indicators in rural and urban settings 2009/2010

	Stunting (%)	Wasting (%)	Underweight (%)
Urban	49.2	14.9	34.9
Rural	60.4	19.9	47.5

Source: NSD & ICF Macro 2010.

Table 20 Under-5 Nutrition Indicators by District

Percentage of children under five years classified as malnourished according to three anthropometric indices of nutritional status Timor-Leste 2009-2010

	height-for-age (stunting)		weight-for-height (wasting)		weight-for-age (underweight)	
	Percentage below -3 SD (severe)	Percentage below -2 SD (moderate and severe)	Percentage below -3 SD (severe)	Percentage below -2 SD (moderate and severe)	Percentage below -3 SD (severe)	Percentage below -2 SD (moderate and severe)
Aileu	16.7	31.4	29.8	49.4	12.0	41.2
Ainaro	43.7	68.8	6.7	18.2	17.0	47.5
Baucau	39.6	58.1	5.5	21.6	17.5	43.0
Bobonaro	45.0	72.6	6.8	15.3	18.8	52.5
Cova Lima	36.8	64.7	4.4	13.8	13.2	47.4
Dili	16.1	43.9	4.1	14.5	7.9	30.1
Ermera	48.7	68.2	6.6	20.1	23.4	57.4
Lautem	18.7	51.0	2.9	9.6	6.7	32.1
Liquica	34.7	56.6	5.1	15.1	14.6	41.1
Manatutu	21.2	46.7	10.8	19.6	8.7	34.3
Manufahi	37.1	64.7	5.6	14.9	13.5	43.7
Oecussi	40.4	69.0	9.0	27.0	28.3	62.9
Viqueque	22.7	51.7	9.4	21.7	13.3	46.7

Source: Timor Leste Demographic and health survey 2009-2010, National Statistics Directorate, Ministry of Finance (NSD & ICF Macro 2010).

Figure 8 Trends in underweight and stunting, 2002–2010



Note: prevalence estimated according to the WHO Child Growth Standards.

Source: MICS 2002, DHS 2003, TSLS 2007, DHS 2009–2010, with additional analysis by WHO (reproduced from UNICEF 2011).

Annex VI Portfolio Analysis

Timor-Leste CO in context

Table 21 WFP Country Offices by Size Category

Very large	Large	Medium	Small	Very small
Average Direct Support Costs 2009–2012				
$25m	$4.4m	$2.2m	$1m	$0.2m
Sudan	Zimbabwe	Sri Lanka	Madagascar	Georgia
Afghanistan	Liberia	Central African Republic	Zambia	Iran
Somalia	Tanzania	Korea, DPR	Lao PDR	Eritrea
Pakistan	Iraq	Syrian Arab Republic	India	Angola
Congo, (DRC)	Nepal	Burundi	**Timor-Leste**	Togo
Haiti	Bangladesh	Burkina Faso	Congo	Cuba
Ethiopia	Côte d'Ivoire	Malawi	Guatemala	Cape Verde
Chad	Mozambique	Mauritania	Guinea-Bissau	Namibia
Kenya	Senegal	Colombia	Lesotho	Sao Tome & Principe
Niger	Philippines	Indonesia	Nicaragua	Bhutan
South Sudan	Rwanda	Cameroon	Benin	Peru
Uganda	Mali	Guinea	Bolivia	Dominican Republic
Yemen	Cambodia	Kyrgyzstan	Swaziland	Azerbaijan
Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Sierra Leone	Egypt	Gambia	
Myanmar		Ghana	Ecuador	
		Djibouti	El Salvador	
		Tajikistan		
		Algeria		
		Armenia		
		Honduras		
		Jordan		

Source: WFP internal list February 2013. COs are assigned to groups based primarily, but not exclusively, on average Direct Support Costs (DSC). DSC are a sub-set of "Direct expenditures" which are defined thus:

> Direct expenditures include food, external transport, landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH), direct support costs (DSC) and other direct operating costs (ODOC) components, but exclude indirect support costs (ISC) and programme support and administrative (PSA) budget costs.
>
> Direct support costs (DSC) are those costs, generally at the country office level, that can be directly linked with the provision of support to an operation and which would not be incurred should the activity cease.

Portfolio Details

Table 22 below summarises all WFP's main operations since 1999, Table 23 shows additional activities funded by grants and trust funds, and Table 24 is a comprehensive view of the portfolio's funding sources.

Table 25 and Table 26 below provide more detail on the main WFP operations during the evaluation period.

Table 27 (MDG-F) and Table 28 (COMPASIS) provide more detail on the two UN joint programmes in which WFP participated.

Table 22 WFP operations 1999-2012

Project Number	Type	Title	Approval Year	Food budget (US$)	Total WFP project budget (US$)
200185	CP	Country Programme - Timor-Leste 200185 (2011-2013)	2011	11,459,598	22,456,307
107970	SO	Logistics Augmentation and Capacity Building for the Government of Timor Leste	2008	0	1,986,322
10388.1	PRRO	Assistance to vulnerable populations in Timor Leste	2008	29,440,117	50,937,484
10388.0	PRRO	Investing in People's Future	2004	4,279,496	9,460,887
10317.0	EMOP	Assistance to Drought and Flood-affected Populations in Timor-Leste	2003	1,244,643	2,719,531
06178.0	SO	Emergency food Assistance to IDPs and urban poor (SO)	1999	0	17,063,705
06177.0	EMOP	Food Assistance to Victims of Civil Strife	1999	10,839,355	22,243,843
06175.0	EMOP	Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in East Timor	1999	2,685,425	8,796,071
TOTAL (US$)					135,664,150

Source: SPR, RS 10 February 2013 (CP 200185)

Table 23 Main additional activities supported by grants/trust funds (US$)

Donor	Contribution Year	Current budget	Activities funded
Brazil	2008	125,378	Support WFP capacity development regarding school feeding programme: to strengthen mechanisms for legal, institutional and financial frameworks. Emphasis is placed on engaging civil society participation, promoting local purchase of commodities and integrating inter-sectoral approaches
Brazil	2009	173,670	FFW/Assets, VAM and capacity development for the National School feeding Programme
Germany	2009	35,800	Project for Enhanced Synergy between FFW/Assets & VAM in Timor-Leste
USAID	2009	313,240	Transition Opportunity Grant for the MCHN Programme
Spain	2009	673,500	Multi donor trust fund (Children food security and nutrition)
Spain	2011	2,082,600	Cash pilot project in 2 districts (Bobonaro and Baucau). Activities of cash for work (disaster preparedness and mitigation activities)
total		3,404,188.00	

Source: RMBG and ERD departments, Country Office, SPA, Brazilian trust fund briefing of November 2009

Table 24 Timor Leste Portfolio 2008–2012: Financing Sources

	TOTAL	DEV 200185	PRRO 10388.1	SO 107970	Support WFP capacity development regarding school feeding programme	FFW/Assets, VAM and capacity development for the National School feeding Programme	Project for Enhanced Synergy between FFW/Assets & VAM in Timor Leste	Transition opportunity Grant for the MCHN Programme	Multi donor trust fund (Children food security and nutrition).	Cash-transfer pilot project
Australia	7,373,692	2,978,396	4,395,296							
Carryover from previous operations	6,350,120	3,399,877	2,950,243							
USA	5,497,640		5,184,400					313,240		
Multilateral	5,432,732	1,912,000	3,520,732							
Japan	4,642,119		4,642,119							
Spain	4,446,351		1,690,251						673,500	2,082,600
Private Donors	2,771,137	708,150	967,620	1,095,367						
Timor Leste	2,050,000	1,700,000	350,000							
UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF)	719,515	184,515	535,000							
Brazil	656,809	357,761			125,378	173,670				
Korea, Rep. of	550,000	400,000	150,000							
Ireland	1,029,627	643,501	386,126							
European Commission	324,963		324,963							
Germany	35,800						35,800			
Miscellaneous income	211		211							
TOTAL	**41,880,716**	12,284,200	25,096,961	1,095,367	125,378	173,670	35,800	313,240	673,500	2,082,600
source		RS 10.03.2013	RS 04.03.2012	RS 17.11.2011	*Table 23 above*					

Table 25 Factsheet/Timeline 2008–2012

Timeline and funding level of Timor Leste portfolio (2008-2012)

Operations	Time Frame	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRRO 10388.1	Sept 2008 Aug 2011	Req: $50.9 M Contrib: $ 25.1 M				
SO 107970	April 2009 Aug 2011		Req: $1.9 M Contrib:$1.1 M			
DEV 200185	Sept 2011 Dec 2013				Req: $22.5 M Contrib: $12.3 M → 2013	



Food Distributed (MT)	7,730*		6,834		5,146		3,984		3,632		
Direct expenses (US$, millions)	$8.1*		$10.8		$5.9		$7.5		$9.6***		
% Direct Expenses: Timor Leste vs. World	0.2%		0.3%		0.1%		0.2%		n.a.		
Beneficiaries (actual)	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
	123,887	135,073	182,177	186,357	155,775	158,885	152,397**	170,558**	n.a.	n.a.	
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)	258,960		368,534		314,660		322,955		102,000***		

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situations (4 March 2012, and 10 February 2013), Annual Performance Report 2008 - 2011 , CO

Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US$ millions

* These figures take into account the PRRO10388.0 that ended in August 2008 but which is not included in the evaluation portfolio

** The MCHN beneficiaries were double-counted (in PRRO SPR 2011 and in CP SPR 2011). The figures in this table correct this mistake and as a result do not correspond to total number of beneficiaries indicated in SPR 2011

*** Data from the Executive Brief: Timor leste cleared on 10 September 2012

Table 26 Overview of Major Operations

Operation number	Operation title	Timing	Strategic objective	Beneficiaries and activity time	Planned beneficiary number	Funding obtained	Donors	Cooperating international agencies	Operational governmental partners	NGOs partners
DEV 200185 (country programme)[1]	Country Programme - Timor-Leste 200185 (2011-2013)	Sept 2011 Dec 2013	SO3, SO4, SO5	1) MCHN for most vulnerable groups (children, pregnant and lactating women from the 13 districts). 2) FFA (COMPASIS Project) to improve food security of 15 000 beneficiaries of 2 districts (Ermera and Oecusse); 3) Technical Assistance and Capacity Development to Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, Ministry of social solidarity	115,000	11,112,219	Australia, Timor Leste, Rep. of Korea, Brazil, private donors, UN common funds and agencies	FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO	Ministry of Health (Nutrition department), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, Ministry of social solidarity, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	CARE International, World Vision, HIAM Health and Health Net in transport, Organisasaun Haburas Moris, Grupu Bili Bala Olaria, Grupu Hadia Futuru and Yayasan Raimaran
SO 107970[2]	Logistics Augmentation and Capacity Building for the Government of Timor Leste	April 2009 Aug 2011	_	1) Establishment of a Logistics Coordination Cell within the Min, of Social Solidarity, 2) updating the assessment of the logistics infrastructure needs 3) Rehabilitation of logistics infrastructure for emergency response	--	1,175,367	private donors	-	Ministry of Social Solidarity, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry	
PRRO 10388.1	Assistance to vulnerable populations in Timor Leste	Sept 2008 Aug 2011	SO1, SO3, SO4, SO5	1) MCHN for pregnant and lactating women and children under 5; 2) School Feeding for primary school children in the 13 districts 3) Food For Work/assets for communities where food insecurity is at critical levels and alternative sources of income are particularly scarce; 4) Return Packages for IDPs, 5) Relief assistance for IDPs in case of natural or human disaster, 6) Systems and capacity development	376,550	25,096,959	USA, Japan, Australia, Spain, European Commission, Ireland, Rep. of Korea, private donors, UN common funds and agencies, Timor Leste,	FAO, UNICEF, WHO, ILO, UNDP, UNFPA	1) Ministry of Health, 2) Ministry of Education, 3) Ministry of Social Solidarity, 4) Ministry of Infrastructure, 5) Ministry of Planning and Finance,6) Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,7) National Disaster Management Department, 8) Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, 9) Secretary of State for Professional Training and Employment	**International NGOs**: 1) World Vision International,2) Caritas Australia, 3) Care International, 4) Intermon-Oxfam, 5) World Neighbours, 6) Catholic Relief Service,7) Concern Worldwide, 8) Services for the health in Asian and African regions, 9) Oxfam Australia **National NGOs**: 1) CARE Timor Leste, 2) PT Bili Bala Olaria group, 3) Grupu Hadia Futuru, 4) Hamutuk Ita Ajuda Malu, 5) Health Net Timor-Leste, 6) Organisasaun Haburas Moris, 7) Timor-Leste Associacao Integrado Ba Saude, 8) Yayasan Raimaran, 9) Fundasaun Haburas, Tecnica Assistencia Integrado Saude, 10) Associacao Hametin Cultura Atoni Enclave, 11) Hiam Health

Sources:[1]Project document, SPR 2011, Last resource situation of 19 August 2012[2]Pproject document, SPR 2011, [3] project document, BR number 7, SPR 2011, SPR 2008, last resource situation of 4 March 2012 / 3. Average annual figure.

Table 27 Details of WFP component of MDG-F Joint Programme

Expected Results (Outcomes & outputs)	Indicators (with baselines & indicative timeframe)	Means of verification	Collection methods (with indicative time frame & frequency)	Risks & assumptions
Outcome 1. Improved health and nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children in 4 selected districts				
Output 1.3. Increased production, availability and consumption of micronutrient-rich foods among women and children in 4 selected districts	1.3.5. Metric tonnes of food produced from pilot local blended food project **Baseline:** 0 **Target:** 1,500 (2011)	Project Manager monthly reports	Monthly WFP submitted reports	
Outcome 2. **20 percent more children access, and 25 percent more children complete, free compulsory quality basic education**				
Output 2.1. **Improved quality of ongoing school feeding in 4 districts**	2.1.1. # of basic education schools providing locally produced food in 4 districts Continued support by GoTL to school kitchen staff **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 150 (2011)	Min. of Education and WFP monitoring	Monthly Reporting	Continued support by GoTL to school kitchen staff
Outcome 3. **Food Security and Nutrition surveillance systems established and functioning at all sub-districts in 4 selected districts**				
Output 3.1. [WFP with FAO] **Strengthened capacity of Central and District Team to utilize Food Security Information and Early Warning System (FSIEWS) at the national, district and community levels**	3.1.1. # of district produced monthly integrated FSIEW datasheets **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 4 (2011)	District Administrator Reports, Project Progress Repo	Monthly collection by project managers	District Administrators appointments change in support for District Food Security Committees
	3.1.2. 4 District Food Security Committees involved in food security and nutrition services trained on FSIEWS **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 4 Committees (2011)			
	3.1.3. 20 relevant staff (10 men and 10 female) equipped with formats and registers for operating FSIEW system **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 20 (2011)	District Administrator Report, DFSC Reports, WFP Monitoring	Training reports submitted to Food Security Department MAF	Limited capacity of district level staff
Output 3.2. Improved capacity of district food security committees to plan, support mitigation and response initiatives	3.2.1. # of District response teams formed **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 4 (2011)	District Administrator Report, DFSC Reports, WFP Monitoring	Response team contingency plans approved by MAF	Limited capacity of district level staff
	3.2.2. 4 districts prepared to respond in mitigating food insecurity and natural disaster **Baseline:** 0 (2008) **Target:** 4 (2011)	Project Progress Report	District Food Security Committee reports from the District Food Security Officers	

Source: Project document (UN 2009)

Table 28 Planned Budget for WFP component of MDG-F Joint Programme

Outputs	Activity	Partner	Resource allocation (US$) and indicative time frame*			
			Y1	Y2	Y3	**Total**
1,500 metric tonnes produced by pilot blended-food production facility per year	Establishment of fortified blended food facility	MoH	226,500	141,500	15,000	383,000
150 schools in 4 selected district increased use of locally produced foods in school feeding programs	Training on school feeding programme staff and MCH staff in use of locally produced foods	MoE	89,500	25,000	1,000	115,500
4 district Food Security Committees involved in food security and nutrition services trained on FSIEWS	Establishment and training of Food Security Committee members on Food Security Information and Early Warning Systems	MAF	25,000	20,000	0	45,000
20 relevant staff (10 men and 10 female) equipped with formats and registers for operating FSIEW system	Development of tool and operational guidelines for FSIEW systems	MAF	70,000	20,000	0	90,000
4 districts prepared to respond in mitigating food in-security and natural disaster	District response team formation and contingency plan prepared	MSS	25,000	15,000	0	40,000
Total WFP component			436,000	221,500	16,000	**673,500**

Source: Project document (UN 2009)

Table 29 COMPASIS results and resources framework: outputs and activities for WFP component.

Objective 1: To reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilisation, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support. Output 1: Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilisation					
Activity	**Activity Indicator**	**Activity Target**	**Activity Baseline**	**Means of Verification**	**Inputs**
Activity 1.6 Rural assets created through 76 schemes of food-for-work	Percentage of food insecure households in Ermera and Oecusse districts (disaggregated by sex of household head) Number of months per year of low food consumption in Ermera and Oecusse districts Number of households in Ermera and Oecusse (2009- 2012) participating in food-supported asset creation. Amount of food distributed to Food-for Work/ Assets participants in Ermera and Oecusse (2009 – 2012) Number of identified rural assets created in Ermera and Oecusse (2009 – 2012)	10% of households are classified as food insecure in both districts. 3.3 months of low food consumption per year in Ermera and Oecusse 2280 households in Ermera and Oecusse participated in food-supported asset creation. 547 ton of food distributed in Ermera and Oecusse 76 rural assets have been completed in Ermera and Oecusse Districts	2007 data shows household food insecurity is at 16% in Ermera and unavailable in Oecusse. In 2007, Ermera experienced an average of 4.8 months of low food consumption; Oecusse averaged 4.2 months per year. At 2009, no households in Ermera and 870 households in Oecusse are participating in food-supported asset creation. At 2009, no food has been distributed in Ermera, and 201 ton has been distributed in Oecusse. At 2009, no assets have been created in Ermera, and 29 assets have been created in Oecusse.	Inter-Agency Food Security Information System WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission WFP Beneficiary Contact Monitoring Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards WFP Cooperating Partners' reports WFP Commodity Movement, Processing and Analysis System Receipts of food purchases and delivery Contractor/engineer and site visit reports from asset creation projects Pre-work and post-work surveys by local technical engineers and WFP staff. UNDP MDG Annual Report FAO Annual Country Report	Construction/rehab. of 76 schemes including land reclamation, irrigation canals, and tertiary roads; income generation for 2,280 food-insecure households in rural areas during the lean period; and distribution of basic food commodities to 11,400 people. Including: Year 1: $204,302, 35 schemes Rice: 180 MT, Beans: 45 MT, Oil: 11 MT Year 2: $115,475, 20 schemes Rice: 102 MT, Beans: 25 MT, Oil: 6 MT Year 3: $124,358, 21 schemes Rice: 109 MT, Beans: 27 MT, Oil: 7 MT Total: = $444,135, 76 schemes Training in community-based asset creation and maintenance (year 1: $10,000, year 2: $5,652, year 3: $6,087 = $21,739). Provision of earthwork tools including shovels and compactors to project participants (year 1: $698, year 2: $395, year 3: $425 = $1,518). Pre-work and post-work surveys by local technical engineers and WFP staff members (year 1: $15,000, year 2: $8,478, year 3: $9,130 = $32,608).

Source: COMPASIS project document (UN 2010).

Map 3 WFP Operations 2012



Annex VII Additional Data on Portfolio Performance

Food Distribution

Figure 9 Total food distributed vs. planned 2008–2012 (MT)



Source: Actual: SPR, data received from CO for 2012. Planned from CO.

Year 2008 takes into account the total distribution (PRRO 1388.0 and 10388.1)

Figure 10 Food distributed vs. planned by activity 2008–2012 (MT)



Source: Actual: SPR, data received from CO for 2012. Planned from CO.

Year 2008 takes into account the total distribution (PRRO 1388.0 and 10388.1)

Figure 11 Food distributed by activity and by year 2008–2012 (MT)



Source: SPR, Data received from CO for 2012.

Year 2008 takes into account the total distribution (PRRO 10388.0 and 10388.1).

Figure 12 Food distributed vs. planned, by activity 2008–2012 (MT)



Source: SPRs, data received from CO for planned by CO and for actual 2012.

Year 2008 only takes into account data relative to PRRO 10388.1

MCHN

Table 30 MCHN outputs 2008–2012

	2008			2009			2010			2011			2012		
	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned
Health centres and health posts assisted	120	109	91%	136	134	99%	140	132	94%	140	154	110%	283	176	62%
Nurses and midwives trained in MCHN	18	16	89%												
No. of cooking demonstrations undertaken for fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products				10	10	100%	10	7	70%	60	56	93%			
No. of participants attending in nutrition and health thematic training activities				286	108	38%									
Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution							300	203	68%	220	119	54%			

Sources : SPRs, CO.

Figure 13 MCHN beneficiaries: actual vs. planned 2008-2011.



Source: SPR 2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1 and SPR 2011 of CP 200185
Year 2011 did not take into account the MCHN beneficiaries mentioned in PRRO SPR 2011 as they were already counted in CP SPR 2011.

Figure 14 Pregnant and lactating women: actual vs. planned 2008-2011.



Source: SPR 2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1 and SPR 2011 of CP 200185
Year 2011 did not take into account the MCHN beneficiaries mentioned in PRRO SPR 2011 as they were already counted in CP SPR 2011.

Figure 15 Children 6–59 months: actual vs. planned 2008-2011.



Source: SPR 2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1 and SPR 2011 of CP 200185
Year 2011 did not take into account the MCHN beneficiaries mentioned in PRRO SPR 2011 as they were already counted in CP SPR 2011.

Box 9 MCHN – Reported CP implementation status in 2012

Food Operation from Sept 2011 to October 2012

- 180 health centres/health post covered
- 60,000 children and mothers registered
- 3,400 MT of commodities distributed

Technical assistance from Sept 2011 to October 2012

- Nutrition Trainings: 185 health staffs, 118 volunteers and 22 NGO staff trained (18 trainings conducted at national and district level)
- M&E/Reporting Training: 149 health staffs, 30 volunteers and 5 NGO staff trained (11 trainings conducted at national and district level)
- Logistic/warehouse management training: 185 health staffs, 160 volunteers, 14 NGO staff trained (10 trainings at district level)
- Timor Vita production factory: the factory at Timor Global has been producing Timor Vita since mid 2010. By November 2011 a Food Technologist was deployed, and production quality and stability increased. The current maximum output lies between 60–120 MT, stable at 80MT a month.
- Infrastructure: 29 Store Rooms built. 1 planned to be completed by the end of the year: 2 warehouses, 1 in Oecusse (contract awarded, construction to be completed by end of January) and 1 in Dili (land-issue to be resolved). This provides a country-wide storage network on which the MCHN programme can rely.

Source: CO concept note on transition and handover (WFP/TL 2012c); data as shared with MoH; minor discrepancies with updated data elsewhere in Annex VII.

Box 10 2012 Joint Rapid Assessment

This exercise came very late, as an effort to collect some specific evidence about the effects of the supplementary feeding programme. It was on too small a scale to be representative, but it provides some useful pointers for programme management.

It followed a small number of children (35) aged 6–59 months diagnosed with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), at 4 different sites in different districts, over a period of 3 months (July–September 2012); it recorded changes in the children's physical status and was supplemented with interviews with caregivers and MCHN staff.

Main findings:

a) Recovery: 29 of the 35 children sampled had recovered from MAM at the end of the third month of intervention (as measured by MUAC).
b) Palatability: the rations (just CSB and oil in the cases studied) were generally found palatable (but no comparison with Timor Vita).
c) Sharing: strong finding that in most cases the ration was used up in less than a month (sometimes much less). The caregivers of the selected children were asked for how long the supplementary food would last from the date of receipt, and about 69 percent of the selected beneficiaries' caregivers reported finishing it within the first three weeks. In almost half of the households the supplementary food was consumed within the first 2–3 weeks of a given month. Possible explanations were sharing amongst all children, or even more widely among the household; errors in measurement (too little – but there was no direct evidence of this).
d) Effect as an incentive to access health services : health staff judged that the supplementary feeding was an incentive for mothers to attend, and the pattern of (increasing) attendance where the supplementary feeding was being introduced was consistent with this view, although there may also have been other contributing factors.
e) Targeting: problems in correct measurement/targeting of the right children; thus:
    - Faulty measurement of the children's MUAC leading to the inclusion to the MCHN programme of children that are not eligible → difficulty in finding the right children to be included in the assessment. More than half of the children that according to the records had a MUAC between 11.6–12.5cm, were found to have actually a MUAC higher than 12.5cm (in some cases much higher). This is a clear indication that the screening and the measurements may not be properly done, compromising the overall programme .
    - The assessment found that 29 of the 35 target children sampled recovered from the moderate acute malnutrition at the end of the third month of intervention period, having received monthly follow-up visits. While it is difficult to say how significant the visits were to achieving positive outcomes, it does suggest there is potential for exploring the possible impact further.

Main recommendations:

- move ahead with systematic PDM system;
- strengthen measuring and data recording capacity of health staff;
- strengthen messaging about the use of targeted supplementary food;
- address main reasons for food sharing.

Source: WFP/TL 2012a

Timor Vita

Table 31 Monthly deliveries of Timor Vita from Timor Global to WFP

Month	Jul-10	Aug-10	Sep-10	Oct-10	Nov-10	Dec-10	Jan-11	Feb-11	Mar-11	Apr-11	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	TOTAL
MT	84	102	96	19	212	0	76	46	16	0	1	0	14	0	29	41	93	74	89	101	111	96	69	0	166	0	0	0	110	0	44	1689

Source: WFP CO Dili, 22 February 2013.

Table 32 Monthly deliveries of Timor Vita from WFP to MOH stores (July 2010 – Feb 2013)

Arrival date	AILEU	AINARO	ATAURO	BAUKAU	BOBONARO	DILI	ERMERA	COVALIMA	LAUTEM	LIQUICA	MANATUTO	OECUSSE	MANUFAHI	VIQUEQUE	Grand Total	Remarks
Jul-10							36.06					32.238			68.298	
Aug-10		13.08		5.55	4.86	10.02						33.3			66.81	
Sep-10	22.17					3.42	9.69		7.14	7.29			13.26		62.97	
Oct-10		15.12		21.09	22.35							33.3			91.86	
Nov-10	22.44	12.69		11.82	10.62	2.85	13.74	23.64	8.04	5.31		33.3	30.9		175.35	
Dec-10										5.22					5.22	
Jan-11	36.66					9.36	23.1		6.24	19.26					94.62	
Feb-11									19.86				26.13		45.99	
Mar-11						5.82	7.5								13.32	
Apr-11							2.67								2.67	
May-11	0.96														0.96	No TV stocks
Jun-11																No TV stocks
Jul-11							13.68				0.03			0.03	13.74	
Aug-11																No TV stocks
Sep-11							28.86								28.86	
Oct-11							41.07								41.07	
Nov-11	27.69									32.37					60.06	
Dec-11	33.09		11.49						23.4						67.98	
Jan-12							54.93					0.99			55.92	
Feb-12	9.99			41.97	6.81	12.12	16.29		15.21	30.9					133.29	
Mar-12											1.68				1.68	
Apr-12	1.29	15.12	6.33	13.56	24.96		2.19	10.02	6.21		4.38		6.21	8.91	99.18	
May-12							69.12				17.46				86.58	
Jun-12			9.81			10.83	8.7				6.18				35.52	
Jul-12	59.55						50.25				33.54				143.34	
Aug-12							46.2			11.79	6.24				64.23	
Sep-12	29.085		8.64												37.725	
Oct-12																No TV stocks
Nov-12	41.43		7.56							2.46	36.66				88.11	
Dec-12	12.42														12.42	
Jan-13						0.012	1.02				35.64				36.672	
Feb-13			7.74					6.69	9.87		4.53			7.14	35.97	
TOTAL	**296.775**	**56.01**	**51.57**	**93.99**	**69.6**	**54.432**	**425.07**	**40.35**	**95.97**	**114.6**	**146.34**	**133.128**	**76.5**	**16.08**	**1,670.415**	
%	**18%**	**3%**	**3%**	**6%**	**4%**	**3%**	**25%**	**2%**	**6%**	**7%**	**9%**	**8%**	**5%**	**1%**	**100%**	

Source: WFP CO Dili, 22 February 2013.

School Feeding

Table 33 School feeding outputs 2008–2011

	Unit	2008			2009			2010			2011		
		Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned
Number of feeding days per school year in WFP-assisted primary schools	number	62	62	100%	253	199	79%						
Number of kitchens or food storage rooms rehabilitated or constructed	number							40	19	48%	89	72	81%
Number of schools assisted by WFP	number	700	730	104%	1157	1006	87%	1160	1054	91%	1160	1062	92%
Number of training courses conducted under school feeding	number				40	31	78%						
Number of teachers or cooks trained in environmental protection and management	number							30	24	80%	180	44	24%
Number of WFP-assisted schools with improved fuel or energy-efficient stoves	number							30	27	90%	92	75	82%
Number of PTA members trained in school feeding management or implementation	PTA member										150	145	97%
Teachers and parent/teachers associations trained in school feeding	number	952	888	93%									
Number of fuel or energy-efficient stoves distributed in WFP- assisted schools	number										153	83	54%

Sources : SPR 2008,2009, 2010, 2011 (PRRO 10388.1)

Figure 16 School feeding beneficiaries: actual vs. planned 2008-2011, by gender



Source: SPR 2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1
2008 data are only related to PRRO 10388.1 and do not take into account the previous PRRO 10388.0 that ended in August 2008.

Box 11 Timor Vita specification

Ingredients		Nutritional value (per 100g)	
Extruded whole yellow/white maize	64.24%	Energy	410 kcal minimum
De-hulled soya beans	23%	Protein	15.0% (N x 6.25) minimum
Sugar	9%	Fat	9.0% minimum
Oil	2%	Crude fibre	3.0% maximum
Vitamin and mineral premix	1.76%		

Source: Local Purchase Contracts between WFP and Timor Global, June 2010 and May 2012.

Table 34 Sphere standards for targeted supplementary feeding programmes

Indicator	*Standard*
Coverage	>50% in rural areas, >70% in urban areas and >90% in a camp situation
Deaths	<3%
Recovered	75%
Defaulted	<15%.

Source: Sphere Project 2011 (monthly data)

FFW/A

Table 35 FFW/A Outputs 2008–2011

Outputs	unit	2008			2009			2010			2011		
		Actuals	Planned	% achieved	Actuals	Planned	% achieved	Actuals	Planned	% achieved	Actuals	Planned	% achieved
Infrastructure													
Feeder roads rehabilitated or constructed	km	21	21	100%	339	339	100%	46	75	61%	38	47	81%
Schools constructed	number	20	20	100%	7	7	100%						
Assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance	number										38	38	100%
Agriculture and land management													
hectares of agroforestry	ha				4	4	100%						
Coffee plantation cultivated	ha	4	4	100%									
Land reclaimed	ha	83	83	100%									
Fencing created	km	4	4	100%									
Paddy field protection with gabion	metres^2	100	100	100%									
area protected/developed	ha				78	78	100%						
hectares of gully land reclaimed	ha				134	134	100%				29	30	97%
hectares of land cleared	km										5	5	100%
Water management													
Water reservoir constructed	number	225	225	100%									
Irrigation canal constructed	km	21	21	100%							3	4	75%
hectares of land with irrigation system built/restored	ha				870	870	100%	24	30	80%			
No. of community based water ponds for domestic uses constructed	number				12	12	100%	1	1	100%			

Source: SPR s2008,2009,2010,2011 of PRRO 10388.1

Capacity Development

The following tables draw on WFP documents (project documents and SPRs) to show planned outcomes, outputs and indicators for capacity development elements of each main operation in the portfolio. The final column assesses progress against indicators/outputs, according to the information available[106]

Table 36 Capacity development performance of the PRRO

Programme	Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Assessment against indicators
PRRO 10388.1 **(September 1 2008-August 31 2010)**	Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions – Improved government capacity and systems for food security assessment and analysis (cluster action) and local production of blended food. (NB replaced version in PD submitted to Board for approval August 8th 2008.)	Agreed hand-over strategies in place.	Two hand-over strategies discussed and agreed to between WFP/GoTL and partners.	No hand-over strategies agreed. Activities conducted towards hand-over: • Advisory support to MoE • Exposure visit for school feeding focal points to Brazil • Advisory support to MoH • Multi-agency food security assessment implemented.
			Number of national counterparts, CP staff and civil society members trained in food security assessment and analysis methodology.	Training provided in nutrition and health to 446 – 54% of planning target. Training provided in school feeding, environment protection and management to 1140 – 89% of target.
			Number of staff trained at the local blended food factory in commodity management and quality control.	12 people trained in Good Manufactory Practice (GMP) and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP): Timor Global (6), MoH (3), MTCI (2); WHO (1 observer).
		Local produce used for blended food production.	Small-scale, pilot blended-food production unit established. .1	Production unit established 05/10.

[106] Numbers of people trained under MCHN and School Feeding in 2008-2011 are shown in the table for PRRO 10388.1 and numbers trained in 2012 are included in the table for DEV 200185.

Table 37 Capacity development performance of the Special Operation

Programme	Outcomes	Outputs	Assessment against outputs
Special Operation 107970 (January 1-December 31 2009 - August 31 2011) **Logistics Augmentation and Capacity Building for the Government of Timor Leste**	Increased government capacity in logistics planning and implementation.	A functioning Logistics Cell at the Ministry of Social Solidarity	Functioning logistics capacity in MTCI: - Design of logistics unit completed - Development of operational procedures - Logistics Operations Manual - Storage Management Handbook - Training: on-the-job and formal - Warehouse establishment, national and districts - Staffing requirements and new organisation (90%) Other contributions to national logistics capacity: - Storage Management Handbook printed - Logistics Operations Manual for MSS - Design of logistics unit for MSS, MoE and MoH
	Improved data base of rehabilitation needs.	An updated assessment of the logistics infrastructure in Timor-Leste	National survey of government warehouses Rehabilitation and equipping of 3 warehouses; maintenance of 2 warehouses

Table 38 Capacity development performance under the MDG-F

Programme	Outcome	Outputs	Indicators	Assessment against indicators
MDG-F **January 2010-December 2012** **(Joint Program Promoting Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security in Timor-Leste)**	Food Security and Nutrition Surveillance Systems established and functioning at all sub-districts of the 4 districts	(NB No Output statement)	% food-insecure communities visited among those recommended by district verification meetings	No reporting (mid-term evaluation finding was that "activities have started")
		Strengthened capacity of central and district teams to utilize Food Security Information and Early Warning System (FSIEWS) at the national, district and community levels	# districts producing monthly integrated FSIEW datasheets in the last 3 months Percentage of sub-districts reporting monthly to the district level in the last 3 months Number of monthly district reports produced on time by central team in the last 6 months	Quarterly reports available for Q2 2011 through Q1 2012.
		Improved capacity of district food security committees to plan, support mitigation and response initiatives	# districts where verification team meetings are conducted on a quarterly basis in the last 6 months	(mid-term evaluation finding was that "activities have started")

Table 39 Capacity development performance of the Country Programme

Programme	Outcomes/outputs	Indicators	Assessment against indicators
Country Programme **DEV 200185 (September 2011-December 2013)** **(Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through handover strategies and local purchase)**	Increased marketing opportunities at national level with cost-effective WFP local purchases.	20% of raw materials composed of maize and soy beans purchased locally for food fortification.	Not reported.
	(Output) Food purchased locally	5,000 tons of Timor Vita (locally produced CSB) purchased for distribution under MCHN component. 30% of the total food requirement for the programme procured locally.	Total Timor Vita distributed September 2011-January 2013 1,023 MT. Details in Table 31 and Table 32 above. Share of Timor Vita in total programme procurement was 23% in 2011, 14% in2011, 22% in 2012 (see Table 10 in the main report).
	Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions	Two hand-over strategies developed and agreed to between WFP and the Government: - School Feeding to MoE - MCHN to MoH	No hand-over strategies agreed. Transition plan developed for MoH.
		Two Ministries have increased efficiency in operational mechanisms: - Reach and assistance to vulnerable groups and poor households increased by Ministry of Social Solidarity - Access and availability of subsidized rice increased by Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry	Planned work with MSS not implemented. MSS appears to have increased efficiency but not fully attributable to WFP. Planned work with MTCI not implemented.. WFP significantly contributed to increased efficiency in MTCI under Special Operation, though problems in supply of subsidized rice remain.
		Logistics and supply chain management established, agreed to and fully managed by the assisted-government ministries	Logistics and supply chain not fully managed by MoH, but: • MoH logistics manual developed under the Special Operation used in training. • 29 Storerooms built. 1 planned to be completed by the end of 2012: 2 warehouses under construction or planned. When completed these will provide a country-wide storage network for MCHN.

Programme	Outcomes/outputs	Indicators	Assessment against indicators
			Logistics support to MoE not implemented.
	Capacity and awareness developed through WFP-organized actions/training	300 health staff and or volunteers trained in MCHN implementation modalities	326 trained in MCHN – 90% of revised planning figure of 364. .
		3,000 school principals (pre-primary, primary and pre-secondary) and Parent-Teacher Association members trained in school feeding programme implementation	Not implemented after MoE assumed responsibility for school feeding.
		300 government technical staff trained in safety net programme design, implementation, as well as in monitoring, evaluation and reporting system	100 trained in M&E – 35% of revised planning figure of 289. 155 trained in logistics – 47% of planning figure of 332.
		200 schools use the newly introduced ecological stoves (biogas and fuel efficient stoves).	102 schools assisted – 84% of revised planning figure of 122 (2011) 83 stoves installed – 54% of a planning figure of 154 (2011)
	Percentage increase in Government's funding for hunger solution tools in national plans of action	School feeding programme 100% resourced and managed by the Government. MCHN 100% resourced and managed by the Government.	Government took over school feeding programme in 2011; no hand-over Discussions under way on government resourcing of MCHN.
		Subsidised rice programme fully managed by the Government	Subsidised rice programme fully managed by government.

Annex VIII Gender

This annex provides a summary analysis of WFP Timor-Leste performance against the corporate standards articulated in WFP's Gender Policy and Action Plan (WFP 2009b and WFP 2009h), derived from the evidence collected by the evaluation. The evaluation was not required to carry out a full gender assessment of WFP's portfolio, so the findings presented here are indicative only.

Summary findings

The evaluation's overall assessment is that the CO's incorporation of gender in its work has been weak. The evaluation found little evidence that WFP's corporate commitments on gender have been systematically incorporated into programme design, monitoring and reporting or that these commitments have been promoted through advocacy with partners. However, the main reasons for this appear to lie in the relatively small size of the CO (and associated limited staff capacity) and in a lack of support for gender-mainstreaming from the Regional Bureau and from Rome. The evaluation was unable to find evidence that CO staff have received gender training or that WFP tools for gender analysis and evaluation have been transmitted to the CO in 'user-friendly' ways. In addition, WFP's standard programme documents, monitoring systems and SPRs do not appear to have been adapted to reflect a stronger gender focus in light of WFP's commitments on gender.

Gender assessment against WFP corporate commitments

CORPORATE COMMITMENT	WFP TIMOR LESTE
Capacity development • WFP will ensure that staff members develop the capacity to mainstream gender into their work, including gender analysis. • As part of United Nations country teams (UNCTs) and through its involvement in Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) processes, WFP will advocate for and support governments and cooperating partners in strengthening their capacity to incorporate a gender perspective into national food and nutrition plans, policies and programmes.	• No evidence that CO has mainstreamed gender in its work. • No evidence that CO has contributed to developing partners' capacity to incorporate a gender perspective into national nutrition plans, policies and programmes. • CO capacity to mainstream or promote gender-sensitive approaches constrained by: - No training provided for CO staff in gender mainstreaming. - A small CO and high staff turn-over, which limits the extent to which gender-sensitive approaches can be institutionally embedded.

CORPORATE COMMITMENT	WFP TIMOR LESTE
Accountability • WFP will improve its accountability systems and review and revise its accountability tools to incorporate a gender perspective, promote accountability for gender mainstreaming among its partners, and strengthen its monitoring and evaluation systems to measure and report on progress in gender mainstreaming, including tracking and reporting on gender-related allocations and expenditure	• Corporate monitoring systems do not allow the tracking of gender-related financial allocations/expenditure. • Corporate monitoring and reporting systems are not focused on outcomes with respect to gender e.g. whether equal access and equal pay is available and achieved in FFW/A. • Until recently, monitoring of gender equity has not been immediately relevant to M&E of nutrition in Timor-Leste because beneficiaries are PLW and children. • CO has not had monitoring systems capable of identifying and following up should relative nutrition levels between boys and girls became a cause for concern. Current proposals for PDM may address this. The need for this has become more apparent as recent evidence indicates higher rates of stunting in boys than in girls.. [107]
Partnerships, advocacy and research • WFP will work with its partners to raise awareness of the importance of promoting gender equality and empowering women to achieve sustainable food and nutrition security. • WFP will collaborate with academic institutions on research to improve its policies and programmes and with partners to assess the impact of its interventions. • WFP will continue to strengthen partnerships at all levels, including work at the inter-agency level to address gender issues.	• Agenda of UNCTs (UNMIT Gender Affairs Unit; Gender Working Group) chiefly concerned with issues of security, gender based violence and women's political and legal representation rather than directly related to nutrition • No evidence that WFP has collaborated with or commissioned research institutions to carry out gender-relevant research although better understanding of gender/intra-household relations could provide insights into persistent high malnutrition levels and reasons for sharing of CSB, and so could influence programming.
Gender mainstreaming in operations • WFP will make it mandatory to incorporate a gender perspective into operations at all stages of a project cycle and will revise its assessment and evaluation tools to support this process. • WFP will launch a gender-friendly/sensitive country office initiative which will recognize country offices for compliance with measures set out in the policy.	• WFP does not appear to have made it mandatory for a gender perspective to be incorporated into the project cycle. Relevant WFP assessment and evaluation tools exist but with no requirement that they be applied consistently by COs. WFP TL has not received support to apply tools. • No evidence that CO has explicitly incorporated a gender perspective into operations.

[107] Recent multivariate regression analysis of the data from the 2009 DHS finds:

> Independent of area of residence and other factors, boys were significantly more likely to be stunted than girls throughout the entire country. Controlling for other factors included in the models, the odds of stunting were consistently 40% higher in boys than girls. (UNICEF 2011)

This appears to be a novel finding, and requires to be followed up.

Annex IX The MDG-F Joint Programme

Promoting Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security in Timor-Leste

This joint programme is mainly financed by a Spanish international fund which supports achievement of the MDGs. The programme focuses on efforts to accelerate the reduction of child and maternal under-nutrition with interventions in four districts: Aileu, Baucau, Manatuto and Oecusse.
It is a 3-year programme, which began in November 2009,and has secured a no-cost extension until March 2013.

The project document sought US$ 3,5 million from Spain, and an additional US$ 530,000 from the Timor-Leste government, with participating agency components as follows:

- United Nations Children's Fund – UNICEF ($2.3m) for work to support the community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM). Elements include training, support and mentoring of health staff at health centres and health posts in the four districts; strengthening of data management; support to community education on nutrition, and the promotion of breast-feeding. The programme also supports the use of micronutrient powders and local salt iodization. This is seen in the context of UNICEF's and WFP's complementary support to nutrition programmes run by the Ministry of Health.

- Food and Agriculture Organisation – FAO $448,000: (a) support to home gardening, aquaculture and small livestock; (b) support to school gardens; (c) support to the food security information system (on which WFP leads – see below).

- World Health Organisation –WHO $53,500 to support the training of doctors to provide support to in-patient care as needed.

- WFP $673,500 from Spain, plus $530,000 from the government. This is mostly to support local production of fortified blended food (FBF) – $383,000 from Spain, plus $350,000 of the government funds for the purchase of machinery to establish the factory and $180.000 for purchase of Timor Vita from the producer. Much smaller elements support (a) nutrition education in schools, alongside the FAO-supported school gardens ($115,500), (b) Establishment of food security and nutrition information system in the four target districts ($175,000; in the event additional funding from the EU allowed this to be developed as a national programme).

The programme is implemented by the parallel funding modality, in which each UN agency has a separate budget, has complete responsibility for its own components, and follows its own procedures during implementation. At the same time, it aims to work as closely as possible with government counterparts, comprising the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Environment, formerly known as the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce, and Industry (MTCI). The Nutrition Department of the Ministry of Health and the Food Security Department of the Ministry of Agriculture are key players. UNICEF hosts a programme management unit.

Source: UN 2009, Noij 2011, Lenci 2012. See budget breakdown in Annex VI, Table 28.

Annex X The COMPASIS Joint Programme

Community Mobilization for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery

COMPASIS is a three-year (March 2010 to February 2013) project which is responding to the human security situation in Timor-Leste, particularly in the context of the social violence that occurred in 2006-2008. It is being implemented by 6 UN Agencies: UNDP (also the Lead Agency), FAO, ILO, WFP, UNICEF, and UNFPA. These agencies are, in turn, working with local government and NGO counterparts. COMPASIS is the biggest joint effort by the UN Agencies in Timor-Leste, under the UN's Delivering As One framework. It is funded by the UNTFHS at a total cost of US$4.088 million. Of this, WFP has received US$550,000,

The project is being implemented in 17 sucos (communities) in the districts of **Ermera** (10 sucos) and **Oecusse** (7 sucos). The original target is to strengthen 200 Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in these areas, to reduce the vulnerability of households to hunger and poverty. This is being done by UNDP which is in charge of the strengthening of these SHGs, FAO which is implementing agricultural training and providing inputs to the SHGs, and ILO which is conducting entrepreneurship training to selected SHG members. Components on micro-finance and small infrastructure rehabilitation by UNDP are also part of the intervention. The other agencies are also delivering services to the sucos based on their specializations: **WFP is implementing food-for-work schemes in the sucos**, UNICEF is in charge of putting up WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) facilities in the areas and conducting literacy classes, and UNFPA is conducting activities related to family planning and reproductive health. A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is tasked with the overall coordination of project activities.

The overall objectives of COMPASIS are: (1) to reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support; and (2) to promote social inclusion in the service delivery system.

WFP activities are: Rural assets created through 76 schemes of food-for-work, as a contribution to **Output 1**: Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilization. (The activity and output matrix for the WFP component is in Annex VI, Table 29.)

COMPASIS is implemented by the parallel funding modality, in which each UN agency has a separate budget and follows its own procedures during implementation.

Source: UN 2010, Beasca 2011.

Annex XI Strategic directions in the PRRO (2008) and CP (2011)

Objectives as stated in the PRRO (2008)

The overall objective of PRRO 10388.1 is to improve vulnerable people's food security and nutrition in the short term through food-assisted activities and in the long term through the establishment of national systems and programmes.

The specific objectives of this PRRO are to:

- increase the ability of targeted communities to meet their food needs through food-for-work activities aimed at increasing food production and asset creation;
- improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups and increase their access to health care clinics;
- improve the enrolment and attendance of boys and girls in primary schools and increase their attention spans ;
- improve government capacity and systems with regard to disaster response, logistics, assistance to chronically vulnerable groups through safety nets and local food processing;
- develop an institutional framework for a nationwide school feeding programme;
- maintain a relief contingency stock to cover emergency needs of families affected by the onset of sudden or natural disasters; and
- support the return and resettlement of IDPs.

The strategic focus of the new PRRO is to increase the engagement of line ministries (Education; Health; Social Solidarity; and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) and local partners in the planning and implementation of all food-assisted activities; and to set up support systems and infrastructure. In terms of food-assisted activities, the strategy of the PRRO is to enable women and children to have better access to education and basic health care services, improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups and maintain reserve food stocks for any emergency. (WFP 2008f)

Objectives as stated in the CP 2011

Specific Objectives are to:

a. improve the food and nutrition security of the most vulnerable groups in ways that build longer-term human and physical assets;
b. strengthen the Government's capacity to design, implement and manage tools, policies and systems for reducing food insecurity, and
c. hand over food-based programmes to the Government in a responsible manner.

The CP builds on WFP's strengths and experience while progressively repositioning WFP so that it is no longer solely a food aid agency but also provides enhanced technical support contributing to longer-term nationally owned food security solutions. (WFP 2011b)

Annex XII DPs' capacity development experiences in Timor-Leste

In 2009 and 2011, the OECD carried out consultations with government and development partners to assess how far development partners have contributed to increasing government capacity within the framework of the principles that have been elaborated for donor engagement with fragile states **(**OECD 2010, OECD 2011a). The 2011 assessment concluded that donor support has overall made a positive contribution to the government's ability to carry out state functions and deliver services. However, it also highlighted a number of problems.

A particular issue is poor coordination between development partners. This was most marked at sector level where different approaches were being adopted and pursued by different advisers, who were often more influenced by their own national systems than by an understanding of the Timor-Leste socio-cultural context and political legacy. Advisers were also sometimes taking on inappropriate managerial roles. At the same time, the scarcity of skilled local human resources has led to competition for staff, an associated 'brain drain' away from government, and wage inflation, along with distortions as government has hired back ex-civil servants as advisers on preferential terms.

Other weaknesses identified include that capacity development activities have often focused on increasing individuals' skills rather than strengthening institutional capacity; activities to improve capacity in administration and management have typically been short-term, ministry-specific, and not based on assessments of competency requirements and capacity gaps. In terms of the level at which capacity development initiatives have been focused, the assessment concluded that insufficient attention has been focused on the need to develop capacities in middle managers and lower level staff. The associated lack of capacity at middle management level was seen to have resulted in (or to have compounded) centralisation of decision-making at senior levels in ministries and to have compromised the effectiveness of service delivery.

Annex XIII The UN Role in Timor-Leste

The UN role in Timor-Leste has been exceptional. Timor-Leste was under UN administration from 1999 until independence in 2002. Following the crisis in April and May 2006, in which more than 150,000 people were displaced, the UN Security Council, authorised a new UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a mandate to provide policing and security services until the national police could be reconstituted. UNMIT was also involved in organising elections, in providing support to governance, justice and security, and in coordination of donor support. With an authorised police strength of 1,600, UNMIT was a major presence throughout the evaluation period.

UNMIT led the UN country presence, and a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2009–2013) was the focus of coordination amongst UN agencies. Under an overarching goal of consolidated peace and stability, its three focal areas were democratisation and social cohesion, poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, and basic social services, encompassing education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and social welfare and social protection.

In March 2011 the national police resumed front-line responsibilities. Successful national and local elections[108] were held in April and July 2012. In September 2011, the Government and UNMIT signed a Joint Transition Plan (GoTL & UNMIT 2011) to guide planning for UNMIT's withdrawal, which was completed in December 2012.

Source: UN n.d., UN 2012.

Annex XIV Comoro Declaration: "Putting an end to hunger and malnutrition"

The Comoro Declaration against famine and malnutrition was signed in October 2010 and reflects a commitment of the government and concerned line ministries to address issues of malnutrition and food security in a concerted way. The declaration emphasizes the need for "access by anyone, at any given time, to sufficient food that is nutritionally adequate and safe". It stresses the need "to further strengthen and increase coordination and cooperation in the areas of food security and nutrition between each of our Ministries" alongside international support from development partners. Signatories include the Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries, Finance, Health, Tourism, Trade and Industry, Economy and Development, Education and Social Solidarity.

Source: adapted from Noij 2011.

[108] The national elections led to a democratic change of government.

Annex XV Concept Note for Transition and Handover of MCHN Responsibilities,

Key points of the Concept Note:

(a) It sets out stages without a detailed time line (so as to engage MoH in the timetable discussion); it does refer to the CP's December 2013 end-date (but not the risk of an earlier departure if funding evaporates).

(b) Also offers no cost implications – but notes that these need to be jointly addressed.

(c) Main steps:

- Step 1 – Capacity Assessment
  - Focus on Nutrition Department and its ability to take over "functional areas and responsibilities that WFP has been directly managing up to date"
  - Identify needs in terms of human resources; technical expertise; mapping of assets, budget requirements
- Step 2 – Identification of Strengths and Critical Areas
  - In effect a gap analysis, to yield plans for recruitment, training, additional assets/infrastructure requires, and financial commitments needed
- Step 3 – Development of a hand over operational model
  - At central level to include "the gradual integration of WFP staff as technical advisers to selected functional areas".
  - At district level, develop a model to be piloted in one district, then rolled out; to involve training, additional storerooms as necessary, and "deployment of WFP staff within the nutrition department at district level during the transition phase".
- Step 4 – Food supply chain and Timor Vita
  - "The Timor Vita production capacity will have to be increased if the MoH intends to cater for all the operational needs of the supplementary feeding programme using this commodity."
- Step 5 – Operational Plan
  - The hand over strategy to be implemented by phases and in accordance with an agreed timeline.
  - "a common resources mobilisation strategy shall be developed and based on the MoH commitment of adequate funding level from the Government budget and advocacy to donors in order to address the funding gaps of the hand over process."

Source: WFP/TL 2012c (Concept note; Ministry of Health/WFP Timor Leste, joint transition and handover strategy of the MCHN programme, WFP Country Office November 2012)

Annex XVI Explaining successful capacity development

External factors and factors within WFP's control explain the positive outcomes from work with MTCI.

- First, MTCI has been described as a "willing partner" in the sense that a request for support came in the first instance from the ministry. It should be noted that this request was not to develop the ministry's logistics capacity but for help in solving an urgent logistics problem.
- WFP's swift and effective response to this encouraged MTCI to request a longer-term programme of capacity development. MTCI showed that it was committed to the enterprise by dedicating staff, time and other resources. For its part, WFP was able to make available sufficient financial and human resources over the length of time needed for a capacity development intervention (The Special Operation was financed through funds remaining from the tsunami appeal; three staff were assigned to the work who did not have significant competing demands on their time.).
- WFP adopted a systematic approach, with identified individual and organisational learning objectives, to put in place the necessary skills, systems and infrastructure. Training included formal courses but was mainly on-the-job with a high level of mentoring and monitoring to check that learning objectives were being reached.
- Finally, the success of the Special Operation owes much to the fact that it focused on developing logistics capacity, an area where WFP has unmatched experience and recognised distinctive competence.

Annex XVII Additional Information about Recommendations 3 & 5

Box 12 Agenda for SISCa review (relates to recommendation 3)

- PSF – active case-finding, tracing defaulters, more rigorous community mobilisation, sensitisation to address sharing
- Supervision – skilled staff should mentor and supervise health workers to reduce errors
- Transport – how to ensure continuous supply
- Remote areas and coverage – understand the coverage of the SISCa and how to reach the remote areas
    - Conduct a coverage survey
    - Better monitoring and evaluation of mobile clinics
    - Identify the constraints for reaching remote area and identify possible solutions

Box 13 Agenda for strategic review of school feeding (relates to recommendation 5)

- To include budgetary analysis; and follow up with budget transparency – so that costs and commitments are clear, and it is also clear whether this is seen as part of education budget or social welfare budget, etc.
- Clarify main and subsidiary objectives (social protection as well as education perspective) – hence important that all stakeholders are involved, with a strong role for the Ministry of Finance
- On home-grown school feeding, distinguish between national and local procurement (role for Timor Vita?); see school gardens as a strictly educational initiative
- Consider operational and logistic implications of whatever model is chosen, and consequent capacity development requirements

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Acronyms

AER	Annual Evaluation Report
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
AusAID	Australian Aid
BCC	Behaviour Change Communication
BMI	Body Mass Index
BSF	Blanket Supplementary Feeding
BSFP	Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme
BSP	Basic Services Package
CBTL	Central Bank of Timor-Leste
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CD	Country Director
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CHC	Community Health Centre
CMAM	Community Managed Acute Malnutrition
CNRT	National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction
COMPAS	Commodity Movement, Processing and Analysis System
COMPASIS	Community Mobilisation for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery
CO	Country Office
CP	Country Programme
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CSB	Corn-soya blend
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DPHO	District Public Health Officer
EB	Executive Board
EC	European Commission
EFSA	emergency food security assessment
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
ER	Evaluation Report
ERD	WFP Government Donor Relations Division
ETL	Evaluation Team Leader
EU	European Union
FAM	Food Assistance Monitor
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFA	Food for Assets
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FFW/A	Food for Work/Assets
FGD	Focus Discussion Group
Fretilin	Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste
FSIEWS	Food Security Information and Early Warning System

GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	gender-based violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFD	General Food Distribution
GHI	global hunger index
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
HDR	Human Development Report
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
HMIS	Health Management Information System
HP	Health Post
HQ	headquarters
HSSP	Health Sector Strategic Plan
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financing Institution
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IR	Inception Report
IRA	Immediate Response Account
IR EMOP	Immediate Response Emergency Operation
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JAMA	Journal of the American Medical Association
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JPO	Junior Pofessional Officer
KfW	German development bank
LESS	Logistics Execution Support System
LQAS	Lot Quality Assurance Sampling
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCHN	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MoA&F	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MSS	Ministry of Social Solidarity
MT	metric Tonnes
MTCI	Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
MUAC	mid-upper arm circumference
n.a.	not available / not applicable
n.d.	no date
NDAE	National Directorate of Aid Effectiveness
NESP	National Education Strategic Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNS	National Nutrition Strategy
NSD	National Statistics Directorate
ODA	official development assistance
ODE	Office of the Director of Emergencies
OE	Office of Evaluation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OpEv	Operations Evaluation
PLW	pregnant and lactating women

PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PSF	Promoter Saude Familia (family health promoter)
QS	Quality Support
RB	Regional Bureau
RMBG	WFP Grant Management Unit
RS	Resource Situation report
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SISCa	Integrated Health Services at the Community Level (*Servisu Integradu de Saude Comunitária*)
SLEAC	Simplified LQAS Evaluation of Access and Coverage
SLMS	Suco Level Food Security Monitoring System
SMP	School Meals Programme
SO	Special Operation
SO1 – SO5	WFP strategic objectives
SOWC	State of the World's Children
SPA	Standard Project Approval (WFP database)
SPR	Standard Project Report
SQUEAC	Semi-Quantitative Evaluation of Access and Coverage
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TA	Technical Assistance
TBC	to be confirmed
TDY	Temporary Duty
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
TSLS	Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UN CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTFHS	UN Trust Fund for Human Security
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VGF	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WCF	Working Capital Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global Systems

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