

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Case Study: Yemen

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Summary Information for Yemen

- Currency = Yemeni real (YER)
- Exchange Rate: USD 1 = YER 200
- Fiscal Year = January–December
- School year = September–June
- Structure of education system: 9 year basic education + 3 years secondary
- Population: 22.4 million
- Population growth rate: 3%

Acknowledgements

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Findings and opinions in this report are those of the study team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and by 2009 had been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation was intended to provide an opportunity for reform and change where necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation was required to draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and to make recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness.

The evaluation took place between November 2008 and February 2010. It was independent but jointly supported by a consortium of donors. An Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) was made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society.

The evaluation team was a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The methodology and process for the evaluation are described in Appendix V (Volume 4) of the final synthesis report.

The main outputs of the evaluation, which included nine country case studies and eight desk studies, are listed overleaf.

Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Preliminary Report. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

Burkina Faso	<i>Burkina Faso Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
Cambodia	<i>Cambodia Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
Ghana	<i>Ghana Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
Kenya	<i>Kenya Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
Mozambique	<i>Mozambique Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
Nicaragua	<i>Nicaragua Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
Nigeria	<i>Nigeria Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sulliman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
Pakistan	<i>Pakistan Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
Yemen	<i>Yemen Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

Ethiopia	<i>Ethiopia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
Malawi	<i>Malawi Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
Mali	<i>Mali Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Moldova	<i>Moldova Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
Rwanda	<i>Rwanda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Uganda	<i>Uganda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
Vietnam	<i>Vietnam Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
Zambia	<i>Zambia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa
AES	Annual Educational Survey
APP	Aid Policy Paper
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BEC	Basic Education Certificate
BEDP	Basic Education Development Project
BEEP	Basic Education Expansion Project
BEIP	Basic Education Improvement Program
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CB	Capacity Building
CC	Community College
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CD	Capacity Development
CF	Catalytic Fund
CSO	Central Statistical Organisation
CSR	Country Status Report
CSS	Comprehensive School Survey
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DEO	District Education Office
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DP	Development Partner
DPPR	Development Plan for Poverty Reduction
ECCE	Early Childhood and Care Education
ECF	Expanded Catalytic Fund
EDI	EFA Global Development Index
EFA	Education for All
EFARP	Economic, Financial and Administrative Reform Project
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund
ESP	Education Sector Plan
FGI	Foundation Grades Initiative
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GBS	General Budget Support
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEI	Gender specific EFA Index
GEO	Governorate Education Office
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GIR	Gross Intake Ratio
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNI	Gross National Income
GOY	Government of Yemen
GPI	Gender Parity Index

GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HBS	Household Budget Survey
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
IF	Indicative Framework
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMWG	Inter Ministerial Working Group
INSET	In Service Teacher Training
JAR	Joint Annual Review
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW	German government-owned development bank
LAEO	Literacy and Adult Education Organisation
LAL	Local Authority Law
LEG	Local Education Group
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCS	Ministry of Civil Service
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MLA	Monitoring Learning Achievement Survey
MOHESR	Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
MIS	Management Information System
MOCS	Ministry of Civil Service
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOLA	Ministry of Local Administration
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MOT EVT	Ministry of Technical and Vocational Training
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTRF	Medium Term Results Framework
NBEDS	National Basic Education Development Strategy
NCYS	National Children and Youth Strategy
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGES	National General Education Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NGSES	National General Secondary Education Strategy
NIR	Net Intake Rate
NRA	National Reform Agenda
NSDHEY	National Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Yemen
NSDVTE	National Strategy for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAU	Education Development Programme Administration Unit
PBA	Programme Based Approach

PCR	Primary Completion Rate
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PWP	Public Works Project
QA	Quality Assurance
SC	Steering Committee
SCEP	Supreme Council for Education Planning
SDF	Skills Development Fund
SEC	Secondary Education Certificate
SEDGAP	Secondary Education Development and Girls Access Project
SFA	School Fee Abolition
SFD	Social Fund Development
SSR	Students-Staff Ratio
STR	Student-Teacher ratio
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TEVT	Technical Education and Vocational Training
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTI	Teacher Training Institute
TTL	World Bank Task Team Leader
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UPC	Universal Primary Completion
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
YHEMIS	Yemen Higher Education Management Information System
YER	Yemen Rials

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Executive Summary

Sector context

S1 The Republic of Yemen was only twelve years old in 2002 following the reunification of traditionalist North Yemen and Marxist South Yemen: and it was only eight years since the civil war. The process of merging the two public administrations led to the creation of a massive civil service. The civil service had a complex and centralised organisational structure, representing a significant strain on public finances while producing little value added in terms of delivering needed services to the population. The public administration laws were often superseded by traditional and non-formal rules deeply embedded in a powerful tribal culture. In 2002, the country relied heavily on oil resources to sustain its economy. It was severely under-aided relative to need but also faced significant institutional constraints on its ability to use aid effectively. Little progress had been made in implementing an aid effectiveness agenda. Yemen was the poorest country in the Middle East with one of the highest population growth rates in the world which stressed the country's resources and added extra burden on the government to meet its poverty-reduction goals. The majority of Yemenis lived in rural areas, scattered across small villages in different terrains proving challenging for service delivery

S2 The public formal education system was unified, based on an educational ladder of nine years of compulsory basic education followed by three years of general secondary. Parallel religious education was integrated into the mainstream. Three different ministries were given responsibilities to manage education services for basic, technical and higher education. Formal basic education was identified as one of the key pillars of the country's long term vision and benefited from favourable budget allocation as well as external support from a small pool of bilateral and multilateral partners. However Yemen was off track for achieving EFA goals. The country had some of the worst school enrolment and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls and women. Acknowledging that previous efforts to reform and improve basic education in Yemen had not been as successful as anticipated, the Government of Yemen (GOY) prepared, the National Basic Education Strategy (NBEDS). This was done in a participatory manner and was the first strategy to be completed which addressed education related MDGs directly.

Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Yemen

Year	Month	Event
2002	June	Yemen among the first 18 countries to be invited to join the FTI Partnership
2002	August	GOY accept the invitation
2002	September	The World Bank and the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands conduct a joint FTI mission
2002	November	Donors informally endorse a draft of the EFA-FTI Country Proposal and send a letter to the FTI Secretariat seeking approval from the donor community during the Brussels Partnership meetings
2002	December	Seven countries endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meeting, but Yemen not one of them
2003	February	Yemen jointly appraised by the local donor community and the FTI Secretariat
2003	March	The donor community at the Paris donor meeting further endorse the Yemen proposal
2003	November	Yemen is granted the first of three successive allocations – United States Dollar (USD) 10m during official launch of FTI Catalytic Fund
2004	November	Yemen is granted the second allocation of USD 10m from CF
2005	December	Yemen is granted the third allocation of USD 10m from CF
2006	November	Decision is made during the Partnership meetings in Cairo to top up Yemen third allocation of USD 10m

Progress towards EFA (2002–2009)

S3 Progress has been slow over 2002–2009 and Yemen is unlikely to meet any of the EFA goals by 2015. Although enrolments in lower basic education have increased from 2.2

million in 1997 to 3.3 million in 2007, and the GER in basic education shifted from 62% to 74% over the same period, the PCR is estimated at 60% in 2007, 70% for boys and 49% for girls. There were still 1.8 million children of basic school age out-of-school in 2005. Yemen is still ranked at the bottom in terms of the gender gap (UNESCO ranking of the gender-specific EFA index in 2006). Learning achievements of primary graduates are still low in international assessments. The high population growth rate has militated against progress in Yemen and the absolute number of illiterate adults has increased.

The FTI in Yemen (2002–2009)

S4 Yemen was among the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI Partnership in June 2002 following the endorsement of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and development of a comprehensive National Basic Education Strategy (NBEDS) in the same year. The GOY with the technical support of the World Bank prepared an EFA-FTI draft proposal which was jointly endorsed by the local donor community and the FTI Secretariat in March 2003. The GOY sent to the FTI Secretariat its final proposal corresponding to a three year implementation plan for NBEDS (EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003–2005) in October 2003 just in time to benefit from the largest allocation of the newly established FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) in November 2003.

S5 Yemen was granted three successive allocations from the FTI Catalytic Fund for a cumulative amount of USD 40 million. The FTI CF Grant phases 1, 2 and 3 were managed like a traditional World Bank project at each stage of the design, implementation, and supervision, through the support of a programme administration unit. The implementation of phases 1 and 2 has targeted four (out of 21) governorates, each completed in a one-year period, by August 2005 and November 2007, respectively. The FTI CF resources were invested as planned on "priority" programmes in the areas of access (school construction) and quality (teacher/school, manager/supervisor training) with capacity building activities at governorate and district levels to support implementation of the project. Phase 3 is due to start in the second half of 2009 until 2011 increasing coverage to seven governorates and scaling up of key policy areas

S6 Yemen is the second largest recipient of the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) after India with an estimated amount of USD 1.885 million allocated since 2005/06. Following Ministry of Education (MOE) discussion and agreement on World Bank proposed set of activities, the EPDF provided support: i) to education sector plans; ii) to capacity building in a variety of areas; iii) to monitoring and evaluation and knowledge-sharing; and iv) to sustain partnership agreements.

Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Yemen

Date of endorsement: February 2003	
First allocation: November 2003 – First allocation of USD 10m	For 1st and 2nd allocations: Grant focused on access and supply-side activities – 70% of grant allocated for this (school construction and provision of school kits). 20% of grant allocated to quality-related activities (support to decentralised training schemes, provision of equipment etc). Remaining 10% devoted to capacity building activities at central, governorate and district levels on planning, statistics and computer literacy.
Second allocation: November 2004 – Second allocation of USD 10m	
Third allocation: December 2005 – Third allocation of USD 10m November 2006 – Top-up allocation of USD 10m	The 3 rd allocation (to be disbursed in 30 month period over 2009–2011) will support a "female teacher contract scheme" on selected governorates

FTI and the Education Sector

S7 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Yemen.

S8 **Education Policy and Planning:** FTI has made a contribution to improving policies within the basic education sub-sector. This influence has mainly taken place through i) the gender focus of the endorsement process; ii) the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the FTI CF projects which tailored supply-side policies for underserved governorates; and iii) the FTI EPDF which supported a wide range of upstream and downstream analytical work with direct linkages on demand-side policies. The influence of FTI was also discernible in the approach to planning within different levels of the education sector. In basic education the FTI proposal initiated the development of the first medium term implementation plan for NBEDS with costed strategies. In addition, the FTI Catalytic Fund project helped identify priority programmes in the area of access. However, the projectised nature of FTI CF support, which introduced parallel planning processes at governorate and district levels, superseded FTI's earlier strategic inputs into national planning. Support has also been provided by EPDF to finalise a general secondary education strategy and served as a basis for the design and implementation of the second largest multi-donor funded project (SEDGAP). The EPDF also funded the education country status report, completed in July 2009.

S9 **Education Financing:** The available data show that there has been no increase in the relative priority accorded to basic education in public expenditure decisions over the period of the FTI's involvement. Public expenditure has risen in real terms but this has been at well below the rate necessary to achieve EFA targets. Education spending has fallen as a share of GDP and as a share of public spending (but in a context of a large shock in oil revenues that is not likely to be permanent). There has also been a relative shift in the allocation of education spending away from basic education towards technical education and vocational training. On the donor side, the study found that external resources increased in the period following FTI endorsement, directly through the catalytic fund allocation (USD 40 million over 2004–2011) and indirectly through a catalytic effect on existing donors (World Bank, GTZ, the Netherlands, KfW) and on attracting new donors (Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID)). However, after peaking in 2006, donor financing has been falling subsequently.

S10 FTI CF resources were invested on priority programmes, used as planned and therefore reached beneficiaries in the most underserved rural areas of four populous governorates which account for the majority of out-of school children. Due to high fiduciary risks, the procedures for disbursement and management of the FTI CF were not aligned on government systems. Finally, the evaluation found that delays in finalising agreement and disbursement of FTI CF grant phase 3 (USD 20 million over 2009–2011) have impacted negatively on aid predictability for basic education.

S11 **Data, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** The study found that FTI did not have a clear strategy for its engagement in data and monitoring and evaluation. As a result its influence was low over the evaluation period. Delays in designing an Education Management Information System (EMIS), inconsistency of annual school surveys, persistence of fragmented information management and low internal demand for timely data from policy makers, has highly constrained the effectiveness of donor support in the area of data collection. By contrast the FTI EPDF supported studies usefully promoted data analysis and provided a set of evidence on the performance of the Yemeni education system on key outcomes. However, there is no evidence yet of an effective feedback loop into planning and decision making processes at central and local levels. Whilst the FTI IF indicators were

collected and discussed among stakeholders in 2002/03 – establishing a baseline which was presented in the FTI credible Plan 2003–2005 – these indicators were only reviewed during the supervision of the "FTI CF project" they were not used as a benchmark against which to report progress during joint annual reviews.

S12 Capacity: Firstly, the evaluation found that many of the factors that constrain CD lie well beyond the education sector and that FTI missed the opportunity to engage and sustain inter-ministerial discussion on CD issues. Secondly, FTI processes did not explicitly discuss the trade-off between supporting the speedy delivery of education services and supporting long term capacity development. However, the choice of a programme administrative unit (PAU) to manage the FTI CF projects implicitly marked the preference for the former. One can argue the negative effect of PAU on strengthening national systems in the short-term (capacity building activities supported by PAU focusing on unfamiliar and complex World Bank procedures) but conversely, there were significant efficiency gains given implementation capacity and the fiduciary management environment. It is worth noting that the FTI CD guidelines have not contributed to address the above mentioned trade-off and – without being a result of the latter – they have not been used in Yemen. It was difficult to assess the durable impact of the limited FTI inputs in the area of CD. It is too early to identify the effective contribution of the FTI EPDF to institutional capacities in Yemen.

S13 Aid Effectiveness: The FTI provided an important initial boost to the aid effectiveness agenda in education in Yemen. Available evidence indicates that the FTI endorsement period a) encouraged a unified process of policy dialogue leading to the signature of a Partnership Declaration and organisation of Joint Annual Reviews; b) consolidated sub-sector ownership on the part of MOE officials; c) reinforced alignment with government sub-sector plan and priorities; and d) promoted coordination and harmonisation. The FTI proposal has contributed, although not exclusively, to the design of the multi-donor funded basic education development project (BEDP) where the World Bank, KfW, DFID and the Netherlands used the same procurement, financial management and supervision procedures. However the initial boost provided to aid effectiveness has not been consolidated over the evaluation period. No evidence has been found of efforts made by FTI to integrate Gulf donors into education sector roundtable. The FTI CF has adopted the same implementation arrangements established for BEDP but was not merged with it. Moreover the CF projects are using a mechanism of reporting disconnected from the annual review.

S14 Cross-cutting issues: Gender has been a prominent cross-cutting issue for Yemen reinforced by FTI processes and activities in the areas of policy, planning and data for the period covered by the evaluation. Gender issues were at the heart of the policy dialogue during the FTI proposal and endorsement processes. As a result, the FTI CF grant successive projects have addressed girls' access and retention in basic education schools in seven governorates through provision of classrooms and female teachers in remote rural areas and/or improvement of the school environment to be supportive of girls and acceptable to their families. Moreover, the FTI EPDF-funded studies helped provide evidence of the persistence of a gender gap, the relevance of demand-side policies and the social benefits of female literacy. The FTI EPDF also contributed to the design of the conditional cash transfer scheme to benefit a sample of rural girls enrolled in grades 4–9. On the contrary, the study found that Yemen's particular aspects of *fragility* do not appear to have influenced the design of FTI engagement. While constraining the effectiveness of government programmes and donor support, FTI activities have not directly addressed fragility issues. Security concerns have contributed to a relatively limited donor in-country presence which has constrained donor engagement.

Overall Conclusions

S15 **Relevance.** Overall FTI's aims were highly consistent with the needs and priorities of Yemen in early 2000s but the means of doing so were much less clear in the complex Yemeni context. Firstly whilst Yemen was lagging behind and struggling with each of the EFA goals, paradoxically, the Indicative Framework parameters were actually close to the benchmarks in Yemen. Therefore the Indicative Framework did not help highlight key policy gaps notably low efficiency in the use of resources; higher unit costs in the delivery of education services and demand-side constraints for access and retention in schools. The FTI- IF focuses more on resource mobilisation and service delivery parameters than on the efficient use of resources and demand constraints. Secondly, the focus on filling the data gap and on the institutionalisation of M&E systems was highly relevant. Nevertheless the FTI's emphasis on an EMIS was undermined by the absence of incentives to promote internal demand for data from policy makers. Thirdly, Yemen was an obvious candidate for FTI in the area of capacity development but it was ambitious to expect it to make a significant difference, given the considerable capacity constraints beyond the education sector. Critically, FTI was short of proposals to address the trade-off between the speedy delivery of education services and the long term capacity development of the education sector. Finally, the aim to increase financial support and enhance progressive aid modalities was relevant in an under-funded and under-aided country where partners operated individually. However the FTI's proposals to operate in a risky fiduciary environment and to include non traditional donors (e.g. Gulf donors in Yemen) on aid discussions were not developed when Yemen was endorsed.

S16 **Accelerating progress on EFA.** Progress towards EFA is slow. In the area of lower basic education where external education resources were expended (including those of the catalytic fund) the improvement on equitable access and retention did not match the expectations over the period FTI is active in Yemen. Although FTI contributed to improving policy and planning, many of the key challenges the sub-sector faced in 2002 (especially interaction between gender, poverty and residential area) remain acute while the long-term financing prospects for the sector have not improved. Overall it is difficult to argue that FTI contributed significantly to fast track progress on the six EFA goals.

S17 **Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness.** The FTI in Yemen provided an initial impetus for donor support to EFA but this appears not to have been sustained. Public spending on basic education has fallen as a share of total public expenditure and the financing gap to achieve EFA targets is increasing, while the sustainability of current public spending levels is uncertain as Yemen faces the exhaustion of its oil reserves that have supplied up to 75% of government revenue. While FTI played an important initial role in taking forward the aid effectiveness agenda for the sector there is no plan in place to move towards the use of government systems through sector budget support or a full sector wide approach.

Recommendations and Reflections for the Overall Evaluation

S18 The findings in this study suggest that the main catalytic effects of the FTI inputs in Yemen have been on policy and planning for primary education and on aid effectiveness. The evidence on education financing is mixed as the initial positive contribution has not been sustained. Through EPDF studies, FTI has contributed indirectly to data and monitoring and evaluation activities. FTI activities did not impact institutional or organisational capacities.

S19 This case study highlights a number of key issues, including:

- The need for further reflection around the core objective FTI wishes to pursue in states facing major capacity constraints and potential trade-offs between short-term service delivery and long-term capacity development.

- The centrality of capacity development issues for the effective implementation of education reforms and the potential use of FTI as a platform to extend the dialogue of in-country donors beyond education sector (e.g. civil service reform, public financial management).
- The value added of the FTI CF for both a demonstration effect for the whole system of reform while at the same time being adequately concentrated and focussed (e.g. promotion of school grant mechanisms).
- The importance of ensuring that elements of the FTI compact continue to be understood and considered beyond the endorsement period, especially considering high turnover of Ministry officials and donors staff.
- The implications of the limited presence of donors for in-country ownership of FTI i.e. the FTI in Yemen is essentially a relationship with the World Bank who lead much of the technical work.
- The centrality of EPDF for the financing of analytical work which would not otherwise have happened.
- The capacity of FTI to mobilise "non-traditional donors" (e.g. Gulf donors in Yemen), especially when sufficient funds cannot be mobilised through regular Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) channels.

PART A: APPROACH

1 Introduction

The Fast Track Initiative¹

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is "accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015" (FTI 2004a p3). It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development Banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.² Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, FTI was designed as a compact that "explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' improvements in policy performance and accountability for results" (FTI 2004a p3).

1.2 According to its Framework document (FTI 2004a), the FTI's major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education.
- More efficient aid for primary education.
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education.
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education.
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.

1.4 The 2004 FTI Framework (FTI 2004a) set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country level;
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework (IF)), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes;
- **Support linked to performance:** the FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources;
- **Lower transaction costs:** the FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves);
- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

¹ This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (see Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b, Annex A).

² The Dakar Forum *communiqué* stated that "No countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources".

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed). Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI specific instruments which can provide support at country level:

- The **Catalytic Fund (CF)** set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The Fund had disbursed United States Dollars (USD) 396 million to 20 countries as of November 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)** set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8 million (of USD 58.5 million committed) to over 60 countries as of December 2008.

1.6 The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.7 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at 0 of this report includes a summary of the main changes in FTI, as well as its involvement with Yemen.)

Purpose and outputs of the evaluation

1.8 The FTI partnership commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation to take place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target date of 2015. It was therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the Terms of Reference (TOR):

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (TOR, ¶12)

1.9 The evaluation was managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process was meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raises. The main outputs are listed on p ii.

Evaluation methodology

1.10 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI was to disentangle the activities and effects of FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted was contribution analysis. This involved a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence was then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) the FTI may have made to the overall results observed.

The role of country studies

1.11 The work programme for the evaluation envisaged nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the

context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (TOR ¶21)

1.12 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with FTI.³ Each country study was a contribution to the overall evaluation. It was not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor was it linked the FTI's processes for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies were conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in FTI, and it was expected that their reports would be of value to the countries concerned.

1.13 The country studies took account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and considered the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), aid effectiveness) which FTI is intended to have. They aimed to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. (See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to country studies.)

The study process for Yemen

1.14 The country case studies were based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

1.15 The visit to Yemen took place between 13th and 24th June 2009. The Country Study team consisted of Elsa Duret (Country Study Team Leader), Stephen Jones, and Hassan Abdulmalik.

1.16 The team met a range of stakeholders from the Government – at both central, governorate and district levels, in particular representatives from the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocation Training (MOT EVT), the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR), the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The team had fruitful discussions with representatives from Al Baidha, Dhamar, Hajja and Hodeidah governorates and visited Bajel district and Al Manar school in Mehasam (Hodeidah Governorate). The team also held meetings and/or phone interviews with donors, including Department for International Development (DFID), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), The Netherlands, the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society representatives. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is at Annex A. A Country Visit Note summarised the team's preliminary findings and was circulated to in-country stakeholders on June 29th, 2009 (Duret et al 2009).

Outline of this report

1.17 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (¶1.10 above), this report first reviews Yemen's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B), then systematically considers the parts played by the FTI (Part C). Conclusions and recommendations are in Part D.

1.18 Part C is structured according to the five work streams within the overall evaluation: policy and planning, finance, data and M&E, capacity development and aid effectiveness. Each subsection addresses the context, inputs and activities of the FTI, and the relevance,

³ See the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b, Annex H) for a full explanation of the choice of country cases.

effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (where possible) within these work stream areas. There is also a chapter on cross-cutting issues.

1.19 This country case study aimed to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- All stakeholders in Yemen with an interest in the education sector.
- The FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report.
- The EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee).
- Any other interested parties.

PART B: EDUCATION FOR ALL IN YEMEN

2 Yemen Background

Yemen in brief

2.1 Yemen is a country of 22 million people of whom over 40% live in poverty. Average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is about USD 930 and Yemen was ranked 153 out of 177 countries in the 2007 Human Development Index and is by a considerable margin the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa region. Despite significant improvements in social indicators (for instance life expectancy increased from 42 to 62 between 1970 and 2005) deep challenges remain and Yemen is not expected to achieve key Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Yemen has one of the highest total fertility rates in the world (6.2 births per woman) and population is growing at over 3% per annum with almost 50% of the population under 15. Women are deeply disadvantaged throughout society with more than half of women marrying by the age of 15 and only 31% of women literate. The widespread use of the narcotic *qat* is regarded as adversely affecting health and productivity while providing the main source of income to around 14% of the population. The majority of Yemenis (74%) lived in rural areas with a population scattered among approximately 100,000 small villages in widely differing terrains (mountains, plains, coasts, desert plateau) proving a challenging environment for service delivery.

2.2 Yemen's political system is formally a multi-party democracy. Although President Saleh has been in power since 1978 (in North Yemen) and through the whole period since Yemen's reunification in 1990, the 2006 presidential election was regarded as a genuine contest by external observers, and there is an active opposition. However, the underlying social structure remains strongly tribal and traditional authorities retain considerable authority while formal institutional structures are weak.

2.3 Yemen faces significant security problems having suffered from civil war in 1994. These are related to the *Shi'ite* insurgency in the northern province of Sa'ada, an armed insurrection in the South, Islamic extremist violence directed against Western interests and the government which is seen as aligned to the West with Yemen also serving as a base for wider international operations by Al Qaeda aligned groups, as well as endemic tribal violence in a heavily armed society. These security problems are rooted in and feed on the underlying economic and social problems including widespread poverty and unemployment and the exclusion of large parts of the population from the economic benefits of oil, as well as increasing pressure on resources, notably water.

2.4 The Yemeni economy has been heavily dependent on the hydrocarbon sector which provides about a third of GDP, almost three quarters of government revenue, and 90% of exports. However oil reserves are expected to be exhausted within 10 to 12 years meaning that Yemen faces both a substantial challenge for the employment of its rapidly growing labour force and for the financing of social services and infrastructure.

2.5 Although Yemen has avoided a collapse into violence and disorder, it exhibits many characteristics of fragility and was ranked 18th in the Foreign Policy Fragile States Index for 2008 with the state assessed as lacking effective authority in the face of a wide range of social, security and economic challenges.

Institutional framework

2.6 The reunification of North and South Yemen in 1990 involved the merging of the two public administrations without any process of rationalisation or reform. This led to the creation of a large civil service, with a complex and centralised organisational structure, representing a significant burden on public finances while producing little value added in

terms of delivering needed services to the population. The formal system of public administration is often in practice of secondary importance compared to the role of traditional and non-formal rules that are deeply embedded in a powerful tribal culture.

2.7 The World Bank and other donors have supported efforts at civil service reform since the development of the Civil Service Modernisation Program in 1997, with the civil service being characterised as acting as an employer of last resort and a mechanism for patronage with little focus on service delivery. The initial experience with this reform effort was unsuccessful and through 2005 little progress was made and there was significant bureaucratic opposition to reforms. In 2006 the pay of senior public service managers was only two and a half times that of the lowest civil servant and the organisational structure was characterised as "antiquated and excessively complex and centralised with little ability by lower level management to take decisions or be held accountable for activities as mundane as approval of annual leave for individual staff. Organisational structures and work flows were duplicative and unnecessarily complex, and modern human resource-management practices were virtually absent. The result was a bloated civil service with extremely low pay scales, weak capacity, opaque hiring and promotion practices, and relatively few effective enforcement mechanisms" (World Bank 2008a, p1–2).

2.8 Since 2005 however, more progress has been made with implementation of the civil service reform agenda. This has included the implementation of improved personnel management practices and better information on civil services numbers, the removal from the civil service of employees working for political parties, enforcement of retirement rules, identification and freezing of payments to over 50,000 suspected "double dippers" (i.e. staff receiving more than one salary). This has led to reductions in the number of civil servants on the payroll in 2006 and 2007. Progress was however slower in implementing organisational reforms to assist with the improvement of service delivery although duplication and potential overlaps in the mandates of different organisations have been identified.

National development strategy

2.9 Yemen's national development strategy is set out in the "Strategic Vision 2025" (which includes targets of reducing illiteracy to 10% and achieving 95% female enrolment in basic education). The current (Third) Socioeconomic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR) runs from 2006–2010. It is based on eight pillars providing a prioritised framework for action: (i) macroeconomic policies and targets; (ii) good governance; (iii) development of productive and promising sectors; (iv) water, environment and basic infrastructure; (v) human development; (vi) government services; (vii) social safety net, social protection and social security; and (viii) women's empowerment. The DPPR is complemented by the National Reform Agenda (NRA) and the Public Investment Programme. The NRA focuses on governance issues, in particular (i) judicial reform; (ii) administrative reform and civil service modernisation; (iii) investment and business climate; (iv) anticorruption, transparency and accountability; and (v) political reforms.

2.10 The DPPR was subject to a midterm review in 2009 which argued for a stronger focus in the key areas of accelerating economic growth through private sector-led diversification, enhancing governance, improving living conditions and social indicators, and managing natural resource scarcity and natural risks.

2.11 In relation to accelerating private sector-led economic growth, the DPPR focuses on reducing the budget deficit (including through increasing non-oil revenue and reducing expenditure), containing inflation and managing a slow depreciation of the Yemen rial (YER) against the USD. Regulatory reforms are identified as necessary to encourage private investment through improving the environment for business, strengthening the financial sector and achieving accession to the World Trade Organisation and fulfilling all the

requirements for participation in the Greater Arab Free Trade Zone and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The DPPR also has a strong emphasis on infrastructure investment including in the power sector, transport, and urban services. Sectors identified as promising sources of growth include natural gas, manufacturing, fisheries, mining and tourism.

2.12 The DPPR seeks to enhance governance through fighting corruption and increasing transparency including through participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, and the strengthening of audit and corruption control bodies. Public Financial Reform (PFM) is also emphasised (see below) as well as strengthening administrative capacity through further modernisation of the civil service.

2.13 In the area of improving living conditions and social indicators, the DPPR envisages reforming or transforming service delivery with an emphasis on gender (though it lacks an action plan to achieve social transformation of gender relationships in addition to legal reforms), the development of a Children and Youth Strategy, improved management and planning of health services and a substantial strengthening of reproductive health services to reduce population growth to 2.75% per annum, and a cautious approach to reform of Yemen's subsidy system which is not well-targeted on the poor. In relation to basic education, the DPPR emphasises increasing enrolment rates especially for girls, curriculum reform, teacher training and overall quality management.

2.14 In relation to managing natural resource scarcity and risks, the DPPR focuses on water resources management, natural disaster response and climate change adaptation.

Quality of public financial management (PFM)

2.15 A Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment was carried out in 2008 (World Bank 2008c). The assessment highlighted three main factors that influence public financial management in Yemen:

- The large oil component of revenue which "presents a special challenge to budgetary and macro-fiscal forecasts" (p12) due both to price volatility and declining oil reserves.
- Capacity constraints specifically (p12–13) that "the great majority of spending units spread across the country within the districts and line ministries are operated on a manual basis and do not have adequately trained personnel... The recent decentralisation efforts that have moved much more responsibility directly to the Local Authorities appear to have further exacerbated the capacity challenge."
- An ongoing and substantial reform of the legal and regulatory framework which has meant that the system is in flux. Important initial steps have been taken to provide an improved process for ensuring budget allocations match priorities and are undertaken within a coherent and realistic medium-term framework. However, significant progress needs to be made both to strengthen this process and to strengthen budget execution, in particular to ensure that budget out-turns are in line with the agreed budget.

Budget cycle

2.16 The PEFA assessment (World Bank 2008c) describes Yemen's budget process as "comprehensive and policy-capable". The first steps have been taken to implement a multi-year budgetary framework with the DPPR providing a clear statement of medium term policy objectives. A macro-fiscal analysis is undertaken each year ahead of budget preparation. There is also regular analysis of debt sustainability and three year forecasts of fiscal aggregates are prepared on the basis of economic classifications. However, only a few

sectors have developed sector strategies and those that exist are not all fully costed, and where costings have been undertaken these are not in line with aggregate fiscal forecasts.

2.17 The budget cycle is well defined and clear guidelines are provided for the budget process. Cabinet approves sector expenditure ceilings at an early stage in the process and budget preparation allows time for parliamentary scrutiny and discussion. The PEFA assessment notes that "the budget documents are quite detailed and appropriately address many of the requirements both for meaningful budgetary oversight and to properly guide implementation. However, there remain some issues of transparency and clarity as to how parliamentary recommendations are incorporated into budgetary implementation". There is however "well-structured and vibrant parliamentary oversight of the government's budget estimates approval process" (World Bank 2008c p9). In 2007 Parliament undertook a comprehensive review of audit findings.

Main PFM issues and reform process

2.18 In relation to **aggregate fiscal discipline**, Yemen has had a robust recent revenue performance, well developed monitoring of debt and credible three year fiscal forecasts. Together with the well-developed budget process important elements of what is required to achieve aggregate fiscal discipline are in place. However, the PEFA assessment (World Bank 2008c p13) noted that "there remain important challenges towards meeting this objective including the absence of an effective cash management system to support predictable budget releases... weaknesses in the application of commitment control systems ... [and] significant losses both with salary payments and procurement."

2.19 Yemen has taken important initial steps towards developing a budget process that can aid the strategic **allocation of resources**. However (World Bank 2008c p13), the "practice of justifying supplemental budgets ex-post undermines the achievement of a strong strategic element to actual budgetary achievements."

2.20 **Efficient service delivery** is undermined by apparently high levels of arrears, and weaknesses in procurement systems and payroll control. While top down budget discipline is strong, the lack of participation in budget preparation of lower levels of government militates against the alignment of the budget with actual needs.

2.21 Yemen is implementing a comprehensive PFM reform strategy that was approved by the Cabinet in 2005. This focuses on six objectives:

- Improving the level of priority setting and basis for decision-making.
- Improving budget execution.
- Developing public financial management information systems.
- Enhancing control and financial accountability.
- Improving the system of bidding and procurement.
- Improving capacity and skills of public finance staff.

The PEFA assessment notes that important reforms have been implemented and that (World Bank 2008c p14) the "PFM Reform Programme in Yemen has political championship at the very highest levels" with a PFM Reform Task Force headed by the Deputy Minister of Finance overseeing implementation. However, the lack of clear structure to manage PFM reform was noted including that "no clear components have been defined for the PFM Reform pillar, with specific component managers tasked with clear roles and responsibilities each with a clear set of activities, targeted outputs, fully costed inputs, monitoring indicators and reviewable milestones. There are no arrangements to coordinate linkages between different PFM reform components... and no specific arrangements for managing the

implementation of the reforms within the Line Ministries." While there is an active donor harmonisation effort in support of PFM reform, the assessment suggested that there was a need for "closer and stronger alignment with Government reform plans and implementation, and more cognisance of capacity constraints in attempting to implement all of the PFM Reforms simultaneously."


Aid relationships

Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels

2.22 Yemen, in the recent past, has been regarded as an "aid orphan", receiving substantially less aid than would be expected in relation to its level of need (in terms of GDP per capita, poverty levels and social indicators) even taking into account its weak policy and institutional capacity (as measured for example by the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) on the basis of cross-country statistical comparisons. However, at the same time Yemen has had considerable difficulties absorbing aid and using it effectively. The Paris Declaration monitoring survey notes that over the period 1990–2004, overseas development assistance averaged around USD 260 million per annum, but that USD 5.3 billion of aid pledges have been received for the period 2007–2010, representing a fivefold increase in aid. The largest share of this aid is expected to come from members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

2.23 Figure 2.1 below shows information on aid commitments which suggest that at least by 2007 these pledges had not been converted into substantial commitments. There are also significant weaknesses in the data available on aid to Yemen particularly because aid provided by GCC members is not reported through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC). Despite some initiatives from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) to strengthen information on aid to Yemen aid information remains weak.

Figure 2.1 Total aid commitments (constant 2007 USD bn)



Source: Table E1

Aid coordination mechanisms

2.24 Yemen has taken a number of initiatives towards improving aid harmonisation and alignment in line with the Paris Declaration and related initiatives. In January 2005, a localised version of the Rome Declaration was signed by Yemen's development partners and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation established an Aid Harmonisation and Alignment Unit with support from the Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This unit took a number of

initiatives towards improving aid information and encouraging processes of strengthened harmonisation and alignment as well as monitoring and reporting on Yemen's progress with implementing Paris Declaration commitments.

2.25 At the Yemen Consultative Group Meeting held in London in November 2006 an Aid Policy Paper (APP) was presented (MOPIC & OPM 2006) which was based in part on discussions from an Inter Ministerial Working Group (IMWG). This proposed key principles and actions for the strengthening of aid management in Yemen. The APP noted weaknesses in the framework for aid management (set out in Prime Ministerial Decree No. 996 of 2002) which sets out responsibilities for aid management between MOPIC, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Yemen and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Specifically it noted (p4) that "First, the regulation is not articulated within any overall policy framework towards aid making it difficult to assess the appropriateness of its various provisions. Second, some important aspects of the Decree have not been implemented (for instance the requirement in Article 13 for the development of a comprehensive documentation of procedures). Third, there is no effective process of monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of the Decree, which necessarily requires a cross-ministerial perspective."

Table 2.1 Consultative Group Meeting APP Key Actions

Action	Responsibility
Review of aid management framework in Decree 996 of 2002: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation of revised legislative framework • Definition of mandate of MOPIC and other key government organisations • Review of capacity development requirements for strengthening aid management • Development of detailed procedures manual 	IMWG / Prime Minister's Office / MOPIC
Review of plans for strengthening public financial management and other accountability reforms to identify issues for strengthening aid management	Ministry of Finance
Development of an action plan for review of aid alignment and policies for specific aid modalities	MOPIC and sector ministries under guidance of IMWG / Prime Minister's Office
Review of project implementation unit (PIU) arrangements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of guidelines for PIUs • Preparation of Action Plan for rationalisation and strengthening of PIU arrangements 	MOPIC
Agreement on overall dialogue structure and implementation of agreed dialogue forums, including results and reporting framework	MOPIC and sector ministries
Establishment of aid database	MOPIC
Development of framework for annual Development Cooperation Report	MOPIC

Source: MOPIC & OPM 2006

2.26 The APP set out a number of proposals including for an overall structure for dialogue on aid issues between government and donors. The key actions proposed are summarised in Table 2.1 above. However, since the Consultative Group Meeting in 2006 it appears that little progress has been made in implementing this agenda with most initiatives on aid effectiveness happening at the sectoral rather than national level. There is a particular problem with the reporting of data on aid received from GCC countries which is not included in the OECD aid reporting system and is only partially reported in Yemeni government sources.

2.27 Table 2.2 below summarises information for Yemen for the 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring survey (OECD DAC 2008).⁴ It was noted in the survey that only one of the 2010 targets had been achieved by 2007 and that (OECD DAC 2008 p54–15) "substantial efforts are required by the government and donors to improve the use of country systems, predictability of aid, use of Project Implementation Units (PIUs), Programme Based Approaches (PBAs) and results-based monitoring frameworks".

Table 2.2 Summary of Yemen's Performance against Paris Declaration Indicators

INDICATORS		2005 REFERENCE	2007	2010 TARGET
1	Operational development strategies	C	C	B or A
2a	Reliable public financial management (PFM) systems	3,0	3,0	3,5
2b	Reliable procurement systems	Not available	D	C
3	Aid flows are aligned on national priorities	0%	33%	85%
4	Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support	16%	46%	50%
5a	Use of country PFM systems	10%	5%	No target
5b	Use of country procurement systems	13%	44%	Not applicable
6	Strengthen capacity by avoiding Parallel PIUs	29	27	10
7	Aid is more predictable	0%	33%	50%
8	Aid is untied	91%	86%	More than 91%
9	Use of common arrangements or procedures	50%	21%	66%
10a	Joint missions	26%	29%	40%
10b	Joint country analytical work	55%	31%	66%
11	Results-based monitoring frameworks	D	C	B or A
12	Mutual accountability	No	No	Yes

Source: OECD DAC 2008

⁴ It should be noted that the validity of the PD Monitoring Survey results is questionable because they do not include aid from Gulf Cooperation Council donors who are expected to be Yemen's major source of aid over the medium term.

3 Basic Education in Yemen

Education system

3.1 **Institutions.** Education is presently managed by three ministries that share important constraints in exercising their core functions:


- Ministry of Education (MOE) manages pre-basic, basic and general secondary education. Literacy is under the mandate of the Literacy and Adult Education Organisation (LAEO), under the supervision of, but distinct from, the MOE.
- Ministry of Technical Education and Vocation Training (MOT EVT) manages post-basic TEVT and post-secondary.
- Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) is in charge of tertiary/university education.

3.2 Three key constraints affect these ministries: i) the traditional tendency for significant policy decisions to be set independently above the level of the ministry; ii) the funding for education institutions is under the direct control and regulations of the Ministry of Finance and by-passes the education ministries; and iii) the staffing of education institutions (and the ministries themselves) is under the direct control and regulations of the Ministry of Civil Service (Orbach 2008, Beatty 2008 and World Bank 2009c).

3.3 **Decentralisation.** Yemen's 2000 Local Authorities Law launched an ambitious decentralisation programme, assigning to local authorities a wide range of responsibilities for local development planning, budgeting, revenue generation, economic and social development (including education) without much of a transition period. Such orientation is now a reality to which the MOE has to adapt both centrally and for its peripheral branches (Governorate and District Education Offices). However "MOE has not yet been able to effectively change its implementer role to one responsible for setting policies, standards and outcome indicators, monitoring performance, quality and differences in service levels" (World Bank 2009c). Moreover the coordination mechanisms between MOE, GEOs/DEOs and local authorities to which the peripheral branches are technically accountable have not been yet clearly set up (see Chapter 8).

3.4 **Schooling system.** As a result of 1990 reunification of the country, the two systems of public formal education which were in place in North and South Yemen⁵ were integrated into one system based on an educational ladder of nine years of compulsory basic education followed by three years of general secondary. Early childhood education is not compulsory, rare and mostly private. Students can enter secondary school if they have a Basic Education Certificate (BEC) which requires passing the ninth grade examination. Basic education graduates enrol in grade 10 either in a two-year vocational or three-year technical institute or in a general secondary school in which they choose between Science or Literary tracks. Vocational schools and community colleges have difficult and complex entrance requirements. Secondary school graduates, after a one year waiting period, can enter universities, which have very recently established entrance requirements (Abdulmalik 2009). Figure 3.1 below provides visualisation of student flows across the education system based on the most recent available information.

⁵ The schooling system was organised on the basis of 6+3+3 in North Yemen and on the basis of 8+4 in South Yemen.

Figure 3.1 Structure of the Education System (2007/08)

Source: World Bank 2009c

3.5 Religious education. Prior to the unification of Yemen, religious education was a central source of education in the Yemen Arab Republic.⁶ The parallel religious education continued until 2002 when the decision was made to integrate it with the mainstream of basic and secondary education in an effort to unify the official education system of the country (Kefaya 2007).

3.6 Role of the private sector. Private and community based education also exists in Yemen. However, the private sector seems to capture only a small proportion of the pupils enrolled in all levels and types of education, although growing rapidly in higher education (Abdulmalik 2009).

National education strategy

3.7 Education sector. There is **no integrated education sector strategy** which embraces all levels and types of education. However, the government has endorsed **five strategies since 2002⁷** which guide the three ministries in the provision and regulation of education and training in Yemen with different years of coverage (see Figure 3.2 below). Each sub-sectoral strategy aims to increase equitable access, improve quality and efficiency of delivery, quite independent of what is happening in other sub-sectors (see Chapter 5).

⁶ In the Yemen Arab Republic, the government-supported public education consisted of two parallel programmes: general education (schools) and religious education (religious institutes). Both schools and institutes had the same structure (6-3-3, then 9-3) and used the same policies, curriculum, textbooks and evaluation. They were compatible: any student could transfer at any grade from any institute to any school and vice versa. The main difference was on the curriculum focus as religious institutes gave more attention to Arabic and Islamic Education than to Sciences and Mathematics.

⁷ In addition, the National Strategy for Literacy and Adult Education (1998) aims to eradicate illiteracy in the population ages 10–40.

Figure 3.2 Current national education strategies and years of coverage

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS)													
National General Secondary Education Strategy (NGSES)													
National Strategy for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education (NSD/TE)													
National Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Yemen (NSDHEY)													
National Children and Youth Strategy (NCYS)													

Source: World Bank 2009c

3.8 Basic Education sub-sector. The National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS), approved in 2002, is the framework for the MOE and its partners to achieve the goals of Education for All by 2015. Accomplishment of the Basic Education Development Strategy (BEDS) objectives depends on both expansion and reform of the education sector. In 2006, the Government devised its five year implementation plan called Medium Term Results Framework (MTRF 2006–2010). The MTRF operationalised BEDS by outlining the strategies, policies, programmes, and targets necessary to achieve the BEDS outcomes for 2006–2010. It acts as the document that guides and coordinates the planning and support of all education sector partners. It focuses on the three outcome areas of access, quality, and institutional capacity; it proposes five outcome areas with targets to be achieved by 2010; and eight programmes to achieve those targets.

Figure 3.3 NBEDS Targets and Programmes

Targets	Programmes
Overall Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) to raise from 77% to 90% Gender gap to reduce from 25% to 11% Illiteracy overall from about 47% to less than 30%, targeting mainly females	Access <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme 1: Household Incentives Programme • Programme 2: Infrastructure and School Facilities Development Programme • Programme 3: School Level Management and Community Participation Programme
Quality measured by learning achievement grades 1 to 9 by subject with 2005 as the benchmark.	Quality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme 1: Learning Achievement and Curriculum Programme • Programme 2: Learning Services Programme • Programme 3: Learning Materials Development Programme
	Institutional Capacity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme 1: Sector Management Framework Programme • Programme 2: Sector Organisation and Skills Development Programme

Source: MOE 2006, MTRF 2006–2010

3.9 An organisational framework to implement the MTRF includes a BEDS Steering Committee; a Council of Deputies; four Task Forces: 1) Access, 2) Quality, 3) Institutional Modernisation, and 4) Planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and Policy; and eight Working Groups. The task forces correspond to the three outcome areas, in addition to the special task of planning, policy and M&E. The eight Working Groups correspond to the eight programmes.

Progress towards EFA

3.10 The **EFA Global Development Index (EDI)** published by UNESCO/HQ in the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) 2009 (UNESCO 2008) reflects four Dakar goals. It incorporates the total primary net enrolment rate (NER), the adult literacy rate, the gender specific EFA index and the survival rate to grade 5.⁸ Yemen is ranked 121 out of 129 in 2006 (last year documented). The value of EDI is 0.643 in 2006 against 0.525 in 1999. The extent of movement is noticeable but Yemen improved its ranking only by five places.⁹

3.11 **Goal 1: Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE).** Enrolment in ECCE remains very low, even in comparison to low-income countries. The number of children attending ECCE classes shifted upwards from 13,600 in 2000/01 to 22 000 in 2007/08 while the number of institutions was multiplied by 10 over the period (World Bank, 2009c). Such increase is not significant to show any increase in the pre-primary gross enrolment rate (Figure 3.4 below)


3.12 Goal 2: Universal Primary Education.

- Out of school children. Despite the government's compulsory basic education policy, 1.8 million children of basic education age were still out-of-school in 2005. Out of school children are concentrated in rural areas of populous governorates, and more likely to be girls from poor households (UNESCO 2008).
- Enrolments. Enrolments in primary education have increased from 2.2 million in 1997 to 3.3 million in 2007. There have been impressive gains in basic education gross enrolment ratios (GERs) which improved from 62% 1998/99 to 74% in 2007/08 and for girls from 42% 1998/99 to 64% in 2007/08. Yemen's primary GER is only 85% in 2007/08 (where the low-income average is 94% and FTI country average is 98%) (Abdulmalik 2009, World Bank 2009c). Concerning net enrolment rate (NER), it should be pointed out that Yemen's gain over 1999 to 2006 was the highest in the Middle East/North Africa region as shown in figure 3.4.
- Access. Access to grade 1 has improved during the last decade, 85% of children eventually join school (94% of boys and 76% of girls) in 2006/07 (Abdulmalik 2009, World Bank 2009c).
- Internal efficiency. The dropout rate is 9% (7% for boys and 11% for girls). The rural dropout rate is much higher than urban areas. In addition, instead of taking six years to complete primary education, students take, on average, 8.8 years (8.1 years for boys and 9.9 years for girls) in 2006/07. It takes twice the nominal number of years of schooling in the case of girls to complete basic education (Abdulmalik 2009, World Bank 2009c).
- Completion. In 2006/07, the primary completion rate (PCR) (equivalent to the first six years of basic education in Yemen) was 60% overall, 70% for boys and 49% for girls. About 40% of children who entered school do not complete primary school. Yemen's PCR is similar to the average for low-income countries but if the current trend of demographic growth continues it is unlikely that Yemen will achieve the MDG target of 100% PCR. (Abdulmalik 2009, World Bank 2009c).

⁸ If an Education for All Development Index is to measure overall progress towards EFA, its constituents should ideally reflect all six Dakar goals. In practice, however, this is difficult, since not all the goals have a clear definition or target. For example, Goal 3 – learning and life skills programmes – is not yet conducive to quantitative measurement. For rather different reasons, Goal 1 – early childhood care and education – cannot easily be incorporated because the data are insufficiently standardised across countries, and they are, in any case, available for only a small minority of states. Moreover, there is no a target value for this goal. Accordingly, for the time being, the EFA Development Index (EDI) only incorporates indicators for the four goals of universal primary education, adult literacy, gender parity and the quality of education.

⁹ Between 1999 and 2006, EDI change was +9.9 in relative terms (see UNESCO 2007, p 251).

Figure 3.4 Changes in key EFA goals between 1999 and 2006 in Yemen



Source: UNESCO 2007

3.13 Goal 3: Learning needs of young people and adults. The structure of the Yemeni education system provides little flexibility for lifelong learning opportunities. However non-formal education programmes exist to supplement the acquisition of basic skills for youth. The lack of common understanding of what this goal entails and the difficulty to find comparable indicators over time makes the monitoring of progress difficult.

3.14 Goal 4: Adult literacy. According to the 1994 and 2004 censuses, the adult literacy rate increased from 44% to 54% over the period but it remains low (Kefaya 2007). In addition, the population growth rate counteracted the improvement in Yemen with an increase in the number of adult illiterates (UNESCO 2008). Calculation derived from the 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey showed that the percentage of 15+ year old women who found it difficult to read a simple sentence after six years of schooling is more than 90% both in rural and urban areas (World Bank 2009c).

3.15 Goal 5: Gender. Despite significant improvement over the decade, there is still a long way to go for girls' enrolment at all levels of education. The gender specific EFA index (GEI) is

published by UNESCO/HQ in the Global Monitoring Report 2009. The value of GEI improved by 32% in relative terms between 1999 and 2006 but Yemen is still ranked 127 out of 129 just in front of Niger and Chad in 2006 (UNESCO 2008).

- Widest gender gap in the world for access and retention. Access to grade 1 is 94% of boys and 76% of girls in 2006/07 and PCR is 70% for boys and 49% for girls. Addressing the issues of girls, particularly in rural areas, is necessary for achieving the MDGs (World Bank 2009c).
- Girls outperformed boys in student learning assessments. Learning achievements of girls are higher than those of boys in lower basic education. Girls outperformed boys in both the 2002 and 2005 Monitoring Learning Achievement (MLA) surveys. Yemeni girls similarly outperformed Yemeni boys in both Mathematics and Science in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007, and the difference was one of the largest seen among all participating countries in the 4th grade test. (IEA 2008a, IEA 2008b).
- Low appropriation of public spending by women. For the aged 5 to 25 cohort, males receive 49% more resources than females because of their higher enrolment rate especially at the higher level of education where unit cost is higher (World Bank 2009c).

3.16 Goal 6: Quality.

- Student learning outcome. Student performance in the MLA (2002 and 2005) and the TIMSS 2007 reflect low levels of student learning achievement in lower basic education. The average score for both boys and girls, in rural and in urban areas tend to be less than 40% in 2002 and less than 50% in 2005 MLA tests. Yemen ranked lowest in both mathematics and science among all 36 countries that participated in the TIMSS 2007 4th grade examination. 94% of Yemeni students scored below the "low" benchmark of performance for mathematics and 92% scored below the "low" benchmark for science. But it is worth noting that Yemen was the only low-income country to participate in 4th grade TIMSS in 2007 (IEA 2008a, IEA 2008b).
- Determinants of quality: (i) there are reasonable quantities of textbooks available to all schools but the availability of other teaching and learning materials and facilities is seriously lacking; (ii) the average class size and student teacher ratios are relatively small in Yemen (respectively 30 and 25 in basic education) but the distribution of teachers across schools is highly varied within governorates, with a greater element of randomness in schools with lower grades; (iii) the teacher force is large, predominantly male, and a large proportion is unqualified; (iv) low actual time on task due to teacher absenteeism and student absenteeism (time on task is only 69% of what the government is trying to provide); and (v) non-favourable attitude of teachers affect the students' learning (World Bank 2006, World Bank 2009c)

3.17 Prospect for meeting EFA goals. Yemen is still lagging behind and struggling with the six EFA goals. With an EDI below 0.80, Yemen falls in the category of countries "far from reaching EFA goals" by 2015 (UNESCO 2008)

- Yemen has one of the highest population growth rates in the world (3%) with a total population likely to double every 20 years. By 2015, the number of basic school age population (6–14) is estimated to reach around 6 million and it is likely that Yemen will have to accommodate some additional 2.5 million students¹⁰. Such

¹⁰ In the Arab States the primary school-age cohort is estimated to grow by 4 million in 2015 (UNESCO 2008).

continued increases in the basic school age population mean incremental pressure on financial, physical and human resources. One consequence is that Government of Yemen will have to work harder to maintain existing gains.

- Yemen is still a rural country with a population scattered in small villages which makes the delivery of education services close to the majority of rural children – especially girls – more costly on average.
- In the mean time the economic prospects are daunting. Yemen economy relies upon limited and depleting natural resources (water and oil) and remains vulnerable to commodity shocks and the effect of slower regional and world economic activity (International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009). It is likely that the education sector will have to compete harder to secure its own share of scarce domestic resources for financing desirable reforms and increase the level of expenditure per pupil.

3.18 These constraints will not allow the EFA objectives to be pursued and achieved if left unsupported by the donor community.

Finance for education¹¹

Public expenditure in the education sector

3.19 As described in Section 2 above, Yemen has had a strong revenue performance though one that is heavily dependent on unstable oil revenues that are expected to decline sharply in the medium-term as oil reserves are exhausted. While Yemen has made recent progress both in developing a budget process that can support the allocation of funds to priorities, and in commencing a process of public administration reform that has at least begun to eliminate waste and overstaffing, these reforms have in general yet to have a substantial impact on improving service delivery performance. For example, the 2006 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) found that budget allocations and expenditures in education were characterised by excessive rigidity and lack of predictability and transparency with the high degree of central control limiting the ability of spending units to allocate resources in line with their own view of priorities. The PETS also found that teacher management is poor with high levels of teacher absenteeism and abuse of the system of rural allowances that is supposed to encourage teachers to undertake assignments in rural areas.

3.20 Public expenditure as a share of GDP in Yemen is high (at between 30% and 40%) compared to most countries at a comparable stage of development and public spending has been increasing significantly in real terms over the last decade. Education has been one of the principal beneficiaries of this growth with recurrent spending increasing almost 140% in real terms between 1997 and 2007. In 2007, public education expenditure was 6% of GDP and 14% of total public expenditure. However, the share of education in total public expenditure fell from more than 18.5% between 1997 and 2002 to 15.5% between 2003 and 2007. Total education expenditure per child in the age group 6 to 15 increased by 85% in real terms between 1997 and 2007, representing USD 192 per child in the latter year.

Allocation of public expenditure in education

3.21 Over the period since 2002, the share of basic and secondary education in total public expenditure has been falling, continuing a trend from 1997. The share was 85% in 1997, 82% in 2002 and 78% in 2007 with Technical Education and Vocational Training increasing its share from under 2% to 5% in the latter period. Recurrent expenditure between 1997 and 2007 has grown at a rate which is twice that of basic and secondary expenditure. Recurrent

¹¹ This section is based primarily on the Yemen Education Country Status Report, (World Bank 2009c).

spending on basic education has fallen from 66% of total recurrent spending in 2000 to 60% in 2007.

3.22 Capital spending has accounted for around 10% of total spending in basic and secondary education and far higher proportions (26% and 55% in higher education and TEVT respectively). Teacher remuneration accounts for 69% of total recurrent expenditure in lower basic education and 67% in higher basic education, with non-teacher administrative costs accounting for 25% and 27% in lower and higher basic education respectively. Consequently only 6% of total recurrent expenditure is for non-salary items, amounting to only about USD 8 per child.

Efficiency and equity in education expenditure

3.23 The Education Country Status Report (CSR) concluded that the increase in basic education expenditure over the period from 1997 to 2007 financed the maintenance of enrolment levels in a rapidly increasing population while expenditure per child in basic education fell slightly in real terms. In terms of the efficiency of expenditure, the Report concluded that (i) too little is being spent on educational inputs other than teacher remuneration, that efficiency gains could be made by increasing the pupil-teacher ratio which is currently comparable to middle income countries and much lower than most countries at Yemen's level of development; (ii) the salary bill for administrative staff is too high for general education; and (iii) there is scope for rationalising school sizes and teacher deployment if policy on teacher allocation is changed and in particular if average school sizes could be increased.


3.24 In terms of equity, males of educational age receive 49% more resources from the education budget as a whole than females because of their higher enrolment rates especially in the more expensive higher levels of education. The urban population receives 58% more public resources than the rural population, and the richest income quintile receives 2.5% more resources than the poorest, although these disparities are dominated by differential participation in higher education and basic education expenditure is quite equitable.

External aid to education

3.25 Data on external aid to education is incomplete with support from GCC members in particular not being fully reported or integrated with other aid reporting. Aid commitments to education and basic education rose over the period 1999–2007, with peaks in 1999 mainly due to contributions from multilateral donors, and in 2004 due to contributions from both bilateral and multilateral donors. There has also been an uneven rise in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has significantly increased from 16% to 56% over the period. Total recurrent spending on basic education in 2007 is estimated to be USD 638 million (World Bank, 2009c). However in the absence of a comprehensive analysis of disbursements and clarification of the proportion of aid that is included in the budget it is difficult to make an assessment of the relative significance of external aid to the education sector.


3.26 The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2007 was the International Development Association (IDA) representing a 37% share, with Germany the second most significant contributor at 29%. Over the period 1999–2007, the IDA was the most significant donor with 45% of the share, followed by Germany and the Netherlands with 20% and 14% respectively. Japan and the United Kingdom also featured in the list of top five donors over the period, making similar levels of contribution.

Figure 3.5 Total commitments to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)



Source: Annex D

Figure 3.6 Total commitments to basic education by donor 1999–2007



Source: Table E10

PART C: THE FTI IN YEMEN

4 Overview of the FTI in Yemen

FTI country proposal and endorsement process

4.1 **Yemen was among the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI Partnership**, as early as **June 2002**.¹² This invitation was based on the fact that Yemen had adopted its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (2003–2005) in 2002, and had developed a comprehensive National Basic Education Strategy which covered grades 1–9: the NBEDS (2003–2015) was adopted in National Education Conference in October 2002. In this initial invitation letter, mention was made that one of the key objectives of the initiative was to offer the possibility for endorsed countries to receive additional "flexible", "long term" and "predictable" aid for primary education programmes to finance both additional recurrent and investment expenditure. This additional financing was to be announced as available as of early 2003.

4.2 Immediately after the Government of Yemen accepted the invitation of the FTI in August 2002, the **World Bank and the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands conducted a joint FTI mission in Yemen in September 2002**. The purpose of the mission was twofold: i) to establish consensus on FTI among government and donor partners; and ii) to agree the baseline indicators and assumptions used for the financial gaps estimations. During the mission the team held a workshop with senior MOE staff and other funding donor agencies on the details of the FTI and presented a FTI background paper prepared by a World Bank Education Economist in Washington. As Ogawa 2005 reported, there was considerable discussion during the mission (see below) but, by the end of the mission, "the objectives of the FTI were well understood and well received by MOE senior officials and all funding agencies".

- Coverage of the FTI:

the FTI was, at first, not received positively by the MOE's senior officials because the FTI focuses on grades 1–6 of basic education. The MOE wanted FTI to focus on the entire basic education system (grades 1–9) and set a target of 100 percent completion rate for grade 9 by 2015. However the MOE realised later that it (was) very difficult to achieve the target if they set at grade 9 (...) The Ministry has justified the narrower coverage that would be more feasible to achieve (Ogawa 2005).

- Education indicators:

the government (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Planning and Development¹³, Central Statistic Organisation) worked very closely to the mission team to set up the baseline indicators, assumptions used for the simulation model and targeted indicators. The difficult part of this exercise is that the MOE and MOPD had two different education indicators and both parties claimed that their indicators were official. (...)FTI targeted indicators and assumptions used were agreed among the following persons: Director of General Education (MOE); Head of Basic Education Development Program (BEDP), Deputy Minister of Ministry of Planning and Development, World Bank Education Economist and GTZ Senior Technician (Ogawa 2005).

4.3 After the World Bank-Netherlands joint mission, the Ministry of Education started to **draft** an EFA-FTI proposal with the technical support of the World Bank Education Economist based on the FTI background paper presented during the September mission. A

¹² Letter from World Bank to MOE Minister, 20th June 2002. The 17 other countries invited were: Albania, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Mozambique, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam Zambia. In addition five large countries representing 50 million out-of-school children were also invited to receive "analytical and technical support": Bangladesh, D.R. Congo, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

¹³ Now Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC).

letter from the FTI Secretariat¹⁴ informed Yemen of the rules for the evaluation of country requests as defined during the 24th October 2002 meeting of FTI contributing donors – evaluation to be carried out in country by local donor representatives before the November Partnership meetings if Yemen was to present its request as foreseen. Despite the short timeframe, the donors reviewed an earlier draft of the "**EFA-FTI Country Proposal**", informally endorsed it and sent a letter to FTI Secretariat in November 16th, 2002 seeking approval from the donor community during the Brussels Partnership meetings planned for November 27th 2002.

We presented comments to the government on 9 November. Under enormous time pressure many of these comments were successfully taken on board, resulting in the new proposal submitted to the EFA-FTI Secretariat (...) we fully endorse this draft Yemeni proposal. We request the donor meeting in Brussels to endorse the draft proposal and the process that is envisaged to complete it. We would also very much appreciate to know how the FTI donors see the process of approval of additional FTI funding unfold after the November meeting (The Netherlands 2002)

4.4 Seven countries¹⁵ were endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meetings but Yemen was not one of them. The main reason was the **lack of donor commitment** to support Yemen's basic education strategy as further explained in a letter from FTI Secretariat to MOE on December 10th, 2002:

Although Yemen was not yet one of the countries where donors have made a commitment to meet the long-term financing requirements for basic education, the hope was expressed that this could happen in the coming weeks or months". It was emphasised that this did not require a further meeting at the international level (...) a final endorsement could be given by the local donors, with participation by the EFA FTI Secretariat to contribute the cross-country perspective (FTI 2002b)

4.5 Following the Brussels meeting, Yemen continued the development of its proposal which **was jointly appraised** by the **local donor** community and FTI **Secretariat** and **endorsed in February 2003** (see Box 4.1).¹⁶

4.6 During the following month, the **donor community at the Paris donor meeting (March 25th, 2003) further endorsed the Yemen Proposal** but specific funding commitments were left unclear. While acknowledging delays to consideration of Yemen's Proposal, FTI Secretariat expressed its confidence that the additional financing for the accelerated programme in 2004 and 2005 would be mobilised and channelled through existing donor mechanisms and additional pledges formulated by donors in Paris meeting, as indicated below:

Let me take this opportunity to thank you for your patience over the past several months, during which the "rules of the game" for the FTI were still being worked out. I know that this period has been especially frustrating for countries such as yours, which moved quickly to prepare FTI proposals, when many aspects of the process were not yet completely clear

The Donors in Paris expressed their desire to see Yemen now move as quickly as possible into the phase of implementing the proposed programme. They noted that the funding requirements for 2003 and most of 2004 appear to be covered by existing and planned donor commitments, and expressed confidence that the remaining funding needed would be mobilised for Yemen, assuming continued strong performance by your Government in implementing the programme.

¹⁴ Letter from FTI Secretariat to MOE Minister, 30th October 2002 (FTI 2002a)

¹⁵ Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Guyana, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

¹⁶ "This review meeting was held via videoconferencing among Sana'a, Hague, London and Washington DC as almost all the donors have evacuated to their own countries due to the conflict in the Middle East" (Ogawa 2005).

The High Level donors recommended the following specific next steps for Yemen:

- Clarify the details of how your accelerated programme will be implemented.
- Verify and refine the annual cost estimates and compare these verified cost estimates with available donors resources (existing and new in order to identify any possible net gap.
- Prepare a Memorandum of Understanding between your Government and the local donors supporting your programme .
- Agree with the local donors that the FTI supported acceleration of primary education progress will be monitored on the basis of the agreed indicators formulated in the MOU and within the framework of annual joint sector reviews.
- Agree with the local donors that, to the degree possible, a single, unified report of progress will be prepared annually by your Government (FTI 2003).

Box 4.1 The Joint Assessment of the Yemen Proposal by Local Donor Group and FTI Secretariat

► Strengths

The **consistency** of the Yemeni Government strategies like Vision 2025, PRSP, NBEDS, the Second Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan and the Millennium Development Goals is clearly expressed in the proposal.

The EFA FTI Proposal **builds on NBEDS** and is considered to be **the more concrete implementation plan for the period 2003–2005** indicating the key areas to reach the long-term objectives of improving access, equity, quality and efficiency.

The proposal **clearly identifies the challenges** Yemen faces in achieving universal primary completion and as well as the areas to be strengthened by funding and other forms of support in the context of FTI: improvement of girls' enrolment and completion rate, particularly in under-served areas, is given due emphasis; strengthening the capacity at all levels of the education system to plan, manage and monitor improvements in the performance of the education system; improvement of the quality of education, Increased coverage through school construction, including feeder schools.

There is very **strong national ownership** of the proposal and it builds on a very strong participatory process. The proposal itself has been elaborated by a small technical team, but since the underlying NBEDS builds on 18 months of intense participation across regions and stakeholder groups, the participation requirement has been fully respected.

The proposal reflects the clear and **strong commitment** of the Yemeni Government **to basic education**. A further increase of public expenditure on basic education has been announced. The PRSP has targeted education expenditure as a share of GDP to be 9.6% by 2005.

► Concerns

Even though significant improvements in implementation capacity have been witnessed in several major projects, the **proposal seems overly ambitious given the current capacities** in the sector.

There is some **internal inconsistency in the use of indicators and targets**. They also need to be disaggregated to gender where appropriate. For example the targets and priorities regarding gender in the text are not consistently translated into performance indicators.

Adjustment will need to be made to the financial projections. The **financing gap** should be determined by showing how the current resource envelope is planned to be utilised for the interventions and which share of the costs cannot be financed from available resources.

Implementation of the plan needs some further elaboration. This applies particularly to the mechanism through which the different ministries and different levels will work together (e.g. interaction between bottom-up planning and national strategies, interaction between ministries at central and decentralised levels) and through which projects will be transformed into one coherent programme.

Some **issues do not receive adequate attention** yet or their treatment in the proposal is too brief: relevance of education as a factor in enrolment and completion/discontinuation; the redeployment of teachers to rural areas; operation and maintenance; the interaction between gender, poverty and residential area is insufficiently analysed and translated; gender-sensitivity of teachers and teaching as a factor in girls' performance; the need to examine ways of further reducing unit costs of textbook production/distribution and classroom construction.

Source: LDG and FTI 2003

4.7 The next step was the **joint Government of Yemen-Donors meeting held in Washington during 15–21 May 2003**.¹⁷ The purpose of the joint mission was "to address issues concerning the funding and the implementation of the Yemen's EFA-FTI proposal, to enhance coordination mechanisms to facilitate efficient support of the execution of FTI activities and to pursue the preparation of the BEEP II¹⁸ as an instrument to support the FTI within Yemen's NBEDS". The Aide Memoire of the mission (GOY and FTI 2003) underlined four important points:

¶5: The Yemeni delegation received strong indications of additional donor support from the US (...) the United Kingdom (...) and Canada."

¶6: "additional work still needs to be done in order to make the (three year implementation) plan more realistic and to further secure additional finances"

¶7: "The government policy of reaching out the entire country is commendable, however given current capacity constraints, it was agreed that the government would revise its FTI implementation plan. While building capacity is recognised as a priority activity, the Government may wish to build it throughout the country in a phased manner, by prioritizing capacity building interventions at all levels within one governorate at the time"

¶8: "Government and donors (...) agreed to work within a common framework and on an evolving approach towards integrating individual donor projects (...) Three stages were discussed (...) current situation was described at the first stage whereby donors finance individual projects albeit they intend to coordinate better their effort in aligning to fit the NBEDS (...) second stage (...) possibly through co-financing arrangements for projects (...) third stage (...) more integrated approach to financing and implementation.

4.8 While EFA-FTI Partnership was setting-up financial arrangements to provide transitional funds for donor orphan countries, Yemen pursued its efforts to refine its implementation plan following the conclusions of the Joint Mission. The GOY sent to FTI Secretariat its three-year work programme and budget for NBEDS, called **"EFA-FTI Credible Plan" in October 2003**. Then, the FTI credible plan was not seen as a separate plan but rather as a means to make the NBEDS and its concomitant implementation and investment plan operational in the medium term. The Partnership finally agreed to allocate USD 10 million to Yemen during the first Catalytic Fund meeting held in November 2003 (see section below on FTI CF).

Funding gap for lower basic education (Grades 1–6)

4.9 **EFA-FTI Country Proposal estimation (2002) & long term financing gap.** In 2002, the GOY presented three financial scenarios for achieving the EFA targets by 2015, including Status Quo, Reform, and Cautionary Scenarios. The focus of the analysis was on the government's financial envelope and requirements between 2001 and 2015, linked with the macroeconomic framework as well as estimates of external financing. The analysis warned that Yemen would face a significant financing gap unless efficiency of resource use was improved through a systemic reform.

¹⁷ The meeting was held in Washington due to travel restrictions in-country. The Yemen delegation comprised Vice Minister of Education (MOE); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (MOF), Deputy Minister for Curricula & Training (MOE), Deputy Minister for Projects (MOE), Deputy Minister for General Education (MOE), Advisor to Minister (ERDC), Deputy Chairman (ERDC), Director General Inspection Department (MOE) and Director of Credit Administrative Unit.

The donor's delegation comprised representatives from CIDA, DFID, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, France, EC, ILO, Unicef and WFP.

¹⁸ BEEP: World Bank funded Basic Education Expansion Project.

BEEP II will become the multi-donor funded BEDP (Basic Education Development Program) with contributions from the Netherlands, DFID, KfW and World Bank.

Table 4.1 Financing Gap Estimates for Grade 1–6 of Basic Education (USDm)

	EFA Requirement			Resource Envelope *			Financing Gap		
	Recurrent	Capital	Total	Recurrent	Capital	Total	Recurrent	Capital	Total
SCENARIO 1: Status quo									
Cumulative 2003–15	7,328	2,309	9,637	3,827	675	4,502	3,501	1,634	5,135
Annual	564	178	742	294	50	344	270	128	398
SCENARIO 2: Realistic Reform Scenario*									
Cumulative 2003–15	6,081	1,052	7,133	5,095	675	5,770	986	3,77	1,363
Annual	468	81	549	392	50	442	76	31	107
SCENARIO 3: Cautionary Scenario *									
Cumulative 2003–15	6,945	1,430	8,375	5,095	675	5,770	1,850	755	2,605
Annual	534	110	644	392	50	442	142	60	202

Notes:

- Status quo scenario: This scenario illustrates a continuation of the 2000 education policies (no changes in key policy parameters of domestic resource mobilisation and service delivery)

- Realistic reform scenario: This scenario introduces efficiency measures of the National Basic Education Strategy, such as increase in student-teacher ratios decrease in the proportion of repeaters combined with quality improvement measures and improvement in resource mobilisation

- Cautionary scenario : This scenario takes into consideration that progress made in implementing policy changes in the above scenario might be slower than expected and the efficiency gains might not materialise as quickly as the projections assume

* Projected donor financing of USD 27.5 million per year is factored in the resource envelop.

Source: MOE 2003

4.10 The **reform scenario** is the one selected in the EFA-FTI country proposal. The policy changes are due to large **efficiency gains** brought on by improvements in student/teacher ratios (from 25 in 2000 to 35 in 2015) and by introducing automatic promotion to reduce the number and the cost of repeaters (from 7% to 3% by 2015). At the same time, non-teacher items — quality improvement — are factored in (e.g. spending on inputs other than teacher salaries shift from 30% to 36%). They are combined with improved resource mobilisation based on the following assumptions: i) an increased share of public recurrent spending on education as a percentage of public spending (from 16% to 20%); and ii) an increased share of education spending on primary education (from 48% to 50%).


4.11 **EFA-FTI Country Credible Plan estimation (2003–2005) and short term financing gap.** The additional funding required during the first phase of NBEDS is **USD 96 million** (or USD 32 million per year — USD 19 million for quality, equity, and efficiency improvements and USD 13 million for school construction) — equivalent to 27% of the budget allocated to goods and services, and investment in 2002. This amount is presented as the one that "needs to be financed by the FTI funding".

Table 4.2 Request for FTI Funding between 2003 and 2005 (USD Millions)

	2003	2004	2005	Total (2003–05)
Total Estimated EFA Requirement	414	414	414	1,242
Total Available Resources	382	382	382	1,146
Salaries (government)	264	264	264	792
Goods/Services & investment	118	118	118	354
Financing Gap	32	32	32	96
Request for FTI funding	32	32	32	96

Source: MOE 2003

4.12 Revision of financial gap (2008). The simulation model analysis has been updated in 2008 to locate how far Yemen has moved towards its EFA target by 2015 and remaining financial implication.

Figure 4.1 Scenarios for financing gaps for Grades 1–6 of basic education in Yemen

Source: World Bank 2009a

4.13 The analysis discovered that there was not a significant financing gap until 2006 due mainly to two reasons.

The first reason is that the MOE has been committed to reforms as presented in the Reform scenario, and various efficiency parameters have improved, including pupil-teacher ratios and use of double-shifting. However, the second reason explains that the financing gap is not as large as anticipated because the enrollment expansion has not been as fast as expected in the original simulation. Relatively slow increase of enrollment has resulted in moderate pressure to financial envelope so far. This fact warns that Yemen will be required to speed up the enrollment expansion during next 6 years in order to achieve the EFA targets, and it will result in a significant financial pressure to the country (World Bank 2009a)

4.14 The GOY's Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in education sector envisaged financial resources of USD 717 million for Basic Education each year between 2007 and 2010 of which USD 595 million will be allocated for grades 1–6 (lower basic). According to the updated FTI simulation, which estimates the required resource envelope to achieve 100% Grade 6 completion rate in 2015, the required resources for 2009 to 2011 are respectively USD 647 million, USD 678 million and USD 734 million. Based on these resource availability and requirements, the **financing gap for lower basic education is**

USD 257 million over 2009–2011 (USD 52 million in 2009, USD 83 million in 2010 and USD 122 million in 2011)

4.15 The specific **contribution of the FTI CF grant phases 1, 2 and 3 to financing gap is presented and discussed in chapter 5.**

FTI Catalytic Fund grant phases 1, 2 & 3

4.16 **Allocation.** EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund was established in November 2003 to provide transitional financing for countries with too few donors present to enable these countries to scale up their existing education programmes while leveraging more sustainable financing from bilateral and multilateral donors. The Catalytic Fund regulations evolved in 2007 to be able to support all endorsed countries and provide longer term funding (see Box 4.2 below).

Box 4.2 The Catalytic Fund and evolution towards the Expanded Catalytic Fund

The CF was established in 2003 as a multi-donor, multi-recipient trust fund.

Between 2004 and 2006 the CF was open to so called "donor orphan" low income countries (i.e. having fewer than four donors disbursing more than USD 1m annually) with an endorsed education sector plan (ESP). Under this concept, it aimed to provide transitional short term funding for up to three years. It was expected that this would help to establish a good performance record to attract increased and longer-term support through regular bilateral and multilateral channels ("catalytic effect").

However over time it was recognised that (i) this strategy had not worked; and (ii) for many countries access to additional funding from the CF was a major incentive for seeking FTI status.

2007 marked the start of the second phase of CF operations. The Expanded Catalytic Fund (ECF) concept was approved in May 2007 to enable the CF to support all endorsed ESPs with insufficient funding, making the donor orphan criterion redundant. The CF was opened up to all IDA eligible countries. Its other explicit aim was to provide more predictable long-term financing, and provision was made to extend the implementation period from year-to-year to three years.

4.17 Yemen received **three successive allocations** from FTI CF for a **cumulative amount of USD 40 million**: i) USD 10m in November 2003 during the official launch of the FTI Catalytic Fund in Oslo (Norway) as it satisfied the donor orphan clause; ii) USD 10m in November 2004 during the FTI Partnership Meeting In Brasilia (Brazil) following its early success in implementing the first allocation; and iii) USD 10m in December 2005 during FTI meetings in Beijing (China) followed by a top-up USD 10m in November 2006 during the Partnership meeting in Cairo (Egypt) in light of the country's unmet financial need, good performance and absorptive capacity.¹⁹


4.18 The World Bank Task Team Leader (TTL) reported that Yemen was endorsed in 2003 "to receive three allocations" therefore it was not necessary to re-engage in a full endorsement process by the local donor community during the preparatory phase of grant 3.

4.19 While Yemen got the lion's share of the Catalytic Fund in 2003 (USD 10m out of USD 37m), to date **Yemen ranks at the 14th place (out of 30 countries) in allocations.**

4.20 The **delay between the allocation of the FTI CF Grant phase 3 and the grant agreement is to date 29 months** (the grant agreement could be signed in July 2009), equivalent to the period registered in Nicaragua and Ghana. If we exclude Niger where the programme was stopped for two years, such delay is one of the most significant ever registered since FTI CF operations started (see Figure 4.2 below).

¹⁹ The World Bank Education TTL reported that the FTI Secretariat contacted her in advance of the Cairo meeting informing that additional resources could be provided to Yemen based on needs.

Figure 4.2 FTI CF Grant phase 3 processing and disbursements delays in Yemen (in months)



Notes: (i) A number followed by a plus (+) sign indicates an on-going process, i.e. grant agreement not yet signed, or a first disbursement that has not yet occurred; and (ii) Niger's program was suspended for two years.

Source FTI 2009b, FTI 2009a

4.21 The explanations given by the World Bank Task Team leader are linked to: i) the unclear and sometimes contradictory guidance provided by FTI Secretariat and WB sector management to access FTI CF under the new regulations attached to Expanded Catalytic Fund; and ii) the overload of both the World Bank and the education programme administrative unit (PAU) to fast track the preparation of the FTI CF phase 3 request in parallel to the management of a multi-donor programme in basic education (BEDP) and the design of a new multi-donor funded programme in secondary education (SEDGAP). Such delays created a lot of misunderstanding and frustrations on MOE side especially in comparison with the smooth access and implementation of the first two grants -"fast track is not fast anymore".

4.22 **Geographical coverage.** Four governorates out of 21 have been initially identified to benefit from FTI CF grant during phases 1 and 2 (2004–2007): Al Baidah, Dhamar, Hajja and Hodaïda (see Map in Annex A). The fact that there were no major donor supported programmes in these governorates was a criterion considered. Three more governorates have been added (Al Daleh, Al Mahweet and Rhyma) for the third phase (2009–2011). As is presented in Table 4.3, in comparison to the non-FTI governorates and to the national average, the seven FTI governorates register, for both male and female students: (i) lower access rates to school; (ii) lower completion rates of grade 6; and (iii) lower gross enrolment rates. In addition, 47% of the out-of-school children are found in the seven FTI governorates.

Table 4.3 Key Indicators for FTI and Non-FTI Governorates, 2006

Indicators for 2006	7 FTI governorates	14 Non-FTI Governorates	National
G1 Access Rate (male)	120%	129%	126%
G1 Access Rate (female)	99%	121%	113%
G1 Access Rate (total)	110%	125%	119%
G6 Completion Rate (male)	64%	79%	74%
G6 Completion Rate (female)	38%	58%	51%
G6 Completion Rate (total)	52%	69%	63%
GER Grade 1–6 (male)	87%	99%	95%
GER Grade 1–6 (female)	65%	85%	78%
GER Grade 1–6 (total)	76%	93%	87%
Out-of-School Children Age 6–11 (male)*	263,969	295,105	559,073
Out-of-School Children Age 6–11 (female)*	354,129	409,239	763,368
Out-of-School Children Age 6–11 (total)*	618,098	704,344	1,322,442

*Data from Household Budget Survey 2005. Source: World Bank 2009a

4.23 **Implementation, administration and supervision arrangements.** The EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund – Grant phases 1, 2 were managed like a traditional World Bank project and used the institutional arrangements previously established for the multi-donor funded project in Basic Education (BEDP) with a prominent role of a Programme Administrative Unit (PAU) comprising MOE officials and national consultants (see Box 4.3 below). Most of the interviewees (MOE officials at central and local levels as well as donors) referred to FTI in the terms of "the Catalytic Fund Project".

4.24 EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund grants were monitored along with the multi donor supervision mission of BEDP. The monitoring of FTI Indicative Framework parameters was part of the M&E framework of the "FTI CF project".

4.25 The same arrangements are selected for the FTI CF grant phase 3, except for civil works which are to be implemented by the Public Works Projects (PWP) as per GOY's decision in 2007.

4.26 **Activities implemented or planned.** The first phase was associated with "priority programmes" within the EFA-FTI credible plan (2003–2005) which was in fact the three year operational plan of NBEDS. The second phase largely mirrored the activities successfully implemented during phase 1. However the phase 3 introduces new activities based on lessons learnt from phases 1 and 2 as well as from other donors funded projects.

4.27 The focus on "access" and "supply-side activities" for phases 1 and 2 (i.e. school constructions) was decided to ensure smooth disbursement of the amount allocated in a one year period. Around 70% of the grant was allocated for this component. Most of the interviewees at the governorate and district level said that the FTI Catalytic Fund project was an emergency plan for school buildings in scattered, remote and isolated areas. The size of school construction funded by FTI CF grant was different from the norm (between one multi-grade classroom to a three classroom building to be used for grades 1–3 only or for 1-6 against a norm of a six classroom building). Such a choice emanated from the limited budget (necessary to lower the unit costs) and the low density of population in the targeted areas. The only demand-side activity implemented was the provision of school kits²⁰ to around 250,000 pupils.

²⁰ Each school kit contained 4 exercise books, 2 pens, a ruler and 12 pencils.

Box 4.3 Implementation and administration arrangements for the "FTI CF project"

CF grant has been implemented by the Ministry of Education under the leadership and the oversight of a Steering Committee (SC) headed by the Minister of Education. The Steering Committee was responsible for overall orientation. Its main tasks were to develop policies, direct the implementation of the project, endorse budget and work plans, and held regular meeting to review and approve progress reports. The Programme Administration Unit developed the agendas for the SC meetings, received and circulated progress reports to all members of the SC.

Through the existing operational structure of the MOE, each administrative entity, at both the central and regional levels, implemented the activities that fall under its responsibilities. The Sector of Projects and Equipment was responsible for civil works in phases 1&2*, the Sector of Curricula and Training was responsible for the provision of training, learning resources, office equipment and furniture, the Technical Team in association with the Technical Office was responsible for planning, monitoring and evaluation, and the Community Participation Unit assisted sectors by getting communities involved in their respective activities. The responsibilities for the implementation of the FTI CF grant have been shared as follows:

- **At the central level:** The MOE general directors of curriculum, training, supervision, projects, community participation unit and others were responsible for the overall implementation of the project activities for central MOE. They were to develop budget and work plan, specify necessary requirements, conditions and procedures for the implementation of the plans, get the plans approved by the Steering Committee, send the plans and conditions for implement to the Programme Administration Unit and governorate officials, and supervise implementation.
- **At the governorate level:** Once they received the activities allocated for the governorate along with plans and implementation directives and procedures from the MOE central team, each department started preparing for the activities that fall under its responsibility. In close coordination with district officials and local communities they started nomination and selections of the elements of each activity (e.g. selecting sites for school buildings, schools to be rehabilitated, teachers or headmasters to be trained). Each governorate sent the plans they prepared to the central team who reviewed the plans and get them approved by the SC. Once the plans were approved, the Governorate Education Office was responsible for the implementation of all activities in the governorate. They were tasked to monitor and supervise implementation on regular bases, consult with the Programme Administration Unit official on related issues, prepare progress reports and send these reports to the central team and the PAU.
- **At the district level:** The main tasks of district officials were selecting teachers for training, distribution of learning resources to schools, monitor and report implementation progress to the governorate team.

Source: Abdulmalik 2007, Abdulmalik 2009, Abdulmalik and Abdulbaset, 2006.

4.28 20% of the grant was allocated to quality related activities: i) support to decentralised training schemes in 76 targeted districts for head master and teachers (classroom teachers from grades 1–3; ii) subject teachers for grades 4–6) to improve classroom teaching practices and school management; and iii) provision of equipment (16 buses) for supervision departments at governorate level to undertake collective school inspection visits.

4.29 The remaining 10% was devoted to capacity building activities at central, governorate and district levels on planning, statistics and computer literacy (see Chapter 5 for more details)

4.30 The third allocation is to be implemented in a 30 months period over 2009–2011. The main innovation is the "female teacher contract scheme" already piloted under BEDP, JICA and Unicef projects. About 500 female teachers will be contracted in rural districts/areas (intake from secondary school graduates with good pass rates) to support girls' enrolment and retention. The female contract-teachers will receive annual training in order to be qualified at the end of the phase 3 implementation period. An agreement between the MOE and the Civil Service and Finance Ministries has been signed to ensure recruitment of these contract-teachers into the civil service after completion of Phase 3 implementation (World Bank 2009b). This scheme as well as activities initially identified in phase 1 to attract female teachers in rural areas but which were not finally implemented will be discussed under the "cross-cutting issues" Chapter.

4.31 During the preparatory phase of FTI CF grant phase 3, other activities were discussed (e.g. school nutrition programme for an estimated allocation of USD 6 million). Finally they were not selected as "the 3 year implementation period would have just been sufficient to put in place the mechanism but not to deliver the service".²¹

4.32 **Impact.** Dr Hassan Abdulmalik, member of the Yemen evaluation team, was commissioned by the World Bank to carry-out two studies in order to measure outcomes of the FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 (Abdulmalik and Abdulbaset, 2006, Abdulmalik 2007). However such evaluation studies were highly constrained due to the following reasons:

- The studies had to rely upon official education data as no baseline information had been collected before hands in the selected governorate.
- Official education data at governorate and district levels where the FTI CF activities took place were not available or accurate.
- The impact of the access related activities was difficult to measure because other projects (funded by Social Fund Development (SFD), local councils, etc.) were also contributing to the expansion of the school system in the same targeted areas and no consolidated information could be provided locally to isolate the specific contribution of FTI CF project.
- The quality of teaching and learning improvements was difficult to measure over the limited implementation period of one year.
- The effects of the capacity building activities were also challenging to measure because no indicators had been set-up and the nature and size of investments were too small to produce immediate changes.

4.33 The only way to carry out the study was to focus on **process indicators** (number of activities undertaken and the comparison between activities planned and activities effectively implemented). It was found that **most activities were implemented as planned** (with very few exceptions/deviations) and 99% of the grant was disbursed. In addition some **questionnaires** were completed by teachers, headmasters, and parents and officials of departments of Projects, Training, Supervision and Planning at the district and governorate levels, mainly to assess the benefits and returns of training activities in a sample of project schools.

FTI Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)²²


4.34 The sources of information used to document EPDF activities in Yemen are the following: i) the review of the activities and allocations of the EPDF over the period 2005-2007 done by Bellew and Moock 2008; ii) funding proposals issued by the World Bank MENA region for years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008; iii) EPDF progress report of December 2007 (last one available) from the EFA-FTI Secretariat; and iv) in-country interviews during field visit.

²¹ Interview of the WB/TTL.

²² The sources of information used to document EPDF activities in Yemen are the following: i) the review of the activities and allocations of the EPDF over the period 2005-2007 done by Bellew and Moock 2008; ii) funding proposals issued by the World Bank MENA region for years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008; iii) EPDF progress report of December 2007 from the EFA-FTI Secretariat (FTI 2007b), the last one available during country case study investigation); and iv) in-country interviews during field visit.

4.35 **Estimated amounts.** Based on the allocations over 2005–2008, **Yemen is the second largest recipient of the EPDF** after India with an estimated amount of **USD 1.885 million** (Bellew and Mook 2008). The different proposals show a requested amount of USD 350,000 for each year during 2005–2006 period and USD 820,000 for year 2008. Yemen is the only recipient country with Djibouti for the Middle East North Africa Region.

Table 4.4 Total EPDF Allocation (2005–2008) in USD



Source: Based on statistics collected by Bellew and Mook 2008

Note: The figure estimated for Yemen reflects the amounts in the funding requests.

4.36 **Decision making process.** The World Bank TTL reported that it lead the process of determining and preparing proposals, and then the document was passed to senior MOE officials and Development Partners (DPs) for comment and suggestions. While the Education Program Development Fund is not as well known as the Catalytic Fund in Yemen, senior staff in the Technical Office of MOE were able to mention EPDF, identify some of the activities supported by EPDF and even provide a copy of the proposal for 2006–2007. The selection of EPDF activities has been recently formalised:

The EPDF request for Yemen has been endorsed by an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee set up for the preparation of the integrated education vision diagnostic and policy note. This team includes members of the Ministries of Planning and International Cooperation, Finance, Education, Vocational Training, Higher Education, Civil Service and Local Administration. The proposal has also been discussed and received overwhelming support from members of Yemen's local Development Partner community (Bellew and Mook 2008).

4.37 **Activities supported by EPDF.** In this section we merely highlight the activities identified in the request proposals and their status (completed/on-going/planned); the analysis of their relevance, effectiveness and efficiency will be done in the relevant forthcoming chapters to avoid repetition. The activities are listed following the main objectives initially attached to the EPDF.

4.38 **Support to Education Sector Plan.** The following activities were identified in EPDF proposals: i) support to **Education budget reform** (joint work between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education to reform and restructure the education budget at the central and local levels to improve resource allocation, budget implementation and service delivery); ii) assist the GOY to finalise the **National General Secondary Education Strategy** (NGSES); iii) undertake an **Education Country Status Report** (CSR) based on a series of analytical background papers addressing key knowledge gaps (e.g. an assessment of the institutional structure of education, a review of student flow across the grades, levels and types of education, an analysis of the household budget survey 2005 on causes of

dropout and linkage to education quality, an assessment of time on task in basic and secondary schools, a secondary graduate tracer study, a survey of factors of success in formal and informal sector employment, and a survey on marginalised groups in education); and iv) prepare an **Integrated Education Vision** policy paper. The first three activities were completed and the fourth one will start in the second half of 2009.

4.39 *Support to Capacity Building.* The EPDF contributed to the financing of some capacity building activities linked to the participation of Yemen into the international student assessment exercise called **TIMSS** (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study). The activities suggested for the future are: i) the financing of a training course, organised with the World Bank Institute, focusing on how **Yemen's post-basic education and learning** system could be reformed to respond to the needs of the labour market in an increasing global society for the inter-ministerial technical committee members; ii) organisation of a workshop to **disseminate the key findings of the Education CSR** and to prepare for the visioning exercise; and iii) preparation of a **national conference on education to involve stakeholders** in the process of developing the integrated education vision.

4.40 *Support to M&E and Knowledge sharing.*

- *M&E.* The proposals identified basic workshops on **education indicators and statistics** to accompany the preparation of a comprehensive report on education statistics carried-out with the provision of technical assistance to support the **development of various tools for monitoring at sub-sector level as well as across the education sector** and to support education's link to monitoring at the national level (for the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the five year national plan) which is on-going.
- *Knowledge sharing.* Specific studies were identified and completed: i) two surveys to assess the demand and supply-side impact of **the abolition of school fees**; and ii) a **pilot conditional cash transfer scheme** to support the retention of girls in grades 4–9 and to set in motion a rigorous randomised impact evaluation. In addition the **translation** of key documents from English to Arabic was commissioned to facilitate dialogue and improve knowledge of international examples supporting key reforms.

4.41 *Support to donor partnerships.* It is planned that EPDF will support **Partnership Agreements** in the sector and the development of institutional structures such as donor and government forums that will coordinate and harmonise support behind basic, secondary and tertiary sub-sectors.

4.42 In 2009, the EPDF has been the primary funder of the preparatory work required for receipt and management of the FTI Catalytic Fund grant phase 3.

4.43 **Access to and Management of funds.** The World Bank TTL reported that "it could not survive without EPDF" as no resources would have been available (within the World Bank) to undertake the activities abovementioned. Access to funds was identified as straightforward "it's a pleasure to work with the EPDF" which might explain the high level of EPDF resources requested and used in Yemen. The funds were entirely managed by the World Bank.

4.44 **Consultation on concept note on EPDF II.** Following a decision taken in the EFA-FTI meeting in Oslo in December 2008, a task team has been established to redesign the EPDF (objectives, activities and governance). A concept note on EPDF II has been drafted and endorsed in the EFA-FTI Partnership meeting which took place in Copenhagen

in April 2009.²³ The in-country visit confirmed that the task team started a consultation at country level. The Education Lead Donor (USAID) received a letter from the task team on May 19, 2009 calling for "the participation of the Local Education Group in the redesign of the EPDF" along with a list of detailed questions for feedback.

4.45 The comments and recommendations provided by GTZ, USAID and the World Bank in June 2009 can be summarised as follow:

- On EPDF II objectives and proposed measures: All three objectives were assessed as "reflect[ing] the realities, demands and needs of the Yemen. Donors emphasised that that "a lot of the proposed measures, especially those of capacity building, under the objectives [were] already subject of different programmes and projects implemented by the development partners" and EPDF II suggested activities "should be linked to those already undertaken". Donors suggested that a focus is made "on developing the planning and monitoring skills and systems aiming at a unified monitoring system for both, government and donors.
- On the proposed process and governance structure: Donors recognised that the "approach (was) the right one (i.e. develop the plan with the country) and that "the ownership of the MOE within Local Education Group (was) of course important" but questioned which mechanisms could be put in place to avoid misuse of resources "How to control/ monitor tightly and respecting ownership at the same time?". They also raised the issue of the role and empowerment of Local Education Group. They marked their preference for a LEG which could fit in the existing arrangements between Ministry of Education and development partners to avoid parallel structure and make use of functioning institutions and procedures. They underlined that there were conditions for the empowerment of LEG "personnel, finances, management, control, guidance".
- On the management of resources: Donors informed that the EPDF II notional allocation to Yemen could be managed at country level "by the education programme administrative unit or a similar unit". (Source: information shared with Evaluation Team by USAID during the in-country visit).

²³EPDFII refines objectives and governance arrangements:

- (i) 3 objectives are suggested: i) strengthen country capacity to develop and effectively implement good education policies, robust results oriented programs and realistic budgets; ii) deepen knowledge and learning around issues identified as priority by countries and in a global fora in partnership with existing regional and national institutions; iii) reinforce the role of the local education group in coordinating support to the education sector, engaging and aligning a broad constituency and advancing country leadership and accountability.
- (ii) Governance structure and responsibilities: A prominent role is given to the Local Education Group led by the country government with the support of a central management unit.


See FTI 2009e.

5 The FTI and Education Policy and Planning

Context before FTI endorsement (2002)

5.1 **Yemen is off track to achieve UPC by 2015.** Around 2000, Yemen had some of the worst school enrolment and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls and women. 50% of primary school age children were estimated to be out-of-school (see Chapter 3). The *status quo* policies, while contributing to an increase in enrolment, would have not allowed Yemen to reach UPC by 2015 as demonstrated in Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1 Require trend to achieve MDG in Yemen



Source: Bruns 2003

5.2 **Unsatisfactory education reforms in basic education.** It was acknowledged in the *EFA-FTI Country Credible Plan* (GOY 2003, FTI 2003) that most previous efforts to reform and improve basic education in Yemen were not as successful as had been hoped for due to a variety of reasons:

First, past efforts were not based on a comprehensive analysis of the education reform context but rather on a series of separate and partial attempts to plan and implement the reforms. There was a lack of community participation and ownership, which alienated local communities who felt as the reforms were being forced upon them. There was a lack of scientific research and methodology, which resulted in schools without children and children without schools. Past attempts were centrally planned, which led to disconnected efforts from the needs of the targeted groups. Bureaucratic centralism slowed implementation, lacked of flexibility to adapt to field developments, and increased costs (GOY 2003).

5.3 **Preparation of National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS).** Following completion of its PRSP, the Government of Yemen prepared a National Basic Education Strategy in a participatory manner with involvement from teachers, local education officials and top-level officials: more than 400 male and female citizens from more than ten Governorates participated in crystallising the strategic perception of basic education development (see Annex A for a description of the participatory approach). This sub-sector strategy (it covered grades 1–9) was presented to the National Conference on Education in October 2002 and approved by the Cabinet early 2003.

5.4 The pressing issues in basic education were identified as follows:

- Low enrolment rates mainly caused by inadequate school buildings, lack of schools especially for girls in rural areas, inadequate curricula, shortage of teaching and learning materials and weak community involvement.
- Low internal efficiency of education with high repetition and drop-out rates (while it should take six years to complete lower basic, it took often eight years for boys and twice the nominal number of years of schooling in the case of girls).
- Low quality reflecting the low qualification of teachers, especially in rural areas (60% of teaching staff was reported in the 2000/01 education survey to have completed only basic education, with one or two years of additional training which meant that there were not a big different between teachers' and pupils' knowledge specially in grades 5–9).
- Weak institutional capacity to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the educational strategies at all administrative levels and concrete steps for decentralisation needed to be developed.

5.5 NBEDS was seen as a long term strategy (2003–2015) to deal with these problems and the **Government set a higher goal than the EFA-FTI goal**:

- Raise the net enrolment rate in the basic education cycle of grades 1–9 up to 95% by 2015 (against 100% completion rate of grade 6 by 2015 for EFA-FTI goal) by providing the appropriate educational access and environment, increasing the efficiency of school construction and basing school location on school mapping.
- Reduce inequalities in access and retention: decrease the enrolment gap between boys and girls, urban and rural areas, and children from better off and poor families by placing small schools closer to girls' homes and involving local communities in site selection, construction and management of schools;
- Improve the internal efficiency.
- Improve the quality of education through planning for large-scale programmes of in-service teacher training, head teachers and school administrators and the modernising of school curriculums.
- Reinforce the capacity of the Ministry of Education through institutional reforms and establish competent management at the central and governorate levels.

5.6 **Stabilisation of the governance of the education sector.** The 90's were an intense period of institutional changes in the education sector for technical and tertiary education with establishment and removal of ministries (see Annex B). 2001 was the year where the institutional context for the delivery of education services was stabilised: i) the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MOT EVT) became an independent ministry and included in its mandate the oversight of community colleges; and ii) the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) was re-established to monitor government and private universities.

FTI inputs and activities

5.7 The FTI inputs and activities relevant for education policies and planning have been abundantly described in the Chapter 4. We propose a quick summary highlighting key features below.

5.8 **FTI proposal and endorsement processes.** The appraisal highlighted in the area of planning that adjustments in the phasing of interventions were necessary (definition of

priorities) and in the area of policies that some issues did not receive adequate attention yet or their treatment in the proposal was too brief.

Among them: relevance of education as a factor in enrolment and completion or discontinuation; the redeployment of teachers to rural areas (the number mentioned is inadequate); operation and maintenance; the interaction between gender, poverty and residential area is insufficiently analysed and translated; gender-sensitivity of teachers and teaching as a factor in girls' performance; the need to examine ways of further reducing unit costs of textbook production/distribution and classroom construction. (LDG and FTI 2003)

The articulation of the NBDES with other education sub-sectors was not mentioned nor discussed.

The Activities implemented through the FTI CF support are shown in table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 Activities funded under FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2

	Phase 1 (2004–2005)	Phase 2 (2006–2007)
Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>New Construction</u> of 110 schools and 26 multi-grade classrooms • <u>Addition/ Rehabilitation</u> of 180 classrooms in 46 existing schools • <u>Improvement of school environment</u> in 40 existing schools (boundary walls, toilets, ramps, and administration rooms) • <u>Construction of a female teacher Institute</u> • <u>Provision</u> of school kits to around 181,000 pupils in rural areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>New Construction</u> of 104 schools buildings with 312 classrooms • <u>Addition</u> of 105 new classrooms in 37 existing schools • <u>Rehabilitation</u> of 170 classrooms in 39 schools • <u>Provision</u> of school kits to around 68,000 pupils in rural areas
Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Training</u> of around 400 trainers, 7,200 headmasters, 2,300 supervisors, and 15,000 classroom teachers of grades 1–3 (part 1) • <u>Provision of 6,000 TV video programmes</u> and cassettes to hundreds of basic schools • <u>Provision of equipment and furniture</u> for teacher training institutes and main MOE directorates, and conduction of a comprehensive survey for the required teaching aids based on basic education curriculum • <u>Provision of 16 buses</u> to departments of supervision at governorate level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Training</u> of 464 trainers, headmasters, 4,500 supervisors, and 12,200 classroom teachers of grades 1–3
Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Training of 415 administrative staff at central, governorate and district levels</u> on the analysis, interpretation and reporting of data and the preparation annual work plans • <u>Provision of working equipments</u> at central/governorate and district levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Training of 570 administrative staff at central, governorate and district levels</u> on computer & internet and planning and statistics • <u>Provision of working equipments</u> at central/governorate and district levels (computers, printers and for a) 30 basic female schools; b) governorate Departments of Girls' Education; c) Departments of Planning and Statistic in 50 districts; d) Training Department in 50 districts; and e) Examination Departments in 50 districts, to facilitate the implementation and administration of daily duties and data analysis)

Source: Adapted from Abdulmalik 2007, Abdulmalik 2009, Abdulmalik and Abdulbaset, 2006.

5.9 Activities supported by the FTI EPDF. The EPDF supported a wide-range of upstream and downstream analytical work with direct linkages with strategic planning and education policy issues:

- Support to education sector performance (e.g. Education country status report and participation of Yemen to TIMSS exercise)
- Support to sub-sector education strategies (e.g. National General Secondary Education Strategy)
- Support to impact evaluation of education policies (e.g. School fee abolition surveys and follow-up workshops)
- Support to design pilot education reforms (e.g. Conditional cash transfer scheme)

5.10 The FTI EPDF did not support only primary or basic-education related studies but also looked at the relevance of secondary and tertiary education (support to the secondary graduate tracer study and training course on how Yemen's post-basic education and learning system could be reformed to respond to the needs of the labour market).

The relevance of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.11 The relevance of FTI's inputs is appreciated looking at the Indicative Framework, and the targets of CF and EPDF supported activities.

5.12 FTI Indicative Framework and efficiency. The reading of the FTI Indicative Framework in the light of the Yemen context is particularly interesting as the tool shows its limit to address relevant policies. **While Yemen was off track for reaching UPC in 2002, paradoxically the country was close to the FTI's benchmarks** or even presented more favourable positions towards some parameters (see Table 5.2 below). For example: i) the allocation to education sector as a whole (inter-sector trade-off) or to primary education (intra-sector trade-off) was higher in percentage of GDP than FTI's benchmark; and ii) the teacher salaries as a multiple of per capita GDP and non-teacher salaries as percentage of total recurrent expenditure were roughly equalising FTI's benchmarks and the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) or repetition rates were lower than FTI's benchmarks. That is why the unit costs as a percentage of per capita GDP – which was significantly higher (18.5% against 12%) – was added to the list of indicators as an attempt to provide an explanation to the low performances of the country.

Table 5.2 Yemen and FTI Indicative Framework in 2002

	Allocation to Education Sector *	Allocation to Primary Education*	Unit cost **	Teacher salaries ***	Non teacher salary spending****	Pupil teacher ratio	Repetition rate
Group 1: Countries with high GER (103%) and high completion (83%)	3.8	1.7	12	3.3	26	39	10
Yemen: GER (67%) PCR (59%)	5.6	2.7	18.5	3.4	27	25	7

Note: * As a percentage of GDP; ** As a percentage of GDP/capita; ***As a multiple of GDP/capita;**** As percentage of total recurrent spending on primary education

Source: Bruns B, (2003), *Achieving UPE by 2015, A New policy and Financial Framework* Presentation to Yemen Government and Donors, May 2003

5.13 In the case of Yemen, the FTI Indicative Framework needed to be considered with safeguards to prevent inadequate policies: i) the GDP was much lower than the average GDP of the performing countries' sample used to define the benchmarks; ii) the average

small PTR could call for an increase in the average class size for the purpose of improving efficiency in resources but had to be balanced with the potential increase in distance to schools in remote rural areas with low density of population; and iii) the non-teacher salary spending didn't reflect a high level of expenditure on quality inputs but was mainly due to wage bill of non teacher staff. In short the FTI Indicative Framework was not the best tool to address efficiency issues in Yemen.

5.14 FTI CF interventions and reasons for non-enrolment and drop-out. An analysis from the Household Budget Survey in 2005 illustrated reasons for non-enrolment and dropout and showed that supply-side constraints still played an important role in rural areas, especially for females, for non-enrolment while demand-side barriers were the main explanation for dropout for both gender in urban and rural areas (see Table 5.3 below).

Table 5.3 Reasons for non-enrolment and dropout, by urban-rural and gender (% share), 2005

	Reason for non-enrolment				Reason for dropout			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
Supply-side issues	4	9	37	49	2	6	13	32
Demand-side issues	57	69	50	44	89	82	80	60
Economic	2	1	3	3	16	4	27	10
Attitude	45	61	35	38	72	76	52	52
Personal	10	7	12	2	0	2	1	0
Others	39	22	13	7	9	13	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: World Bank 2009c

5.15 Moreover, the breakdown of supply-side constraints showed that among the age 6-11 out-of-school children, while 7% of boys and 12% girls reported lack of school is the main reason for non-enrolment in non-FTI Governorates, 15% of boys and 19% of girls reported so in FTI governorates. In FTI governorates, a lack of teachers (particularly female teachers) is also a main obstacle for enrolment. 19% of girls are not attending schools in FTI governorates because of an absence of female teachers.

Table 5.4 Reasons for non-enrolment for age 6–11 children by gender and governorates

	Non-FTI Governorates		FTI Governorates	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Lack of schools	7%	12%	15%	19%
Lack of teachers	2%	17%	6%	21%
of which female teachers in particular	0%	17%	1%	19%

Source: World Bank 2009a

5.16 Such ex-post analysis provides some support to the interventions selected under the FTI CF interventions focusing on the provision of schools and teachers in FTI governorates.

5.17 FTI EPDF studies and knowledge gap. While a great deal of analytical work has been undertaken in the country on the various education sub-sectors, a critical gap has been noted in terms of analytical work looking across the spectrum of education, from basic to tertiary (the purpose of the education sector analysis and "integrated vision paper"). In the same vein the secondary graduate tracer study filled a critical knowledge gap as regards the linkage of secondary education to labour market outcomes. Also the study on marginalised children highlighted that the phenomenon not only referred to the African-descendent *Akhdams* (known as the marginalised group in Yemen) but also extended to the non-*Akhdams* group due to economic downturn. Moreover the co-financing of Yemen's participation in the TIMSS exercise contributed to a comparison of learning achievements of pupils on an international scale (the co-financing of TIMSS will be reviewed in Chapter 7 on data and M&E).

The effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.18 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of (a) whether FTI has contributed to strategic planning in the sub-sector of basic education, in other sub-sectors (general secondary, technical and vocational, tertiary) and sector-wide and, if so, in an inclusive way or not; and (b) whether FTI resources have been used to design, pilot or implement policies which have a bearing on progress towards UPC target and EFA goals.

The FTI's influence in the approach to planning for education

5.19 Basic education sub-sector. A lot of progress has been made to strengthen the planning environment in basic education since the articulation of the NBEDS. Key achievements include: i) the development of medium term plans (the EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003–2005, the Medium Term Results Framework 2006–2010 and the forthcoming MTRF 2009–2011); ii) the development of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework in 2007 (the MOE has pioneered the articulation of a MTRF and a MTEF in Yemen); and iii) the design of annual work plans (AWP) since 2007 with cost estimates, implementation responsibilities and time frame.

5.20 The EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003–05) initiated the process of medium term planning which was then repeated and expanded in 2006. While the EFA-FTI Credible plan (2003–05) focused on lower basic, the MTRF (2006–2010) integrated early childhood, adult literacy and secondary education and was structured around eight programmes (three in "access", three in "quality" and two in "capacity development"). The process of using a country specific cost and finance simulation model was useful in 2003 as it allowed for different scenarios to be developed and a financial gap to be derived on the medium term. However, the simulation model did not seem to have served as a basis for the MTRF which did not present any funding gap.

5.21 The FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 had to be implemented in a one year period and then forced the MOE to translate NBEDS into priority programmes for lower basic education to be delivered on the immediate term. This exercise prepared the ground for the AWP which covered basic education in 2007 and both basic and general secondary education in 2008. The FTI CF grant priority programmes also helped combine top-down and bottom-up planning processes through specific support given to a sample of GEOs and DEOs in work planning.

5.22 Other types and levels of education and training. Since the adoption of NBEDS, four other long term national strategies have been independently developed and endorsed by the Government of Yemen in less than five years: i) the National Strategy for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education (2005–2014) adopted in 2004; ii) the National Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Yemen (2006–2015) adopted

in 2005; iii) the National Children and Youth Strategy (2006–2015) adopted in 2006; and iv) the National General Education Secondary Strategy (2007–2015) adopted in 2007.

5.23 The FTI EPDF contributed to the finalisation of the National General Education strategy (NGES) through the finance of a consultancy and a wide-ranging consultation process involving education officials, school management personnel, supervisors, teachers, NGOs, local authorities, student and parents, agricultural unions and higher education beneficiaries. The policy was adopted by the Cabinet in July 2007. This strategy was a natural extension of the NBEDS and complemented the long term strategy under the responsibility of the MOE. The availability of such strategy allowed the launch of the second most important donor funded project in the education sector. The USD 100 million Secondary Education and Girl's Access Project (SEDGAP) is supported by GTZ, KfW, DFID, the Netherlands and the World Bank over 2009–2014.

5.24 **Sector wide approach.** While five long-term strategies are available for the education sector, they were developed under the leadership of three different ministries without the moderation of an umbrella body entrusted with competence and authority to ensure consistency among them.

Each sub-sectoral strategy has aimed to increase access, equity, improve quality and efficiency of delivery, quite independent of what is happening in other sub-sectors. There is a clear absence of a national vision that looks at education and training in an integrated manner and that could articulate the skills requirements for the economy and society. In fact, it could be stated that there are major disconnects between the strategies and investments of the various sub-sectors, such as the disparate expansion programmes of all sectoral strategies and the mismatch between teacher demand for basic and secondary education and teacher supply by the pre and in-service teacher training programmes (World Bank 2009c).

5.25 It is precisely this gap in vision that started to be addressed through the FTI EPDF supported education CSR which aimed to provide the diagnostic work to develop the salient features of the national education vision. The education CSR launched an exercise to steer dialogue between the three education ministries to support the development of an integrated vision for education spanning all education sectors.

5.26 The education CSR was based on a series of analytical background papers undertaken by external consultants and/or World Bank staff over 2008/09:²⁴ assessment of the institutional structure of education, a review of student flow across the grades, levels and types of education, an analysis of the household budget survey 2005 on causes of dropout and linkage to education quality, an assessment of time on task in basic and secondary schools, a secondary graduate tracer study, a survey of factors of success in formal and informal sector employment, and a survey on marginalised groups in education. The main findings of the CSR have been officially presented at central level in July 2009.

5.27 The education CSR could be seen as the foundation stage for a SWAp, preceding an education integrated vision and an education sector plan.

5.28 **Education policy inter-ministerial dialogue.** The ability to deliver basic educational services is not the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Other ministries such as Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Civil Service (MCS), Ministry of Local Authority

²⁴ These studies were not conceived as capacity building exercises and the MOE staffs were mainly involved as information providers. The acknowledgements of the Education Country Status Report referred to a Yemeni technical team led by a high level Supervisory Committee (including ministers of MOPIC, MOE, MTVET and MOHESR). The mandate of the Yemeni counterpart team was to "discuss issues to be highlighted in the CSR and collect the data for the analyses" (World Bank 2009c, p5).

(MOLA) and semi-autonomous agencies such as Social Fund for Development (SFD) and Public Works Projects (PWP) under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) play significant roles (see Box 5.1 below). As the MOE has a limited mandate over the staff and resources allocated for the effective delivery of education services, the implementation of education reforms depends on mechanisms that brings the key ministries and agencies to work out coordination modalities.

Box 5.1 Role of key Ministries to deliver basic educational services

<p>► Ministry of Finance: MOF controls 90% of the basic education budget through payment of teacher and non teacher staff salaries.</p> <p>► Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance: while the MOE submits to the MCS its staffing needs (number and qualifications of teachers, supervisors and school principals), it does not participate in the selection process of candidates to fill in vacant posts, nor in the deployment of these new and existing teachers, which is now done by the Local Councils at the district level.</p> <p>► Ministry of Local Authority: Following the 2000 Local Authority Law (LAL), local councils at governorate and district levels have taken some responsibilities in education (e.g. redeployment of teachers) and the practices are not always aligned with the legal decentralisation framework. These emerging actors cannot be ignored and the relationships between the local councils in one hand and the governorate and districts education offices in the other hand are now shaping the delivery of services.</p> <p>► Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation: MOPIC is respectively directly and indirectly connected with the two following semi-autonomous agencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Works Project: The PWP was established in 1996 as one of the social safety net components to combat poverty and unemployment by providing job opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers linked to delivery of basic infrastructure services. PWP has been recently charged with management of new construction for basic and secondary education projects, including the school programme to be financed by the FTI CF grant phase 3. • Social Fund for Development: The SFD was established in 1997. Its objectives are to further improve access of low income groups to basic social services, while providing an example of an effective, efficient, and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services in Yemen by (i) refining social service delivery approaches; and (ii) empowering local communities and councils to take charge of their local development. Education is a key sub component with over 50% of resource allocation mainly for school construction. Recently SFD started activities to support quality basic education but on a small scale. <p>Both PWP and SFD are supported by bilateral and multilaterals partners and signed the Declaration Partnership on NBEDS in 2004 and 2007.</p> <p>Source: Authors</p>

5.29 Recently, the MOE has undertaken to enter into a protocol of participation with the Ministries of Planning and International Cooperation, Finance and Civil Service and Insurance in relation with the first major externally-financed project in Secondary Education. In addition, the abovementioned ministries and agencies are invited to participate in joint annual reviews. Such decisions were made independently of the FTI, but this high level inclusive dialogue around education policies benefited from and was reinforced during the design of the programme for the FTI CF grant phase 3. For example, the rural female teacher contract scheme, planned under phase 3, has been negotiated with all ministries concerned which signed a memorandum of understanding to ensure that the 500 female teachers will be recruited after the completion of the programme in 2011.

FTI's influence on the approach to policies towards UPC/EFA

5.30 With a very high population growth rate, low per capita GDP, high prevalence of poverty and long backlog of under investment: both supply-side and demand side policies were needed to further expand basic education and change family's attitudes towards education. While the FTI CF support directly addressed some supply-side issues in underserved governorates, the FTI EPDF resources contributed to a better understanding and stimulation of demand for education.

5.31 Supply-side policies. The FTI CF support targeted critical elements of the supply strategy identified in NBEDS, i.e. schools and teachers.

5.32 On *the school side*, the CF resources contributed to provide answers to the scattered population among small villages built sometimes in very rugged and inaccessible mountains establishing new or additional classrooms. The size (1 class or a block of 3 classes) and organisation of the school (multi-grade class in low density areas, classrooms for grades 1-3, classroom for grades 1-6 or double shifting in populated urban zone) was contextualised depending on the most pressure needs: attracting children in remote areas, reducing walking distance to school for foundation grades (1-3), or completing existing schools (in 2001, it was estimated that 10% of the basic education schools (grades 1-9). The school environment (latrines for girls, boundary walls, administrative blocks etc.) was also improved in some targeted sites.

5.33 The efficiency measures attached to the school building programme were the use of a school mapping database and technical criteria as a basis for school establishment and the research of lower unit costs using local contractors for small lots with reduced supervision costs as the function was implemented by the Governorate Education Offices' (GEOs) and the District Education Offices' (DEOs) staff with the additional social control of targeted communities.

5.34 On the *teacher side*, the CF resources during phases 1 and 2 contributed to the in-service teacher training policy (INSET). The teaching workforce characteristics, especially in rural areas, were as follows: mostly male (only 8% of female teacher in rural areas in 2001); unqualified to teach subjects they were not specialised in; unqualified to master multi-grade classes; and unqualified to use student-centred methods or organise continual assessments. The FTI CF helped support a school cluster based INSET for both rural and urban teachers in the targeted governorates to raise some teaching skills (e.g. training in multi grade class).

5.35 The efficiency measures linked to the effective deployment and use of teachers were also addressed. The FTI CF grant during phases 1 and 2 supported school managers and supervisor trainings to reduce teacher's absenteeism (as mismanagement of leave authorisation for teachers at schools was one of the key factors identified in high absenteeism rates) and improve cooperation among local schools to provide substitute teachers. In addition, the FTI CF grant phase 3 has included a female teacher scheme to contribute to effective deployment of female teachers in rural areas (see Chapter 10).

5.36 The FTI CF support was not used to improve school resources management in the area of textbooks and instructional materials but helped provide school kits to around 250,000 pupils.

5.37 Demand-side policies. The FTI EPDF resources were used to better document demand-side impact of the removal of community participation and school activity fees and prepare the design of a pilot conditional cash transfer mechanism.

5.38 *Removal of school fees.* While public primary education is free in Yemen, households were required to pay community participation and school activity fees. In order to eliminate the financial constraints to send children to school and encourage families to send more children (especially girls) to school, a Decree was issued that eliminated fees charged to families for sending their children to schools (YER 150 to 200) in May 2006. This fee has been eliminated for girls attending grades 1-6 and boys in grades 1-3 as of the start of school year in September 2006.

5.39 The impact study was carried out in February 2007 by Dr. Mohammed Abdul Kareem Al-Mansoor from CMT House Consultant. The study undertook a school survey (200 schools) and a household survey (random sampling of 1000 household across all 21 governorates). In addition to the surveys, focus group discussions were conducted.

5.40 The main results were i) there was anecdotal evidence that the elimination of the school fee has resulted in a large increase in grade 1 enrolment in schools; ii) education offices at the district and government level were not adequately prepared to deal with the situation because of the need for increased inputs (i.e. teachers, textbooks, seats, etc.) in response to the large number of intake; and iii) the lack of fees had left schools with limited money for operational and maintenance expenditures with the counterproductive practices from schools/sheiks to charge more money from families to support education service delivery.

5.41 The results of the study were discussed during a national workshop in Sana'a (with participants from Egypt, Jordan, Kenya and Uganda) in April 2007 and a regional workshop in Mali in June 2007 convened by ADEA, Unicef and the World Bank.²⁵ The Yemen team comprised representatives from MOE and SDF.

5.42 Following the workshop in Mali, the head of Education Department in SDF wrote a letter to the Prime Minister and Council of ministers titled "A proposal to abolish all direct and Indirect Education Fees/expenses to increase enrolment and hasten the achievement of 2015 EFA goal". The key arguments were that community contributions to school activities (YER 150 or USD 0.75) were not the bulk of the costs supported by poor families as indirect expenses were estimated at YER 4,000–5,000 (USD25);²⁶ that more ambitious financial programmes were required to boost enrolment such as "cash transfers, food allotments, capitation grants" and that such policy needed the "examination of educational allotments within the national budget". The letter required a resolution from the Council for the 2007/08 educational year which was not finally followed-up.

5.43 *Conditional cash transfer (CCT) scheme.* CCT have become one of the most popular interventions seeking to alleviate poverty in the short-run, while improving the education status of poor children as a means of reducing long-term poverty. The conditional cash transfer mechanism in Yemen (see Box 5.2 below) was designed to transfer resources to households on condition that they enrol their girls in grades 4–9 where dropout rates are known to become significant as girls reach puberty. In that way, the CCT scheme in Yemen contributes to change families' attitudes towards the education of younger girls, especially in rural areas.

²⁵ The countries invited to Bamako conference were grouped in three categories in relation to school fee abolition processes:


- Countries with experience in school fee abolition processes: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.
- Countries which have recently abolished and/or are in the process of planning school fee abolition: Benin, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone and Yemen.
- Countries with interest in planning and implementing school fee abolition, as well as reaching out to the marginalised/excluded: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, PNG, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Togo.

²⁶ "While the constitution guarantees free education, households are burdened by indirect expenses of 4000-5000 YER per grade 1-6 student for school uniforms, exercise books, pens/pencils and bags, obtaining exam-entering forms, monthly, mid-year and final examination fees, getting passing certificates, school activities fees, sanitation tool costs and the transportation of text-books expenses".

Box 5.2 Conditional Cash Transfer Scheme

- ▶ CCT is financed under the multi donor funded **Basic Education Development Project**
- ▶ **Objectives of the scheme:** encourage retention and improve enrolment of girls in grades 4–9 and provide an incentive for learning
- ▶ **Scheme concept:** pay cash for girls in grades 4–9
 - Grades 4–6 get Yemeni riyal equivalent of USD 35 a year
 - Grades 7–9 get Yemeni riyal equivalent of USD 40 a year
 - Add. USD 5 achievement bonus in grade 6 and 8 if the student passes EOY school exam with good grades
- ▶ **Conditions of the scheme:** minimum 80% school attendance, successfully pass the grade, regular meetings of mothers councils, one year of repetition allowed between grades 4 and 9, mothers/guardians receive the cash
- ▶ **Targeting criteria**
 - For Governorates (lower enrolment of girls in grade 4–9, higher drop out);
 - For schools (rural schools, coeducation or girls basic schools, minimum of 50 girls in the school, school of good standing, student/teacher ratio less than or equal to 40)
- ▶ **Implementation phases**
 - First Pilot in Lahj Governorate (2006/07): three districts, eight schools, 597 students and 422 mothers/guardians, total cash USD 6,500
 - Second pilot in Lahj Governorate (2007/08): all 15 districts, 216 schools from 570 schools, 25,000 students and 13,000 mothers/guardians, total cash USD 1,000,000
 - Third pilot in Hodeida Governorate (2008/09): pilot implementation for impact assessment for 100 schools in most districts of the governorate using randomised selection processes and control group. The rationale is to provide answer to the following policy questions: Is conditionality necessary? Do conditions improve outcomes? Is CCT effective in reaching the poorest of the poor? What is the impact on key human development indicators, such as girls' attendance, retention and learning outcomes? What is the impact on poverty? Does it matter who receives the transfer?

▶ Immediate Effects



- Increased total enrollment in 216 schools from 24,061 in 2007/08 to 26,133 students in 2008/09 (in grades 4-9).
- Reduced drop out in the targeted schools.
- Increased student's attendance rate.
- Improved teacher's attendance for teaching.
- Improved schools' commitments to start working on time.
- Increased mother's participation in school activities.
- Activated mothers and fathers councils.
- Enhanced capacity building of scheme implementers.
- Increased the community awareness and participation in monitoring, supervision and facilitating process.

- ▶ **Next steps:** based on the results of the impact evaluation in Hodeida governorate:
 - Expand and target new areas where possible.
 - Discuss modalities of Government finance of the full scheme through welfare fund.

Source: Adapted from Al-Shawafi & Al-Arashi 2009

Efficiency of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.44 Planning for basic education sub-sector. While the EFA-FTI initial proposal (EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003–05) has supported nation-wide policy level planning, the project nature of the FTI CF phases 1, 2 and 3 have moved away from the strategic level but contributed to identify priorities for example in the area of access.

5.45 The FTI CF projects started at a time where the process of annual work plans was not yet established in MOE at central and local levels. Under the supervision of the

Programme Administrative Unit, the FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 initiated a planning process in a sample of governorates and districts in the area of school construction and at central level in the area of teacher and school manager training. Capacity building activities were even funded under FTI CF to support process of annual work plans at local levels. This initiative made a significant step towards efficiency over 2004–2007. Since 2007 a process of annual work planning is in place in MOE but the detailed plan for the FTI CF activities (phase 3 over 2009–2011) have been drafted separately by PAU in consultation with MOE and selected GOEs. This parallel process may be seen as effective in the short term but will reduce efficiency in the longer term if it doesn't serve to reinforce the existing one.

5.46 Policies for basic education sub-sector. The EFA-FTI can potentially support the abolition of school fees and policy measures to remove economic barriers to education and promote school financial autonomy through different channels (see Box 5.3 below). In Yemen the key findings of the EPDF supported study on monitoring of School Fee Abolition (SFA) could have been followed by use of other FTI inputs to help address the financial consequences. This would have maximised efficiency.

Box 5.3 The EFA-FTI and School Fees Abolition

→ "The **EFA FTI can provide added value** to school fee abolition processes on several levels:

- ▶ The FTI **endorsement process** supports countries in crafting sound national education plans and budgets with greater and long term commitment of political and financial resources;
- ▶ The FTI **Indicative Framework** includes key benchmarks supportive of successful school fee abolition, such as the target for non-salary quality inputs, which can be useful in determining the level of school grants;
- ▶ The FTI is well placed to **help donors develop proactive strategies** with regard to school fees. FTI local donor coordination groups, annual review missions and the Education Program Development Fund represent key channels for helping countries undertake data collection and analysis regarding school fees, determine the resource needed, monitor implementation and mobilise capacities and expertise;
- ▶ The FTI **Catalytic Fund** can help countries meet additional financing burden created by fee abolition.

→ **School fee abolition movements** in certain countries can also contribute significantly to the FTI, especially on ways to encourage rapid expansion, improve equity, strengthen governance, enhance accountability and enhance problem solving. Ultimately, school fee abolition experiences and policy debates contribute to the evolution of the FTI framework"

Source: World Bank and Unicef 2009 p13

Sustainability

5.47 Two types of risks should be considered, those outside and those within the education system.


5.48 Risks outside the education system. The risks are linked to the demographic and economic prospects which are likely to impact the education system.

5.49 First, **the demographic transition is still at the very early stage**, making the annual demographic growth rate one the highest in the world (3%) and the proportion of youths in the population high which will pose a continued challenge for educational coverage over the next few decades. The MOE will have to work harder to maintain existing gains and even harder to expand provision in order to universalise education coverage.

5.50 Second, the youth are coming of age at a time when the country's limited natural resources (water, arable land, oil) are under a great deal of pressure. Yemen faces considerable **challenges in dealing with the transition to a non oil economy**, generating

strong non oil economic growth, ensuring fiscal and external sustainability and reducing poverty and unemployment (see Box 5.4 below).

Figure 5.2 Number of additional children to be enrolled by 2015




Source: World Bank 2009c.

Box 5.4 Yemen: Medium Term Economy Outlook

► **An economy vulnerable to external shocks and under the pressure of demography.** Overall GDP grew by 3.3% in 2007, just above the annual demographic growth rate estimated at 3%.

► **A growing inflation.** After falling to about 9% at the end of 2007, core inflation (excluding the volatile prices of the narcotic *qat*) surged to 27% by May 2008 largely reflecting a similar increase in world commodity prices and local drought condition.

► **Tensions on public finances putting a risk of debt distress.** A sizeable fiscal deficit emerged in 2007. A Sharp decline in oil production coupled with inflexible government expenditure and only marginal improvement in the tax to GDP ratio led to an overall deficit of 5.8% in 2007. For 2008 a deficit around 5–6 % in 2008 is possible in the wake of recent drop in international oil prices, continued rigid expenditure and limited non oil revenue improvement. As in previous years a large supplementary budget was approved toward the end of the year to validate additional spending on fuel subsidies and an increase in wages, pensions and social welfare transfer. Fuel subsidies and wage bill account for about 50% of government expenditure



Oil production has been in decline since 2000. In the absence of major discoveries, reserves could be depleted in ten to twelve years. The start of a new liquefied natural gas project from 2009 will only partly compensate for the expected decline in crude oil.

► **A real exchange rate likely to depreciate** over the medium term.

► **A high unemployment rate.** Led by the oil sector, the recent economic growth does not add much employment. Moreover, the non-oil economy has not started to generate sufficient job opportunities to absorb the annual increase of the labour force of 3.5% (or 200,000 new job seekers). The youth unemployment rate was estimated at 30% in 2005. Such situation impacts the public sector with an increase number of registered applicants for posts in the civil service.

Source: Adapted from IMF 2009 for growth, inflation, fiscal and monetary issues and World Bank 2009c for labour market and unemployment rate.

5.51 In a context of pessimistic prospects on domestic resource mobilisation, the education sector will have to compete harder to maintain its share in the budget allocation's competition. In addition, the key education reforms piloted through multi-donor funded programmes to address both supply and demand side constraints (respectively the female teacher scheme and the conditional cash transfer scheme) might turn unsustainable if they are scaled up nation-wide and have to be fully covered by state budget.

5.52 While current poor educational attainment means youth are ill-prepared to contribute economically; the daunting economic perspectives might reinforce the obstacles youth face in securing access to gainful employment. Young men with low levels of education might end up in low wage work or migrate in search of better opportunities. Youth with education credentials will continue to queue for restricted public sector employment in an intensified competition. Both phenomenon might play against the demand for education.

5.53 **Risks within the education system.** The main risks belong to the fragmented governance and management of the education sector leading to inefficiencies in resource use and erosion of accountability mechanisms.

5.54 The education sector is a collection of ministries (MOE, MOTEVT, MOHESR), semi-autonomous agencies (Public Works Projects, Social Development Fund) and strategies (five so far) yet to be integrated. The missing vision and unified framework in which all human, financial and materials investments could be optimised across levels and types of education is damageable in a highly competing environment for scarce resources.

5.55 The ministry's leadership in management and implementation of education reforms is declining. It is contested both at central level (centralisation of power in the hands of MOF and MCS and capacities in semi-autonomous agencies and PIUs) and at local levels with decentralisation reform.

5.56 The decentralisation reform is unfinished and may delay the devolution of financial autonomy to schools through capture of local resources. Some local councils have started to collect money from the schools.

5.57 The weak implementation capacity at school, district, and governorate levels. More effective communication and provision of information within the government and capacity building is necessary to address the internal risks.

6 The FTI and the Financing of Education

Context before FTI endorsement (2002)

6.1 Yemen has had a strong revenue performance (in terms of the ratio of government revenue to GDP which is considerably higher than most countries at an equivalent level of development). However this has been extremely dependent on revenue from the hydrocarbon sector which has accounted for around 75% of government revenue. These revenues are expected to fall sharply over the medium term as Yemen's known oil reserves are exhausted. So Yemen's strong revenue performance can be seen as a depletion of capital rather than reflecting a sustainable revenue effort.

6.2 Yemen has made progress in developing a budget process that can support the allocation of funds in line with policy priorities. Since the middle of the current decade there has also been some progress with the implementation of public administration reforms which had until then made little progress with Yemen having had a bloated and ineffective civil service in the wake of the reunification of North and South Yemen and the use of civil service positions as an instrument of patronage. Significant weaknesses remain in the public finance management system however as well as issues about the sustainability of revenues in the face of the exhaustion of oil reserves.

6.3 The 2008 PEFA assessment (World Bank 2008c) describes Yemen's budget process as "comprehensive and policy-capable". The first steps have been taken to implement a multi-year budgetary framework with the DPPR providing a clear statement of medium term policy objectives. The budget cycle is well defined and clear guidelines are provided for the budget process. Cabinet approves sector expenditure ceilings at an early stage in the process and budget preparation allows time for parliamentary scrutiny and discussion. There is a "well-structured and vibrant parliamentary oversight of the government's budget estimates approval process".

6.4 Yemen is implementing a comprehensive PFM reform strategy that was approved by the Cabinet in 2005. The PEFA assessment notes that important reforms have been implemented and that (World Bank 2008c p14) the "PFM Reform Programme in Yemen has political championship at the very highest levels" but that there is a lack of a clear structure to manage PFM reform.

6.5 Table 6.1 provides an overview of education finance within the context of the overall public finance situation. It shows the level of public expenditure on education in nominal terms (in YER) in relation to GDP and total public expenditure. It also shows the share of basic and secondary education expenditure in total government expenditure, and trends in education spending deflated by the consumer price index and in current USD. At the macro level, it is notable that total government spending has consistently accounted for around a third or more of GDP and that this ratio peaked at 41% in 2007, representing a high proportion of public spending for a country at Yemen's level of GDP.

Table 6.1 Macro Data, Public Finance and Education Expenditure

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Billions of YER											
Total GDP	879	844	1173	1539	1628	1811	2067	2385	3207	3755	4309
Total Govt Expenditure	308	301	343	502	522	594	777	890	1194	1180	1755
Total Govt Recurrent Expenditure	244	232	267	382	394	441	526	625	862	871	1353
Public Education Expenditure	46	57	67	89	102	123	133	149	172	200	251
Recurrent Education Expenditure	37	45	59	81	91	113	116	127	149	170	212
Capital Education Expenditure Basic and Secondary Expenditure	9	12	8	8	11	10	17	22	23	30	39
Basic Recurrent Expenditure	39	47	57	76	85	101	107	119	138	158	195
				53	59	70	71	77	91	102	127
% GDP											
Total Govt Expenditure	35%	36%	29%	33%	32%	33%	38%	37%	37%	31%	41%
Total Govt Recurrent Expenditure	28%	27%	23%	25%	24%	24%	25%	26%	27%	23%	31%
Public Education Expenditure	5%	7%	6%	6%	6%	7%	6%	6%	5%	5%	6%
Recurrent Education Expenditure	4%	5%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	5%	5%	5%	5%
Capital Education Expenditure Basic and Secondary Expenditure	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Basic Recurrent Expenditure	4%	6%	5%	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	4%	4%	5%
				3%	4%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
% Government Expenditure											
Total Govt Recurrent Expenditure	79%	77%	78%	76%	75%	74%	68%	70%	72%	74%	77%
Public Education Expenditure	15%	19%	20%	18%	20%	21%	17%	17%	14%	17%	14%
Recurrent Education Expenditure	12%	15%	17%	16%	17%	19%	15%	14%	12%	14%	12%
Capital Education Expenditure Basic and Secondary Expenditure	3%	4%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%
Basic Recurrent Expenditure	13%	15%	17%	15%	16%	17%	14%	13%	12%	13%	11%
				11%	11%	12%	9%	9%	8%	9%	7%
<i>GDP Deflator</i>	324	360	273	217	217	207	184	151	126	111	100
<i>CPI</i>	242	228	210	194	159	152	138	129	122	111	100
<i>Annual Average Exchange Rate</i>	129	136	156	162	169	178	183	185	192	197	199
Billions of 2007 YER (CPI Deflator)											
Basic and Secondary Expenditure	95	106	119	147	135	153	147	154	169	176	195
Basic Recurrent Expenditure				102	94	106	98	99	111	114	127
Millions of USD											
Total GDP	6,814	6,206	7,519	9,500	9,633	10,174	11,295	12,892	16,703	19,061	21,653
Total Govt Expenditure	2,388	2,213	2,199	3,099	3,089	3,337	4,246	4,811	6,219	5,990	8,819
Total Govt Recurrent Expenditure	1,891	1,706	1,712	2,358	2,331	2,478	2,874	3,378	4,490	4,421	6,799
Public Education Expenditure	357	419	429	549	604	691	727	805	896	1,015	1,261
Recurrent Education Expenditure	287	331	378	500	538	635	634	686	776	863	1,065
Capital Education Expenditure Basic and Secondary Expenditure	70	88	51	49	65	56	93	119	120	152	196
Basic Recurrent Expenditure	305	343	364	468	504	566	582	644	720	803	981
				326	350	393	387	416	474	520	638

Source: Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 in World Bank 2009c. Some figures differ slightly because of rounding errors.

FTI inputs and activities

6.6 The following FTI inputs and activities have addressed education financing issues:

- FTI supported an analysis of the financing gap for EFA which has been used in the development of implementation plans for NBEDS and to inform decisions on external financing needs.
- FTI has encouraged the development of a framework for the alignment of donor support to NBEDS through the Credible Plan and the Medium Term Results Framework (discussed in more detail in Chapter 9) which could be expected to encourage additional donors to participate and existing donors to increase their commitments.
- The FTI CF contributed additional funding of USD 40 million in four annual tranches of USD 10 million focused on improving basic education access and quality in specific underserved rural areas.

The relevance of the FTI's contribution to education financing

6.7 The development of a financing model and the provision of additional finance through the FTI CF, as well as the process of developing an agreed results framework for the NBEDS, were relevant to the problems facing education finance in Yemen. The process of using the country specific cost and finance simulation model was relevant as it allowed for different scenarios to be developed and a financing gap to be estimated which the MOE had not undertaken before. While the model is still used by the World Bank to update the calculation of financing gap and prepare the FTI CF grant application, the model has not been incorporated into the Ministry of Education's budget or planning processes.

6.8 The Credible Plan using this model identified a financing gap of USD 96 million for 2003-05 that was presented (as discussed in Chapter 4 above) as representing the needs to be financed by FTI. The revised financial analysis using the model in 2008 however concluded that there had not been a significant financing gap until 2006 because (a) the implementation of various efficiency reforms reduced financing needs; and (b) that relatively slow increases in enrolment resulted in moderate pressures on the financial envelope. The updated analysis suggests an increasing financing gap defined against the objective of achieving 100% Grade 6 completion by 2015: from USD 52 million in 2009 to USD 122 million in 2011.

6.9 This analysis raises some questions about the relevance of short-term finance provision for achieving EFA objectives, if other factors are acting as constraints such as either institutional capacity to manage enrolment expansion or longer-term financial sustainability concerns that might militate against investments expanding enrolment in the short-term if it is unclear how expenditure is going to be maintained at the higher levels implied. The FTI CF resources provided were in fact focused on priorities in relation to improving educational access in underserved rural areas. This was directly relevant to immediate priorities but the approach did not address longer-term capacity constraints. The FTI in Yemen has not specifically focused on the longer term sustainability issues facing public finances in Yemen and their possible implications for education financing.

The effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to education financing

6.10 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of (a) whether FTI has increased the funding for UPE (directly or indirectly); (b) whether FTI funds have reached the intended beneficiaries; and (c) whether, if so, they have then been used effectively.


Increased funding

6.11 The FTI endorsement process generated a substantial expectation that additional resources would be provided for basic education. The analysis in World Bank (2009c) suggests that over the period since 2002 (continuing an earlier trend) spending on basic education has increased in real terms but only sufficiently to allow the maintenance of enrolment rates with a rapidly increasing population.

6.12 6.5 above provides a summary of information on trends in public spending in education. In the period 1997–2002, public expenditure on education represented 18.5% of total public spending. In 2002, education spending was equivalent to about 7% of GDP. While education spending has continued to increase significantly in real terms (recurrent expenditure increased by 140% from 1997 to 2007), education spending has fallen as a share of GDP (to between 5% and 6% by 2007) and as a share of public spending (15.5% between 2003 and 2007). There has also been a relative shift in the allocation of education spending away from basic education toward technical education and vocational training. Significant inefficiencies in basic education spending have been identified (including insufficient spending on non-staff educational inputs, excessive administration costs, low teacher-pupil ratios in comparison to other countries at a similar level of development, too many small schools). Basic education spending fell from 66% to 60% of total education spending over the period 2000–2007 which puts Yemen closer to international norms (the FTI-IF states 50% for primary education) to move towards a better balanced sector.

6.13 This analysis suggests that there has been **no increase in the relative priority accorded to basic education in public expenditure decisions over the period of the FTI**. Public expenditure has risen in real terms but as the financing gap analysis suggests this has been at well below the rate necessary to achieve EFA targets.

Figure 6.1 Donor Funding for Basic Education in Yemen



Source: Ministry of Education, Education Donor database. No information is available on aid from the regional Islamic and Arab banks and funds (who contribute mainly for buildings).

6.14 Figure 6.1 above shows summary information on donor financing of basic education from the Ministry of Education's donor database. While information available is not complete, the figure and detailed information in the table suggests that the FTI endorsement may have contributed to an initial increase in donor support for basic education. In the period following FTI endorsement external resources increased, directly through catalytic fund allocation (USD 40 million over 2004–2011) and indirectly through a catalytic effect on existing donors

(World Bank, GTZ, the Netherlands, KfW) and on attracting new donors (DFID, USAID).²⁷ The major programme launched after FTI endorsement was the multi donor funded Basic Education Development Program for USD 65 million over 2004–2010.

6.15 However, after peaking in 2006, donor financing has been falling subsequently and it appears this falling trend is continuing (although estimates of expected expenditure for 2009 and 2010 are incomplete). Catalytic Fund resources are a small proportion of total aid to basic education and its contribution to filling the estimated financing gap is estimated at 10% for phase 3.

Reaching beneficiaries

6.16 The FTI CF resources were invested on "priority" or "emergency" programmes and reached beneficiaries in the most underserved rural areas of four populous governorates which account for the majority of out-of-school children. Evaluations of FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 suggest that these resources were used effectively to do this although there is a lack of baseline information to allow a full assessment to be made.

Effective use of funds

6.17 The FTI CF resources have been used for what they were assigned for: school constructions, provision of school kits to pupils, training of teachers and managers, equipment and training of supervisors and staff from GEOs and DEOs.

Efficiency of the FTI's contribution to education financing

6.18 There was no specific support of FTI to the strengthening of the national financial management system as the FTI CF resources were channelled and administered following the procedures of the World Bank. The FTI CF resources did not reinforce the fiscal decentralisation process and the financial autonomy of schools as the mechanisms are not fully in place (e.g. school bank accounts are only in place for a pilot number of schools in a few governorates).

6.19 There have been some improvements in the efficiency of public spending for education but it is difficult to assess whether the FTI may have influenced this; the Annual Review process and improved donor harmonisation around the NBEDS may have contributed to a greater focus on these issues

6.20 Delays in finalising agreement and disbursement of FTI CF grant phase 3 (USD 20 million over 2009–2011) have impacted negatively on aid predictability for basic education.

6.21 The FTI CF resources were used to build classrooms in remote rural areas on varied terrain for a scattered population. Some interviewees reported that this was done with lower costs than under some other arrangements although school construction costs did increase between phases 1 and 2.

Sustainability

6.22 Yemen faces serious medium-term issues about the sustainability of its public finances and hence of its ability to improve performance towards achieving EFA targets. The achievements to date in maintaining spending sufficiently to support enrolment increases in line with population growth are vulnerable to the likely deterioration in public finances as oil reserves are exhausted as well as to risks of increased conflict. Improvements in the

²⁷ Although some interviewees did not consider that the involvement of new donors was dependent on FTI endorsement.

budgeting process (and the framework for donor engagement which should affect levels of external finance) are likely to be sustainable so long as donors maintain confidence in government commitment although problems of coordination in the budget process between the education sector ministries (MOE, MOT EVT, and MOHESR) remain.

6.23 The financing gap analysis discussed in Section 4 above suggests an increasing need for finance to reach the EFA goals but the prospects for increased donor support to basic education are not regarded as strong. EFA-FTI does not appear to have contributed to a solution to the long-term financing issues facing the sector in the context of the exhaustion of oil reserves.

7 The FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

Context before FTI endorsement (2002)

7.1 The unification of the country led to the merger of the statistical systems in 1990 and the creation of a new Central Statistic Organisation (CSO) with large power and huge challenges to help line ministries to streamline their data collection systems (see Box 7.1 below).

Box 7.1 The Yemen Central Statistical Organisation

The unified CSO faced the challenge of having to reconcile itself to the different modes of operation, organisational structures and types of responsibility. The statistical system of the South operated inherently in the Soviet mode of data with emphasis on a system of complete reporting catering to the needs of a centrally planned economy. (...) There was considerable decentralisation (...) with branches set-up at governorate and at some district levels. The system in the North was rather rudimentary (...). They did not have offices at district levels.

The CSO is the only government institution responsible for the collecting, processing, disseminating and publishing statistical data. The CSO will give published figure the official status after approving such figures and approving the processes of data collection, issuing field surveys or by obtaining data from government institution or private legal entities who are obliged by law to answer the CSO data requests

Source: World Bank 2004, Statistical Master Plan, Feb 2004

7.2 **Data collection.** There were four databases managed by different departments within MOE which were not linked: the central database on school statistics, the school map, the MOE staff database and the examination database.

- School survey: The statistical unit in the MOE was recognised by the Central Statistical Organisation as better resourced (staff, equipment) than other statistical cells in line ministries with available staff also at both governorate and district levels. In 1998, the Ministry of Education conducted a "General Education census" funded by the World Bank. The Survey was supervised by CSO. There was continuous cooperation between MOE and CSO, especially in terms of technical support. The statistical staff of the ministry received training in statistics through CSO, the Social Fund for Development or Unicef.
- School mapping: The school mapping department established in 1982 within Education Resource Development Centre was attached to the Project Sector within the MOE in 1993. Between 2002 and 2004, around three governorates were covered per year, it took two months for two persons (one from district, one from MOE) to identify schools for one governorate. The function of the school mapping department was to check the adequacy of school locations identified by districts and governorates and provide information for the Project Sector.
- MOE staff: The personnel data base (teacher and administrative staff) was established only for payment issues.
- Examination: Yemen did not have a national assessment system. Public examinations were organised at the main exit points from the school system (9th and 12th grades). Grade 6 exams were cancelled after the integration of primary and preparatory into basic education. Nevertheless, Yemen participated into international exercises such as MLA (2002) and TIMSS (2003) but the results of TIMSS assessment were not released in 2003 due to low quality of data collected in 2002.

7.3 Indicators and data analysis. There were limited use of indicators and analysis of administrative data at district, governorate and central levels. For example in the governorate EMIS-report 2003/04, 26 tables out of 45 (58%) contained only absolute figure: cardinal numbers of the formal education system, cardinal numbers relating to other types of education, number of different education institutions, numbers of teachers in different types of education, allocation of male and female teachers to school, average teacher weekly workload (GTZ 2008).

7.4 The indicators were not always consistent with the indicator set used to monitor the MDGs internationally. Goal number 2 (achieve UPE) was documented using the average net enrolment rate in primary education and the percentage of children reaching fifth class (UNDP 2003).

7.5 The other sources of information available (e.g. 1997 Demographic and Health Survey, 1998 Household Surveys, 1999 Labour Force Survey, 1999 National Poverty Survey) were not used by MOE to supplement the analysis of administrative data. The financial data were not part of the landscape. This reflected a common feature of all line ministries:

Yemen has had a tendency to embark on new collection before exhausting the full potential of existing data, especially those collected through surveys (World Bank 2004).

7.6 Dissemination of results and use of data. The internal arrangements did not really provide for the functions. The management of information was highly fragmented both vertically between the MOE and the governorate and districts education offices as well as horizontally between the different departments of the MOE. The release of data was low: no publication of regular consolidated statistical yearbooks or periodic reports. The decision making process by high level management was then based on opinions or anecdotal evidence rather than large scale evidence based facts.

7.7 Organisational structures for M&E. There was no monitoring and evaluation mechanism set-up for the education sector as a whole. The Basic Education Development strategy set up long term goals but did not really describe how they will be annually monitored. The Social Fund for Development developed its own baseline surveys and monitored impact of its projects in basic education independently of the MOE. The donor supported projects had their own project development objectives and follow-up systems based on supervision and field missions.

7.8 At the national level, the first attempt to monitor poverty was made in 1998 with the introduction of the Poverty Information and Monitoring System at the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) supported by UNDP. The PRS and MDG frameworks with their progress reports were encouraging improved statistical practices and better use of statistical data. However, the Paris21 review in 2004 highlighted difficulties in Yemen for M&E in the following terms:

Given Yemen's limited capacity to monitor programme and policies, demand for indicators in policy planning processes across all line ministries is currently low although there is an increase in level of demand for key indicators for both the PRS and MDG process. Demand for statistical data from donors and other development partners is also increasing although this tends to be influenced by sectoral interest. Within Government the most significant user of indicators appears to be the MOPIC and the ministry of health although economic indicators are also widely used. Weak demand is related to limited dissemination practices, low capacity to use data and the limited culture of evidence and results-based planning (Paris21 2004)

FTI inputs and activities

7.9 The EFA-FTI proposal used the Indicative Framework to refine baseline year and set up relevant indicators to measure progress made on the sub-sector of lower basic education.

(...) the IF has been widely used to set the targeted indicators for monitoring and evaluating the progress of educational development in Yemen. In the FTI proposal, the government pointed out the targeted indicators for the next three years and these indicators will be evaluated (...) as soon as the school census is updated (Ogowa 2004).

7.10 The FTI Framework and Appraisal Guidelines envisage that the FTI can contribute to M&E processes by drawing together the available indicators and highlighting areas for improvement in terms of data accuracy and comprehensiveness at the time of appraising a country's sector plan. The intention is that issues raised in the appraisal of the sector plan, in preparation for the FTI endorsement, may be followed up by all development partners during the implementation of the plan. In the case of Yemen the **FTI appraisal** was used to highlight the country's "data gap" for the sub-sector of lower basic education in the following terms:

There is some internal inconsistency in the use of indicators and targets. Targets need to be revised in view of the feasible balance between reform and expansion. These indicators and targets needs to be made more consistent and realistic. They also need to be disaggregated to gender where appropriate. The targets and priorities regarding gender in the text are not consistently translated into performance indicators. The inconsistent use of indicators may partially be due to the low monitoring capacity. Enhancing the capacity for monitoring through the establishment of an Education Management Information System is rightly given priority. Indicators should be result-oriented whereby learning achievement takes centre stage (LDG and FTI 2003)

7.11 Separately from this the FTI has made two series of contributions to M&E. These are:

- The use of the FTI CF grants to support capacity building activities in data collection and M&E at governorate and district levels;
- The use of the FTI EPDF resources to co-finance with UNDP and BEDP the participation of Yemen into the TIMSS International Assessment²⁸ and to fund the first Education CSR.

7.12 The effects of M&E setting in the FTI proposal, of discussion on data gaps in the appraisal, and the merits of the activities that were undertaken under CF and EPDF are discussed in the following subsections.

The relevance of the FTI to M&E in education

7.13 **FTI Indicative Framework and indicators for NBEDS and BEDP.** When the government accepted the invitation to participate in the FTI, the MOE was in the final stage of completing NBEDS and a group of donors (World Bank, the Netherlands, DFID, KfW) were preparing BEDP.

7.14 **National BEDS:** The EFA-FTI proposal focused on the implementation of NBEDS for 2003–05. It mobilised both administrative and household survey data available at that time to describe in the most comprehensive way possible the situation faced by the basic education

²⁸ The EPDF financed the participation of six nominees from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to attend the IAE - TIMSS International Assessment Training of the Arab region, which was held in Tunis in February 2007. The national team that received this training led the implementation of the TIMSS 2007, and undertook a national training in analyzing TIMSS data in Arabic once TIMSS tests were completed.

sub-sector around 2000. It then helped revise NBEDS baseline data and **allowed the constitution of a baseline dataset for the year 2001** to run the simulation model. The EFA-FTI proposal also included an **ambitious M&E framework** for NBEDS which went beyond the FTI Indicative framework as it suggested including i) disaggregation of PCR by gender and geographical location to capture progress for the most disadvantaged group (rural girls); ii) learning achievements; and iii) donor commitments to EFA (see Box 7.2 below).

Box 7.2 M&E Framework Suggested in EFA-FTI Proposal (2003)

► **Key outcomes**

- Gender parity in first grade intake in primary school
- Primary school completion rate (PCR)* (total, girls, rural girls)
- Learning outcomes in primary school for grades 4 and 6 (Life skill, Science, Mathematics, Arabic)

► **Outputs and Service Delivery**

- Coverage (NER), especially of rural girls (total, girls, rural girls)
- Internal efficiency (repetition rates*, dropout rates, teacher-student ratio*)
- Quality of learning inputs or activities (Teacher qualification, Instructional materials, Instructional time*)

► **Inputs**

- Domestic resource mobilised for EFA and FTI (Public domestically-generated revenues as percentage of GDP*; Public recurrent spending on education as percentage of public recurrent expenditure*; Total public recurrent spending on primary education in USD millions; Public recurrent spending on primary education as percentage of total recurrent spending on education)
- Donor commitment to EFA-FTI concretised and maintained on a long-term basis (Total grants/donor support (Bilateral and Multilateral) provided to in USD millions and human resources; FTI Grants provided to fill financing gap in USD terms, as percentage of total resources available, and as an increment over the previous year)
- Country commitment to quality education and service delivery (Average teacher salary as a percentage of GDP per capita*; Recurrent spending on recurrent items other than teacher remuneration as percentage of total recurrent spending on primary education*; Government current spending per pupil as percentage of per capita GDP)
- Sustainability of FTI financing (Changes over time in the source of financing from Government, donors and FTI will show increasing financing from the government)

Note: *indicators included in FTI IF
Source: GOY 2003

7.15 Both the attempts to consolidate available information from different sources to set up a baseline year and the definition of a framework to monitor progress for the whole lower basic education sub-sector including indicators from the FTI IF were relevant as they contributed to align Yemen on the best international practices (i.e. promoting result-based approach).

7.16 Multi-donors funded BEDP: The Basic Education Development Project, key support for the implementation of NBEDS, also referred to the FTI Indicative Framework in its monitoring framework including the completion rate for female in grade 6, the student teacher ratio and the percentage of recurrent spending on quality inputs (see Table 7.1 below).

7.17 **FTI appraisal and focus on M&E.** The discussions during appraisal focused on the targets suggested for selected indicators (identified as too ambitious), emphasised the necessity to disaggregate the indicators by gender and agreed that M&E should be given priority support due to low monitoring capacity.

Table 7.1 BEDP – Project Development Objectives in 2004

	Baseline	Year 1		
	2002/03	2005		
Key Indicators		Target	Target MTR	Target End of Project
1. Access				
Objective: Increase enrollment in basic education				
Total GER in basic education (%)	64	68	76	84
Ratio of girls to total student population (%)	38	39	43	47
Gross intake rates (%) – Female/Male	72/96	76/97	90/97	95/97
2. Quality				
Objectives: Improve student's learning achievement and retention in basic education				
% of qualified teachers (%)	52	53	62	68
Female completion rates in grades 6 and 9 (%)	40/28	43/32	53/45	70/58
Female promotion rate from grade 4 to 5 (%)	91	92	93	95
3. Sector Management and Efficiency				
Objectives: Improve implementation capacity of education policies and efficiency of resource usage				
Percent of the districts that prepare their own education plan at the MoE satisfactory level *	--	tbd	tbd	30
Student-teacher ratio in publicly financed basic education schools	23	24	27	30
Recurrent spending on items other than teacher remuneration as % of total recurrent spending on basic education	29	31	33	35

Source: World Bank 2004

7.18 The joint assessment of the Yemen proposal could be said "light touch" in the area of data and M&E. It did not identify areas of "data gap" (e.g. learning achievements for lower basic after cancellation of grade 6 exam), point out institutional and management constraints in the area of data (e.g. data collection housed in different departments without incentive mechanisms for coordination), comment the suggested M&E framework for NBEDS, nor identify the need to link-up lower basic education M&E framework with those initiated for MDG or PRSP. The reference in the appraisal to the establishment of a MIS in the MOE – to be developed with the assistance of donor partners through BEDP – closed up the discussion on M&E in 2003.

7.19 Without explaining the priority issues to be addressed by a management information system (MIS) or which minimum set of indicators the MIS should support to be consistent with both international standard and practices in the education sector, the appraisal did not help identify relevant direction for M&E activities.

7.20 **FTI CF and FTI EPDF support to M&E.** The activities supported under the FTI CF were part of the capacity building activities supported by donors on data collection. They were relevant in the sense that they targeted governorate and district levels and wished to strengthen the critical intermediate levels in the chain of information going from school to MOE.

7.21 The EPDF support to TIMSS was relevant for M&E two reasons. First it focused on the key education outcome of learning achievements for lower basic education where there

was no longer national assessment undertaken. Second it contributed to finance regional activities which ensured integrity of the whole TIMSS process. The TIMSS activities are internationally defined and consist on a series of international and domestic activities which cannot be undertaken selectively without compromising the quality of the whole exercise. In fact the international activities are guidance and training events for the national activities.

7.22 The EPDF support to Education CSR was also relevant for M&E. It was the first attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the whole education sector and not only the sub-sector of primary or basic education. Such diagnosis provided also an example of data analysis for the education sector exploiting and cross-comparing different sources of available information (administrative data, household surveys, labour market survey, budget and finance data), documenting indicators agreed internationally (primary completion rate for lower basic, number of student per 100,000 inhabitants for tertiary education etc.) and providing comparisons across time (between 1998 and 2005) and space (across governorates, districts and schools).

Effectiveness of the FTI in improving M&E

7.23 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of whether the FTI resources have contributed to (a) the development of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) at national and local levels; (b) the promotion of use and analysis of data; and (c) establishment of a robust M&E framework compatible with educational outcomes agreed and followed at international level.

7.24 **Development of the EMIS at national and local levels.** The MOE was aware that the collection, recording, management and use of information was a crucial input for policy and project development, priority setting, resource allocation, and annual planning at the central, governorate, district and school level. It was then agreed in 2003 that the Education Management Information System will be developed with the assistance of donor partners.

7.25 A comprehensive review of activities was carried out under BEDP with a view to ensuring better coordination and complementarity of inputs by all parties involved as all donors used to support activities in this area. Central Ministry and local educational offices had their equipment upgraded and staffs at all levels were trained. The activities supported by the FTI CF in the targeted four governorates were part of the "EMIS master plan" and help improve quality of data collection process and decentralisation of data entry.

7.26 Although some activities might have positive effects locally, the continuous efforts deployed in this area are reported not to have produced results country-wide commensurate with the money spent over time:

Many donor-funded initiatives have supported development of education management information systems with very limited results for the level of investment over a long period of time (World Bank 2009c).

7.27 Similarly, the information on pupils, teachers, materials resources, finance, and examination results is not yet produced in a comprehensive way. The statistical survey presented at the 2009 joint annual review reflected the shortcomings of data collection and analysis.²⁹ The key issues are:

²⁹ The final statement of JAR 2009 (English translation of the Arabic) included the following comments:

6. "Care for school records because they are the main source for information and data of schools and apply the legislations in the area of statistics on data collection".

21. "Set up specific basic performance indicators to measure how close they get to NBEDS and Millennium goals".

- **Population data:** The geographical breakdown of population data are limited (huge challenge to get baseline data and measure outcomes at governorate and district levels). The population census conducted in 2004 has not been used to develop effective annual district or governorate level population projections (pressure from school age population growth on the capacity of the education system difficult to anticipate at decentralised levels). The low prevalence of birth registration continues to make age data not accurate in administrative record or household surveys (unreliability of cohort projections).
- **School administrative data:** The inconsistency of annual school surveys (notably the data gathered through the comprehensive school survey and the annual education survey) severely challenged the validity and reliability of educational data (see Box 7.1 below). The fact that three departments in MOE still house data collection exercises (Statistic and planning, IT and School mapping³⁰) doesn't help to rationalise the management of information.
- **Examination data:** The exam database is not reliable to monitor progress on student learning achievements. The governorate 9th grade and the national 12th grade examinations are linked to transitions policies in the upper levels and the growing phenomenon of cheating have largely undermined the credibility certificates obtained (Abdulmalik 2009).

7.28 Use and analysis of data: Example of TIMSS exercise. The co-funded evaluation of learning achievements in mathematics and sciences for Yemeni fourth graders in 2007 has been effective in four ways. First, TIMSS tests have been performed, data retrieved and analyses published. Whereas in 2003, the sampling procedures did not comply with comparability standards forcing International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) to remove Yemen from the international publication; the 2007 exercise built on the 2003 experience to ensure integrity of the whole process leading to the publication of the results. The reports were written both in English and Arabic to target a wider audience, especially at country level. The reports were also made available on the IEA website.

22. "Set up directions analysis for the following: enrolment; completion rate; share of teachers to students; number of female teachers".

25. "Present the statistical survey results in a simplified analytical form to help decision makers understand them and benefit from them in designing policies, plans, programmes and making decisions".

³⁰ A new method using GPS was introduced in 2005. The old database was gradually cancelled. It took four years to cover all the 21 governorates but now a school mapping unit exists in each governorate education office (four persons) and one respondent has been identified in each district education office. In 2010 the school mapping survey is planned to be updated. School mapping report: There are reports for each district/governorate and a nation-wide report. Reports (in Arabic) present existing situation, shortages in school building (mainly) and assess needs based on population projection.

Box 7.1 School Surveys Exercises (2003/04–2007/08)

For three successive academic years different methods have been used to collect data and consistency was then lost. Such inconsistency has limited the utility of trend analysis based on the three different sources

► **2003/04 academic year:** The **Planning & Statistic Department** (Technical Office/MOE) was in charge of data collection, entry and analysis. It printed school questionnaire which were sent to GEOs, DEOs and finally to schools for the headmaster to fill it (**self reporting method**). The data entry was done either at district level for those equipped in computers or at central level.

► **2004/05 academic year** (as for 1998/99): The **Planning and Statistic Department** (Technical Office/MOE) mobilised qualified staff (from other ministries, from CSO, etc.) to perform a school record (**direct recording method**). The exercise was completed in two months (20 days for data collection). The questionnaire was close to the one administered in 2004 but not identical. The enrolment appeared to have drop by 200,000. The budget for a comprehensive survey is five times more important that for the annual school survey (YER 65m against YER 11m) and should take place every 5 years. The 1998/99 and 2004/05 are called the Comprehensive School Surveys (CSS).

► **2005/06 academic year:** The **IT Department**, also in charge of staff (teachers plus administrative staff) payroll was in charge of data collection (decision of the Minister against Department of planning & statistics). The coverage was limited (light questionnaire but also less schools). Two figures were successively announced for enrolments, the second one with an artificial inflation of 200,000 pupils reported the education economist from the World Bank.

► **2006/07 academic year:** the different departments in the MOE collaborated to carry-out the school survey which was financially supported by the multi- donor funded basic education project (BEDP).

► **2007/08 academic year:** the school survey was not conducted. BEDP did not finance the exercise as the conditions on quality control were not met.

Source: From interviews during in-country visit

7.29 Secondly, results were used to reflect on teaching and learning processes in Yemen (NBEDS meeting, joint annual review, etc.). Performances in TIMSS 2007 were low: Yemeni fourth graders ranked last in Maths and Sciences tests (see Box 7.3 below). Such results encouraged a critical review of in service teacher training for grades 1–3 and the launching of the Foundation Grades Initiative (FGI) with the MOE Guidance Sector to help Yemeni pupils perform better in the 2011 TIMSS exercise. The FGI is based on the premises that there are three prime factors that must have played a role in shaping TIMSS results in 2007: unfamiliarity of pupils with the kind of test items and testing procedures, incompetence to read in general and inadequate science and mathematics teaching. The FGI suggests remedial actions to be implemented in a sample of schools to see if the pupils will perform differently in 2011 in these schools than in others.

7.30 Thirdly, TIMSS international database has been made available to targeted postgraduate student in mathematics and science education and their supervisors in five main universities of Yemen to demonstrate the potential of its rich data for research and encourage for more secondary analyses.

7.31 Finally, TIMSS exercise associated GEOs and DEOs which could lay the foundation for national assessment exercise at lower basic education.

Box 7.3 TIMSS Results and Follow-Up Activities**Indicators and M&E frameworks: the dilution of the FTI Indicative Framework.**

7.32 Sub-Sector of Basic Education. While the reference to the FTI IF indicators was at the heart of the suggested M&E framework for NBEDS and of the project development objectives for BEDP in 2003/05; it did not succeed to effectively influence the M&E strategies on the longer term.

7.33 National BEDS: The refinement of policies, strategies and outcomes for NBEDS in 2005 put in place a far less ambitious and clear M&E framework than the one initially designed in the EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003–05). This reflected the difficulties encountered in the MIS and data analysis as well as the absence of consensus on an agreed set of monitorable indicators to measure progress at school, district, governorate and national levels.

Box 7.4 M&E Framework in the NBEDS Medium Term Result Framework (2006-2010)

► **M&E process**

- Annual school surveys (enrolment rates, drop-out rates, repetition rates, access to learning facilities)
- Implementation monitoring (annual work plan and budget)
- Studies and surveys of specific activities

► **Outcome indicators**

Access

- Overall enrolment versus target
- Enrolment by governorate, district, by urban and rural (measured versus distribution of enrolment targets)
- Enrolment by gender by geographic locations (measured versus gender gap target)

Quality

Learning achievements (levels & targets not specified)

Institutional

No outcome indicators defined

Source: MOE 2006 NBEDS-Medium-Term Result Framework (2006–2010)

7.34 Multi-donors funded BEDP: Over the life of the project, the indicators have been adjusted to better show results, first in 2006 to align with the NBEDS MTRF, secondly in 2008 at the BEDP mid-term review in recognition of data constraints and inaccuracies and lastly in 2009 with a complete revision of the PDO to focus only on project's activities impact and not on sub-sector impact as envisioned in 2004. The retention rate to grade 6 disaggregated by gender is the only indicator reflecting the FTI IF which remains.

Table 7.2 BEDP – Revision of Project Development Objectives (June 2009)

Objective 1: Increased participation of children particularly girls in basic education in 10 governorates	
1	Number of students enrolled in grades 1-9 in 10 governorates (male)
2	Number of students enrolled in grades 1-9 in 10 governorates (female)
3	Gender parity index for basic education enrolment (G1-9) in 10 governorates
Objective 2: Improved quality of teaching in basic education nationally	
4	Average Grade 4 student percent correct on questions covered in the Yemen curriculum
5	Percentage of Grade 4 students in schools where few (25% or less) teachers had professional development in improving teaching skills
6	Retention rate to Grade 6 (male/ national)
7	Retention rate to Grade 6 (female/ national)
Objective 3: Establishment of foundations for improved MOE capacity to carry out its core functions	
8	General MOE AWP prepared and linked to budget
9	Reform policies approved based on BEDS
10	Number of civil work projects procured by GEOs in 10 governorates using agreed project financial

Source: BEDP Supervision Mission, Aide memoire, June 2009 (MOE 2009b).

7.35 FTI Catalytic Fund project: Nevertheless the FTI IF was documented as part of the supervision mission of the FTI CF project which was jointly done with the BEDP one.

7.36 **Education Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategy**. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) is in charge of poverty monitoring. The Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR) 2006–2010 is currently implemented. It has integrated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the framework for achieving the MDGs.

7.37 The FTI IF indicators have never been considered at the national level in the monitoring of poverty reduction. It is difficult to know if the FTI IF could have influenced the

high level M&E framework if the indicators have been routinely followed at the sub-sector level.

7.38 Looking at the evolution of the number and type of indicators selected to reflect progress for the whole education sector at national level, the following remarks can be made: i) the main reference are the enrolment ratios (whether gross or net) at all education levels which reflect the focus on expansion strategies (not a single indicators looking at learning achievements); ii) indicators are disaggregated as far as possible by gender, and urban/rural location but the geographical dimension – governorate – has been lost between the third and the fourth development plans); iii) the MDG indicator for UPE has been lost in the merging of the MDG M&E framework into the national policy evaluation mechanism; and iv) the allocation of resources to education or education service delivery parameters – part of the FTI indicative framework – are not considered.

Box 7.5 M&E of Education Indicators in Socio-Economic Development Plans

Second Socio-Economic Development Plan (2001–2005) - three indicators

- Illiteracy rates (15 + years) (disaggregated by gender and governorate)
- Enrolment in basic education (disaggregated by gender and governorate)
- Classroom density in basic education (disaggregated by gender and governorate)

MDG progress report (2003) - five indicators

- Goal 2 (achieve UPE): i) Average net enrolment rate in primary education; and ii) Percentage of children reaching fifth class
- Goal 3 (promote gender equality): proportion of boys to girls in basic, secondary & tertiary education

PRPS (2003–2005) - progress report - three indicators

- Basic education enrolment
- Basic education share of education spending
- Share of female students in universities and share of graduates from science and applied studies

Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2006–2010) – nine indicators out of 110

- Adult illiteracy rate
- Net enrolment rate in basic education (urban, rural, total)
- Ratio of female to male in basic education (urban, rural, total)
- Average number of students in class for basic education (urban, rural, total)
- Net enrolment rate in secondary education (urban, rural, total)
- Ratio of female to male in secondary education (urban, rural, total)
- Average number of students in class for secondary education (urban, rural, total)
- Enrolment rate in scientific and applied colleges (boys, girls, total)
- Enrolment rate in technical education and vocational trainings (boys, girls, total)

Source: From development plans and PRSP abovementioned.

Efficiency of resource use in M&E

7.39 **Prioritisation of M&E and rationalisation of indicators.** There is no evidence that that FTI endorsement has resulted in increased prioritisation of M&E by government or in definition of a common set of indicators internationally recognised as benchmarks against which to measure progress. The prioritisation of M&E in basic education, in the education sector as a whole or in national development plans is still low and not yet recognised as a powerful public management tool.

M&E units have relatively low status within line ministries and although they formally report to their respective ministries, the real recipients of information are outside agencies and donors (GOY, UNDP and World Bank 2007, p80)

7.40 The completion rate is not given as much as emphasis as traditional GER and NER and seems documented for MDG report only. The other FTI IF indicators have been clearly phased-out over time. This may be the result of the light touch endorsement in 2003. Some of the checks and balances were missed as a result of relying on the establishment of an EMIS through BEDP and the opportunity to re-address these issues was lost in the remainder of the process.

7.41 **Expenditure on data collection, analysis and use.** While the FTI did not initiate support to M&E activities, the resources deployed through the CF and EPDF contributed to increase the financing of data systems and use. The CF resources invested in capacity development at governorate and district levels would have been more efficient if the institutional framework for the management of information was more supportive.

7.42 The EPDF resources have financed or co-financed a lot of studies of interest for M&E (impact of school fee abolition, education situation of marginalised children, secondary tracer graduate study, CSR, TIMSS, etc.). On the positive side, these studies have re-balanced efforts on data analysis and demonstrated that existing data from household and labour market surveys were under exploited and could be better used to inform education decision making process. On the other hand these studies could have had a greater impact with a systematic translation into Arabic and appropriate dissemination events down to local levels.

7.43 **Reporting.** There is no evidence that the FTI has resulted in increase coordination of reporting mechanisms between government and donors. Not all partners in education used a common system of monitoring and reporting. In the basic education sub-sector, the progress resulting from the implementation of the national strategy are evaluated during joint annual review prepared by the MOE and the major project (BEDP) is assessed during bi-annual multi-donors supervision missions prepared by the Education Program Administrative Unit. Moreover, the Public Works Projects and the Social Fund for Development annually report of their investments and activities in the sub-sector to their own management only.

7.44 The FTI CF projects (phases 1, 2) were said not to have created any additional reporting requirements by government or donors since they were reviewed along BEDP. The same arrangement is expected to be replicated for the forthcoming phase 3. According to the interviewees, no regular reports have been exchanged between Yemen and the FTI Secretariat in Washington.

Sustainability

7.45 **M&E for the basic education sub-sector.** The persistence of parallel systems within MOE have duplicated efforts, created confusion and finally contributed to maintain a lack of confidence in the data collected (each department defending its data set as the most accurate and relevant). While the donors strongly call for a unified data collection system and collaboration among departments at central level, the institutional fragmentation appears to be a long process to overcome giving internal resistances. Nevertheless, there is an attempt through the modernisation and restructuring task force of MOE to mitigate governance and management failure which go beyond the issue of data and M&E (see Chapter 8).

7.46 The comprehensive school survey (CSS) which took place in 1998/99 and 2004/05 is credited by MOE and donors as the most reliable source of information on schools data but it is only planned to be replicated every five years due to costs implications. If the annual education survey is not made compatible with the CSS, the annual follow-up provided by the MOE at the joint review will be undermined. And the semi-autonomous agencies and donors will pursue their own parallel fragmented investigation (e.g. baseline surveys) in the areas of interventions.

7.47 The focus on data collection systems has distracted resources and efforts from data analysis and use. The culture of evidence won't progress without clear requirements on simple indicators and analyses which help compare position of a school, district, and governorate against standards in order to drive remedial measures.

7.48 The decentralisation process could lead to greater care of school records, data collection and analysis at district and governorate levels if the local councils wish to use available resources to act upon the most needed areas and schools rather than spread resources to get political support.

7.49 **M&E for the whole education sector.** The process of an Integrated Vision Policy Paper for the education sector based on the Education CSR diagnosis may offer an opportunity to review the list of relevant indicators to measure progress for each level and type of education and orient future monitoring requirements. The preparation of the Fourth Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction in 2010 could then benefit from the sectoral discussion, embed the updated selected indicators and provide the high level incentive to monitor them.

8 The FTI and Capacity Development

Context before FTI endorsement (2002)

8.1 Deficiencies of the civil service. In the early years of 2000, the government and the public administration in Yemen had not solved the complex institutional capacity issues which arose from the unification of the country (see Box 8.1 below). For example, the low wages made the civil service unable to attract high quality workers, with lack of effort on the part of existing staff with many persons holding more than one job (either within the public or private sector), and increased the reliance of civil servants on petty corruption to top-off salaries. It has also reinforced the concept that wages paid to a civil servant are nothing more than a safety-net.

Box 8.1 Features of Public Sector after the Unification of the Country

Yemen's public administration was in a precarious state following the unification of North and South Yemen and a destructive Civil War in the early 1990s. During the early part of the 1990s, Yemen's Civil Service acted as an employer of last resort and a central component of Yemen's safety net. This situation created a large civil service which interfered in private sector activities and impeded its development, represented a large burden on public finances while producing little value added in terms of delivering needed services to the population at large.

As a result of merging the administration of North and South Yemen, the organisational structure became antiquated and excessively complex and centralised with little ability by lower level management to take decisions or be held accountable for activities even as mundane as approval of annual leave for individual staff. Organisational structures and work flows were duplicative and unnecessarily complex, and modern human resource-management practices were virtually absent. The result was a bloated civil service with extremely low pay scales, weak capacity, opaque hiring and promotion practices, and relatively few effective enforcement mechanisms. World Bank 2008a

8.2 The numerous shortcomings inherited from the unification of the government system have particularly affected the basic education sub-sector. The Ministry of Education was the largest recipient of the Yemen's safety net strategy and became the most important employer in the country. There were a lot of ghost workers in the payroll of the MOE. Due to politicised and non-meritocratic staff appointment practices, staff at all levels did not have the necessary knowledge, skills nor facilities to carry out their responsibilities effectively

8.3 While the government had engaged in a civil service reform modernisation with the support of donors (World Bank and EC) at the end of the 90s, the management of public resources as well as the delivery of essential services remain still severely challenged.

8.4 Rise of semi-autonomous agencies such as PWP and SFD. The situation in the public sector lead to the creation of parallel semi-autonomous agencies such as the Public Works Project (PWP) and Social Fund for Development (SFD) to counterbalance deficiencies of the civil service, ensure transparent use of resources and effectively provide needed services in water, sanitation, health and education to the population (see Chapter 5). They were given responsibilities by government for a large share of investment in basic education.

8.5 Both PWP and SFD benefited from specific arrangements: i) authorisation to operate outside normal civil service rules (e.g. salaries significantly higher than within civil service, flexibility in hiring and the use of short contracts); and ii) derogations to bypass routine, cumbersome procurement and financial management procedures. Such arrangements led to a multiplication of processes often reflecting different level of donors' involvement as both PWP and SFD were receiving support from donors.

8.6 Emergence of unprepared actors in the wave of the Local Authority Law (LAL) (2000). The elections of local councils took place in 2001 and Yemen started to decentralise the education system and to devolve authority without much of a transition period. Neither the central ministries nor the local executive branches and local councils were properly prepared for this change. As the primary motivation of the LAL was political and not to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of social services delivery, the instruments and procedures were not in place. Those with roles to play did not know well their mandate, nor did they look to acquire the necessary skills to perform their functions well.

8.7 Project implementation units and use of external systems by donors. The donors involved in supporting the basic education sub-sector, like the World Bank, the KfW or GTZ implemented activities entirely through external systems to overcome the mismanagement of resources. The implicit strategy was that the testing of various approaches through projects might show the way to reinforce Yemen's implementation capacity (e.g. community participation for school construction programmes; or decentralisation of in-service training for teachers).

8.8 A new strategy for basic education with little guidance for capacity development. While NBEDS envisaged an ambitious and complex multi-faceted reform programme for basic education in an adverse institutional context, there was no commensurate strategy elaborated in the area of capacity development to guide priority activities at central, governorate and district levels to support the key functions of planning, management of resources and monitoring of results.

FTI inputs and activities

8.9 The FTI inputs in terms of capacity development were of four types: discussions on capacity development issues during preparation and appraisal of the "EFA-FTI credible plan" for the implementation of NBEDS; ii) choice of a programme administrative unit to administer the FTI catalytic fund resources in 2004, 2006 and 2009; iii) capacity development activities directly supported by the FTI CF grant phases 1,2 and 3; and iv) technical assistance (TA) funded or co-funded by the FTI EPDF to undertake studies and follow-up knowledge sharing workshops.

8.10 The **EFA-FTI proposal** included a brief diagnosis of the capacity constraints affecting the public sector insisting on the "weak institutional capacity, low internal efficiency, declining motivation, low salaries, incompatibility of the labour force (and) inflation in the number of workers". The proposal also raised the alarm of the danger of neglecting institutional capacity building for the basic education sub-sector:

Many of the reform target and activities implementation need to strengthen their institution capacity especially in planning, implementing, monitoring programmes, coordinating, and modern management; otherwise performance will either be inefficient or a nucleus for corruption may emerge. As such, one may say that the issue of human capacities and their development shall persist to form the most significant challenge that faces the implementation of NBEDS and FTI plan (GOY 2003).

8.11 The FTI proposal suggested that "institutional capacity building is considered to be the most important priority" and defined the strategy to be followed as one focusing on managerial and administrative staff at central and local levels, teachers and school managers:

The objectives of the Institutional Capacity Building are: Supporting MOE to build up the legal framework required to develop the decentralisation process; Supporting MOE to implement the basic education strategy at the local levels; enhancing the professional and managerial competence of all education staff at different levels, in order to empower them to plan, implement, follow-up and evaluate the educational process effectively, Improving the professional capacities of teachers through decentralisation of the teacher

training approach, which has proven to be more effective than the traditional (centralised) training approach; Supporting school administration through training courses and workshops.

(...) Strengthening institution capacity needs to include training, qualification, development and other factors, such as attracting the human cadre to the remote areas. (GOY 2003)

8.12 Upon **endorsing the FTI proposal**, donors recognised that "significant improvements in implementation capacity have been witnessed in several major projects" but they were concerned by the proposal being "overly ambitious given the current (implementation) capacities in the sector". They suggested to "build the capacity throughout the country in a phased manner, by prioritising capacity building interventions at all levels within one governorate at the time".

8.13 The **FTI CF grant** phases 1, 2 and 3 approached the capacity development issues in the basic education sub-sector in two ways. First, it was decided that the FTI CF project would follow the implementation arrangements that were used for the previous World Bank funded Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) – and adopted for its successor (the multi-donor funded BEDP) – through the support of a **programme administrative unit** (PAU). This arrangement meant that the implementation of the activities would go through the existing operational structures of the MOE (each administrative entity, at both the central, governorate, district and school levels, implementing the activities that fall under its responsibilities) but the administrative aspects of procurement, financial management (incl. audit), monitoring progress and liaising with donors would be the responsibility of an organisation external to the MOE.

8.14 Secondly, the FTI CF grant phases 1, 2 directly supported **capacity development activities** in the **four targeted governorates** for teachers and school managers and for managerial and administrative staff at GEOs and DEOs levels: training, on the job support and provision of equipment for the departments of planning, training, supervision and examination to support their administrative, planning and reporting functions (see Chapters 4 and 5 for details).

8.15 The **FTI EPDF** funded or co-funded technical assistance to undertake studies and follow-up knowledge sharing workshops on education policies issues (school fees abolition, pupils learning achievements, education CSR).

8.16 At the global level the EFA-FTI Partnership produced in April 2008 some **capacity development guidelines** which did not appear from the in-country visit to have been disseminated or discussed locally.

Relevance of the FTI's contribution in the area of capacity development

8.17 In a context of very weak public delivery capacity, the trade-off between the strong need for speedy delivery of services and long-term capacity development is a critical issue. The compromise reached between the government and the donors was to rely upon semi-autonomous agencies and Project Implementation Units (PIUs) respectively.

8.18 There is a general interest by MOPIC and the donor community in applying the successful experience of SFD and PWP elsewhere in the public sector. This requires identifying the factors contributing to the success of the semi-autonomous agencies and how these can be incorporated into the wider civil service modernisation programme, including the decentralisation process. On the other hand, there is no clear strategy to phase out and integrate project management into government systems.

8.19 In the basic education sub-sector, the donors use different types of PIUs to support the implementation of NBEDS. The education Programme Administrative Unit (PAU) is the most important one and channelled resources from GTZ, KfW, DFID and the World Bank. PAU is seen as a more progressive PIU. The structure doesn't implement the project activities for which the MOE is entirely responsible. The PAU has a twofold mandate: i) to deal with projects fiduciary matters, and the proper administration of project documents and payments to ensure that project funds are planned for and disbursed according to schedule and within the framework agreed upon during the preparation of the project; and ii) to help build the capacity of the public sector to ensure swift move to the utilisation of national system country's systems in the medium to longer term.

8.20 The fact that the FTI CF support is administered by PAU and not by an additional PIU can be seen as relevant in the specific context of Yemen in an attempt to minimise mismanagement while strengthening capacities. The effectiveness of PAU in ensuring its twofold mandate is discussed below.

8.21 Surprisingly, the FTI capacity development guidelines barely mention the potentially positive aspects of the use of PIUs in situations of very weak government capacity (focusing instead on distorting effects) and how to make them effective in the delivery of capacity building services to counterparts at central and local levels to prepare the ground for SWAps.

Effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to capacity development

8.22 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of whether the FTI influenced (a) the national approach and policies of the Government of Yemen towards capacity development; and (b) strategies of donors in capacity building. It appears that the FTI's contribution was minimal at the institutional and organisational level given the scale of the challenges which are far beyond the education sector but provided effective support at individual or unit-based level to ensure timely implementation of the FTI CF supported activities.

National approach and strategies towards capacity development

8.23 The government of Yemen engaged in **high level reforms** of importance for the education sector but **progress is being made very slowly**:

- **Civil service:** the civil service reform has been under way since the late 90s based on an incremental and phased approach. Despite bureaucratic resistance some progress has been made³¹ but the ultimate goal of establishing a modern and performance-oriented civil service is not close to completion in 2009. The civil service cannot yet guarantee the right mix and location of education staff,

³¹ "Among them, (i) the development of a wage strategy designed to effectively link wage increases to the implementation of reform objectives and passing of the Wage Bill law, which provides a legal basis for its implementation across the GOY; (ii) the referral to the pension authorities of approximately 67,000 individuals who had effectively passed the retirement age and as a result more than doubling its enrolment; (iii) the elimination from the payroll of approximately 11,000 individuals whose main activity was working for political parties; (iv) the transfer of civil servants salaries to their agency, thereby decentralising the workforce at the governorate level and increasing wage management transparency; (v) the building of a consolidated and centralised civil service database, which includes relevant information regarding qualifications, seniority and wages of all civil service employees; (vi) the identification and freezing of salaries of over 50,000 suspected double dippers, roughly 13% of the total civil service; (vii) the development and successful introduction of a personnel retrenchment programme (the Civil Service Fund) and the processing of over 7,000 employees by August 2007 (approximately 2% of civil service); and (viii) the development of an Accounting and Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) with pilot implementation in four large ministries (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Public Works) in the first phase slated for December 2007" (World Bank 2008a).

with the salary scales and incentives in place that will create the basis for good quality education outcomes.

- **Procurement:** In 2007, the GOY passed a new procurement law intended to create the basis for more transparent and efficient procurement. This law largely adopted the World Bank procurement procedures. Two years later, in 2009, the new procurement law has yet to be implemented in full.
- **Financial management:** In August 2005, the Cabinet approved a PFM reform strategy and a partnership agreement on PFM was signed in May 2006 between Government and several members of the donor community. However diagnostics reviews continue to identify several major issues (see Chapter 1).
- **Decentralisation:** A strategic vision for the Local Authorities was published recently by Ministry of Local Administration recently but serious coordination issues remain as well as gaps which will need to be addressed legally before policy and legislation initiatives at the national level can be coordinated with the implementation and planning roles of decentralised structures.

8.24 While the above mentioned issues were beyond the scope of the education sector, the **MOE** adopted **complementary approaches** to capacity development mainly through donor supported projects:

8.25 Restructuring and modernisation of the MOE. The MOE recognised that the reform and expansion aspects of NBEDS were highly ambitious, and require the rapid building up of management structures and capacities at the different levels of the MOE. MOE set up a "Modernisation Task Force" to lead the reform and restructuring of the Ministry through: formulating a policy paper; suggesting a new organisational structure; re-engineering core services and establishing an institutional performance system. While the task force was established in 2006, it took two years to mobilise a full time technical assistant (in place since October 2008) to support the restructuring process. The first draft of the policy framework for reforming the structure and organisation of the MOE, GEO and DEO was presented at the 2009 joint annual review and was a fair attempt to link up with high level reforms.

8.26 Procurement and financial management. On the side of the Ministry, improvement of procurement and financial management systems was not explicitly stated in the MTRF or MTEF. However this dimension has begun to be addressed on a sub-sector scale for specific activities currently piloted through BEDP such as the whole school improvement and the conditional cash transfer schemes. As these two schemes relate to the setting up of school development funding and cash redistributive policies they present the leverage for financial reforms involving MOE.

8.27 Decentralisation and community participation. NBEDS and its associated MTRF are fairly centralised processes, although implementation of some activities, notably school construction, is carried out in a decentralised manner. On the other hand, community participation is institutionalised in the Education Sector through Mothers' and Fathers' Councils. The school construction programmes (including those financed under the FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 have contributed to reinforce capacities of GEO/DEO and targeted communities in the area of civil works.

Donor strategy in capacity building

8.28 The responses of donors to support NBEDS implementation can be looked at from the efforts to address institutional framework and organisational structures issues on the one hand and to build capacities of individuals or units on the other hand. The alignment of donor's initiatives in the area of capacity development with MOE priorities is not yet formalised given the absence of a capacity development strategy and its associated

technical assistance plan. In addition, some interviewees highlighted the difficulty to mobilise long term TA in Yemen due to the volatile security context of the country.

8.29 **The institutional and organisational support** was effectively provided through improvement of knowledge on "capacity gaps" in the education sector and provision of TA to support the Modernisation Task Force of MOE. However, donors failed to support the preparation of a SWAp through the Basic Education Development Project.

8.30 Capacity gaps analysis. Donors have commissioned numerous institutional and organisational capacity assessments of education sector ministries; governorate and education offices to mitigate the risks during implementation of future projects and help design capacity building strategies (e.g. capacity assessments underlined BEP and SEDGAP designs respectively in 2003 and 2008).

8.31 The last capacity assessment covered all three ministries in charge of education and showed that "the three ministries (were) trying to superimpose fast track ambitions on slow-track organisational machineries" (Orbach 2008). A combination of four alternatives strategies were then recommended: i) lower the vision, and/or narrow down the mission – the objectives of action – so that less capacity is required; ii) lengthen the period of time during which the vision/mission are to be achieved; iii) increase the productivity – the utilisation and efficiency – of existing resources and operations by improving leadership and management, organising better, building up skills, reviewing and changing work practices, methods and procedures; and iv) add resources (provide more people, procure more systems and equipment, increase allocations to recurrent expenditure, etc).

8.32 The key findings from the diagnosis were integrated into the education CSR funded by EPDF and the third strategy served as a basis for the assignment of the technical assistant in support of the Modernisation Task Force of the MOE.

8.33 BEDP and pre-SWAp capacity development. The pre-SWAp aims of BEDP (e.g. strengthening the procurement and financial management capacity of the MOE) have not been operationalised in terms of activities and results, leading to a relative lack of focus on these aims (see Box 8.2 below).

8.34 The capacity **building activities at individual or unit-based levels** were mostly provided by donor funded long and short term TA (from GTZ, KfW, JICA and USAID) and by the education development programme administrative unit (PAU).

8.35 The project implementation units established by bilateral and multilateral donors worked with different MOE sectors (Technical Office, Projects Sector, Training Sector, Girls' education sector, etc.) and their counterpart at governorate and district levels and supported nested capacity building activities in planning, civil works, teacher training and community participation areas to help implement agreed project activities.

Box 8.2 BEDP and failure of pre-SWAp capacity building activities**► BEDP as a preparation for the further development of SWAp**

"In the PAD, BEDP is described as a "pre-SWAp" arrangement, with the expressed aim of preparing the education sector for a sector wide approach (SWAp).

In particular, Component 3: Sector Management and Efficiency supports the strengthening of the sector to put in place the institutional mechanisms for SWAp. It further states that "Greater emphasis will be placed on strengthening government procurement and financial management capacity throughout the sector, with the help of the PAU, in preparation for SWAp-based budgetary support envisaged as a later phase of multi-donor support to the sector."

► Absence of pre-SWAp output indicators

"BEDP's pre-SWAp aims have not been translated into the results framework, weakening its ability to achieve these aims"

► Capacity Building (CB) activities in procurement and financial management

"PAU has engaged in a number of activities to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry at central and governorate levels to handle procurement and financial management. However, these are mostly specific to BEDP requirements, they are primarily informal on-the-job training, and the actors are not necessarily the same ones as would be managing a government run system".

Source: Beatty 2008

8.36 On a larger scale (due to the financial amounts managed), PAU helped build systems and enhanced individual skills at central and governorate/district levels for the delivery of activities funded by the FTI CF and BEDP. While PAU successfully supported implementation of the FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2 as design and activities carried out were clear and simple,³² issues are raised concerning the capacity of the PAU itself to play a similar supportive role in the future given the increased workload (see Box 8.3 below).

Box 8.3 Challenges facing PAU to support implementation of the FTI CF phase 3

The **PAU is considered a "temporary" structure** and partly as a result of this has not received sufficient resources to develop a strong organisational structure and management system, with many system aspects not yet built. This negatively impacts its effectiveness and efficiency. The complexity of BEDP tasks has not been adequately recognised in the PAU's organisational structure, TOR, staffing mix and skills requirements" (...)

"It has already been decided that the PAU will be taking on the administration of SEDGAP, in addition to BEDP and FTI. As such, **PAU has become a semi-permanent structure administering multiple programmes and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of development funds**. The type of activities it now manages has evolved from relatively simple ones to a complex set of reform initiatives that demand a broad set of skills. However, as mentioned above, its organisational structure, management systems, and staffing skills mix are not strong enough to manage this heavy load efficiently. Development of a longer term vision of the role of PAU in supporting the SWAp process (beyond that of each individual project it administers), will aid the smooth transition to SWAp. It will also help avoid further overload on the PAU, once SEDGAP is added to the PAU's portfolio this year.

Source: Beatty 2008

Efficiency of the FTI's contribution to capacity development

8.37 The **FTI CF activities** during phases 1 and 2 (respectively in 2004/05 and 2006/07) reinforced capacity building in the area of **civil works** (from site location in needed areas to quality supervision of local contractors through transparent bidding process) at governorate and district levels. Such support was unanimously well received at local level (see Abdumalik, 2005 and 2007). However it was agreed that the civil works component to be financed under the FTI CF grant phase 3 (2009/11) will be directly implemented by the

³² In contrast with some BEDP's activities which were delayed due to bottlenecks in applying complex and unfamiliar World Bank procurement and financial management procedures.

Public Works Project following ministerial decision. PAU argues that such a decision is inefficient, given the past investment in capacity building at local levels in this area. Nevertheless, the funds available to Education Offices through the Local Authorities are limited – so far – to civil works. This provides an opportunity to assess that built capacities are effectively re-invested in locally funded operations. In that case the initial investment could be said to be efficient.

8.38 The FTI CF support to **planning** (work plans, costing of activities, implementation schedules, etc.) and **monitoring** (focusing on process and outputs) at local levels has been primarily designed for the purpose of the "CF project". The issue here is that the wider processes of planning and M&E at district, governorate and central levels had not been formalised when the FTI CF grants had begun to be utilised. The efficiency of the CB activities supported by the FTI CF grant during phase 3 (2009–2011) will rely upon its linkages and contribution to these newly established processes of AWP and EMIS.

8.39 The **FTI EPDF studies** used to develop capacity for **analysis and evidence-based decision making process** could be made more efficient if the studies were systematically translated into Arabic (to ensure knowledge diffusion to a large audience), key findings were discussed both at central and local levels (invitation of governorate's representatives to a central dissemination event could be coupled with local events), critical issues coming out of different studies were linked and monitored closely during the joint annual review, and the necessary next steps to address them were incorporated into MOE and governorate annual work plans. As the disbursement rate is not an indicator of "value for money", the completion of a study is not an indicator of what could be called "value for knowledge".

Sustainability

8.40 **The major institutional reforms** which condition usefulness of capacity building measures in MOE are beyond the education sector and **not close to completion**: progress on civil service reform, implementation of the 2007 procurement law, improvement of PFM reforms, clarification of coordination procedures between MOLA and the line ministries.

8.41 **Individual capacity building** activities are **challenged by both centralised management culture and high turnover of staff**. The Ministry of Education is, in fact, carrying out three steps all at once – capacity building, institutional reform, and implementation of BEDS quality and access activities. Due to the low level of delegation, the few MOE staff in control are exceptionally busy with training workshops and exposure visits to other countries; with committee and task force responsibilities related to institutional reform; and with implementing the expansion and improvement of services related to the access and quality aspects of NBEDS. In the meantime, the high turnover of staff at both central and local levels prevents the increase of drivers of change at central and local levels.

8.42 **Pending greater decentralisation and potential diminution of the role of MOE**. "There is discussion under way about the design of a federal system, to replace the current administrative system, which would abolish Ministries such as the MOE entirely (...) MOE functions will be carried out at the governorate level" (Beatty 2008). This further complicates the current situation and makes it difficult to plan reasonable strategies for capacity development in the education sector at central level.

8.43 **Uncertainty on the long term status of semi-autonomous agencies**. There is no exit strategy for the semi-autonomous agencies. The PWP is looking at changing its name and status to move from a temporary structure to a long term one (Public Works Foundation³³) and is likely to undertake most of the school construction programmes

³³ This is one option described by the current director of PWP during in-country visit for the future of the structure.

externally funded. The SFD has started deploying resources outside school infrastructure programmes to address quality issues as well as those of equitable access. In a hypothetical configuration in which a more decentralised system is set up with the above mentioned agencies as the core central multifunctional structures to deliver social services, the efforts to strengthen MOE at the institutional, organisational and individual levels will not be sustainable.

9 The FTI and Aid Effectiveness

Context before endorsement (2002)

FTI's aid effectiveness goals

9.1 The following goals set out in the FTI Framework document are directly concerned with aid effectiveness:

- *More efficient aid for primary education*, through actions of development partners to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonisation in aid delivery and reduce transactions costs for the FTI recipient countries;
- *Sustained increases in aid for primary education*, where countries demonstrate the ability to utilise it effectively.

The aid landscape in Yemen

9.2 Very little progress had been made with implementing an agenda to improve aid effectiveness in Yemen by 2002. Although reform strategies had been developed in the areas of public finance management and civil service modernisation (addressing some of the main constraints on the ability of the Government of Yemen to use aid) little progress had been made in implementing these. Donor support across all sectors relied on project modes with relatively limited harmonisation and heavy dependence on the use of project implementation units. As discussed in chapter 2 above, Yemen also received low levels of aid in comparison to other countries at a similar level of development but still suffered a consistent problem of difficulties in disbursing the aid that was committed.

9.3 Since 2005 in particular, there has been some progress in improving the general environment for aid in Yemen as international engagement in Yemen has increased along with its perceived geostrategic significance and potential vulnerability to Islamic extremism. This has included some developments in implementing reforms in PFM and civil service modernisation, and an active engagement by Yemen in the international aid effectiveness processes including around the Paris Declaration. This included the signing of a localised version of the Rome Declaration in January 2005 as a framework for partnership arrangements with donors, and an initiative supported by DFID and UNDP to strengthen the role of MOPIC in promoting aid effectiveness through the establishment of an Aid Harmonisation and Alignment Unit to improve information on aid and to provide a focus for the development of agreed approaches to implementing the aid effectiveness agenda.

9.4 These efforts culminated in a substantial increase in aid pledges to Yemen that were made at the London Consultative Group meeting in November 2006, with the Gulf Cooperation Council donors being particularly prominent. However subsequent to this, initiatives to improve aid effectiveness have mainly been at the sectoral level, and no further progress has been made on the development of an overall aid policy. Information on aid patterns since 2006 is incomplete but it does not appear that actual aid disbursements have substantially increased. By 2007, Yemen had only achieved one of the Paris Declaration targets for 2010 (as reviewed in the 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Report). Implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda at the national level appears to have been constrained by several factors including (i) the low in-country presence of donor staff which reflects in part security concerns and has limited the scope for country led and locally managed processes of harmonisation and alignment; (ii) continuing constraints on public administration capacity and a lack of embedding of the aid effectiveness agenda in government in a context where responsibility for different aspects of aid management were shared across different ministries and government bodies; and (iii) the important role of GCC donors who had not participated fully in the aid effectiveness process.

9.5 In the education sector, the National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS) was developed in 2002 to provide the framework for achieving EFA by 2015. However before the FTI process no implementation plan had been developed for NBEDS and no progress had been made either in moving beyond project modes of delivery for aid for education or in providing a framework for mobilising additional donor resources.

9.6 Table 9.1 below shows the main donors providing support to basic education (excluding support from Arab and Islamic funds and banks which are mainly involved in buildings construction).

Table 9.1 Donor and Other External Financing Sources for Basic Education

Donor and other source of financing	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
World Bank – BEEP	12.0	12.0	12.0	3.1	3.1			
World Bank – BEDP			0.3	7.0	15.5	19.0	17.5	5.7
Netherlands – BEDP			0.1	2.5	5.5	6.7	6.2	2.0
UK – BEDP			0.1	2.7	6.0	7.3	6.7	2.2
Germany FC CRES I,II, BEIP I,II, BEDP	2.7	0.4	1.0	10.1	15.6	12.7	1.4	
Netherlands –others	0.8	10.9	7.6	8.0				
Germany BEIP-TC	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.2
Germany FC-TC	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	1.0	0.4		
UK-TA-facility				0.2	0.2			
US – EQUIP1		1.7	3.3	3.3	1.7			
US - Adult Life Skills		0.3	0.7	0.7	0.3			
US - Basic Health & Educ		1.0	1.0	0.5				
WB-FTI CF		10.0	10.0				10.0	10.0
WB-FTI EPDF				0.7	0.4			
Japan	12.8	4.8	0.6	1.2	1.2	0.6		
Unicef	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
WFP	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7
Social Fund for Development Public Works Programme (includes KfW and Netherlands financing)	41.9	28.1	30.6	46.0	30.2	24.0		
Dubai Care through Care International	8.4	20.7	10.6	12.4	13.4	8.7	2.0	
Dubai Care through Care Children						0.5	1.0	1.0
Total	86.5	97.8	86.7	108.0	102.1	87.8	52.6	28.7

Source: Ministry of Education donor database (excludes Arab and Islamic donors for which information is not available).

FTI inputs and activities

9.7 The FTI has built on the foundation provided by NBEDS to provide an implementation plan, results framework and framework for aid provision in support of EFA objectives. The EFA-FTI Credible Plan provided an implementation plan for the period 2003-5, and was followed by the development of the Medium Term Results Framework (MTRF) covering the period 2006–10. The discussion of the EFA-FTI proposal and Credible Plan (2003–2005) in 2002/03 was the first formal dialogue between the Ministry of Education and donors in the sub-sector of basic education. Prior to this all donors were running individual projects and dialogue took place entirely on a bilateral basis with the Ministry of Education.

9.8 Following the acceptance by the international donor community of the Yemeni proposal for EFA-FTI and a subsequent meeting held in Washington in May 2003, a Partnership Declaration was signed in January 2004 between GOY (Ministry of Education and Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation), two public-private agencies (Social Fund for Development and Public Works Projects) and eight partners (four bilateral and four multilateral agencies) to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in supporting BEDS. Both sides committed themselves to setting-up a joint annual review for policy dialogue and monitoring of progress in the sub-sector of basic education.

9.9 The FTI CF grant has directly provided funds to increase total donor support to EFA, focused on underserved rural governorates.

The relevance of the FTI

9.10 The FTI was highly relevant to the improvement of aid effectiveness in Yemen since it highlighted and reinforced the agenda of improving harmonisation and efficiency in the delivery of aid in a context where no progress had been made prior to 2002 in moving beyond a project approach or in establishing a common framework for development partner engagement which could serve as a basis for alignment at any level below that of overall programme goals.

9.11 At several points decisions have been made to proceed with the provision of funds through mechanisms that only partially use government systems though with a high degree of harmonisation (BEDP) or that are not fully harmonised (FTI CF). This has reflected a judgement that seeking to disburse funds through such arrangements was preferable to delaying the provision of funds until country systems had been sufficiently strengthened or in the case of the FTI CF, to avoid further delays that would be caused by full harmonisation with BEDP.

FTI influence on the effectiveness of aid

Influence on ownership

9.12 GOY commitment to EFA through NBEDS appears to have remained strong and the GOY has participated actively in the FTI processes, although most key documents appear to have been drafted by donors or consultants rather than directly by GOY officials.

Influence on alignment

9.13 NBEDS (and the commitment to EFA objectives) provided a structure of goals for alignment but the FTI has played a critical role in providing a framework for practical action. In particular, the FTI endorsement process encouraged movement towards more aligned and coordinated practices amongst donors through:

- Inclusion of all project and programme activities within the NBEDS implementation plan (i.e. EFA-FTI Credible Plan for 2003–2005 and MTRF for 2006–2010);
- Providing a framework for the development of Basic Education Development Project (BEDP) which establishes a joint financing mechanism in which the World Bank, KfW, DFID and Government of the Netherlands have participated;
- Co-financing of projects/programmes using the same procurement, financial management and supervision procedures through the BEDP;
- Better use of technical advisory services and information sharing (including sharing of TOR, and briefing and debriefing during monthly donors meeting);

- Formulation of a more unified process of policy dialogue with the Ministry of Education, especially during the joint annual review.

9.14 These have been important achievements although some donors such as JICA remain outside this framework (although JICA envisages signing the 2009 Partnership Declaration). Others (including USAID and GTZ) operate within the partnership framework but are not participating in the BEDP. While the BEDP has been envisaged as the precursor to a full SWAp there is currently no plan or timetable for the transition to a SWAp. There are also no indications that further major donors may join the sub-sector. The current arrangements for BEDP and SEDGAP are up to respectively 2012 and 2014.

9.15 The BEDP uses country systems to some extent. The implementation concept (based on the previous World Bank's Education Expansion Project) uses World Bank guidelines for procurement with MOE's normal structures responsible for planning and implementation with support on fiduciary matters provided by a Programme Administration Unit, with reporting through Joint Annual Review process set out in the Partnership Declaration. This model was preferred during the design process over moving towards a full SWAp or sector budget support for reasons of Ministry of Education capacity. Beatty 2008 states that

Supporting NBEDS through direct budget support was rejected because the present public finance management, monitoring and audit system was not believed to be sufficiently robust to support this option. Institutional changes to ensure transparent policy based budgeting, resource releases and forward financial planning were planned to be supported under the Institutional Development Component of the project. (Beatty 2008 p3).

9.16 The FTI CF adopted the same implementation arrangements established for the multi-donor funded BEDP. However, it was not merged with it to constitute an expanded BEDP covering an extended number of governorates. This choice was reiterated in the design of each of the three phases with a somewhat different rationale in each case. At the time of CF phase 1 BEDP was not yet fully functioning. CF phase 2 was a replication of phase 1 and it was regarded as simpler to maintain the existing institutional arrangements. For phase 3 more discussion took place and the majority of donors agreed to merge it with BEDP. However, the FTI/ WB management suggested that keeping it as a separate project would be simpler and avoid further delays, given the long delay that already occurred between allocation and effectiveness.

Influence on harmonisation and coordination

9.17 Coordination and harmonisation among donors is aided by the fact that the number of donors engaged in basic education support is small but constrained by the fact that the Gulf donors do not participate in the arrangements. All the other main donors have signed the sectoral Partnership Declaration except for JICA and it is hoped to develop an amended Partnership Declaration by the end of 2009 in which JICA can participate. The United States has signed the Partnership Declaration and is acting as lead donor for the sector although it does not participate in BEDP. A database on education donors has been developed and was presented at the June 2009 donors meeting. However data had not yet been entered in it and currently MOE, PAU and the World Bank all are using their own databases on donor activities.

9.18 Constraints identified on the effectiveness of coordination arrangements included continuing bilateral negotiations by some donors and a reported unwillingness by some donors in "silent partnerships" to fully accept limited visibility. Sectoral comparisons suggested that the education sector lags behind the water sector in terms of progress in harmonisation and coordination but is ahead of the health sector. An additional issue is the

focus of harmonisation on the Ministry of Education while other ministries play a significant role in the sector.

Influence on managing for results

9.19 The FTI has contributed to establishing a common results framework for the EFA through the MTRF for 2006–10. However, the extent to which a management focus on outcomes can be applied is constrained by the quality of monitoring and evaluation information which is discussed in Chapter 7 and there are significant weaknesses in the MTRF.

Influence on mutual accountability

9.20 The Annual Review process has provided a forum to discuss the joint commitments that are set out in the Partnership Declaration as well as more specific issues relating to the performance of government and development partners in delivering on agreed actions and resource provision. However, BEDP is still using a mechanism of reporting through twice yearly donor supervision missions. The FTI has therefore played a role in developing structures and processes of mutual accountability around EFA commitments.

FTI influence on the efficiency of aid

9.21 It is difficult to make an assessment of whether the processes supported by the FTI (for instance the Annual Review process and the BEDP) have contributed significantly to aid efficiency for instance through reducing transactions costs. The harmonisation process has partially but not fully replaced bilateral discussions, since not all donors are within this framework. The Annual Review process may have contributed to improving efficiency in the sector through reducing waste and duplication though specific examples of this have not been identified. The BEDP is envisaged as reducing transactions costs through the use of common procurement and reporting procedures but no estimates are available of the scale of savings envisaged or realised.

9.22 The influence of the FTI on the predictability of aid is also difficult to assess. The more coordinated aid arrangements that the FTI has promoted have allowed greater information sharing and provided an opportunity through the Annual Review process for consideration of issues related to the overall level of aid and its matching to priorities and effective planning, but it is difficult to identify specific examples of how this has affected aid provision. Delays in the process of approving and disbursing the third FTI CF grant reduced the efficiency of the provision of this particular instrument.

Sustainability

9.23 There appears to be continued shared commitment to goals of EFA as set out in NBEDS between the Government of Yemen and its main partners in the sector, although Yemen remains off track to achieve these objectives. There also appears to be continued commitment to the use of the partnership arrangements for the sector that have been developed. However, there are continued constraints to improving aid effectiveness that derive from capacity weaknesses as well as the limited in-country donor presence which is influenced by security concerns which limits donor capacity to engage fully effectively at the in-country level either with government or in harmonisation processes. This may contribute to the unwillingness to move towards greater use of government systems in areas where there is exposure to fiduciary risk. There are no current plans to move towards a SWAp and the information presented in Table 9.1 above as well as in-country discussions suggest that the prospects for increasing aid towards achieving EFA are not strong, with levels of aid recorded for basic education appearing to continue to fall from their 2006 peak.

10 Cross-Cutting Issues

Context before FTI endorsement (2002)

Gender Issues

10.1 Yemen faced the highest gender gap in the world in terms of access, retention and completion in basic education. Most of the out-of-schools children were girls and girls were under represented at all levels of education. The 1998/99 comprehensive school survey (CSS) estimated that the gross enrolment rate was 42% only for girls against 80% for boys in basic education, 16% against 31% in secondary education and 4% against 9% at the university.

10.2 Female literacy was low especially in rural areas (the youth literacy rate was below 20% for rural female in 2000). Social norms, traditional rules and values, early marriages and pregnancies (no legal minimum age for marriage) contributed to inhibit the engagement of women in the labour force.

10.3 The 1998/99 CSS indicated that female teachers accounted for only 24% of total teachers and the shortage of female teachers is particularly acute in rural areas where less than one third of total female teachers work. In the MOE and its peripheral branches (GEOs and DEOs) the domination of male employees is significant with most of the female being secretaries, typists and cleaners (Kefaya 2007).

Fragility Issues

10.4 At the time of the FTI endorsement and subsequently Yemen has been regarded as a "fragile state" according to some criteria.³⁴ As described in chapter 2, it suffered a civil war during the early 1990s and capacity weaknesses within the civil service have reflected the use of civil service employment as a source of patronage and the decision not to undertake major restructuring of the civil service following reunification, for political reasons. State control, and in some cases legitimacy, is contested both through armed rebellions in parts of the country and through the power of traditional and tribal authorities. These features imply constraints on the effectiveness of government service delivery (including potentially in education). A further dimension of fragility is exposure to risks. In Yemen these risks include terrorism related to Islamic radicalism (which has contributed to a number of donors reducing staffs or restricting their activities because of security concerns), the fiscal risks faced because of the exhaustion of oil reserves, and increasing pressures on the environment notably water.

FTI inputs and activities

Gender Issues

10.5 **FTI proposal and endorsement.** The EFA-FTI credible plan (2003–2005) recognised that Yemen presented the highest gender gap in basic education in the world providing available data disaggregated by gender. The proposal made clear that UPC/EFA goals won't be achieved without significant focus and improvement of girls' access and retention in basic education schools and suggested traditional supply side strategies to address the challenges (awareness campaign on the importance of girls' education, provision of girls' friendly school infrastructure, supply of female teachers in rural areas).

³⁴ For example in the Fragile States Index 2008 produced by the journal Foreign Policy (which emphasises risks of state failure) Yemen was rated the 18th most fragile state. Its position has risen from 21st and 24th in the two previous years.

10.6 The joint assessment of the Yemen proposal by the local donor group and the FTI Secretariat acknowledged such effort. Nevertheless it criticised some suggested supply side strategies (e.g. provision of houses for female teachers in rural areas due to past unsuccessful experience in other countries) and called for more emphasis on demand-side policies to address the vicious circle existing between poverty, rural residence and low educational opportunity (see Box 10.1).

Box 10.1 The Joint Assessment of the Yemen Proposal regarding coverage of girls' education

► **General comments**

Republic of Yemen has one of the largest gender disparities in primary school. It will almost certainly not reach the 2005 gender equity goal. Given this, there is a need for the Proposal to provide considerable specificity and purpose on actions to reduce gender disparities and establish benchmark targets for progress. The Proposal is laudable in that considerable attention is focused on existing gender disparities and because some targets and numerous strategies for redressing the disparities were identified in the proposal.

► **Strengths**

- Acknowledges that significant inequality exist between boys and girls and provides useful data to illustrate this.
- Sets clear goals and objectives for improving gender equity: increasing girls' enrolment rate at the primary level to 65% by 2005; raise primary completion rates for girls from 33% to 45% in 2005.
- Proposes clear strategies for dealing with gender inequality: increase awareness of the importance of girls' education; supply rural areas with female teachers through provision of teachers' housing make schools more attractive to girls by improving school infrastructure and attracting supportive donor assistance reducing the direct and indirect costs of education.

► **Concerns**

- Results Framework for the Evaluation of EFA (a) does not specify target reductions in the dropout rate and does not do this by gender; (b) fails to specify a target PCR for girls and for rural girls in 2005 and 2015; and (c) includes only the rather modest gender goal of gender parity in first grade by 2010.
- Fails to acknowledge that an inter-relationship exist between poverty, rural residence and low educational opportunities.
- Strategy for dealing with gender inequality is mainly supply side which is a relative concern. Supply side responses like awareness campaign are ineffective in raising girl's educational performance. More emphasis is needed on the demand side strategies.
- Proposal stresses that in a bid to provide more female teachers it will provide and furnish houses for female teachers. This has been experienced in many countries as an unsuccessful approach; high cost and low success. The chances are it will be the same in Yemen.

Source: LDG and FTI 2003

10.7 The **FTI CF grant phases 1, 2 and 3** identified and/or implemented **supply-side activities** (i.e. provision of schools and teachers) to address the gender gap in the targeted underserved governorates. The **FTI CF grant phases 1 and 2** addressed girls access in four governorates to schools through provision of classrooms in remote rural areas (long distances, unsafe roads create threats to school going girls' reputation and security) and/or improvement of school environment to be supportive of girls and acceptable to their families (toilets, wall etc.). While the FTI CF grant phase 1 had identified the provision of houses for female teachers in rural areas, such activity was not implemented due to negative comments made during the joint assessment of Yemen proposal (see above). But the construction of an equipped female teacher institute with six classrooms was completed in Shabwa but not immediately used.

10.8 The **FTI CF grant phase 3** (2009–2011) plans to support the policy of the government which now intends to employ girls with some education, who are from the village, and train them so that they can begin to provide a key input to the delivery of education in rural areas.

In many instances, girls are teaching on a volunteer basis because they do not qualify to be teachers or because there is a shortage of funds to finance their expenditures. The FTI CF **grant phase 3 will contract in the seven selected governorates about 500 volunteer female teachers in rural districts/areas** (intake from secondary school graduates with good pass rates). They will receive annual training in order to be qualified at the end of the phase 3 implementation period to be employed by the civil service (agreement signed between MOE, MOF and MCS).

10.9 The **FTI EPDF** supported studies looked at i) providing evidence on gender gap along the education system in terms of access, retention and completion as well as performance of girls in learning achievements tests (e.g. TIMSS); ii) identifying cultural, social and economic reasons underlying such significant differences; iii) highlighting individual and social benefit of women literacy (e.g. Education CSR); and iv) designing policies and strategies to address some of the issues (e.g. Support to National General Secondary Education Strategy, evaluation of short term effect of school fees abolition for girls, design of conditional cash transfer mechanism).

Fragility Issues

10.10 The main link between Yemen's "fragile" context and FTI activities has related to the diagnosis of Yemen as under-aided that provided part of the rationale for the FTI CF. This reflects a general concern reflected also in the World Bank's LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress) initiative that mainstream aid instruments and practices were not well-suited to engagement in countries with weak capacity and facing other dimensions of fragility (particularly those that were not accorded geostrategic significance by major donors) and that consequently many became "aid orphans."

10.11 Dom (2008) notes that the FTI Action Plan in 2002 does not mention state fragility and that is only since 2005 that the FTI has been explicitly examining issues related to state fragility through its analytical work as part of a widening international concern with the problems of fragile states (including the particularly severe problem of children out-of-school in them), including through development in 2006 of the "Progressive Framework" that was envisaged as suitable for assisting countries committed to EFA but with very weak capacity to move towards the Indicative Framework. This and subsequent initiatives do not, however, appear to have influenced the FTI in Yemen.

Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability

Gender Issues

10.12 **Relevance.** Improvement in girl's education (access, retention and completion of basic education) is a necessary condition for achievement of the MDGs and EFA goals in Yemen. The FTI proposal and endorsement processes were therefore highly relevant in advocating for systematic disaggregation of indicators by gender and focusing on potential strategies to address both supply-side and demand-side constraints. However it must be recognised that some factors inhibiting girls' education in the rural society of Yemen are deeply embedded in social norms, traditional values and rules which are beyond the sole leverage of the education sector (e.g. perception of girls that early marriage is considered desirable and men acting as gate keepers – in keeping with social norms and expectations). The unfavourable economic environment (prospects for decent work is currently limited) often reinforced the socio-cultural tendencies. All these factors have contributed to the low progress registered in gender equality and women empowerment over the past decade (see Chapter 3).

10.13 Effectiveness. On a small scale, the FTI CF grant phases 1, 2 contributed to provide in underserved governorates/districts adequate infrastructures to reduce distance to schools in mountainous rural areas. The FTI CF grant phase 3 has targeted a complementary measure on contracting female teachers to satisfy social expectations for girls. The provision of school kits also contributed to value access to schools for girls. The FTI EPDF supported studies helped provide evidence on the persistence of gender gap, relevance of demand-side policies and social benefits of female literacy. The FTI EPDF also contributed to help design the conditional cash transfer scheme to benefit to a sample of rural girls enrolled in grades 4–9 (see Box 5.2).

10.14 Efficiency. The linkages of FTI supported activities through the CF or the EPDF with other government and donors funded activities in the area of girl's education was perceived by most of the interviewees as efficient. As an example the FTI CF grant phase 3 will help scale-up the female teacher scheme in rural areas already supported by bilateral and multilateral donors in other governorates/districts. The FTI EPDF supported studies consolidated evidence on what works and what doesn't for girl's education related policies.

10.15 Sustainability. The promising policies to satisfy adequate provision of female teachers in rural areas and to provide cash transfer to rural girls are so far at a piloting stage and are highly donor dependant. Their scaling-up nation-wide might be financially unsustainable given unfavourable medium term economic outlook (see Chapter 5).

Fragility Issues

10.16 Relevance. Major issues for achieving EFA in Yemen are weak capacity that is related to governance concerns and exposure to risks (of conflict and of long-term fiscal difficulties).

10.17 Effectiveness. The various aspects of the fragile context have constrained the effectiveness of government programmes and donor support but the EFA-FTI activities have not directly addressed fragility issues.

10.18 Efficiency. Security concerns have contributed to a relatively limited donor in-country presence which has constrained donor engagement.

10.19 Sustainability. Yemen's context remains highly fragile in a number of dimensions and although overall capacity (as measured for instance by the World Bank CPIA) has improved over the period since 2002, vulnerability to conflict and fiscal vulnerabilities appear to have worsened.

PART D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11 Conclusions

Introduction

11.1 This chapter first gives the evaluation team's overall assessments for Yemen against each of the main high level questions. It then provides the country evaluation team's findings and conclusions for each stream of analysis, against the principal DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

The high level evaluation questions

Was what the FTI aimed to accomplish (in 2002) consistent with needs and priorities of Yemen?

11.2 Overall the FTI's aims were **consistent with the needs and priorities of Yemen in 2002**. Firstly, the country was **far from reaching EFA, MDGs, UPC and GPI goals** at the time of the FTI endorsement in March 2003. Yemen was lagging behind and struggling with each of EFA goals. Yemen had one of the worst school enrolment, retention, completion and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls and women. The GER in basic education was estimated at 42% for girls in 1998/99 and rural female adult literacy rate at 20%. Yemen ranked at the bottom for gender gap. There were also important issues regarding the quality of lower basic education with low levels of learning achievements from those who had completed primary. The focus on access, gender and quality of primary education was highly relevant.

11.3 Secondly, Yemen was a country where the selected resource mobilisation and education policy parameters in the **FTI Indicative Framework** were close to the benchmarks: the allocation to education sector as a whole (inter-sector trade-off) or to primary education (intra-sector trade-off) was higher in percentage of GDP than the FTI's benchmark; the teacher salaries as a multiple of per capita GDP and non teacher salaries as percentage of total recurrent expenditure were roughly equivalent to the FTI's benchmarks and the pupil teacher ratio or repetition rates were lower than the FTI's benchmarks. Yet the FTI Indicative Framework did not highlight **key policy gaps in Yemen** linked to: i) very low efficiency in the use of resources; ii) significant higher unit costs as a percentage of per capita GDP in the delivery of education services than in other countries (18.5% against 12% in average); and iii) significant demand-side constraints (both economic and social) for access and retention in schools. It would have been more relevant if it had done so.

11.4 Thirdly, there were no sufficient reliable **data** available nor a culture of calculation of indicators to measure trends in education indicators to cover all EFA goals, and **M&E** was not recognised as a critical function to be performed by public administration. Since the reunification of the country and the restructuring of the basic education system, only one comprehensive school survey had been undertaken in 1998/99 and national examinations were not covering the lower basic education cycle any more. The lack of evidence on performances and potential explanatory factors contributed to hamper adequate remedial policy measures. The focus on filling data gap and institutionalisation of M&E systems with manageable set of indicators were highly relevant to help the country move towards a results-based approach.

11.5 Fourthly, Yemen was an obvious candidate for the FTI in the area of **capacity** development. There were very low capacities in the public administration established as a social safety net system rather than tasked to delivery equitable education services across the territory. There was also a very low knowledge of what works and what doesn't work in education due to past isolation of the country and very few opportunities of participation of

high level senior management staff in international or regional knowledge sharing events. However, it was **ambitious to expect to make a significant difference** in this area before high level capacity development issues were tackled (e.g. civil service modernisation, public financial management, procurement, decentralisation reforms). The **trade-off between speedy delivery of education services and long-term capacity development** in the education sector was a critical issue in Yemen not sufficiently taken into consideration. In 2002, the FTI was short of proposals to address sequencing and modalities of Capacity Development (CD) support while suggesting transitional ways to ensure effective delivery of services in a fragile state like Yemen.

11.6 Finally, **primary education sub-sector in Yemen was a severely under-funded and under-aided (small pool of donors)**. The potential catalytic effect of the FTI label for leveraging domestic and existing international resources as well as attracting new multilateral and bilateral partners was therefore highly relevant. The initial idea of setting-up a financial mechanism (i.e. "donor orphan clause" of the FTI CF) to ensure that the FTI could play the role of last resort donor made sense in the case of Yemen in 2002. The promotion of better **alignment, coordination and harmonisation of aid modalities** was also relevant in a context marked by bilateral negotiations with education authorities at central or local levels to run individual projects on donor's oriented priorities.

To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, accelerating progress on EFA?

11.7 The main approaches and policies to achieve EFA were significantly deepened during i) the design and endorsement processes of the FTI proposal; ii) the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the FTI CF priority programmes; and iii) the policy studies and related knowledge sharing events supported by the FTI EPDF.

11.8 The FTI supported nascent government education policies in the sub-sector of basic education formalised in 2002 in the National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS) and had a significant catalytic effect on policy discussions for lower basic education (grades 1–6). Coincidentally, the preparation of the FTI proposal in 2002/03 was used to foster the development of the first medium term implementation plan of BEDS. The **EFA-FTI Credible Plan for 2003–05** became *de facto* the **road map** for both the government and the development partners to **implement NBEDS**. The objectives of the FTI Indicative Framework were then integrated into the sub-sector plan.

11.9 The EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003–2005 put considerable attention on existing gender disparities and proposed some targets and strategies for redressing the disparities.

11.10 The **FTI CF support** has been (and will be for phase 3) implemented in seven targeted populous governorates accounting for the majority of out-of-school children. It was aligned to a priority programme within the medium-term implementation plan of NBEDS. It tackled supply-side constraints in the most underserved rural areas where high distance to schools and lack of teachers (including female teachers) formed the principal reasons for non-enrolment or low retention in schools, especially for girls as indicated by data from 2005 Household Budget Survey.

11.11 The FTI CF support has been successfully implemented at governorate/district levels demonstrating the workable arrangements associating a programme administrative unit (PAU) and MOE/GEOs/DEOs for an effective delivery of education services in the most underserved rural areas of targeted governorates.

11.12 The FTI CF has been allocated in phases 1 and 2 to capital costs (low cost school construction) and non-salary recurrent expenditure (mainly school kits to pupils, teacher training for foundation grades 1–3, equipment and training for school supervisors). It will

support salary costs for 500 female teachers during phase 3 before the Ministry of Civil Service /Ministry of Finance take over in 2011 following an agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

11.13 The specific impact of the FTI CF supported activities in targeted districts/governorates were difficult to measure due to lack of baseline and reliable data at decentralised levels.

11.14 The **FTI EPDF resources** (estimated at USD 1.885 million) have been extensively used by the World Bank to **fill the knowledge gap** in a variety of education policy related areas.

11.15 The use of the FTI EPDF resources helped: i) gather evidence on education system performances, providing a foundation for a more coordinated and integrated education vision across levels and types of education (e.g. Education CSR and student learning achievements such as TIMSS); ii) support finalisation of sub-sector strategy (e.g. National General Secondary Education Strategy) which prepared the ground for the alignment of the multi-donor funded programme for secondary education; iii) disseminate knowledge on effects of policy options (e.g. study on demand and supply-side impacts of school fee abolition); iv) design implementation arrangements of policy reform in priority areas (e.g. development of an operational pilot conditional cash transfer scheme); and v) link education expenditure with educational services delivery (e.g. support to education budget reform).

11.16 Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the FTI contributed significantly to fast track progress on EFA. **Progress has been slow between 2002 and 2009 and Yemen is unlikely to meet any of the EFA goals by 2015.** Although enrolments in primary education have increased from 2.2 million in 1997 to 3.3 million in 2007, and gross enrolment rate in basic education shifted from 62% to 74% over the same period, the primary completion rate (equivalent to the first six years of basic education in Yemen) is low at 60% in 2007, 70% for boys and 49% for girls. There were still 1.8 million children of basic school age out-of-school in 2005. Learning achievements of primary graduates are still low in international assessments (94% of 4th grade Yemeni students scored below the "low" benchmark of performance for mathematics and 92% scored below the "low" benchmark for science in 2007 TIMSS exercise). The high population growth rate counteracted the improvement in Yemen with an increase in the absolute number of adult illiterate.

Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?

11.17 The FTI endorsement in 2003 initially positively influenced the **level of external financing** to Basic Education development Strategy (BEDS) both directly through the FTI Catalytic Fund and indirectly through leverage of existing resources and attraction of new donors. However although available data are incomplete it appears that donor support for Basic Education peaked in 2006 and has been falling subsequently.

11.18 Domestic financing of basic education has been growing in real terms through the period since the FTI endorsement. However the share of basic education in total education expenditure and as a share of GDP has been falling. There is a large and widening financing gap measured relative to the objective of achieving EFA targets by 2015. This is in a context where Yemen faces medium- to long-term questions about the sustainability of public finances as oil reserves are exhausted.

11.19 The endorsement of a three year implementation plan subsequently led to the **deal to allocate to Yemen three successive grants from the Catalytic Fund over the**

2004-2006 period without calling for the re-engagement in a full endorsement process each time.

11.20 The **FTI CF grants** (a cumulative amount of USD 40 million) have made a contribution to **filling the financing gap** identified in NBEDS implementation plan (e.g. around 10% for phase 3).

11.21 The FTI Catalytic Fund has **increased the funds available to the Ministry of Education** for 2004/05 (USD 10m), 2006/07 (USD 10m) and 2009/11 (USD 20m). However, the implementation of the grants was increasingly delayed: one year for phase 1 (allocation in 2003 against an implementation in 2004/05); two years for phase 2 (allocation in 2004 against an implementation in 2006/07) and finally three years for phase 3 (allocation in 2006 against an implementation planned for the second half of 2009 up to 2011). While the preparation of a priority programme and of implementation mechanisms were identified to explain delays in phase 1 (which mechanically affected phase 2), the new unclear rules attached to process the grant from the expanded Catalytic Fund were blamed for phase 3.

11.22 In 2003, the World Bank was preparing the second phase of its Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP II). After the endorsement of the EFA-FTI credible Plan (2003-2005), BEEP II became the **Basic Education Development Project (BEDP)** co-financed by DFID, the Netherlands, KfW and the World Bank (**USD 150 m**). Other bilateral partners declared to have reinforced or initiated projects based on the FTI endorsement of Yemen (respectively GTZ and USAID).

11.23 The **aid effectiveness agenda** in the basic education sub-sector appears to be clearly an output of the FTI process as it was initiated during a FTI meeting in Washington between GOY and donors in May 2003.

11.24 The **MOU** on BEDS was signed in January 2004 by four bilateral (France, Germany, The Netherlands, and DFID) and four multilateral agencies (ILO, Unicef, WFP and World Bank) and renegotiated in July 2007 (with the addition of USAID and the withdrawal of France) with the addition of TORs for the donor co-ordinator.

11.25 The **aid modalities** in the education sector (basic and secondary) **shifted from individual projects** running by independent project implementation units (PIUs) to **co-financed programmes** sharing the same procurement, financial and supervision procedures –aligned to those of the World Bank – under the auspices of a programme administrative unit (PAU).

11.26 The FTI CF has not been merged into the existing multi-donor funded BEDP and was seen as an "independent project". While it used the same institutional arrangements established for BEDP for implementation and supervision, there is a specific reporting system for the FTI CF which includes the FTI Indicative Framework.

11.27 The **education partners do not use government systems** in Yemen and therefore the FTI Catalytic Fund has not increased the World Bank's alignment to the government systems.

Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability

11.28 **Education Policy and Planning.** The influence of the FTI was discernible in the **approach to planning at various levels**. The EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003–2005) process is credited with having contributed substantially to sharpening policies and plan for lower basic education in the medium term. The FTI proposal was not seen as a separate plan but rather as a mean to make the NBEDS and its concomitant implementation and investment plan operational. The Medium Term Result Framework (2006–2010) updated the former

EFA-FTI credible plan (2003–2005) and expanded it to include early childhood, adult literacy and secondary education.

11.29 The FTI CF grant planning process introduced short term planning and the definition of priority programmes at a time (2003/04) where no annual work plans (AWP) were available at the MOE level. The AWP with cost estimates, implementation responsibilities and time frame have only been introduced in 2007.

11.30 The FTI EPDF helped finalise the National General Secondary Education Strategy to prepare the ground for the second multi-donor funded project in the education sector (Secondary Education Development and Girls Access Project).

11.31 Through the support to the education country status report the FTI EPDF has also initiated the process of an integrated education sector vision associating the three ministries in charge of education (MOE, MOTEVT and MOHESR) in order to pay attention to linkages across levels and types of education and training. Such process will receive further support from the EPDF in the forthcoming year.

11.32 The design of the FTI CF grant phase 3 has pioneered an agreement between Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service for the contract of 500 female teachers after the completion of the programme. Given the power and authority of these ministries for basic education provision, their inclusion in policy decision was highly relevant.

11.33 The influence of the FTI was also discernible in **the approach to policies to achieve UPC/EFA**. The FTI endorsement process focused on gender and reviewed suggested strategies to tackle gender inequalities in light of the lessons learnt from other countries experiences (see FTI and cross cutting issues below).

11.34 The FTI CF support was used to tackle supply-side constraints in remote rural areas where distances to schools were the principal reason for non-enrolment: the school construction programme provided multi-grade classes or a block of three classes to accommodate for foundation grades (1–3). The FTI CF also expanded governorate-wide cluster based teacher trainings, a model successfully developed and tested for teacher in-service training by the GTZ-supported BEIP project and later adopted country-wide by the MOE.

11.35 While the abolition of school fees for girls in grades 1–6 and boys in grades 1–3 (decided in September 2007) was made independently of the FTI, the FTI EPDF supported an impact study of this measure and contributed to enlarge the policy dialogue on the full indirect costs supported by poor families (which represent the real economic barrier to schools).

11.36 The FTI EPDF helped design a conditional cash transfer mechanism, major reform to address demand side constraints to retention in and completion of basic education. The scheme is currently piloted through the multi-donor funded BEDP.

11.37 The basic and secondary education sub-sectors are becoming more donor dependant. The on-going BEDP and just started SEDGAP are seen as the main channels to implement education reforms respectively in basic and secondary education. The sustainability of key promising education reforms piloted through multi-donor funded programmes to address both supply and demand side constraints in access and retention (respectively the female teacher scheme and the conditional cash transfer scheme) is questionable following recent economic downturn and pessimistic prospects on domestic

resource mobilisation (fiscal space is highly dependent on diminishing and volatile oil resources)

11.38 Financing of Education. The development of a financing model and the provision of additional finance through the FTI CF, as well as the process of developing an agreed results framework for the NBEDS, were relevant to the problems facing education finance in Yemen. The FTI CF resources were focused on priorities in relation to improving educational access in underserved rural areas. This was directly relevant to immediate priorities but the approach did not address longer-term capacity issues. However, the FTI in Yemen has not specifically focused on the longer term sustainability issues facing public finances in Yemen and their possible implications for education financing.

11.39 Although information is incomplete, donor support to basic education appears to have increased following the FTI endorsement (including directly through the FTI CF) peaking in 2006. Subsequently donor support has fallen and prospects for further increases in donor support do not appear to be strong. It does not appear that decisions by new donors to engage in the sector were significantly influenced by the FTI.

11.40 The EFA-FTI has not contributed to a solution to the long-term financing issues facing the sector in the context of the exhaustion of oil reserves. Prospects for increased donor support to basic education are not regarded as strong. A financing model developed by the World Bank has been used in support of each FTI CF request but the model has not been incorporated into Ministry of Education planning processes.

11.41 The EFA-CF has provided funds that have contributed to reducing the financing gap for basic education but EFA-CF funding represents only around 1% of basic education expenditure and it does not appear to have had a "catalytic" effect on funding.

11.42 There have been some improvements in the efficiency of basic education spending. These however do not appear to be related to the EFA-FTI specifically though the Annual Review process and improved donor harmonisation around the NBEDS may have contributed to a greater focus on these issues. The FTI CF resources have been used in line with what they were assigned for with a focus on non-salary support (and in phase 3 on support to the female teachers scheme). However, delays in agreement and disbursement of the FTI CF grant 3 have impacted on aid predictability.

11.43 Data and M&E. There are **structural issues that affect data**: i) limited geographical breakdown of population data (huge challenge to get baseline data and measure outcomes at governorate and district levels); ii) low prevalence of birth registration making age data not accurate in administrative record or household surveys (unreliability of cohort projections); and iii) no official population data projections (pressure from school age population growth on the capacity of the education system difficult to anticipate).

11.44 The management of information is weak : i) school administrative data are housed in three different competing departments within MOE (planning and statistics, EMIS, school mapping) and databases are not reconcilable; ii) annual education statistics collection (Annual School Survey) remains very weak with wild fluctuation between years; iii) data accuracy and consistency is a persistent issue as there is no systematic cross-checking mechanism put in place (only the 1998/99 and 2004/05 school surveys are credited "credible" by donors); iv) there is no functional national assessment system to measure student learning outcomes and changes in quality over time (the national examinations at the 12th grade and the governorate examinations at the 9th grade are assessed not analysable due to issues of data reliability and reporting); and v) data on the financing of education are not comprehensive (donors' contribution not systematically included) or produced in a timely manner.

11.45 The **demand for timely data** from policy makers in the education sector is still low and the real recipients and users of information are outside agencies and donors.

11.46 The **monitoring and evaluation frameworks** are weak at all levels: i) the monitoring of the Development Plan and Poverty Reduction (DPPR) selected 10 indicators to cover the education sector but the MDG n°2 (i.e. PCR) is not part of them; ii) there is no integrated M&E framework for the education sector agreed between MOE, MOTEVT and MOHESR; and iii) the basic education sub-sector was supposed to be monitored during the Joint Annual Review (JAR) of BEDS but the progress reports have not been developed in a comprehensive way to measure progress against targets.

11.47 While the **FTI Indicative framework** indicators were collected and discussed among stakeholders in 2002/03 – in this manner establishing a baseline which was presented in the FTI credible Plan 2003–2005 – these indicators were only reviewed during the supervision of the "FTI CF project" and were not used as a benchmark against which to report progress during joint annual reviews. This was an opportunity lost for high level policy dialogue.

11.48 The **FTI appraisal** mentioned "some internal inconsistency in the use of indicators and targets" in the proposal and asked for the indicators to be "disaggregated to gender where appropriate" but was not used to highlight the country's "data gap" and therefore did not set out areas for improvement in M&E.

11.49 There have been **abundant donor driven plan and fragmented capacity building activities in the area** of data collection, treatment and analysis at both central and local levels (all donors funded projects have a capacity building component linked to EMIS) but without clear impact nation-wide.

11.50 The **FTI CF support equally included capacity building activities** on data collection during phases 1 and 2 in the first four targeted governorates but the effect on the quality of data collected during subsequent annual schools surveys was not assessed.

11.51 The **FTI EPDF supported studies** attempted to fill the knowledge gap and to provide a set of evidence on the performances of the education system (especially on learning achievements through participation of Yemen in TIMSS exercise) to ensure that data and indicators would be more systematically used to inform decision making. However, the Education CSR highlighting main findings of a series of background papers has just been completed and it is too early to see how such evidence will be used in the future by the three ministries in charge of education.

11.52 **Capacity Development.** The capacity development issues inherent to the **governance and management of the public sector** in Yemen affect the effective delivery of education services at all levels. The high level CD issues have started to be addressed through the following initiatives: programme for modernisation of the civil service, public financial management reform, new law on procurement and a strategic vision for the local authorities.

11.53 Upon endorsing the **FTI proposal**, donors were concerned by the proposal being "overly ambitious given the current capacities in the sector" and suggested to "built the capacity throughout the country in a phased manner, by prioritising capacity building interventions at all levels within one governorate at the time".

11.54 There were **no institutional development and technical assistance plans** developed by the MOE to tackle CD issues emphasised during the early phase of the FTI.

The basic education sub-sector mainly relied upon projects and programmes implemented by DPs, decentralisation process and community participation.

11.55 The **responses of donors** to CD issues were as follow: i) choice of project implementation units (like Public Works Projects for civil works under forthcoming FTI CF grant phase 3) or programme administrative unit to directly implement or administer external resources devoted to education; ii) provision of direct support to public-private agencies like Social Fund for Development; iii) commission of numerous capacity assessment studies at central and local levels; iv) systematic inclusion of capacity building activities in the districts/governorates selected to benefit from externally funded interventions; and v) support to a restructuring and modernisation task force within MOE (full time TA) in charge of shifting the direction of the activities implemented in basic and secondary education from "engineering inputs" to "engineering for results".

11.56 No evidence was found that the **FTI capacity development guidelines** have been disseminated, discussed or used in Yemen. While GTZ was leading the FTI task team on capacity development at the international level, the subsequent FTI tool appeared to be unknown by GTZ staff at local level.³⁵

11.57 The **FTI CF** has **not contributed to strengthening national procurement and financial management systems** as they have not been used (this echoes the common practice of donors in Yemen which do not use the government systems). Nevertheless, training in World Bank procedures seemed to have been sufficient to handle the implementation of priority programmes supported by the CF. On the other hand, the FTI CF resources were implemented by the MOE at central and local levels and reinforce the capacities of MOE in the management of large scale trainings for school teachers, managers and supervisors and those of GEOs and DEOs in the area of civil works. While the FTI CF were also used to train GEOs and DEOs staff in planning and statistics, the durable impact of these limited inputs is difficult to assess.

11.58 The **FTI EPDF** contributed to the development of institutional capacity in the area of **student's learning assessment** through co-financing of Yemen's participation in TIMSS exercise. The resources were also used for a variety of other capacity building activities (e.g. workshop on education statistics and indicators) and complemented activities supported by other bilateral sources with no evidence of clear value added. It is too early to identify institutional changes in Yemen's capacity for **analysis and greater use of evidence** in policy making and implementation. The analytical studies financed by EPDF were carried out by external consultants (some Yemeni). The sharing of findings at central level (e.g. workshops on school fee abolition or education CSR) represents a modest stage for building knowledge and rationalising policy decisions in education.

11.59 **Aid Effectiveness.** The FTI was highly relevant since it highlighted and reinforced the aid effectiveness agenda and helped to maintain impetus towards EFA, and played a critical role in developing a results and management framework for partnership in basic education.

11.60 Ownership of NBEDS appears to remain strong and the signing of the Partnership Declaration in January 2004 to support implementation of NBEDS including establishment of a joint review process. The FTI has therefore provided a framework and management processes to encourage the alignment of aid on agreed priorities and for harmonisation between development partners. The Annual Review process has provided a framework for mutual accountability between the Government of Yemen and development partners. The

³⁵ However, it is worth noted that at the time of the country visit, a completely new GTZ-team was still in the process of orientation/on-the-job training.

MTRF provides a common results framework that harmonisation processes encouraged by the EFA-FTI have continued to reinforce although the MTRF has significant weaknesses.

11.61 However, the FTI has not led to any substantial increase in alignment on the use of government systems. BEDP is envisaged as the precursor to a SWAp but there is no plan as to how the transition to a SWAp will be accomplished. Delays in the process of approving the FTI CF grant reduced the efficiency of the provision of this aid and the harmonisation process around BEDP has not fully replaced bilateral discussions and so it is not clear that transactions costs for aid have been reduced.

11.62 There appears to be continued shared commitment to the goals of the NBEDS (though Yemen remains off track to achieve these objectives) and to the use of the partnership arrangements that have been developed. However, there are continued constraints to improving aid effectiveness that derive from weak capacity in government systems and the limited in-country donor presence (influenced by security concerns). The prospects for sustained aid to enable a better performance in achieving EFA targets remain uncertain and there are no current plans for the envisaged move towards a SWAp for the sector.

11.63 **Gender** issues were already incorporated into NBEDS in 2002 and were at the heart of the policy dialogue during the FTI proposal and endorsement processes. In fact, the EFA-FTI credible Plan (2003–2005) was specifically assessed regarding coverage and treatment of girls' education. The main concern was that the suggested strategy for dealing with gender inequality was mainly supply side.

11.64 Some activities initially planned to be financed under the FTI CF resources (e.g. houses for female teachers) were then abandoned but no more emphasis was given to demand side strategies as the implementation period for CF (one year) was seen too short to put in place relevant mechanisms. The conditional cash transfer scheme was designed using the FTI EPDF resources and is currently piloted through the multi-donor funded BEDP.

11.65 Available statistics are disaggregated by gender. The value of the gender specific EFA index improved by 32% in relative terms between 1999 and 2006 but Yemen is still ranked 127 out of 129 just in front of Niger and Chad in 2006.

11.66 **Fragility Issues.** Yemen has been classified as a "fragile state" in relation to a number of factors including weak capacity reflecting the use of the civil service for patronage purposes, ongoing armed opposition to the government, insecurity and vulnerability to risks. Other than the selection of Yemen to receive Catalytic Fund resources (reflecting a concern that Yemen was under-aided as a number of fragile states have been judged to be) Yemen's particular aspects of fragility do not appear to have influenced the design of FTI engagement. The various aspects of the fragile context have constrained the effectiveness of government programmes and donor support but the EFA-FTI activities have not directly addressed fragility issues. Security concerns have contributed to a relatively limited donor in-country presence which has constrained donor engagement.

11.67 Annex H summarises the country evaluation team's findings and conclusions, overall and for each stream of analysis, against the principal DAC evaluation criteria.

12 Recommendations and Reflections for the Overall Evaluation

12.1 The core objective of FTI needs to be clear where there are trade-offs between short-term delivery and long-term capacity development objectives. The balance between delivering services quickly and building capacity for the longer term is a real tension in countries such as Yemen where basic education has been relatively well funded but there are systematic institutional constraints on the ability of government and the education system to use resources effectively and large long-term issues about fiscal sustainability. The implementation of the FTI in Yemen appears not to have been driven by a clear strategic vision as to what extent it is seeking to fill a short-term funding gap (which is largely how the CF appears to have been used) as opposed to supporting a longer term process to address the underlying problems of capacity constraints and long-term fiscal sustainability. Clarity of purpose is vital if the FTI is to have impact.

12.2 The emphasis on capacity building needs to be understood and accepted by all partners. Capacity building in countries where system wide reform is being undertaken only slowly (and where the political context makes civil service reform a sensitive issue) is an uphill struggle. The FTI as it currently stands focuses on the existence of political will and commitment to reform merely within the education sector as a precondition for success. In Yemen, many of the key blockages lie outside the sector in particular the issue of long-term fiscal sustainability, and weaknesses within the civil service system that reflect its role as an instrument of patronage within a political system that is vulnerable to a range of threats and challenges to the government's legitimacy and control. Without sustained progress in the broader reform agenda – particularly civil service and public financial management reform – faster progress and the impact of the FTI will be undermined. In such a context, the FTI needs to be used as a platform for dialogue that goes beyond the education sector since EFA goals cannot be achieved by a focus of action on the education sector alone. In Yemen, in-country donors should utilise the FTI as a platform to have this dialogue at higher levels more consistently building on progress that has already been made.

12.3 The FTI CF should be used for both a demonstration effect for whole system reform and be adequately concentrated and focussed if it is to have an impact beyond short-term financing gap filling. In Yemen, given the challenges and the context, the FTI CF would have had a greater impact in relation to potential long-term sustainability if the total resources had been concentrated on one area – for example piloting on a significant scale capitation grants to schools – rather than replicating all existing areas of projects in different governorates provided that this was done in a way that was explicitly designed to generate replicable and innovative approaches that could then be mainstreamed. A key recommendation for future CF support in Yemen is to ensure real value added of financing.

12.4 The importance of ensuring that elements of the FTI compact (e.g. demonstrate results on key performance indicators and harmonise procedures as much as possible) continue to be understood and considered beyond the endorsement period, especially considering high turnover of Ministry officials and donors staff. The story of Yemen also shows that some of the issues discussed during the endorsement process were lost in the remainder of the process as some of the checks and balances have been missed.

12.5 The implications of the limited presence of donors for in-country ownership of the FTI. In practice, in Yemen the FTI is essentially a relationship with the World Bank. The FTI appears to have acted as a supplement to World Bank-led activities in the sector, through providing additional funding managed through World Bank procedures, and through the use of the EPDF to undertake supplementary studies. But it is worth noting that a lot of

useful analytical work would not probably have happened without the lead of the World Bank. If the FTI is to have a significant added value it needs to be through its ability to provide a platform and focus that encompasses all stakeholders on the critical issues that will determine basic education performance and achievement of the EFA goals.

Annex A – A Note on Methodology

A1. The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the *Evaluation Framework* (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b), available from the study web-site at:

www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.


A2. The *Evaluation Framework* includes a detailed programme theory for the FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the *Evaluation Framework* (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b). The same theory is being tested at both global and country levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country level).

A3. The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the *Evaluation Framework*. Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note (Duret et al 2009), shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report will also be available for discussion and comment before it is finalised.

A4. Each country study includes a summary matrix which relates overall findings and findings against each work stream to the logical framework for the evaluation. See the matrix in Annex H of this report.

A5. For a more retrospective explanation and reflection on the study process and methodology, see the Note on Approaches and Methods which constitutes Appendix V (Volume 4) of the evaluation's final synthesis report.

Figure A1 Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI



Source: Evaluation Framework, Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b, Figure 3A.

Annex B Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
	<p>March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p>1990 May: Unification of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) following years of open unrest and conflict. President Saleh of the former YAR became president of the new republic. President al Attas of the People Democratic Republic of Yemen is named prime minister</p> <p>In late 1991 through early 1992: deteriorating economic conditions led to significant domestic unrest, including several riots. Legislative elections were nonetheless held in early 1993. In May, the two former ruling parties, of former North and South Yemen -the General People's Congress and the Yemen Socialist Party, merged to create a single political party with an overall majority in the new House of Representatives.</p> <p>1994: Civil war and attempted split. Vice president al Baydh and other leaders of the former South Yemen declared secession and the establishment of a new Democratic Republic of Yemen centred in Aden. Saleh rejects secession as illegal. New republic failed to achieve any international recognition.</p>	<p>During 1990s: Unification of the schooling system on the basis of 9+3 (nine years of compulsory basic education, followed by three years of secondary education). The schooling system was organised on the basis of 6+3+3 in North Yemen and 8+4 in South Yemen.</p> <p>1990: Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) is established with responsibility for supervising higher education and coordination among universities.</p> <p>1994: MOHESR is cancelled and its tasks were assigned back to the Ministry of Education.</p> <p>1995 -1996: Establishment of six new universities (Ibb, Dhamar, Taiz and Hodeidah and Hadramout)</p> <p>1997: Establishment of the Social Fund for Development. The SFD objectives are: to further improve access of low income groups to basic social services, while providing an example of an effective, efficient, and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services in Yemen by (i) refining social service delivery approaches; and (ii) empowering local communities and councils to take charge of their local development. Education is a key sub component with over 50% of resource allocation.</p> <p>1998: Establishment of first Community College (CC) in Sana'a; other CCs will be opened across the country later on.</p> <p>1998: Approval of the National Strategy for Literacy and Adult Education to</p>		

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Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
			eradicate illiteracy in the population ages 10-40.		
		<p>1994 August: in an attempt to undermine the strength of southern military units loyal to the YSP, President Saleh prohibited party membership within the armed forces; he also introduced amendments to the constitution abolishing the Presidential Council and establishing universal suffrage.</p> <p>1994 October: President Saleh re-elected as president.</p> <p>1995: The Gulf War in 1991 (which saw the return of over 1 million Yemeni from Arab states) and civil war in 1994 led to economic downturn and a noticeable deterioration of living standards and an increase in poverty. Yemen's currency, the riyal, is devalued; the cost of fuel doubles, water and electricity are in short supply, and food costs rise. During the same period, inflation rise from 30% to 7%¹. Average GNP per capita income declined from USD 701 in 1990 to USD 318 in 1995.</p> <p>1995: In a bid to stabilise the economy, the GOY with support from the IMF, WB and other Donors adopted Economic, Financial and administrative Reform Programme (EFARP).</p>			

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
		1996: Adoption of the First Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1996–2000) . It includes a multitude of components for economic, financial and administrative reforms.			
1999	Education For All (EFA) Assessment 1999–2000 , involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.	1999: Presidential elections were held, re-electing the incumbent, President Saleh , to a five-year term by an overwhelming margin.			
2000	United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 , 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals. World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.				2000: Launch of the World Bank funded Basic Education Expansion Program (BEEP) .

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Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2001	G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. July 2001: G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada	2001: Adoption of the Second five year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2001–2005): The overall objective of the Plan has focused on the generation of economic growth, poverty reduction, job creation and ensuring socio-economic stability.	2001: Re-establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research to monitor government and private universities and the Community Colleges which were introduced in 1998. 2001: the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MOT EVT) becomes an independent ministry and includes in its mandate the oversight of community colleges, which had previously been supervised by the MOHESR.		

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2002	<p>G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community.</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.</p> <p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>	<p>2002 June: Adoption of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). GOY recognises that poverty reflects more than just the insufficiency of income or the provision of the basic needs of the population. Rather it also shows facing suffering and lack of capacity to express opinions as well as lack of representation, capacity build-up and empowerment. In this context, Yemen's PRSP is based four pillars of intervention.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Achieving Economic Growth ➤ Human Resources Development ➤ Improving Infrastructure ➤ Ensuring Social Protection <p>With respect to education, the PRSP realises that education is central to the progress of the country, increasing production and productivity, facing up to the challenges of globalisation and competition and keeping pace with the developments and qualitative transformations in science, research and technology.</p>	<p>2002 October: presentation of the National Basic Education Strategy present to Council of Education.</p> <p>2002 November: A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is signed among the donor agencies to strengthen their harmonisation and support to the NBEDS.</p>	<p>2002 June: Following Kananaskis 18 countries were invited to participate in the EFA-FTI. Yemen is the only country invited to participate from the Middle East and Northern African Region.</p> <p>2002 August: GOY accepts EFA-FTI invitation.</p> <p>2002 September: World Bank and the Netherlands undertake a joint FTI mission in Yemen in September for nearly three weeks. The purpose of the mission was twofold: (i) to establish consensus on the FTI among the government and donor partners; and (ii) to agree the baseline indicators and assumptions used for the financial gaps estimation.</p> <p>2002 November: Completion of the first draft of the "EFA-FTI Country proposal" just in time for the FTI Brussels meeting on Nov 16th. The Local Donor Group informally endorse this proposal and request further endorsement at international level during Brussels FTI partnership meeting but Yemen won't be endorsed at that meeting following lack of donor commitment.</p>	<p>2002: Launch of GTZ funded Basic Education Improvement Project (BEIP). BEIP is TA programme planed for three phases up to 2011.</p>

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Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2003	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, Feb 2003. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonise donor policies and priorities around country systems</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of two-three years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p>		<p>2003: Adoption by the Cabinet of the National Basic Education Development Strategy (2003–2015). NBEDS was prepared in a participatory manner with involvement from teachers, local education officials and top-level officials, sub-sector strategy covers grades 1-9.</p> <p>2003: Participation of Yemen in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). The results won't finally be published given low quality of data collected.</p> <p>2003: Decision to use of a school mapping database and technical criteria as a basis for school establishment and personnel deployment decisions to reduce inefficiencies.</p>	<p>2003 February: Joint Assessment of Yemen proposal (<i>EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003-2005</i>) by Local Donor Group and subsequent endorsement.</p> <p>2003 March: The donor community at the Paris Donor meeting further endorsed the proposal.</p> <p>2003 May: Joint Donor Government meeting at the World Bank in Washington: The meeting provided an opportunity (i) for representatives from GOY and Donor community to discuss issues concerning funding and implementation of Yemen FTI proposal; (ii) for donors to enhance coordination mechanism to facilitate and support the execution of FTI activities; and (iii) bank team to pursue the preparation of second phase of its project (BEEP II) as an instrument to support FTI with Yemen NBEDS.</p> <p>2003 October 3rd: Yemen submits a Credible Plan to FTI which forms part of the NBEDS.</p>	

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
	FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003 : Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.			2003 November : Official launch of the FTI Catalytic Fund in Oslo. Yemen is allocated USD 10 million for 2004 and 2005). This is the single largest allocation among the FTI countries that received financial support from the Fund and a testimony that the international community recognises the challenges Yemen is facing and values its efforts (will be implemented in four governorates over 2004–2005).	
2004	<p>Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and programme development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, Nov 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>		<p>2004: Adoption of the National Strategy for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education (2005–2014) NSDVTE aims to achieve an adequate balance between general education and TEVT, with a target to attract 15% of basic and secondary education graduates to post-basic and post-secondary TEVT, respectively, by 2014.</p> <p>2004 January: Signature of a Partnership Declaration between GOY and donors for the implementation of NBEDS.</p>	<p>2004 November (FTI Partnership Meeting in Brasilia: i) Dr. Abdulsalam Al Jawfi, Minister of Education of Yemen participates and presents Yemen experience regarding implementation of FTI CF grant phase 1; and ii) Yemen receives an additional allocation of USD 10 million from FTI Catalytic Fund (will be implemented in the same four governorates over 2006 and 2007).</p>	<p>2004: Launch of the four year JICA project (Broadening Regional Initiative Development in Girls Education) for USD 3.8 million. BRIDGE is operating in Taizz Governorate/focus on disadvantaged districts/rural areas. Four key activities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Contract of female teachers to teach in schools in rural areas 2) Community participation (fathers and mothers, community leaders etc.) 3) School development grant 4) Capacity building activities of GEO and DEOs in line with school improvement scheme

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Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2005	<p>March 2005, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials. Who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates were accused of producing a "watered-down" outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p>	<p>2005: Through its "Strategic Vision 2025", the Government defines its ambitions and goals for the development of Yemen.</p> <p>2005 January: Partnership Declaration on Harmonisation and Alignment by the government of Yemen and Donors.</p>	<p>2005: Adoption of the National Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Yemen (2006–2015). NSDHEY strategy aims to "<i>create a higher education system characterised by quality, broad participation, multiple and open routes vertically and horizontally, that is effective and efficient and delivers quality programmes, shows excellence in teaching, learning, research and service to society, and enhances Yemen's quality of life</i>". In terms of enrolment growth, the strategy aims to expand access to universities and other higher education institutions (including TEVT), particularly for the 19–23 age group, from 13% to 16% in 2010 and to 35% in 2025.</p> <p>2006 May: 1st Joint Annual Review of the implementation of the National Basic Education development Strategy.</p>	<p>2005 February: EPDF proposed allocation to Yemen for 2005–2007: USD 950,000.</p>	<p>2005: Launch of the multi-donor funded Basic Education Development Program (BEDP)</p> <p>Contribution from World Bank, DFID, KfW and Royal Embassy of the Netherlands for a total amount of USD 150 million.</p> <p>Objectives are as follow:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Expand access to education, by increasing the number of schools, through construction, and rehabilitation of schools. 2) Improve the quality of education in rural basic schools, through in-service teacher training, and, training for inspectors, and, headmasters. Reforms in teacher deployment will be performed to enhance interventions, and, a new curriculum will be introduced. 3) Strengthen the capacity of the MOE, to implement basic education reforms, and to prepare educational statistics, and monitoring. <p>From Mid- 2005 to mid 2007: GTZ is Education Lead Donor in Yemen</p>

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2006	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.</p> <p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> that took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the 12th of November 2006. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors, such as Mozambique, to qualify.</p>	<p>2006: Adoption of the Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR) 2006–2010 is currently being implemented and merges national plans, strategies and programmes into one document, integrating the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the MDGs.</p> <p>May 2006 the World Bank adopted a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Yemen under which it will provide approximately USD 400 million in International Development Association (IDA) credits over the period FY 2006 to FY 2009.</p> <p>2006 September: President Saleh is re- elected in September.</p>	<p>2006: Preparation of a National Children and Youth Strategy 2006–2015 (NCYS)</p> <p>2006: Publication of the study related to the Tracking of Basic Education Expenditure in Yemen: Analyses of Public Resource Management and Teacher Absenteeism.</p> <p>2006 April: Development of a Medium Term Results Framework (MTRF) 2006-2010.</p> <p>2006 May: 2nd Joint Annual Review of the implementation of the National Basic Education development Strategy.</p> <p>2006 September: Abolition of school fees for girls in grades 1–6 and boys in grades 1–3.</p>	<p>2006 November (FTI Partnership Meeting in Cairo): i) Dr. Abdulsalam Al Jawfi, Minister of Education of Yemen participates; and ii) the FTI CF Steering Committee makes the decision to top up Yemen's Year 3 allocation as requested to reach USD 20 million (will be implemented in seven governorates over 2009-2011).</p>	

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Yemen Case Study

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2007	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p>In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on May 23, 2007: CF funding for Mozambique approved.</i></p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Dakar, December 10 2007.</i></p>	<p>2007 November: Publication of the Poverty Assessment based on the results of the Household Budget Survey 2005.</p>	<p>2007: Participation of Yemen in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) with improved data collection process. The results will be published.</p> <p>2007: Development of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for basic education. The MOE has pioneered the articulation of a MTRF and a MTEF in Yemen.</p> <p>2007 May: 3rd Joint Annual Review of the implementation of the National Basic Education development Strategy.</p> <p>2007 July: Adoption of the National General Secondary Education Strategy (2007–2015). NGSES aims at: (i) enhancing equity of access, particularly for girls'; (ii) developing tailor-made interventions to reduce repetition and dropout; (iii) diversification of academic streams which are relevant to student and labour market needs; and (iv) strengthen capacity and enhance efficiency of the secondary education system at all levels.</p> <p>2007 July: Update of the Partnership Declaration between the GOY and donors for the implementation of NBEDS.</p>		<p>From mid-2007 to Nov 2008: The Netherlands are Education Lead Donor in Yemen.</p>

Date	International Context	Yemen Context	Education Policy in Yemen	FTI in Yemen	Other donor activities in Education sector in Yemen
2008	<p>September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid.</p> <p>Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects.</p> <p>Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p>	<p>2008: food and fuel crises leading to a general global economic downturn.</p>	<p>2008 May: 4th Joint Annual Review of the implementation of the National Basic Education development Strategy.</p>	<p>2008: EPDF proposed allocation to Yemen for 2008: USD 845,600.</p>	<p>2008 September: Launch of the multi-donor funded Secondary Education Development and Girl's Access Program (SEDGAP).</p> <p>Contribution from World Bank, DFID, GTZ, KfW and the Netherlands for a total amount of USD 100 million.</p> <p>From Nov 2008: USAID becomes Education Lead Donor in Yemen.</p>
2009		<p>2009 January: Revision of the 2006–2010 DPPR (Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction).</p>	<p>2009 June: 5th Joint Annual Review of the implementation of the National Basic Education development Strategy.</p> <p>2009 July: Dissemination of key findings of the Education Country Status Report.</p>		

Annex C – List of persons met during in-country visit

ORGANISATION/Department	Name	Function	Met/interviewed
GOVERNMENT Central level			
Ministry of Education (MOE)			
	Al Jawfi	Minister	M
Technical Office	Dr Hamoud Seyani	Adviser	M
Technical Office	Mohamed A. Al Reyashi	Adviser	M
Donor Coordination Unit	Khalil Al Hussaini	Donor Coordinator	M
Curriculum and Supervision Sector	Abdullah Ismaail	Director General	M
Projects Sector	Abdulrahman Al Sumawi	Director School Mapping	M
Training Sector	Sabri Al Hakeemi	Director General	M
Education Resource Development Centre	Tawfiq Ahmad Al-Mekhlafy	National Coordinator for TIMSS	M
Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MOT EVT)			
	Alawi Mohamed A. Bafaqih	Vice Minister	M
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research			
	Ali Kasim Ismail	Deputy Minister	M
Ministry of Finance (MOF)			
External Aid Department	Dr Hani Henan	Director General	M
Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation (MOPIC)			
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit	Ali A. Dahhaq	Head of Unit	M
Projects Sector	Nabila Aljerayee	Human Development Unit	M
Projects Sector	Mohamed Musaad	Human Development Unit	M
Public Works Project	Saeed Abdu	Head	M
GOVERNMENT Governorate level			
Al- Baidha Governorate	Mohamed Al Ahsmori	General Director/ Projects Department/GEO	M
	Salem Al Masoodi	General Director/Training Department/ GEO	M
Dhamar Governorate	Abdulaleem Al Alawi	FTI Coordinator/GEO	M
	Jamal Al Gubari	General Director/ Projects Department/GEO	M
Hajjah Governorate	Ahmed Al Muallemmi	General Director/GEO	M
	Dhaifallah Al Akari	Advisor General Director/GEO	M
Hodeidah Governorate	D. Ali Bahloul,	Director General/ GEO	M
	Ahmed Al Aslari	Director of Projects Department/GEO	M
	Qasim Yahya	Director of Supervision Department/GEO	M
	Khaled Kassem Hakami	Director of Statistics and Planning Department/GEO	M
	Nawal Aqili	Director of Girls Education Department/GEO	M
	Hassan Al Haij	General Secretary of Local Council	M
GOVERNMENT District level			
Bajel District	Mohammed Al Moafa,	General Secretary of Local Council	M
SCHOOL			

ORGANISATION/Department	Name	Function	Met/interviewed
Hoddeidah Governorate/Bajel District/Mehasam/ Al Manar School	Ahmed Al Ahdal	School Head Master	M
	Abdo Saghiree,	Deputy Head Master	M
SOCIAL FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT (SFD)			
Education Unit	Jalila Shugaaldeen	Head of Education Unit	M
Education Unit	Sultana Aziz Al-Mswari	Education Programs Officer	M
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit	Khalid A. Moheydeen	Senior Donors Relations Officer	M
PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT (PWP)			
	Saeed Abdu	Director of Public Works Projects	M
EDUCATION PROGRAMME ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT (PAU)			
Director	Dr Al Arashi	Director PAU (BEDP, SEDGAP, FTI)	M
M&E	Dr Abdurahman Mohamed Al Jabree	M&E officer for FTI CF project	M
Finance	Jubran Al-Muriesh	Finance manager	M
DONORS			
GTZ	Rudolf Pfeifer	Project Director General Improvement Education Program (GIEP)	M
	Erfan Diebel	Management Assistant (GIEP)	M
JICA	Yoshie Hama	Project Formulation Advisor/Education	M
Royal Embassy of the Netherlands	Afkar Al-Shami	Education advisor	M
Unicef	Mohamed Ali Bile	Senior Education Specialist	
	Belqis Al Dabbi	Education Specialist	
USAID	Susan H. Ayari	Senior Education Adviser, Lead Donor Coordinator for education	M
	Abdulhamid N. Alajani	USAID, Education Specialist	M
World Bank	Ayesha Vawda	Senior Education Specialist, Task Team Leader on the Basic and Secondary Education Programmes	M
	Sinshaku Nomura	Education Economist,	M
LOCAL NGOS			
YERO (Yemen Education Relief Organisation)	Nouria Nagi	Director	M
NSMA (National Safe Motherhood Alliance)	Mohamed M. Al-Khiati	Training Responsible	M

Annex D – Basic Education Indicators


	1997–98	1998–99	2001–02	2004–05	2007–08	Sources
Out of school children						
In absolute number (basic school age)				1,800,000		Education CSR (2009)
In % of the primary school age children	50%*					*EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003)
Number of pupils						
Lower basic (6–11 year old)	2,600,000*					*EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003)
Basic Education (6–14 year old)			3,446,847		4,190,719	Education CSR (2009)
Secondary			491,354		560,907	
Gross Enrolment Rates						
Lower basic (6–11 year old)			67%*			*EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003)
Girls	61%*		52%*			
Boys			81%*			
Basic education (6–14 year old)		62%			74%	Education CSR (2009)
Girls		42%			64%	
Boys		80%			83%	
Secondary Education		31%			34%	
Girls		16%			23%	
Boys		46%			43%	
Access Rates						
Grade 1					85%	Education CSR (2009)
Girls					76%	
Boys					94%	
Grade 6					53%	Education CSR (2009)
Girls					43%	
Boys					63%	

	1997–98	1998–99	2001–02	2004–05	2007–08	Sources
Grade 9					42%	Education CSR (2009)
Girls					30%	
Boys					53%	
Grade 12					32%	Education CSR (2009)
Girls					24%	
Boys					41%	
Repetition Rates						
Lower basic (6–11 year old)		10.6%*	6.9%*			*EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003)
Completion Rates						
Primary completion rate					60%	Education CSR (2009) using administrative data and UN data population
Girls					49%	
Boys					70%	
Literacy Rates						
Youth literacy rate			66%*			*EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003)
Rural female	61%*		27%*			
Urban female			82%*			

Annex E – Yemen External Aid Data³⁶

Total aid flows


Figure E1 Total aid commitments (constant 2007 USD bn)



Source: Table E1


E.1 Total aid commitments decreased by just over USD m 65 between 1999 and 2007, with peaks in 2000, 2002 and 2004. The share of multilateral aid in total aid decreased, with the nadir at 24% in 2003. Its share in 2007 was thirteen percentage points lower, at 42%, than in 1999.

³⁶ The following charts and tabulations rely on the data used in the 2009 GMR (UNESCO 2008) (which cover the period 1999-2007 in the case of commitments and the period 2002-2007 in the case of disbursements, in constant 2007 USD). The original source of these data are the OECD-DAC creditor reporting system (CRS). The multilateral data in the GMR external aid database is incomplete because the EC was the only multilateral agency reporting data on disbursements to the OECD-DAC Secretariat (although IDA provided unofficial data). For this reason disbursements are not reported on here.

Figure E2 Aid dependency (commitments/GNI)³⁷

Source: Table E4

E.2 Aid dependency fell slightly over the period, dropping from 2.5% to 1.5%. Between 1999 and 2007 there was an unsteady fluctuation with slight rises and falls, mirroring the general trend in aid volumes mainly from multilateral donors over the years. Cumulative real GDP growth over the period was 37.3%. Average growth per annum was 3.58% (Table E5 below).


Figure E3 General budget support as a proportion of total aid commitments

Source: Table E6

³⁷ For reasons already stated in footnote 1, the aid dependency ratio calculated in this report relies on total aid commitments data (commitment/GNI). It is important to note that utilising commitment data to measure this indicator risks overstating aid dependence.

E.3 General Budget Support (GBS) as a proportion of total aid commitments increased over the period, rising from 3% to 15%. During the period 1999–2006, it fluctuated year on year, rising and falling from zero in alternate years. In 2007, there was a sharp increase of fourteen percentage points due to a general increase in GBS that year.


Figure E4 Share of total aid commitments by donor 2007



Source: Table E8

E.4 The biggest donor to Yemen in terms of total aid commitments in 2007 was IDA, followed by Germany. Over the period 1999–2007 the most significant donor was again IDA, followed by Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and Japan all making similar levels of contributions.


Figure E5 Share of total aid commitments by donor 1999–2007



Source: Table E8

Aid to education³⁸

Figure E6 Total commitments to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)




Source: Table E6

E.5 Aid commitments to education and basic education rose over the period 1999–2007, with peaks in 1999 mainly due to contributions from multilateral donors, and in 2004 due to contributions from both bilateral and multilateral donors. There has also been an unsteady rise in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has significantly increased from 16% to 56% over the period, showing a sharp decline of thirty-nine percentage points, at 35% in 2002 with an equally rapid rise of forty-two percentage points, at 78%, followed again by a sharp decline of twenty-eight percentage points, at 56% in 2007.


³⁸ The following figures show total (rather than just direct) aid flows to education and basic education. These broader definitions include assumptions about the use of aid flows that are not strictly assigned to education or basic education (following the convention adopted by the GMR): Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level.

Figure E7 Share of multilateral aid in aid to education and basic education, and of aid to basic education in total aid to education, 1999–2007




Source: Table E6

Figure E8 Share of total commitments to education by donor 2007




Source: Table E9

E.6 The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2007 was IDA, commanding a considerable 37% share. Germany also commands an important portion of the share, at 29%, and shows a significant presence over the period 1999–2007 through consistent contributions. Over the period 1999–2007, the IDA was the most significant donor with 45% of the share, followed by Germany and the Netherlands with 20% and 14% respectively. Japan and the United Kingdom also featured in the list of top five donors over the period, making similar levels of contribution.


Figure E9 Share of total commitments to education by donor 1999–2007

Source: Table E9

E.7 In terms of aid to basic education, the Netherlands and Germany command a significant 25% share of aid to basic education in 2007 each, followed by IDA with a 21% share. Japan and the United States also feature as prime donors in 2007. Over the course of the period 1999–2007, the IDA remains the primary donor to basic education with a 46% share, followed by the Netherlands and Germany with a considerable contribution of 18% and 16% respectively.

Figure E10 Share of total commitments to basic education by donor 2007

Source: Table E10

Figure E11 Total commitments to basic education by donor 1999–2007

Source: Table E10

Direct aid to education

E.8 As elaborated in footnote 38 above, total aid to education and basic education are calculated according to the GMR conventions that apportion certain amounts of General Budget Support (GBS) and aid to education that isn't specified by level. Table E1 below details the breakdown of aid to education by category, as well as presenting the figures for General Budget support and Total aid to education and basic education.


Table E1 Direct aid to education (constant 2007 USDm) – commitments

Category	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Education unspecified	0.33	40.62	0.54	6.89	0.58	16.54	1.90	2.57	9.81
Basic education	0.75	96.42	31.20	6.33	23.86	180.25	43.42	48.35	33.43
Secondary education	1.24	0.21	3.16	2.51	0.24	1.50	1.02	0.31	15.28
Post-secondary education	8.02	6.93	6.76	11.81	5.70	5.26	4.49	7.52	9.27
General Budget Support	11.53	0.00	11.84	0.00	8.17	0.00	0.00	3.57	50.93
10% GBS	1.15	0.00	1.18	0.00	0.82	0.00	0.00	0.36	5.09
20% GBS	2.31	0.00	2.37	0.00	1.63	0.00	0.00	0.71	10.19
Total aid to education	12.65	144.18	44.03	27.53	32.01	203.56	50.84	59.46	77.97
Total aid to basic education	2.07	116.73	32.66	9.77	24.96	188.53	44.37	49.99	43.42

Notes: total aid to education = all direct aid to education + 20% GBS; total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 50% Education unspecified + 10% GBS.

Catalytic Fund³⁹

Figure E12 Total contributions from the Catalytic Fund (current USDm)



Source: Table E2

E.9 Contributions from the Catalytic Fund came in just three years. In 2004 allocations were at USD 10m with a single grant agreement to cover it. In 2005 allocations again totalled USD 10m, with a grant agreement of equal value following in 2006. In 2006 allocations were doubled to USD 20m, but no grant agreement for this allocation has yet been awarded. Over the period disbursements comprised of two smaller contributions of USD 3m and 7m in 2004 and 2005, followed by a larger contribution of USD 10m in 2006. These disbursements covered both grant agreements of previous years. Over the period 2004–2006 the share of CF funding (allocations) in overall commitments to basic education has increased, amounting to 6%, 26% and 35% respectively. The FTI's share in basic education as reported in Table E2 below is based on grant agreements, but allocations for 2006 were double grant agreements for 2006 and this is what explains the discrepancy between the two figures.

Table E2 Contributions from the Catalytic Fund (current USDm)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Allocations	10	10	20	0	0	0	0	0
Grant agreement amounts	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
Disbursements	3	7	10	0	0	0	0	0
Allocations (constant 2007 USDm)	10.95	10.60	20.54	0.00				
Share of CF funding in total aid to basic education (%)	5.81%	23.89%	41.09%	0.00%				

Source: Fast Track Initiative, Catalytic Fund. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

³⁹ Catalytic Fund data were supplied on request by the Evaluation Team from the CF in 2008.

Table E3 Bilateral and multilateral aid commitments 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USDbn)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral	0.1839171	0.263115	0.251278	0.280874	0.291718	0.246018	0.259252	0.196153	0.1972322
Multilateral	0.2205720	0.389076	0.175612	0.281455	0.090979	0.275291	0.129498	0.140055	0.1417696
Total	0.4044891	0.652191	0.426889	0.562329	0.382697	0.521309	0.38875	0.336209	0.3390018
Share of multilateral aid in total aid (%)	0.5453101	0.596567	0.411375	0.500516	0.237731	0.528076	0.333114	0.416573	0.41819719

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

Table E4 Aid dependency ratio (commitments/GDP constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral	1.1%	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.5%	1.2%	1.2%	0.9%	0.9%
Multilateral	1.3%	2.3%	1.0%	1.5%	0.5%	1.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Total	2.5%	3.8%	2.4%	3.0%	2.0%	2.6%	1.8%	1.5%	1.5%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009); World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008d). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36); deflators for GDP from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008d).

Table E5 GDP (current and constant 2007 USDm) and GDP deflator

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
GDP (current USDm)	7468	9441	9460	9903	11007	13874	16754	19082	22523
Inflation (annual %)	31.8875	25.7663	-0.0956	4.9086	12.6091	22.1064	18.5342	13.5880	15.0173
GDP Deflator (1=2007)	0.46	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.57	0.70	0.80	0.88	1.00
GDP (constant 2007 USDm)	16406	17128	17915	18614	19191	19954	21069	21737	22523
Real GDP growth (%)		4.4%	4.6%	3.9%	3.1%	4.0%	5.6%	3.2%	3.6%
Cumulative GDP growth over the period 1999–2007	37.3%								
Average annual growth over the period 1999–2007	3.58%								

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008d). Note: Internal inflation from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008d).

Table E6 GBS as a proportion of total aid commitments (constant 2007 USDbn)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total aid	0.4044891	0.652191	0.42689	0.562329	0.382697	0.521309	0.38875	0.336209	0.339002
GBS	0.0115294	0	0.011841	0	0.008174	0	0	0.003573	0.05093
GBS as % of total aid	2.85%	0.00%	2.77%	0.00%	2.14%	0.00%	0.00%	1.06%	15.02%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009)

Table E7 Total aid to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total aid to education									
Bilateral	12.64658	24.90048	42.712	20.18184	31.15592	76.04132	49.97432	48.22802	47.56993
Multilateral	0	119.2829	1.318289	7.352944	0.857957	127.5213	0.864262	11.23447	30.40315
Total	12.64658	144.1834	44.03029	27.53478	32.01388	203.5626	50.83858	59.46249	77.97308
Aid to basic education									
Bilateral	2.069619	17.62006	31.34066	9.465612	24.10689	68.6744	43.73119	38.9065	33.60546
Multilateral	0	99.10988	1.318289	0.304989	0.857957	119.8506	0.643393	11.08152	9.818441
Total	2.069619	116.7299	32.65895	9.770601	24.96485	188.525	44.37458	49.98802	43.4239
Share of multilateral aid in total aid to education (%)	0.00%	82.73%	2.99%	26.70%	2.68%	62.64%	1.70%	18.89%	38.99%
Share of multilateral aid in aid to basic education (%)	0.00%	84.91%	4.04%	3.12%	3.44%	63.57%	1.45%	22.17%	22.61%
Share of aid to basic education in total aid to education (%)	16.37%	80.96%	74.17%	35.48%	77.98%	92.61%	87.29%	84.07%	55.69%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009) Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

Table E8 Total aid commitments by donor (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total 1999–2007
Austria	0.0222466	0.072245	0.042947	0.032184	0.041353	0.040936	0.020436	0.039174	0.0340977	0.345619
Belgium	0	0	0	0.007099	0.20173	0.099184	0.537391	0.082725	0.0063504	0.934479
Canada	0.2856205	0.5689	4.516427	0.602044	1.083304	1.581387	0.222099	0.238428	0.1861677	9.284376
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	3.531928	3.54698	1.164315	2.734906	10.97813
EC	18.46081	61.9872	33.82004	25.21107	17.85952	22.6296	24.24723	31.77254	29.42824	265.4163
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.011908	0.0117112	0.02362
France	5.930853	6.434435	4.078735	7.391433	10.6494	5.81539	82.23349	10.42509	9.414894	142.3737
Germany	53.23895	49.58479	35.88947	57.73254	51.78425	55.68785	49.34746	98.37766	56.7144	508.3574
Global Fund	0	0	0	0	5.152352	0	7.174169	8.368482	3.568333	24.26334
Greece	0	0	0	0.084175	0.052565	0.099935	0.091465	0.054703	0.0557016	0.438545
IDA	185.6878	322.7692	132.1218	229.1008	58.71228	238.6281	72.06062	86.73604	80.93	1406.747
IFAD	16.42344	0	0	19.75542	0	0	10.42994	0	16.582	63.1908
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0.044126	0	0.272734	0.1016316	0.418492
Italy	3.220737	2.620351	1.208447	4.670305	0.137076	4.860546	2.238667	1.076883	27.88607	47.91908
Japan	25.29683	20.75604	17.83317	17.02732	182.9046	17.85493	15.23954	19.16229	18.15877	334.2335
Netherlands	32.60953	47.85202	112.2164	130.2658	1.714348	54.14005	42.98849	23.64524	52.68578	498.1177
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.095734	0	0	0.095734
Norway	4.459043	0.659382	0.070733	0.435857	0.401919	0.510971	0.468266	0.285049	0	7.29122
Spain	0	16.43428	16.2483	0	0	0	0.002988	0	0.1476044	32.83317
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.642972	0	0.7879245	2.430897
Switzerland	0.1334979	0	0.005238	0	0	0	0	0	0.5792632	0.717999
UNAIDS	0	0	0.005365	0	0	0	0.085476	0.112042	0.1630058	0.365889
UNDP	0	0	0	0	0	6.48698	7.251059	4.895542	3.971947	22.60553
UNFPA	0	0	4.088224	3.210475	3.549827	2.355954	2.19435	2.091684	1.406466	18.89698
Unicef	0	4.319407	5.576361	4.17704	5.705082	5.190382	6.055105	6.078973	5.719579	42.82193

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total 1999–2007
United Kingdom	3.425128	20.25748	7.318836	7.45366	9.161226	38.59634	44.64491	4.193102	3.700191	138.7509
United States	55.29465	97.87543	51.84892	55.17175	33.58623	63.15453	15.9309	37.12397	24.02677	434.0132
Total	404.4891	652.1911	426.8895	562.329	382.6971	521.3091	388.7497	336.2086	339.0018	4013.865

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

Table E9 Total commitments to education by donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total 1999– 2007
Austria	0.0222466	0.033339	0.042947	0.032184	0.041353	0.01035	0.010954	0.022385	0.0340977	0.249857
Canada	0	0	0.439876	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.439876
EC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	5.232694	3.396734	3.945174	1.660638	1.305501	1.232227	1.271405	0.984693	0.949654	19.97872
Germany	5.077331	5.809064	16.17541	5.143681	13.79255	28.04787	3.859497	31.56163	22.81582	132.2829
Greece	0	0	0	0.084175	0	0.046992	0.045451	0.016573	0.0382888	0.23148
IDA	0	118.5255	0	7.047956	0	126.7001	0	10.842	29.086	292.2016
Italy	0	0.14664	0.342476	0.116295	0	0	0.334663	0	0	0.940074
Japan	2.305883	0	0.950309	11.22518	15.65612	0.322689	0.996045	7.356871	8.464884	47.27798
Netherlands	0.008429	14.95275	15.90041	1.560585	0.13804	40.21538	10.3973	0	11.10911	94.282
Norway	0	0	0	0.359094	0	0	0	0	0	0.359094
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.002988	0	0	0.002988
UNDP	0	0	0	0	0	0.000553	0.22087	0.152958	0.0027715	0.377152
Unicef	0	0.757422	1.318289	0.304989	0.857957	0.820619	0.643393	0.239511	1.314374	6.256554
United Kingdom	0	0.561956	1.417829	0	0.22236	0.650401	33.05602	1.334357	0.2685611	37.51148
United States	0	0	3.497559	0	0	5.515408	0	6.951509	3.889513	19.85399
Total	12.64658	144.1834	44.03028	27.53478	32.01388	203.5626	50.83858	59.46249	77.97308	652.2457


Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

Table E10 **Total commitments to basic education by donor (constant 2007 USDm)**


donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total 1999-2007
Canada	0	0	0.219938	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.219938
France	0.1636873	0.017788	0.051815	0	0.001245	0.001188	0.32143	0.106776	0.1012106	0.765141
Germany	0.7529902	2.274297	10.48686	0	9.475905	22.71764	0.207252	24.56543	10.69055	81.17092
IDA	0	98.35246	0	0	0	119.03	0	10.842	8.993	237.2175
Italy	0	0	0	0.058147	0	0	0	0	0	0.058147
Japan	1.152942	0	0.475155	8.174443	14.51856	0.152278	0.80219	6.615605	7.680794	39.57197
Netherlands	0	14.80225	15.90041	0.873928	0	39.96268	9.979992	0	11.10911	92.62837
Norway	0	0	0	0.359094	0	0	0	0	0	0.359094
Unicef	0	0.757422	1.318289	0.304989	0.857957	0.820619	0.643393	0.239511	0.8254409	5.767621
United Kingdom	0	0.525729	0.708914	0	0.11118	0.3252	32.42033	0.667178	0.1342806	34.89281
United States	0	0	3.497559	0	0	5.515408	0	6.951509	3.889513	19.85399
Total	2.069619	116.7299	32.65894	9.770601	24.96485	188.525	44.37458	49.98801	43.4239	512.5054

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008 annex table 36).

Annex F – Governorates selected to benefit from FTI Catalytic Fund Grants phase 1&2



Source: GOY, UNDP and World Bank 2007



Source: Al-Jawfi 2004

Annex G – Participatory Approach of NBEDS

G1 The introduction and philosophy upon which the fundamentals of formulating the strategy were reflected in the major directive for the stages of building and implementing the strategy, as well as the selection of the work method and mechanism. Hereunder, we present a brief review:

Work method

G2 This is a set of successive stages that were completed according to the following:

The Preparation Stage

G3 This contains the following steps:

Crystallisation of the idea of the project: The idea of the basic education development strategy project was crystallised through numerous meetings held with the Ministry leadership at various levels. The Ministry asked the German Technical Cooperation in Yemen to present technical assistance for the preparation of the project.

Determination of the project objective: The previous step resulted in the determination of the objective of the project, i.e., "Formulation of the national strategy for the development of basic education" in the long-term (extending to 2015).

Composition of the project management team:

- **The project leading committee was established by the Ministerial Resolution No. (144) issued on 9/4/2001 and composed of:**

1. Minister of Education	(Chairman)
2. Vice-Minister of Education	(Member)
3. Deputy Minister for the Education Sector	(Member)
4. Deputy Minister for Curriculum and Guidance Sector	(Member)
5. Deputy Minister for Projects Sector	(Member)
6. Chairman, Technical Bureau at the Ministry	(Member)
7. Director, Education Research and Development Centre	(Member)
8. Chairman, Illiteracy Eradication & Adult Education Organ	(Member)
9. Advisor of the Ministry for Planning	Member)
10. General Director of Planning & Statistics	(Member & Secretary)

- The major technical team for the management of the strategy formulation project is composed of the following:

Core technical team

G4 **Formulation of the strategic vision stage** includes the following steps:

G5 Using a scientific model to "formulate" the future perception of basic education by 2015. The model encompasses the following major dimensions:

- Description of the current conditions of basic education in Yemen.

- Description and determination of the gap analysis between the current condition and the desired one in the future.
- Determination of priorities to fill in the gap to arrive at an aspired future condition of basic education in Yemen by 2015.

G6 Carry out a stakeholders' analysis survey to determine the main partners in the education process. This should be an introduction to formulate the common strategic vision of the future of basic education.

G7 Formulate a strategic vision of the future of basic education by 2015. This was carried out in four workshops in which 400 persons representing various categories concerned with education issues at the official and popular levels participated.

First Workshop: It included the higher leadership of the Ministry of Education and aimed at formulating a future perception of basic education as seen and determined by the Ministry leadership.

Second Workshop: It included the education leadership at various levels in the governorates and districts.

Third workshop: It included the representatives of various social, vocational and political segments.

Fourth workshop: It included representatives of those participating in the four workshops. It aimed at formulating a common vision of the education leadership at the central and local levels and that of the representatives of civil society.

G8 Within the framework of the previously mentioned workshops, the aspired purpose of the future of basic education in Yemen was determined within the context of the strategy, and it was made up of four major components as follows:

1. Shared Strategic Vision (What is the future condition that we wish basic education in Yemen by 2015 to be?).
2. Strategic Mission: (Commitment and determination of the education establishment to realise the vision).
3. Strategic Objective: (What is the result(s) that must be accomplished by 2015 to realise the task and arrive at the vision?).
4. Strategic dimension for reform: (What are the priorities of reforming the basic education system so that it is prepared and able to effect the desired change?).

Field work stage

G9 This is the stage of creating the appropriate frameworks and mechanisms to search for the most important and best priorities and programmes necessary for realising the aspired vision as determined by the education field work near to the education process. This would enable the government to diagnose and study the education reality and then propose realistic – not imaginary – solutions within an inherent practical context of ambitious hope and desire for development. The fieldwork stage comprised the following steps:

Selection of governorates participating in field work

G10 As the participation of all governorates was impossible for practical, methodological and financial reasons, it was decided that 10 governorates (50% of the governorates of the Republic) participate in the field work stage. These were selected according to the following criteria:

- Geographic distinction: coastal, mountainous, hot, cold governorates.
- Degree of urbanisation: urban, close to urban and rural governorates.

- Educational reality: Governorates with advanced experience in one or more axes.
- Educational process: Governorates with beginning experience in one or more axes of the educational process.
- Level of zeal and readiness to participate in formulating the strategy.
- Based on these criteria the following governorates were selected: Shabwa, Saada, Aden, Abyan, Al-Hodeida, Lahej, Hadhramout, Ibb

Selection of members of fieldwork groups from the governorates

G11 The members of the field work groups were selected from among the best education cadres working in the education field as well as representatives of the civil and local society in the selected governorates according to the following criteria:

- Each governorate should be represented by a selected group from: the school, the education centre, the Governorate Education Office, the Local Council, Parents Councils, and representatives of civil society.
- Women should have 50% representation in the composition of the groups wherever possible.
- The qualification of any member should not be less than the first university certificate.
- The experience of the nominated member should not be less than five years' work in the education field.
- In each group there should be at least one representative from civil society and the local council.

G12 Based on the previous criteria (109) members were selected from ten governorates of the Republic. Among these, fieldwork groups were formed and they will be discussed in more detail later

Selection and formation of the assisting educational technical team

G13 The streamlining and support of education experience in the field points towards an educational methodological course. On this basis, high expertise and specialisation teams were composed from the local cadres working at the universities, the Education Research and Development Centre, the Ministry of Education and its Offices in the governorates. They were to assist and direct the field groups in formulating the subsidiary and pivotal field strategies. They were also to undertake the preparation of a comprehensive field strategy at the national level in each of the axes determined for the reform of the basic education system.

Formation of the field work groups

G14 Three to four field groups were formed at the level of each of the ten selected governorates to prepare field strategy papers on the determined axes as shown in the following Table G1 below.

Table G1 Field Work Groups

Governorate/Axis	Aden	Sana'a	Hodaïda	Abyan	Saada	Hadhram	Ibb	Lahej	Hajja	Shabwa	National groups	No. of strategies in each axis
The teacher		X		X							X	3
The curriculum	X							X			X	3
Education funding		X						X			X	3
School administration	X							X			X	3
Decentralisation						X	X		X		X	4
School buildings				X	X				X		X	4
Girls education			X		X					X	X	4
Community participation			X				X			X	X	4
Number of groups in each Governorate	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	8	27

G15 From the preceding rows it is clear that in each axis, 32–33 groups work in different governorates. There is, in addition to that, a technical group that deals with a specific axis subject from a comprehensive perspective. The local groups deal with the axis subject from the angle of the governorate. The purpose of that is to provide comprehensive and complemented perception of the axis subject. Based on this mechanism, 28 field work papers were prepared dealing with the eight axes for the reform of basic education.

Formation of field work teams

G16 The field work groups working in each axis formed work teams which were assigned the task of developing unified strategies for the axis through merging the field strategies of each axis. This resulted in the creation of eight axis strategies on the basis of 28 field strategies.

Field work mechanism

G17 The pivotal field strategies were developed in accordance with the following mechanisms:

1. Formulation of general model for preparation of the strategy

An integrated scientific model was developed to guide the formulation of the pivotal field strategies made up of a set of steps as shown hereunder: -

Pivotal field strategies' preparation steps

1. Analysis of the current situation:

- Diagnosis of basic education's current situation.
- Analysis of the spheres of strength.
- Analysis of the spheres of weakness.
- Analysis of factors conducive to the process of change.
- Analysis of factors obstructing the process of change.

2. Determine desired targeted future situation:

- What do we desire the situation of basic education to be by 2015 and why? Who is concerned? Who benefits from the aspired situation? What are their aspirations and hopes?

3. Analyze the development gap between situation (1) and (2).
 - Description of the gap:
 - Manifestations and indicators of the gap.
 - Its reflections upon the education process.
 - To what extent this can be overcome?
4. Determine spheres of development necessary to overcome the gap without taking constraints into account.
5. Formulate an executive action plan according to Step (4).
6. Determine spheres of development necessary to overcome the gap taking the constraints into account.
7. Formulate an action plan according to Step (6).

2. Training and follow-up

G18 The major technical team and the assisting educational team undertook implementation of eight workshops. Each workshop consists of three successive steps to train, follow-up and direct the work groups and teams to formulate and prepare the strategies, overcome the difficulties faced and submit advice during all stages of the preparation of the pivotal field strategies.

3. Review and handing over of field strategies and formulation of pivotal strategy for each axis.

G19 After the fieldwork groups had completed formulation of the field strategies, they held two workshops each of which continued for three days. During this period, each team submitted a review of the field strategies to the strategy team as a whole. The field strategy papers amounting to 28 papers were handed over.

G20 Each team within its own axis formulated the pivotal strategy related to its axis by integrating the field strategies in an integrated strategy of the axis.

4. Presentation of the pivotal strategies to the education partners.

G21 A workshop was convened and continued for three successive days. During this time, the education partners at the central and local levels of the Ministry as well as representatives from civil society reviewed the pivotal strategies. The representatives of the donor organisations concerned with education issues were also invited to review the strategies. In the light of the fruitful discussions of the participants in those workshops, each team undertook the integration of the excellent proposals and views within the final context of each strategy. After that eight (8) pivotal strategies were submitted. These were:

- The teacher and guidance axis development strategy.
- The curriculum and evaluation axis development strategy.
- The education funding axis development strategy.
- The school administration axis development strategy.
- The school building axis development strategy.
- The girls' education axis development strategy.
- The community participation axis development strategy.
- The education management and education decentralisation axis development strategy.

These strategies were submitted to the major technical team and with it the field work stage ended.

5. Submission of the pivotal strategies to the higher leadership of the Ministry of Education and the Strategy Project Steering Committee.

G22 In November 2001, the pivotal strategies were handed over to the members of the higher leadership of the Ministry of Education and the Strategy Project Steering Committee. The aim was to have them peruse the final draft of the pivotal strategies. They were asked to submit any opinions thereon in their capacity as the persons who will undertake and be committed to the process under their care and implementation. During the period November 23 – 27, 2002 a two-day workshop was convened during which the pivotal strategies were reviewed by the higher leadership of the Ministry of Education. The workshop was attended by the Minister of education, Dr. Fadhle Abu Ghanem, the Vice-Minister of education, Prof. Dr. Abdul Aziz Saleh bin Habtoor, the Vice-Minister of Education, the Deputy Ministers at the Ministry, the Chairman of the Technical Bureau, the Ministry General Directors, the Chairman of the Education Committee at the House of Representatives, the General Secretary of the Supreme Council for Education Planning, the President of the Education Professions Trade Union, the Chairman of the Illiteracy Eradication Organ and other leaders from civil society. The major objective of the workshop was to get a better understanding of the views, proposals and priorities of those concerned so as to incorporate them in the pivotal strategies. These will form the basis for the formulation of the National Strategy for Basic Education in Yemen.

6. Formulation of the National Basic Education Strategy

G23 The pivotal strategies formed the basis for the formulation of the National Basic Education Strategy, which was prepared by the Yemeni Technical Team. Prof. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Al-Hadhrami, the Chairman of the Major Technical Team, chaired a workshop in which Dr. Hamood Muhammad Ghaleb Al-Sayyani and Dr. Insaf Abdo Kassem were also present.

Source: GOY 2002, National Basic Education Strategy, Sana'a: Yemen

Annex H – Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Yemen
Context (before 2002): <i>What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy & Planning: unification of the formal secular education system with nine year compulsory basic education; integration of religious education in the mainstream of basic education; stabilisation of institutional context for education sector with three ministries in charge of education & training (Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Technical and Vocational Training (MOTVET) & Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR)); Yemen is severely off-track to achieve Millennium Development Goals/Education for All (MDG/EFA) goals (especially universal primary completion (UPC) & gender parity index (GPI)); unsatisfactory reforms undertaken in basic education sub-sectors; completion of a new long term strategy (up to 2015) for basic education (NBEDS) prepared in a participatory approach with the support of GTZ/no medium term implementation plan/no annual work plan in place/no linkages with budget process. • Finance: Yemen has had a strong revenue performance in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) but this was based on the unsustainable depletion of oil resources. Public financial management (PFM) processes and administrative capacity to use funds effectively have been weak though have improved somewhat over the period since 2005. Education spending in 2002 was 7% of GDP. Education represented 18.5% of public expenditure in 1997–2002. • Data, monitoring and evaluation (M&E): Four databases managed by different departments within MOE which were not linked (school statistics, school map, staff database, examination database); limited use of indicators and analysis of administrative data at district, governorate and central levels; MOE internal arrangements did not really provide for dissemination of results or use of data; no M&E mechanism set-up for the education sector as a whole. Introduction of a Poverty Information and Monitoring System at the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) based on household surveys. • Capacity Development (CD): deficiencies of the public service acting as a social safety net system rather than tasked to deliver services; rise of parallel semi-autonomous agencies such as public works project (PWP) & Social Fund Development (SFD) to deliver services; emergence of unprepared actors at local levels in the wave of the local authority law (LAL) with confusion of roles and responsibilities; use of project implementation units by donors due to high risky environment in public procurement & financial management system; uncoordinated provision of technical assistance (TA). • Aid effectiveness: Very little progress had been made in the aid effectiveness agenda by 2002. Since 2005 there has been progress in PFM and public administration reform and in engagement with the Paris Declaration process. By 2002 a sector strategy for education had been developed but no framework for improving the effectiveness of aid in support of it existed. • Cross cutting Issue: Yemen had the widest gender gap in the world and suffered from several important dimensions of fragility.
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fast track initiative (FTI) proposal called FTI Credible Plan (2003–2005) conceived during 2002/03 as a <u>three year implementation plan of the National basic Education Strategy</u> focusing on lower basic (grades 1–6). • FTI joint appraisal by Local donor community and FTI Secretariat in 2003. • FTI (Catalytic Fund (CF) grant phase 1 (United States Dollar (USD) 10m for 2004/05); phase 2 (USD 10m for 2006/07) and phase 3 (USD 20m for 2009/11)- conceived as a <u>project</u> for selected underserved governorates administered by a <u>Programme Administration Unit</u> • FTI Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) for an estimated cumulated amount of USD 1.885 m since 2006 (Yemen second recipient of EPDF).

SUMMARY – Yemen		
Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to relevant? Was the design appropriate?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency?	
	Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?	Efficiency - How economically was FTI support translated into results?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Policy & Planning</u>: FTI IF not the best tool to assess the status and guide policies to improve efficiency, reduce unit costs and address demand-side issues; CF interventions focusing on provision of school & teachers relevant as supply-side constraints are still a reason for non enrolment; EPDF studies filled knowledge gap. • <u>Finance</u>: development of financing model, focus of FTI CF on underserved areas and framework for donor coordination were relevant. Limited attention to long-run financing issues in context of falling oil revenues. • <u>Data, M&E</u>: suggested indicators in FTI credible Plan relevant; FTI appraisal too light touch to help identify relevant directions to M&E; EPDF co-financing of Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) & financing of Education Country Status Report (CSR) relevant. • <u>CD</u>: trade off between need for speedy delivery of education services and long term capacity development issues not addressed. Role & position of semi-autonomous agencies and PIUs left aside. • <u>Aid effectiveness</u>: highly relevant by highlighting and reinforcing aid effectiveness agenda. FTI CF grant not used to advance this agenda. • <u>Cross cutting Issues</u>: focus on gender gap and related supply and demand side policies relevant as key trigger to move towards UPC. FTI has not addressed or appeared to have been directly informed by "fragility" issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Policy& Planning</u>: FTI's activities influenced the approach to planning (at the basic, secondary and even the whole education sector level) and policies (FTI CF through supply-side interventions in selected governorates and EPDF studies through providing evidence & mechanism to stimulate demand for education) and promoted a better policy dialogue. • <u>Finance</u>: FTI has not contributed to addressing long-term financing issue. Financing model not mainstreamed in MOE. FTI CF made direct contribution of about 1% of basic education financing and was effective in reaching targeted beneficiaries. Share of budget on education (and even more so basic education) has fallen since 2002 although expenditure has risen in real terms. • <u>Data, M&E</u>: i) Low influence on development of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) system at central and local levels; ii) medium influence on analysis (but high valued added of co-funded TIMSS and just completed CSR) and use of data (CF interventions used school mapping to select school sites, household surveys analysis were done to help design conditional cash transfer scheme, TIMSS results helped pilot of a quality improvement initiative in grades 1–3) but no effective feedback loop into planning and decision making process; and iii) low influence on indicators and M&E framework (e.g. UPC not integrated in the list of indicators to be documented& analysed during joint annual reviews). • <u>CD</u>: i) low influence at institutional/organisational level but EPDF co-funded TIMSS improved national capacities for the assessment of learning outcomes and could lay the foundations for establishment of a national measurement centre; ii) medium influence at individual/unit based level (FTI CF effectively provide CB support to ensure timely implementation of projects' activities in access & quality but effects on quality improvements at school level of in-service teacher training (INSET) and school manager/supervisors training difficult to appreciate); and iii) difficulty of programme administrative unit to build capacities beyond project's implementation. • <u>Aid effectiveness</u>: FTI reinforced ownership, provided a framework and process for alignment and harmonisation, a results framework and review process to reinforce mutual accountability. But little progress in alignment on use of government systems and have not succeeded in moving towards a sector-wide approach (SWAp). • <u>Cross cutting Issues</u>: Gender: i) on a small scale, the FTI CF project provided in a sample of governorates schools and teachers that satisfy social expectation to send/maintain girls to school; and ii) FTI EPDF supported studies provided evidence on the persistence of gender gap, relevance of supply-side & demand-side policies, social benefits of female literacy and helped design the conditional cash transfer scheme to benefit to a sample of rural girls enrolled in grades 4–9. Fragility context has constrained implementation but has not been addressed through the FTI. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Policy&Planning</u>: i) need to refocus on nation-wide strategic planning process at central level and avoid parallel planning process induced by FTI CF project at local levels; and ii) room to link-up FTI CF interventions and EPDF studies to maximise efficiency. • <u>Finance</u>: Some improvements in efficiency of education spending but not directly related to FTI. Delays in FTI CF grant three reduced aid predictability. • <u>Data, M&E</u>: i) opportunity lost to rationalise performance indicators ii) EPDF efficiently counterbalanced focus put by donors on data collection systems by giving priority on data analysis and use. • <u>CD</u>: i) CB activities supported by CF in planning & monitoring could be more efficient if they were not only linked to CF project purpose but also to wider planning and M&E processes at district/governorate levels; and ii) CB for analysis and evidence based decision making process supported by EPDF studies could be more efficient if studies were translated into Arabic, discussed at both central and local levels, critical issues were linked & monitored during joint annual review (JAR), necessary next steps incorporated into MOE/governorate annual work plans • <u>Aid effectiveness</u>: Harmonisation process has not fully replaced bilateral discussions with donors. • <u>Cross cutting Issues</u>: the linkages of FTI supported activities through the catalytic fund or the education programme development fund with other government and donors funded activities in the area of girl's education is efficient.

Annex H: Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Yemen	
Outcomes: What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Access/ retention/completion</u>: Although enrolments in primary education have increased from 2.2 million in 1997 to 3.3 million in 2007, and gross enrolment rate in basic education shifted from 62% to 74% over the same period, the primary completion rate (equivalent to the first six years of basic education in Yemen) remains low at 60% in 2007, 70% for boys and 49% for girls. There were still 1.8 million children of basic school age out-of-school in 2005. • <u>Gender disparities</u>: The value of the gender specific EFA index improved by 32% in relative terms between 1999 and 2006 but Yemen is still ranked 127 out of 129 just in front of Niger and Chad in 2006. • <u>Quality</u> : still low performance of pupils in international learning assessments tests at lower basic level Learning achievements of primary graduates are still low in international assessments (94% of 4th grade Yemeni students scored below the "low" benchmark of performance for mathematics and 92% scored below the "low" benchmark for science in 2007 TIMSS exercise). <p>→ No sufficient data/indicators available to measure precisely trends in other education indicators (e.g. youth and adult literacy rates, learning needs of young people and adults).</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Sustainability</u>: Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks? 	
Risks: i) <u>outside the education system</u> (high demographic growth rate making pressure to maintain existing gains in education sector, challenges to ensure transition to a non-oil economy generating growth, fiscal resources & employment to finance education reforms and support demand to education); and ii) <u>within education sector</u> (fragmented governance and management of the education sector leading to inefficiencies in resource use and erosion of accountability mechanisms).	

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
Context (before 2002): <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to policy and planning? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education Sector: i) during 90s unification of the formal secular education system with stipulation of compulsory basic education; ii) in 2002 integration of the parallel religious education into the mainstream of basic education; and iii) three ministries in charge at central level (MOE for pre basic, basic & general secondary education + literacy; MOT EVT for secondary technical & vocational and MOHESR for tertiary education) + local branches (District & Governorate Education offices)- see chapter 3 Basic Education sub-sector (MOE) -Yemen is off track to achieve MDG/EFA goals: Around 2000, Yemen had some of the worst school enrolment and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls and women (highest gender gap in the world) and low levels of student learning achievement. 50% of primary school age children were estimated to be out-of-school (mostly girls) – see chapter 3 -<u>Unsatisfactory reforms</u> due to lack of comprehensive situation analysis, of community participation and ownership, of scientific research and methodology which resulted in schools without children and children without schools; Bureaucratic centralism slowed implementation, lacked of flexibility to adapt to field developments and increased costs – see chapter 5 -<u>Preparation of National Basic Education Development Strategy (NBEDS)</u> which is a long term strategy (2015), in a participatory approach, with technical support of GTZ to increase enrolment in basic education, particularly for girls and in rural areas, to reach 95% of 6 to 14 year olds by 2015/ no medium term implementation plan/no annual work plan/no linkage with budget process. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI proposal: use of FTI IF+ costs and finance simulation model to design EFA-FTI Credible Plan (2003–2005) conceived as a three year implementation plan for NBDES (see chapters 4&5). FTI joint endorsement process by LDG/FTI Secretariat in 2003: appraisal highlighted in the area of planning that adjustments in the phasing of interventions were necessary (definition of priorities) and in the area of policies that some issues did not receive adequate attention yet or their treatment in the proposal was too brief. FTI –CF grant (cumulative of USD 40m) phases 1(04/05), 2(06/07) & 3(09/11) in a selected number of underserved governorates accounting for 50% of out-of-school children in Yemen (see chapters 4&5). FTI EPDF supported a wide-range of upstream and downstream analytical work with direct linkages with strategic planning and education policies issues (see chapters 4&5). 		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI IF, outcome and efficiency. Yemen was off track for reaching UPC in 2002, but close to FTI's benchmarks on some parameters. IF tool was relevant for its focus on outcome indicators (completion rate) but not to address policies underlying low achievements which mostly related to the very low efficiency in the use of resources, high unit costs, demand issues. CF interventions focusing on provision of schools and teachers were/are relevant as supply-side constraints still play an important role in rural areas, especially for female for non enrolment while demand-side barriers are the main explanation for dropout for both genders in urban and rural areas. EPDF supported studies were relevant as they filled knowledge gap in terms of analytical work looking i) across the spectrum of education, from basic to tertiary (purpose of the education sector analysis); ii) linkages of secondary education to labour market outcomes (secondary graduate tracer study); iii) changing patterns of marginalised children groups; iv) position of Yemen in international learning achievements tests; and v) effects of school fee abolition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI's influence in the approach to planning for education: i) at the <u>basic education</u> sub sector, FTI proposal initiated medium term planning process for NBDES and CF project helped define priority programmes; ii) at <u>secondary level</u> EPDF helped finalised general secondary education strategy; and iii) at <u>sector level</u>, education CSR is seen as the first step to move towards an integrated vision for the whole sector promoting inter ministerial policy dialogue and coordination. FTI's influence in the approach to policies towards UPC/EFA: While the <u>FTI CF</u> support directly addressed some <u>supply-side issues</u> in underserved governorates (e.g. school programme in remote rural areas, cluster based teacher training, contract of female teacher), the FTI <u>EPDF</u> resources contributed to <u>better understand and stimulate demand for education</u> (e.g. effect of school fee removal and persistence of high indirect costs and design of a pilot conditional cash transfer currently implemented with donor support). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Planning: While the EFA-FTI initial proposal has supported nation-wide policy level planning, the project nature of the FTI CF phases 1, 2 and 3 have moved away from the strategic level but contributed to identify priorities in the area of access for example. The parallel planning process for CF project may be seen as effective in the short term but will reduce efficiency in the longer term if it doesn't serve to reinforce the existing ones at local and central levels. Policy: the key findings of the EPDF supported study on monitoring of SFA could have been followed by use of other FTI inputs to help address the financial consequences. This would have maximised efficiency.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
Risks: <u>Outside the education system</u> (high demographic growth rate making pressure to maintain existing gains, challenges to ensure transition to a non oil economy generating growth, fiscal resources & employment to finance education reforms & support education demand); <u>Within education sector</u> (fragmented governance & management. of the education sector leading to inefficiencies in resource use & erosion of accountability mechanisms).		

STREAM 2: Finance

Context (before 2002): *What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before FTI?*

Country level: Yemen has had a strong revenue performance (in terms of the ratio of government revenue to GDP which is considerably higher than most countries at an equivalent level of development). However this has been extremely dependent on revenues from the hydrocarbon sector which has accounted for around 75% of government revenue. These revenues are expected to fall sharply over the medium term as Yemen's known oil reserves are exhausted. So Yemen's strong revenue performance can be seen as a depletion of capital rather than reflecting a sustainable revenue effort. Other sources of revenue such as taxation and aid have been limited. Yemen has made progress in developing a budget process that can support the allocation of funds in line with policy priorities. Since the middle of the current decade there has also been some progress with the implementation of public administration reforms which has until then made little progress with Yemen having had a bloated and ineffective civil service in the wake of the reunification of North and South Yemen and the use of civil service positions as an instrument of patronage. Significant weaknesses remain in the public finance management system however as well as issues about the sustainability of revenues in the face of the exhaustion of oil reserves.

Education sector: In the period 1997–2002, public expenditure on education represented 18.5% of total public spending. In 2002, education spending was equivalent to about 7% of GDP. While education spending has continued to increase significantly in real terms (recurrent expenditure increased by 140% from 1997 to 2007), education spending has fallen as a share of GDP (to between 5% and 6% by 2007) and as a share of public spending (15.5% between 2003 and 2007). There has also been a relative shift in the allocation of education spending away from basic education toward technical education and vocational training. Major inefficiencies were basic education spending have been identified (insufficient spending on non-staff educational inputs, excessive administration costs, low teacher-pupil ratios, too many small schools). The "Credible Plan" identified a financing gap of USD 96 million for 2003–05.

Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*

FTI supported an analysis of the financing gap for EFA which has been used in the development of implementation plans for NBEDS and to inform decision on external financing needs.

FTI has encouraged the development of a framework for the alignment of donor support to NBEDS that may have encouraged increased donor finance.

The FTI CF contributed funding of the order of 1% of total basic education expenditure (USD 40 million) over the period it was provided focused on improving access and quality in specific underserved rural areas.

Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to education finance relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness and efficiency? (immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The development of a financing model and the provision of additional finance through the FTI CF, as well as the process of developing an agreed results framework for the NBEDS, were relevant to the problems facing education finance in Yemen. The FTI CF resources were focused on priorities in relation to improving educational access in underserved rural areas. This was directly relevant to immediate priorities but the approach did not address longer-term capacity issues. The FTI in Yemen has not specifically focused on the longer term sustainability issues facing public finances in Yemen and their possible implications for education financing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although information is incomplete, donor support to basic education appears to have increased following FTI endorsement (including directly through the FTI CF) peaking in 2006. Subsequently donor support has fallen and prospects for further increases in donor support do not appear to be strong. Decisions by new donors to engage in the sector were not significantly influenced by the FTI. EFA-FTI has not contributed to a solution to the long-term financing issues facing the sector in the context of the exhaustion of oil reserves. Prospects for increased donor support to basic education are not regarded as strong. A financing model developed by the World Bank has been used in support of each FTI CF request but the model has not been incorporated into Ministry of Education planning processes. The EFA-CF has provided funds that have contributed to reducing the financing gap for basic education but EFA-CF funding represents only around 1% of basic education expenditure and it does not appear to have had a "catalytic" effect on funding. Spending on basic education has increased in real terms but only sufficiently to allow the maintenance of enrolment rates with a rapidly increasing population. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There have been some improvements in the efficiency of basic education spending. These however do not appear to be related to the EFA-FTI specifically though the Annual Review process and improved donor harmonisation around the NBEDS may have contributed to a greater focus on these issues. FTI CF resources have been used in line with what they were assigned for with a focus on non-salary support (and in phase 3 on support to the female teachers scheme). Delays in agreement and disbursement of FTI CF grant 3 have impacted on aid predictability.

Sustainability: *Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?*

Yemen faces serious medium-term issues about the sustainability of its public finances and hence of its ability to improve performance towards achieving EFA targets. The achievements to date in maintaining spending sufficiently to support enrolment increases in line with population growth are vulnerable to the likely deterioration in public finances as oil reserves are exhausted as well as to risks of increased conflict. Improvements in the budgeting process (and the framework for donor engagement which should affect levels of external finance) are likely to be sustainable so long as donors maintain confidence in government commitment but there remains a problem of coordination between the education ministries (MOE, MTVET and MOHESR) in the budget process.

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation

Context (before 2002): *What was the situation at level zero with respect to data and M&E? What was happening in country before FTI? Was quality and use of data relevant to the context and to the M&E needs?*

- **Data collection:** Four databases managed by different departments within MOE which were not linked (school statistics, school map, staff database, examination database)/Participation in MLA 02 & TIMSS 03
- **Indicators and data analysis:** limited use of indicators and analysis of administrative data at district, governorate and central levels (e.g. use of absolute number of pupils, school & teachers).
- **Dissemination of results and use of data:** MOE internal arrangements did not really provide for the functions.
- **Organisational structures for M&E:** no M&E mechanism set-up for the education sector as a whole. Introduction of a Poverty Information and Monitoring System at the CSO based on household surveys.

Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?*

- The **FTI IF and benchmarks used in the FTI proposal** (FTI Credible Plan 2003–2005) to set up baseline year (2001), run cost and finance simulation model & suggest M&E framework for the sub-sector.
- The **FTI appraisal** which i) insisted on systematic disaggregation of indicators by gender; ii) highlighted the inconsistent use of indicators due to low M&E capacities; and iii) agreed on priority given to establishment of an EMIS to be supported by donors.
- The use of the **FTI CF grants** to support **capacity building activities** in data collection and M&E at governorate and district levels.
- The use of the **FTI EPDF** resources to co-finance with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and BEDP the participation of Yemen into the **TIMSS International Assessment** (2007) and to fund the **first Education CSR** (2009).

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FTI proposal: Both the attempts to consolidate available information to set up a baseline year for NBEDS and the definition of an ambitious framework to monitor progress for the whole lower basic education sub-sector (including indicators from the FTI IF+ learning outcome and donors commitments) were relevant as they laid foundation for a <u>results based approach</u>. • FTI appraisal: "light touch" it did not identify data gap, point out institutional and management constraints in the area of data, comment the suggested M&E framework for NBEDS, or identify the need to link-up lower basic education M&E framework with those initiated for MDG or PRSP. It <u>did not help identify relevant direction for M&E activities</u> outside general emphasis for a management information system (MIS). • CF: <u>CB activities in data collection</u> at GEO/DEO levels relevant to strengthen the critical intermediate levels in the chain of information going from schools to MOE. • EPDF: i) <u>TIMSS</u> relevant to provide evidence on key education outcome of learning achievements for lower basic education where there was no longer national assessment undertaken; ii) <u>CSR</u> relevant as it was the first attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the whole education sector exploiting & cross comparing different data sources (admin data, surveys, financial data). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FTI's influence on development of EMIS at national and local levels : low Delays in designing EMIS (started in 2007), inconsistency of annual school surveys data (only 2 surveys are credited reliable 98/99 and 2004/05), persistence of fragmented information management have constrained effectiveness of donor funded initiatives in the area of data collection (incl. those supported at local level by the CF grant phases 1&2) and progress are still difficult to monitor during joint annual reviews. • FTI's influence on analysis & use of data: medium • <u>Analysis:</u> EPDF supported studies (e.g. TIMSS 07, CSR 09) provided evidence on performance of education system in terms of access/completion, equity & quality. • <u>Use:</u> FTI CF grant programmes used school mapping information to select school sites and household surveys analysis were done to design conditional cash transfer & TIMSS results helped pilot of a quality improvement initiative in grades 1–3 BUT there is no yet evidence of an effective feedback loop into planning and decision making process. • FTI's influence on indicators and M&E frameworks: low -<u>Basic Ed.:</u> performance indicators for NBEDS were only completed in Dec.06, reviewed in July 07 and were finally far less ambitious than the ones suggested in the FTI proposal & UPC is not part of the selected set. -<u>Ed. sector & poverty monitoring:</u> Out of 110 indicators monitored for the DPPR, only 6 concerned education –mainly enrolments– reflecting wish for expansion strategies (UPC not include in the list)- very weak inter-ministerial coordination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritisation of M&E & rationalisation of indicators in basic education is still low and not yet recognised as a powerful public management tool. This may be the result of the light touch endorsement in 2003. Some of the checks and balances were missed as a result of relying on the establishment of an EMIS through BEDP and the opportunity to re-address these issues was lost in the remainder of the process. • Expenditure on data collection and use: focus on data collection systems has distracted resources and efforts from data analysis and use, EPDF studies counterbalanced such tendency. • Reporting: no evidence that FTI's activities resulted in increase coordination of reporting mechanisms between MOE and donors. But the FTI CF grant progress reports were merged with those of the multi donors funded project in basic education and did not create additional requirements in that sense (inclusion of a FTI CF section in the aide memoires of the BEDP supervision mission)
Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Basic education:</u> still long way to go for a unified reliable data collection system and for quality reporting (including financial data) which could timely inform on progress for planning and decision making process. • <u>Education sector:</u> Need to review the list of relevant indicators to measure progress for each level and type of education & strengthen linkages with M&E framework of the forthcoming 4th DPPR. 		

STREAM 4: Capacity

Context (before 2002): *What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?*

- **Deficiencies of the civil service:** the result of the merging of the administration of North and South Yemen in the 90s was a bloated civil service with extremely low pay scales, weak capacity, opaque hiring and promotion practices, and relatively few effective enforcement mechanisms. Civil service used a safety net strategy.
 - **Rise of semi-autonomous agencies (PWP and SFD)** which benefited from specific derogations to operate outside civil service rules and bypass bureaucratic bottlenecks in procurement and FM.
 - **Emergence of unprepared actors in the wave of the Local Authority Law (2000):** transfer of education competencies without much of a transition period (instruments and procedures were not in place).
 - **Project implementation units /uncoordinated provision of TA** and use of **external systems** by donors.
 - A new strategy for basic education (**NBEDS**) with **little guidance for capacity development**.
- Weak planning, management, monitoring capacities throughout the system at school, district, governorate & central levels.

Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?*

- **EFA- FTI proposal** included a brief diagnosis of the capacity constraints affecting the public sector, raised the alarm on the danger of neglecting institutional capacity building and defined strategy to be followed focusing on managerial and administrative staff at central and local levels, teachers and school managers.
- **FTI appraisal:** donors concerned by the proposal being "overly ambitious given the current (implementation) capacities in the sector" and suggested to "build the capacity throughout the country in a phased manner, by prioritising capacity building interventions at all levels within one governorate at the time".
- **FTI CF grant** phases 1 & 2 CD issues in 2 ways: i) CF project relied upon a programme administration unit (PAU) to help MOE implement activities at central & local levels; and ii) directly supported capacity development activities in the four targeted governorates for teachers and school managers and for managerial and administrative staff at GEOs and DEOs levels (same arrangements for forthcoming phase 3).
- **FTI EPDF** funded or co-funded technical assistance to undertake studies and follow-up knowledge sharing workshops on education policies issues (SFA, TIMSS, CSR).
- **FTI CD guidelines** endorsed at international level: no evidence that they were known, have been disseminated or discussed. (See chapter 8)

Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FTI appraisal: Trade-off between strong need for speedy delivery of services and long-term capacity development given high level institutional constraints in civil service and fragile state context was not discussed. Role and position of semi-autonomous agencies as well as PIUs with regards to CD left aside. • FTI CD guidelines barely mention potential role of semi-autonomous agencies/ PIUs in helping CD (only focus on negative side of PIUs). 	<p>FTI's influence at institutional/organisational level: FTI EPDF co-funded 2007 TIMSS exercise improved national capacities for assessment of learning outcomes (in 2003 Yemen results had not been published due to low quality) and laid foundations for establishment of a national measurement centre.</p> <p>FTI's influence at individual/units based level: FTI CF provided effective support at governorate/district for administrative staff to ensure timely implementation of project's activities in access and quality during phases 1&2 but effects on quality improvements at school level (learning outcomes) of in-service teacher training and school managers/supervisors trainings has not been assessed (even if management/teaching and supervision practices were reported to have been positively modified).</p> <p>Strengthening national systems: PAU (in charge of FTI CF) face difficulties to build capacities beyond project's implementation to prepare for SWAp.</p>	<p>CB activities supported by CF phases 1&2 at individual & unit-based level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In civil works: while resources were invested in phases 1&2 to strengthen capacities at local levels to implement school building programme; ministerial decision was made to delegate school programme for phase 3 to central PWP. However enhanced skills could be reinvested for school programme financed by local authorities. • In planning (work plans, costing of activities, implementation schedules) & monitoring (mainly process& outputs): primarily designed for project purpose and not linked to newly established processes (annual work plans) and system (EMIS) (challenge for CF phase 3). <p>CB for analysis and evidence-based decision making process supported by EPDF studies could be more efficient if the studies were systematically translated into Arabic, key finding were discussed both at central and local levels, critical issues coming out of different studies were linked and monitor closely during joint annual review, necessary next steps to address them were incorporated into MOE and governorate annual work plans.</p>
<p>Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i></p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risks: i) Major institutional reforms which condition usefulness of capacity building measures in MOE are beyond the education sector and not close to completion (civil service, procurement, PFM, decentralisation etc.); ii) Individual capacity building activities are challenged by both centralised management culture and high turnover of staff; and iii) Pending greater decentralisation and diminution of the role of MOE; Uncertainty on the long term status of semi-autonomous agencies. 		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
Context (before 2002): What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very little progress had been made with the aid effectiveness agenda in Yemen by 2002. Subsequently Yemen has been closely engaged in the international aid effectiveness process as part of an effort to increase aid as part of the response to declining oil revenues, while donor interest in Yemen has intensified. Since 2005 there has been some progress in implementing PFM and public administration reforms that are a requirement for overcoming constraints on the ability to use aid. Ahead of the Consultative Group meeting in 2006 (which resulted in substantial new aid pledges) some progress was made in developing an aid policy and a framework for improving the harmonisation and alignment of aid. Subsequently there have been initiatives in some sectors (such as water) to strengthen aid effectiveness but progress is constrained by a number of factors including (i) the limited in country presence of donors which reflects in part security concerns; (ii) continuing constraints on public administration capacity; and (iii) the important role of GCC donors who have not participated fully in aid effectiveness processes. Yemen had by 2007 only achieved one of the Paris Declaration targets. In the education sector, the National Basic Education Development Program (NBEDS) was developed in 2002 and provides the framework for achieving EFA by 2015. At that time, no implementation plan had been developed for NBEDS and no progress had been made in moving beyond project modes of delivery of aid for education. 		
Inputs: What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI provided support for developing the EFA-FTI Credible Plan as an implementation plan from NBEDS which has (followed by the Medium Term Results Framework for 2006–10) provided a basis for policy alignment and mutual accountability. FTI Credible Plan and MTRF provide an agreed framework for aid in support of NBEDS for the sector. The FTI CF grant provided funds to support underserved governorates but this was managed as a World Bank project and was not merged with the multi-donor funded NBEDP. 		
Relevance – Was FTI support to aid effectiveness relevant? Was the design appropriate?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness and efficiency? (Effects refer to processes, outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)	
	Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to more coordinated international aid that is more coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?	Efficiency – How economically was FTI support to aid effectiveness translated into results?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI was highly relevant since it highlighted and reinforced the aid effectiveness agenda. There was consideration of integrating the FTI CF grant into the BEDP but it was decided not to do this. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI helped to maintain impetus towards EFA, and played a critical role in developing a results and management framework for partnership in basic education. Ownership of NBEDS appears to remain strong. Partnership Declaration signed in January 2004 to support implementation of NBEDS including establishment of a joint review process. FTI has provided a framework and management processes to encourage the alignment of aid on agreed priorities and for harmonisation between development partners. FTI has not led to any substantial increase in alignment on the use of government systems. BEDP is envisaged as the precursor to a SWAp but there is no plan as to how the transition to a SWAp will be accomplished. The Annual Review process has provided a framework for mutual accountability between the Government of Yemen and development partners. The medium-term results framework (MTRF) provides a common results framework that harmonisation processes encouraged by EFA-FTI have continued to reinforce although the MTRF has significant weaknesses. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delays in the process of approving the FTI CF grant reduced the efficiency of the provision of this aid. It is difficult to identify specific ways in which the Annual Review process has contributed to improving efficiency in aid provision though in principle it may have reduced waste and duplication. The harmonisation process around BEDP has not fully replaced bilateral discussions and so it is not clear that transactions costs for aid have been reduced.
Sustainability: Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
There appears to be continued shared commitment to the goals of the NBEDS (though Yemen remains off track to achieve these objectives) and to the use of the partnership arrangements that have been developed. However, there are continued constraints to improving aid effectiveness that derive from weak capacity in government systems and the limited in-country donor presence (influenced by security concerns). The prospects for sustained aid to enable a better performance in achieving EFA targets remain uncertain and there are no current plans for the envisaged move towards a SWAp for the sector.		

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues identified as particularly relevant in the case of Yemen: "Gender" and "Fragile State"**Context (before 2002):** *What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before FTI?*

- **Gender:** i) **Social norms, traditional rules and values** (e.g. early marriages & pregnancies) contributed to social and economic disadvantage of women; and ii) Yemen faced **highest gender gap in the world** in terms of access, retention and completion in basic education. Most of the out-of-schools children were girls and girls were under represented at all levels of education. Female literacy was low especially in rural areas (the youth literacy rate was below 20 % for rural female in 2000);
- **"Fragile State":** It is important to distinguish (a) weak capacity to deliver effective services; (b) lack of effective control over territory and disputed legitimacy; (c) security concerns; and (d) vulnerability to risks (including of conflict or of economic or fiscal decline). In relation to each of these areas:
 - (a) Yemen has suffered from weak capacity within public services that is related to political imperatives following reunification and the use of the civil service for patronage within a strong tribal culture.
 - (b) Yemen faces several ongoing conflicts as well as powerful traditional authorities that limit government reach in some areas of the country and leave legitimacy contested.
 - (c) The security situation in Yemen has become increasingly perceived as problematic including for Westerners as a result of terrorist attacks.
 - (d) Yemen is rated (for instance on the Fragile States Index) as vulnerable to further conflict while the depletion of oil reserves threatens economic and fiscal sustainability and there are increasing pressures on limited water resources which can also be a focus of conflict.

Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?*

- **Gender:** i) the **FTI proposal** recognised that MDGs/EFA goals won't be achieved without focus on girls' education and suggested supply side strategies to tackle gender gap; ii) the **FTI appraisal** insisted on systematic disaggregation of indicators by gender and called for more emphasis on demand-side policies to address the vicious circle existing between poverty, rural residence and low educational opportunity ; iii) **FTI CF grant** phases 1,2&3 focused on girls access issues through provision of schools & female teachers in selected governorates; and iv) **FTI EPDF studies** looked at providing evidence on gender issues.
- **"Fragile State":** Fragility issues were not a focus of the FTI and do not appear to have directly influenced the design of the activities undertaken. However, the initial rationale for the FTI CF was related to the perception of Yemen as being under-aided which was seen as a characteristic of a number of fragile states.

Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency & Sustainability
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender: Improvement in girl's education (access, retention and completion of basic education) is a necessary condition for achievement of the MDGs and EFA goals in Yemen. The FTI proposal and endorsement processes were therefore highly relevant in advocating for systematic disaggregation of indicators by gender and focusing on potential strategies to address both supply-side and demand-side constraints. • "Fragile State": The EFA-FTI activities have not been relevant to addressing the various dimensions of fragility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender: On a small scale, the FTI CF grant phases 1, 2 contributed to provide in underserved governorates/districts adequate infrastructures to reduce distance to schools in mountainous rural areas. The FTI CF grant phase 3 has targeted a complementary measure on contracting female teachers to satisfy social expectations for girls. The provision of school kits also contributed to value access to schools for girls. The FTI EPDF supported studies provided evidence on the persistence of gender gap, relevance of supply-side & demand-side policies, social benefits of female literacy. The FTI EPDF also contributed to help design the conditional cash transfer scheme to benefit to a sample of rural girls enrolled in grades 4–9. • "Fragile State": the various aspects of the fragile context have constrained the effectiveness of government programmes and donor support but EFA-FTI activities have not directly addressed fragility issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender: The linkages of FTI supported activities through the catalytic fund or the education programme development fund with other government and donors funded activities in the area of girl's education is efficient. As an example the FTI CF grant phase 3 will help scale-up the female teacher scheme in rural areas already supported by bi and multilateral donors in other governorates/districts. The FTI EPDF supported studies consolidated evidence on what works and what doesn't for girl's education related policies. • "Fragile State": Security concerns have contributed to a relatively limited donor in-country presence which has constrained donor engagement.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to cross-cutting issues likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender: Progress in reducing the gender gap is slow. Promising policies to tackle gender gap in access (female teacher scheme) and retention (conditional cash transfer) are donor dependant. Economic downturn and daunting public finance perspectives might challenge scaling-up of pilot initiatives. • Fragile State: Yemen's context remains highly fragile in a number of dimensions and although overall capacity (as measured for instance by the World Bank CPIA) has improved over the period since 2002, vulnerability to conflict and fiscal vulnerabilities are likely to have worsened. 		

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