

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Case Study: Pakistan

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draft

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Summary information for Pakistan

- Currency = Pakistan Rupee (PKR)
- Exchange Rate (10 June 2009) USD 1 = PKR 81
- Fiscal Year = 1 July – 30 June
- School year = September – June
- Structure of education system:
2 years pre-school + 8 years elementary + 4 years secondary + higher
- Population: 173 million (July 2008 estimate)
- Population growth rate: 2.2% p.a.

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Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation will provide an opportunity for reform and change if necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation will draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and make a series of recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness. Most importantly it is hoped that, as a result of this evaluation, progress towards expanding and enhancing educational opportunities will be strengthened.

The evaluation is independent but is jointly supported by a consortium of donors. The evaluation is taking place between November 2008 and December 2009. The Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) is made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society. It is coordinated by Joe DeStefano (email: jdestefano@futureofschooling.org).

The evaluation team is a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM).

The evaluation includes nine country case studies, in Cambodia, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen.

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For regular updates about the evaluation and the most recent outputs please refer to the evaluation website at: www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Preliminary Report. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

Burkina Faso	<i>Burkina Faso Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
Cambodia	<i>Cambodia Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
Ghana	<i>Ghana Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
Kenya	<i>Kenya Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
Mozambique	<i>Mozambique Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
Nicaragua	<i>Nicaragua Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
Nigeria	<i>Nigeria Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sulliemman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
Pakistan	<i>Pakistan Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
Yemen	<i>Yemen Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

Ethiopia	<i>Ethiopia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
Malawi	<i>Malawi Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
Mali	<i>Mali Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Moldova	<i>Moldova Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
Rwanda	<i>Rwanda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Uganda	<i>Uganda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
Vietnam	<i>Vietnam Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
Zambia	<i>Zambia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

S1 This is one of nine country studies carried out as part of the mid-term evaluation of the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The FTI was launched in 2002 by a partnership of donors and recipient countries to "accelerate progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015". The FTI has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent evaluation to see whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. A full explanation of the evaluation, its methodology and its timetable is provided in the *Evaluation Framework*, available from the study website at www.cambod.com/fasttrackinitiative. The Pakistan country study draws on field work in June 2009.

Sector Context

S2 Pakistan is a Federal state, comprised of four main Provinces (Punjab, Sindh, the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan) together with a number of other territorial units (the capital territory, federally administered areas on Pakistan's borders, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir). The four provinces account for the vast majority of Pakistan's land area and population, but are very different from each other in population size, ethnic composition, political economy and other dimensions. Since independence more than sixty years ago, Pakistan has experienced alternating periods of military and civilian rule. Since 2001, efforts at political and administrative devolution down to the district level have changed the landscape for the delivery of basic services.

S3 The Pakistan economy grew rapidly during most of the 2000s, but has more recently been affected by the political turmoil and global economic downturn in 2008. Pakistan is not highly aid dependent, but the aftermath of September 11, 2001 highlighted Pakistan's strategic importance in the "war against terror". International ties that had been affected by a nuclear test and by the return to military rule in 1999 were renewed, and there was a resurgence in aid. Measured by aid commitments as a proportion of GNI, aid levels rose from about 1% to 2% over the period to 2007, but with fluctuations linked to debt relief.

S4 On many economic, social and governance indicators, Pakistan has underperformed compared with its Asian neighbours. Income and wealth distribution is highly unequal, and analysts identify deep-seated reasons in its political economy for the apparent lack of "political will" to make mass education a priority. There are long-standing governance concerns related to endemic corruption at all levels and to systemic weakness in public financial management.

S5 Attitudes towards the use of aid to support large-scale improvements in basic services, including education, are coloured by the experiences of the Social Action Programme (SAP) during the 1990s. Coordinating multi-donor support across provinces and sectors proved immensely complicated, and there was inadequate ownership at provincial level. Weaknesses in governance and financial management were exposed, and the government failed to fulfil its commitment to increase its own funding of social services.

Progress Towards EFA

S6 Pakistan has signed up to EFA and the MDGs, but consistently low levels of public expenditure on education and on social services in general suggest that the level of political commitment is, in practice, rather weak. Successive EFA Global Monitoring Reports have highlighted that Pakistan is off track for achieving universal primary education by 2015, and accounts for a substantial share of the global number of children out of school. Pakistan

underperforms compared with its South Asian neighbours and other countries of comparable average income. Education performance is marked by deep disparities based on gender and wealth, as well as across regions of the country. Moreover, there are deep concerns about the quality of the education that is provided. There are large deficits in basic infrastructure and teaching materials, and fundamental weaknesses in the systems for training, engaging and managing teachers. The available assessments indicate very poor levels of learning attainment, while primary cohort completion rates are estimated at well under 50%.

Table S1 Summary Timeline of FTI and Other Relevant Events in Pakistan

Year	Event
1998	National Education Policy (1998–2010) developed – one of a number of documents outlining how GoP intends to meet EFA targets.
1999	Civilian Government Overthrown. Military Rule Under General Pervez Musharraf.
2000	Millennium Summit adopts MDGs. World Education Forum. Pakistan among signatories of Dakar Declaration.
2001	Education Sector Reform (ESR) Programme (2001–2004) includes core objective to improve the literacy rate and universalise primary education.
2001	Beginning of decentralisation to district level.
2001	9-11 attacks highlight Pakistan's strategic importance and presage re-opening of aid ties and a resurgence in aid flows.
2002	FTI launched. Pakistan receives letter of invitation as one of five large countries to receive "analytical and technical support", and confirms interest in participating.
2003	MOE complains to FTI Secretariat at lack of progress in seeking endorsement and additional funding. MOE has prepared a Pakistani version of the Indicative Framework.
2004	FTI Secretariat informs Pakistan of approach adopted under the FTI Framework document. Pakistan will not qualify for Catalytic Fund. Secretariat notes that Pakistan's federal system would require adaptation of the FTI model. [but no evidence of subsequent work to follow this up].
2005	Commencement of support through EPDF – between 2005–2008 Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of EPDF support.
2008	Return of civilian rule.
2008–2009	Contacts with FTI Secretariat suggest continued FTI interest in engaging with Pakistan.

The FTI in Pakistan

S7 When the FTI was launched in 2002, Pakistan was included as one of five large countries (along with Bangladesh, DRC, India and Nigeria) that were invited "to receive analytical and technical support as a first step towards possible eligibility for financing".¹ The Federal Ministry of Education expressed interest, and saw this particularly as an opportunity to attract additional external finance for the sector. It prepared a document which, inter alia, sought to show where Pakistan stood against the benchmarks of the Indicative Framework, and to set targets related to those benchmarks. However, these targets were never made operational.

S8 Pakistan's efforts to seek endorsement and additional external finance through the FTI foundered for several reasons. When the original design was crystallised in the 2004 FTI Framework, the FTI Catalytic Fund was made available only to "donor orphans", and Pakistan did not qualify. Pursuing the endorsement process, as a way of stimulating coordinated and strengthened donor support for a credible national plan to achieve the core FTI goal of UPC (universal primary completion), would have required active support from a lead donor, and a willingness of donors as a group to collaborate in supporting the exercise. Neither of these conditions was met. In turn this was linked to a deeper issue: as acknowledged by the FTI Secretariat in 2004, the design of the FTI as set out in the Framework did not fit federal cases like Pakistan, where responsibilities for basic education

¹ Letter from WB Country Director to Pakistan MOE on 25 June 2002.

were devolved to sub-federal levels. The work that would have been required to adapt the basic model to such cases was never undertaken.

S9 However, as an "analytical fast track" country, Pakistan was eligible for support through the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), and has been one of the biggest EPDF recipients, with a total allocation of more than USD 1.4 million between 2005–2009.

The Education Sector

S10 The country study examines education progress in six interrelated areas, highlighted in bold below.

S11 **Education Sector Policy and Planning:** Responsibilities for basic education are divided between federal and provincial level, and decentralisation during the 2000s saw a further transfer of the responsibilities for basic education service delivery to the district level. At federal level, the Ministry of Education has been weakened by the transfer of responsibilities to other Federal bodies, such as the Higher Education Commission (HEC), which effectively has Ministerial responsibility for tertiary education, and the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), which has a direct role in relation to basic education. The bulk of federal expenditure on education now falls under other bodies than the MOE, and this has had a debilitating effect on the MOE itself.

S12 Since 2001, the government has been actively encouraging the private sector to increase its role in education provision (including through public-private partnerships), but the state remains the largest provider of education, covering 67% of total primary enrolment. The IMF and World Bank have acknowledged that Pakistan's recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest.

S13 The federal government has adopted a consultative approach in the development of national strategy documents (engaging in particular with donors and with the growing number of civil society organisations in the sector) but it has taken an inordinately long time for such documents to be finalised. Moreover, national education policies and plans (as in other sectors) remain very weakly articulated with the annual plans and budgets – mostly at sub-federal levels – that more directly affect service delivery in practice.

S14 **Education Financing:** Despite repeated commitments (and even obligations in federal legislation) to increase allocations to education, public expenditure on education remains restricted to less than 2% of GDP per annum. Public budgets are dominated by recurrent costs, for teacher salaries in particular. There are systemic problems in the utilisation of development budgets at all levels, which are regularly underspent by as much as 50%. A major reason for this underutilisation of funds is the complex financial allocation and release system whereby authority to allocate and release funds rests at the federal and provincial levels while actual utilisation of funds is highest at the district level.

S15 Various estimates have been made of the "financing gap" that needs to be filled if EFA targets are to be achieved. These differ greatly in their scope and methodology, but it is clear from all of them that the existing levels of public expenditure are far short of requirements. At the same time, there is no mechanism for such "gap" calculations directly to influence public policies or expenditures.

S16 The share of donors in education finance has steadily grown since 2001, with current estimates resting at 11% of the education budget. Traditionally, external funds have been

utilised for development budget, and most external funds have been disbursed through project modalities.

S17 In addition to government spending, there is substantial private spending on education. Education appears to be a highly valued good at the household level, including among poor households.

S18 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: The FTI design gives central importance to improved data and analysis as a basis for better policies, without which additional expenditure may be fruitless. FTI's data gap perspective is particularly relevant for countries which, like Pakistan, were invited to join an "analytical fast track", and this is the area where the FTI (through the EPDF) has made its most obvious input.

S19 There are major concerns about the quality of basic data on education. Administrative data are heavily reliant on self-reporting, and annual education statistics do not cover non-government institutions (the five-year census in 2005 was the first to do so). Donors have supported efforts to strengthen data collection (including EMIS in several provinces), but there are few signs that the government itself systematically uses the data available to monitor performance and to inform policy (though there are efforts to improve this situation through the Punjab and Sindh education sector programmes). The National Education Assessment System (NEAS), funded by World Bank and DFID, has carried out sample-based standard assessment exercises at Grade 4 in 2005-06-07-08 (the latter including private schools on a pilot basis) and at Grade 8 in 2008.

S20 There is a particular concern about data collection and use at district level, since monitoring, if it is to be effective, needs to take place at the levels responsible for service delivery. Data on adult literacy are especially weak, and governance issues in the management of teachers render the related data unreliable.

S21 The EPDF financed about 16 activities in Pakistan, most of them analytical studies. Poor record-keeping made it difficult to identify and assess them. Generally, the studies conducted seem to have been relevant and potentially useful, although in some cases the link to basic education was, at best, tenuous. However, the EPDF seems to have been used primarily as a tactical adjunct to other World Bank activities. There was hardly any awareness of the EPDF as such, either in government or among donors, and it has therefore not been used in the strategic and capacity-building manner that its bilateral donor funders hoped for.

S22 Capacity: There are serious issues in terms of personal, organisational, and institutional capacities at all levels in Pakistan. They are linked to Pakistan's governance weaknesses which, in the education sector, are strongly manifested in teacher management, with systemic problems of political patronage, ghost and absent teachers, and a very weak role for head teachers.

S23 Weak capacity hampers policy and planning at federal and provincial levels and is also a central challenge to education management at the district level. Since decentralisation, the district government is responsible for the day to day planning and delivery of education. It is the district government which gets to assess the needs in the schools, identify the sites to build new ones, and make decisions on where to do reconstruction work, and is also responsible for undertaking monitoring of education delivery in schools. However, this tier of government continues to suffer from serious capacity gaps in planning, delivery and monitoring of education inputs.

S24 Weak capacity often reflects systemic weaknesses. For example, teacher training institutions are chronically under-resourced, and therefore often depend on external financing to run courses. "Development budget" activities, including capacity development, tend to be left to the donors, but, in the absence of effective national capacity development strategies, donor inputs are likely to be projectised, excessively focused on individual training and gap-filling, and of doubtful sustainability.

S25 **Aid Effectiveness:** Aid to Pakistan is dominated by a small number of large donors – the World Bank, AsDB, USAID, Japan and the UK. Part of the legacy of the SAP, also linked to subsequent decentralisation, is a greater tendency to operate through provincial-level partnerships. At Federal level, aid is coordinated by the Economic Affairs Division (EAD). The strategic reasons for supporting Pakistan since 2001 have ambivalent influences on aid effectiveness: the profile of education has been raised, as have levels of aid for basic education, but the urge to disburse for strategic reasons may be at odds with the requirements of delivering aid more effectively. Moreover, donors' in-country capacity is limited not only by the scale of the country (Pakistan's population exceeds the combined population of the 28 smallest FTI-endorsed countries) but also by security-related constraints.

S26 In terms of the Paris Declaration agenda: **alignment with government policies** tends to be un-demanding, because national policies and plans are stated in very general terms, yet reporting to government of aid commitments and disbursements is very unsatisfactory; **alignment with government systems** on the other hand is more difficult for donors, because of the complexity of federal structures, and the weaknesses in governance and public financial management that have already been described. The 2008 economic crisis was a setback in making Pakistan ineligible for further direct budget support from the World Bank, and its large education operations in Punjab and Sindh have been configured as sector support programmes. Coordination and **harmonisation** among donors is limited because there is not a strong and effective demand (as opposed to exhortation) from government; there are significant multi-donor collaborations clustered around the WB education programmes in Punjab and Sindh, while, interestingly, the government of NWFP and its donors are working towards a sector wide approach at provincial level, with Germany playing a pivotal role. Progress towards more **results-oriented** approaches is very limited, as is any realisation of **mutual accountability** in practice. As noted, the EPDF has not been used systematically to enhance country ownership or donor coordination.

S27 **Cross-Cutting Issues:** The most salient cross-cutting issues relate to inequalities. Gender inequalities have received the most international attention, and, despite some progress, the gender gaps in Pakistan remain large. However, they are part of a pattern of inequality that is strongly correlated with wealth, and much greater in rural than in urban areas, and linked to regional inequalities across and within provinces and territories. There is very limited attention to the educational needs of children with disabilities, and policy statements are often not matched by effective action. Although HIV/AIDS is seen by UNAIDS as a growing problem in Pakistan, preventive efforts are feeble for a variety of capacity and cultural reasons.

Overall Conclusions

S28 **Relevance:** The FTI objectives are certainly relevant to Pakistan. FTI's primary objective of facilitating universal primary education by 2015 is clearly consistent with Pakistan's needs, and with stated public policy. At the current rate the country is expected to have 3.7 million out-of-school children by 2015 (and this is probably a substantial underestimate). The expressed commitment to meeting EFA targets is, however, not

matched in action by the Pakistan government, as reflected in low budgetary allocations and political appointments in the education sector. This apparent lack of political commitment is a challenge to any donors seeking to engage with Pakistan.

S29 While the **objectives** of the FTI are clearly relevant to Pakistan, its current **design** is more problematic, since Pakistan does not fit the model where a single group of donors (and other non-government stakeholders) can usefully engage with an empowered national ministry of education. The final chapters of the report reflect further on how the FTI model might need to be adapted to become more relevant to Pakistan's situation.

S30 **Accelerating progress on EFA:** As already noted, progress in Pakistan continues to fall far short of what would be required to meet the EFA objectives. Thus far, the FTI has had no significant impact. Nor can it be said (as is argued in regard to some other large countries operating without FTI endorsement) that government and donors have found effective and adequate means of collaboration outside of the FTI mechanisms.

S31 **Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness:** Again, the FTI has so far made no significant contribution to the mobilisation of resources for basic education in Pakistan, nor to assisting government and donors in using aid more effectively.

Reflections

S32 The Pakistan case offers both retrospective lessons and future challenges for the FTI. On the former, it shows that the FTI was ill-prepared for the challenges of dealing with the large "analytical fast track" countries. It was slow to realise the special problems posed by the combination of size and federalism. In the absence of a donor willing to take an active lead, the FTI Secretariat lacked the capacity (and also the mandate) to move things forward. The lack of intellectual effort addressed to this group of countries contrasts with the amount of attention the FTI paid to the challenges of fragile states. It is hard not to conclude that the concern to increase the number of (small) endorsed countries outweighed concerns about the number of potential beneficiaries in larger countries.

S33 If the FTI is to be relevant to Pakistan in the future, it will certainly need to adapt its design. Moreover, although this has not been a comparative study, even casual observation shows that the characteristics and possibilities in different federal states are very different, and therefore the FTI will need to come up with country-specific designs for them. In Pakistan's case, each of its main provinces constitutes a different theatre of activity, with a different subset of donors involved. It would therefore be worth examining whether the FTI could operate in one or more provinces, endorsing and supporting a provincial-level sector plan. If, on the other hand, it is decided to keep the FTI engagement at an "analytical " level, the FTI will need to seek a more strategic instrument than the EPDF has, so far, proved to be.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB/AsDB	Asian Development Bank
AEPAM	Academy of Education Planning and Management (in federal MOE)
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AsDF	Asian Development Fund
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BISE	Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CCBs	Citizen Community Boards
CCI	Cross-Cutting Issue
CD	Capacity Development
CEF	Commonwealth Education Fund
CF	Catalytic Fund
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPD	Continuous Professional Development
CQE	Campaign for Quality Education
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EC	European Commission
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EDO	Executive District Officer
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
ESR	Education Sector Reforms
ESRA	Education Sector Reform Assistance
ESP	Education Sector Plan
ESSP	Education Sector Support Programme
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FANA	Federally Administered Northern Areas
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
FY	Financial Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNI	Gross National Income

GOB	Government of Balochistan
GoNWFP	Government of NWFP
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GOPj	Government of Punjab
GOS	Government of Sindh
GTZ	Germany Agency for Technical Cooperation
HEC	Higher Education Commission
HIES	Household Income and Expenditure Survey
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRCP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
ICT	Islamabad Capital Territory
IDA	International Development Association
IED	Institute for Educational Development
IF	Indicative Framework
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITA	Idara-Taleem-o-Aagahi (an education NGO)
LDG	Local Donor Group
LEAPS	Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools
LEG	Local Education Group
LGO	Local Government Ordinance
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEd.	Masters of Education
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MTDF	Medium Term Development Framework
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NCHD	National Commission for Human Development
NEAS	National Education Assessment System
NEC	National Education Census
NEMIS	National Education Management Information System
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NIPS	National Institute of Population Studies
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
P&P	Policy and Planning
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCE	Pakistan Coalition for Education
PDF	Pakistan Development Forum

PEF	Punjab Education Foundation
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PESRP	Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIFRA	Project for Improvement in Financial Reporting and Auditing
PITE	Provincial Institute for Teacher Education
PKR	Pakistani Rupee
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
PTSMC	Parents Teachers School Management Committee
SAP	Social Action Programme
SBMC	School Based Management Committee
SC	School Council
SEF	Sindh Education Foundation
SERP	Sindh Education Sector Reform Project
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMC	School Management Committee
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTL	Task Team Leader
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UPC	Universal Primary School Completion
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VEC	Village Education Committee
WB	World Bank

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PART A: APPROACH

1 Introduction

The Fast Track Initiative²

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is "accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015." (FTI 2004) It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.³ Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, FTI was designed as a compact that "explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' improvements in policy performance and accountability for results" (ibid. p3).

1.2 According to its *Framework* document (FTI 2004), the FTI's major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education
- More efficient aid for primary education
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.

1.4 The 2004 *FTI Framework* set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country level.
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes.
- **Support linked to performance:** The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources.
- **Lower transaction costs:** The FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves).
- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

² This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (see *Evaluation Framework, Annex A*, in Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a).

³ The Dakar Forum communiqué stated that "No countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources."

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed). Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI-specific instruments which can provide support at country level:

- The **Catalytic Fund (CF)**, set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The CF had disbursed USD 445 million to 21 countries as of December 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)** set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8 million (of USD 58.5 million committed for 60 countries) as of December 2008.

The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.6 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at Annex C of this report includes a summary of the main changes in FTI, as well as its involvement with Pakistan.)

Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.7 The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the MDG target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the TOR:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (TOR, ¶12)

1.8 The evaluation is being managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process is meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raises. The main outputs are shown on page iv above.

Evaluation Methodology

1.9 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI is to disentangle the activities and effects of the FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted is *contribution analysis*. This involves a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence is then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) FTI may have made to the overall results observed.

The Role of Country Studies

1.10 The work programme for the evaluation envisaged nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the

context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (TOR ¶21)

1.11 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with FTI.⁴ Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked the FTI's processes for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies have been conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in FTI, and it is expected that their reports will be of value to the countries concerned.

1.12 The rationale for the Pakistan case study, even though Pakistan was not 'endorsed', has three elements:

- The mid-term evaluation is required to assess FTI performance to date. This requires an understanding of elements of the original design that were not followed through as envisaged. It is therefore important to understand the reasons on both sides why full endorsement was not pursued, and to consider whether, and if so in what sense, this was a "missed opportunity". This entails considering the relevance of the FTI analytical approach (e.g. its focus on "gaps" in education policy and planning, in financing, in data and in capacity) to the Pakistan case, and the relevance or otherwise of the FTI "design" to Pakistan's circumstances.
- The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) appears to have been the main vehicle for FTI technical and analytical support to Pakistan. Pakistan has received one of the largest shares of EPDF resources, and, at global level, the EPDF itself has featured prominently in the relationship amongst the donors who support FTI. The Pakistan case study therefore assesses the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the EPDF support that has been provided to Pakistan. This also provides insights into the operation of the EPDF as a whole.
- The evaluation is also required to be forward-looking and to make recommendations about the FTI's future direction. Support to populous countries which have large out-of-school populations is still on the FTI agenda, and the FTI Secretariat recently made a renewed approach to Pakistan. The case study therefore considers the future relevance (if any) of the FTI to Pakistan. This includes considering how the FTI might need to adapt to the federal structure of Pakistan, as well as to the other distinct features of Pakistan's educational system and performance.

1.13 All the country studies take account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and M&E, aid effectiveness) which the FTI is intended to have. They aim to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. In Pakistan's case, because of the limited engagement with FTI, the study pays special attention to the overall pattern of aid to the education sector and to basic education in particular. The summary matrix used (see Annex K) has been amended to make it relevant to the considerations of external aid in general prior to FTI endorsement, and the team has focused the evaluation on level zero of the evaluation logical framework. See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to country studies.

The Study Process for Pakistan

1.14 The country case studies are based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

⁴ See the *Evaluation Framework's* Annex H for a full explanation of the choice of country cases (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a).

1.15 The Country Study team consisted of Stephen Lister (Country Study Team Leader), Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. Lister, Bano and Carr-Hill visited Pakistan between 28 May and 11 June 2009.

1.16 The team met a range of stakeholders from the government, donor, NGO and civil society communities, in Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. The team spent a day visiting Sheikhpura District where it met the district government officials and also held discussions with parents, teachers, members of School Management Committees (SMCs) and students in two state schools. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is provided in Annex B. A Country Visit Note (Lister et al 2009) summarised the team's preliminary findings and was circulated to in-country stakeholders.

Outline of this Report

1.17 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (§1.9 above), this report first reviews Pakistan's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B), then reviews Pakistan's interactions with the FTI and systematically considers the challenges in key educational themes of relevance to FTI (Part C). Part C is structured to consider each of the "gaps" identified in the FTI's founding documents (policy and planning, education financing, data and monitoring and evaluation, capacity development, and aid effectiveness, plus cross-cutting issues). Conclusions and recommendations regarding the FTI's past and potential involvement in Pakistan are in Part D. This study is not a full sector review, but is oriented towards understanding what the FTI influences on Pakistan have been, might have been, and might be in the future.

1.18 This country case study has aimed to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- all stakeholders in Pakistan with an interest in the education sector;
- the FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report;
- the EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee);
- any other interested parties.

1.19 The present version of the report is a draft. Comments are welcome and will be taken into account in the final version.

PART B: EDUCATION FOR ALL IN PAKISTAN

2 Pakistan Background

Overview

Pakistan in brief

2.1 Pakistan is a country of around 172 million people, 36% of whom live in urban areas and nearly a quarter of whom live below the poverty line. The population is growing at 2.3% per year. Pakistan's Gross National Income (GNI) is USD 141 billion, giving a GNI per capita of USD 870, which is slightly lower than the South Asia average of USD 880 per capita but higher than the low income country average of USD 578.⁵ Infant mortality rates are 78 per 1000 live births, and 31% of children under 5 are malnourished. 50% of adults are literate, and the gross enrolment rate is 84%, although only 73% for girls. On the Human Development Index, Pakistan ranked 139 out of 179 countries covered in the 2007/08 Human Development Report.

2.2 The Pakistani economy has grown rapidly in the 2000s. This growth came with relative price stability and meant that the debt burden was reduced and foreign direct investment grew, as investors perceived Pakistan as a strong emerging market. At the same time, Pakistan's support for the United States' and others' "War on Terror" expanded aid to Pakistan, although it placed some strain on domestic resources. However, the benefits of growth have not been distributed very evenly, and this together with rapid population growth meant that Pakistan was not on track to meet many Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets.

2.3 2007/2008, however, saw a set of domestic and external events that damaged economic growth, starting with the judicial crisis in Pakistan in March 2007 and continuing with the oil price spike, the global financial crisis, and the deterioration of the security situation. Pakistan sought additional international aid, including over USD 7 billion from the IMF in September 2008.

Distinct features from the FTI perspective

2.4 Several distinct features of Pakistan are especially relevant from an FTI perspective:

- Its size – Pakistan's population exceeds that of the 28 smallest FTI-endorsed countries⁶ combined.
- Its federal structure and complex internal politics which give rise to challenges in governance.
- Its poor record on human development indicators, including basic education.
- Its strategic importance, and hence aid relationships that are highly political.

2.5 These points are elaborated below. The time line in Annex C provides background.

The Political Framework

Federal structure

2.6 Pakistan comprises four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Balochistan, and some additional federal units – the Islamabad Capital

⁵ Pakistan At a Glance, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/pak_aag.pdf.

⁶ Out of 38 countries which had been endorsed by the end of 2009.

Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) and Northern Areas (FANAs), plus Azad Kashmir.⁷ In area Balochistan is the largest province with over 45% of the country's area while about half of the country's population lives in the province of Punjab. The four main provinces account for over 95% of the total population. There are strong contrasts between the four provinces which affect, among other things, the pattern of education and of aid to education at provincial level (see Annex D).

2.7 Pakistan is a federal republic with a Senate and a Legislative Assembly. The President is Head of State and Commander of the armed forces, and the Prime Minister is usually the leader of the largest party in the National Assembly. Each of the four provinces has a Provincial Assembly and the Chief Minister is the leader of the largest party in the Provincial Assembly. The constitution sets out the division of labour between federal and provincial governments and gives substantial autonomy to the provinces.

2.8 Pakistani politics is dominated by the military and a few civilian ruling elites. The military has intervened at various points to support or oust democratically elected politicians since 1958, when after a post-independence decade of political unrest General Ayub Khan declared martial law and presided until 1969. There was a brief interlude of civilian rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who came to power in 1972 following the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). However, in 1977 General Zia ul-Haq assumed power and ruled until 1988. A second period of democratically elected governments followed General Zia ul-Haq's death in 1988, when Benazir Bhutto's and Nawaz Sharif's governments alternated. In 1999, however, yet another military coup propelled General Pervez Musharraf to power. Following judicial crisis, increasing civilian dissatisfaction with Musharraf's government, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto while campaigning for the 2008 elections, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was elected in 2008 and Yusuf Raza Gilani was appointed Prime Minister. Shortly afterwards, Musharraf resigned and was replaced as President by Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP.

2.9 More recently, however, the development debate in Pakistan has been overshadowed by concerns about growing threats from Islamic militancy. The recurrent Taliban threats and actions have contributed to nervousness amongst the government, the development agencies and international investors. The government is too preoccupied with responding to these security threats to effectively invest time and resources in long-term development plans. The challenge of coping with over 2 million people displaced by the current military operations targeted at fighting Taliban militants in NWFP has further weakened the state's capacity to focus on more structural problems to development.

Decentralisation

2.10 In the early 2000s, progressive decentralisation beginning with the Local Government Ordinance abolished the existing system of divisions and greatly strengthened the role of the districts. The District Government now has more autonomy and administrative and financial powers, and is composed of the district administration that is responsible to the elected district leaders (Zila Nazim). At lower levels, the Tehsil administration has a similar structure (the first time that the local level administration has been made nominally accountable to local elected officials).

2.11 The provincial government transfers funds to district governments under a one-line budget, leaving it to the district government to decide how much of the budget to spend on

⁷ Also known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Its population of about 4 million is not included in the total for Pakistan.

education (MOE 2008b). However, the district governments face serious constraints in executing their functions due to limited fiscal devolution, which allows them limited powers to generate their own taxes, and weak capacity of the staff at district level. Further, the very existence of this third tier of government in Pakistan is threatened under the changed political climate in Pakistan since the 2008 elections, where the elected parties feel limited ownership of this structure introduced under a military regime.

National Development Strategy and Performance

National strategies

2.12 The period starting from 1999 was marked with intensive activity at planning policy reforms in Pakistan. Having ousted an elected government, General Musharraf embarked on a major reform agenda to secure domestic and international legitimacy. Starting from 2000, a series of high profile policy initiatives were introduced; central to these were the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and development of the decentralisation framework. Later the PRSP was followed with a Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) for 2005–2010. In parallel with the successive iterations of the PRSP a Vision 2030 document was developed in 2007 (see Box 1 below). Sector specific reform strategies were to be aligned within these overarching reform frameworks. Investment in education was in turn identified as critical for economic growth and poverty reduction. However, although provincial governments are consulted in their preparation, the national strategies are not explicitly coordinated with provincial plans.

Public financial management

2.13 Public financial management has been recognised by the government as a constraint to the effective implementation of its plans and strategies, and is featured in various government documents, including the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2003) that recognises the need for a comprehensive approach to PFM reform (Mahmood n.d.). The decentralisation to district levels has left some unresolved PFM issues around control of treasury and account officials at different levels. Reviews of the PFM system in provinces by the World Bank and others⁸ have found:

- disconnects between long-term plans and annual budgets;
- incremental and procedural budgeting rather than strategic budgeting;
- an absence of specialised staff in finance and planning offices at local government level;
- lack of information to monitor spending and budget execution;
- management and organisational issues at provincial and district finance and planning offices;
- stagnant internal auditing;
- poor capacity for local external audits; and
- weak legislative oversight, partly due to capacity constraints.

2.14 Pakistan sought to improve its public financial management in 1997 with the Project to Improve Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA). PIFRA included computerisation and a gradual migration to accrual accounting, modern auditing guidelines and automated tools; human resource and change management; and a management information system, a project management unit and office automation (World Bank 2005a). However, PIFRA took more than five years to take root, partly because policy makers appeared reluctant to

⁸ See GOP & Development Partners 2009, PEFA 2009, GOPj & Development Partners 2007, GONFWP & Development Partners 2007, GOB & Development Partners 2009.

address institutional issues and it remained difficult to translate top-level ownership into action. For example, World Bank 2005a notes that several changes (e.g. splitting the audit and accounts function, changing the budget classification) were perceived as threats to government staff and were therefore resisted. The five-year PIFRA II was approved in 2005 to continue PIFRA I and to work more closely with local government. The project is designed to work on the financial accounting and budgeting system; capacity building and upgrading the offices of the Auditor General and the Controller General of Accounts; and project management.

Box 1 National Policy Documents

PRSP-I (2003)

The first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I) was approved in 2003, and itself built on the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper presented in 2001. According to the WB-IMF Joint Staff Review of PRSP-II:

PRSP-I provided a broad policy framework outlining the road map for accelerating economic growth and poverty reduction in Pakistan. Its implementation resulted in steady progress in education and health outcomes, and in access to drinking water. The economy grew at about seven percent a year on average during 2003/04-2006/07, and the poverty headcount decreased from 34.5 percent in 2001/02 to 22.3 percent in 2005/06. However, in 2007/08, large external terms of trade shocks-the sharp rise in international commodity prices-in combination with policy inaction and internal political turmoil, led to rapidly growing macroeconomic imbalances. In the absence of adequate remedial policy measures to address these imbalances, economic activity slowed down and inflation rose sharply-hindering progress in poverty reduction, and balance of payments pressures intensified.

PRSP-II (2008)

In December 2008 Pakistan's new PPP government finalised a second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II) begun by the previous government. PRSP-II focuses on regaining macroeconomic stability and growth of 5-7% per annum and reducing the fiscal deficit to 3.3% in 2010 through nine pillars. It aims to create employment opportunities by liberalising and deregulating the economy and privatising in a transparent way. It aims for pro-poor growth, placing greater emphasis than PRSP-I on agriculture and manufacturing. It also aims to expand social protection, increasing spending on social protection from 0.3% of GDP in 2007/2008 to 0.9% in 2008/2009. This expansion is partly achieved by reducing expenditure on food and energy subsidies. Expanding social protection builds on the National Social Protection Strategy launched in 2007 and the Benazir Income Support Programme launched by the PPP government in 2008 that will cover 7 million families by 2009/2010.

The World Bank and IMF Joint Chiefs' assessment of PRSP-II (World Bank & IMF 2009) was concerned about coordination. The PRSP-II is a federal government strategy, and while provincial governments were consulted and provincial strategies are referred to in the document, PRSP-II is not explicitly coordinated with provincial plans. Neither PRSP-I nor PRSP-II is explicitly coordinated with the five year (2005-2010) Medium-Term Development Framework (MTDF) that was launched by the Planning Commission in 2005.

Vision 2030 (2007)

Both the recent PRSP and MTDF draw on the government's Vision 2030 for Pakistan. For the economy as a whole, the Vision 2030 envisages a 'developed, industrialised, just and prosperous Pakistan through rapid and sustainable development in a resource constrained economy by developing knowledge inputs.' The human development targets for Vision 2030 have been set in line with the Millennium Development Goals 2015.

Aid Relationships

The political economy of aid

2.15 Aid to Pakistan is strongly driven by geo-politics. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 highlighted Pakistan's strategic importance in the "war against terror". International ties that had been affected by a nuclear test and by the return to military rule in 1999 were renewed, and there was a resurgence in aid. The focus of the increased aid has reflected western security concerns. The association of militancy with low levels of literacy and increasing enrolment in madrasas made the education sector one of the major beneficiaries of increased aid flows.⁹ At the same time, security conditions constrain the posting of foreign staff and technical experts in Pakistan and limit the donors' capacity for effective utilisation of increased aid flows.

2.16 Pakistan's internal politics also present challenges for aid that is oriented towards poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. There are structural reasons why poverty and inequality persist, and these underlie the weak "political will" that is often referred to (Easterly 2001, Nadvi & Robinson 2004). For example:

the 2002 *Poverty Assessment* (Report no. 24296-PAK) found that, "The deepest and most pervasive poverty in the country is rural and it is worst in areas that have traditionally been considered 'feudal'. . . Rural elites have exceptional influence in Pakistan.. they have had relatively little interest in enhancing their constituents' access to education or insuring that the poor could obtain the protection of the law without elite intervention". [cited World Bank 2006d]

2.17 In turn, the governance issues which are often cited by donors have deep roots. Again, the WB Country Assistance Evaluation (World Bank 2006d) provides a typical commentary:

The Bank, as well the Government and other stakeholders, have long noted that governance issues in Pakistan have been impediments to development throughout the period. While governance is difficult to measure, there is evidence of serious problems:

- In the 1990s, two democratically elected governments were dismissed on the basis of corruption charges.
- As of 1996, when the World Bank Institute (WBI) began collecting survey data, Pakistan was ranked in the 15th percentile on surveys on control of corruption, the lowest in the South Asia region.
- An inquiry in 1996 by the education department of Sindh discovered that 2,932 schools in rural areas existed only on paper. Many of the buildings had been converted into guesthouses, stables, or storage facilities. The Punjab government discovered similar abuses; it found about 1,600 "ghost schools" which had not operated for years, but the teachers continued to get paid [World Bank 2004b]. Similar results were found in other Bank reports. The World Bank 2002 Pakistan Poverty Assessment (Report no. 24296-PAK) noted, "In surprise visits, Gazdar (2000) found that one quarter of the schools surveyed were not open, there were no teachers present at all in 19 percent of them, and only one teacher was present in 35 percent. Only 38 percent of the schools were classified as "functional", only a quarter of the schools had electricity, and only half had a latrine."

Lessons of experience – the Social Action Programme

2.18 Attitudes towards the use of aid to support large-scale improvements in basic services, including education, are coloured by the experiences of the Social Action Programme (SAP) during the 1990s (see Box 2 below). Coordinating multi-donor support across provinces and sectors proved immensely complicated, and there was inadequate

⁹ For more on aid and madrasa reform, see Box 9 in Chapter 5.

ownership at provincial level. Weaknesses in governance and financial management were exposed, the performance of the primary education component was particularly poor, and the government failed to fulfil its commitment to increase its own funding of social services.

Box 2 The Social Action Programme

The Social Action Programme (SAP) was a multi-donor effort led by the World Bank. It dominated aid for basic services from the mid 1990s. The initial SAP (1994) involved USD 200m of support from the World Bank plus other donors, and SAP II, from 1998, was even larger. However, the SAP came to be viewed as a colossal failure, and the experience had a marked influence on subsequent donor attitudes to service delivery, to programme design and to coordination of aid at the national level. The primary education component of the SAP was particularly disappointing, and the Government failed to increase its own social sector spending as envisaged.

The retrospective verdict on the SAP is illustrated by the following quotes from the evaluation of World Bank country assistance in 2006 (World Bank 2006d).

The 2001 Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report stated that the considerable support to SAP had not delivered commensurate results, that outcomes fell “far short of the SAP’S targets” and that “overall results in this area remain disappointing despite significant investments from the government and the international donor community including IDA-financed interventions. Primary education is by far the worst-performing, but the very poor governance (weak financial management, poorly motivated teachers with lax accountability for results) lack of leadership and resistance to mobilizing NGOs’ help undermined efforts in health, family planning, and community infrastructure as well.”

In addition to poor social outcomes, the Bank’s program failed to attain its primary intermediate output: an increase in Government expenditures for the social sectors. By 2002, the Government’s contribution to SAP as a percent of GDP had actually dropped.

SAP suffered from a number of major problems: complex project design, and large numbers of government units and donors involved, which in turn meant large administrative costs to appraise and supervise, and inadequate fiduciary safeguards on the use of funds. Finally, it is not clear whether sufficient Bank effort was put into the critical buy-in to the SAP by provincial ministers, and thus the program was not owned by the sub-national governments who were expected to implement it.

Among the design issues were: (i) inadequate mechanisms to measure intermediate results or the effectiveness of spending; (ii) overly complex project design. For example, although implementation completion reports stressed the need for focused projects with a limited geographical and administrative span, SAP involved twenty-seven government units and numerous donors with mission teams of more than twenty members; and (iii) financial management requirements which did not reflect the capabilities of the counterparts. Weaknesses in financial and project management were common.


Aid Flows

2.19 Pakistan’s aid profile as recorded in the OECD DAC statistics is summarised in Annex G, and shows the following main features:

- Pakistan’s aid commitments increased in 2001 from around USD 0.5 billion in 1999 to a level around USD 2 billion each year.
- Pakistan is still not heavily aid dependent. ODA has been running at about 2% of GNI. (Occasional higher ratios are associated with episodes of debt relief.)
- The number of major donors remains limited to a few: the World Bank (IDA), Japan, United States, ADB and DFID (see Figure 1 below).

2.20 Aid flows to education are reviewed in Chapter 6, and aid effectiveness is discussed in Chapter 9.

Figure 1 Share of total aid commitments by donor 1999–2007



Source: OECD DAC CRS

3 Basic Education in Pakistan

Responsibilities and Actors

Constitutional responsibilities

3.1 The government is constitutionally responsible for providing primary education to all and the state remains the largest provider of education, covering two thirds of total primary enrolment. According to the constitution, education is a concurrent subject, i.e. its responsibility is shared by the federal and the provincial governments.

3.2 The federal government is responsible mainly for policy and planning, coordination with provinces, curriculum development, coordination of foreign governments' and international agencies' inputs in development of Pakistan's education sector, and providing necessary funds for education to the provinces. The federal Ministry of Education has six administrative wings: curriculum wing, policy and planning wing, project wing, training wing, administrative wing and monitoring and evaluation cell.

3.3 Provincial Departments of Education are responsible for the administration of elementary, secondary, technical and higher education in the provinces. Each provincial department has many bodies such as the Curriculum Bureau, Provincial Institute for Teacher Education (PITE), Textbook Boards, Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE), etc. The provincial governments retain primary responsibility for pre-service teacher training programmes and thus have a central role to play in improving capacity for delivery of quality education within the schools.

3.4 Under the Local Governance Ordinance (LGO) 2002, many duties of actual management of education were devolved to district government (see Annex E). The LGO 2002 devolved responsibility for planning the infrastructure, manpower, and financial needs of the basic education sector (pre-primary, primary and elementary) to the district level. The school management responsibilities of district government include planning new schools, including their location and financing, and then arranging for inspection of schools to ensure compliance with standards. The district government is also responsible for the annual evaluation of teachers and head teachers and shares, with the provincial governments, responsibility for in-service teacher training.

The MOE and other federal agencies

3.5 Apart from decentralisation of authority within the education bureaucracy, another noticeable feature of the education reforms since 2001 is that Tertiary Education, Technical and Vocational Education and Adult Literacy have been separated from the Ministry of Education into separate commissions or bodies which are not answerable to the ministry. In addition, separate bodies and institutions have been established that work in parallel to the Ministry of Education for delivery of basic education. Examples of the latter include the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) – which has been appointed as the primary body to deal with adult education – and the national and provincial Education Foundations, which are semi-autonomous bodies working with NGOs and the private sector education providers. There has thus been a hollowing out of the Ministry of Education since 2001 with the intention of ensuring more efficient service delivery.

Non-government actors

3.6 Since 2001, the government has been actively encouraging the private sector to increase its role in education provision. This policy shift, which has also been actively supported by some donors, is considered further in Chapter 5.

3.7 The education sector is also marked by the presence of a large number of NGOs working in service provision. Many NGOs run innovative non-formal school models while some are also involved in running whole school improvement programmes in selected state schools. The number of NGOs is continuing to grow, and a sign of their growing influence is that under donor-funded projects, the government is increasingly contracting teacher training of government teachers to NGOs and allowing them to adopt government schools (Sarwar 2006). In the past few years, two coalitions of education NGOs – the Pakistan Coalition for Education (PCE) and the Campaign for Quality Education (CQE) – have also emerged though their capacity to run sustained campaigns to initiate policy reforms remains very limited (Bano 2007a, Bano 2007c).

The Education System

Formal Education Structure

3.8 The basic education system in Pakistan is organised on the basis of 2+8+4: two years of pre-primary; eight years of elementary (five years for primary and three for middle); and four years of secondary (two years for secondary and another two for senior secondary). Urdu is the medium of instruction and English is taught as an additional language.

Early childhood education (ECE)

3.9 The education sector in Pakistan had an established tradition of Katchi (pre-primary classes) which used to be part of the formal primary schools until the 1970s. These classes were almost discontinued during 1980s. However, the National Education Policy (1998–2010) argued for reintroducing pre-primary classes in primary schools and the position was consolidated in the subsequent Education Sector Reform (ESR) plans and the White Paper. ECE has been given special attention in the White Paper and other initiatives around it include development of a separate curriculum for ECE, formation of an ECE Cell in the MoE, and sponsorship of pilot ECE programmes by donor agencies. Under ESR for the first time, budgets were provided to the provincial governments for ECE programmes (Aly 2007). The private sector schools have a well developed pre-primary education section. The government is also trying to engage the communities to take over the role of running ECE centres. The government hopes to secure greater support of the donor agencies to help develop and implement the national ECE curriculum.

Adult literacy

3.10 Adult literacy has also been an area of importance for the government whereby almost 15 major literacy programmes/projects have been launched in the country since independence. However, most programmes were terminated before completion (Aly 2007). Since 2002, the National Commission for Human Development has launched a literacy programme at the national level, initially in 16 districts (4 in each province) and later expanded to 105 districts. The Commission launched over 6,000 basic literacy centres. However, effectiveness of its literacy programme has yet to be independently assessed and the sustainability of the programmes is under question due to a dramatic decrease in the budgetary allocations for the commission (its budget for 2008/09 was reduced by 50%).¹⁰

¹⁰ See also Box 6 in Chapter 5 below.

Non-formal education

3.11 The government is also actively supporting non-formal education programmes to meet the EFA targets. The non-formal schools are being run primarily by NGOs with the support of the donor agencies and the government. The federal government runs a non-formal Basic Schools programme. The project is implemented through NGOs: the government provides the teacher's salary and a fixed fee to the NGO for monitoring the schools. The schools are based on multi-grade teaching with a single teacher for class I-V and age groups 5-14 years. In 2008, 10,185 schools with a population of 361,747 were actually working. In addition, many donors directly support NGOs to run non-formal school programmes to reach the girl child and to reach children in remote communities. The Sindh Education Foundation (SEF) received support from the World Bank supported Sindh Education Sector Support Programme to run community based school programmes.

Technical education

3.12 While there has been a lot of emphasis placed on technical and vocational education in the policy documents, such plans have not been integrated with the main education policies, and investment in this sector has been very limited. The National Technical and Vocational Education Commission is housed outside the Ministry of Education. The White Paper noted that research shows that students from lower income families opt for technical subjects and strongly advocated serious investment in the sector and better coordination between the Ministry and the Commission. It also argued for introduction of technical subjects in schools in a phased manner, beginning at the middle level as awareness campaigns and later as separate fully-fledged streams starting with Class IX, preferably in separate schools.

Education Sector Performance

Overview

3.13 Pakistan has signed up to EFA and the MDGs, but consistently low levels of public expenditure on education and on social services in general suggest that the level of political commitment is, in practice, rather weak. Successive EFA Global Monitoring Reports have highlighted that Pakistan is off track for achieving universal primary education by 2015, and accounts for a substantial share of the global number of out-of-school children. Pakistan underperforms compared with its South Asian neighbours and other countries of comparable average income. Education performance is marked by deep disparities based on gender and wealth, as well as across regions of the country. Moreover, there are deep concerns about the quality of the education that is provided. There are large deficits in basic infrastructure and teaching materials, and fundamental weaknesses in the systems for training, engaging and managing teachers. The available assessments indicate very poor levels of learning attainment, while primary cohort completion rates are estimated at well under 50%.

Expenditures


3.14 Despite repeated commitments to increase allocations to education, public expenditure on education remains restricted to less than 2% of GDP per annum. The government policy documents frequently note the need to increase the allocation to at least 4% of GDP. The White Paper argued for raising the financial allocations to 6% of GDP by 2015 and the current Minister for Education in the interview with the evaluation team argued that he would like to see the allocation go up to "4% in immediate future and up to 8% by 2015." However, despite verbal commitments, none of the governments have made the envisaged increases in allocations.

Progress towards EFA

3.15 The National Education Strategy focuses on the six EFA targets. It in particular places heavy emphasis on issues of access at the ECE, elementary and secondary levels. Further it expresses commitment to improving the quality of education through investment in qualitative inputs including provision of better teacher training facilities, curriculum reforms, better assessment of student performance and better gathering of education statistics. The education strategy also argues for increased financial allocations to education by increasing public allocations to education to 6% of the GDP by 2015.

3.16 However, Pakistan is off-track for achieving the EFA targets (see Annex F for an overview of education indicators). Net intake rates for primary education remain below 90%. There are serious gender disparities (which are discussed later), but poor survival rates mean that only about 60% of the age group complete Grade 5 (see Figure 2 below). The GMR predicts that Pakistan will have at least 3.7m children out of school in 2015.

Figure 2 GMR 2010 Estimated Cohort Completion Rates for Pakistan




From GMR 2010: South and West Asia Regional Overview, Figure 3.

3.17 Pakistan performs significantly less well than its South Asian neighbours and is held back by inequalities in several dimensions – see Figure 3 below, which illustrates disparities by wealth, by urban/rural location, and across provinces. Within each of these categories, there are gender gaps (girls account for 60% of out-of-school children), but the gender gap is much worse among the poor and in rural locations; Punjab has the smallest gender gap among the main provinces, NWFP the biggest. See Box 3 below on the factors behind gender inequities.

3.18 Further, the quality of education in terms of teaching content and curriculum as well as school infrastructure is very weak – 61% of primary state schools have no electricity, 41% have no drinking water, and 23% have no textbooks. A study testing learning achievement of grade 5 students studying in both public and private schools of Pakistan across 8 districts, where 2 districts were included from each of the four provinces, shows that of the 1902 students (1155 urban and 747 rural) tested the scores were very poor. The mean percentage scores in Maths, Urdu, and Science were 46%, 57%, and 49% respectively. The children from private schools did better but only marginally. Similarly, surveys conducted between 2003–2007 under the Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) show that children perform significantly below curricular standards for common subjects and concepts at their grade level. By the end of grade 3, barely 50% of children had mastered the mathematics curriculum for class 1 (Andrabi et al 2008).

Figure 3 Pakistan's primary school attendance is marked by gender, regional and wealth inequalities



Source: GMR 2010 Figure 2.9.

Box 3 Explaining Gender Disparities in Primary Education

Pakistan is off track for achieving universal primary education by 2015. The country accounts for a significant share of the global out-of-school problem. Failure to tackle gender disadvantages that intersect with poverty and regional differences is at the heart of the problem.

Deep disparities based on location and wealth are a feature of education in Pakistan. In the richest households, over 85% of children go to primary school, with little difference between boys and girls. Attendance rates for children from poor households are far lower, especially for females: only around one third of poor girls are in school. Similarly, attendance is higher and the gender gap smaller in urban areas than in rural ones, and in the relatively wealthy Punjab province than in Balochistan and Sindh [see Figure 3 above].

The North West Frontier Province stands out as having above average attendance for boys but well below average attendance for girls. There is growing concern that this gender gap could be widening further. In the Taliban-occupied parts of the province, 91 girls' schools have been destroyed and 25 damaged, with some boys' schools also suffering.

The factors behind Pakistan's deep gender disparities have been extensively researched. Distance to school matters far more for girls than boys, reflecting security concerns and household labour demands. Girls' enrolment drops off sharply with each 500-metre increase in distance from the closest school admitting girls and this 'distance penalty' accounts for 60% of the gender gap in enrolments. Cost factors can also disadvantage girls because households tend to spend more on boys.

The presence of a government school in the community has a significant positive effect on girls' enrolment. As there has been a marked trend towards sex-segregated primary education, the absence in some areas of all-girl government schools has emerged as a major constraint on girls' schooling. Insufficient recruitment of female teachers is another constraint. Rural parents strongly prefer to have girls educated by women, but the legacy of low investment in girls' education means few local women have appropriate qualifications. It is also difficult to attract qualified female teachers to rural areas from other parts of the country.

Education policy documents increasingly recognize that more weight has to be attached to gender equity, but it is far from clear that the current policy framework provides concrete measures for translating statements into action. Policies indicate community needs as criteria for the location of new government primary schools, for example; however, research suggests that community economic status and the extent of gender disparity have had little influence over the placement of new government schools.

Overall levels of public financing remain low, education is weakly integrated into national poverty reduction strategies and there have been limited attempts to introduce the type of incentives for girls' education that have been successful in Bangladesh, which has moved far ahead of Pakistan in terms of enrolment and gender parity.

Sources: Aly 2007; Andrabi et al 2008; Lloyd et al 2007; O'Malley 2009; GOP 2003a.

Source: GMR 2010, Box 2.8.

PART C: THE FTI IN PAKISTAN

4 Overview of the FTI in Pakistan

FTI Background

4.1 The FTI was announced in 2002 as an initiative to accelerate global progress towards the goals of Education for All. It highlighted in particular the goals included in the MDGs – of universal primary education and gender parity. Drawing on analytical work that had been undertaken by the World Bank (Bruns et al 2003) it emphasised the importance of universal primary completion (UPC) as an objective, and linked this to a set of education policy benchmarks that became known as the Indicative Framework (IF).

4.2 The FTI emerged from consultations among concerned donors, including work by the G8 group. Eagerness to seize what was seen as a favourable political opportunity meant that some important design issues were unresolved at the time the FTI was launched, supported by a very small Secretariat located in the World Bank. One such issue was the countries to be targeted. The initial idea was to target additional support on a small group of countries judged to have good prospects of adopting more effective policies, and to use their positive experience to galvanise others. At the same time, there was pressure from senior supporters of the initiative to demonstrate that it was of sufficient scale to make a global difference. In the end, the list of countries invited to join was augmented by the inclusion of five large countries, including Pakistan, which accounted for a large proportion of the world's out-of-school children. They were invited to join an "analytical fast track".

4.3 The nature of the support to be provided through the FTI was also not clear at the outset. There was a definite intention to expand the aid available in support of UPC, but the FTI's originators sought to avoid creating another global vertical fund; instead they emphasised that scaled-up support should be provided by existing aid partners through their regular programmes, as part of an "FTI compact" in which additional support would be linked to the country's own efforts focused on a "credible" education sector plan. Moreover, financial support was envisaged as part of a balanced approach which would address four "gaps": there needed to be simultaneous improvements in education policy and planning, in data, monitoring and evaluation, and in capacity building, as well as additional domestic and external finance for basic education. Coherent efforts to address these gaps would also seek to increase the effectiveness of aid, while working through country systems rather than creating new parallel approaches.

4.4 The more worked-out design of the FTI was eventually crystallised in the Framework document (FTI 2004). This made it clear that the lead in organising FTI support was to be taken by the existing in-country donors. In line with this, the FTI continued to work with a very "lean" secretariat; the lead donor in each country was expected to be the principal FTI point of contact with the Ministry of Education. A Catalytic Fund (CF) was established to provide temporary additional support to countries seen as "donor orphans". Over time, the scope of the CF was expanded, so that it is currently accessible to all IDA-eligible countries whose education sector plans have been endorsed by the FTI. In 2004 an Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) was also established. This was particularly oriented towards helping countries with analytical and planning work that would facilitate endorsement, and it was explicitly open to the five "analytical fast track" countries.

The FTI and Pakistan

Invitation and prospective endorsement

4.5 Pakistan's initial initiation to be involved with the FTI was controversial. As noted in the Preliminary Report of this evaluation:

The Action Plan foresaw a beginning to the fast-tracking even while discussions continued on the overall architecture. A small number of countries were invited to apply for endorsement, but, although the initiative was announced at the G8 meeting in June 2002, there were still basic disagreements about how the initiative should operate. ... Senior proponents of the initiative were dismayed to find that the initial set of invitees accounted for only a small proportion of the world's out-of-school children; others were then surprised to find that some very large countries had been added to the announced initiative at the last minute. (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b ¶2.20)

4.6 Pakistan was among five large countries added in this way (the others were India, Bangladesh, DRC and Nigeria). The acting World Bank country director wrote to the Minister of Education on 25 June 2002, noting that 23 countries were on the first invitation list. The invitation letter to Pakistan drew an explicit connection between initial analytical support and the possibility of additional financing:

Eighteen of the twenty-three countries have met eligibility criteria that would enable them to receive additional support including financing to support their primary education programs. In addition, five countries with large out-of-school populations have been identified for analytical and technical support that could enable them to potentially qualify for fast-track financing. It is my pleasure, on behalf of the EFA Partnership, to invite Pakistan to participate in this program as one of the five countries to receive analytical and technical support as a first step towards possible eligibility for financing.

4.7 Pakistan responded favourably to the invitation, but the subsequent correspondence between the MOE and the FTI Secretariat was sporadic, and the FTI Secretariat was very slow to respond to communications. In November 2003, MOE wrote to the Secretariat in the wake of the EFA High Level Meeting that had been held in Delhi, and just before the FTI meetings that were due to be held in Oslo. The MOE expressed dissatisfaction with progress thus far; it stated that designating DFID as lead donor for the FTI had not been successful, and that MOE intended to take matters into its own hands. It had established a technical committee, which had prepared a Pakistan version of the Indicative Framework (enclosed with the MOE letter) and planned to carry matters forward in consultation with local donors.

4.8 Pakistan did not receive a substantive reply from the FTI Secretariat until 3 May 2004, in a letter which drew attention to the refinement of the FTI approach which had been agreed in Oslo. The letter also made clear that Pakistan would not qualify for support from the new FTI Catalytic Fund, and highlighted the difficulty posed by the federal distribution of responsibilities in Pakistan:

The conclusions of the Oslo meeting and next steps are set out in the summary of the Co-Chairs, a copy of which is attached. On March 30, 2004, the FTI Framework document was adopted by the donor partners which incorporates these conclusions. I attach a copy for your reference. The main implications of the Oslo meetings concern the FTI entry criteria and resource mobilization.

With respect to the FTI criteria, the goal of the FTI is to support faster progress towards the completion of primary education by all children in low income countries through support for sound and sustainable education policies and programs. This applies to all low income countries with PRSPs and an education sector development program, supported by the PRSP, which contains a program to achieve complete primary education for all children by 2015 and is endorsed by the donors currently supporting the education sector. As part of the program and agreement, participating countries also

agree to monitor progress on a set of common indicators (called the FTI Indicative Framework).

With respect to financing, the FTI promotes resource mobilization among the donor partners supporting a country's education sector program. When donor partners endorse a country's sector program for FTI, they also take on the responsibility of mobilizing additional resources, where needed, through their bilateral and multilateral programs or other venues, such as Consultative Group meetings. However, this process may not suffice to fill the program's financing gap where there are few donors supporting the education sector. For these situations, the FTI has established a fund – the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund – which provides transitional (2-3 year) financing with the anticipation that progress demonstrated will encourage other donors to support the program through regular aid delivery channels. Pakistan would not qualify for funding under the Catalytic Fund, given the purpose for which it was established. Therefore, you may wish to contact the donor partners that currently support education in Pakistan to discuss how FTI might work for you.

The FTI also promotes donor harmonization, with the conviction that the harmonization of procedures and of financial delivery mechanisms will lower transactions costs for countries and donors alike, and will strengthen a focus on results.

For large countries with Federal/state systems, where states or Provinces or districts are responsible for education financing, the FTI "country" model would require some adaptation. I thank you for bringing this important point to our attention. To address this, I would suggest that we take a two-prong approach. On the Secretariat's part, we will initiate a discussion among the FTI donor partners about how the FTI can be adapted to the circumstances of countries where the financing of primary education is not primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government, looking in particular at your situation. At the country level, I would suggest contacting the donor agencies active in education to express your interest in the FTI and to explore how the FTI can play a role in Pakistan. I will also request the World Bank's Pakistan team to inform the local donor partners of your interest. (Letter from Head of FTI Secretariat, dated 3 May 2004, emphasis added).

4.9 There were further sporadic contacts between the MOE and the FTI Secretariat. Pakistan attended the FTI Partnership Meeting in Brasilia on 10-11 November 2004 and spoke on behalf of the South Asia group, drawing attention to the disproportionately low share of aid the region receives, and calling for much larger support from the donor community, in the context of the Dakar commitment. On 12 November 2004, the FTI Co-chairs (USAID and Sida) wrote to the Pakistan Minister of Education (cc Ministers of Finance, Economy and Planning). This letter appears to have been part of a general "recruitment drive" by the FTI, but although the MOE wrote to the FTI Secretariat again in March 2005, there appears to have been no substantive follow-up. In late 2008 two officials from Pakistan participated in an FTI workshop held in Kampala, and there has been some subsequent correspondence between MOE and the FTI Secretariat. In practice, however, the idea of Pakistan becoming an FTI endorsed country has not been seriously pursued.

4.10 Pakistan's uncertain position in the FTI's plans is reflected in the references to its status in successive FTI reports – see Box 4 below.

Box 4 Pakistan's reported status in successive FTI status reports etc.

FTI Report	Pakistan's status description
Stocktaking Report, Nov 2003	initially invited for enhanced technical support
Status Report Nov 2004	"potential 2006"
Progress Report Dec 2005	[no information]
Status Report Nov 2006	endorsement "expected 2008"
Annual Report 2007	no endorsement date, included under "other eligible"
CF Status Report Dec 2008	"other"


Source: *Evaluation Framework*, Annex J2 [updated]. (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a)

Analytical and technical support (EPDF)

4.11 On the other hand, Pakistan has been one of the largest recipients of EPDF funding (see Figure 4 below). Pakistan's total allocations were more than USD 1.4 million between 2005–2009. Pakistan's EPDF allocations are described in more detail in Annex J, and are also discussed in the context of Chapter 7's review of data, monitoring and evaluation.

4.12 However, the EPDF has not been a very visible element of the relationship between Pakistan and the FTI. EPDF inputs have been managed by the World Bank, and the federal Ministry of Education, as well as other government agencies, have been barely, if at all, aware of their FTI provenance.

Figure 4 Total EPDF Allocations by Country, 2005–2008 (USD)



Source: Bellew & Mook 2008, Chart 10 (updated to include 2008).

4.13 Pakistan's eligibility for EPDF support has remained somewhat controversial among the aid agencies funding the EPDF. General concerns have been expressed about the World Bank's failure to "brand" EPDF products as such and to link them to the FTI, and the use of the EPDF to support studies that are not directly related to primary education has also

been queried. There have also been concerns about the EPDF process in Pakistan; thus the minutes of the EPDF committee in April 2008 record:

EPDF funding requests, Three requests were submitted ex ante: Bangladesh (US\$130,000), Pakistan (US\$310,000), and Haiti (US\$500,000).

The EPDF Committee approved the requests for Haiti and Pakistan, with comments. ... Regarding Pakistan, the Committee would like assurances that local education groups, which include Government and CSOs endorse the EPDF proposals.

4.14 In parallel with the FTI mid-term evaluation, an FTI task team was undertaking a thorough internal review of the EPDF and of its possible future configuration.

Current situation and perspectives

4.15 The limited interaction between FTI Secretariat and Pakistan reflects a keenness on the part of Pakistan's federal MOE to gain FTI endorsement, and thereby to access additional external funding. On the other hand, the FTI Secretariat was very slow in its responses, and never followed up on its resolve to explore ways of making the FTI more relevant to federal cases such as Pakistan's (cf. the 2004 letter quoted at ¶4.8 above). There was a conspicuous lack of interest among Pakistan's main education donors in taking up the issue of FTI endorsement. It is not surprising that the federal MOE feels that expectations were raised and then disappointed.

4.16 The continued interest of the Pakistan federal government in securing FTI endorsed status was reconfirmed during the interviews with government officials during the country visit. Those who had engaged with the FTI Secretariat did voice a great sense of disappointment with the FTI Secretariat as well as the potential FTI lead agencies in Pakistan. Some came to the conclusion that FTI has "simply not worked out the mechanisms of working with the large states" and that the pursuit of endorsement was futile. They also perceived varying attitudes among the local donors, with some local donors, such as DFID, failing to come to grips with FTI requirements despite initially wanting to engage with it, while other development partners such as the World Bank were "always lukewarm". One respondent noted: "The Bank was too keen to remain focused on Punjab Sector Reform programme. We felt that the donors are not serious about it.....If we looked at the countries, which were reached by FTI, they were little countries. We were constantly evaluating FTI and had meetings on it from time to time."

4.17 However, despite the frustration of the past experience and cynicism expressed by some of the capacity of the FTI Secretariat, all respondents expressed continued interest in FTI. Even the Executive Summary of the Education for All Mid-Decade Country Assessment Report prepared by the Ministry for Education for UNESCO, notes, "Pakistan is a member of the UNESCO High Level Group on EFA and E-9 Forum and a potential EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) country". (MOE 2008c)

4.18 In addition to the government, within the civil society groups during the country visit, there was recognition and demand for FTI to play a role. The Pakistan Education Coalition (PEC), the coalition of education NGOs in Pakistan initially supported by the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF), has in particular has been lobbying for FTI endorsement. The coalition is keen to secure funds available under EPDF to support national education coalitions:¹¹ "We have been trying to lobby for FTI endorsement because the NGO coalitions for Education from the endorsed countries are eligible to secure double the amount of fund from FTI than the non-endorsed countries."

¹¹ Through a project managed by the Global Coalition for Education that has been approved for EPDF funding.

4.19 On the other hand, within the donor agencies in country even during the interviews there was no matching interest in the FTI. There appeared to be three main reasons for this position. First, it was felt that since September 11, 2001 Pakistan is already receiving more aid flows than the education sector can absorb. Second, it appears that due to the security situation, Pakistan is considered a difficult country to deal with and given the high pressures from the head offices to disburse funds, the staff in the field offices are not keen to cope with additional coordination requirements that would come with the FTI. Finally, there was also lack of confidence expressed in the FTI in general by some respondents within donor agencies. The FTI was viewed to be on one hand quite complicated and on the other it was seen to be having little evidence of success on the ground, thus further reducing the appeal for the donors in country to adopt it.

4.20 The current status regarding the status of the FTI in Pakistan thus remains remarkably unchanged since the inception of the FTI. As at the time of its launch, Pakistan (not just the government but also the NGO sector) remains interested in securing FTI endorsement but the donors share little enthusiasm for subjecting their activities to an aid coordinating framework in a country where they admit that aid flows and their utilisation are closely tied to security concerns continually redefined at the head office level.

5 The FTI and Education Policy and Planning

Context

The FTI perspective

5.1 Policy and planning was one of the four main "gaps" identified in the FTI framework (along with finance, data and capacity). The FTI embodied a holistic approach: it stressed that the four gaps needed to be tackled simultaneously and coherently, and the FTI Indicative Framework was seen as a pointer to the key policy and planning issues to be tackled. The FTI envisaged a credible government plan as a focal point which donors could support, financially and in other ways. The FTI highlighted Universal Primary Completion (UPC) as a key objective, but, again, this was to be the centrepiece of efforts to achieve all the EFA targets; the emphasis on primary *completion* (UPC) and not just *enrolment* (UPE) reflected a concern for education quality, not just access. And it was expected that plans to achieve the basic education targets of EFA would be part of broader education sector plans. (FTI 2004)

5.2 In principle, a sector plan that satisfied FTI criteria for endorsement was supposed to stimulate the country's education partners to step up their financial support through their existing channels. In practice, the FTI Catalytic Fund assumed increasing importance, and access to the CF became, for most FTI countries, the main motive for seeking endorsement of their sector plans. As the FTI evolved, there was increasing stress on engagement with a broader set of country stakeholders, to be represented in a Local Education Group (LEG) that was wider than the Local Donor Group (LDG), involving civil society representatives as well as the education ministry.

5.3 As explained in the previous chapter, Pakistan was always seen as belonging to a special category of FTI countries, and formal FTI endorsement of its education plans was never pursued. Nevertheless, it is possible to review the evolution of planning and policy in Pakistan and to assess the FTI's actual and potential relevance.

Public policy commitments

5.4 The state commitment to providing education to all in Pakistan is as old as the country itself:

A strong role for education was recognized by the founders of independent Pakistan, and UPE was established as a goal at the first National Education Conference in 1947. However, military tensions with India and perceptions of national security needs led to relatively high military expenditures and relatively low education expenditures—an unfortunate spending pattern that still persists.

Over the years, the goal of UPE has been repeatedly announced in national conferences and policy papers, but each time shifting the timing further into the future. (World Bank 2007g)

5.5 In 1998, ahead of Dakar, an Education Policy (1998–2010) was developed, which became the key document to guide the government policy planning exercise initiated from 2000. Significant policy documents produced in the immediate post-Dakar period included: the 10 year Perspective Development Plan (2001–10); a National Plan of Action on Education for All (2001–2015) prepared in 2003 in collaboration with UNESCO; and short and medium term action plans such as the Education Sector Reform Plan 2001–2005. The numerous strategy documents and action plans produced explicitly addressed the six key EFA goals. The draft National Education Policy 2008 similarly prioritises increased access to ECE, elementary, secondary and higher secondary education, literacy and non-formal learning, in addition to bringing qualitative reforms through improving teacher quality,

curriculum reform, quality in textbooks and learning materials, improving student assessment and investing in technical and vocational education. More recently, the 160 page long EFA Mid-Decade Evaluation report produced by the Ministry of Education Policy and Planning Wing (MOE 2008c) reflects the government's continued commitment to align its policies with the EFA targets. As well as being comprehensive, the plans are also quite honest about the challenges in reaching these goals.

5.6 The MOE thus feels it has done well in terms of preparing comprehensive national EFA Action Plans, and this underlies its frustration with the FTI: "We developed all the policy documents; we even prepared the indicative framework for FTI but we received no response."¹² However, such documents do not necessarily meet the standards of a "credible plan" for achieving UPE or UPC. The next section considers how relevant and operational such plans have been.

Credibility of Public Policy and Planning

Issues in planning and implementation

5.7 Ultimately, plans and policies need to be judged according to their results. As noted in Chapter 3 (¶3.13ff), Pakistan has consistently fallen short of its EFA goals, although the demand for basic education is probably stronger than it has ever been. (Box 5 illustrates this and also hints at some of the systemic problems that affect the sector, viz. a situation in which delegation is so limited that the waiting room of a Provincial Secretary can be filled with individual petitioners.)

5.8 Below we consider the consultation process and ownership of Pakistan's plans, how operational they are, and whether they get to grips with the basic factors that affect the delivery and the quality of basic education.

Consultation and ownership

5.9 The federal government has adopted a consultative approach in the development of national strategy documents (engaging in particular with donors and with the growing number of civil society organisations in the sector) but it has taken an inordinately long time for such documents to be finalised. Moreover, national education policies and plans (as in other sectors) remain very weakly articulated with the annual plans and budgets – mostly at sub-federal levels – that more directly affect service delivery in practice.

5.10 Since 2000, the government of Pakistan has led a series of consultative dialogues, to guide the education policy and planning process. All key stakeholders – government staff, donors, NGOs, and academics – have been part of this consultation process. However, the consultative process has been stretched for too long, to the point of impeding actual implementation of reforms – the policy dialogue which started in 2005 led to production of the White Paper in 2006, a revised White Paper in 2007, and a draft Education Policy in 2008. But the policy was still not finalised in 2009: instead, the new government initiated another round of consultations at the provincial level.

¹² See ¶4.7 in the previous chapter.

Box 5 The unmet demand: parents ask for help but can the state or donors respond?

"I am here because I want to request the secretary to help me purchase textbooks for my three children. I say my life has passed but at least my children must study." Naz, a thirty-three year old mother of three, started talking to a member of the FTI evaluation team while waiting to see a Provincial Education Secretary. She has been a frequent visitor to the Secretariat since her husband, a craftsman, fell from the roof while on duty and severely damaged his hand and has been in bed since then. Naz, who is now sustaining the family on daily wages of PKR 150 earned through work in a factory, is desperate to ensure continuity of education for her two sons and a daughter, all three of whom are enrolled in low-fee private schools: "I want so much that my children should get good quality education. My children study so hard. See here are their school reports; see their grades are so high. But, I cannot afford to buy their textbooks and copies. I have therefore been coming to the secretariat to ask for support to buy these books. They keep sending me from one official to another. I am now waiting to take my 'darkhuast' [the letter of request] to the Secretary because he might help. I only studied till matric. I have to work so hard in the factory to make ends meet. See I am only in early thirties but I look as if I am already in forties. I don't want my children to live such a life".

This desperate desire to find financial means or institutional facilities to educate their children, including daughters, was shared by a group of mothers met during the country visit in a government-owned primary school in Sheikhpura, which is supported by an NGO. During the visit, mothers from the community pleaded with the FTI team to pressurise the government to upgrade the school to at least middle level so that their girls can carry on studying: *"We want our girls to study after primary. However, there is no secondary school for girls in the area, and we cannot send these girls to distant schools because you know public transport is not safe. We have now even employed a teacher who we are ourselves paying [the teacher was also brought to meet the team] but that is not a substitute for proper learning in a school. Currently, she teaches in a room in a house. There is a different learning when you leave the home and sit in the formal building of the school. We say we will pay for the teacher's salary; just add more classrooms to the school so that our girls can continue studying. The only alternative would be either make them stay at home or to send them for courses to madrassas which are in the local area and where they can become alamas [religious scholars] because our men feel that they will be secure there."*

The high demand for education among parents from all income groups was also acknowledged by representatives among many donor agencies and is also confirmed by numerous studies.¹³ As one donor representative noted: *"Education is a highly privileged good at the household level in Pakistan. But, education is seen as a private good and the notion of comprehensive national policy on education is not known here..... Pakistani parents do definitely want to have their children go to schools but they are failing to create the public demand on the state to deliver it."* The question is whether the state and the donors can leave this active demand unmet.

5.11 NGO representatives have time and again expressed concern that they should be consulted but their suggestions for reforms do not find much space in the policy documents. This is also reflective of the limitation of the NGOs' own working processes. While NGOs are very active in the education sector, their ability to exert influence on the state remains restricted as increasing number of NGOs act as contractors and service providers to the government on donor-supported programmes. In addition, NGOs' capacity to lobby or influence the government through advocacy remains limited: the two education NGO coalitions – PEC and CQE – are recent inventions and owe their existence to donor funds. They have yet to develop the strong lobbying mechanisms needed to influence government policies.

¹³ And Annex H of the present report draws attention to the high level of household expenditure on education revealed by household surveys.

5.12 Thus, although the policy documents and plans are arguably a product of heavy consultations involving the key stakeholders, in particular donors and NGOs, this does not ensure that there is broad ownership of them. Moreover, as discussed next, there are serious flaws in the plans themselves.

How operational are the plans?

Link to costs and budgets

5.13 National education policies and plans (as in other sectors) remain very weakly articulated with the annual plans and budgets – mostly at sub-federal levels – that more directly affect service delivery in practice. There are no detailed action plans prepared by the provinces to support systematic movement towards attainment of targets set in the education policy documents. Nor is there any adequate monitoring mechanism to adjust the plans based on past performance: the PC5 form, which is the primary instrument designed to monitor and evaluate the impact of development projects, is rarely completed. (See Chapter 6 for more on the costs and financing of education, and Chapter 7 on M&E.)

Project focus

5.14 Government planning in Pakistan has traditionally focused primarily on projects and the development budget, with much more limited attention to sector-wide issues and policies. The tendency to view things in project terms limits the ability of plans to be coherent and strategic. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6, the implementation rate for projects and the development budget is characteristically poor.

5.15 This emphasis on a project rather than a programme approach to policy planning also seems to have contributed to the adoption of inefficient means to achieve the desired EFA targets. During the 2001–2005 period, the policy process increasingly supported measures which were advocated to be innovative and thus having the potential to reform the system, but which tended to bypass the main government institutions through the establishment of parallel structures while postponing the required institutional reforms.

Gaps between planning and implementation responsibilities

5.16 The federal MOE has led the preparation of the national policy documents and plans, but under the Education Sector Reforms (ESRs) initiated between 2001–2004, many of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Education were taken away from the Ministry's mandate and assigned to new agencies or parastatal bodies. Examples include the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD). The primary justification for this redistribution of responsibilities was argued to be task specialisation. However, in practice, the setting up of institutions which often are given special status allowing them to operate outside standard government procedures indicates a tendency to look for short-cuts rather than addressing the underlying structural problems.

5.17 The ad hoc nature of the NCHD's creation and its vulnerability to political change are illustrated in Box 6 below. Similar concerns apply to the Education Foundations. These are semi-governmental organisations, linked to the Ministry of Education, which were established between 1991–1994 to facilitate private sector participation in education. Under the ESR, the Foundations were in theory appointed as the main government agencies to provide the public-private partnerships in the education sector and were supported by most donors (e.g. they have been engaged as partners in the World Bank-supported education sector programme in Sindh and Punjab). However, the Punjab and Sindh Foundations have had problems in getting their budgets approved after the recent change of government. The senior leadership of PEF was removed by the new government and the Education Secretary,

Punjab was given additional charge of the Foundation. The Chief Executive of SEF was also removed for eight months but then brought back.

Box 6 The National Commission for Human Development

The National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) was established through an Ordinance in 2002. It was primarily given the portfolio of literacy and basic education. However, the political decision to create it was not well grounded in a needs assessment. The Commission was established on recommendation of a Task Force, which produced a report in six months. The report presented no proper analysis of the challenges faced by the Ministry of Education in provision of basic education and proposed no detailed reform action plan. Nor did it have any costing estimates to meet the EFA goals. All that the report presents in terms of a strategy is the idea of transplanting the 'incubators' approach from the business models:

Two separate incubation programmes have been identified to: i, support the restructuring initiatives with change management, government process re-engineering, and competency building within line departments and newly elected representatives; ii, strengthen the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) focused on education, healthcare and micro-enterprise, improve their rate of success and increase their capacity. (Page 108)

President Musharraf approved the establishment of the Commission on the basis of this report and noted in the approval letter: "In June 2001, I created a special Task Force on Human Development to develop innovative strategies for delivery of primary education, adult literacy, primary health care and propose plans for capacity building in social sectors. .. For this I have set up the National Commission for Human Development, to be chaired by Dr Nasim Ashraf. To support the activities of the Commission I have created a Trust Fund." If this directive itself did not indicate the ad hoc basis of this decision, the change in government did. After the change of government in the 2008 elections, the new government slashed the annual budget of the NCHD and released only PKR 472 million against the requirement of PKR 874 million so that NCHD had to sack 45,000 of its 87,000 employees.

Source: PTFHD 2002

5.18 The working of these parallel structures raises concerns about the political basis of education policy formation in Pakistan and the tendency among the government and the donors to look for quick fixes where large sums of educational funds are channelled through parallel structures that bypass the standard government procedures rather than investing those resources in addressing the systemic obstacles to the delivery of education on a sustainable basis.

The provincial dimension

5.19 The biggest disconnect between plans and the responsibilities for implementation arises from the distribution of responsibilities across the tiers of government (see Annex E for details). Federal plans are not systematically translated into plans and budgets at the provincial level and, since devolution, the provincial governments themselves have a challenging relationship with the districts. As reported by one high provincial official:

The devolution from province to district level is a grey area. The major challenge we feel is with the priorities of the district governments. We have to really push them to understand that these particular funds are being provided for such a such programme and have to be utilized for that. So this is a difficult area where lots of problems keep on arising and I don't see any immediate resolution.

Public and private sector roles

5.20 Since 2001, the government has been actively encouraging the private sector to increase its role in education provision (including through public-private partnerships), but the state remains the largest provider of education, covering 67% of total primary enrolment.

The IMF and World Bank have acknowledged that Pakistan's recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest.

Box 7 Private schools: promises with limits

The government's failure to meet the EFA targets has led to growing recognition within the government policy documents of the role of the private sector, which is already estimated to represent 33% of the total school enrolment. The position is also supported by lead donor agencies in Pakistan, especially the World Bank. The Bank has sponsored some influential studies on the importance of the private sector in Pakistan and the World Bank Education Sector programmes in Punjab and Sindh also work through the Punjab and Sindh Education Foundations to directly support private schools. However, many observers regard the expectations from the private sector as a bit exaggerated. It is clear that private schools are less viable in the rural areas and less accessible to the poorest groups. Further, the quality of education provided within most is only marginally better than state schools.

While private schools are also increasing in rural areas they have a natural limitation on expansion in the rural population due to very practical modalities of running private schools. As Alderman et al 2003 argue, based on a study in Balochistan, private schools in the urban areas have advantages like attracting good managers and teachers at a relatively low cost and are particularly successful in attracting female teachers). As opposed to this, in the rural areas it is much more difficult to find educated women who can become teachers and managers in private schools. Andrabi et al 2008 show how the rise of private schools in rural areas is linked to the existence of a government secondary school, without which there are unlikely to be enough secondary-educated females in the area who can become teachers in private schools.

Also, the private schools fail to cater to the poorest. The first round of the Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) survey, which was carried out in all the public and private schools offering primary-level education in 112 villages of Punjab, found that access to private schools is not universal: rather, private schools choose to locate in richer villages and richer settlements within villages, limiting access for poor households. This finding matches the national trend: private schools are expanding more rapidly in the more prosperous provinces of Punjab and NWFP than in rural Sindh or Balochistan. Between 1999–2001, the share of private schools in the total increased from 15% to 30% in Punjab and from 4% to 17% in NWFP, but grew only from 16% to 21% in Sindh and from 4% to 6% in Balochistan (Andrabi et al 2006).

Research shows that parents opt for private schools not only because of lack of access to state schooling but also because the quality of education in state schools is perceived to be extremely low (Khan et al 2003). This means that private schools are often able to get away with poor performance because relatively uneducated parents have only abysmal government schooling to compare with private schooling (Khan et al 2003). This also has another negative effect: since anyone who can afford it is sending their child to private schools, only the poor are really left in the government schools and due to this crowding out of relatively prosperous students those who remain in the government schools have even fewer resources or means to influence the government to improve the quality of education in these schools. In general, while the expansion of the private sector is increasing access, it is also raising concerns about the poor being forced to opt for private schools which might be marginally better than the government schools but are still providing very low quality education. Over-emphasis on private provision is likely to lead to lack of access or access to very low quality schooling among the poor.

A reviewer of the LEAPS report sums up the concerns in these words: "The only reason the private schools look so good is that the poorly performing public schools are so disastrous: if at some future date, children actually started demanding something more than the most rudimentary education, the semi-educated teachers in the private schools would actually find it hard to cope" (Andrabi et al 2008).

The IMF and World Bank, in their comments on the PRSP, note that Pakistan's recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest. (World Bank & IMF 2009)

5.21 The policy shift towards the private sector has also been actively supported by some donors, both by building provisions within their aid packages to include the private sector and by funding studies that have highlighted the importance of the private education sector (Zia & McBride 2008). Some influential studies supporting the role of the private education sector in Pakistan have been conducted with the support of the World Bank (e.g. LEAPS, Andrabi et al 2008). The World Bank and the government of Pakistan data estimate between 30-36% of the primary school enrolment to be in private schools (MOE 2006a; World Bank 2007a). However, there continue to be many concerns about the limits of the private sector to cater to the needs of poor families and to ensure equitable quality of education to all (see Box 7 above).

5.22 This emphasis on trialling alternative models has also led to an increased reliance on private sector provision in the policy documents. Though not explicitly stated, the state has practically withdrawn from establishing new state schools – a fact noted by an official in Punjab. With the population expanding annually at 2.2%, two-thirds of whom live below the poverty line, this reliance on the private sector as a central pillar of education policy is unrealistic and is unviable and seriously limiting in terms of equity (see Box 7 above).

Box 8 Where are the real problems?

The World Bank's evaluation of its support to primary education characterised the fundamental problems as follows:

The main story of primary education (grades 1 to 5) in Pakistan since independence from Great Britain in 1947 is that of a struggle to achieve universal primary education (UPE) under severe resource constraints, organization and management problems, and a government structure that hinders good management.

It is useful to consider a few simple questions that put the problems in perspective. The mission team asked a number of Pakistani interviewees the following questions:

- What is so difficult about building appropriate schools?
- What is so difficult about providing decently trained teachers?
- What is so difficult about supplying adequate textbooks?

The answers varied, but most did not have to do with complicated technical considerations; instead, they focused on inadequate spending, organization problems, and inadequate incentives.

Another way of posing this is in the form of a puzzle posed by Prof. P. Hoodbhoy in his book on education in Pakistan for the 50th anniversary of independence [Hoodbhoy 1997]: Why do other institutions in Pakistani society (the military, military schools, railways, electricity authority, etc.) function, albeit not perfectly, while the public education system does not function? The answer is partly one of resources, but also one of organization and public sector incentives to carry out basic functions and to deliver basic goods and services.

Source: World Bank 2007g

Issues in implementation

5.23 Evaluations of donor support to social services in Pakistan have consistently identified systemic problems in implementation as the greatest challenge (see Box 8 above for an eloquent example). This is corroborated by Pakistani interviewees: a typical statement was "The main problem with education in Pakistan is not with the planning but with the implementation." The symptoms of a dysfunctional system noted by our interviewees include the immense problems in teacher management and deployment ("education gets treated as an employment issue and not an education issue"), the extremely poor quality of the primary education that public schools provide ("The government goes for financial audit, they don't go for academic audit"), and the

characteristic difficulties in project implementation (the latter are discussed further in the next chapter).

5.24 Box 9 below uses the issue of policy towards religious education to illustrate the gap between policy and implementation, and the political factors that may explain this.

Box 9 Madrasa reforms: The missing will?

The role of religious education within government schools in Pakistan has historically been a cause of contention between religious and secular forces within the Pakistani state.¹⁴ The curriculum has been argued to be insensitive to the religious minorities and held responsible for promoting a strong Muslim rather than a national identity. Since September 11th 2001, while there continue to be concerns around Islamisation of the regular curriculum by the state, the primary concern has shifted to madrasas (Islamic seminaries) which impart religious education to Pakistani children. The madrasas are considered to teach an extreme interpretation of Islam, which on one hand is feared to lead to religious sectarianism and on the other hand to contribute to international Islamic militancy.

With financial support from the USA, the government of Pakistan launched a USD 225 million madrasa reform programme in 2002. The reform programme provides the madrasas support to recruit teachers for teaching of secular subjects at primary and intermediate levels. However, by 2008 the reforms had failed to win support within the madrasas: only 250 out of the approximately 16,000 registered madrasas had accepted the reform programme.

The main reasons for this slow progress rest in the lack of political will and weak administrative capacity. Because of their close ties with the religious elites, the military elite did not push the reforms despite apparently prioritising the reform programme (ICG 2002). The government did not allocate the required financial resources. There were extreme delays in the release of approved funds to the provinces: as late as 2007 NWFP and Balochistan had not received the funds to release to the madrasas which had cleared the vetting process (Bano 2007b). The programme was heavily understaffed, with only two officials appointed in each province to execute the programme; further, there was no provision for vehicles and transport costs to enable the staff to visit the madrasas. The project was itself highly flawed. It asked for immediate introduction of secular subjects across the primary classes rather than gradually building the capacity for teaching secular subjects starting from first to second and then senior grades. It also did not build in correct incentives, as there was no provision made for the salaries of the teachers of the religious subjects including the head of the madrasa.

Finally, the ulemas' distrust of the Musharraf government's close contacts with the USA meant that they saw the reform programme as a Western attempt to control Islam. Thus, Western support to the Musharraf government actually undermined its ability to undertake serious reforms because it lost credibility within the religious community. Analysis of the reform programme shows that to achieve effective reforms, the state must win the trust of the religious community and should move to financing these reforms through the regular educational budget rather than through donor funds.

Overall, in a country where 98% of the population believe that Islamic studies should be a 'required' part of the curriculum, 60% believe that madrasas are an 'indispensable' feature of the existing educational landscape, and 40% are inclined to identify religious education as their 'top educational priority' (Nelson 2006), madrasa reforms or changes within the curriculum need more serious attention than they seem to have been given in the current reform programme.

At a more basic level, the weak implementation of the madrasa reform programme, despite high verbal commitment expressed to it by the government, highlights a fundamental challenge to the reform of the education sector in Pakistan: in general, policies are designed and projects are developed to appease certain constituencies (in this case Western governments) without the required political will to execute them in practice.

Source: Bano 2007b, Bosch et al 2008.

¹⁴ Although religious schools are a very small proportion of non-public schools.

Assessment and the Relevance of the FTI

5.25 While its educational needs are enormous, Pakistan provides an extremely challenging context for education donors. Donors have actively taken part in the consultation process during both the phases of intense dialogue between 2001–2003 and 2005–2007, and they have also facilitated this process by providing TA support in terms of advisors to the Ministry of Education and for policy research work. More recently donors have also been helping the planning towards provincial level sector support plans. The World Bank has led the process in Punjab and Sindh and is being supported by DFID in the former and EC in the latter. A joint donor collaboration with NWFP is in its initial stages.

5.26 Donor engagement has helped to keep EFA in the spotlight, and has helped to highlight key policy issues, such as the quality of education in terms of its learning outcomes, and the need to address sector governance and the politicisation of the teaching profession. As in the overall education planning process, donors have been able to put the pressure on the government to include gender issues and marginalised groups in policy formulation. However, as with overall sector planning, there is a lack of detailed plans that are credible and operational.

5.27 The donor tendency to focus increasingly on planning and implementation at the provincial level is realistic, and has been helpful in advocating and supporting systemic improvements. A notable example is that the World Bank Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP) in Sindh has negotiated a major policy shift towards merit-based teacher appointments to overcome serious impediments to improving the quality of education arising from the political appointment of teachers. However, it is too early to assess the success of these measures in practice. The shift towards supporting sector support programmes as seen in Punjab and Sindh and now in NWFP does indicate the potential for a shift towards programme level policy and planning.

5.28 The FTI has played no significant role in education planning and policy in Pakistan. The focus of the FTI design on national-level plans for EFA was only marginally relevant for Pakistan's circumstances, both because of the weaknesses of the national planning process that this chapter has described, and because of the federal system which locates the key responsibilities for basic education at sub-federal levels.

5.29 The danger of placing too much reliance on plans and policy statements was a principal conclusion of the Asian Development Bank's evaluation of its social assistance programmes:

The main points resulting from the assessment are:

- (i) There has been no shortage of well-intentioned policies, strategies, and targets for improving social sector performance in Pakistan, but the level of policy implementation and attainment has been extremely limited.
- (ii) In some cases, political instability has resulted in administrations being replaced before they could implement their policies.
- (iii) Policies generally appear to have been made in isolation from a detailed consideration of the resources required and available to implement them.
- (iv) Much of the time there was insufficient political or bureaucratic support for stated policies, at least by those allocating financial resources and with the power to influence outcomes.
- (v) These findings raise the question of whether it is sufficient to claim that ADB strategies are relevant based solely on their alignment with Government policies. In such circumstances a greater emphasis may need to be placed on supporting implemented actions rather than statements of intent. (AsDB 2005)

6 The FTI and the Financing of Education

Context

FTI Perspectives on education financing

6.1 As shown in Chapter 4, the apparent prospect of additional aid for primary education was a principal reason for the Ministry of Education's early interest in the FTI. The FTI envisaged reciprocal commitments with finance from FTI donors complementing a high level of domestic expenditure effort. Although the process of FTI endorsement was never pursued, there are several financial dimensions that are worth reviewing. This chapter therefore considers how relevant to Pakistan the FTI approach to calculating a "financing gap" has been, and the degree to which such a gap has been a binding constraint on progress towards the EFA and MDG targets. This involves considering the level of domestic expenditure effort, the quality of public finance management, and the efficiency of public expenditure on basic education.

Education finance in Pakistan

Historic levels of funding

6.2 Pakistan's public expenditure on education does not reflect well on the government's expressed commitment to meeting EFA targets. Public expenditure on education has remained broadly constant at around 2% of GDP over the period from 1999 to 2007. It thus remains stubbornly below the 4% of GDP targeted in the National Education Policy (1998) and recommended in the Ministry of Education and UNESCO's review of education financing in 2003. The Federal Debt Limitation Act (GOP 2005) committed to doubling health and education expenditures by 2012 (from their 2002 base) but such efforts to mandate a step-increase in expenditure have not been effective.

6.3 Public expenditure on education is complemented by households' own spending. In Annex H we draw on the 2005/06 household survey data to estimate total household expenditures on education. It shows that they are very substantial, adding approximately 63% to the estimated amount of public expenditure in that year. Inter alia, this is further evidence of the high value households attach to education.

Responsibilities for public finance of education

6.4 Public spending on education is mostly financed by federal revenues, which are shared with the provinces under the determinations of the National Finance Commission. The provinces' own revenues contribute just over 15% of the actual requirement. The districts (whose own revenue sources are even more meagre) in turn receive the bulk of their funds through the Provincial Finance Commissions' awards under a one-line budget. It is thus up to the district government then to distribute that budget among the different sectors. It is estimated for 2006/07 that 27% of public expenditure on education was executed at federal level, 17% by provincial governments, and 56% by districts. (Aly 2007)

6.5 Thus, while the largest amount of education funds are to be disbursed through the district government, the allocating and disbursing authorities remain at the federal and provincial levels. This has been a critical challenge in improving fiscal matters at the district government level. Furthermore, it leads to variations between provinces and districts in the amount of money allocated to education.

6.6 Because of the reassignment of responsibilities described in the previous chapter (¶5.16ff), the bulk of federal expenditure on education now falls under other bodies than the MOE, and this has had a debilitating effect on the MOE itself.

Public finance management and the efficiency of expenditures

6.7 The low level of public spending on education is exacerbated by obvious inefficiencies in its use. As one interviewee pointed out: "Even if 50% of the current resources were used more effectively, the situation would be much better." Symptoms of inefficiency include the very high proportion of expenditure that is absorbed by recurrent costs, including salaries, leaving only 5% to 10% for development costs across the three tiers of the government. Moreover, development budgets are chronically underspent, by as much as 50%, across all tiers of government. A major reason for this underutilisation of funds is the complex financial management system whereby authority to allocate and release funds rests at the federal and provincial levels while actual utilisation of funds is highest at the district level.

6.8 The general weaknesses in public finance management have been noted in Chapter 2, ¶2.13–2.14. Inefficiencies are compounded by the interaction of weak management systems and prevalent corruption, and the education sector is conspicuously affected, as illustrated by the summary of SAP experiences in Box 10 below.

Box 10 Corruption and inefficiency as experienced by the SAP

The evaluation reports for SAP I and SAP II noted the serious challenges posed to the programme due to systematic corruption across different tiers of the government. The World Bank Pakistan Country Assistance Evaluation (2006) noted the challenges faced by SAP I and II in recruitment, site selection, absenteeism and corruption for development projects. The evaluation further noted:

'Bank documents on the SAP report other governance issues such as "vehicles are working out of the program and should be recovered", "delivery of educational materials is essentially supply driven and does not reflect the needs of each school as determined by teachers and head teachers." Other Bank projects had similar problems. One reported the "75% of the teachers recruited were unqualified and had been appointed directly by political entities, teacher training programs were cancelled due to lack of vehicles; monitoring and quality of civil works was unacceptably poor and procurement issues persisted." Another project had the collapse of a part of a school under construction...; another noted that millions had been spent on the purchase of supplemental reading materials, even though no textbooks were delivered and that science demonstration benches had been delivered, while only half of the schools received the equipment to be used with the benches.'

Source: World Bank 2006d

6.9 This environment not only dissipates Pakistan's limited education budgets, it also raises the costs, and thereby reduces the efficiency, of providing aid. Donors are required to impose their own fiduciary safeguards ("there have to be credible means of tracking what is going on"), and are more likely to prefer to bypass government systems altogether. Major donors have sought to design their programmes to strengthen the fiduciary environment and improve fiscal sustainability. Thus, for example, the Punjab Education Development Policy Credit from the World Bank notes this to be the first of "three pillars of the Government's reform programme to be supported by the IDA credit: (i) ensure that the public expenditure continues to be increased and effectively used for education at both provincial and district levels; (ii) strengthen the districts' financing capacity and ensure that adequate resources are transferred to districts to meet education needs; (iii) increase transparency of financial management and procurement processes and practices, and (iv) strengthen provincial and district capacities to monitor financial flows." But progress is slow.


Trends in Education Finance

Aid for basic education¹⁵

6.10 This analysis is based on the OECD DAC data on aid commitments. For a fuller treatment, including an explanation of data sources, see Annex G. The DAC data suggest that aid commitments¹⁶ to education and basic education generally rose substantially over the period 1999–2007, with significant increases starting in 2001.¹⁷ However, total commitments fluctuated significantly, both from bilaterals and from multilaterals. There was also an unsteady rise in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid to education. Aid appears to be running at about 11% of government education budgets (though of course, not all such aid is passed through or recorded in those budgets).

6.11 Over the period 1999–2007, IDA was the most significant donor to education, followed by the United States – both donors have made consistent commitments from 2001 onwards. The EC also featured in the list of top five donors over the period, as did the ADB and Germany, all making yearly commitments consistently across the period (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5 Share of total commitments to education by donor 1999–2007¹⁸



6.12 The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education rose over the period from 18% to 62% (but with substantial year-to-year fluctuations). Over the course of the period 1999–2007, the IDA appears to be the largest donor to basic education, closely followed by the United States (Figure 6 below). The EC, the ADB, and the Netherlands make up the

¹⁵ See Chapter 2, ¶2.15ff for a review of aid in general.


¹⁶ Data on external aid come from the 2009 GMR, which drew on the OECD Creditor Reporting System to present data on commitments from 1999 to 2007. The analysis is limited to commitments, since most multilaterals had not been reporting disbursements.

¹⁷ The amount of aid to education is estimated using the GMR convention for attributing aid that is not directly committed to education (such as budget support) or to basic education (such as unspecified aid). This convention has it that Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level.

¹⁸ This also appears in Annex G as Figure G.7.

remaining top five donors. In terms of aid to basic education, the United States was the major donor in 2007, with a 52% share, followed by IDA with a 34% share).

Figure 6 Donor shares of commitments to basic education 1999–2007¹⁹



Estimates of the EFA financing gap

6.13 Annex I reviews various EFA costing exercises for Pakistan, investigating what techniques and models were used, what the scope of the exercise was, who was involved, and what conclusions were drawn. The costing exercises reviewed were:

- Submissions to the Dakar (2000) World Education Forum.
- Those in Bruns et al 2003 ("A Chance for Every Child").
- Work by the Ministry of Education and UNESCO (2003).
- Those for the PRSPs (PRSP-I in 2003, PRSP-II in 2008).

6.14 The review demonstrates that such "gap" calculations are not an exact science. The size of the estimated gap is sensitive to the scope of the exercise (e.g. reckoning for some or all of the EFA targets), to the unit cost estimates used in calculating overall requirements, and to assumptions about the level of financing available from domestic revenues. Since required donor funding (to fill the gap) is essentially calculated as a residual, changes in assumptions can lead to large differences in estimates of the aid required.

6.15 It is striking that all of the "resource gap" estimates reviewed in the Annex are detached from the processes of preparing, implementing and monitoring federal and provincial budgets in Pakistan. They provide crude estimates of the (daunting) scale of the challenges Pakistan faces, but there is no indication of their systematic use in practice to drive policy and budgeting.

6.16 The estimated financing gaps presented are widely different, but they all require very large increases in public expenditure on basic education, both from additional external

¹⁹ This also appears in Annex G as Figure G.9.

assistance and by raising the share of GDP and of the government budget that is allocated to basic education. Box 11 below summarises the WB and IMF staffs' commentary on the PRSP-II projections. Its key points are:

- An acknowledgement that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest.
- Comment on the margins of error inherent in such calculations.
- A note that the PRSP envisages a substantial increase in spending on education as a proportion of GDP, and advice that, in view of constraints on total resources, much of this will need to be achieved by shifting resources from other uses to accommodate the needs of basic education.

Box 11 WB-IMF Assessment of PRSP-II Expenditure Projections

E. Costing, Budget, Financing and Targets

25. The strategy emphasizes that PRSP-II implementation will be prioritized through the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), which is updated annually in the context of the budget process. Sectoral expenditures will need to be embedded in the MTEF, which in turn should be consistent with the medium-term macroeconomic framework. This will ensure that expenditures reflect the policy priorities of PRSP-II, and that the cost of PRSP-II implementation is consistent with the available resources and the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. PRSP-II does not include costing for the entire strategy, but only for three sectors – education, health, water and sanitation – and, within these sectors, only for the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)-related expenditures. The strategy also provides detailed year-by-year comparisons of projected PRSP expenditures and MDG costing estimates linked to explicit quantitative MDG targets for education, health and water and sanitation; and stresses the limitations of the costing exercise in view of the strong assumptions used to derive the cost estimates and large standard errors owing to the evolving economic and fiscal environment.

26. While PRSP-related expenditures on education, health and water and sanitation are projected to increase from 2.9 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2010/11, Pakistan plans to spend on these sectors less than what the MDG costing estimates would call for during the PRSP-II period. It would be important to clarify whether and how the resource gap will be bridged during 2008/09-2010/11, especially since it is unclear whether the MDG costing estimates derived in 2005/06 are still accurate for the PRSP-II period. For example, in 2006/07 the net primary enrolment rate in Pakistan was only 56 percent against the MDG target of 100 percent by 2015. Clearly, to meet the MDG target, will require substantial public and private resources. Over the longer term, however, spending on education and health is projected to increase substantially as a percent of GDP, while spending on water and sanitation is not projected to increase.

27. In light of Pakistan's deteriorated fiscal and economic outlook, it would be important to bring the MDG and poverty reduction agenda in line with the available fiscal envelope. Currently, the MDG costing estimates are not aligned with the needed fiscal rationalization. Given the limited fiscal space, unless the targets are adjusted, any resource gap would need to be filled by mobilizing additional donor and private resources. However, for example, in the case of education Pakistan's recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrollment gaps are the largest. Hence, moving forward, the staffs would urge the authorities not only to take measures to increase the efficiency of public spending, but also to revisit the allocation of funds across sectors with the aim of re-allocating spending to priority areas.

Source: World Bank & IMF 2009

Assessment and the Relevance of the FTI

6.17 It is clear that the financial resources deployed towards the EFA targets, including UPE/UPC, are seriously inadequate, even though external aid for basic education rose significantly after 2001. The scale of public education financing, both by GOP and by donors, has not been commensurate with achieving EFA targets. However, the problem of "filling the financing gap" is not straightforward. Thus:

- (a) Pakistan provides support for the FTI's concern that the "financing gap" should not be seen in isolation, but as part of interlocking concerns about policy and planning, data and capacity, as well as finance.
- (b) It highlights a dilemma for the FTI when a government's actual choices (if not its declared policies) demonstrate that EFA is not a top political priority. The point was eloquently made by an interviewee:

The fundamental problem of very low allocations to education is endemic to Pakistan and there is no question of anyone making excuses. I don't believe anyone in the ministry, or the government who claim "But the issue is not money. The issue is capacity". The issue is money ... It's because the Government of Pakistan is not serious about education. ... Donors have got nothing to do with it. That's a government of Pakistan flaw.

The "FTI compact" is supposed to involve mutually accountable commitments between a government and its donors, but there is no sign that additional donor funding for basic education has elicited a corresponding financial effort from the government. (As noted in Box 2, the government also failed to raise its own expenditures in the context of the SAP.)

- (c) It is important not to confuse "scenario forecasts" which may show, broadly, what it would require to achieve EFA targets, with operational fiscal and budgetary strategies to allocate and use resources to achieve those targets. Pakistan has had the former but not the latter.
- (d) Addressing the efficiency, and the fiduciary standards, of public expenditures is crucial: this will directly increase the value of public expenditures, and in doing so make the attraction and effective use of external aid more likely.

6.18 Issues in aid effectiveness are further considered in Chapter 9.

7 The FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

Context

The FTI's data gap perspective

7.1 The FTI design gives central importance to improved data and analysis as a basis for better policies, without which additional expenditure may be fruitless (FTI 2004). The FTI's data gap perspective is particularly relevant for countries which, like Pakistan, were invited to join an "analytical fast track", and this is the area where the FTI (through the EPDF) has made its most obvious input. This chapter therefore reviews the relevance of the FTI approach in Pakistan's case, as well as assessing the EPDF support that Pakistan received.

Data issues in Pakistan

7.2 There are major concerns about the quality of basic data on education in Pakistan. Administrative data are heavily reliant on self-reporting, and annual education statistics do not cover non-government institutions (the five-year census in 2005 was the first to do so). The evaluation of World Bank support to primary education (with field work in 2005) highlighted this issue:

A significant part of future ESW [World Bank economic and sector work] should be devoted to assessing the quality and accuracy of education data at the federal and provincial levels. The mission team encountered inconsistencies in basic administrative data just in selecting and locating a small sample of schools to visit. Other researchers and reports have also pointed out these inconsistencies. For policymakers to feel confident about their diagnoses of problems, they must also have confidence in the underlying data. (World Bank 2007g)

7.3 The FTI evaluation team, visiting Pakistan four years later, similarly found many reasons to doubt the reliability of administrative and other data. There is a particular concern about data collection and use at district level, since monitoring, if it is to be effective, needs to take place at the levels responsible for service delivery.

7.4 In 1999, for public government schools, there was only basic administrative data and very little monitoring and evaluation. Since then, there have been substantial efforts at both federal and provincial level in terms of strengthening EMIS systems, although with little apparent coordination other than geographical partitioning. This has extended in some cases to district level, in respect of monitoring of teacher and student attendance. As regards private and non-formal schools, there has been only one attempt to monitor the number of private institutions (2005) although it was due to be repeated in 2010; each agency monitors numbers in non-formal environments (not included in annual censuses).

7.5 There is an Annual Education Census covering government institutions collected through Provinces and Districts. The procedure for collecting the data varies between Provinces. The census collects the usual information on students, teachers and buildings, but this still takes a long time to process as, by mid-2009, the latest volume of Pakistan Education Statistics available appeared to be for 2005–06. The 2005 National Education Census included all institutions whatever their management, and covers the same data as well as income and expenditure. In schools covered by one of the many School Improvement Programmes, there will usually be monitoring of school characteristics but these are only a small minority of all schools. There is no systematic monitoring of adult literacy. There are sex breakdowns to inform gender issues, but no data has been produced in the government publications on HIV/AIDS or on disability.

7.6 As regards monitoring of achievement, the National Education Assessment System (NEAS) was established in 2003 with support from the World Bank and DFID. It has carried out standard assessment exercises covering student achievement in Mathematics and Urdu at Grade 4 in 2005-06-07-08 (the latter including private schools on a pilot basis). The sample sizes are designed so as to provide estimates at provincial level. There have been surveys of achievement at provincial level by the World Bank as part of other specific studies (e.g. LEAPS) apparently unrelated to NEAS.

7.7 Population figures are typically derived from the 1998 census. Obviously, this makes them significantly out of date, especially in urban areas. The coverage of institutions outside the public sector in the National Education Census (NEC) in 2005 is unclear: NEAS tried to use the NEC listing of institutions as the sampling frame for their 2007 assessment exercise, and found a large number missing. The extent to which even that census included non-formal institutions – whether public or private – is unclear; although each agency monitors numbers in non-formal environments.

7.8 In the National Survey of EMIS cells (AEPAM/NEMIS 2008), districts reported problems with the processing of data taking several months longer than the agreed schedule. Only 61 or 45% of the districts reported data validation; and although 92 or 68% reported some sort of data verification, the consistency and quality of the verification process is suspect.

7.9 Although lip service is paid to the importance of data for planning (and of timely data for the planning cycle), data do not appear to be systematically used either at federal or at provincial level (though there are efforts to improve this situation through the Punjab and Sindh education sector programmes); it is telling that nowhere was the evaluation team shown a schedule for data collection which made any reference to the planning or budgetary cycle. The government in principle has a requirement for post-evaluations of projects (the PC5 form) but these are almost never carried out. There have been only limited attempts to improve linkages between the data and M&E processes and the planning processes in the sector, and these have been mostly at the level of specific districts.

7.10 The constituent elements of the Indicative Framework were reported in 2003 as part of the early exchanges over possible FTI endorsement (see Chapter 4 above, ¶4.7); but there was no reference to them either in the UNESCO-sponsored MOE mid-decade assessment, or in the World Bank PAD for the Sindh ESSP. The annual Pakistan Education Statistics do not report any of those indicators (nor net or gross enrolment ratios).

Donor Support to Data Development

7.11 DFID, EC, NORAD, Unicef, USAID have put substantial funds into strengthening the infrastructure of EMIS at both federal and provincial levels, and in some districts to the soft end of EMIS (using data for decision making) – see Box 12 below. Unicef has supported the development of software (Integrated Decision Support System), which generates user-friendly reports at district level from the raw data. The EMIS being promoted contains the standard content of enrolment, teachers, etc.

Box 12 Support to EMIS Development

Before 1990, with the exception of NWFP, there was no computerised database in Pakistan. Since then, there were substantial efforts through the 1990s funded by donors at both federal and provincial levels to strengthen EMIS systems, although with little apparent coordination other than geographical partitioning according to donor interest. Thus, the NEMIS Project Phase I was launched during 1990–1993 with the assistance of UNESCO, UNDP, and USAID. The project was then shifted to AEPAM and the federal EMIS Project was approved for the following two years. The NEMIS (National Education Monitoring Information System) Phase II project was approved in May 1997, followed by NEMIS-III in April 2002. All these were externally funded projects with little government ownership.

In addition to the NEMIS Project Phases II (1997–2002) and III (2002–2006), DFID, EC, NORAD, Unicef, and USAID have put substantial funds into strengthening the infrastructure of EMIS at both provincial and district levels, and in some districts to the soft end of EMIS (using data for decision making); but it is unclear what lasting effects remain after the donor intervention has been withdrawn.

NEMIS was eventually regularised to become part of the regular budget in July 2007; this had taken 17 years. At the provincial level, there are functioning EMIS although their structure and procedures vary. A National Survey of the state of District EMIS cells (AEPAM/NEMIS 2008) covered most districts of the country (136/141) and reported the following:

- 92 out of 136 district EMIS cells reported having no office or poor office conditions;
- 22 or 16% of the district EMIS cells did not have a functioning computer;
- 57 or 42% did not have an internet connection;
- 24 districts had no EMIS staff, another 24 had only one position filled;
- data security was poor and computer viruses were rampant;
- many of the EMIS cells were treated as typing pools, with EMIS activities treated as an unwelcome interruption.

Staff who were in place had a good level of education with over 90% having a diploma or better. But:

- many district offices were in very poor condition;
- some offices were damaged during the riots after 27th December 2007;
- power outages were frequent.

7.12 There was also substantial donor support for the National Education Census (NEC) in 2005. The exercise was jointly carried out by AEPAM and the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The purpose here was to cover *all* schools in the country. This was a very important exercise, but there are question marks about the quality of the data; in particular it is not clear that verification was satisfactorily carried out. In both the NEC and the annual census, all data are self-reported from the head teacher (even where the enumerator went to the school in the NEC, there are no fields for them to include their own observation of, say, a toilet or a boundary wall). The NEC questionnaire form included a section on the income and expenditure of private schools and, understandably, there was some reluctance to complete this section. Even when this was not completed, there was some reluctance to fill in the data for the number of students, because the interviewer would know the standard fee rate and therefore the amount raised in fees. The default assumption must therefore be that the estimates of fees based on NEC data are under-estimates and should be cross-checked with household expenditure surveys (cf. Annex H).

7.13 The Project for the Improvement to Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA) has been supported by the World Bank since 2002 to track all kinds of financial transactions.

7.14 Support from the World Bank and DFID was instrumental in the establishment of the National Education Assessment System (see ¶7.6 above). As regards analytical work, a large number of studies have been commissioned at the Federal Level – although usually

based on provincial data sets – but almost invariably by and for donor interests; at provincial level the PESRP and the Sindh Reform Support Unit have commissioned evaluations.

FTI Support through the EPDF

Background

7.15 As noted in Chapter 4, the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) has been the main substantive FTI contribution in Pakistan. The EPDF is funded by a variety of donors who support the FTI, but managed and implemented through the World Bank. There have been some tensions relating to its deployment, both generally, and specifically in relation to the "analytical fast track" countries. As a general point, donors have expressed concern that the EPDF has been insufficiently visible as an FTI contribution, and that it has been treated as an adjunct to World Bank activities more than as a resource overseen by Local Education Groups (LEGs). The EPDF has been viewed largely as a means of assisting countries to develop education sector plans fit for FTI endorsement. These expectations sit uneasily in a country like Pakistan. On the one hand, the "analytical fast track" category implies analytical assistance, and Pakistan has been a major beneficiary of EPDF resources. But on the other hand, as Chapter 4 also notes, FTI endorsement has not been seriously pursued, and there is not a functioning LEG to approve EPDF proposals.

Overview of EPDF activities

7.16 The EPDF support to Pakistan is reviewed in detail in Annex J. As documented there, there was considerable difficulty in locating adequate records. The EPDF financed about 16 activities in Pakistan, most of them analytical studies (see Box 13 below for their titles); Annex J includes as much detail about their objectives, cost and reporting as the study team was able to locate. The total EPDF allocation for Pakistan has been about USD 1.4m.

Box 13 EPDF-funded activities in Pakistan

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Start year</i>
1 Primary Education Sector Reviews	2005
2 Secondary Education, VET and College System Review	2005?
3 Assisting Pakistan in the Development of an Effective Monitoring System	2005
4 Evaluation of Girls' Stipend Programme in Punjab and Sindh in Middle School	2005
5 School Council Capacity Building Program (Punjab Education Sector Reform Program)	2006
6 Sindh Education Sector Program	2006
7 School Survey in Rural Sindh	2006
8 Pakistan Higher Education Strategy Development	2006
9 Education Census Analysis	2007
10 Sindh School Surveys and MIS Data	2007
11 Higher Education Reforms	2008
12 Quality Improvement Strategy Development	2008
13 Sindh: Survey of Teacher/Student Absenteeism	2009
14 Sindh: Differential Stipend Impact Assessment	2009
15 Sindh: Public Private Partnership Impact Evaluation	2009
16 Punjab: Public Private Partnership Impact Evaluation	2008

Assessment of quality, relevance and evidence of use

Federal level

7.17 Items 8 and 11 were concerned with Higher Education. After meeting the Vice-President of the HEC, the evaluation team were impressed by the quality of the input, but puzzled about its relevance to UPC.²⁰ The policy note refers to primary education only as a background to forecasting likely enrolments in Higher Education; and the PAD explicitly acknowledges that the inter-sectoral trade-off is a risk to the World Bank loan which would however be mitigated by the capping of the Higher Education budget as a share of the total education budget.²¹ Moreover, as the Higher Education Commission is totally independent of the Ministry, there is no question of developing a shared sector plan.

7.18 Items 3 and 12 would have been associated with support to the National Education Assessment System (NEAS) but that activity was taken over by DFID. For item 9, the Sector Manager reports that "while analysis was carried out by a consultant, there were great challenges in doing significant training or capacity building. The consultant did run a hands on clinic while doing the analysis but owing to lack of appropriate staff at the academy and the fact that the TTL had to leave Islamabad for personal reasons, the progress on this task has been limited."

Punjab Province

7.19 The support of the World Bank to the PESRP is clearly appreciated by the Punjab Government; but the specific EPDF-funded evaluations were not mentioned by anyone the team interviewed at the government level. It should also be mentioned that whenever the LEAPS study was mentioned, each of the Pakistani interlocutors was critical of the design of the study.

Sindh Province

7.20 The support by the World Bank to the Sindh Provincial Government in preparing their sector plan was appreciated and used although the specific EPDF contribution was not visible as such. The two sets of surveys of schools (items 7 and 10) were mentioned in the PAD but do not appear to have been used by Government.

Summary

7.21 Generally, the studies conducted seem to have been relevant and potentially useful, although in some cases the link to basic education was, at best, tenuous. Of the 16 issues/studies/topics, two of the items (numbered 8 and 11) are concerned with higher education at the Federal Level and at least three (items 2, 4 and 14) with secondary education only. The three concerned with secondary education can be linked to the development of sector plans; but the two with higher education cannot. Item 6 and associated input work (items 7 and 10) were clearly very relevant for the development of the Sindh sectoral reform programme. Items 4, 14, 15 and 16 are impact evaluations which have been discussed with the Government of Sindh.

²⁰ The World Bank Regional Manager said that the financing of some stand-alone post-basic education activities had been permitted by the EPDF committee and these fell under those. The relevant EPDF Minute is September 20th, 2007 where it says "the EPDF can be used for post-primary work in two cases: (i) any education sector activities which support the objective of universal primary school completion; and (ii) the development and/or update of the Education Sector Plan which cover the entire sector."

²¹ No figure is given in the PAD document; but the fact that the HEC share of Federal spending on education has risen from below 40% at its foundation in 2003–04 to more than 50% in 2006–07 (and from about 8% of total education spending in 2003 to nearly 13% in 2006–07) suggests that 'capping' may not be wholly successful.

7.22 However, the EPDF seems to have been used primarily as a tactical adjunct to other World Bank activities. There was hardly any awareness of the EPDF as such, either in government or among donors, and it has therefore not been used in the strategic and capacity-building manner that its bilateral donor funders hoped for. Overall, the impression given is that, despite its volume, the EPDF has made a limited and rather fragmented contribution to the development of the country's capacity building and planning. It is also clear that the information held by the FTI Secretariat on EPDF activities in Pakistan leaves much to be desired.

Assessment and the Relevance of the FTI

General

7.23 There have been significant efforts to improve education data in Pakistan, including the extension of coverage to non-government institutions, and the beginnings of a system for monitoring learning outcomes. Aid donors have often led efforts to improve data and to extend analytical work, but there must be concerns about sustainability and the degree of government ownership of these efforts. There is increased use of data for external advocacy, but the government does not systematically use data to inform policy and planning.²²

7.24 The government data development activities which received external support were partially relevant, in that it is definitely useful to have information on attendance, enrolment and outcomes; they could have been much more relevant if they had put the main emphasis on characteristics of schools, not individual pupils.

7.25 Similarly, while support to the infrastructure of EMIS in both Punjab and Sindh was relevant, the relevance could have been enhanced by more emphasis on the demand for, and use of, the outputs from the EMIS system.

7.26 Systemic inefficiencies in data collection have persisted, and external support has tended to echo the fragmentation and poor coordination in the collection and use of data. Thus, external support has contributed to the generation of more reliable and better quality data, but the generation of data by projects rather than sector-wide means that there are still disputes concerning overall numbers enrolled and numbers out-of-school.

Direct influence of the FTI

7.27 Concerning the FTI Indicative Framework, some data were assembled in 2003 when the Federal. MOE drafted an application to the FTI, but there appears to have been no systematic use of the Indicative Framework after that.

7.28 The review of EPDF-funded activities found a mixed picture as regards relevance. Support to the Higher Education Commission was not relevant to EFA objectives; activities linked to secondary education were relevant to the extent that they supported overall sector plans; the other EPDF-supported activities were directly relevant from an EFA perspective.

7.29 Although EPDF resources have often supported valuable activities and outputs, the EPDF has not contributed significantly to greater coherence in analysis and monitoring to support basic education objectives.

²² One of our Pakistani interviewees commented: "we have a culture of ignoring the data" and cited an example of a ministerial decision to start English language teaching from class 1: "If he had looked at the data on teacher profiles alone, he would have realized that such a policy is completely infeasible."

8 The FTI and Capacity Development

Context

The FTI perspective on capacity

8.1 "Capacity", along with policy and planning, finance and data, was seen in the FTI design as one of a set of gaps that need to be tackled in a coherent way, and an area that should attract external support (FTI 2004). The capacity to develop a credible education sector plan was an obvious concern, and this was an important motivation for the EPDF. However, the FTI partnership also adopted a broader concept of capacity development which was reflected in the FTI Capacity Development Guidelines (FTI 2008). These sought to influence education donors globally, and embodied a dynamic view of "capacity development" (personal, organisational and institutional) as opposed to the rather static concept of a "capacity gap" to be filled. This chapter briefly reviews capacity issues as they affect basic education in Pakistan, and the ways that government and donors have approached them.

Capacity issues in Pakistan

8.2 There are serious issues in terms of personal, organisational, and institutional capacities at all levels in Pakistan. They are linked to Pakistan's governance weaknesses which this report has already touched upon. There is a widespread view that military rule and political instability have taken their toll on the civil service, not least because recruitment has become more politicised and less based on merit.

8.3 The education system is huge (with over 150,000 public schools) and its scale and complexity are a management challenge at the best of times. Governance weaknesses are strongly manifested in teacher management, with systemic problems of political patronage, ghost and absent teachers, and a very weak role for head teachers. Weak capacity hampers policy and planning at federal and provincial levels and is also a central challenge to education management at the district level.

8.4 Since decentralisation, the district government has been responsible for the day-to-day planning and delivery of education. It is the district government which gets to assess school needs, identify sites for new schools, and make decisions on where to do reconstruction work, and it is also responsible for undertaking monitoring of education delivery in schools. However, this tier of government continues to suffer from serious capacity gaps in planning, delivery and monitoring of education inputs. As a normal practice, a senior head master of a secondary school is appointed to become the EDO (Executive District Officer) for education, the highest position within the education hierarchy in the district government, leaving the actual outputs to vary depending on the individual's capability and his or her personal ability to resist political pressures. Many positions remain unfilled or are filled with untrained staff. Watson & Khan 2005 conclude:

There is little scope for staff management at district level. Few variables are within the competence of district authorities. Many of the 'stock' of district education officers are in any case unsuited for their managerial responsibilities: they are approaching retirement, have no management background, and are pawns in political manipulation from council members and the influence of MPAs.

8.5 The provincial government by virtue of being responsible for delivery of education services shoulders the responsibility for training the school management and teachers to ensure delivery of quality education in schools. However, the capacity of the teacher training institutes is severely limited. They run out-dated B-Ed and M-Ed programmes while the in-

service institutions for teacher training, especially PITEs established with financial support from the ADB in the 1990s, have no budget lines in the annual education budget. The government's ability to run in-service training programmes is thus entirely dependent on supplementary funding from the donor agencies.

Government and Donor Approaches to Capacity Development

8.6 There is no national or provincial level capacity development plan though the government is aware of the severe capacity deficiencies at all levels. With the government's own budgetary allocations being largely absorbed by salaries, capacity development initiatives are usually left to the donors. The low development budget, which rests at less than 10% across the three tiers, reflects, inter alia, the low government investment in capacity development. There is a tendency for government and donors alike to conceptualise capacity building in terms of personal training, rather than organisational or institutional level reforms, while the "institutions for capacity development which are there are predominately static traditional facilities that provide training off-site, using methods that are unlikely to lead to behavioural change (unless followed up on-site)" (Watson & Khan 2005)

8.7 Because of clear signs of weak capacity in policy and planning as well as the actual delivery of education in schools, capacity development has been central to donor interventions in the education sector. However, given the project rather than programme or sector level approach which has shaped donor interventions in Pakistan, the donor capacity development programmes have had limited impact. Most capacity development work in donor projects has been focused on hosting training workshops and producing training manuals rather than strengthening the capacity of the state institutions to deliver better outcomes.

8.8 The use of a project rather than a programme approach in capacity development has had a number of related impacts. Donor capacity development projects have not been coordinated and there is often evidence of overlap between them. During the evaluation team's country visit, numerous respondents referred to Thata district as a notable example of the cause of failure of donor-led capacity development efforts in Pakistan. The district, an hour's drive from Karachi, attracted over 22 donors to undertake capacity development work as part of the decentralisation process while there was no donor operating in the neighbouring district. Most conducted capacity development as part of their devolution programme. In one month, the EDO was reported to have been away for 16 days due to capacity development programmes run by different donors in Karachi, the provincial capital. This also had the side effect of increasing rather than bridging regional gaps in state capacity as some districts received surplus training while others received none.

8.9 The other dominant concern about these capacity development projects is the absence of a clear purpose for undertaking the capacity development work. The result is that the training provided has been supply driven and often had limited relevance.

8.10 It is important to see beyond superficial diagnoses of capacity gaps to be filled. One NGO observer remarked: "To talk of capacity limitations in this situation is masking a complex web of blockages to implementation of a programme", and gave as examples:

- (a) Provincial Institutes of Teacher Training which have a budget line for maintenance and salaries, but do not have a budget line for training itself. So districts and donors can come and use the facility so long as they have some resources for the training itself but that stops when the project budget is withdrawn.
- (b) The National EMIS which remained operational for nearly 18 years in project mode, and only recently became a line item in the government budget (see Box 12 in the

previous chapter). Also its focus on the production of data without sufficient attention to the demand and capacity for its effective use.

- (c) An Institute of Educational Planning and Management which has PKR 16 million for salaries, but only PKR 0.5 million for research; how is it meant to improve planning and management?

Assessment and the Relevance of the FTI

8.11 The FTI has not made significant direct inputs to capacity development in Pakistan. In principle, the EPDF inputs reviewed in the previous chapter (and in more detail in Annex J) could have had a capacity development focus, but they were actually dominated by substantive analytical work. Nevertheless, capacity development as conceived in the FTI capacity development guidelines is clearly a hugely important issue in Pakistan, although an intractable one (how far can the capacity development work be effective if the underlying political structures limiting the working of teachers and education ministry personnel remain unchanged?).

8.12 Donor efforts at capacity development have rarely been coordinated, raising problems of sustainability, fragmentation of effort (with the focus remaining at individual rather than organisational or institutional level), and overlaps. However, the lack of systematic government plans for capacity development across the sector makes it likely that supply-driven approaches to capacity development will continue.

8.13 Although it is easier said than done, the FTI concept of joint rather than fragmented efforts seems relevant. Among donors there is growing recognition of the limitation of the existing capacity development interventions, leading to greater dialogue and collaboration for moving towards more organisational or institutional level capacity development work. In NWFP, many donors have agreed to align themselves to support a SWAp for education and the capacity development component is central to the plan. Donors are expected to support one TA facility in NWFP to develop the capacity development plan. GTZ is leading on this, and by chance the TA engaged for this work has been involved with the development of the FTI capacity development guidelines, which may thus help to shape the capacity development work in NWFP. As a first step to developing a provincial level capacity development plan, GTZ is undertaking an extensive capacity development needs assessment exercise with over 2000 interviews across different tiers and departments of the government in NWFP.

8.14 There are no state monitoring mechanisms in place to monitor the effectiveness of the capacity development programmes. The only monitoring is that by the donor agencies of their specific capacity development projects, and systematic learning from previous experiences has been rare:

We found no evidence of discussions among GoP stakeholders or donors on what capacity building is, what the lessons of experiences are, and what they imply for a future strategy to support devolution... All the new capacity building activities appear to have taken place without reference to earlier experiences in Punjab, Pakistan or elsewhere. (Watson & Khan 2005)

8.15 There is clearly a great need for capacity development across the three tiers of government and in schools and the government ideally has to take the lead in the process. However, as one donor representative noted:

We agree that we can't look at education as a project you have to look at it as a sector. It has been projectised by us and by them (government). But, what is ironic is that the more we push for local ownership the further we get away from systemic change. You can't underscore enough the lack of political commitment to this project.

8.16 The challenge is for donors to support underlying institutional reforms required to address the major weaknesses in the education sector whenever there are opportunities to do so.

9 The FTI and Aid Effectiveness

Context

The FTI's aid effectiveness goals

9.1 The following goals set out in the FTI Framework document (FTI 2004) are directly concerned with aid effectiveness:

- *More efficient aid for primary education*, through actions of development partners to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonisation in aid delivery and reduce transaction costs for FTI recipient countries;
- *Sustained increases in aid for primary education*, where countries demonstrate the ability to utilise it effectively.

9.2 The FTI design envisaged coordination of donors around an endorsed sector plan, ideally through a Sector Wide Approach. A country level "compact" between government and donors would embody their reciprocal commitments, which would be followed up through joint monitoring and review. In effect, a "virtuous circle" was envisaged, in which increased aid was a reward for its effective use.

The aid landscape in Pakistan

9.3 While all donors operating in Pakistan have to seek the approval of the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) at the federal level to function in the country, most deal directly with the provincial government education departments when it comes to negotiating aid or policy credits. The role of the federal Ministry of Education is limited. There are few formal mechanisms for aid coordination, though an annual Pakistan Development Forum (PDF) allows an exchange of ideas between government and donors.

9.4 Trends in aid to education were summarised in Chapter 6, which also noted that, although a large number of agencies have been involved in the sector, a small number have accounted for the bulk of the aid provided. Following the events of 11 September 2001, there was a resurgence in aid to Pakistan, with a number of donors (including USAID and the Netherlands) returning to Pakistan, and others stepping up their programmes. However, this aid was strongly driven by political motives, which were not necessarily compatible with aid effectiveness objectives. In the words of one aid agency official:

There was a huge amount of donor interest in Pakistan but the donor interest was really in bolstering Musharaf at a political level. It was about political support at a federal level. Trying to make an education sector programme work is time consuming and burdensome and it didn't really fit the political requirement i.e. that we could deliver support visibly and noticeably on a short timeframe to Musharaf.

9.5 Agencies' perspectives were also influenced by the lessons learned from the Social Action Programme. There was no longer an appetite for large-scale coordination around efforts to scale up funding for service delivery, and the focus shifted to provincial programmes.

9.6 Some agencies perceived a degree of congestion in the education sector. The AsDB has scaled down its involvement, on the grounds that the sector is now crowded. And several agencies have found it difficult to disburse as much as they wished to: the Netherlands for example, aimed to spend EUR 30m annually but was unable to disburse more than EUR 10m.

9.7 Budget support from several donors, notably the World Bank and DFID, has been significant, but the World Bank has moved away from budget support after the 2008 financial crisis and reconfigured its education programmes in Punjab and Sindh as sector support programmes. These programmes draw complementary support from some other donors, and these clusters are the main examples of joint donor efforts in practice. A SWAp to support primary and secondary education in NWFP is under development.

Aid effectiveness issues

9.8 The FTI has placed great emphasis on the Paris Declaration, with the FTI aspiring to be "the Paris Declaration in action". However, there has been some feeling among aid agencies on the ground that the Paris Declaration is not relevant to Pakistan's special circumstances. A review of aid effectiveness for the 2006 Pakistan Development Forum took issue with this:

We conclude from an examination of the Declaration that much of it is relevant and disagree that the claimed irrelevance is a justification for inaction. We identify specific elements of it which particularly stand in need of implementation locally, particularly in the area of ownership, limited alignment of donors and government systems, weak GoP capacities, limited joint working by donors and deficient mechanism for dialogue and mutual accountability. Responsibility for this is shared between GoP and donors. (Killick & Shah 2006)

9.9 The same review highlighted the education sector as a case that "seems to reflect many of the worst aspects of the situation the Paris Declaration was meant to address". It noted :

- Weak leadership and planning from the GoP side
- Multiple donors, resulting in fragmented initiatives that do not make up a coherent educational strategy
- Donors pursuing their own priorities rather than those of the GoP, resulting in distortions in service provisions, e.g. in favour of primary education,²³ and eroding national planning efforts.
- Certain donor programmes being conducted independently of GoP institutions, jeopardising the sustainability of the initiatives in question.
- Poor reporting of aid disbursements, as well as of results and impacts, so that the Federal (and probably Provincial) ministry has little idea of what is actually being spent and done, and what effects it might be having on performance indicators. This particularly related to grant aid from bilateral donors being channelled through NGOs.
- Few joint actions on the part of donors. (Killick & Shah 2006)

9.10 The report recommended, inter alia, that the government should develop a more proactive aid policy, but also acknowledged:

The strong geopolitical and security motivations for much of the aid coming to Pakistan. This tends to subordinate developmental and poverty-reducing motives to the political ones, so that there may be fewer brownie points to be earned from harmonisation and alignment, as against policies which avoid rocking the boat.

...donor agencies do not necessarily perceive strong incentives to pursue the Paris Agenda. (Killick & Shah 2006)

9.11 No government policy on aid management has appeared, although an EAD paper for the next PDF reiterated many of the government's concerns (EAD 2007). The impression from the team's interviews is that there has been little substantive change in aid management and coordination. Although various working groups are referred to, there is no

²³ An interesting indication that primary education is not such a high priority for the government as it is for many donors.

systematic forum for education sector coordination. As described by donors, meetings within the education sector tend to be ad hoc, and few of them are actually led by the government side.

Assessment

9.12 In this section we briefly comment on each of the Paris Declaration objectives, then consider how relevant the FTI is, or could be, to Pakistan. The analytical summary matrix in Annex K provides some more detail.

Paris Declaration objectives

Ownership and alignment with government policies

9.13 Alignment with government policies tends to be un-demanding, because national policies and plans are stated in very general terms. (This applies generally to the PRSP, not just to education policies – see World Bank 2006c). Fragmentation partly reflects perceptions that existing government strategies are too broad to align to (Prokop 2008), while coordination and harmonisation among donors is limited, largely because there is not a strong and effective demand for it (as opposed to occasional exhortation) from the government.

9.14 This in turn raises questions about the extent to which donor projects and programmes are owned by the government. While most projects receive active government support during implementation, the record is very bleak in terms of government's ability to sustain them after external funding ends.

Alignment with government systems

9.15 Alignment with government systems is difficult because of the complexity of federal structures and weaknesses in governance and public finance management. However, even information sharing is poor:

Currently, there are no harmonised procedures for reporting on planned and actual commitments and disbursements. Multiple donors are using various different formats and timelines to report on their development assistance. This makes it very difficult for the government to develop a comprehensive overview of aid flows, which affects its ability to allocate external resources in line with domestic budget. (EAD 2007)

Harmonisation

9.16 Coordination of development assistance is weakened both because government federal and provincial mechanisms are not well coordinated with each other, and because donor partners coordinate poorly with each other. The main efforts to improve the efficiency of aid take the form of coordination around and co-financing of certain programmes, and an ad hoc division of labour through the geographical and thematic focus chosen by donors. Moreover, donor representatives acknowledge that the pressure to disburse may inhibit harmonisation; as one of them put it:

donors keep their plans close to their chest. Don't reveal what they are going to do because they are all under tremendous pressure from HQ to spend more money on basic education – why should you share your plan with your colleagues?

Results orientation

9.17 Results-orientation in government programmes is weak (see Chapter 7 above). The NEAS is an important, but exceptional, initiative to monitor learning outcomes. Most efforts are (understandably) focused mainly on ensuring that programmes are actually carried out as planned (e.g. the approach to third party validation of district programmes in the PESRP).

Mutual accountability

9.18 There are no durable mechanisms for education sector dialogue at federal level. but sector programmes in Punjab and Sindh have been useful in focusing a number of donors on a programme led by the WB; there is an incipient SWAp in NWFP, but it is too soon to comment on its effectiveness.

Relevance of the FTI

9.19 The FTI has had negligible influence on aid effectiveness in Pakistan. Its only substantial input has been through the EPDF, and this has not been used systematically to enhance donor coordination or country ownership. As for catalysing additional funding, one interviewee commented that:

The 9/11 dividend has brought more money to the country than FTI would ever do.

9.20 However, it would be complacent to regard the FTI's aid effectiveness objectives as irrelevant for Pakistan. The environment in Pakistan makes it difficult to deliver aid effectively, and this is reflected in the evaluations of donor programmes (see USAID 2008, Chapman et al 2008, AsDB 2005, World Bank 2007g, World Bank 2006d). For example, the evaluation report of ESRA, under USAID, which committed USD 100 million to the education sector notes serious difficulty in monitoring the success of the interventions due to weak monitoring frameworks built into the programme design. It notes that constant turnover in mission personnel and precarious security conditions were primarily responsible for the inadequate practices in monitoring the implementation and performance of the ESRA programme (USAID 2008). Other agencies tend to highlight the difficulties arising from governance and management issues when working with government agencies.

9.21 Difficulties in disbursement could be seen as an indication that Pakistan is saturated with aid. However, when seen against the major financing gap to meet the EFA targets, this inability to utilise the increased flow of aid partially reflects the weak absorptive capacity of the state to utilise the funds effectively and partially highlights the limits of the donors' capacity to identify efficient means to support the education sector in Pakistan. This is more or less the opposite of the "virtuous circle" the FTI aspires to (see ¶9.2 above).

9.22 The FTI principles of donor collaboration behind government leadership, and focus on public provision of basic education, are relevant. But the degree of government commitment to EFA is questionable, and the "standard" FTI design which depends on an operational plan and a functioning donor group at national level does not fit Pakistan's federal structure or the in-country capacities of its existing education donors. The FTI could be relevant in the future in several ways:

- advocacy at international level may influence both donors' and the government's approaches to basic education in Pakistan, and the degree of priority it is given;
- a reformed (and presumably much larger) Catalytic Fund might be a useful source of support that was less subject to the constraints and uncertainties of direct bilateral funding;
- however, such support would need to be delivered at provincial level, and would require the FTI modus operandi to be adapted accordingly.

10 Cross-Cutting Issues

Context

The FTI perspective

10.1 The FTI Framework (FTI 2004) highlights the importance of addressing cross-cutting issues such as gender and equity in the education plans it supports. The FTI partnership has been a focus for advocacy on various cross-cutting issues, and has contributed to the development of guidelines on addressing equity and HIV/AIDS (for example) as they affect basic education (Clarke & Bundy 2008, Clarke 2009). This chapter reviews the relevance of such cross-cutting issues in Pakistan's case, and the influence that the FTI may have.

Salient cross-cutting issues in Pakistan

10.2 The most salient cross-cutting issues in Pakistan all relate to various dimensions of equity, including gender. These have been highlighted in Chapter 3; see in particular ¶3.16ff, Figure 3 (which depicts inequality across income, regional and gender dimensions), and Box 3 which addresses gender disparities in primary education. General contrasts between provinces are described in Annex D.

Gender

10.3 Gender disparities are compounded not only due to poor supply of educational facilities but also due to cultural values and norms which make it difficult to access education for girls. For example, religious and cultural emphasis on 'purdah' makes parents reluctant to send girls to schools at a distance. However, the high turn out of girls in NGO-run non-formal schools and recent World Bank sponsored stipend schemes suggests that the cultural values are not against female education per se, rather parents require institutional arrangements responding to their cultural requirements: for example, establishing schools close to home to ensure female security and providing female teachers to respect purdah²⁴ (World Bank 2002; Sarwar 2006).

Other dimensions of inequity

10.4 Furthermore, disparities in access continue to be significant across the four provinces and across income and the urban/rural divide. There are great disparities in access among the four provinces, and high variations in rural-urban education indicators. A large proportion of the literate population is concentrated in the national and provincial capitals. The areas with low literacy are also backward in terms of economic development (Husain & Qasim 2005).

HIV/AIDS

10.5 The threat of HIV/AIDS has not been taken very seriously. UNAIDS' assessment is that, although current prevalence is low, AIDS could have a severe impact in certain communities over the coming decade (UNAIDS 2010), but preventive efforts are feeble for a variety of capacity and cultural reasons. The EFA mid-decade review report claims that Pakistan is taking due measures to develop awareness among school children through interventions in the textbooks: "The Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) has been catering to emerging trends like drug abuse, health, population explosion, and HIV/AIDS. National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) operating under the Ministry of Health also aims to develop awareness among the masses." (MOE 2008c) However, within the education

²⁴ This was also noted in the field visit – see Box 5 in Chapter 5 above.

sector policy and planning documents there is little reference to HIV/AIDS groups or the need to design programmes for children potentially suffering from HIV/AIDS.

Children with special needs

10.6 Children with special needs also do not get much attention within the education sector plans. The responsibility is partly delegated to the Social Welfare Ministry, which also carries the portfolio of duties for special education. To show the government's commitment to addressing special needs some of the ministry's documents refer to the fact that the Disabled Person Employment and Rehabilitation Ordinance was enacted in 1981 to cater to needs of disabled persons and made it mandatory for 2% of public sector employees to be disabled persons. In 1985 a Directorate General of Special Education was established aimed at developing facilities for disabled persons. But there is no systematic plan available to address the needs of special children.

Government Strategies and External Support

Government strategies

10.7 Against these challenges the government has failed to develop strategies to bridge disparities based on incomes, region, and urban/rural divides. The policy paper, produced in 2007 after extensive deliberation among government, NGOs, donors and private sector educationists, to reform the education sector, acknowledges these challenges. In fact, it goes further and defines equity not just in terms of ensuring equal access but in terms of "fostering a bias free environment": "Equity in education, therefore, would take into consideration not only equal access to education of a particular standard, but the content of curriculum, instructional and evaluation materials and practices, different ways of learning and views of knowledge, and everyone having the opportunity to achieve" (MOE 2007b). The problem with this, however, remains the same as with the education sector reform strategy developed in 2001: it fails to provide an action plan to attain these goals. The paper also notes the parallel systems of education and different medium of instruction as a challenge to equity, whereby there is a wide difference in employability of students from private English medium schools and those from state run or low-fee charging private Urdu medium schools.

10.8 Of all the cross-cutting issues, gender has received the most attention in the policy documents. More focused interventions have also been targeted towards addressing the gender gaps, and there has been significant progress in reducing them. There are also numerous education sector gender studies. Nevertheless, as with other cross-cutting issues, concrete and costed action plans to meet the education needs of the marginalised groups are not available.

External support for cross-cutting issues

10.9 The donors in general have been concerned about raising the issues of marginalised and vulnerable groups. However, their main focus has remained on gender rather than on other areas. Apart from the ensuring the absorption of gender as a cross-cutting issue in education policy documents, many donors support education programmes especially targeted towards girls. Traditionally many donors have supported NGOs to run non-formal primary education schools for girls especially in rural areas. More recently, special schemes have also been introduced to promote girls' participation in schools: for example the Female Secondary School Stipend programme implemented in 2004 in Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, as part of the education reform plan totalling USD 300 million from the World Bank's concessionary International Development Association. The stipend programme targets girls in grades 6 to 8 in 15 districts of Punjab where literacy is below 40%. The girls

receive a stipend conditional on being enrolled in grade 6–8 in a government girls' school in a target district and on maintaining a class attendance record of at least 80%. Eligible students receive PKR 200 per month. According to the World Bank, within one year of the programme's inception, enrolment in government primary schools increased by 13% compared with the previous trend of less than 2% a year. And girls' enrolment in grades 6 to 8 in the low-literacy districts receiving the stipends increased by 23%. The evaluation of this performance (Chaudhury & Parajuli 2006) was funded through the EPDF – see activity #4 in Annex J.

10.10 The other areas have, however, not received such targeted interventions. The World Bank has a major HIV/AIDS programme but it does not have an active component for school studies. The government medium term evaluation report on EFA for UNESCO (MOE 2008c) however claims that the curriculum reforms have introduced awareness about HIV/AIDS and other health hazards in the revised curriculum.²⁵

10.11 Donors have been least explicit on their policy interventions or programmes in meeting regional disparities. Donors claim to identify areas to work on the basis of need. However, as the case of Thata district highlights (see ¶8.8 above), the selection of actual locations to work results from a combination of factors including ease of access, security concerns and donors' priorities, rather than necessarily the urgency of the need and inter-regional differences.

Assessment and the Relevance of the FTI

10.12 The donor emphasis on dealing with gender gaps in education policy and programmes has clearly had an impact. Gender is now an explicitly addressed issue in education sector policies and plans. Donor efforts in creating awareness towards addressing educational needs of specialised groups such as children infected with HIV/AIDS or children with special needs are also relevant.

10.13 In term of effectiveness, donors have had a visible influence only in the area of gender. The donors have also supported HIV/AIDS awareness programmes, which in future have the potential to get linked to education plans. However, the donors have not yet convinced the government to translate this verbal commitment into concrete plans as has been achieved in the case of female education. The biggest challenge lies in bridging the inter-provincial and urban and rural differences in access and quality of education; however, current efforts are piecemeal and neither the donors nor the government have systematic plans in place to deal with these gaps.

10.14 The FTI's direct role in relation to cross-cutting issues has been very small (the specific EPDF study mentioned in ¶10.9 above, and others in which cross-cutting issues may also feature). The FTI also has an international role in promoting good practice in the incorporation of cross-cutting issues in education planning and practice, although so far there is little sign of FTI influence in Pakistan. There is scope for more advocacy and analytical work, in a more systematic fashion, in future. If the FTI model were adapted to allow interaction at provincial level, there could be a more realistic prospect of promoting cross-cutting issues through the endorsement of credible (provincial level) education sector plans.

²⁵ Neither that document nor the Policy Document specifies the level at which the material has been introduced into the curriculum.

PART D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11 Conclusions on the FTI in Pakistan

Introduction

11.1 Since Pakistan is not an FTI endorsed country, not all of the high level evaluation questions which guide the conclusions for most country studies are relevant. This chapter, therefore, addresses the following questions:

- What influence has the FTI had in Pakistan?
- Are the FTI's aims relevant to the current needs and priorities of Pakistan?
- To what extent is the present design of the FTI relevant to the circumstances of Pakistan?

11.2 Under the latter heading possible adaptations are considered against each of the workstreams that correspond to Chapters 5 to 10 above. A more detailed summary for each workstream is provided in Annex K, which identifies FTI and other inputs and considers their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

11.3 Chapter 12 reflects on the wider lessons and implications for the FTI that may be drawn from the Pakistan case study.

What influence has the FTI had in Pakistan?

11.4 **Accelerating progress on EFA:** Thus far, the FTI has had no significant impact. As already noted, progress in Pakistan continues to fall far short of what would be required to meet the EFA objectives. As described in Chapter 4, the FTI initially raised some false hopes, but the path of endorsement for a country plan was never pursued. The FTI therefore played no direct role in influencing Pakistan's education plans.

11.5 **Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness:** Again, the FTI has so far made no significant contribution to the mobilisation of resources for basic education in Pakistan, or to assisting government and donors in using aid more effectively. Nor can it be said (as is argued in regard to some other large countries operating without FTI endorsement) that government and donors have found effective and adequate means of collaboration outside of the FTI mechanisms.

11.6 The FTI did have a direct input through the **EPDF**, supporting various discrete pieces of analytical work (as reviewed in Annex J). Generally, the studies conducted seem to have been relevant and potentially useful, although in some cases the link to basic education was, at best, tenuous. However, the EPDF seems to have been used primarily as a tactical adjunct to other World Bank activities. There was hardly any awareness of the EPDF as such, either in government or among donors, and it has therefore not been used in the strategic and capacity-building manner that its bilateral donor funders hoped for. Overall, the impression given is that the EPDF made only a limited and rather fragmented contribution to the development of the country's capacity building and planning.

Are the FTI aims relevant to the current needs and priorities of Pakistan?

11.7 The FTI objectives are certainly relevant to Pakistan. The FTI's primary objective of facilitating universal primary education by 2015 is clearly consistent with Pakistan's needs, and with stated public policy. At the current rate the country is expected to have 3.7 million out-of-school children by 2015 (and this is probably a substantial underestimate). The

expressed commitment to meeting EFA targets is, however, not matched in action by the Pakistani government, as reflected in low budgetary allocations and political appointments in the education sector. This apparent lack of political commitment is a challenge to any donors seeking to engage with Pakistan.

To what extent is the present design of the FTI relevant to the circumstances of Pakistan?

11.8 While the **objectives** of the FTI are clearly relevant to Pakistan, its current **design** is more problematic, since Pakistan does not fit the model where a single group of donors (and other non-government stakeholders) can usefully engage with an empowered national ministry of education. We consider below how the FTI model might need to be adapted to become more relevant to Pakistan's situation.

Policy and planning

11.9 The need for strengthened policy and planning is clear, but the present FTI "model" of operating through a donor-endorsed education sector plan (ESP) at national level has no prospect of achieving traction in Pakistan (a) because the key theatres of action are at provincial level and below, and (b) because the donor configuration does not provide sufficient support at federal level for the Local Donor Groups (LDGs) and Local Education Groups (LEGs) that the FTI model requires. Possibilities of direct FTI influence in future appear to lie with (a) the future iteration of the EPDF as a support to analytical work and capacity development, and possibly (b) new FTI modalities that would allow the FTI to operate at provincial level, and make it less dependent on operating through an in-country lead donor.

Finance

11.10 Potential FTI inputs could relate to analysis, advocacy and financing. On analysis, there continues to be a role for assessing the financial requirements of reaching EFA targets. To be useful, this needs to be clearly linked to planning and budgetary processes. Progress requires increased domestic priority for EFA, reflected in public expenditure decisions, not just policy statements; FTI support for civil society analysis and advocacy in Pakistan therefore continues to be relevant. The (successor to the) EPDF could be relevant in supporting both analysis and advocacy. If the Catalytic Fund (or its successor) is to have significant value in Pakistan, it will need enhanced resources and also an ability to channel funds to the provincial level.

Data, monitoring and evaluation

11.11 FTI support (through the EPDF) has been ad hoc and fragmented. Although a number of individual activities have been of high quality, there has been insufficient attention to ownership and capacity development in the way they have been implemented. As noted under other workstreams, the FTI design would need to be significantly adapted in order to be relevant in the context of Pakistan's federal system. If the FTI were able to provide coherent support at provincial level, addressing data gaps and, in particular, fostering better use of data, would be an important component of such support.

Capacity development

11.12 In principle the FTI Catalytic Fund and the EPDF (or their future variants) could be used to support more systematic capacity development work. It is true that unless there is the will and capacity within the government to invest in the education sector, real capacity development cannot take place. However, the issue is that if the government starts making the right interventions especially at provincial levels, then would the donors be there to support and reward that government? Any positive shifts are fragile so the donor support can

matter. As noted earlier, the FTI "design" would need to be adapted to allow relevant, substantive engagement in Pakistan.

Aid effectiveness

11.13 The FTI principles of donor collaboration behind government leadership, and its focus on public provision of basic education, are relevant. But the degree of government commitment to EFA is questionable, and the "standard" FTI design which depends on an operational plan and a functioning donor group at national level does not fit Pakistan's federal structure or the in-country capacities of its existing education donors. The FTI could be relevant in the future in several ways:

- advocacy at international level may influence both donors' and the government's approaches to basic education in Pakistan, and the degree of priority it is given;
- a reformed (and presumably much larger) Catalytic Fund might be a useful source of support that was less subject to the constraints and uncertainties of direct bilateral funding;
- however, such support would need to be delivered at provincial level, and would require the FTI modus operandi to be adapted accordingly.

Cross-cutting issues

11.14 The FTI has an international role in promoting good practice in the incorporation of cross-cutting issues in education planning and practice, although so far there is little sign of FTI influence in Pakistan. More specifically, a number of the EPDF-supported analytical studies have been relevant to cross-cutting issues, and there is scope for more such work, in a more systematic fashion, in future. If the FTI model were adapted to allow interaction at provincial level, there would be a more realistic prospect of promoting cross-cutting issues through the endorsement of credible (provincial level) education sector plans.

12 Reflections and Recommendations

12.1 The purpose of this final chapter is to reflect upon the findings of the country study presented above and in doing so to consider what wider lessons about the FTI may be drawn from Pakistan's experience.

12.2 There were legitimate reasons for including Pakistan (and the other "+5" countries) within the scope of the FTI. An initiative that aspired to global impact could not afford to ignore the countries with the largest numbers of out-of-school children. However, this was not well thought through. Pakistan's Ministry of Education was led to believe that there was a prospect of qualifying for additional financing. Its frustration with the FTI Secretariat and the in-country donors was understandable. The FTI Secretariat's responses were very slow, and there was no sign of follow-up on the issue of federalism after this was identified as an obstacle. This reflects the limited capacity of the "light touch" secretariat. It also seems that there was no "FTI champion" for Pakistan among its education donors; DFID decided that the federal hurdle was insuperable, while the World Bank proceeded with substantial interventions at provincial level, and presumably saw no added value in engaging with the FTI (apart from the EPDF).

12.3 There is an obvious general lesson about the risks of commencing implementation of an initiative before its design has been worked out. However, the sense of urgency at the FTI's launch was understandable. A more serious criticism is that relatively little effort was subsequently made to get to grips with the design issues that Pakistan's case highlighted. There has been considerable effort within the FTI to address the challenges of working with fragile states, for example, but similar efforts have not been made to analyse and tackle the obstacles to engaging with large/federal states. The net result has been that none of the "analytical fast track" countries have so far been endorsed. It is hard not to conclude that the concern to increase the number of (small) endorsed countries outweighed concerns about the number of potential beneficiaries in larger countries.

12.4 If the FTI is to be relevant to Pakistan in the future, it will certainly need to adapt its design. The previous chapter has outlined how this might be done. Each of Pakistan's main provinces constitutes a different theatre of activity, with a different subset of donors involved. It would therefore be worth examining whether the FTI could operate in one or more provinces, endorsing and supporting a provincial-level sector plan. If, on the other hand, it is decided to keep the FTI engagement at an "analytical" level, the FTI will need to seek a more strategic instrument than the EPDF has, so far, proved to be.

12.5 As well as enabling the FTI to engage at a provincial level, it would be desirable to make it less wholly dependent on being championed by one of the in-country donors. In turn, this implies a stronger role, and more capacity, for the FTI Secretariat.

12.6 Moreover, although this has not been a comparative study, even casual observation shows that the characteristics and possibilities in different federal states are very different, and therefore the FTI will need to come up with country-specific designs for each of them.

12.7 A final reflection is that Pakistan starkly exemplifies a wider challenge for the FTI: how to engage effectively with the states which are not "good performers" and which do not in practice give Education for All a high political priority?

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Annex A – A Note on Methodology


A1 The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the *Evaluation Framework* (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a available at www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative).

A2 The *Evaluation Framework* includes a detailed programme theory for FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the *Evaluation Framework (Annex E)*. The same theory is being tested at both global and country levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country level).

A3 The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the *Evaluation Framework*. Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note, shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report will also be available for discussion and comment before it is finalised.

A4 Each country study includes a summary matrix, which relates overall findings and findings against each workstream to the logical framework for the evaluation. See the matrix in Annex K of this report. For the two non-endorsed case-study countries (Pakistan and Nigeria) the matrix has been adapted to consider the role of education sector aid as a whole.

A5 For a more retrospective explanation and reflection on the study process and methodology, see the Note on Approach and Methods which constitutes Appendix V (Volume 4) of the evaluation's final synthesis report.

Figure A1 Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI

Source: Evaluation Framework, Figure 3A

Annex B – Interview Schedule

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
Friday, 29 May		
AM	Team assemble and team meeting, Lahore	Hotel
10.30	Abbas Rashid, Chairperson, and Ayesha Awan, Research Analyst, Society for Advancement of Education (SAHE), Lahore	SAHE office
12.00	Rukhsana Zia, Forman Christian College (FC College) for Teacher Training, Lahore. Ex-Pakistan representative to UNESCO for Education, 2001-2004; Ex-Head of Department of Staff Development Ministry of Education, Punjab Provincial	FC College
17.00	Shaheen Attique-ur-Rehman, Chairperson, Bunyad, Lahore	Residence
Saturday, 30 May		
Day Field Trip to Sheikhpura district to visit the education department at the district government. The core meeting was held with Mr Afzal Ahmed, Executive District Officer, EDO Finance & Planning Department and Muhammad Akhtar, District Accounts Officer, to understand the role and responsibilities of the district government in education provision. The team also visited two primary government schools currently receiving support from ITA, an education NGO, under a Whole School Development Programme and had group discussions with teachers, head teachers, parents (mother and fathers), members of the School Based Management Committees (SBMCs), schools benefactors, and students. Saeed ul Hasan, Manager Partnership & Governance, ITA accompanied during the field visit and provided background information on the education challenges faced at the school level.		
Sunday, 31 May		
15.00	Team meeting, Islamabad	Guest House
Monday, 1 June		
10.00	Salman Humayun, Executive Director, Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (ISPS), Islamabad	ISPS
12.00	Federal Minister for Education, Mir Hazir Bijrani, Islamabad	Ministry of Education
14.00	Jim Butler, Programme Manager, First Secretary, DFID, Islamabad	DFID office
16.00	Baela Jameel, Chairperson, Idra-e-Taleem-o-Aaghai (ITA), Islamabad	ITA office
Tuesday, 2 June		
10.00	Mr Muhammad Siddique Bhatti, Development Advisor, European Commission Delegation, Islamabad	EC Delegation
14.00	Muhammad Tariq Khan, Education Specialist, USAID, Islamabad	Serena Hotel
15.30	Mr Naveed Naqvi, Senior Economist, Human Development, Umbreen Arif, and Huma Waheed, Research Analyst, The World Bank, Islamabad	World Bank
17.00	Mr Fayyaz Ahmed, Former Joint Secretary, Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education, Islamabad	Islamabad Club
Wednesday, 3 June		
10.00	Dr Haroona Jatoti, Director General, Academy of Education Planning and Management (AEPAM) Islamabad	AEPAM
11.00	Mr Zafar Malik, Director, EMIS, Islamabad	AEPAM
11.00	Ms Julie Reviere, Principal Advisor, GTZ, Islamabad	GTZ office
12.30	Ms Mehnaz Aziz, Chief Executive & Founding Director,	CGN office

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
	Children's Global Network (CGN), Islamabad	
14.00	Ms Nighat, Pakistan Coalition for Education (PCE), Islamabad	SPO office
15.30	Dr Maurice Robson, Director/Representative, UNESCO Islamabad, Islamabad	UNESCO
Thursday, 4 June		
10.30	Ms Alia Shahid, Chief Program Manager, Reform Support Unit, Ms Raisa Adil, Deputy Programme Manager, Reform Support Unit, Karachi	Reform Support Unit
13.00	Mr Peter R. Portier, Team Leader, European Commission Technical Assistance (ECTA), Karachi	Reform Support Unit
15.00	Naz Ahmad, a mother waiting outside the Secretary Education's office to seek support from the government to secure textbooks for her three children, Karachi	Waiting Room Secretary Education Sindh Secretariat
15.30	Mr Rizwan Memon, Secretary Education, Government of Sindh, Karachi	Sindh Secretariat
Friday, 5 June		
10.00	Sadiqa Salahuddin, Executive Director, Indus Resource Centre (IDC), Karachi	IDC office
11.00	Prof Anita Ghulam Ali, Managing Director, Sindh Education Foundation (SEF), Aziz Kabani, Director Programs, Operations & Research, Karachi	SEF office
15.00	Prof Nelofer Halai, Institute for Education Development (IED), The Aga Khan University, Karachi	IED
Saturday, 6 June		
10.30	Mr Iqbal-ur-Rehman Sharif Director Education National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), Islamabad	NCHD office
11.30	Mr Pervez Iqbal, Joint Education Adviser, Policy & Planning Wing, Ministry of Education	Planning Commission
14.00	Professor Kamal, National Coordinator, National Education Assessment System (NEAS)	NEAS
14.30	Mr Rodney Reviere, GTZ consultant on capacity building, Lahore	Phone
Sunday, 7 June		
15.00	Team meeting	Guest House
17.00	Mr Alan Leber, First Secretary Development, Canadian High Commission	Canadian Club, Diplomatic Enclave
Monday, 8 June		
10.00	Mr Talib Hussain, Chief Education, Deputy Chief Education Planning & Mr. Muhammad Almas Khan Khattak, Assistant Chief, Education Planning, Planning Commission, Islamabad	Planning Commission
12.00	Prof Dr Mukhtar Ahmed, Director General Operations and Planning, Higher Education Commission	Higher Education Commission
14.00	Mr Abdur Rauf Chaudhry, Executive Secretary, Federal Ministry for Education	Telephone debriefing
15.30	Huma Waheed, Research Analyst, World Bank	World Bank

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
Tuesday, 9 June		
13.00	Ms. Linda Arthur, Asian Development Bank, Islamabad	ADB
15.30	Muhammad Khalid Khan, Deputy Secretary, Economic Affairs Division (EAD)	EAD
Wednesday, 10 June [Lahore]		
10.00	Mr M. Mujtaba Paracha, Director, Punjab Resource Management Program (PRMP), Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab	PRMP office
12.00	Ms Maliha Batool, Director CPDP, Punjab Education Foundation	Punjab Secretariat
14.00	Mr Muhammad Imran Raza Abbasi, Deputy Director, Planning, PMIU-PESRP, & Saima Jehangir, Govt of The Punjab	PMIU-PESRP
Thursday, 11 June		
9.00	Team meeting, Lahore	Hotel

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
1947-1970		<p>1947: Independence from Britain. Muhammed Ali Jinnah is the first governor general of Pakistan. 1948, Jinnah dies. Succeeded by Liaquat Ali Khan who is assassinated in 1951</p> <p>1956 - Constitution proclaims Pakistan an Islamic republic.</p> <p>1960 - General Ayub Khan becomes president.</p>	<p>1951-1957: National Plan of Educational Development</p> <p>This policy had a target of 500,000 people to be made literate in 1955. Additional 300,000 for every year after that. Enrolment target of 66.7% of the out of school children (b/w ages 6 and 11) by 1957. Also target to establish 24000 primary schools. The outcome of this Plan was that literacy rate declined from 16.4% in 1951 to 16.3% in 1957.</p> <p>1955-1960: First Five-Year Plan: Reaffirmation of standing literacy targets. Rise in gross primary enrolment rate from 43% to 49% (additional 1 million children) through said initiatives.</p> <p>1960-65: Second Five-Year Plan: Target of 50% primary school enrolment by 1965</p> <p>1965-1970: Third Five-Year Plan: Target to increase primary enrolment rate from 45 to 70% by 1970. 42,500 new schools to be set up in west Pakistan.</p>	

Annex C: Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
1970s		<p>1970- Rising tension between east and west Pakistan.</p> <p>1971 - East Pakistan attempts to secede eventually breaking away to become Bangladesh</p> <p>1973 - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes prime minister. First civilian rule in two decades. 1977 – military coup and General Zia-ul-Haq takes over.</p> <p>1979: Bhutto is executed on charges of conspiring to murder a political opponent.</p>	<p>1972 – 80 : National Education Policy: Main aim to improve education quality through teacher training and infrastructure development</p> <p>1978 – 83: Fifth Five-Year Plan: Emphasis on education expenditure</p> <p>1979: National Education Policy: Aimed to achieve universal education for boys. Targets : 60% retention rate by 1983 by 1987 and for girls by 1992. 1000 adult literacy centres. Raise literacy rates from 24% to 35% by 1983 and 100% by 2010.</p>	
1980s		<p>1988 November - Benazir Bhutto's PPP wins general election but soon dismissed.</p>	<p>1983-88: Sixth Five-Year Plan Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raise primary enrolment rate from 48% to 75% by 1988. • Raise literacy rate from 26% to 33% by 1986 under the National Literacy Plan. 500,000 people to be made literate in the first year at an estimated per capita cost of PKR 147 <p>1988 - 93 : Seventh Five-Year Plan Target to raise literacy rate to 40% by 1993.</p>	
1990s	<p>March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980s by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p>1991 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation programme. Islamic Shariah law formally incorporated into legal code.</p> <p>1993 Benazir Bhutto comes back. However, in 1996 President Farooq Leghari dismissed Bhutto on charges of corruption, and in 1997 Nawaz Sharif replaced her.</p>	<p>1993-98 Eighth Five-Year Plan. Targets: A primary school to be established for every settlement of 300 people. 65% of new places were to be for girls. Also to raise participation rate for boys from 85% to 96% and that for girls from 54% to 82%. Increase literacy from 35% to 48%.</p> <p>1998: Ahead of Dakar, National Education Policy (1998-2010) was developed. Forms part of a number of policy documents which outline GoP plans to meet EFA targets.</p>	

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Pakistan Case Study

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
1999	Education For All (EFA) Assessment 1999-2000 , involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.	1999 October - Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif overthrown in military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. Coup is widely condemned, Pakistan is suspended from Commonwealth.		
2000	United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 , 189 world leaders signed up to try to end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals. World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.			
2001	G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. July 2001 : G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada.	Decentralisation to district level begins with Local Government Ordinance.	<p>2001: Education Sector Reform programme (2001-2004): This is a long term perspective on National Education Policy (see above). Thus this is not a new Education Policy but an Action Plan for Reform.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Drafted in a participatory manner, in consultation with major stakeholder. A compassion for underserved and the disadvantaged ➤ An attempt to deal with imbalances and disparities ➤ Devolving education from federal level to district level. Making the whole sector more people- and learner-centred. <p>Core objectives of ESR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Improvement in literacy rate and Universalisation of Primary Education. (ii) Improvement in the quality of education through better teachers, reformed curriculum and efficient examination system, and (iii) Introducing a third stream of gender and area specific Technical and Vocational Education at Tehsil and District levels. 	

Annex C: Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
			<p>ESR has 6 main thrust areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National literacy campaign 2. mainstreaming madrassas 3. Universal Primary education 4. Improving quality of education i.e. curriculum reform, teacher training 5. Technical streaming at secondary school 6. Public private partnership <p>With specific respect to UPE, the ESR has the following targets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Increasing gross participation rate from 89% to 100% (4% per annum) ➤ Reducing gender disparity by 10% annually ➤ Enhancing primary completion rate from 50% to 70% (6% per annum) <p>ESR will achieve the above targets with programmes consisting of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ National Ordinance for Compulsory Primary Education ➤ Improving infrastructure in existing primary schools ➤ Construction of new schools ➤ Early Childhood Education – an innovative programme 	

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Pakistan Case Study

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
2002	<p>G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid strong support from the international community.</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits EUR 135 million to set the process in motion.</p> <p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>	Musharraf re-elected	<p>Innovative programme to increase access; Tawana Pakistan:</p> <p>2002-2006: Tawana Pakistan is a school nutrition package for girls between the ages of 5 and 12 years. An initiative of the Ministry of Women Development and Social Welfare and Special Education. Between 2002-2006 the project was implemented in 29 of the poorest districts of all provinces of Pakistan. The programme had multiple targets including improvement of nutrition of girls of early school-going age, increasing and sustaining school enrolment, reducing gender gap in school enrolment, developing community participation and ownership and involving local NGOs and the private sector.</p>	<p>2002 June 22: Pakistan receives letter of invitation to participate in FTI. Pakistan is one of the five countries with large out-of-school population and is therefore invited to receive analytical and technical support as a first step for possible eligibility for financing. FTI Secretariat encourages Pakistan to participate, outlining the benefits of the Initiative. It also pledges technical support to help Pakistan to complete all the eligibility requirements.</p> <p>July 2002: Pakistan responds favourably to the participation of FTI through a letter to confirm participation. Letter mentions that work is under way to ensure Pakistan qualifies for FTI. The letter mentions that CIDA has agreed to offer the ministry technical support to this end</p> <p>October 2002: The Government presented to donors, its agenda on Education Sector Reforms (ESR). The ESR gives a framework for EFA FTI.</p>
2003	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, Feb 2003. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonise donor policies and priorities around country systems.</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting , Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2-3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p>	2003 June - North-West Frontier Province votes to introduce Sharia law.		<p>Ministry of Education writes to FTI Secretariat expressing dissatisfaction with progress so far, and with the performance of the designated lead donor. Informs FTI Secretariat of establishment of a technical committee to carry matters forward. (Technical committee has prepared Indicative Framework targets for Pakistan.)</p>

Annex C: Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
	FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003 : Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.			
2004	<p>Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and program development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, Nov 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>	2004 May - Pakistan readmitted to Commonwealth.	<p>2004: Female Secondary School Stipend programme implemented in Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, as part of the education reform plan totalling \$300 million from the World Bank's concessionary International Development Association. The stipend program targets girls in grades 6 to 8 in 15 districts of Punjab where literacy is below 40%. A girl receives a stipend conditional on her being enrolled in grade 6- 8 in a government girl's school in a target district and conditional on her maintaining a class attendance of at least 80%. Eligible students receive PKR. 200 per month.</p> <p>According to The World Bank, within one year of the programme's inception, enrolment in government primary schools increased by 13% compared to the previous trend of less than 2% a year. And girls' enrolment in grades 6 to 8 in the low-literacy districts receiving the stipends, increased by 23%</p> <p>Recent household survey data show that net primary enrolment rates increased from 45% in 2001 to 58% in 2004/05. This translates into one million more children enrolled in Punjab schools since the launch of the reform program</p>	<p>May 2004: Letter from FT Secretariat informs Pakistan of refinements to FTI approach agreed in Oslo; notes that Pakistan would not qualify for the Catalytic Fund and advises consultation with in-country donors on funding requirements. Also notes that Pakistan's federal system would require adaptation of the FTI model. FTI secretariat intends to initiate discussion among donors about this, and advises Pakistan to initiate similar discussions at country level.</p> <p>November 2004: Sida and USAID write an official letter to the MoE about FTI and its potential benefits. It also encourages Pakistan to join following the completion of a sound education sector plan. (Letter appears to be part of a general recruitment drive.)</p>

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Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
2005	<p>March 2005, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials. Who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates were accused of producing a 'watered-down' outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p>			<p>March 2005: Pakistan accepts invitation from FTI secretariat to become an active participant in FTI, but no subsequent follow-up.</p>
2006	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education Millennium Development Goals.</p>		<p>2006: National Education Census released</p> <p>2006 (revised in March 2007) The White Paper gives an honest assessment of the challenges facing the Ministry in meeting EFA targets set in Dakar.</p>	<p>November 2006: EPDF regional Annex</p> <p>November 2006: Support provided by the EPDF is tailored at province level given the fact that Pakistan is a decentralised country with strategies and education reform plans largely defined at the provincial level. Activities supported by the EPDF in 2006 included</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) To estimating the impact of the Girls Stipend Program on school enrolments and learning outcomes. (ii) Technical support to School Council Capacity Building Program (Punjab Education Sector Reform Program)
	<p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> that took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the 12th of November 2006. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors, such as Mozambique, to qualify.</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (iii) Sindh Education Sector Program: Technical advice is being provided to the Government of Sindh on the reform program in the areas of: teacher quality; training and development; associated quality assurance framework to support sustained improvements in teaching and learning; and public/private partnerships in the provision of quality schooling in the underserved areas of Sindh. (iv) School Survey in rural Sindh

Annex C: Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
				Also with support from the EPDF, technical assistance was provided to the Government of Pakistan to assess the MTDF and to make recommendations to further improve the proposed policy measures and programs. Focus was given to the most critical parts of the strategy: (i) public-private partnership; (ii) accreditation and quality assurance; (iii) management and governance; and (iv) fiscal impact of the development of higher education sub-sector and affordability given the need not to jeopardise resources to primary and secondary education.
2007	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p>In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries.</p>	<p>2007 October - Musharraf wins most votes in presidential election.</p>		<p>2007 December: EPDF Summary progress report: Funding proposal request for 2008.</p> <p>EPDF support to Pakistan has the following activities:</p> <p>Sindh Education Sector Strategy (\$135,000): Funds will support continued technical assistance for the development and implementation of the education sector plan, particularly in the areas of (i) teacher quality, education and professional development; (ii) strengthening education management at all levels including the system for quality assurance; (iii) launching new demand side programs and public-private partnerships; and (iv) implementation of performance agreements in partnerships between provincial and district governments, including performance aspects in education service delivery; (v) mainstreaming environmental issues.</p>

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
Date	International Context	Pakistan Context	Education Policy in Pakistan	FTI in Pakistan
				<p>Higher Education Reforms (\$80,000): technical assistance on the development of reform plans in the areas of: (i) improvement of quality and relevance of research undertaken in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs); (ii) promotion of greater private sector participation in the HE sector; (iii) alignment of university outputs with national development objectives; (iv) diversification of source of funds for HEIs; (v) development of Medium-term Expenditure Framework for the sector; and (vi) optimisation of resource management in HEIs.</p> <p>Quality Improvement Strategy Development (\$115,000): support the development of strategies for quality improvement, and will include support in the form of: (a) analytical work to inform the strategy for the various elements of quality (e.g., realigning the role of federal MOE – national teacher accreditation council vis-à-vis links with provincial professional development programs; national assessment system strengthening and links to education quality reforms at all levels; support to provincial and district programs in the areas of examinations, and teacher professional development; and b) capacity development in the shape of cross learning, exchange, and workshops.</p>
2008	<p>September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid. Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.</p>	<p>2008 August - The two main governing parties agree to launch impeachment proceedings against President Musharraf. Mr Musharraf resigns</p> <p>2008 September - Asif Ali Zardari elected by legislators as Pakistan's new president. The government borrows billions of dollars from the International Monetary Fund to overcome its spiralling debt crisis.</p>		<p>2008 29th September – 2nd October Pakistan participates in FTI workshop in Kampala</p> <p>2008 November : FTI correspondence with Pakistan MoE suggesting that stock is taken of progress and challenges based on recommendations made at the Kampala meeting (see above).</p>

Annex D – Provincial Profiles

Pakistan's provincial complexities

D1 Pakistan has a federal structure. In addition to the four provinces, there are four federally administrated units including Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and Azad Kashmir.²⁶ These divisions are representative of distinct ethnic groups, geographical landscape, population density, nature and size of the economy, political dynamics and human development indicators.

Figure D1 Pakistan Provinces and Territories



²⁶ Also known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).

D2 This inter-provincial variation is also reflected in the education sector. The profile of the education sector in each province and the nature of donor interventions to support the education reforms across the four provinces thus often have a distinct character. While all donors operating in Pakistan have to seek the approval of the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) at the federal level to function in the country, most deal directly with the provincial government education departments when it comes to negotiating aid or policy credits. The role of the federal Ministry of Education is limited.

Punjab

D3 Punjab, the province constituting 56% of the country's total population, comprises only 25% of its total land. It is politically the most influential province having highest representation in the national parliament and has produced the largest number of political and military heads of the state. Punjab is also the province which has benefited the most from recent gains in education in Pakistan: the net national primary school enrolment jumped by 17% between 2001–2007 as opposed to the national average of 14%. However, there is great variation within Punjab with major differences in human development indicators between northern Punjab, which consists of more urban areas, and southern Punjab, which is agriculture based and a stronghold of land-owning feudal families.

D4 Since the inter-provincial financial allocations are made on the basis of population, Punjab gets a larger share of national resources. The province has always traditionally attracted more donor interventions, partly because of the large population and partly because of its proximity and ease of access to the federal capital. Donors have been engaged in the education sector in Punjab in a number of projects since 2001 – for example, many bilateral donors have been supporting the Provincial Institute of Teacher Education (PITE) since 2003. However, the most visible programme in Punjab since 2004 to now has been the World Bank supported Education Sector Reform Programme. This sector-wide support programme is tied to the Punjab government Education Sector Reform Programme; in June 2009 it received its third extension with a policy credit of USD 350 million to be spent over three years. The first Punjab Education Sector Adjustment Credit (PESAC) was approved in February 2004 and was meant to be the first part of a five to ten year programme of World Bank support to help Punjab attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There are two components to the project. The first component of the project is programme financing and accounts for the large part of the total financing provided by the Bank. The second component of the project is technical assistance. This component will provide support to strengthen existing capacities for implementation and monitoring of the sector program.

D5 The focus of current reforms is to:

- (i) enhance fiscal sustainability and the effectiveness of public expenditures in education;
- (ii) enhance the quality of school education;
- (iii) improve and expand access through improvements in school participation and completion rates and reduction in gender and regional disparities;
- (iv) strengthen school management and governance in the education sector; and,
- (v) support private sector schools through the Punjab Education Foundation. This has also dramatically increased the scale of operations of the Punjab Education Foundation in recent years.

Sindh

D6 Sindh has 23% of the country's population and 18% of the total land area. With 49% of its population living in urban areas (compared with 29% in the rest of the country), Sindh is highly urbanised and has the highest per capita income. In Sindh, the net enrolment ratio

in the last decade increased by 10 percentage points as opposed to the national average of 14%. However, Sindh like Punjab also has a strong urban and rural difference in human development indicators, as rural Sindh is the stronghold of feudal landlords and often reports extreme cases of lawlessness, such as poor families being forced into bonded labour for decades. The issue of patronage-based recruitment of teachers and inequitable distribution of teachers across schools is particularly serious in the case of Sindh. Thus, despite improvements in the overall literacy rate, the enrolment rates are still low, especially in rural Sindh. For every 100 boys who enrol in primary and high school in urban Sindh, only 43 and 17 girls respectively are enrolled in rural Sindh. Politically, Sindh in common with the other two smaller provinces supports a strong nationalist movement. The Sindhi language movement is also quite strong and since the 1980s, the mohajir ethnic movement has resulted in violence and unrest in the provincial capital of Karachi, which is also the commercial capital of Pakistan.

D7 After Punjab, Sindh has also entered a sector-wide reform programme in the education sector with the support of the World Bank. The Sindh government's Education Reform Program (SERP) has been supported by three World Bank credits in the form of the Sindh Education Sector Development Policy Credit (SEDPC) series launched in 2007 when the World Bank approved the first Sindh Education Sector Development Policy Credit for USD 100 million. In June 2009, the Sindh government negotiated a renewal of this IDA credit worth USD 300 million, with three tranches of USD 100 million each. The European Commission has also aligned its Sindh Education Sector Grant of EUR 39 million with the World Bank Education Sector Development Policy Credit. The Sindh Education Sector Project (SERP) supports multiple interventions. It takes a sector-wide approach and also acknowledges that education reforms cannot be successful in isolation, but need to be embedded in a broader reform framework that ensures fiscal sustainability and improves the fiduciary environment. The objectives of the programme are to improve participation, retention, and transition; reduce gender and regional disparities; and improve quality in elementary and secondary education (grades 1–10).

D8 The reform program is built on four complementary pillars:

- (i) The first pillar includes fiscal, financial management, and procurement reforms aimed at strengthening provincial finances and the effectiveness of public expenditures while increasing education and other poverty-related expenditures.
- (ii) The second pillar includes reforms to strengthen the functioning, capacity, and accountability of provincial and district education management in line with devolution objectives; to provide incentives to district governments to improve service delivery; and to strengthen the role of school management committees in school development and monitoring.
- (iii) The third pillar aims at improving access to quality schooling, with a particular focus on rural areas and girls, by improving the quality and utilisation of school physical infrastructure and the implementation of incentive programmes (free textbooks and girls' stipends), and by launching partnerships with the nongovernment/private sector to increase access and quality.
- (iv) The fourth pillar aims to improve the quality of teaching and learning, through instituting merit-based recruitment and improved accountability of teachers, establishing a competency-based system of teacher education and continuous professional development, and through strengthening the assessment of student achievement in the provincial education system.

D9 In addition, other donors continue to operate in the province to support specific projects. Some other donor interventions after 2001 include the ADB Decentralised Elementary Education Project (DEEP) and its Devolved Social Services Programme (DSSP) and USAID's district improvement programmes in four provinces under ESRA. During this period, Unicef has also been involved in the province by focusing on five districts to increase girls' enrolment and promoting a more child-friendly environment in the classrooms.

NWFP

D10 NWFP has 13.4% of the country's population and 6% of the land area. NWFP compares reasonably well in terms of literacy rate with Punjab and Sindh. While its total literacy rate of 43% is below the 53.3% for Punjab and 55.3% for Sindh, its female literacy rate in rural areas of 21.7% is ahead of the 15.7% for Sindh. Like Sindh, NWFP harbours a strong nationalist movement. The province has since 2007 also become engulfed in concerns about Talibanisation, where Islamic militant groups confined in the tribal belt appeared to have spilled out into the settled regions of NWFP including Swat and even Peshawar, the capital of the province.

D11 This spread of the Taliban movement also impacted on the schooling system as elements reported to be linked with the Taliban started to target girls' schools and many government girls' schools in the Swat valley were bombed to deter parents from sending girls to school. The education system in NWFP had earlier also faced a serious setback during the 2005 earthquake: in the five affected districts of NWFP, out of a total of 7,577 educational institutions from primary to college level, 53% of the schools were demolished or damaged (GOP 2006b; World Bank website). Thus, the province faces additional challenges in meeting its education targets. The province did vote in a government of the Islamist parties in the 2002 elections, partly as a response to the US invasion of Afghanistan, but during the 2008 election the government returned to the hands of the ANP, a secular socialist party, with strong roots in the province from the pre-partition period.

D12 In terms of donor landscape in the education sector, NWFP currently presents the most promising picture of donor collaboration. Partly attributed to the responsive behaviour of the provincial government and partly a result of the deteriorating security conditions in the province, almost all major bilateral donors have now signed a joint MOU for the education sector reform in NWFP. The donors involved in this sector reform programme include DFID, AusAID, EC, Netherlands, Norway and CIDA. GTZ, which is viewed to have developed strong links with the department of education in NWFP through sustained work in the province, has been appointed as the formal coordinator for the capacity development work in the education sector in the province. Other initial investment includes financing of numerous studies including costing and financial analysis of NWFP Education Sector Plan and a security assessment on service delivery.

Balochistan

D13 Balochistan, the province comprising 47% of the country's land area, is home to less than 4.9% of the total population. Balochistan in general has the lowest human development indicators: its female literacy rate is 17.6% as opposed to the national average of 39.2% and the total literacy rate is 36% as opposed to the national average of 51.6%. It is also the province where the nationalist movement is currently most hostile. Under the previous government, repeated military operations were carried out to curb the nationalist groups. Apart from feeling hostility against Punjab's domination over the federal government, Balochi nationalist movements also harbour strong grievances over distribution of gas royalties. The province, which has been supplying natural gas to the rest of the Pakistan for power generation, industry, fertiliser-production and domestic consumption has only 3.4% of gas consumers as compared to 51% from Punjab alone, which contributes only 4.75% of gas.

The province contributes PKR 85 billion per year through gas revenues but receives only PKR 7 billion from the federal government. The fact that, in terms of human development indicators and even physical infrastructure, Balochistan lags behind the other provinces accentuates a sense of grievance. (Baloch 2007)

D14 Despite its high need, the donors have had limited engagement with the education sector in Balochistan. Few donors actually operate in the province, often due to concerns about security. Even the World Bank runs a specific project under Balochistan Education Support Project (BESP) to establish community and private schools in Balochistan rather than working on a broader sector wide approach as adopted in Sindh and Punjab. The Balochistan Education Support Project for Pakistan aims to promote public-private and community partnerships to improve access to quality primary education particularly for girls. Project components consist of: (a) establishing community schools in rural areas, (b) supporting private schools; and (c) capacity building for the Balochistan Education Foundation, the implementing agencies, the parent education committees, and teachers. Due to limited donor input, unlike Punjab and Sindh Education Foundation, the Balochistan Education Foundation (BEF) has also remained very small scale in its activities.

Tribal belt

D15 The Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA) has an estimated population of 3,341,070 people, or roughly 2% of Pakistan's population. With only 3.1% of its population residing in established townships, FATA is the most rural administrative unit in Pakistan. The Federal Government of Pakistan has limited administrative control over the unit. The Constitution of Pakistan governs FATA through the same rules which were left by British in 1901. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court does not extend to FATA.

D16 The status of education in the region is dismal. The literacy rate is estimated to be around 17%, which is far below the national average of 51%. Only 29.5% of males and 3% of females receive education. Lacking higher institutions of learning, students have to migrate to other provinces of Pakistan to secure higher education.

Azad Kashmir

D17 Azad Kashmir is another separate administrative unit emerging as a result of the disputed partition of Kashmir. The Azad Kashmir has its own government. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council is a supreme body consisting of 11 members, six from the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and five from the government of Pakistan. Its chairman/chief executive is the president of Pakistan. Other members of the council are the president and the prime minister of Azad Kashmir and a few other AJK ministers. Financial matters, i.e., budget and tax affairs, are dealt with by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, rather than by Pakistan's Central Board of Revenue.

D18 The literacy rate for Azad Kashmir was 62% in 2004, which is higher than the national average for Pakistan. The education sector in Azad Kashmir faced serious damage after the 2005 earthquake: in the three affected districts of AJK, out of the total of 3,879 government institutions from primary to college level, 95% were either completely destroyed or damaged to the point that they were dangerous to use (GOP 2006b; World Bank website). This has created distinct educational challenges linked to reconstruction of educational facilities in the area.

Annex E – Education Structure After Devolution

E1 Pakistan comprises four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan, and some federal units, Islamabad Capital Territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) and Northern Areas (FANAs). Area-wise Balochistan is the largest province with over 45% of the country's area while over half of the country's population lives in the province of Punjab.

E2 Pakistan is administratively a federal system of government with several ministries and the same system is repeated at the provincial level. Under the 2001 Local Government Ordinance (LGO), divisions, as an administrative unit in the province, were abolished and replaced by district governments. The district governments are responsible for district based planning, management and administration. There are over 100 districts in Pakistan and 13 agencies of FATA. Districts are further divided into 380 talukas or tehsils (sub-districts) and below the sub-districts rest the unions. The district government has its elected council and administration, and is headed by an elected Nazim. It has up to 12 administrative departments. The Education Sector Reform (ESR) programme initiated in 2001 was closely hinged on the devolution programme. Both these measures were in turn viewed to be central to the PRSP and poverty reduction strategy.

Objectives and design of district government

E3 The main objective of the devolution plan was to take planning and management of social services to the district level whereby, rather than the province, the district becomes the operational tier of governance and the focus of all development activity. The core objectives were:

- To take decision-making close to people.
- Ensure planning and development are carried out in accordance with local needs.
- Promote community participation in governance.
- Promote transparency and accountability.
- Ensure better service delivery and poverty reduction.

E4 To ensure community participation and greater accountability, provision was also made for the establishment of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) to enable communities to participate in development-related activities in both urban and rural areas. The establishment of committees could be facilitated by a locally elected body or by the citizens themselves. Such committees are registered at the district and to do so they must provide 20% of the funds. In addition, within the education sector reforms, heavy emphasis was placed on establishment of School Management Committees (SMCs). SMCs are known by a variety of names— Village Education Committees (VECs), Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) in NWFP, Parents Teachers School Management Committees (PTSMC) and VECs in Balochistan, PTAs in Sindh and School Council in Punjab.

Responsibilities across the tiers

E5 After the devolution, the Federal Ministry is responsible for development of policy statements and national plans, budgets, and overall curriculum development and setting the standard of education. The policy, planning and coordination of major components of Education for All, i.e. Non-Formal Primary Education, Adult Literacy and Early Childhood Education, is the responsibility of the Planning Wing of the Ministry of Education, whereas the implementing agencies are the Provincial Education Departments, District Governments and NGOs. Learning achievements and training in essential skills (curricula, examinations,

evaluation, standard of education, learning/competency level, teacher training) are under the purview of the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education and provincial line departments/organisations. In addition, the Special Education and Social Welfare Division at the federal government level manages the education for the special persons/handicapped and children with special needs. Other duties at federal level include setting of teachers' salaries, teachers' accreditation and evaluation of pupil achievement.

E6 The provincial educational departments are headed by their respective Provincial Education Ministers. The civil servant in charge of the department is the Provincial Education Secretary. The provincial government carries the primary responsibility for the delivery of education. Its most critical role since devolution is the responsibility for running pre-service teacher training institutes. In addition, the main authority at the provincial government rests in the power to make appointments of the district government staff, which limits the ability of the district government to take decisions independent of the provincial government. However, decisions about teacher appointments and salary levels remain in the domain of the district government.

E7 The district government is responsible for planning, directing and evaluating the education system and for disbursing the salaries of teaching and non-teaching personnel. The head of the Education Department in the District is Executive District Officer (EDO) Education, and the head of the Literacy Department (in case of Punjab and Sindh only) is Executive District Officer Literacy. In NWFP and Balochistan, literacy is part of the Education Department. The hierarchy then runs down to the District Education Officer, Sub-district Education Officer, Supervisors or Assistant Sub-District Education Officers. In addition to the resources transferred by the federal and provincial governments, the district has the authority to generate additional resources, but in practice its ability to generate revenues remains very restricted.

Limitations

E8 Weak capacity at the district level has limited the ability of the district governments to ensure better delivery of education despite the devolution of power.

E9 The extent of fiscal decentralisation (i.e. local government authority over resources) remains limited because no new taxes have been devolved to local governments. Most district expenditures are 'establishment charges' that cannot be altered by the districts, and because most middle and senior ranking employees are, and remain, provincial employees, who cannot be fired by, or have salaries adjusted by districts (Watson & Khan 2005).

E10 Finally, the future of the district government remains uncertain due to lack of ownership by the political parties. Historically, local governments in Pakistan have always been established by the military governments in a bid to gain political legitimacy. In 1959, Ayub Khan passed the Basic Democracies Order for Local Government reforms, devolving representation to the village level to serve as an electoral college. In 1979, the local Government Ordinance was promulgated by General Zia ul Haq to activate local government. In 1999, the newly formed government of General Musharraf established the National Reconstruction Bureau which devised the Devolution plan in 2000 and by August 2001 all district government were in place, mediated by sub-district and union council teams and headed by district, sub-district and union council nazims. Due to this, local governments have failed to become sustainable under the political governments. The future of the current district government system was indicated to be uncertain in numerous interviews conducted in the field.

Annex F – Basic Education Indicators

Socio-Economic Context			
GNI Per Capita (US \$)	860		
Population (millions)	159.0		
Population Growth Rate (%)	2.2		
Population Ages 0-14 (millions)	61.2		
Population Ages 0-14 (% of total population)	38		
HIV Prevalence Rate, ages 15-49 (%)	0.1		
Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	90		
Adult Literacy Rate (%) [M/F]	54 [68/40]		
Unemployment rate (% of labor force) [M/F]	5 [5/8]		
Access, Coverage and Efficiency			
	Total	Male	Female
Gross Intake in Grade 1 (%)	118	127	109
Primary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) (5 years)	92	101	83
Primary Repeaters (% of primary cohort)	5.3	5.5	4.9
Primary Drop Out Rate (%)	30.3	32.2	27.6
Primary Completion Rate (%)	63	70	56
Expected Primary Completion Rate (%)	81	88	75
Number of Primary Age Children Out of School (thousands)	6821	2705	4116
Primary Gender Parity Index (GER ratio) ^a	0.82		
Secondary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) (7 years)	33	37	28
Lower Secondary (%) (3 years)	46	52	39
Upper Secondary (%) (4 years)	23	26	20
Vocational and Technical (% of secondary enrolment)	3.6	0.0	0.0
Secondary Gender Parity Index (GER ratio) ^a	0.76		
Tertiary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%)	5.1	5.5	4.7
Tertiary Graduates in Science (% of total graduates)	..		
Labor Force with Secondary Education (% of labor force)	11.0	13.0	3.4
Labor Force with Tertiary Education (% of labor force)	22.9	25.7	12.0
Education Financing			
Public Education Spending (% of GDP)	2.9		
Public Education Spending (% of Government Spending)	11.2		
Share of Education Spending by level of education (%)			
Primary	..		
Secondary	..		
Tertiary	..		
Other	..		

Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), World Bank, UNAIDS, ILO, Household Surveys, IMF, Country. Data are for the most recent year available in 2000-2005.

a. Gender Parity Index (GPI) refers to the ratio of the female to male gross enrollment ratios. A GPI of 1 indicates parity between sexes.

Source: World Bank, (2009), Pakistan: Education at a Glance.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/EXTDATASTATISTICS/EXTEDSTATS/0,,contentMDK:21605891~menuPK:3409559~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3232764,00.html>

Annex G – International Aid Data for Pakistan

External aid to Pakistan


G1 Data on aid to Pakistan are problematic. OECD DAC data from the Creditor Reporting System (presented in the EFA Global Monitoring Reports) give aid to Pakistan from reports submitted by aid agencies to the OECD. More recently Pakistan now also has an aid information system – DAD Pakistan – that aims to capture aid at a project level. As is frequently the case, there are significant discrepancies between the data collected internationally from donors and the data assembled in-country. Moreover, in-country information on aid in Pakistan is limited in any case, with donors using a variety of channels, formats and timelines for reporting assistance (EAD 2007). There are no harmonised procedures for reporting on aid allocations, and the absence of a comprehensive overview of aid flows complicates the government's planning processes.

G2 This Annex therefore draws mainly on the OECD data, as a standard international series that covers the whole period since 1999. The broad picture and trends from these data are likely to be valid, but the potential for gaps and discrepancies should be borne in mind.

G3 This Annex's data on external aid come from the 2009 GMR, which draws on the OECD Creditor Reporting System to present data on commitments from 1999 to 2007. The analysis in this section is limited to commitments, since most multilaterals (except the EC) have not been reporting disbursements.

G4 With these caveats in mind, Pakistan's aid commitments increased in 2001 from around USD 0.5 billion in 1999 to a level around USD 2 billion each year. Both the total amount of aid commitments and the share of multilateral aid in them fluctuates considerably, and 2003 saw a significant peak in commitments as bilateral contributions spiked because Japan rescheduled a USD 4 billion loan (see Figure G.1).


Figure G.1 Total aid commitments (constant 2007 USD bn)



Source: OECD DAC CRS. Commitments by the main donors are detailed in Table G.2 below.

G5 Aid represents around 2% of GNI. Aid dependency rose sharply from well below 1% in 1999 to above 2% in 2002 and 2003 (reflecting the sharp increase in aid commitments following the international events of 2001) and broadly maintained that level subsequently – see Figure G.2 below. Aid dependency spiked in 2003 at nearly 7% (but again this peak figure is an artefact of one-off debt relief figures in 2003). Even at 2%, aid dependency is low compared with many other aid recipients.


Figure G.2 Aid Dependency Ratio 1999–2007 (commitments as % of GNI)



Source: OECD DAC CRS.

G6 Five donors have committed significantly more than others over the period: the World Bank (through IDA), Japan, the United States, ADB and the UK (DFID), as Figure G.3 shows. In 2007, Japan's commitments had reduced to leave IDA (39%), the United States (24%), ADB (17%, through AsDF), and the UK (6%) as the main contributors.

Figure G.3 Share of total aid commitments by donor 1999–2007



Source: OECD DAC CRS

Aid to education

G7 DAC data suggest that aid to education comes principally from the Asian Development Bank, the United States, the World Bank (IDA), the EC and Germany. Table G.3 (at the end of this annex) suggests that aid to education increased very rapidly from 1999 to fluctuate around USD 300 million (in 2007 constant prices) in more recent years.

G8 The amount of aid to education is estimated using the GMR convention for attributing aid that is not directly committed to education (such as budget support) or to basic education (such as unspecified aid). This convention has it that Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level. Table G.1 below details the breakdown of aid to education by category, as well as presenting the figures for General Budget Support and total aid to education and basic education.

Table G.1 Direct aid to education (constant 2007 USD m) – commitments

Category	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Education unspecified	3.33	17.08	1.45	10.37	6.96	121.86	31.55	17.74	36.91
Basic education	0.98	10.20	5.73	73.10	149.34	50.72	114.71	128.85	110.85
Secondary education	1.61	0.22	1.13	2.73	0.56	3.88	0.48	9.44	0.51
Post-secondary education	8.57	19.14	11.26	9.68	14.38	17.11	14.19	20.05	32.17
General Budget Support			1237.3	1058.7					
	0.12	0.00	4	0	171.42	477.45	779.34	601.47	680.00
10% GBS	0.01	0.00	123.73	105.87	17.14	47.75	77.93	60.15	68.00
20% GBS	0.02	0.00	247.47	211.74	34.28	95.49	155.87	120.29	136.00
Total aid to education	14.51	46.64	267.04	307.63	205.52	289.07	316.80	296.37	316.44
Total aid to basic education	2.65	18.74	130.19	184.16	169.96	159.40	208.42	197.87	197.31

Notes: total aid to education = all direct aid to education + 20% GBS; total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 50% Education unspecified + 10% GBS.

G9 Figure G.4 shows that aid commitments to education and basic education have generally risen substantially over the period 1999–2007, with significant increases starting in 2001. However, total commitments have fluctuated significantly, both from bilaterals and from multilaterals. There has also been an unsteady rise in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid to education, as Figure G.5 shows. Figure G.5 also indicates that the share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has risen from 18% to 62% over the period, experiencing a relatively steady increase from 1999 to 2003, reaching its peak at 83%, followed by a sharp decline of 28% in 2004 and a subsequent rise of 10% in 2005.

Figure G.4 Total commitments to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)







Figure G.5 Share of multilateral aid in aid to education and basic education, and of aid to basic education in total aid to education, 1999–007



G10 The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2007 was IDA with a share of 43%, followed by the United States with a share of 36% (Figure G.6). Figure G.7 indicates that over the period 1999–2007, IDA was again the most significant donor, followed by the United States – both donors have made consistent commitments from 2001 onwards. The EC also featured in the list of top five donors over the period, as did the AsDF and Germany, all making yearly commitments consistently across the period.

Figure G.6 Share of total commitments to education by donor 2007**Figure G.7 Share of total commitments to education by donor 1999-2007**

G11 In terms of aid to basic education, the United States commands a 52% share of aid to basic education in 2007, followed again by IDA with a 34% share (Figure G.8). Over the course of the period 1999–2007, the IDA appears to be the largest donor to basic education, closely followed by the United States (Figure G.9). The EC, the ADB, and the Netherlands fill out the remaining top five donors.

Figure G.8 Share of total commitments to basic education by donor 2007




Figure G.9 Donor shares of commitments to basic education 1999–2007




Table G.2 Total aid commitments by donor 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total aid commitments 1999–2007
AsDF	190.96	144.91	485.32	286.63	415.20	238.51	218.96	169.21	489.65	2,639.35
Australia	0.77	3.31	7.30	3.17	6.56	3.28	20.05	33.86	6.05	84.37
Austria	1.72	1.64	1.80	10.21	1.19	2.61	7.99	1.89	2.27	31.33
Belgium	0.12	0.41	0.10	1.35	0.08	0.07	2.62	4.13	1.19	10.07
Canada	8.63	12.45	19.13	29.74	25.86	23.95	72.67	51.63	76.42	320.48
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.72	0.37	1.38	3.48
EC	1.24	25.00	47.80	130.25	22.53	8.34	200.75	2.20	45.42	483.55
Finland	-	0.03	5.00	1.69	0.06	1.13	26.56	2.76	5.00	42.23
France	1.98	120.05	115.17	2.10	650.02	5.07	34.21	60.80	5.64	995.05
Germany	40.18	11.21	70.66	74.65	27.41	108.16	60.03	123.54	31.49	547.32
Global Fund	-	-	-	-	11.90	8.13	-	6.81	26.87	53.71
Greece	-	-	-	0.12	0.47	0.34	4.46	0.66	0.93	6.99
IDA	120.75	-	987.76	1,038.16	555.82	844.57	1,135.23	229.85	1,109.99	6,022.15
IFAD	-	23.95	21.16	-	26.96	28.93	29.33	28.61	35.01	193.95
Ireland	-	-	0.05	0.90	0.76	0.91	12.49	4.42	2.73	22.26
Italy	0.65	10.38	11.72	0.54	5.42	0.10	0.10	5.12	1.91	35.93
Japan	0.65	529.26	73.35	448.80	4,116.11	65.86	276.25	408.92	32.12	5,951.31
Luxembourg	-	-	0.42	-	-	-	5.24	1.27	0.43	7.37
Netherlands	41.55	5.95	42.37	9.81	11.89	15.33	52.44	107.15	20.30	306.77
New Zealand	-	-	-	0.47	0.06	0.08	2.26	0.63	0.50	3.99

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Norway	17.11	7.47	9.30	36.54	25.34	2.86	103.15	20.45	12.05	234.27
Portugal	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.01	0.00	-	0.02
Spain	7.85	0.22	6.85	2.89	0.01	0.09	5.98	1.15	5.64	30.68
Sweden	-	-	-	0.14	-	-	10.80	29.01	10.59	50.54
Switzerland	12.82	10.01	17.46	22.60	11.57	16.15	26.30	17.23	21.47	155.59
UNAIDS	-	-	0.47	0.06	0.43	-	0.29	0.66	1.13	3.03
UNDP	10.01	-	-	-	-	8.89	13.32	11.08	12.51	55.82
UNFPA	-	-	6.88	6.10	11.01	5.67	8.65	7.01	7.00	52.31
UNICEF	-	18.03	18.09	15.50	17.04	14.38	15.57	16.36	16.97	131.94
United Kingdom	147.24	81.62	34.39	60.10	311.01	74.24	200.41	517.97	177.38	1,604.37
United States	87.84	133.01	889.91	369.11	1,294.03	168.82	615.08	504.22	664.68	4,726.70
Total	692.07	1,138.92	2,872.48	2,551.62	7,548.76	1,646.46	3,162.93	2,368.98	2,824.70	24,806.91

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table G.3 Total commitments to education by donor 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to education 1999–2007
AsDF	-	-	-	-	97.70	0.25	24.83	-	-	122.78
Australia	0.00	2.31	-	0.84	3.55	-	-	-	0.90	7.60
Austria	0.16	0.11	0.62	0.13	0.41	0.62	0.96	1.31	2.06	6.38
Belgium	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.01	-	0.36	0.14	0.77
Canada	0.10	6.14	-	8.16	0.14	11.32	4.15	13.98	3.25	47.24
EC	-	19.16	-	30.29	-	-	55.63	-	27.38	132.45
Finland	-	-	2.86	0.29	-	0.78	0.26	0.74	0.68	5.61
France	5.51	2.70	2.50	1.61	1.48	1.61	1.93	13.81	2.98	34.12
Germany	4.81	5.76	9.83	8.57	16.21	19.80	10.26	16.18	14.54	105.97
Greece	-	-	-	0.01	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.20	0.21	0.74
IDA	-	-	102.53	194.52	4.50	202.27	88.69	65.05	136.00	793.56
Ireland	-	-	-	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.29	0.22	1.09
Italy	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.13	-	0.05	-	-	-	0.32
Japan	-	-	4.75	8.04	13.03	13.85	14.46	10.96	2.51	67.60
Netherlands	0.15	1.22	-	-	-	-	14.58	57.96	0.75	74.67
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.04	0.06
Norway	1.64	2.31	0.44	17.39	15.62	0.02	0.20	0.11	0.68	38.42
Spain	0.11	0.04	0.84	0.11	-	0.04	0.11	0.07	1.07	2.39
Switzerland	-	-	-	6.94	1.28	-	-	-	-	8.22
UNDP	0.08	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.00	-	0.10
UNICEF	-	2.81	2.18	1.97	1.72	2.92	2.61	1.55	3.23	19.00
United Kingdom	1.88	3.98	0.20	11.19	25.39	5.33	0.85	27.10	4.84	80.76
United States	-	-	140.18	17.22	24.17	29.96	97.03	86.67	114.95	510.18
Total	14.51	46.64	267.04	307.63	205.52	289.07	316.80	296.37	316.44	2,060.02

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table G.4 Total commitments to basic education by donor, 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to basic education 1999-2007
AsDF	-	-	-	-	97.70	0.12	12.42	-	-	110.24
Australia	-	-	-	0.84	3.55	-	-	-	0.90	5.29
Austria	0.02	-	-	0.02	-	0.09	-	0.01	0.00	0.14
Belgium	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.01	-	0.02	0.02	0.21
Canada	0.05	0.58	-	4.35	0.07	11.32	2.07	6.99	3.02	28.45
EC	-	11.20	-	30.29	-	-	55.63	-	13.69	110.80
Finland	-	-	0.25	0.14	-	0.31	0.22	0.37	0.39	1.68
France	0.59	0.06	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.07	5.64	0.07	6.65
Germany	0.10	-	2.87	0.76	4.80	5.72	0.86	0.21	0.33	15.66
Greece	-	-	-	-	0.07	-	-	0.08	-	0.15
IDA	-	-	51.27	97.26	2.25	101.13	44.35	44.45	68.00	408.71
Ireland	-	-	-	0.06	0.17	0.07	0.11	0.21	0.15	0.77
Italy	-	-	-	0.07	-	-	-	-	-	0.07
Japan	-	-	2.38	4.02	5.66	4.80	6.57	1.57	1.10	26.11
Netherlands	0.15	1.22	-	-	-	-	7.07	57.17	0.38	66.00
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	0.61	2.31	0.24	17.22	15.52	0.01	0.12	0.05	0.52	36.59
Spain	0.04	-	0.63	0.07	-	-	0.02	-	1.03	1.79
Switzerland	-	-	-	4.21	1.28	-	-	-	-	5.49
UNDP	0.04	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.00	-	0.07
UNICEF	-	2.81	2.18	1.97	1.72	2.92	2.61	1.39	2.07	17.68
United Kingdom	1.00	0.53	0.10	5.59	12.97	2.88	0.42	13.55	2.90	39.95
United States	-	-	70.09	17.22	24.17	29.96	75.86	66.14	102.75	386.19
Total	2.65	18.74	130.19	184.16	169.96	159.40	208.42	197.87	197.31	1,268.70

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Annex H – Household Expenditure on Education

Introduction

H1 Total expenditure on education in Pakistan (all levels) should include:

- (a) Government expenditure (by all Ministries, Provinces, Districts, Foundations and Commissions).
- (b) Expenditure by NGOs and philanthropists where not reliant on government grants (i.e. including any external donor funding they get which has not been channelled through budget or sector support grants/loans).
- (c) Expenditure by the corporate sector (through public-private partnerships or otherwise).
- (d) Expenditure by households.

H2 Government expenditure is captured through the civil accounts (insofar as they are coded correctly); NGO and corporate expenditures are presumed to be relatively small. However, as this Annex shows, household expenditures on education are very substantial.

Data Source for Household Expenditures

H3 Data are drawn from the report on Household Expenditure for 2005–06²⁷; table references below refer to that report; key tables are reproduced in Box H.1 below.

Estimating Total Household Expenditures on Education

H4 Average monthly household income in 2005–06 was PKR 12,326 or about PKR 150,000 per year (Table 2.5B). Those in the richest quintile earned on average more than 3 times than those in the poorest quintile. Those in urban areas did earn more than those in rural areas overall but this was not true in all quintiles and, whilst the differences in each quintile were not large, urban populations were more represented in the higher quintiles and rural populations were more represented in the lower quintiles, so that average monthly income was nearly PKR 15,000 in urban areas and nearly PKR 11,000 in rural areas.

H5 Average per capita monthly expenditure was PKR 1,518 and expenditure was higher – although not by much – in urban areas than in rural areas (Table 2.5C). The disparities between bottom and top quintiles were about fivefold; these were larger than with monthly household income mainly because average household size was 8.74 in the bottom quintile, 7.89 in the second poorest quintile, 7.10 in the middle quintile, 6.35 in the second richest quintile and 5.19 in the top quintile.

H6 The breakdown of per capita monthly expenditure into commodity groups shows that food represents the major expenditure item at 43.05% overall with 35.17% in urban areas and 49.56% in rural areas (Table 2.7); the usual pattern.

²⁷ http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/hies05_06/complete.pdf

Box H.1 Key Data from the 2005-06 HIES

The report presents household Income and consumption expenditure data for the year 2005-06. The format of the report is almost the same as of the Household Integrated Economic survey (HIES) that were conducted during the years 2001-02 and 2004-05. In this report all the variables have been presented by consumption quintiles.

Tables 2.5.B, 2.5.C and 2.7.A are reproduced below.

TABLE: 2.5.B AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY QUINTILES AND AREAS

QUINTILES	AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD					
	2004-05			2005-06		
	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
1 st	6203	5446	5567	6497	6768	6725
2 nd	7239	6588	6719	8571	8339	8393
3 rd	8549	7104	7488	10108	9670	9788
4 th	10462	8273	8990	10747	11924	11493
5 th	19233	12658	16182	21954	19277	20811
TOTAL	13371	7929	9685	14968	10929	12326

See table 11 in the main body of this report for further desegregation.

TABLE 2.5.C PER CAPITA MONTHLY CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE BY URBAN/RURAL AREAS AND QUINTILES, 2005-06

Quintiles	2004-05			2005-06		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
1 ST	606	596	598	691	672	675
2 ND	857	848	850	945	937	939
3 RD	1075	1067	1069	1202	1182	1188
4 TH	1431	1397	1410	1580	1550	1562
5 TH	3142	2403	2816	3672	2643	3234
TOTAL	1825	1138	1356	2042	1252	1518

TABLE 2.7.A PERCENTAGE OF MONTHLY CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE BY COMMODITY GROUPS

COMMODITY GROUPS	2001-02			2004-05			2005-06		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Food, drinks & tobacco	38.85	54.42	48.30	40.01	54.53	48.33	35.17	49.56	43.05
Apparel, textile, foot-wear	5.63	7.23	6.60	5.27	6.49	5.97	4.90	6.42	5.73
Transport& communication	4.36	3.56	3.87	6.23	4.44	5.20	7.12	5.39	6.17
Cleaning & laundry	3.73	3.85	3.80	3.75	3.65	3.69	3.54	3.61	3.58
Recreation& entertainment	0.77	0.27	0.47	0.67	0.13	0.36	1.04	0.32	0.65
Education	5.52	2.39	3.62	4.31	1.97	2.97	5.20	2.41	3.67
Housing (rent & other costs)	21.49	7.88	13.23	20.10	7.69	12.99	22.74	8.94	15.19
Fuel & lighting	7.55	8.09	7.88	7.48	8.07	7.82	7.39	8.41	7.95
Miscellaneous	12.10	12.31	12.22	12.17	13.04	12.67	12.91	14.94	14.02

See table 15 in the main body of this report for further desegregation

H7 The percentage of monthly consumption expenditure on education (all levels) is 3.67% overall with 5.20% in urban areas and 2.41% in rural areas (Table 2.7.A in Box H.1 above). Assuming these percentages can be applied across all quintiles, we obtain the figures in the last three columns of Table H.1 below. There is now an 11-fold variation between the poorest quintile in rural areas (PKR 194 per capita) and the richest quintile in urban areas (PKR 2,291 per capita)²⁸.

Table H.1 Estimates of Income and Expenditure from 2005–06 Household Survey (PKR)

quintile	Average Monthly Household Income			Average Per Capita Monthly Expenditure			Estimated Annual Per Capita Expenditure on Education		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
1	6,497	6,768	6,725	691	672	675	431	194	297
2	8,571	8,339	8,393	945	937	939	590	271	414
3	10,108	9,670	9,788	1,202	1,182	1,188	750	342	523
4	10,747	11,924	11,493	1,580	1,550	1,562	986	448	688
5	21,954	19,277	20,811	3,672	2,643	3,234	2,291	764	1,424
Total	14,968	10,929	12,326	2,042	1,252	1,518	1,274	362	669

H8 In terms of estimating total household expenditure on education: with a population of 160 million, estimated total household expenditure in 2005–06 was approx. PKR 107 billions per year when according to MoE estimates, government expenditure (by all Ministries) in that year was 171 billion rupees; so that household expenditure represents nearly an additional 63%.

²⁸ Note that for the poorest quintile in rural areas, this means that their total possible annual spend on education is PKR 1,700 (8.74*194); and most of that would be absorbed by expenditure on stationery, uniforms (?) etc. for any of their children who go to government schools, so that they almost certainly could not afford to send even one child to a private school (where average annual fee is reported to be PKR1,200).

Annex I – Estimated Financing Gaps for Pakistan

Introduction

I1 This Annex reviews various EFA costing exercises for Pakistan, investigating what techniques and models were used, what the scope of the exercise was, who was involved, and what conclusions were drawn. The costing exercises reviewed were:

- Submissions to the Dakar (2000) World Education Forum.
- Those in Bruns et al 2003 ("A Chance for Every Child")
- Work by the Ministry of Education and UNESCO (2003)
- Those for the PRSPs (PRSP-I in 2003, PRSP-II in 2008).

Pakistan's submission for Dakar

I2 In the run up to the 2000 World Education Forum at Dakar country notes were prepared by participating countries to examine and redress policies and programmes intended to contribute to EFA targets.

I3 The report describes investment in education as inadequate in view of the needs of the country but does not make any explicit attempt to cost those needs or to explain how more financing could be obtained. To the contrary, it observes (somewhat confusingly) that "as a proportion of GDP expenditure in education no considerable increase could be possible," but then goes on to detail how Pakistan's expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP is, at 2.12%, considerably below the percentage spent in developed countries (6%) and developing countries (4%), and is below that of all other countries in the South Asian region. The report describes increases in education spending as deriving not from any costing exercise but from a realisation amongst policymakers that education yields returns to society.

I4 The report does, however, include an estimation of the additional resources needed to achieve the UPE target. This is reproduced in Table I.1. The value is calculated from data on out-of-school children and an estimate of per child annual recurring expenditure. The number of out-of-school children is multiplied by the annual cost and by 5 years to generate additional resource requirements for each province. No mention is made of the additional development expenditure that might be required to school these children (the total school population would increase by 1.5 times), and it is not clear how the estimate of per child expenditure is made.

I5 The total additional expenditure required over a five year period is estimated at PKR 74,700 million, or PKR 14,940 million per year. With an exchange rate to the USD at that time of around 50, this implies an additional annual expenditure of approximately USD 300 million.

Table I.1 Estimated Additional Expenditure Required to Achieve UPE Target

Province /Area	Total (5-9) Population (million)	Net Enrolment (million)	Out of School children (million)	Per Student Per Annum Exp. (PKR)	Per Student 5 year Expenditure (PKR)	Total Additional Estimated Expenditure/needs (PKR m)
Pakistan	20.46	12.12	8.34	1,800	9,000	74,700
Punjab	11.05	6.72	4.33	1,800	9,000	38,970
Sindh	4.68	2.49	2.19	1,800	9,000	19,710
NWFP	2.98	1.94	1.04	1,800	9,000	9,360
Balochistan	1.14	0.53	0.61	1,800	9,000	5,490
FATA	0.37	0.25	0.12	1,800	9,000	1,080
FANA	0.15	0.075	0.075	1,800	9,000	675
ICT	0.10	0.097	0.003	1,800	9,000	27

Source: Pakistan report for Dakar 2000

"A Chance for Every Child"²⁹

16 The World Bank-sponsored research reported in Bruns et al 2003 was seminal both in estimating the cost of UPE and in providing a policy agenda taken up by the FTI. Pakistan was among the countries reviewed in undertaking country-level costing of UPC by 2015 with a much more sophisticated model. The model uses primary completion – or the share of each school-age cohort that completes 5 or 6 years of schooling – as its primary variable, but also uses variables on quality. It tests a dynamic path of policy reform and the provision of targeted subsidies to the most vulnerable populations. It limits spending on primary education to a sustainable share of the overall education budget and assumes no user fees or other costs. It distinguishes between recurrent and capital costs. It uses the 2002 United Nations/World Bank projections of school-age populations through to 2015. Simulations test how reforming key elements of the education system would affect the costs of achieving the MDG.

17 Four sets of component variables are estimated in sequence:

- Enrolment: the number of pupils in publicly funded schools. UPC by 2015 will require 100% enrolment by 2009 (6 year cycle) or 2010 (5 year cycle).
- Service delivery: recurrent costs of services in publicly funded schools.
- System expansion: the capital costs of needed classroom construction.
- System financing: the volume of domestic resources mobilised for primary education.

18 This model formed the basis of the FTI's later Indicative Framework. Benchmarks from 1999/2000 indicate the key policy variables of service delivery, system expansion, and system financing (Table I.2). The model highlights four important determinants of primary education and unit costs per primary graduate: average teacher salary, pupil-teacher ratio (PTR), the share of spending on inputs other than teacher salaries, and the repetition rate. These variables' dynamics depend on whether initial values are above or below indicative framework targets – and determine whether adjustments to them are efficiency enhancing or quality enhancing.

²⁹ This is drawn from Bruns et al 2003: 71ff.

I9 There are four steps in the simulation. First, the simulation projects recurrent costs. Recurrent costs are calculated from: 1) the number of children in publicly funded schools by projecting a) the school-age population, b) first grade intake, c) share of first graders who complete primary education, d) the prevalence of grade repetition and e) the proportion of pupils enrolled in publicly funded schools; and 2) the cost of service delivery in the public sector, by estimating a) the pupil-teacher ratio in public schools (allowing the calculation of the number of teachers), b) average salaries of public sector teachers (allowing the wage bill to be calculated), and c) the cost of complementary inputs to promote learning and subsidise the most disadvantaged.

I10 Second, capital costs are calculated from 1) the number of new classrooms implied by the growth in enrolments, assuming a pupil-classroom ratio that equals the pupil-teacher ratio, and 2) a unit cost that was styled as 'good practice within the region'.

I11 Third, domestic resources mobilised towards the MDG are calculated from: 1) projected GDP growth rate; 2) government revenues as a proportion of GDP; 3) the share of government revenues given to education; and 4) the share of education spending devoted to primary education. A GDP growth rate of 5% was used for all countries.³⁰

I12 Fourth, recurrent + capital costs are subtracted from domestic resource mobilisation, in that order. External resources are assumed to be available for both recurrent and capital costs.

I13 The source of data for this model is clearly an important determinant of its credibility. World Bank/United Nations data were used for populations, and the authors note the limitations of age-specific population data. The IMF provided fiscal data, but unfortunately there is no discussion of the ultimate source of fiscal data or of their validity, although it is known that such data are contentious and can be inconsistent. A new World Bank database was developed for the study, with education indicators derived from collections of the latest official enrolment data from national ministries of education in countries (usually from 2000) or published UNESCO data where new data were not available. New data were checked against UNESCO and household survey data for consistency, which revealed "serious issues of accuracy and consistency in education enrolment data for many countries and in some cases required us to make estimates that diverged from official enrolment statistics when these were inconsistent with population, household survey, or past data," (Bruns et al 2003: 26). Different primary cycles complicate the comparison since official cycles were used in each country. Primary completion rates are usually calculated from end-of-year enrolments, but these are not always collected. Where end-of-year enrolments are not collected, primary completion is calculated using beginning-of-year enrolment minus repetition, divided by the population in this age cohort. Service expansion data are projected from "actual data on the baseline number of classrooms," (Bruns et al 2003: 79), and it was impossible to gather data on the quantity and quality of infrastructure other than classrooms.

I14 Unfortunately there is little country-specific discussion of data. In application to Pakistan, the authors note that "official education statistics are limited and present internal inconsistencies" (Bruns et al 2003: 89 ff). They estimate a completion rate in 2000 of 59% (without providing details on how this estimation is made). The service delivery system in Pakistan is found to be "far from our benchmarks".

³⁰ Pakistan's average GDP growth rate was higher than this, implying a tendency to over-estimate the financing gap from this source.

Table I.2 Benchmarks for Primary education efficiency and quality

Variable	Sample Range in 1999/2000 ^a	SAMPLE MEAN IN 1999/2000		2015 Benchmarks
		Adjusted Sample ^b	Highest-Completion Countries	
<i>Service delivery</i>				
Average annual teacher salary (as multiple of per capita GDP)	0.6–9.6	4.0	3.3	3.5
Pupil-teacher ratio	13:1–79:1	44:1	39:1	40:1
Spending on inputs other than teachers (as percentage of primary education recurrent spending)	0.1–45.0	24.4	26.0	33
Average repetition rate (percent)	0–36.1	15.8	9.5	10 or lower
<i>System expansion</i>				
Unit construction cost	\$6,500–\$24,000	—	—	\$6,500–\$12,600 ^c
<i>System financing</i>				
Government revenues (as percentage of GDP) ^d	8.0–55.7	19.7	20.7	14/16/18 ^e
Education recurrent spending (as percentage of government revenues)	3.2–32.6	17.3	18.2	20
Primary education recurrent spending (as percentage of total education recurrent spending)	26.0–66.3	48.6	47.6	50/42 ^f
Private enrollments (as percentage of total)	0–77.0	9.4	7.3	10

a. The range includes data from the full sample of 55 countries.

b. The adjusted sample excludes European and Central Asian countries.

c. Construction costs in constant dollars based on “good practice” average values observed in each region.

d. Government current revenues, excluding grants.

e. Staggered targets proportional to per capita GDP.

f. Benchmark is 50 percent for a six-year primary cycle; 42 percent for a five-year cycle.

Source: Bruns et al 2003

115 Table I.3 indicates that Pakistan's spending on non-teacher items was, at 19.3%, found to be well below the indicative targets of 33.3% and that the share of government revenues going to education was at 10% well below the target of 20%. The figure shows that if this status quo remained, the annual financing gap to 2015 would be USD 285 million. If spending on non-teacher items was raised to meet the target without efficiency gains or resource mobilisation, the annual gap would grow to USD 450 million. If in addition efficiency gains were made (by increasing the pupil-teacher ratio through private school subsidies or bringing students back to public schooling), this gap would fall to USD 261 million. If as well as these quality and efficiency gains, domestic resource mobilisation increased (by spending 20% of government revenue on education), the financing gap would fall to USD 204 million

(C2 with 16% of GDP collected as revenue) or USD 173 million (C3 with 16.7% GDP collected as revenue).³¹

Table I.3 Pakistan MDG Financing gap under alternative policy measures

		A: QUALITY MEASURES			B: EFFICIENCY MEASURES		C: FINANCING MEASURES			
Policy Scenario ^a		Pupils per Teacher	Spending on Inputs Other than Teachers ^b	Average Annual Teacher Salary (as Multiple of Per Capita GDP)	Average Repetition Rate	Government Revenues ^c		Primary Education Recurrent Spending ^d	Private Enrollments (As % of Total)	Annual Financing Gap ^e
						As % of GDP	% for Education			
Status quo		32	19.3%	3.6	6.2%	16.7%	10.2%	51.8%	29.4%	285
A only		32	33.3%	3.5						450
A + B		40	33.3%	3.5	6.2%					261
"Best practice": A + B +	C1	40	33.3%	3.5	6.2%	16.0%	20.0%	42.0%	10.0%	204
	C2					16.0%	20.0%			204
	C3					16.7%	20.0%			173

Note: Shaded cells denote no change from values directly above.

a. Policy scenarios are: A for quality improvement, B for efficiency improvement, and three alternative resource mobilization scenarios (C1, C2, and C3). The combination of scenarios A + B + C is considered "best practice".

b. As a share of primary education recurrent spending.

c. Current revenues, excluding grants.

d. As a share of total education recurrent spending.

e. In millions of 2000 U.S. dollars. Calculated as the difference between the total cost of service delivery under the specific policy scenario and the total resources for primary education mobilized domestically.

Source: Bruns et al 2003

Table I.4 Pakistan MDG cost estimates under best practice policies and alternative resource mobilisation scenarios

(millions of 2000 constant U.S. dollars)

Cost Item	Period	Scenario	Domestic Resources Mobilized	COST OF MDG-2015			FINANCING SOURCES					
				Recurrent	Capital	Total	DOMESTIC RESOURCES			GAP FOR EXTERNAL FINANCING		
							Recurrent	Capital	Total	Recurrent	Capital	Total
Education service delivery	Cumulative, 2001–2015	C1	15,919	16,748	2,224	18,972	15,919	0	15,919	829	2,224	3,053
		C2	15,919	16,748	2,224	18,972	15,919	0	15,919	829	2,224	3,053
		C3	16,373	16,748	2,224	18,972	16,373	0	16,373	375	2,224	2,599
	Annual	C1	1,061	1,117	148	1,265	1,061	0	1,061	55	148	204
		C2	1,061	1,117	148	1,265	1,061	0	1,061	55	148	204
		C3	1,092	1,117	148	1,265	1,092	0	1,092	25	148	173
AIDS-related costs	Annual	C1		0		0	0		0	0		0
		C2		0		0	0		0	0		0
		C3		0		0	0		0	0		0
Both items	Annual	C1		1,117	148	1,265	1,061	0	1,061	55	148	204
		C2		1,117	148	1,265	1,061	0	1,061	55	148	204
		C3		1,117	148	1,265	1,092	0	1,092	25	148	173

Note: "Best practice" policies refer to the combination of scenarios A + B + C. Shaded cells denote no change from values directly above.

Source: Bruns et al 2003

I16 These projections are made only at the federal level. The study did not draw country specific conclusions, except to say that external financing would be required and that Pakistan could consider improving efficiency by making capitation grants to non-profit private schools that serve low-income populations. This would increase their enrolment rate (since these schools would then be, by definition, public), and would serve populations who are

³¹ C1 represents a resource mobilisation scenario where the share of revenue spent on education would remain higher than target if it was higher than target currently, but in Pakistan it is not, so the value is unchanged.

otherwise disenfranchised, thereby improving equity and raising the chances of meeting the MDG.

Ministry of Education/UNESCO Estimates 2003

I17 MOE & UNESCO 2003 estimates the resources required to meet key EFA goals for each province. The exercise was described as *An Estimation of Required and Available Resources to Achieve EFA Goal* and was prepared for a South Asia forum on EFA which took place in May 2003. It uses projections of resources allocated to education during the current plan period to estimate the financing gap for primary education and adult literacy. The methodology involved extensive interviews with officials and other sources and reviews of the literature and surveys. The methodology had the following steps:

- Estimation based on data provided by the National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS) of number of primary school age children and adults.
- Based on net enrolment and literacy rates, an estimation of the number of children and adults requiring additional education.
- Based on cost estimates of each input to education, the total expected cost of physical infrastructure and technical inputs for these remaining children and adults.
- A comparison of this with allocations made by the government and donor agencies.

I18 The report does not elaborate further on this methodology, but presents its analysis and statement (rather than explanation) of the cost to achieve certain goals. For example, the cost of UPE in Pakistan is merely stated as shown in Table I.5 below.

Table I.5 Cost of achieving UPE, PKR million

	2003–06	2006–11	2011–16	Total
Punjab				
development	20,582	12,646	14,604	53,832
recurrent	10,756	36,942	52,814	100,512
total	17,338	49,588	67,417	152,344
Sindh				
development	14,271	9,284	6,017	29,572
recurrent	5,630	21,301	30,982	57,912
total	19,901	30,584	36,999	87,484
NWFP				
development	7,178	11,287	11,048	29,514
recurrent	2,849	14,152	26,016	43,017
total	20,027	25,439	37,064	72,531
Balochistan				
development	2,854	6,342	6,276	15,472
recurrent	1,121	6,505	12,905	20,530
total	3,974	12,846	19,181	36,002
Pakistan*				
development	53,059	42,931	41,823	137,807
recurrent	21,239	83,263	130,963	235,464
total (additional)	74,293	126,192	172,786	373,271
Existing schools' cost	103,636	210,283	268,381	582,300
TOTAL REQUIREMENT	177,929	336,475	441,167	955,571

* Estimates for Pakistan include estimates for FATA and ICT.

Source: MOE & UNESCO 2003

I19 They base their estimation of the gap on a 'more realistic' estimation that PKR 1,212,097 billion is required to meet EFA targets by 2015/16. Better quality education has a higher cost that they also present. Based also an estimated GDP growth rate of 8.5% used in the 2002/2003 PRSP projections,³² they estimate a financing gap of USD 565 million per year (in 2003 USD) in total and USD 495 million for primary education.

**Table I.6 Resource requirement to meet EFA goals by 2015/16
(MOE and UNESCO estimate)**

ITEM	Phase-I	Phase-II	Phase-III	TOTAL
	2003-06	2006-11	2011-16	(PKR M)
Total Adnl. Cost Primary (Development):	53,054	42,931	41,823	137,807
Total Adnl. Cost Primary (Recurring):	21,239	83,262	130,963	235,464
Total Adnl. Cost Primary (Dev + Rec):	74,293	126,192	172,786	373,271
Existing School Costs	103,636	210,283	268,381	582,300
Total Cost (Existing + Additional):	177,929	336,476	441,167	955,571
Total Cost Literacy (Development):	16,400	32,095	34,472	83,028
Total Cost Literacy (Recurring):	24,814	48,385	51,970	125,169
Total Cost Literacy (Dev + Rec):	41,274	80,480	86,443	208,197
Total Cost ECE (Development):	1,876	3,695	4,496	10,067
Total Cost ECE (Recurring):	1,962	11,163	25,138	38,262
Total Cost ECE (Dev + Rec):	3,838	14,858	29,633	48,329
Total Adnl. Requirement (Dev):	71,390	78,721	80,791	230,901
Total Adnl. Requirement (Recurring):	48,014	142,809	208,071	398,895
Total Adnl. Requirement (Dev + Rec)	119,404	221,530	288,862	629,796
Grand Total (including Existing):	223,040	431,813	557,243	1,212,097

Source: MOE & UNESCO 2003:30)

PRSP Estimated costs of Meeting Education Targets

PRSP-I

I20 PRSP-I in 2003 presents tentative costing estimates that require increasing spending on education from 1.8% of GDP in 2001–02 to 2.5% GDP in 2007–08. The PRSP-I costing was developed with assistance from DFID using a simplified version of the FTI model that proposes linking changes in enrolment with the public cost of education resulting from improvements in quality and efficiency. It is summarised in the PRSP (GOP 2003b:106). The model presents a high cost and low cost scenario starting with the 2000/2001 expenditures at base, and presents the required increases by province, and the required share of GDP to education (2.3%, assuming, in line with Bruns et al, 5% GDP growth). The real increases in expenditure required to meet UPE targets by 2007/2008 are 53% in NWFP, 58% in Balochistan, 60% in Punjab and 65% in Sindh, with constant low PTRs. Absolute resource needs are not presented.

³² Actual GDP growth has turned out rather less than this – at 7% or lower.

I21 The PRSP is explicit that this needs following up to include federally administered area (FATA, Islamabad, etc.) and non-ministry schools. Moreover, the available data have problems of consistency and structure. The PRSP notes that the ministry has formally approached DFID to commission a full provincial-level costing study.

PRSP-II

I22 The costing of PRSP-II (GOP 2009b) is based on the MDG costing report resulting from a joint Ministry of Finance/UNDP study, with training and consultations in 2005 and 2006. It refers to a document: "Estimating the Cost to achieve MDGs in Pakistan", UNDP and Finance Division, Islamabad (2007).

I23 The PRSP-II sets out an outline of the MDG costing approach for education (ibid, Annex VII – p. 379). It is based on an Excel template that "captures all relevant information for urban and rural areas in four provinces of Pakistan and simultaneously compiles these into aggregate figures." This suggests that provincial level data were used but are not presented in the costing analysis. However, it is difficult to assess whether they are presented in the final costing analysis because neither data nor the Excel template are presented in this outline – it is purely a conceptual piece.

I24 The costing estimates appear to include non-public institutions: "While the costing exercises confine to estimation of resource requirements by the government, it does not confine to resource requirements for public sector education only [sic]," (GOP 2009b: 381). The estimates assume that the government will provide some support to non-formal basic education through NGOs, independent NGO schools, and madrasa education, but not to the commercially driven private sector.

I25 The PRSP refers to Pakistan's MDG report that sets three targets to achieve by 2015: 5-9 NER of 100%; primary completion of 100%; and an adult (10+) literacy rate of 88%, with gender parity in youth literacy and primary education. The costing framework identifies interventions needed to attain these targets and an appropriate investment model. The exercise involved eight regions and the education module explicitly accounts for institutional diversity. Following the UN Millennium Project Approach to MDG costing, the approach estimates the financial cost of all resources required for interventions that will lead to achieving the target. The methodology has the following elements (GOP 2009b: 328):

- For identification of interventions/strategies required for achieving targets, the use has been made of available research findings and consultations with stakeholders;
- Intervention packages to reflect supply and demand side concerns and reducing overlapping as much as possible;
- Determining feasible technological and institutional options;
- Setting output level targets within each set of intervention packages;
- Using appropriate parameters to translate targets and interventions into resource needs;
- Evaluation of various types of data before using them in the costing exercise;
- Better basis for unit costs so that the marginal interventions are properly accounted for;
- Generation of province and sector level estimates for both rural and urban areas;
- Possible links between budgeting and planning exercises; and
- Information platform that may provide the basis for bringing consistency across various data usages and consensus-building on statistics.

I26 However, no further details on costing methodology are provided in PRSP-II, which simply presents estimates of the resource gap based on 'MDG costing'. It is not made clear whether the provincial estimates are available elsewhere. Nor is a plausible explanation provided for the very high education allocations and hence the negative "resource gap" that is projected from 2010/11 onwards (see Table I.7 below).

Table I.7 PRSP-II proposed allocations, MDG cost estimates, and resource gap for education sector

(PKR million)

(PKR million)	PRSP Education Allocations	MDG Costing Estimate	Resource Gap
2005/06 (Actual)	141,702	150,596	-8,874
2006/07 (Actual)	162,084	176,672	-14,588*
2007/08 (Actual)	182,646	206,863	-24,217
2008/09	167,251	247,910	-80,659
2009/10	251,632	291,043	-39,411
2010/11	359,611	341,308	18,303
2011/12	513,960	364,972	148,988
2012/13	731,023	388,789	342,234

* Resource gap adjusted according to actual figures.

I27 Aside from these costing estimates, and as an input to the resource gap, the PRSP-II sets out challenges facing the education sector and details spending on education as a proportion of GDP (Table I.8) and of government revenue (Table I.9). At 14.1%, the education budget as a proportion of the government budget is higher than that recorded in Bruns et al 2003, but remains lower than the indicative target of 20%.

Table I.8 Education financing as proportion of GDP (PRSP-II)

Year	Recurring	Development	Total	Percent of GDP	Private Sector	Percent of GDP*
2000/01	69.5	6.4	75.9	1.82	16.8	2.22
2001/02	70.4	8.5	78.9	1.79	22.0	2.28
2002/03	79.5	10.4	89.9	1.86	26.3	2.41
2003/04	94.3	30.0	124.3	2.20	31.1	2.75
2004/05	106.6	33.3	139.9	2.13	36.0	2.67
2005/06	128.9	41.9	170.8	2.21	40.7	2.74
2006/07	160.0	56.6	216.6	2.48	45.5	2.96
2007/08	191.0	65.0	256.0	2.44	-	-

Source: Demand for grants, Budget books of Government of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and AJ&K, Federal ministries/Divisions, District Governments.

Table I.9 Education budget as proportion of government budget (PRSP-II)

Year	Percentage
2000/01	11.7
2001/02	11.2
2002/03	10.0
2003/04	13.2
2004/05	12.5
2005/06	12.0
2006/07	14.1

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey FY 2006-07, Finance Division & Financing of Education in the Public Sector, Ministry of Environment, GoP, 2008.

I28 PRSP-II targets 95% gross enrolment at primary (90% girls and 100% boys). It notes that achieving this, according to the National Education Policy, will require system-level reforms that address financing for the sector, "which while increasing, falls short of the requirements. It remains far below the level of expenditures of countries with similar rates of economic growth and per capita incomes. The strategy emphasises the need for sustaining the required levels of financing for the education expenditure program, both at the federal and provincial levels, with the target of increasing allocations to 7% of GDP by 2015." (GOP 2009b: 175).

World Bank and IMF Assessment of PRSP Projections

I29 The Joint Staffs Assessment of PRSP-II notes that Pakistan plans to spend less on education (and other social sectors) than what the MDG costing estimates call for in this period. They suggest (World Bank & IMF 2009: 9) that "It would be important to clarify whether and how the resource gap will be bridged during 2008/09-2010/11, especially since it is unclear whether the MDG costing estimates derived in 2005/06 are still accurate for the PRSP-II period. For example, in 2006/07 the net primary enrolment rate in Pakistan was only 56% against the MDG target of 100% by 2015. Clearly, to meet the MDG target, will require substantial public and private resources." They further note that costing estimates are not aligned with fiscal rationalisation, and unless targets are adjusted, the gap needs to be filled by mobilising additional donor or private resources. They recommend increasing the efficiency of public spending and re-allocating resources to priority areas.

Concluding Remark

I30 It is striking that all of the "resource gap" estimates reviewed in this Annex are detached from the processes of preparing, implementing and monitoring federal and provincial budgets in Pakistan. They provide crude estimates of the (daunting) scale of the challenges Pakistan faces, but there is no indication of their systematic use in practice to drive policy and budgeting.

Annex J – The EPDF in Pakistan

Introduction

J1 This Annex summarises available information on EPDF activities in Pakistan. Obtaining definitive information on the EPDF is difficult, as explained in Appendix IV of the evaluation's main report. The main sources are reports from the various Regions of the World Bank. An exercise by Bellew and Mooock consolidated the information from the regional reports, and included tables of activities in different countries (Bellew & Mooock 2008). The country evaluation team for Pakistan drew on the Bellew and Mooock tables and on a more recent summary spreadsheet provided by the FTI Secretariat to identify the EPDF activities in Pakistan, and then sought more information during the country visit and in subsequent correspondence with the World Bank. For each activity, the team sought:

- Preparatory Concept Notes or Memos outlining the purpose of the activity and the relevance to government programming.
- Reports of the activity or published studies.
- Evidence that the documents/reports were used in subsequent programming.

Pakistan's share of the EPDF

J2 The data compiled by Bellew and Mooock for the period 2005–2009 show Pakistan as the third-largest recipient of EPDF support (after India and Yemen), with a total allocation of more than USD 1.4 million.


Information on EPDF activities in Pakistan

List of activities identified

J3 From the documentary sources, the team identified sixteen EPDF activities in Pakistan as listed below. They are referred to by these numbers in the rest of this annex.

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Start year</i>
1 Primary Education Sector Reviews	2005
2 Secondary Education, VET and College System Review	2005?
3 Assisting Pakistan in the Development of an Effective Monitoring System	2005
4 Evaluation of Girls' Stipend Programme in Punjab and Sindh in Middle School	2005
5 School Council Capacity Building Program (Punjab Education Sector Reform Program)	2006
6 Sindh Education Sector Program	2006
7 School Survey in Rural Sindh	2006
8 Pakistan Higher Education Strategy Development	2006
9 Education Census Analysis	2007
10 Sindh School Surveys and MIS Data	2007
11 Higher Education Reforms	2008
12 Quality Improvement Strategy Development	2008
13 Sindh: Survey of Teacher/Student Absenteeism	2009
14 Sindh: Differential Stipend Impact Assessment	2009
15 Sindh: Public Private Partnership Impact Evaluation	2009
16 Punjab: Public Private Partnership Impact Evaluation	2008

Figure J1 Total EPDF Allocations by Country, 2005–2008 (USD)



Source: Bellew & Moock 2008, Chart 10. [Updated to include 2008.]

Searching for information

J4 The country evaluation team has: discussed the EPDF's Pakistan activities with two out of the four members of the Regional Steering Group; asked the Task Team Leaders in the World Bank office in Islamabad at least twice each; queried the Education Reform Programme officials in Karachi and Lahore about the programmes relevant to Sindh and Punjab respectively; questioned several interviewees about their own specific programmes; and interrogated various documents provided to the team or obtained through web searches.

J5 The two members of the Regional Steering Group contacted could not remember any serious contact (one meeting and no preparatory documents); the World Bank office in Islamabad could not provide any immediate information; and none of the interviewees whether at Federal Level (about activities 2,3,8,9,11 and 12) or at Provincial Level (activities 1, 4,6,7,10,13,14 and 15 in Sindh, and 1,4,5 and 16 in Punjab) had heard of the EPDF.

J6 Eventually, the team obtained clarification from the Task Team Leader (TTL) for the Sindh activities and from the South Asia Regional Manager for the other activities. Overall, only a limited amount of documentation was made available; and, in particular, it was not possible to obtain clear statements of the purpose and intended relevance of all the activities. Furthermore, it became clear that, owing to this lack of clarity, the activity descriptions obtained from Bellew and Moock and from the Secretariat were in many cases inaccurate.

Description of and Reports on the Activities

J7 Table J1, at the end of this Annex, provides the detailed information that the team was able to assemble on each of the activities. There are gaps in financial and other information. To the extent possible, the team provides brief assessments of the activities.

Federal Level: Items 2,3,8,9,11 and 12

J8 Items 8 and 11 were concerned with developing the Higher Education Reform Strategy. They led to the development of a World Bank Policy note in June 2006 and a Project Appraisal Document (PAD) in May 2009 (and subsequently a Pakistan Government document). Items 3 and 12 were concerned with monitoring and quality but were not recognised by the Regional Manager. Item 2, a review of post-basic education sub-sectors, was conceived as part of a forthcoming sector review of Pakistan but will now be funded from other sources. Item 9 with analysis of the National Education Census was conceived of as a capacity building exercise.

Punjab Province: Items 1,4,5 and 16

J9 Item 1 was not recognised by the Sector Manager. Item 4 is an evaluation of an ongoing Punjab Government Project although there is no documentation showing that it was requested by the Punjab Government; it led to a publication in the World Bank's Impact Evaluations series (Chaudhury & Parajuli 2006). Item 5 is discussed in the the PAD for the Punjab Education Sector Reform Project (WB 47951/PK), but there is no mention of an evaluation. Item 16 appears to be ongoing as the only document available was a description of the proposed evaluation. None of these documents mention EPDF funding although they are the only documents that correspond to Items 5, 4 and 16 respectively.

Sindh Province: Items 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14 and 15

J10 After the field visit and following a telephone interview with the TTL for Sindh, the team obtained several relevant documents and learned that support to the Sindh Government Education Reform Programme (item 6 and perhaps item 1) was the main activity from 2006–2008; items numbered 7 and 10 in this list were inputs to it (see Programme Document, 2007, Box 1); and items numbered 13, 14 and 15 are follow-through evaluations of the programmes that are being developed through the SERP.³³

J11 The EPDF contribution is recognised in Annex 1 to the Programme Document, the Letter of Development Policy, and then in the PAD 2009 (both in the main text and in Annex 4). Year 1 was the general development phase and Years 2 and 3 became more specific looking at Teacher Training (see Teacher Education Approved Summary), Education Management (see Approved EMR Summary) etc. Technical Inputs included a national TA (who had previously been Minister of Finance) in the earlier period, and a British international TA to help develop the specific programmes. (RN 170709). Both TA worked with Sindh Government officials in elaboration of general and specific plans and programmes; and collaborated with long-term TA of the EC.

Assessment of Quality, Relevance and Evidence of Use

Federal Level

J12 Items 8 and 11 were concerned with Higher Education. After meeting the Vice-President of the HEC, the evaluation team was impressed by the quality of the input, but puzzled about its relevance to UPC.³⁴ The policy note refers to primary education only as a background to forecasting likely enrolments to Higher Education; and the PAD explicitly acknowledges that the inter-sectoral trade-off is a risk to the World Bank loan which would however be mitigated by the capping of the Higher Education budget as a share of the total education budget.³⁵ Moreover, as the Higher Education Commission is totally independent of the Ministry, there is no question of developing a shared sector plan.

J13 Items 3 and 12 would have been associated with support to the National Education Assessment System (NEAS) but that activity was taken over by DFID. For item 9, the Sector Manager reports that "while analysis was carried out by a consultant, there were great challenges in doing significant training or capacity building. The consultant did run a hands on clinic while doing the analysis but owing to lack of appropriate staff at the academy and the fact that the TTL had to leave Islamabad for personal reasons, the progress on this task has been limited."

³³ The TTL did not recognise the involvement of Sindh in the evaluation of the Girls' Stipend Program.

³⁴ The World Bank Regional Manager said that the financing of some stand-alone post-basic education activities had been permitted by the EPDF committee and these fell under those. The relevant EPDF Minute is September 20th, 2007 where it says "the EPDF can be used for post-primary work in two cases: (i) any education sector activities which support the objective of universal primary school completion; and (ii) the development and/or update of the Education Sector Plan which cover the entire sector."

³⁵ No figure is given in the PAD document; but the fact that the HEC share of Federal spending on education has risen from below 40% at its foundation in 2003–04 to more than 50% in 2006–07 (and from about 8% of total education spending in 2003 to nearly 13% in 2006–07) suggests that 'capping' may not be wholly successful.

Punjab Province

J14 The support of the World Bank to the PESRP is clearly appreciated by the Punjab Government; but the specific EPDF-funded evaluations were not mentioned by anyone the team interviewed at the government level. It should also be mentioned that whenever the LEAPS study was mentioned, each of the Pakistani interlocutors was critical of the design of the study.

Sindh Province

J15 The support by the World Bank to the Sindh Provincial Government in preparing their sector plan was appreciated and used although the specific EPDF contribution was not visible as such. The two sets of surveys of schools (Items 6 and 10) were mentioned in the PAD (Box 1) but do not appear to have been used by Government.

Summary

J16 Of the 16 issues/studies /topics, two of the items (numbered 8 and 11) are concerned with higher education at the Federal Level and at least three (Items 2, 4 and 14) with secondary education only. The three concerned with secondary education can be linked to the development of sector plans; but the two with higher education cannot. Item 6 and associated input work (Items 7 and 10) were clearly very relevant for the development of the Sindh sectoral reform programme. Items 4, 14, 15 and 16 are impact evaluations which have been discussed with the Government of Sindh. Overall, the impression given is that, despite its volume, the EPDF has made a limited and rather fragmented contribution to the development of the country's capacity building and planning.

J17 It is also clear that the information held by the FTI Secretariat on EPDF activities in Pakistan leaves much to be desired.

Table J1 EPDF activities in Pakistan

1	Primary Education Sector Reviews		Allocated	USD 1,038,949	Identified by:		Start year	2005
			Disbursed	USD 587,304				
	Description	Listed in Bellew and Moock tables but not in FTI Secretariat spreadsheet or elsewhere. EPDF objective is capacity building, the primary activity is research.						
	Outputs	The primary output is listed as policy/strategy.						
	Assessment	It is not clear why this has not received more coverage or why the documents are not available. It is possible that this double counts the Punjab and Sindh education sector reform reviews. The World Bank website lists a planned Education Sector Review in Punjab but no outputs.						
2	Secondary Education, VET and college system review		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2005?
			Disbursed					
	Description	Listed in Bellew and Moock tables but not in FTI Secretariat spreadsheet or elsewhere. EPDF objective is capacity building, and primary activity is TA.						
	Outputs	The primary output is listed as policy/strategy.						
	Assessment	It is not clear whether this activity was conducted or what was produced.						
3	Assisting Pakistan in the development of an effective monitoring system		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2005
			Disbursed					
	Description	Listed in Bellew and Moock tables but not in FTI Secretariat spreadsheet or elsewhere. This is apparently an activity at the level of adult education, with the objective of M&E and knowledge sharing. The 'FTI interest' is in data and analysis. This project may tie in with the Bank's support for the National Education Assessment System (a project running since 2003), but evidence for this is not available on the Bank's website, which has only information from 2003.						
	Outputs	The primary output is listed as 'other'.						
	Assessment	N/A						
4	Evaluation of Girls' Stipend Programme in Punjab and Sindh in middle school		Allocated		Identified by:	Co-financed by Netherlands	Start year	2005
			Disbursed					
	Description	Analysis of provincial EMIS school census (2003–05) and household survey data (2002 and 2005) to estimate the impact of the Girls Stipend Program on school enrolments and learning outcomes and inform scaling up the programme. EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing, FTI interest is gender.						
	Outputs	Primary output is policy/strategy. Findings are reported in a paper included in the World Bank's Impact Evaluation series published by the office of the Chief Economist and senior VP of the World Bank (DECVP) (Chaudhury and Parajuli 2006). Quality of paper seems good (methodology explained and limitations of data noted), so study should contribute positively to stock of knowledge.						
	Assessment	Paper has been produced and disseminated via World Bank website.						

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5	School Council Capacity Building Program (Punjab Education Sector Reform Program)		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2006
			Disbursed					
	Description	Technical assistance to Punjab Government school council capacity building programme towards: (i) phasing and costing options that include initiating the program in 9 districts in the first year, and expanding coverage to all 35 districts over a three year period; (ii) preparing a detailed timeline for rolling out the program in the first year, (iii) analyzing the model of the Punjab SC pilot in partnership with Rural Support Programs and experiences of other to help in the implementation of the program; and (iv) evaluation of impact. Contacts: Tahseen Sayed (World Bank). Punjab (Baela Jamil). Discussions with DFID on longer-term analytical work in Punjab. EPDF objective is capacity building.						
	Outputs	Primary output is policy/strategy. A workshop was held in June 2007 to assess emerging lessons from implementation and explore other options with policy makers and practitioners from across Pakistan. Experiences of school management committee and overall community/parental participation in schooling were shared and debated. Workshop report? The Punjab Government prepared a Request for Proposals which it was to have advertised in October 2007 to seek engagement with NGOs for capacity building of School Councils in two districts (first phase), and will then roll this out to other districts.						
Assessment	Further details needed.							
6	Sindh Education Sector Program		Allocated	USD 135,000	Identified by:	EC also supporting	Start year	2006
			Disbursed	USD 135,000				
	Description	Technical advice is being provided to the Government of Sindh on the reform program in the areas of: (i) teacher quality; (ii) training and development; (iii) associated quality assurance framework to support sustained improvements in teaching and learning; (iv) public/private partnerships in the provision of quality schooling in the underserved areas of Sindh, and by 2008 (v) implementation of performance agreements between provincial and district governments for performance aspects of education sector delivery; and (vi) main-streaming of environmental issues EPDF objective is ESP development.						
	Outputs	Primary output is ESP (sector strategy). These series of strategy and policy documents are being integrated into an updated medium term sector plan and financing framework and are expected to have a sustainable impact on participation, gender equity and quality. Programme documents for two World Bank credits (USD 100 and USD 300 million); development and Government of Sindh approval of reforms in education leadership and management and in teacher education and development; Government of Sindh proposal for federal funding for establishment of 1,000 PPP schools.						

Annex J: The EPDF in Pakistan

	Assessment	Activities identified in consultation with government and government has adopted reforms so project seems relevant. Effectiveness has been impressive. Comprehensive sector strategy has been produced with 'World Bank assistance'. This included concrete proposals for education management reform (including District Development Plans) and for teacher education and development that were prepared by the government and signed off by the Chief Minister. It also included detailed policy documents on education management reform and teacher education and development developed by Working Groups. A proposal for PPPs in 1000 schools in underserved areas has been submitted to the federal government. However, no obvious addressing of environmental issues. The work has contributed to support to the SERP by the Bank (USD 100 million/year over 4 years), the European Commission (EUR 39 million), and others, and so could be said to have had a significant catalytic effect on external education financing in Sindh (though the counterfactual – whether funding would have come anyway – cannot be established), and is therefore efficient. Nevertheless, probable that not all stakeholders view PPPs as ideal, so impact and sustainability (in terms of positive change in education outcomes) yet to be established.						
7	School Survey in Rural Sindh		Allocated		Identified by:	TA by EC and perhaps Netherlands	Start year	2006
			Disbursed					
	Description	Primary school surveys have been carried out in rural Sindh and the data are currently being analyzed. Initial results have already been shared with the Sindh Education Reform Support Unit within the Ministry of Education in the context of the Development Policy Lending. As an example, results show the importance of recruiting local teachers to decrease teacher absenteeism (though there may be a trade off with recruiting female teachers). The main contribution of the survey is expected to be on the determinants of learning outcomes. EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing.						
	Outputs	Primary output is policy/strategy. Working paper on challenges in Sindh's education sector (Siaens 2008). Feeds directly into SERP and into impact evaluations on PPP (referred to in impact evaluation proposal).						
	Assessment	Clear direct relevance to the Sindh Education Reform Program funded by the Bank and output is used in further analytical and impact evaluation work in Sindh (see below) contributing to strategy, suggesting this was also effective. The output for this project appears the same as the output for the Sindh Schools Surveys and MIS data project, which raises concerns for efficiency, though since allocation data could not be found, this is hard to assess more precisely.						
8	Pakistan Higher Education Strategy Development		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2006
			Disbursed					
	Description	A review of the reforms proposed by Medium Term Development Framework with the following key questions: is this MTDf strategically and technically sound? Is it affordable? Can it be implemented? EPDF objective is capacity building.						
	Outputs	Primary output is policy/strategy. Policy note available on World Bank website: World Bank (June 28, 2006) <i>Higher Education Policy Note: Pakistan –An assessment of the Medium-Term Development Framework</i> . Report 37247.						
	Assessment	Output delivered and available, so project was effective. Harder to judge relevance, efficiency, impact, sustainability without further contextual information.						

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9	Education Census Analysis		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2007
			Disbursed					
	Description	(i) Build the capacity of the Ministry of Education to carry out analysis of policy issues of relevance and interest to the Federal Government and provinces, and other stakeholders on a regular and demand basis; (ii) In the short term, help the ministry produce descriptive statistics as required by provinces, districts, and tehsils; (iii) Deliver a note on the key issues described for the use of policy makers. EPDF objective was capacity building.						
	Outputs	Primary output was ESP (sector strategy), and the eventual intended output was an Education Census. Only the 2005 Census is presently available.						
	Assessment	Hard to assess for lack of output or other information.						
10	Sindh School Surveys and MIS Data		Allocated		Identified by:		Start year	2007
			Disbursed					
	Description	EPDF supported a school survey in 150 villages to collect data on schools, teachers and students characteristics. This included testing randomly selected students and visiting a member of the Parent-Teacher Assoc. The second component was to create a database where administrative data collected by the Ministry (SEMIS department) were merged with the village census. EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing.						
	Outputs	Working paper on challenges in Sindh's education sector (Siaens 2008). Feeds directly into SERP and into impact evaluations on PPP (referred to in impact evaluation proposal).						
	Assessment	Clear direct relevance to the Sindh Education Reform Program funded by the Bank and output is used in further analytical and impact evaluation work in Sindh (see below). The output for this project appears the same as the output for the School Survey in Rural Sindh project, which raises concerns for efficiency, though since allocation data could not be found, this is hard to assess more precisely. Not clear whether paper has been disseminated widely.						
11	Higher Education Reforms		Allocated	USD 80,000	Identified by:		Start year	2008
			Disbursed	USD 80,000				
	Description	Development of a draft medium term strategy built on the following pillars: (i) improving the quality of Teaching and Research; (ii) Expanding access to, and enhancing relevance of, higher education; (iii) Strengthening the governance and management of the sub-sector; and (iv) Improving fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of expenditure in higher education. EPDF objective is capacity building.						
	Outputs	"Led to the development of a high quality draft [strategy]" (EPDF Annex 2008)						
	Assessment	Evidence that strategy was produced but assessment of its quality is not backed up with evidence, and further information not available.						

Annex J: The EPDF in Pakistan

12	Quality improvement strategy development		Allocated	USD 115,000	Identified by:		Start year	2008
			Disbursed	USD 115,000				
	Description	The focus of this activity is on helping the Government design a strategy for developing a more effective national assessment system, in order to have a better handle on measurement of quality. The scope of the proposal has been revised to focus on the area of learning assessments. This is an area which has been specifically requested by the government. EPDF objective is capacity building.						
	Outputs	Primary output listed as policy/strategy but no evidence that output available.						
	Assessment	Money has been disbursed but outputs have not been located, so an assessment is not possible. A comment on the project noted that it should focus on areas in which government buy-in was likely, suggesting perhaps some irrelevance to government desires in the first iteration.						
13	Sindh: Survey of teacher/student absenteeism		Allocated	USD 75,000	Identified by:		Start year	2009
			Disbursed	USD 75,000				
	Description	To assess the extent, patterns, and correlates of teacher absenteeism in a representative sample of public and private primary and secondary schools in Sindh, Pakistan, with the objective of informing government decision-making on the development of effective attendance monitoring tools and interventions to reduce absenteeism rates. (i) the data and analysis will be disaggregated by gender; (ii) the design is being discussed with other provinces to ensure replicability; (iii) capacity building at the province level is taking place so that this activity can be repeated in the future by the province EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing.						
	Outputs	The EPDF regional annex states that "The teacher absenteeism data collection should be completed by June 2009. Thus, major disbursements of the EPDF allocation should begin early 2009." However, recent communication with the World Bank task team noted that the study will be completed after survey in September/October 2009.						
	Assessment	Project seems relevant to needs of sector; not possible to assess effectiveness etc since not yet started. Project has been slightly delayed. A note on the project suggests a need to demonstrate Department of Education engagement and opportunities for capacity development.						
14	Sindh: Differential Stipend Program Impact Evaluation		Allocated	USD150,000	Identified by:		Start year	2009
			Disbursed	USD150,000				
	Description	An evaluation which will test the impacts arising from, among others, a higher transfer amount and conditioning the transfer on a certain level of attendance. EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing.						
	Outputs	The EPDF Regional Annex states that "The process for hiring a local research organization to administer the baseline survey will begin shortly and should be completed by January 2009. Baseline data collection is timed to precede the rollout of the differential stipends program. The expectation is that the differential stipends program will be rolled out in March 2009. Thus, major disbursements of the EPDF allocation should begin in early 2009." However, communication with the World Bank Task team noted that the study will be completed after baseline (autumn 2009) and follow-ups.						
	Assessment	Project seems relevant to needs of sector; not possible to assess effectiveness etc since not yet started. However, a note on the project stated that approval was contingent on clearer demonstration of links to broader FTI agenda, so question about relevance. Project has been slightly delayed.						

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15	Sindh: Public Private Partnership Impact Evaluation		Allocated	USD 210,000	Identified by:		Start year	2009
			Disbursed	USD 58,800				
	Description	<p>The funds will finance a rigorous evaluation of a pilot public-private partnership program in which the government offers financial incentives and capacity-building support to private entrepreneurs to set up and operate coeducational primary schools in underserved rural communities. This initiative was initially not approved due to insufficient information on the links of the initiative to the broader FTI agenda. The rejection also mentioned that a revised proposal would be considered and that projects in this area should support increased public spending in education which is the case with the proposed intervention. A revised proposal was submitted and was approved.</p> <p>The impact evaluation constitutes, according to the proposal, "an important part of the Bank's financial, technical and advisory support to the Sindh Education Sector Reform Program." The proposal states that "The evaluation is principally motivated by four reasons. First, the provincial government is interested in learning whether the pilot PPP program succeeds in achieving its stated goals. In fact, the continuation of the program beyond the pilot phase as well as its rollout to other parts of the province are contingent on the evaluation finding positive results. Second, the impact evaluation—accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis—would potentially yield useful information for improving the government's budgetary allocative efficiency, a key interest of the government given that it is financially supporting the private sector in this particular program. Third, the evaluation will contribute to the body of knowledge on the impacts of PPPs of different types on key outcomes of interest such as student participation and learning. Such evidence would come at a time when PPPs are increasingly becoming an important mechanism for the provision of education in Pakistan and elsewhere. Fourth and final, the evaluation will add to the body of knowledge on the gender-differentiated schooling effects of a program with a strong gender design element; this evidence can be useful in informing program design in contexts where female disadvantages in opportunities are high."</p> <p>EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing.</p>						
	Outputs	<p>The external research team has been contracted. The process for hiring a local research organization for conducting the baseline household survey will be completed by January 2009. The baseline survey will be conducted prior to entrepreneurs being awarded contracts to set up and operate schools in selected localities. Present plans are that schools will be offered contracts starting in April 2009.</p> <p>Impact evaluation proposal; selected localities; and survey instruments have been submitted. The proposal lists three outputs: 1) An interim evaluation report analyzing the baseline household survey data; 2) An interim evaluation report analyzing program impacts using the baseline and first follow-up rounds of the household survey data, and one year of school monitoring data; and 3) A final evaluation report analyzing program impacts using the baseline and two follow-up rounds of the household survey data, and two years of school monitoring data.</p>						
	Assessment	<p>Evaluation seems relevant to needs of the sector, building on previous work (including that funded by the EPDF) and contributing directly to the Bank and the provincial government's plans for the sector. Quality of proposal is high (discussion of methods, internal, external validity), so study should contribute positively to stock of knowledge.</p>						

Annex J: The EPDF in Pakistan

16	Punjab: Public Private Partnership impact evaluation		Allocated	USD 100,000	Identified by:		Start year	2008
			Disbursed	USD 91,810				
	Description	<p>This evaluation will provide critical evidence on how the government can finance private sector institutions cost-effectively in order to enhance access and improve education quality.</p> <p>Funds are being used to rigorously evaluate a public-private partnership program in Punjab, Pakistan which offers public subsidies to existing low-cost private schools conditional on, among other things, free schooling and minimum levels of student learning. Using non-experimental methods, the evaluation examines the impact of the program on participation and learning. The evaluation will examine these effects separately for boys and girls and across household income levels.</p> <p>This initiative was initially not approved due to insufficient information on the links of the initiative to the broader FTI agenda. The rejection also mentioned that a revised proposal would be considered and that projects in this area should support increased public spending in education. This proposal meets the revised criteria. A revised proposal was submitted and was approved.</p> <p>The EPDF objective is M&E and knowledge sharing, and the activity is TA.</p>						
	Outputs	The primary output is listed as 'policy/strategy'. To date, a draft paper has been produced: Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2008) <i>Evaluating a test-based subsidy program for low-cost private schools: regression-discontinuity evidence from Pakistan</i>						
	Assessment	Evaluation seems relevant to needs of the sector, building on previous work (including that funded by the EPDF) and contributing to the Bank and the provincial government's plans for the sector. Hard to assess project beyond this since current output is a draft Bank paper rather than a policy/strategy document. Would want to seek more evidence that this is directly relevant to the government and has been effective in informing strategy development. Quality of draft is high (methodology rigorous, findings appropriately qualified), so study should contribute positively to stock of knowledge.						

Annex K – Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Pakistan
Context: <i>What is the situation in country within the education sector (level zero)?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pakistan's human development indicators are below those of its South Asian neighbours and it performs less well than would be predicted from its level of GDP per capita. There has been positive progress against all the six EFA goals but Pakistan is not on track to meet the EFA targets by 2015. It is estimated Pakistan will have (at least) 3.7 million out-of-school children in 2015. The disparities in gender, although mitigated, still continue. Vocational education remains particularly weak. The quality of primary education, whether measured in terms of available inputs or of learning achievements, is poor, and primary cohort completion rates are estimated at less than 50%. The main obstacle to UPC rests primarily in weak political commitment to education, which is reflected in the low budgetary allocations and politicisation of the process of teacher appointments. In addition, the problem is compounded by weak technical capacity. The formation of ambitious policy plans and implementation of numerous donor-supported sector reform projects does not result in adequate capacity of the state to deliver quality education to all. Responsibilities for basic education are distributed among the levels of Pakistan's federal structure. Since the process of devolution to district level began in the early 2000s, districts have had the main responsibility for delivering state primary education. Governance issues adversely affect the management of education services at all levels; these include endemic corruption and systemic weaknesses in public financial management. Government has encouraged increasing involvement of the private sector in education provision, and private primary schools are playing a significant role. However, the state remains the largest provider of education, covering 67% of total primary enrolment. The IMF and the World Bank have acknowledged that Pakistan's recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest.
External Inputs: <i>What external inputs have there been into the education sector? To what extent did these inputs focus on UPC?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pakistan was invited at the inception of the FTI to join its "analytical fast track". The federal Ministry of Education sought FTI endorsement, but this was never seriously pursued on the donor side. However, Pakistan has been one of the largest recipients of Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) support (more than USD 1.4m allocated between 2005–2009). Attitudes to aid in the social sectors are strongly influenced by the experience of the Social Action Programme (SAP) which began in the 1990s. This sought to support the expansion of basic services, including primary education, through a coordinated donor programme, led by the World Bank, across Pakistan's main provinces. However, this proved very cumbersome, there was insufficient buy-in from the provincial governments that were the main implementers, there were serious problems with corruption (including in the education sector), and the expected increase in Government's own expenditures on basic services did not materialise. The SAP experience reduced donors' appetite for coordinated national programmes, and devolution during the 2000s was seen as an added reason to focus donor programmes at provincial or even more local levels. At the same time, for geo-political reasons, Pakistan saw a major increase in aid flows after September 11, 2001, and this included a substantial increase in aid for education, including basic education. The aid flows have largely remained focused on project mode and efforts at capacity development have tended to focus more on individual than organisational or institutional capacity. Recently there are shifts towards more systematic engagement to support the education sector through SWAPs and sector wide reform programmes at provincial level.

SUMMARY – Pakistan		
Relevance - Were the objectives of external inputs relevant (Federal and State/Province level)? Was their design appropriate?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes of inputs: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency?	
	Effectiveness – To what extent have external inputs contributed to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness (Federal and State/Province level)?	Efficiency – How economically are current inputs turned into results (Federal and State/Province level)?
<p>A significant proportion of aid for education is focused on basic education, and is thus relevant to EFA objectives. However, the relevance of its design and delivery is qualified in a number of ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> considerations of relevance and effectiveness in the design of aid programmes may take second place to the geo-political concerns that drive aid disbursement; the possibilities for effective donor support are constrained by the absence of a credible and coherent national strategy to support; in turn, this tends to leave donors providing piecemeal support in project mode. <p>However, a number of donors have recognised the limitations of piecemeal approaches and are either aligning behind the World Bank to support the education sector plans in two provinces (Punjab and Sindh) or to coordinate an alliance to support a sector plan in NWFP.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The federal education policy results from a very consultative process including all donors and NGOs; however, it is not matched with well-costed action plans and while there is continued commitment to EFA targets the commitment to the measures required to meet those ends is not visible. The government allocated less than 2% of GDP to education. Commitments to raise this allocation have not been met. The financing gap is not very well costed but the current estimates of more than 50% of the current spending are likely to be even more unrealistic given the recent setbacks in economic performance. Despite trainings, the capacity to deliver education has not improved significantly because capacity building has been focused on individuals rather than organisations or the institutional level. The quality of data, though still unsatisfactory, has improved as the government has with the support of donors established EMIS. However, the data are not being used to do better policy planning or actual planning for delivery of education at the district level. There is awareness of cross-cutting themes around access and equity such as gender, HIV/AIDS, inter-provincial and rural-urban differences. However, the actual plans to meet these ends are not available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The education sector suffers not only from lack of resources but also low absorptive capacity. The result is that 50% of the development budget is estimated to be left unspent annually. The donor inputs so far do not seem to have made a major difference in the absorptive capacity of the government to utilise more efficiently the funds that are available. The aid has remained very projectised. However, now there are efforts towards better coordination through sector wide approaches at provincial level and joint reviews. It is too early to say whether these attempts will be consolidated as a routine practice. The donors themselves also seem to be incurring heavy transaction costs as they are not coordinating their policy dialogue with the government or the action plans. However, as noted the donors are becoming conscious of it and are moving towards coordination.

SUMMARY – Pakistan**Outcomes:** What is the status of the quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?

- Despite recording some progress, Pakistan is unlikely to meet the EFA targets in terms either of access or of quality.
- Quality is a particular concern, as indicated by the (limited) information on learning outcomes, but also the shortages of required inputs, and the systemic weaknesses in teacher management.
- Long-term sustainability of any improvements in educational provision depends on increasing national financial commitment, as well as systemic reforms.
- At the given level of government financial commitment, progress is hindered by the high population growth rate and the increased security problems in the country which are diverting government attention further away from long-term development goals to immediate relief activities.
- Despite increased support from donors, the financing gap remains very large, while the capacity to work strategically towards EFA targets remains very weak.

FTI prospects: Are the objectives and approach of FTI relevant to the priorities within the education sector and the country as a whole?

- The FTI's objectives are relevant, but its approach will need to be modified if it is to make a significant difference in Pakistan. Thus far the FTI's direct contribution has been limited to EPDF support. There remains a legitimate need for such analytical support, but the EPDF so far has not been used in a strategic way to strengthen country ownership, develop capacity and encourage donor coordination. There is also a case for more support with implementation, but this will require (a) addressing the political constraints to more successful education delivery in Pakistan, and (b) adapting FTI's design to Pakistan's scale, federal structure and pattern of donor relationships. Most likely this would involve support at a provincial level, taking into account that the circumstances of different provinces are very different.

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning
Context: <i>What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to policy and planning?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At federal level, the General Musharraf government initiated education sector reforms as part of the overall development planning process from 2000 onwards. A series of documents were produced in line with EFA targets including the Education Sector Reform (ESR) which remained influential between 200–2005. In 2005, another process of consultation was started with a new education team to develop a new education policy. Green and white papers emerged from this, which form the basis of the current draft education policy; they remained equally aligned to the EFA goals. The education sector plans are very comprehensive in terms of coverage of the six Dakar goals and are quite honest in terms of assessment of the challenges towards these goals. Increasing access and improving quality are both explicit priorities along with gender inclusion and increasing provision of early childhood education (ECE). In addition, the policy plans are keen on adopting innovative models especially in partnership with the private sector and NGOs to meet the EFA targets. The government is also supporting a non-formal education programme and adult education programmes. However, the planning process suffers from serious challenges. The policies are not accompanied by feasible action plans and costing of plans remains one of the weakest areas. The policy documents also attempt to address marginalised groups and have a specific focus on gender which has been addressed both at the level of increasing access and in terms of ensuring curriculum reforms. However, other areas of marginalisation such as HIV/AIDS, inter-provincial differences, and rural/urban bias in access to education have not been systematically addressed. The process of policy formation has also been very consultative, including the donors and the NGOs. However, the drawn-out consultative process seems to have become an excuse for delaying actual reforms on the ground. Further, there were concerns voiced by civil society actors that consultations do not necessarily lead to a policy consensus as participation does not mean that the voices of the less influential groups will be taken on board in the final policy. The Federal MOE has become weaker during the period, as the relative importance of the Provincial and district levels has grown, and federal responsibilities have also been assigned to other bodies, such as the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD). Major policy decisions, such as establishment of parallel institutions, which have major implications for working of the federal Ministry, are often taken on political rather than technical grounds. The bulk of federal expenditure on education now falls under other bodies than the MOE, and this has had a debilitating effect on the MOE itself. National education policies and plans (as in other sectors) remain very weakly articulated with the annual plans and budgets – mostly at sub-federal levels – that more directly affect service delivery in practice.
Inputs: <i>What external inputs have there been? What problems were identified and how did it address them?</i>
<p>Concerning external inputs in general:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The donors have actively taken part in the consultation process during both the phases of intense dialogue between 2001–2003 and 2005–2007. The donors have also facilitated this process by providing TA support in terms of advisors to the Minister for Education and for policy research work. More recently the donors are also helping the planning towards provincial level sector support plans. The World Bank has led the process in Punjab and Sindh and is being supported by DFID in the former and EC in the latter. A joint donor collaboration with NWFP is in its initial stages. The direct FTI input has been through a variety of EPDF funded activities (considered in more detail under the data, M&E workstream). There has been no substantive use of the FTI Indicative Framework.

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
Relevance – How relevant have external inputs to strengthen policy and planning been?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)	
	Effectiveness – To what extent did inputs in the education sector contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC targets?	Efficiency - How economically have inputs into Federal and State/Province level policy and planning translated into results?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pakistan's declared commitments to EFA goals echo international standards in which advocacy by donors as well as international civil society has been influential. • However, donors have often been (understandably) sceptical of the GOP's genuine commitment to these objectives, and very conscious of governance weaknesses which impede implementation. • Scepticism of government will and capacity has reinforced some donors in their support for non-state provision and public-private partnerships. • Recent efforts to support planning and implementation at Provincial level in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP are more relevant than piecemeal technical assistance and studies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is difficult to identify long-term sustainable improvements in education policy or planning as a result of external inputs. • Donor concerns have almost certainly helped to keep some key issues (including sector governance and the politicisation of the teaching profession) on the agenda, and to maintain stated policy commitments to the EFA goals. • The actual policies are however not being translated into action plans. Neither the financial nor the political commitment is visible to meet the policy priorities. • The donors are still engaged in the policy planning process but there are also signs of exhaustion where the process seems to have dragged on for too long leaving the policy undecided. • Like the overall education planning process, the donors have been able to put pressure on the government to include gender issues and marginalised groups in policy formation. However, as with the overall sector planning, there is a lack of detailed plans that are credible and operational. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is little evidence that external policy inputs have translated into significant results.
Sustainability: Are the changes that have taken place in policy and planning since 1999 likely to survive (Federal and State/Province Level)? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At Federal level, the planning and policy processes for basic education have remained chronically weak. At provincial level, recent strengthening through the sector reform programmes in Punjab and Sindh remains fragile, vulnerable to political changes and dependent on significant external inputs. • In respect of district decentralisation, there has not yet been a durable alignment of resources and responsibilities at district level, and the future of decentralisation appears politically fragile. • While commitment to EFA is embedded in national policies, there is also little sustainability of policies in terms of attaining the targets. 		
FTI prospects: Are the objectives and approach of FTI relevant to the priorities within the education sector and the country as a whole?		
<p>The need for strengthened policy and planning is clear, but the present FTI "model" of operating through a donor-endorsed education sector plan (ESP) at national level has no prospect of achieving traction in Pakistan (a) because the key theatres of action are at Provincial level and below, and (b) because the donor configuration does not provide sufficient support at federal level for the Local Donor Groups (LDGs) and Local Education Groups (LEGs) that the FTI model requires. Possibilities of direct FTI influence in future appear to lie with (a) the future iteration of the EPDF as a support to analytical work and capacity development, and possibly (b) new FTI modalities that would allow the FTI to operate at Provincial level, and make it less dependent on operating through an in-country lead donor.</p>		

STREAM 2: Finance
Context: <i>What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to education finance? [from 1999 onwards]</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public expenditure on education (as share of GDP) is remarkably low, and efforts to mandate a step-increase have not been effective. The situation is complicated by the division of financial responsibilities between federal, provincial and district governments. Aid accounts for roughly 10% of education funding. Aid tends to focus on the development budget and much is delivered through stand-alone projects. Different assessments of the "funding gap" have made widely different estimates of its size, but it is clear that achieving UPE will require substantially increased expenditure. Private sector provision and expenditures on basic education by households are significant, but it is acknowledged (e.g. by the World Bank and IMF) that more public provision is needed to reach poor households effectively. Education sector plans are not matched with well-costed financial plans, leading to setting ambitious policy targets without a realistic assessment of the financial commitments required to meet those targets. The policy documents and plans do not lead or clearly guide the process of domestic and external resource allocation to education. There are serious inefficiencies in the use of existing levels of expenditure. One aspect of this is that development budgets are chronically underspent (by as much as 50%). There are also serious concerns about public financial management (PFM) in Pakistan, both generally and in the education sector. Pakistan is ranked high on petty corruption in the government sector according to most indicators. Also, development programmes, such as the Social Action Program (SAP), have experienced serious corruption problems at the implementation level.
Inputs: <i>What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?</i>
<p>External inputs have included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial support for education sector projects and programmes (at Federal and Provincial levels). Collaboration in efforts at general PFM reform and capacity development (e.g. through the PIFRA programme), supported by diagnostics such as PEFA assessments. <p>FTI inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None of the external financial inputs can be directly linked to the FTI (except for the financial value of EPDF inputs).

STREAM 2: Finance		
Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to education finance?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)	
	Effectiveness – To what extent have inputs into the education sector contributed to a stronger education budget process? And to an increase in total funds for primary education?	Efficiency - How economically has donor support to country level finance for education translated into results?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Donor inputs have been broadly aligned with stated national objectives for education. However, the government itself has lacked a credible financial strategy for achieving its stated objectives with regard to basic education. The scale of public education financing, both by GOP and by donors, was not commensurate with achieving EFA targets. Efforts to strengthen PFM at federal and provincial levels have been relevant, both in seeking to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency with which existing resources are used, and in creating conditions that are more conducive to increased funding. The generic FTI approach of seeking to assess and then address a "financing gap" was relevant in principle, but has had little traction in a context where the links from strategies to plans to budgets and implementation are systemically weak. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chronic weaknesses in education sector budget processes have persisted, although recent sector programmes in Punjab and Sindh are making some improvements. There is no evidence that external funds have been catalytic in increasing domestic expenditure on basic education and there remains a large gap between current levels of public expenditure on basic education and the levels that would be required to finance UPE. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Efficiency of donor support is compromised by the fragmentation of donor inputs and the short time-horizon of donor commitments. In turn this both reflects and reinforces the systemic weaknesses of government systems for planning, budgeting and implementation. However, there are notable efforts to adopt a sector approach to support, ongoing in Punjab and Sindh, and at the planning stage in NWFP.
Sustainability: Are any improvements that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improvements are characteristically fragile; in particular they are vulnerable to political risks, including instability in the balance between federal, provincial and district responsibilities. Pakistan's track record implies that a sustained increase in domestic resource allocations to basic education is not very likely, while it is likely that levels of external finance will continue to be driven more by political relationships than by educational objectives. 		
FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing the financing gap (at federal or provincial level) in the future?		
<p>Potential FTI inputs could relate to analysis, advocacy and financing. On analysis, there continues to be a role for assessing the financial requirements of reaching EFA targets. To be useful, this needs to be clearly linked to planning and budgetary processes. Progress requires increased domestic priority for EFA, reflected in public expenditure decisions, not just policy statements; FTI support for civil society analysis and advocacy in Pakistan therefore continues to be relevant. The (successor to the) EPDF could be relevant in supporting both analysis and advocacy. If the Catalytic Fund (or its successor) is to have significant value in Pakistan, it will need enhanced resources and also an ability to channel funds to the Provincial level.</p>		

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation
Context: <i>What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to data and M&E? Is quality data used to monitor the needs of the education strategies?</i>
<p>In 1999, for public government schools, there was only basic administrative data and very little monitoring and evaluation. Since then, there have been substantial efforts at both Federal and Provincial level in terms of strengthening EMIS systems, although with little apparent coordination other than geographical partitioning. This has extended in some cases to District level, in respect of monitoring of teacher and student attendance.</p> <p>As regards private and non-formal schools: there has been only one attempt to monitor the number of private institutions (2005) although it is due to be repeated in 2010; each agency monitors numbers in non-formal environments (not included in annual censuses).</p> <p><u>Federal:</u> Annual Education Census collected through Provinces; National Education Census, Support to strengthening of EMIS from DFID, EC, Unicef and USAID (and probably others) and of course the National Education Census (including Private Schools) both funded by Government.</p> <p>National Education Assessment System (NEAS) has carried out standard assessment exercises at Grade 4 in 2005-06-07-08 (the latter including private schools on a pilot basis)</p> <p>National Government does not appear to have carried out any evaluations (nor see the need for them) but there have been a wide range of evaluation exercises carried out (partly using EPDF funds, partly specific donor funds).</p> <p><u>Provincial:</u> Provincial monitoring of (e.g. in Punjab) attendance including 3 or 4 visits per year to schools; Surveys of Achievement at Provincial level by World Bank (unrelated to NEAS).</p> <p><u>District:</u> In Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, in those districts where there has been a donor input (DFID, USAID), there was a sophisticated system for data capture across all sectors; the extent to which these have survived the withdrawal of donor funds is doubtful (it was claimed that the Faisalabad experience would be continued by Punjab).</p> <p><u>Quality and use of Data:</u> Although the importance of data for planning is acknowledged, the articulation between planning and data gathering/analysis is weak. Neither at Federal nor at Provincial level (Punjab and Sindh) did the team find schedules for data collection which made any reference to the planning or budgetary cycle. For all types and at all levels, the fact that the data is not used means that it will decay and deteriorate.</p> <p>Concerning the FTI Indicative Framework, some data were assembled in 2003 when the federal MOE drafted an application to the FTI, but there appears to have been no systematic use of the Indicative Framework after that.</p>
Inputs: <i>What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID, EC, NORAD, Unicef, USAID have put substantial funds into strengthening the infrastructure of EMIS at both federal and provincial levels; and in some districts to the soft end of EMIS (using data for decision making); but it is unclear what difference it has made after the donor intervention. • A large number of studies have been commissioned at the federal level – although usually based on provincial data sets – but almost invariably by and for donor interests; at provincial levels the PESRP and the Sindh RSU have commissioned evaluations. • Since 2005 a number of data and evaluation activities have been funded through the EPDF, which operates under the aegis of the FTI (a total of over USD 1.4m; see details in Annex J).

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to data and M&E needs?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did inputs contribute to improved collection of data and better information services? To what extent is data being used to inform policy and funding?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was support to country data and M&E translated into results?</i>
<p>The government data development activities which received external support were partially relevant, in that it is definitely useful to have information on attendance, enrolment and outcomes; they could have been much more relevant if they had put the main emphasis on characteristics of schools, not individual pupils.</p> <p>Similarly, while support to the infrastructure of EMIS in both Punjab and Sindh was relevant, the relevance could have been enhanced by more emphasis on the demand for, and use of, the outputs from the EMIS system.</p> <p>The review of EPDF-funded activities found a mixed picture as regards relevance. Support to the Higher Education Commission was not relevant to EFA objectives; activities linked to secondary education were relevant to the extent that they supported overall sector plans; the other EPDF-supported activities were directly relevant from an EFA perspective.</p>	<p>External support has contributed to the generation of more reliable and better quality data, but the generation of data by projects rather than sector wide means that there are still disputes over overall numbers enrolled and numbers out of school.</p> <p>There is increased use of data for external advocacy, but the mainstreaming of data use for policy formulation and monitoring within governments (both at federal and provincial levels) remains limited (the Punjab ESRP and Sindh RSU only have advisory roles).</p> <p>The FTI inputs (through EPDF) have made a limited and rather fragmented contribution to the overall improvement of data, monitoring and evaluation.</p>	<p>Systemic inefficiencies in data collection have persisted, and external support has tended to echo the fragmentation and poor coordination in the collection and use of data.</p> <p>The EPDF has been used for ad hoc support within broader programmes. Government bodies have been generally unaware of the EPDF source of funding, and, although EPDF resources have often supported valuable activities and outputs, the EPDF has not contributed to greater coherence in analysis and monitoring to support basic education objectives.</p>
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<p>EMIS interventions are still continuing, so it is early to assess their durability. Infrastructure has been enhanced considerably (see above); donors are still there (in Punjab and Sindh) so they won't immediately disappear; but without a strong demand for their use (including at local level), systems and data quality are likely to decay; the experience of other countries points to the difficulties of maintaining such systems beyond the period of external support.</p>		
FTI prospects: <i>In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing data gaps (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future?</i>		
<p>FTI support (through the EPDF) has been ad hoc and fragmented. Although a number of individual activities have been of high quality, there has been insufficient attention to ownership and capacity development in the way they have been implemented. As noted under other workstreams, the FTI design would need to be significantly adapted in order to be relevant in the context of Pakistan's federal system. If the FTI were able to provide coherent support at provincial level, addressing data gaps and, in particular, fostering better use of data, would be an important component of such support.</p>		

STREAM 4: Capacity
Context: <i>What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity in the education sector adequate for EFA and UPC targets?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An extensive state schooling system does exist and there is also a three-tier system of education planning and management. The responsibility for policy and planning rests with the federal ministry and implementation with the provincial governments. Since 2002, a district level government structure has been established to improve delivery of social services, including education. As part of the devolution process, great emphasis has also been placed on establishment of School Management Committees (SMCs) to help improve the monitoring of education provision in the schools. • However, there are severe capacity gaps at the level of education governance and in-school delivery of education. In terms of governance, there are gaps in policy, planning and monitoring across the three tiers of government. In terms of weak in-school capacity, primary capacity gaps exist in lack of qualified teachers, no head teachers at the primary school level, weak capacity of teacher training institutions, and deficiencies in the deployment and management of teachers, so that even trained teachers show very low performance. • The low development budget which rests at less than 10% across the three tiers reflects, inter alia, the low government investment in capacity development. There is no national level capacity development plan nor is there separate assessment of capacity development required to meet the needs of marginalised groups. • The main problem has been with conceptualising CD by government. The government development budget is very limited as most of the budget is needed for salaries. Capacity development is therefore seen as primarily dependent on donor interventions. • Monitoring and evaluation of any reforms in the education sector is rare and the same is the case in terms of assessment or monitoring of capacity needs or of the measures introduced to address them.
Inputs: <i>What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The donors have actively contributed towards planning, supporting and monitoring of capacity development across the three tiers of governance. • Most donors have placed a lot of emphasis on providing TA support to help develop capacity of the local counterparts and also to hold training workshops. More recently, many donors are involved in developing capacity of the teacher training institutions in Pakistan. • More recently, donors in country are recognising that training workshops or providing TA support alone will not address the capacity development needs in the education sector. There is a move towards developing more holistic capacity development plans— example of NWFP. • By chance a consultant working in NWFP was involved in developing the FTI capacity development guidelines and is following them in NWFP. • Certain studies have been commissioned under EPDF but are not necessarily linked with capacity development (see Annex J).

STREAM 4: Capacity		
Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to capacity development needs (Federal and State/Province level)?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)	
	Effectiveness – To what extent did donor inputs contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services (Federal and State/Province level)?	Efficiency - How economically has support to country level capacity building been translated into results (Federal and State/Province level)?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Donors have invested a lot in capacity development but much of the effort has been very individually focused rather than focused on organisations or institutions. It also appears that the current patterns of TA support have often led to gap filling which has not strengthened, and may even have weakened, government capacity in the long term. Donor efforts at capacity development have rarely been coordinated, raising problems of sustainability, fragmentation of efforts (focus remaining at individual rather than organisational or institutional level); and overlaps. However, the lack of systematic government plans for capacity development across the sector makes it likely that supply-drive approaches to capacity development will continue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are no state monitoring mechanisms in place to monitor the effectiveness of the capacity development programmes. The only monitoring is that by the donor agencies of their specific capacity development projects. Given the context for most capacity development efforts (see under relevance) it is likely that their effectiveness is generally local and limited. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within the donors there is growing recognition of the limitation of the existing capacity development interventions leading to greater dialogue and collaboration for moving towards more organisational or institutional level capacity development work. There continues to be need for more efficient and effective arrangements for the management of TA and other capacity development activities, with more government ownership and leadership.
Sustainability: Are any improvements in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CD interventions conducted so far have little chance of being sustainable. There are signs that donors are moving towards more programmatic approaches to addressing the capacity needs in the education sector in Pakistan. However, it is all very early as yet. A lot will depend on WB programmes as they tend to influence the working of other donors in the area. The deteriorating security conditions in Pakistan make supply of sustained international technical assistance which would be required for any institutional level capacity development plan more difficult. At the more fundamental structural level, there is also an issue of how far the capacity development work can be effective if the underlying political structures limiting the working of teachers and education ministry personnel remain unchanged. 		
FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing capacity development needs in the future?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In principle FTI CF and EPDF funds (or their future variants) could be used to support more systematic capacity development work. It is true that unless there is the will and capacity within the government to invest in the education sector, real capacity development cannot take place. However, the issue is that if the government starts making the right interventions especially at provincial levels, then would the donors be there to support and reward that government? Any positive shifts are fragile so donor support can matter. As noted earlier, the FTI "design" would need to be adapted to allow relevant, substantive engagement in Pakistan. 		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness

Context: *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to aid effectiveness? To what extent has aid for education been efficiently and effectively provided?*

The quest for greater aid effectiveness (both overall and at sector level) is widely seen – e.g. by the Paris Declaration – as a joint enterprise involving collaboration between government and aid agencies. The context for such joint efforts in Pakistan is difficult because:

- Pakistan is not heavily aid dependent, although levels of funding for basic education increased over the period, and the government has not provided strong leadership in aid management.
- Flows of aid are strongly influenced by geo-political considerations, which puts individual donors under strong pressures to disburse in the short term and may make the medium term effectiveness of aid a secondary consideration.
- Pakistan has been a difficult operating environment for donors; its size and diversity are a challenge, and the security situation has placed additional constraints on aid agency personnel. Donors' in-country capacity is thus limited not only by the scale of the country but also by security-related constraints.
- The federal structure means that responsibilities are diffuse, and there are numerous possible arenas to work in.
- Governance issues include political instability, the fact that public services are highly politicised, systemic weaknesses in public finance management, and high levels of corruption. Donors are correspondingly under pressure to demonstrate that their aid is used for the intended purposes, which constrains their use of government systems.

These general factors operate strongly in relation to basic education services. Moreover, the failure of large-scale coordinated aid to basic services through the Social Action Program (SAP) has made donors wary of ambitious attempts to coordinate and scale up support to service delivery.

Inputs: *What inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

The education sector is characterised by a few large donors and very many small ones.

The history of SAP created a distrust for large set-piece donor efforts and led to more attention to provincial level coordination. The most important such efforts have been the sector support programmes led by the World Bank in Punjab and Sindh. Since 2005, also, donors have been working with the government of NWFP towards developing an education SWAp at provincial level.

Aid is mostly provided through projects. (The 2008 financial crisis led the WB to end direct budget support and reconfigure its aid as sector support programmes, which nevertheless can fund eligible expenditure lines within provincial budgets.)

The Economic Affairs Division (EAD) is responsible for coordination and oversight of aid at federal level, and has to approve the channelling of aid to the Provincial level. However, the federal government has not had a formal aid management policy. The role of the federal MOE in coordinating donors is weak.

There has not been a formal education donor group. Most donor coordination meetings are reported to focus on specific projects or themes (e.g. teacher training), to be mainly concerned with information sharing, and to lack leadership from the government.

Since the process of FTI endorsement never got off the ground, the only explicit FTI inputs have been via the EPDF. These have been oriented to analytic work rather than coordination (i.e. they have not focused on the development of joint sector plans per se).

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to aid effectiveness relevant?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent have donor inputs contributed to more and better international aid that is coordinated and coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How efficiently is aid delivered?</i>
<p>Efforts on aid effectiveness per se have been limited, but efforts to support strengthening of governance and PFM have been relevant, albeit difficult.</p> <p>On the other hand, alignment with government systems is difficult because of the complexity of federal structures and the weaknesses in governance and PFM.</p> <p>Alignment with government policies, on the other hand, tends to be undemanding because policies are stated in very general terms.</p> <p>The government itself has not provided strong leadership on aid effectiveness issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No significant mechanisms for education sector dialogue at federal level. but sector programmes in Punjab and Sindh have been useful in focusing a number of donors on a programme led by the WB; there is an incipient SWAp in NWFP, but it is too soon to comment on its effectiveness. • A number of donor evaluations have indicated significant concerns about the effectiveness of aid to education. • Very limited progress toward results-oriented approaches, and no significant realisation of the principles of mutual accountability. • Coordination and harmonisation among donors is limited, largely because there is not a strong and effective demand for it (as opposed to exhortation) from the government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The environment in Pakistan (see context section above) makes it difficult to deliver aid efficiently. • External funding for basic education continues to be project focused. • The 2008 economic crisis was a setback in terms of making Pakistan ineligible for further direct budget support from the World Bank and its large education programmes in Punjab and Sindh have been reconfigured as sector support programmes. • The main efforts to improve the efficiency of aid take the form of coordination around and co-financing of certain programmes, and an ad hoc division of labour through the geographical and thematic focus chosen by donors. • Reporting of aid to government is very unsatisfactory (both in terms of its future availability, and in terms of current disbursements).
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive (Federal and State/Province level)? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<p>High degree of political uncertainty (e.g. changes of government and of government structure). Likely that there will be continued aid to Pakistan, including aid for education, but it is unlikely to be stable and predictable. The contextual factors that constrain aid effectiveness in Pakistan are deep-seated and therefore likely to persist, with high levels of risk. Ironically, security risks may make donors collaborate more, not less.</p>		
FTI prospects: <i>In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing aid effectiveness (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future?</i>		
<p>The FTI principles of donor collaboration behind government leadership, and focus on public provision of basic education, are relevant. But the degree of government commitment to EFA is questionable, and the "standard" FTI design which depends on an operational plan and a functioning donor group at national level does not fit Pakistan's federal structure, or the in-country capacities of its existing education donors. The FTI could be relevant in the future in several ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • advocacy at international level may influence both donors' and the government's approaches to basic education in Pakistan, and the degree of priority it is given; • a reformed (and presumably much larger) Catalytic Fund might be a useful source of support that was less subject to the constraints and uncertainties of direct bilateral funding; • such support would need to be delivered at provincial level, and would require the FTI modus operandi to be adapted accordingly. 		

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion – or others relevant to context)		
Context: <i>What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to cross-cutting issues?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to the overall challenges to EFA, current differences in access to education by certain groups make gender, inter-provincial and rural-urban disparities, and poverty levels important considerations in effective EFA planning. The government's policy documents show sensitivity to the needs of these groups. Special attention is in particular given to gender issues in all the education sector policy documents and plans. HIV/AIDS is mentioned in more recent documents but more in terms of creating awareness as part of preventive medicine rather than in terms of catering to children with HIV/AIDS. There is general low recognition of the potential HIV/AIDS threat. The intra-provincial and urban-rural differences in access to education are noted but have received limited analysis. Apart from the issue of girls' education, the other issues receive very little attention when it comes to actual planning or allocation of resources. There are not special programmes designed to specifically address these gaps. The leadership for reforms on these issues remains quite weak across the three tiers apart from on issues of gender. While the planning process has been very consultative, marginalised groups themselves have not been very actively involved, and plans have therefore not been sufficiently sensitive to their needs. Monitoring and evaluation in general is very weak, and the same holds for these cross-cutting issues. At best, there are occasional donor evaluation studies. 		
Inputs: <i>What inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Donors have tried to contribute to increasing awareness and understanding of the key cross cutting issues by sponsoring studies or funding specific projects such as in the case of gender and more recently HIV/AIDS. They have been less inclined to engage actively in bridging the inter-provincial differences. The donors have undertaken capacity building on gender and education, but not on much else. One possible channel for FTI inputs is the dissemination of good practice from endorsed countries and global advocacy (e.g. FTI advice on mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS). However, there is little evidence of that having trickled down to Pakistan for dealing with these disadvantaged groups. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to cross cutting issues (Federal and State/Province level)?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did donor and government inputs contribute to improved strategies to address cross cutting issues (Federal and State/Province level)?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically did donor and government support to cross cutting issues translate into results (Federal and State/Province level)?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Objectives of support to cross-cutting issues have been broadly relevant to the priorities of the sector and of the country. However, inputs have been more focused on gaining verbal commitments from the government without leading to concrete action plans or higher budgetary allocations from the government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A number of projects aim at better gender inclusion (e.g. girls' stipend programmes). In general, relevant cross-cutting issues are not well mainstreamed in the education sector plan and in the planning process, and serious data weaknesses remain. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The efficiency of girls' stipend programmes is under debate. More generally there is not strong evidence of results pertaining to cross-cutting issues.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity for addressing cross-cutting issues remains weak. 		
FTI prospects: <i>In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing cross-cutting issues (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI has an international role in promoting good practice in the incorporation of cross-cutting issues in education planning and practice, although so far there is little sign of FTI influence in Pakistan. More specifically, a number of the EPDF-supported analytical studies have been relevant to cross-cutting issues, and there is scope for more such work, in a more systematic fashion, in future. If the FTI model were adapted to allow interaction at province level, there would be a more realistic prospect of promoting cross-cutting issues through the endorsement of credible (provincial level) education sector plans. 		