Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Case Study: Kenya

Anne Thomson, Eric Woods,
Clare O'Brien and Eldah Onsomu

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Cambridge Education

Mokoro

OPM
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Policy
Management

Summary information for Kenya

- Currency = Kenya Shilling (KES, or KSh)
- Exchange Rate (31 December 2008) USD 1 = KES 84
- Fiscal Year = 1 July – 30 June
- School year = January–December
- Structure of education system:
  8 years primary + 4 years secondary + 4 years tertiary
- Population: 36 million
- Population growth rate: 2.6% p.a.

Acknowledgements

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Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and by 2009 had been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation was intended to provide an opportunity for reform and change where necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

> The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation was required to draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and to make recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness.

The evaluation took place between November 2008 and February 2010. It was independent but jointly supported by a consortium of donors. An Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) was made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society.

The evaluation team was a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The methodology and process for the evaluation are described in Appendix V (Volume 4) of the final synthesis report.

The main outputs of the evaluation, which included nine country case studies and eight desk studies, are listed overleaf.

Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Preliminary Report. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

Burkina Faso	*Burkina Faso Country Case Study*. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
Cambodia	*Cambodia Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
Ghana	*Ghana Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
Kenya	*Kenya Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
Mozambique	*Mozambique Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
Nicaragua	*Nicaragua Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
Nigeria	*Nigeria Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sullieman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
Pakistan	*Pakistan Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
Yemen	*Yemen Country Case Study,* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

Ethiopia	*Ethiopia Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
Malawi	*Malawi Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
Mali	*Mali Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Moldova	*Moldova Country Desk Study. Mid*-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM.. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
Rwanda	*Rwanda Country Desk Study,* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Uganda	*Uganda Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
Vietnam	*Vietnam Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
Zambia	*Zambia Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABE	Adult Basic Education
ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa
AfDB	African Development Bank
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CF	Catalytic Fund
CFSC	Catalytic Fund Strategic Committee
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DEO	District Education Officer
DICECE	District Centre for Early Childhood Education
DFID	Department for International Development
EAC	East African Community
ECDE	Early Childhood Development and Education
ECDMC	Early Childhood Development Management Committee
EDCG	Education Donor Coordination Group
EDI	EFA Development Index
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee
EPDF	Education Programme Development Fund
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
FMR	Financial Monitoring Report
FPE	Free Primary Education
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNI	Gross National Income
GOK	Government of Kenya
GPA	General Purposes Account
HAC	Harmonisation Alignment and Coordination
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IF	Indicative Framework
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSET	In-service training
IP	Investment Programme
IP-ERS	Investment Programme – Economic Recovery Strategy
JFA	Joint Financing Agreement
JRES	Joint Review of the Education Sector
JRM	Joint Review Mechanism
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KENSIP	Kenya School Improvement Project
KES	Kenya Shilling
KESI	Kenya Education Staff Institute
KESSP	Kenya Education Sector Support Programme
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KJAS	Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy
KRT	Key Resource Teacher
LATF	Local Authorities Transfer Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MOE	Ministry of Education
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MoHEST	Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NACECE	National Centre for Early Childhood Education
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NFE	Non Formal Education
NFEC	Non Formal Education Centre
NFS	Non-Formal School
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIMES	National Integrated M&E System
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
OVC	orphans and vulnerable children
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCR	Primary school Completion Rate
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PNU	Party for National Unity
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRISM	Primary School Management project
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SACMEQ	Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality
SbTD	School-based Teacher Development
SFRTF	Street Families Rehabilitation Trust Fund
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIMBA	School Instructional Materials and Book Account
SMC	school management committee
SPRED	Strengthening of Primary Education project
SWAp	sector wide approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TAC	Teachers Advisory Centre
TAMA	technical assistance management agent
TIVET	Technical, industrial, vocational and entrepreneurship training
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSC	Teachers' Service Commission
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UPC	Universal Primary School Completion
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VVOB	Flemish Association for Development Co-operation and Technical Assistance
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators
WFP	World Food Programme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

S1 This is one of nine country studies being carried out as part of the mid-term evaluation of the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The FTI was launched in 2002 by a partnership of donors and recipient countries to "accelerate progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015". The FTI has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent evaluation to see whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself.

S2 The evaluation is taking place between November 2008 and December 2009. A Preliminary Report was made available for the FTI Partnership Meetings in Copenhagen in April 2009, and the full draft report will be circulated for comment in September 2009. A full explanation of the evaluation, its methodology and its timetable is provided in the *Evaluation Framework*, available from the study website at www.camb-ed.com\fasttrackinitiative.

The Context for FTI in Kenya

S3 The political context in Kenya changed significantly following the victory of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the elections of 2002. The period between 2002 and 2007 saw recovery and rapid economic growth. There was a marked improvement in relations between government and donors, with an accompanying increase in bilateral ODA, from USD 276 million in 2001 to USD 777 million in 2006.

S4 The new government developed an Economic Recovery Strategy, covering the period 2003–2007. In 2008, a long-term plan, Vision 2030 was launched, and a Medium Term Plan 2008–2012 was developed for implementation of the Vision. Vision 2030 highlights the need for Kenya to provide a globally competitive education system which also covers training and research.

S5 In 2003, the incoming government immediately declared Free Primary Education (FPE), which had been central to its manifesto. Its policy initiatives focused strongly on the attainment of Education for All, and in particular universal primary education. An eighteen month participatory process resulted in Sessional Paper No.1 of 2005, which became the policy reference point for all subsequent planning in the sector. The Ministry of Education, supported by development partners, prepared a sector wide programme and plan, the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP), which was launched in July 2005. This became the basis for FTI endorsement in Kenya.

S6 The country suffered severe and traumatic shocks in early 2008 in the form of post-election violence, but it appears to have recovered quite well following a power-sharing agreement. Nevertheless, the World Bank anticipates that economic growth will have reduced to 4-4.5% in 2008, and that the poverty headcount will have increased by 22%, wiping out the gains of the last five years.

The FTI in Kenya

S7 Kenya was not amongst the first countries to apply for endorsement by the FTI, and there is no mention of the country in any of the FTI documentation prior to 2005. Senior civil servants first became aware of the FTI at the High Level Group meeting on EFA in Brazil in late 2004. However it seems clear that Kenya's application to the FTI in 2005 was closely linked to the completion of the KESSP in the first half of that year, and the understanding and knowledge of the FTI mechanisms which had been acquired by the lead donor in the sector (DFID at that time) and the World Bank lead economist for the education sector.

S8 Following an evaluation of the KESSP, Kenya was endorsed by the FTI in July 2005 as is required by FTI protocol. A financing gap of USD 22.5 million was identified. A Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) was then agreed in September 2005 between the International Development Association (IDA), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Government of the Republic of Kenya (GOK). This initially covered funding through DFID, WB and the FTI Catalytic Fund (CF). All FTI CF support has been disbursed through the JFA.

S9 In July 2005 the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee approved an allocation of USD 22.5 million for Kenya. This was later increased following a revised estimate of the country's financing gap by the local donor group. This was followed by a formal Letter of Agreement from the World Bank in November 2005, for a single tranche of USD 24.2 million, which was duly disbursed on December 30, 2005.

S10 It is not clear from the documentation if it was always anticipated that Kenya would have three years of support from the FTI CF. It seems likely that the support was extended to three years in 2006. In that year Kenya requested a further USD 85.4 million from the CF to fill its estimated financing gap for that year. This was not unanimously supported by the development partners and the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee (CFSC) refused to disburse such a high amount, citing concerns regarding the country's implementation capacity. Following long discussions, Kenya's year 2 allocation was doubled to USD 48.4 million, payable in two tranches.

S11 At the FTI Partnership meeting in Cairo in November 2006, it was agreed to top up the year 3 allocation to USD 48.4 million, also payable in two tranches. The final disbursement of funds under the 3-year agreement took place in December 2008. The total amount disbursed to Kenya over the 2005/06–2008/09 period is currently USD 121 million. No further allocations appear to be planned for Kenya to date.

S12 There has been some uncertainty about the process of reapplication to the FTI CF. World Bank staff in country apparently believed that, since the KESSP would have to be revised after 2010, and a Mid Term Review of the KESSP was due to take place in 2008, a bridging arrangement could be negotiated. It was only made clear that this would not be possible in the second half of 2008, by which time it was too late to make an application in time for the second FTI partnership meeting. The evaluation team was told while they were in Kenya that it was unlikely that an application meeting the new and more stringent requirements of the FTI would be possible in time for the April 2009 meeting, so that Kenya had no possibility of FTI funding in 2009.

FTI and Education Policy and Planning

S13 In the period before the introduction of FTI support, there had been intense activity in education policy formulation and planning. The new NARC government was highly motivated, and popularly supported, to repair damage done to the sector through years of neglect, both in physical and human development terms. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2005 and the KESSP were in preparation at the same time, and the possibility of FTI financial support came just as the KESSP was ready to be appraised, so that a dual process took place of KESSP appraisal for GOK and donor support and a "light touch" appraisal for the purposes of FTI endorsement.

S14 To a considerable extent KESSP and FTI are looked upon as the same thing. KESSP has proved a fairly comprehensive plan around which to implement a number of programmes (prioritising FPE). KESSP, while somewhat uneven, is advancing the wider EFA goals, including adult literacy, early childhood development and education (ECDE) and non-formal education.

S15 It is therefore not possible to state that FTI made a material contribution to the improvement of policy formulation and the generation of an education sector plan. Rather, the FTI CF was used as a valuable funding mechanism to supplement other resources in order to implement the existing KESSP. Considering the very strong alignment between KESSP and FTI objectives, the contribution of the CF may be judged as highly relevant to the requirements and aspirations of Kenya. Changes to the modalities of donor support, especially the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA), were of particular significance in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of that support, but these arrangements arose out of a shared commitment to harmonisation and alignment and did not in themselves emanate from the FTI initiative.

FTI and Education Financing

S16 Kenya has an impressive record in strengthening domestic revenue collection, and has substantially increased the share of expenditure on education, and primary education (exceeding the relevant benchmarks from the FTI Indicative Framework) . External funding for education has been a small percentage of the total, but provides a very important contribution to total education spending. This is especially so because of the high proportion of the education budget that is spent on teachers' salaries, leaving small amounts for investment and even teaching materials. At the same time there are issues about the efficiency of sector expenditures.

S17 The FTI has supported the existing modes of funding by contributing Catalytic Fund resources to the pooled fund without putting in place new systems, specific to the CF resources. The FTI has also supported the existing financial monitoring and reporting processes. Disbursements from the Catalytic Fund have enabled the total pool of resources in the KESSP to increase, allowing for a continued emphasis on primary education but also freeing up resources to be spent in other subsectors, including in secondary education. Although CF resources have been allocated to primary education, it is generally recognised that all funding into the pool is fungible.

S18 Kenya has been able to disburse FTI Catalytic Fund resources swiftly because of its existing system of school bank accounts, into which resources are transferred directly from the centre, reducing / minimising leakage. This system was not set up specifically for FTI. Again it is an example of appropriate use being made of existing mechanisms. These mechanisms were carefully designed to limit fiduciary risks, which are a continuing concern in Kenya.

S19 "Funding gap" discussions in relation to the FTI Catalytic Fund have focused on a narrow definition of the gap, in terms of the amounts of external funding that can confidently be planned for in the near term. This is a much more conservative estimate of funding requirements than the broader estimates of the level of expenditure that the achievement of the EFA targets would require. Even so there have been differences among the donor group about appropriate estimates, taking into account government capacity and the need for good monitoring. The cessation of Catalytic Funding has created a gap in the budget for the current (2008/09) financial year. This has made it urgent for the Ministry of Education to recost and revise its sector plan somewhat earlier than might have been expected, in order to reapply for CF resources.

S20 FTI CF resources have made a substantial contribution to external financing of the sector, but they have not noticeably catalysed additional resources from development partners. The long-term availability of CF resources and of other aid remains uncertain.

FTI and Data Gaps

S21 Both the FTI endorsement process and subsequent monitoring and review arrangements for the FTI CF resources were integrated with the design of KESSP. The KESSP framework for analysis and subsequent M&E included a number of the indicators included in the FTI Indicative Framework (IF), but the IF as such did not feature. The inclusion of the FTI CF within the JFA pool helped to reinforce the demands for systematic information, and the Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) that were developed for KESSP have proved to be a valuable management tool. The FTI itself has not placed significant additional reporting demands on Kenya. The only report specific to the FTI CF is one short report per tranche which shows what FTI CF resources have notionally been spent on.

S22 The FTI CF did not directly contribute to the KESSP investment programmes (IPs) relating to M&E, though the additional resources in the pooled fund may be considered to have increased the total amount of funding available to all IPs, including those of M&E and the Education Management Information System (EMIS).

S23 Data collection processes are undergoing a period of change as the EMIS is decentralised to district level and new districts are being created. The need for capacity development in this area is regularly advocated.

FTI and Capacity Building

S24 It is not clear that FTI has added much to capacity building in general, although the way that KESSP works mainly through existing Kenyan structures is commendable. There have been difficulties in developing and implementing a coherent plan for capacity building. Capacity building has been fragmented partly because of responsibilities for it being shared across all 23 IPs of KESSP. Capacity building and TA plans are drawn up annually but appear to be delivered in a somewhat ad hoc manner. One serious weakness has been the inability of the Kenya Education Staff Institute (KESI) to make the significant contribution to management development expected of it. However, there is now much enhanced potential for a closer working relationship between IP team leaders and KESI, with the latter taking on a larger responsibility for capacity building.

S25 Capacity constraints, exacerbated by high turnover rates at all levels, especially in school management committees, threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the very good local management policies which are in place. These deficiencies appear to be partly the result of the size of the overall challenge of building capacity across a very large sector, partly the result of decentralisation and sub-division of Districts, and partly due to a serious shortage of funding.

S26 The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) is not well known or understood, but an unspecified number of senior MOE staff and others appear to have participated in regional activities. Kenya has contributed to understanding in other countries by sharing its experience with non-FTI countries at a regional forum.

FTI and Aid Effectiveness

S27 The aid effectiveness agenda in Kenya pre-dates the FTI, and is structured around the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), eventually agreed in 2007, and the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination donor group (HAC). The education sector fits into that overall framework, but with its own specific sectoral processes.

S28 Education is seen as a model sector for harmonisation and alignment, and is the only ministry implementing a sector-wide approach (SWAp) in Kenya. A number of donors entered a JFA with Kenya in 2005, and the funds allocated by the Catalytic Fund were also included. The CF has contributed around 50% of the total pooled funding to date. FTI CF funds have been disbursed in support of KESSP and FTI is seen as following (and encouraging) good aid effectiveness practices in disbursement and implementation. Although the pooled funding arrangements are at the core of KESSP, many donors deliver aid in project form, albeit aligned with KESSP.

S29 Good progress has been made with the KESSP in areas of harmonised reporting and use of government procurement systems. The joint review process appears to be taken seriously by both government and development partners, though improvements could be made on inclusion of civil society. For the most part, donors have accepted the FMRs as an adequate basis for reporting.

S30 Although development partners argue that aid is more predictable under the JFA, in particular as a result of the March JFA/KESSP meetings which focus on the KESSP budget, there have been occasions when disbursements have been delayed, most recently after the post-election violence. These delays can lead to difficulties at school level in maintaining appropriate levels of inputs, such as school books.

S31 There is scope for significant further progress in implementing the commitments of the Paris Declaration At the same time, the gains in aid effectiveness that are being made could be threatened by any deterioration in standards of public financial management, or by political instability which could undermine the effectiveness of government institutions and threaten the working relationships between GOK and education sector donors.

Cross-Cutting Issues

S32 FTI support to salient cross-cutting issues (equity and inclusion, gender, HIV/AIDS) has mainly been through its overall support to KESSP, which addresses them all, and has a number of IPs focused on them. Kenya has an exceptionally well developed education sector strategy for HIV/AIDS, and the attribution of some FTI funds to this IP may have helped to prioritise it. There remains a general concern that the cross-cutting issues reflected in KESSP have not been as well-funded as other IPs.

Overall Conclusions

S33 **Relevance.** The evaluation concludes that FTI support has been highly relevant both to Kenya's needs and strategies and to the objectives of the FTI partnership. Because KESSP is sector-wide in scope there has been no question of FTI's focus on UPC distorting Kenya's overall broader strategy for EFA and education generally.

S34 **Accelerating progress on EFA.** The FTI Catalytic Fund has provided a major share of external support to KESSP during the years it has been operational, and has thereby helped to boost Kenya's efforts towards EFA.

S35 **Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness.** The volume of CF resources deployed was substantial, both as a proportion of all CF resources and as a share of external financing for KESSP. However, there is little evidence of a catalytic effect whereby FTI endorsement led other donors to increase their financial support to basic education in Kenya. Rather, the efforts of the two existing major donors in the sector (DFID and the World Bank) in supporting the development of KESSP while drawing on their engagement with FTI at a global level made the endorsement process much smoother. The momentum which FTI gave KESSP, along with the joint financing agreement (JFA), may have encouraged some donors to pool resources to the education sector, but there is no evidence that the total amount of official development assistance (ODA) increased.

Recommendations and Reflections

S36 In many respects, the way in which the FTI Catalytic Fund funding has been integrated into the newly developed KESSP, and aid modalities such as the JFA, is a good example of how Paris Declaration principles such as ownership, alignment and harmonisation can be promoted through appropriate aid mechanisms. More effort should be made to disseminate the Kenyan experience as to how support from the FTI CF can be used to promote existing good practices.

S37 At the same time there is a challenge to clarify FTI rules and procedures (the procedure for securing follow-on funding from the CF is a case in point), to make its operation less dependent on the energy of specific individuals, and perhaps to engage more directly with the recipient government and with the EDCG more broadly.

S38 It would seem desirable that when CF funding is given in support of a specific plan, that FTI CF Steering Committee should either commit to supporting that plan throughout its intended period, or should develop an exit strategy, which is articulated in conjunction with the recipient country government and the local donors.

S39 The case of Kenya raises basic questions over the role of the Catalytic Fund. Nobody in Kenya questions the importance of the FTI CF as a financing instrument, nor that it is needed to help the government achieve its objectives, particularly given the capacity building needs of the decentralised governance and management systems in place in the education sector. However, Kenya already has a high proportion of funds currently disbursed from the Catalytic Fund. There are few indications that this has encouraged other donors to join the JFA, or to increase the funding that they give to education in the country. Is the present mode of operation of FTI sustainable, either in Kenya or globally, or is it raising expectations that it cannot meet?

PART A: APPROACH

1 Introduction

The Fast Track Initiative[1]

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is "accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015" (FTI 2004a p3). It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development Banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.[2] Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, FTI was designed as a compact that "explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' improvements in policy performance and accountability for results" (FTI 2004a p3)

1.2 According to its *Framework* document (2004), the FTI's major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education
- More efficient aid for primary education
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.

1.4 The 2004 *FTI Framework* set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country level;
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes;
- **Support linked to performance:** The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources;
- **Lower transaction costs:** The FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves);
- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

[1] This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (see Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a*, Annex A).*

[2] The Dakar Forum communiqué stated that "No countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources."

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed). Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI-specific instruments which can provide support at country level:

- The **Catalytic Fund** (CF) set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The CF had disbursed USD 396 million to 20 countries as of November 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund** (EPDF) set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8 million (of USD 58.5 million committed) to over 60 countries as of December 2008.

The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.6 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at Annex B of this report includes a summary of the main changes in FTI, as well as its involvement with Kenya.)

Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.7 The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid–point between the FTI's establishment and the MDG target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the TOR:

> The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (TOR, ¶12)

1.8 The evaluation is being managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process is meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raises. The main outputs are listed on page iv above.

Evaluation Methodology

1.9 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI is to disentangle the activities and effects of FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted is *contribution analysis.* This involves a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence is then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) FTI may have made to the overall results observed.

The Role of Country Studies

1.10 The work programme for the evaluation envisages nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

> Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the

context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (TOR ¶21)

1.11 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with FTI.[3] Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked the FTI's processes for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies are being conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in FTI, and it is expected that their reports will be of value to the countries concerned.

1.12 The country studies take account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and M&E, aid effectiveness) which FTI is intended to have. They aim to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. (See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to country studies.)

The Study Process for Kenya

1.13 The country case studies are based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

1.14 The visit to Kenya took place between 25 January and 6 February 2009. The Country Study team consisted of Anne Thomson (Country Study Team Leader), Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien, and Eldah Onsomu.

1.15 The team met a range of stakeholders from the government, donor, NGO and civil society communities, and also representatives of public and non-formal schools at primary and secondary levels (see Table 1.1). The team spent a day visiting Kibera, in Nairobi, and a day in Nakuru District and Machakos District. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is at Annex C. A Country Visit Note summarised the team's preliminary findings and was circulated to in-country stakeholders on 17 February (Thomson et al 2009).

Table 1.1 Stakeholders by Category

Affiliation	Men	Women	Number of Informants
NGO/CSO	2	0	2
Central Government	17	13	30
Local Government	5	5	10
Multilateral	1	3	4
Bilateral	3	2	5
Individual	6	6	12
School	6	4	10
Totals	**40**	**33**	**73**

[3] See Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a (Annex H) for a full explanation of the choice of country cases.

Outline of this Report

1.16 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (¶1.9 above), this report first reviews Kenya's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B), then systematically considers the parts played by the FTI (Part C). Conclusions and recommendations are in Part D.

1.17 Part C is structured according to the five workstreams within the overall evaluation: policy and planning, finance, data and M&E, capacity development and aid effectiveness. Each subsection addresses the context, inputs and activities of the FTI, and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (where possible) within these workstream areas. There is also a chapter on cross-cutting issues.

1.18 This country case study aims to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- all stakeholders in Kenya with an interest in the education sector;
- the FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report;
- the EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee);
- any other interested parties.

1.19 A draft version of the report was circulated to the Education Donor Coordination Group, and the EOC. Where comments were received these have been considered and where appropriate the report has been modified in response.

PART B: EDUCATION FOR ALL IN KENYA

2 Kenya Background

Kenya in brief

2.1 Kenya is a country of 35.5 million people, of whom an estimated 16.7 million are poor, and 84% live in rural areas.[4] Average GNI per capita was USD 580 in 2006 and life expectancy at birth was 53.4 years in the same year. Population growth rate was estimated at 2.6% per annum in 2006, and school age population is estimated to increase by 2.9% by 2010, and then fall by 3.2% by 2015.[5]

2.2 Prior to 2000, the Kenyan economy followed a declining trend.[6] In 2002, when the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) took office, the economy was still performing dismally with a growth rate of 0.6% (World Bank 2008b). However, in the last 4 years the Kenyan economy has been on a path of consistent recovery, its annual growth rate reaching a two decade high of 6.9% in 2007 (World Bank 2008b).[7]

2.3 The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) has dominated Kenya's political landscape since its independence. In 1992, political pluralism was legalised in the country leading to the emergence of several political parties and multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997, which were both won by KANU.[8]

2.4 During the third multi-party elections in December 2002, the NARC, formed from the unification of opposition parties together with a faction which broke away from KANU, won the elections. Mwai Kibaki, the NARC candidate, was elected as Kenya's third president, receiving 62% of the vote and with NARC receiving 130 out of 222 of the parliamentary seats.

2.5 In 2007, Kenya held its tenth general election (fourth under the multi-party system). President Kibaki, under the Party for National Unity (PNU), ran for re-election against Kenya's main opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga. The elections were largely believed to have been flawed, with international observers stating that the tallying process was rigged in favour of President Kibaki. A dispute that followed the announcement from the Kenya Electoral Commission unfortunately led to seven weeks of violence in some parts of the country leading to loss of lives, dislocation of people, and destruction of property.

[4] World Bank Country Brief, accessed 23.02.2009 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/KENYAEXTN/0,,menuPK:356520~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:356509,00.html.

[5] World Bank 2006c p179.

[6] The economy experienced rapid growth rate (average of 7.8%) in the decade immediately following independence due to high public investment, increasing agriculture production etc. However, in the subsequent decades the economy followed a declining trend due to several factors such as declining terms of trade against agricultural commodities, the impact of contradictory policies under SAPs etc The economy reached its lowest point in 1997, when growth rates was a mere 0.27%(World Bank, 2006b).

[7] The growth has been widely distributed, covering all economic and social sectors resulting in reduction in poverty levels from 56 per cent in 2002 to 46 per cent in 2006. Also this growth has not only impacted positively on the indicators of other MDGs, for example, education, health, gender, and environment, but also availed more resources to address the MDGs across the economy.

[8] Kenya was officially declared a single party state in 1982.

2.6 With the signing of a peace and power sharing deal (the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement) at the end of February 2008, the violence was quelled and calm restored in the country. The agreement included a fundamental change in the government structure to introduce the post of prime minister and two deputies as well as the formation of a grand coalition between Kibaki's PNU and Odinga's ODM.

2.7 The post-election violence has affected all aspects of Kenyan society and the economy. Within the education sector for example, many learning institutions were burnt and vandalised. Internal displacement put additional pressure on schools in areas to which refugees returned and in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs).

2.8 Although the power-sharing agreement has restored some confidence to the markets, the World Bank (2009, op. cit) anticipates that economic growth will have reduced to 4–4.5% in 2008, and that the poverty headcount will have increased by 22%, wiping out the gains of the last five years.

National development strategy and performance

2.9 Kenya developed an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000, but this was replaced by the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation for 2003–2007 (ERS) by the NARC government. This was accepted as the PRSP by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), but "presents a multifaceted strategy to meet economic growth, equity and poverty reduction, and governance objectives"[9]. The IP-ERS contains a MDG-focused result-based matrix, and appears to have had much greater government ownership than the previous interim PRSP.

The Economic Recovery Strategy (2003–2007)

2.10 This strategy was based on four pillars:

- Economic growth to be achieved through enhanced revenue collection, expenditure restructuring and monetary policy that supports the achievement of growth without affecting price stability.
- Restructuring and reforming of governance institutions such as the public service, security agencies and the judiciary.
- Rehabilitation and expansion of physical infrastructure e.g. the expansion of telecommunications, railways, air transport etc.
- The fourth pillar is based on human resource development, mainly in education and health. *Specifically with regards to **education**, the ERS advocated several interventions such as the expansion of access to primary education, enhancing secondary education by expanding bursaries to cater for students from poor backgrounds, the provision of facilities like laboratories and the provision of more teachers*.

Vision 2030

2.11 Following the success of the ERS, the GOK accepted a recommendation from the National Economic and Social Council to prepare a long term vision to guide the country's development up to 2030. In 2007, the government published a long term strategy for development – Vision 2030 – which will seek to make Kenya a globally competitive and

[9] Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, p1.

prosperous nation with high quality of life by 2030. Kenya's Vision 2030 is formed on three pillars: Economic, Social and Political.

2.12 The first pillar is to increase GDP growth to 10% p.a. and to maintain that average till 2030. The main drivers of this growth will be tourism, agriculture, trade, manufacturing, business off-shoring and financial services.

2.13 The second pillar is social transformation, motivated by the fact that economic development goes hand in hand with creating a just and cohesive society. This pillar addresses eight key areas: education; health, water and sanitation; environmental protection; housing and urbanization; gender, youth, sports and culture; equity and poverty reduction; science, technology and innovation.

2.14 Specifically, under education and training, Vision 2030 highlights the need for Kenya to provide a globally competitive and quality education, training and research. It also highlights Kenya's ambition to become a regional centre of research and development in new technologies. This will be achieved through:

- integrating early childhood education into primary education
- reforming secondary school curricula:
- modernising teacher training;
- strengthening partnerships with the private sector;
- developing key programmes for learners with special needs,
- rejuvenating on-going adult training programmes
- revising the curriculum for university and technical institutes to include more science and technology; and
- in partnership with the private sector, the Government will also increase funding to enable all these institutions to support activities envisaged under the economic pillar.

2.15 Pillar three, the political vision pillar, sets out Kenyan aspirations for a "democratic political system that is issue-based, people-centred, result-oriented and accountable to the public". It sets out eight governance principles and areas of strategic development to address these.

2.16 Vision 2030 was launched in 2008, with considerable dissemination across Kenya. There was good public awareness of the Vision, and care was taken to consult with all the parties contesting the 2007 election, to ensure that there was buy-in to the long-term plan. This appears to have been successful, and in 2008 a five year plan was prepared for the implementation of Vision 2030.

First Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008–2012

2.17 The MTP follows a similar structure to the IP-ERS, with an overarching approach to macroeconomic stabilisation, supported by three pillars addressing economic, social and political challenges. However, there is also an emphasis on cross-cutting foundations for national transformation, in particular infrastructure, ICT and the importance of science and technology. Key legal reforms in areas of land management, and human resource development are also highlighted. The MTP also explicitly addresses some of the factors identified as behind the post-election violence in 2008, and proposes institutional and strategic responses.

2.18 In education, the MTP notes the endorsement of the KESSP by the FTI, and reaffirms its commitment to EFA. However, the plan also notes the need to expand secondary, TIVET and university education, in line with the human capital needs identified in Vision 2030. The education development budget contained in the MTP is allocated around 9% of the total over the five-year period, but by far the greatest allocation within this is given to expanding secondary education, and then to increasing access to university education.

Quality of public financial management (PFM)

2.19 Assessment against the international Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) criteria shows that Kenya's legislative and institutional framework contains many features that support sound PFM practices (Republic of Kenya 2006). However, Kenya's history of high-level corruption makes donors highly sensitive to fiduciary concerns.

2.20 On the one hand, there is a clearly defined budget cycle (Figure 2.1 below) beginning with the production of a Budget Outlook Paper which sets provisional sector ceilings based on macroeconomic forecasts. The government is moving towards a system of programme-based budgeting. The budget cycle also includes the preparation of rolling three-year medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs), and the conduct of annual public expenditure reviews (PERs) by each ministry. Sector working groups then submit their budget proposals in a report to the Ministry of Finance. Throughout the process budget documents are widely disseminated, including through stakeholder consultation and sector hearings. During implementation there is increasing use of performance contracts, including in the education sector. This means that Kenya's education plans are linked to realistic estimates of financing capacity.

Figure 2.1 The budget cycle in Kenya



Source: KIPPRA / OPM.

2.21 At the same time, there are concerns that detailed budget allocations are amended within the Ministry of Finance, after the sector working groups have submitted their finalised reports. (Fölscher 2008). Moreover, budgets are often approved by parliament after the start of the financial year. At implementation stage there has been a history of considerable divergence between budgeted and actual expenditure across government. In part this is attributed to challenges in providing accurate budget forecasts, unpredictable aid flows from development partners and delays in the release of funds.

2.22 In the education sector the low execution rate has been particularly apparent in the development budget, although in the last two years it has improved markedly, from 66% in 2005/06 to 93% in 2007/08 as funds from development partners have been released in a more timely manner (Kenya MOE 2008a).

2.23 In recent years the government has experienced a backlog of pending bills which amounted to 4% of actual expenditure as of 2004/05. In the education sector, prior to the start of the KESSP, this is reported to have arisen because development partners have shifted resources away from large-scale infrastructure projects in the middle of implementation. It is estimated that over KES 500 million is required to finish stalled projects and clear pending bills (Kenya MOE 2008a).

2.24 A sizeable proportion of government expenditure—some 5% in total—is transferred to the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) and Constituency Development Fund (CDF), managed by local authorities and members of parliament respectively. The PEFA assessment of 2006 noted that, "fiduciary risks with CDF are high as the fund is not subject to the same controls, reporting and accountability procedures like other public funds". Part of both funds are spent on development projects including in education: one component of the LATF, known as the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan, may be used for school repairs and the construction of new classrooms, while about 10% of the CDF is spent on education projects, including infrastructure and bursaries. There is a risk that this causes a mismatch between development and recurrent expenditure, because the Teachers' Service Commission (TSC) is formally obliged to fund the salaries of teachers to staff any new schools that are built, without being involved in the decisions about whether those schools are required. In 2008 the Ministry of Education's PER reported, "Construction of unplanned, uncoordinated and non-viable schools through the devolved funds such as CDF and LATF has resulted in serious wastage of resources".

2.25 The recent emphasis on decentralisation to provincial and district level has increased the requirement for financial management, procurement and audit skills at subnational level and poses a challenge since there is reported to be a shortage of qualified personnel to implement and monitor programmes.

2.26 One of Kenya's strengths is its revenue effort. Arguably as a response to the decline in aid following scandals in the early 1990s,

> Kenya has managed a successful transition from a high tax rate, low tax base system with considerable reliance on import taxes and seigniorage to a more efficient and equitable revenue system based on broad-based taxes like income-tax and VAT. ... the revenue-to-GDP ratio at around 21% is still high in Kenya compared to other countries of a similar income level. Kenya collects at least 4–7 percentage points of GDP more in revenue than its EAC partners, Tanzania and Uganda, and is a positive outlier among developing countries (*Bandiera et al 2008*).

Aid relationships

2.27 The political context in Kenya changed significantly following the victory of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the elections of 2002, and the replacement of President Moi by President Kibaki. The period between 2002 and 2007 was marked by an improvement in relations between government and donors, with an accompanying increase in bilateral ODA, from USD 276 million in 2001 to USD 777 million in 2006 (OECD statistics; see Figure 2.2 below for Kenyan records).

Figure 2.2 Official Development Assistance to Kenya, 2000/01 to 2007/08 (KES million[10])



Source: Quarterly budget reports.

2.28 Donors have greatly strengthened engagement with government over this period. The first in-country Consultative Group meeting in 2003 was followed by the establishment of a Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination Group (HAC) in 2004 and the development of a joint donor assistance strategy (KJAS), launched in September 2007. As part of the same process, a set of partnership principles was signed by both government and donors, which addressed issues of alignment, harmonisation, management for results and mutual accountability, in line with the Paris Declaration. The partnership principles also contain commitments to address corruption and to strengthen procurement and financial management systems.[11]

2.29 Official development assistance represented about 5% of GNI in 2006. In 2005/06, the most recent date for which the relevant data are available, this external aid comprised just under 8% of total government expenditure (Fölscher 2008). Despite government revenue from taxes having increased from KES 180 billion in 2002 to KES 450 billion in 2006, the result of economic growth and better tax collection processes, almost 50% of the

[10] The statistics shown in the chart do not correspond to the OECD DAC statistics quoted. This is an endemic problem for aid statistics, where the figures donors report to OECD do not match the figures that recipient governments report. This can be due to differences in commitments and disbursements, but also to the way that TA is included, or not in ODA figures.

[11] The education donors had earlier, in 2005, agreed a set of partnership principles for the education sector.

development budget comes from donor funding. Donors therefore have a significant role to play in supporting measures to address gender equality, social exclusion and human rights.

2.30 The top five donors to Kenya are the United States, the European Commission, Japan, the United Kingdom and the World Bank, under its IDA window. Just over 60% of ODA is bilateral but only the European Commission currently gives budget support. This was designed in 2003–2004, and is strongly linked to indicators for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)[12]. Three other donors (DFID, Sida and the World Bank) have shown interest in budget support, but this has been put on hold after the post-election violence.

2.31 Donor coordination was put to the test following the violence of 2008. KJAS guidelines indicated that donors should be cautious about aid disbursement and move to the low scenario. It is the donor view that their ability to speak with a reasonably unified voice put pressure on the government to come to the power-sharing agreement.

2.32 Corruption in Kenya has been seen as endemic, and the country has scored poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2008, Kenya ranked 147 out of 180 countries, with a score that has only changed slightly over the past five years. This level of corruption (together with some very high profile corruption scandals) has been a factor in limiting moves by donors towards greater alignment and use of government systems, despite the relatively high (for sub-Saharan Africa) score Kenya received in 2006 for its PFM systems.[13]

[12] Although treated as balance-of-payments aid, the PRGF may also be viewed as a form of budget support.
[13] OECD, 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Kenya Country Chapter, and Fölscher, (2008).

3 Basic Education in Kenya

Education System

Formal public schools

3.1 The Kenya education system is organised on the basis of 8 + 4 + 4 years: eight years of primary, followed by four years of secondary and then by a minimum of four more years of higher education. For early childhood education, two additional pre-school years are specified. English is the medium of instruction from upper primary onwards.

3.2 For many years communities have been encouraged to build primary schools locally using their own resources, with government then registering them as public schools and providing some inputs, including teachers, and learning materials, including textbooks. Inputs vary over time with changing government commitment and financial capacity. This has tended to lead to an over-provision in some areas. The Education Act Chapter 211 of 1968 (revised in 1980) sets a minimum school enrolment for registration of 10 students. Teachers are provided through the Teachers Service Commission on a basis determined by a national teacher norms policy (but also affected by budget caps on funds for teachers' salaries).

3.3 Responsibility for public education in its widest sense is shared across several ministries. The Ministry of Education covers basic education (ECDE, primary, secondary and non-formal education programmes) and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MOHEST) covers TIVET and university education.[14] Other relevant ministries are the Ministry of Gender and Children Affairs and the Ministry of Youth Affairs.

3.4 It is GOK policy to welcome the contribution of the private sector to educational provision. In 2008, 10% of primary children went to private schools. This proportion holds for both boys and girls (boys 385,000 out of 3.8 million; girls 405,000 out of 4.3 million). Government policy is to allow the private sector to deliver 10–11% of education provision[15]. Similarly, faith based and civil society organisations also own and manage schools. However, the relationship between public and private provision is complex. For example, it appears that slum dwellers in Nairobi are more likely to attend private schools because of an absence of public school provision in these areas (UNESCO 2008, Box 3.11).

3.5 A major programme of administrative decentralisation has been undertaken in the last few years. This has resulted in the central MOE divesting itself of much of its former responsibilities for the management and implementation of service delivery. In turn, the seven Provinces, and more particularly the Districts, now have significant new responsibilities, made very challenging both by an absolute shortage of human capacity and also by the proliferation of Districts, from 76 in 2005 to 174 in 2009.

Special Education

3.6 According to KESSP 2005, special education had for a long time been provided in special schools, special units attached to regular schools, and more recently through inclusive settings in regular schools. However, special schools and units only catered for relatively small numbers of children with special needs in the areas of hearing, visual, mental

[14] There was a single Ministry of Education, Science and Technology at the time the KESSP was prepared.

[15] Interview with Mr Kimathi N'kanatha, Acting Director Policy and Planning, MOE.

or physical disability. This omitted other areas of special need such as children who are gifted and talented, psychosocially different, autistic, multiply handicapped, or who have specific learning difficulties and communication disorders.

3.7 It was difficult to mainstream special education, due to inappropriate infrastructure, inadequate facilities and lack of equipment. In addition, inadequate capacity among many teachers to handle children with special needs, lack of co-ordination among service providers, inappropriate placement of children with disabilities, inadequate and expensive teaching and learning materials and inadequate supervision and monitoring of special education programmes was deemed to exacerbate the situation. Also, low enrolments in special education were influenced by negative attitudes, taboos and beliefs associated with disability.

Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE)

3.8 Although there were some notable achievements in ECDE before 2005, access to ECDE services remained low, with 65% of the children aged 3–6 years not accessing ECDE services. In Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) areas the situation was much worse with only 9% of the relevant age group accessing ECDE services. The sub-sector was constrained by a large number of untrained teachers and turnover among those trained was high due to poor remuneration and lack of support. Guidelines for management of ECDE centres, activity books and learning materials, were all outdated, and community awareness on the importance of ECDE was low.

3.9 The NARC government established a National Centre for Early Childhood Education (NACECE), as well as District Centres for Early Childhood Education (DICECE) for purposes of in-servicing teachers; mobilizing communities and parents through awareness creation; and providing community support grants to support marginalised/vulnerable communities in collaboration with other partners. Other measures to enhance the quality of ECDE services include: implementation of a 2-year in-service training programme for ECDE teachers; mounting a 9-month training of trainers course; developing guidelines and syllabuses for ECDE programmes; enhancing the capacity of supervisors and inspectors to ensure the quality of ECDE programmes; and equipping NACECE and DICECEs.

3.10 The Sessional Paper No 1 of 2005 outlined several policy measures in the ECDE sub-sector, covering the development of an ECDE policy and legal framework; modalities to mainstream ECDE as part of basic education and integrate 4 to 5 year-old children into the primary cycle by 2010; increased capacity building and resource mobilisation; together with a comprehensive national framework including a national curriculum, teacher training and certification.

3.11 A new Policy for ECDE has now been adopted and ECDE provision and take up has been substantially increased.

Non Formal Education

3.12 In spite of the introduction of Free Primary Education, in 2004 there were an estimated 1.7 million children and youth (1.5 million aged 6–14 and 200,000 youth) who for various socio-economic reasons had been unable to access education through formal school delivery channels[16]. The problem was particularly acute in urban slum areas (informal urban settlements), ASALs and "pockets of poverty" across the country. The MOEST capacity to coordinate and support Non-Formal Schools (NFSs) or Non-Formal Centres (NFECs). NFSs

[16] KESSP 2005 p25.

and NFECs-based service providers was inadequate. As a result the quality of education provided in NFSs and NFECs varied from very good to poor.

3.13 The then MOEST did not provide direct support to the majority of NFSs and NFECs-based programmes; instead it provided a policy and broad framework regulation for a wide range of non-governmental and community-based education service providers, such as national and international NGOs, Community Based Organizations and Faith Based Organizations, entrepreneurs and philanthropists. Many of these service providers were registered under different Government departments, such as under the Office of the President, Attorney General Chambers and Social Services. Very few NFSs and NFECs were registered by MOEST.

3.14 After Kenya implemented free primary education (FPE) in January 2003, the Government also set up a Street Families Rehabilitation Trust Fund (SFRTF) under the Office of the Vice-President and the Ministry of Home Affairs to move street children and families from Nairobi city streets with a plan to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them back to society. Between 2003 and 2005, 250 of the children joined public schools, while over 1,000 youth including teenage mothers, gained vocational and HIV/AIDS-related life skills. In addition, the MOEST piloted Free Primary Education Support Project funding in 59 NFSs and NFECs in Nairobi.

3.15 According to the Kenya FTI Submission,[17] the intention was to improve access and quality of education offered in NFS and NFEC, over the next 5 years, using the following investment strategies:

- Development of curriculum and teacher learning materials.
- Development of NFS policy guidelines for Coordination of education provision in NFS and NFEC.
- Provide support grants to NFS and NFEC.
- Provide teacher support in NFS and NFEC.

Adult Basic Education

3.16 Adult Basic Education (ABE) was defined as providing basic education and training opportunities to adults and out of school youth aged 15 years and above who have either missed their chances in the formal education system during their childhood or dropped out of school before attaining sustainable levels of education. The ABE programmes targeted an estimated 4.2 million illiterate adults and another 2.2 million out of school youth.

3.17 Low levels of access and participation were attributed to such factors as an inadequate number of teachers, lack of teaching/learning materials, inappropriate teaching methods, cost sharing policy, regional and gender disparities. Despite official Government commitment to ABE programmes and recognition of their importance in national development, it had a low public image based on negative attitudes, prejudices and stigmatisation towards ABE programmes. This made it difficult for the programmes to attract adequate funding from the Government and the donor community.

[17] Kenya FTI Submission, 2005.

National Education Strategy

3.18 Since independence, the Government has addressed challenges facing the education sector through Commissions, Committees and Taskforces. The first of these led to the Report of the Kenya Education Commission (The Ominde Report, 1964), which proposed an education system that would foster national unity and the creation of sufficient human capital for national development, formally adopted as Sessional Paper No: 10 of 1965 on *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*.

3.19 The Report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies (The Gachathi Report, 1976), highlighted national unity, and economic, social and cultural aspirations.

3.20 The Report of the Presidential Working Party on the Second University in Kenya (The Mackay Report, 1981) led to the removal of the advanced (A) level of secondary education, and the expansion of other post-secondary training institutions. It also recommended the establishment of the 8:4:4 system of education.

3.21 The Report of the Presidential Working Party on Education and Manpower Training for the Next Decade and Beyond (The Kamunge Report, 1988) focused on improving education financing, quality and relevance. This led to Sessional Paper No 6 on *Education and Training for the Next Decade and Beyond*, and introduced a policy of cost sharing between government, parents and communities.

3.22 The Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (The Koech Report, 2000) was mandated to recommend ways and means of enabling the education system to facilitate national unity, mutual social responsibility, accelerated industrial and technological development, life-long learning, and adaptation in response to changing circumstances. While the Government did not adopt the Report due to the cost implications some recommendations, such as curriculum rationalisation were adopted and implemented.

3.23 In the later years of the Government led by President Daniel arap Moi, there were several policy initiatives, notably the Master Plan on Education and Training 1997–2010 (1998), a Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (1998) and a National Poverty Eradication Plan, 1999–2015, with the creation of a Poverty Eradication Commission. However, a general lack of political will coupled with a serious shortage of financial resources undermined any real change.

3.24 An interim PRSP had been written for the period 2000 to 2003 and a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was expected in 2001. But when a new government, formed by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), came to power as a result of national elections at the end of 2002, it led to a complete revision into what became the Economic Recovery Strategy. This identified key priority areas, notably Free Primary Education (FPE), and made a commitment to increased spending on the social sectors, and to adopt the MTEF and PER mechanisms, foundations on which donor programmes could build[18].

3.25 Immediately, Free Primary Education, which had been central to the NARC manifesto, was declared, in time to generate a major influx of children to primary school at the beginning of the 2003 new school year. The new Government's policy initiatives focused strongly on the attainment of EFA and, in particular, Universal Primary Education (UPE). Key concerns were access, retention, equity, quality and relevance, and internal and external efficiencies within the education system.

[18] DFID 2007. Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes. Country Study Kenya: Final Report.

3.26 A National Conference on Education and Training (27–29 November 2003) brought together over 800 key stakeholders in the sector. These included elected politicians, senior officials, and representatives of civil society, faith based organizations, non-government organizations, trade unions, parents' associations and donors.

3.27 The conference mandated the then Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST) to develop a new policy framework for the education sector which would encompass the EFA and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This was followed by further work which included specific sub-sectoral and financial studies and was eventually formulated as the Sessional Paper No 1 of 2005, approved by Parliament in April 2005. It is this which has become the core policy reference point for all subsequent planning in the sector. In particular it identified the implementation of FPE as critical to the attainment of UPE and therefore as a key milestone towards the realization of the EFA goal.

3.28 Sessional Paper No 1 specified the long-term objective of the Government in terms of providing all Kenyans with basic quality education and training, including two years of pre-primary, eight years of primary and four years of secondary/technical education. Following the 2007 national elections, it has since been complemented by the introduction of Free Secondary Day Education in early 2008.

3.29 In parallel with the developments which culminated in the Sessional Paper No 1, the NARC government developed new national policies for a recovery process in the economy, expressed in The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (ERSWC), referred to usually as the ERS (actually published in March 2004). This is discussed in more detail in ¶2.10.

The Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP)

3.30 Also in 2004, the Ministry of Education began the preparation of a sector-wide programme and plan which would enable implementation of the policies adopted in Sessional Paper No 1. At a series of training sessions and workshops,[19] senior MOE staff and other relevant officials developed an understanding of the principles of a sector-wide approach (SWAp). By way of a series of review missions undertaken jointly by government officials, civil society and development partners, this ultimately led to the preparation, adoption and launch in July 2005,[20] of a sectoral plan for education, the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP), to cover five GOK fiscal years (July 2005–June 2010). This contains outlines of 23 Investment Programmes (IPs), a management structure for the programme, arrangements for annual Joint Reviews of the Education Sector (JRES) the first of which took place in November 2005, and budget workshops which review the financial requirements of KESSP and feed into the annual GOK budgetary process.

3.31 KESSP is anchored around five thematic areas focusing on expanding access in basic education, strengthening education sector management improving quality and retention in primary education, expanding and improving secondary and future investments in TIVET and university education. The 23 IPs were identified around these thematic areas as essential to improve access, equity, quality and relevance of education and training in Kenya. The first of these thematic areas included primary school infrastructure, non-formal schools,[21] special needs education, adult basic education, expanding education opportunities in arid and semi-arid lands, and gender.

[19] Guided by Adriaan Verspoor, an experienced former senior World Bank education expert.

[20] JRES Aid Memoire November 2007.

[21] Non Formal Schools (NFS) are schools which have been established outside the government system, but which have government-qualified teachers, are timetabled formally, follow the national

3.32 Although KESSP is a government owned programme, it does not map straightforwardly onto the GOK budget, and does not directly include most of the government's recurrent expenditures on education – see Box 3.1.

Box 3.1 What is the KESSP?

While the KESSP is formally the name of the education sector plan, there is confusion as to whether or not this refers to the whole of the government's education programme.

The KESSP declares that it comprises, "23 investment programmes focusing on the sector as a whole". However, these investment programmes (IPs) do not include any salaries, for teachers or for ministry employees, which constitutes by far the largest component of ministry spending; nor do they include other ministry overheads, pending bills and some construction costs. In fact, the cost summary provided in the KESSP consistently forecasts that the IPs will constitute only 19% of all spending on education.

There are two further causes for confusion about what the KESSP is. First, the IPs are a mix of recurrent and development spending. Second, they cover expenditure across more than one ministry, not just the MOE (previously MOEST). This means that it is very difficult to map KESSP costs against the MOE budget or against ministry-level expenditure data.

The KESSP document itself uses the term "KESSP" interchangeably to refer variously to the 23 IPs and to the whole of the education sector. So, where it identifies "the financing gap for KESSP" and the amount of resources committed to the KESSP from internal and external resources (see MOEST 2005, Table 2), it actually refers to all spending.

In this report the term is used mainly to refer to the 23 IPs, but it is not always possible to disaggregate these from other types of education spending.

3.33 Due to changes in the structure and responsibilities of ministries, TIVET IPs are managed from MOHEST, but all IP Team Leaders are members of the KESSP Steering Committee, meeting monthly.

3.34 A Mid-Term Review of the KESSP was due to be conducted in 2008 but has been delayed. It is now scheduled to take place in March 2009.

3.35 Specific policies for ECDE and for Non Formal Education (NFE) are also important catalysts of support and attention for these sub-sectors. The ECDE policy has already led to increased support. The NFE policy is due to be finalised by the end of this financial year (June 2009),[22] and already is being warmly welcomed as a stimulus to that area.

Progress towards EFA

3.36 From independence in 1963 onwards, the number of students enrolled at various levels of education increased substantially overall. However, by the mid 1980s, following the implementation of IMF World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes, the government abandoned its prior reforms, FPE and a Cost Sharing Policy (1989) was introduced, under which parents and communities had to contribute to their children's education . The government paid teachers' salaries and administrative costs and funded limited facilities,

curriculum and whose pupils are entered in the public national public examinations. They are supported with staff and financial resources through the existing main schemes as if they were full government schools.

[22] The MOE officials concerned are confident of this as "it is in the Permanent Secretary's performance contract".

while parents paid school fees, including for text books. This Cost Sharing Policy proved such a burden that enrolment dropped by some 20% between 1989 and 1995.

3.37 The Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) at public primary level therefore peaked during the early 1990s at 105.4% but had declined to 87.6% by 2002. Similarly, GER at the public secondary level declined from 30% to 22% over the same period. However, following the implementation of FPE, there was a major upsurge in enrolment in public primary schools, resulting in a GER of 99% in 2003 (102% for girls and 97% for boys).[23] An additional 1.2 million children, who had previously dropped out or never attended school before, increased total enrolment in the 8-year primary school programme to 7.5 million (7.2 million in public schools and 0.3 million in other schools) by year 2004. The primary school net enrolment rate (NER) continued to increase in the following year, with data for 2005 showing an additional 250,000 children in the 18,500 primary schools. The NER (including private and non-formal schools) was approximately 80% in year 2003, and it is now about 83% on average, although there are still slight disparities between boys and girls (the NER for boys is 84%) and especially between the regions.

3.38 Progress is also being made towards having all children complete primary schooling by 2015. The present primary school completion rate (PCR) was about 80% by 2006, with a reduced drop-out rate, partly due to the improved learning environment in schools where the availability of textbooks has increased substantially. Significant changes have also been made in the curriculum for both primary and secondary education, with the number of primary subjects being reduced and with the introduction of new primary school textbooks.

3.39 In 2007, it was estimated that 8.2 million children were enrolled in primary schools. 7.4 million were in government primary schools, 300 000 more were in NFSs, a few of which were supported by FPE capitation and about 490,400 in private primary schools. It is estimated that in 2009 there will be 8.5 million in primary schools.

3.40 The GER for early childhood education in 1999 was 44%; by 2006 it had risen to 49%. Relevant KESSP indicators show that from the 2005 baseline for Primary NER of 83%, the 2006 figure was 86.5%, while Primary Completion Rate (PCR) had fallen from 77.6% in 2005 to 76.5% at the same time the pupil: teacher ratio had worsened from 43:1 in 2005 to 50:1 in 2007.[24]

3.41 In terms of progress towards EFA objectives for primary education, the 2009 Global Monitoring Report ranks Kenya in 100th place out of 129 countries on its EFA Development Index (it just reaches the "medium-EDI" category). Kenya is highlighted as one of a small number of countries (along with Ethiopia, Mozambique and Senegal) which have sharply increased the share of GNP invested in education and also seen significant declines in the numbers of out-of-school children. The GMR (Table 2.5) projects that Kenya's out-of-school population in 2015 will have declined to 859,000 from a 2004–2007 average of 1,371,000. Those not attending school are disproportionately drawn from the poorest quintiles in the population.

[23] Sessional Paper No 1 page 6.

[24] JRES Aid Memoire 2007, EMIS figures

Finance for education

Public expenditure on education

3.42 Kenya's strong domestic revenue effort has already been noted (see ¶2.26 above). In addition, GOK has allocated a large share of public expenditure to the education sector; the KESSP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) noted that government expenditure on education has been about 7% of GDP.

Ministry of Education budget

3.43 The Ministry of Education's budget has increased from KES 64.1 billion in 2002/03 to KES 106.2 billion in 2007/08 (Table E2).[25] The recurrent budget forms by far the larger component of this total: in 2002/03 to 2004/05 it comprised some 92–95% of the total budget, while since 2005/06 it has been allocated 90–91% of the budget. This slightly declining share of recurrent line items in the overall budget, and the corresponding increase in the development budget to 9–10% of the total, coincides with the introduction of KESSP in 2005/06.

Figure 3.1 Ministry of Education budget, 2002/03–2007/08



Source: 2002/03 to 2005/06 data from Ministry of Education (2007a); 2006/07 and 2007/08 data are from Ministry of Education (2008a).

3.44 The recurrent budget remains very heavily concentrated on salary costs, which are included in the budget under the sub-vote "310: Administration and planning". This sub-vote was experiencing a declining share of the budget between 2002/03 and 2005/06 but has since risen sharply, reaching some 82% of the total allocation for recurrent expenditures in 2007/08 (Figure E1 and Table E2). Approximately half of the sub-vote is allocated to salaries for primary school teachers.

3.45 Since the introduction of free primary education a further 7–9% of the recurrent budget each year has been devoted to non-salary expenditures in primary education (Table E2).

[25] Note that during this time the ministry has ceased its responsibilities for university education but has taken on responsibility for adult and continuing education, as discussed in the footnote to Table E2. Its funding has therefore changed accordingly.

Ministry of Education expenditure

3.46 The execution rate of the Ministry of Education's recurrent budget is consistently high, generally exceeding 98% (Table E3). This is in marked contrast to the execution rate of the development budget which, as mentioned in ¶2.21 above, dropped to as low as 66% in 2005/06 but has since recovered. During 2005/06 the ministry experienced delays in receipt of funds from at least two of its development partners, but also received its first tranche of funding from the FTI's Catalytic Fund. The contribution of the Catalytic Fund in filling a shortfall in funding from external donors is discussed further in Chapter 6 below.

3.47 Expenditure by the Ministry of Education has constituted between 32% and 36% of the government's total recurrent expenditure each year from 2002/03 to 2006/07 (Table E3). This figure, which excludes education expenditure by other ministries, is considerably higher than the benchmark in the FTI indicative framework which suggests that, for some successful countries, about 20% of the government's recurrent expenditure is devoted to education. This raises questions concerning the efficiency of expenditure in the education sector, as noted in the appraisal of the KESSP which observed, "additional costs will have to be financed mainly through efficiency savings since it is clear from the MTEF that the GOK has now reached a limit in terms of resource allocations to the education sector" (MOEST, 2005, p10). Future expenditure on education will also be limited by government ability to raise domestic revenue.

Financing of KESSP

3.48 Domestic resources contribute 94% of all expenditure under KESSP (Table E6). However, external partners have contributed KES 17.4 billion since July 2005. The largest share of external funding to the KESSP has come from the FTI Catalytic Fund, which has contributed 37% of total external resources into the programme (Figure 3.2 and Table E7). The next biggest contributors are DFID, with 23%, and the World Bank International Development Association (IDA), with 17%.

3.49 A joint financing agreement (JFA) was drawn up between the Government of Kenya, the World Bank and DFID in December 2005 to pool funds in support of the KESSP. Funding from the FTI Catalytic Fund goes into the pool. Since the JFA started CIDA and Unicef have also channelled some of their funding through the pool. Other development partners retain their own separate funding mechanisms.

3.50 The JFA includes a list of the subset of IPs in the KESSP that are considered by the JFA partners to be eligible to receive the pooled funding. The list is revised on a regular basis. Release of funds from the pool is dependent on the satisfactory production of quarterly financial monitoring reports (FMRs). The JFA initially expected to release funds three times a year but has since condensed disbursement into two annual tranches.

Figure 3.2 Share of external contributions to KESSP, by donor, 2005/06–2007/08 (%)



Source: Kenya MOE 2008c.

Assessment of the Financing Gap

3.51 Care is needed in discussing the education sector financing gap in Kenya (as in other countries). The financing gaps referred to the Dakar declaration and in GMRs are, broadly, the difference between current levels of expenditure on (basic) education and the levels of expenditure that would be necessary to sustain achievement of (some or all) of the EFA goals. Discussion of the financing gap in the context of KESSP has used a narrower interpretation, based on what is deemed to be **an achievable level of external funding in the near term** rather than the **desirable level of external funding in the medium-to-long term.**[26]

3.52 This is acknowledged in the KESSP Endorsement Ceremony document (7 July 2005), which states:

> There has been extensive dialogue between the Ministry and the MOF to ensure that the plans are realistic in relation to the Government's medium-term resource envelope to the sector. *The financing gap has been deliberately set at a modest level,* in view of past concerns about the predictability of external funding.
>
> No alternative financing scenarios were developed for KESSP, which would have enabled Government to present the total programme as well as the priorities within it. The single option that was prepared was *based on the premise of a desired financing gap, rather than starting from a desired programme and estimating the volume of external resources required to fund it.* (emphasis added)

3.53 At various points in this report it will be important to recall the distinction between broad and narrow concepts of the financing gap.

[26] See the FTI Mid-Term Evaluation draft *Preliminary Report,* Box 2.3.

PART C: THE FTI IN KENYA

4 Overview of the FTI in Kenya

FTI Endorsement Process

4.1 Kenya was not amongst the first countries to apply for endorsement by the FTI, and there is no mention of the country in any of the FTI documentation prior to 2005. According to the evaluation team's interviews in Kenya, high level civil servants first became aware of the FTI at the High-Level Group meeting on EFA in Brazil in late 2004.[27] However it seems clear that Kenya's application to the FTI was closely linked to the completion of the KESSP in the first half of 2005, and the understanding and knowledge of the FTI mechanisms which had been acquired by the lead donor in the sector (DFID at that time) and the World Bank lead economist for the education sector. Annex B contains a timeline setting out these events.

4.2 In March 2005, the DFID education advisor in Kenya wrote to the Education Secretary MOE updating him on the FTI process, and alerting him to a new simplified process of country endorsement.[28] Kenya would be the first country to be endorsed through this process. This letter also set out a schedule for the assessment of the KESSP and the endorsement by the development partners in country. The combination of donor support and the new guidelines shepherded Kenya through the endorsement process in a smooth and quick manner.

4.3 Following an evaluation of the KESSP, Kenya was endorsed by the FTI in July 2005 as is required by FTI protocol. When Kenya decided to apply for FTI endorsement, the process for carrying out the appraisal and endorsement had recently changed in two main respects. Firstly, countries were no longer required to submit an FTI-specific proposal, and secondly, the endorsement of the plan was to be undertaken by all the local donors in the country and not by the FTI Secretariat. The FTI appraisal therefore became an integral part of the appraisal of the KESSP itself, but emphasising its primary education components. Hence, as one experienced development partner representative put it, "You can't talk about the impact of FTI, it is all KESSP".

4.4 The first stage in the appraisal was conducted by an independent consultant on behalf of the local donors immediately before the official joint donor appraisal of the KESSP.[29] A presentation of the main findings was made on the first day of the appraisal mission to highlight some of the key concerns to be addressed during the appraisal. The FTI appraisal, therefore, represented a contribution to the final outcome of the joint appraisal mission, and the conclusions reached during the joint appraisal on the primary education components of the KESSP were deemed to have constituted the full FTI appraisal and endorsement.

4.5 In fact a proposal document seeking FTI endorsement was drafted (Kenya MOEST 2005c), but it appears that this was not required. Based almost exclusively on the KESSP document and drawing on Sessional Paper No 1, it did however include a table (ibid, pages 15–16) displaying the FTI's Indicative Framework (IF), complete with the relevant Kenya figures for the various indicators. [30] However, the evaluation team's discussions with MOE officials and donors revealed that the IF had not been used since as a measure of progress

[27] FTI files show a letter of information sent to Kenya from the FTI chairs in November 2004.

[28] Letter dated 18 March, 2005.

[29] Brown, K 2005 Appraisal of Primary Education Components of KESSP (Draft)

[30] The "Endorsement Version" of the FTI appraisal (Kenya MOEST 2005c) included a similar Indicative Framework table as an Annex.

nor as a means of generating discussion around such progress, as recommended by the FTI Framework, 2004.

4.6 A conclusion of the FTI appraisal was that:

> The extent and quality of the engagement with key stakeholders is the strongest feature of the KESSP. The process has been actively led by the Ministry with and strongly supported by the local donor community. The dialogue has been continuing for more than two years and there is clear evidence of an open and trusting relationship emerging between the Ministry and donors that will be invaluable as the plans for primary education unfold.

This included the National Conference which had brought together Parliamentarians, officials from other ministries, academics, NGOs, civil society organizations, teachers, parents, the teachers' unions, student representatives and donor agencies.

4.7 The report went on to identify the key strengths of the consultation process as follows:

> (a) the process has been led by the Ministry and as a result the KESSP is owned by the Ministry; (b) the views and opinions of key stakeholders were invited at the start of the process; (c) essential political support has been secured through the development of the Sessional Paper; (d) donors have worked together towards a common objective and in support of the Ministry; (e) both the Honourable Minister and the Permanent Secretary have been personally involved in the development of the KESSP; (f) there has been dialogue between the Ministry and the MOF to ensure that the KESSP fits within the MTEF. Taken together, these strengths constitute a solid foundation for successful implementation.

4.8 However, a few areas of concern were also highlighted. These included inadequate attention to efficiency gains, lack of alternative financing sources and of explicit links to monitoring indicators, risky and experimental programs, and the fact that training is proposed as the only solution to capacity weaknesses. To address these concerns, the FTI recommended that the GOK/ MOE should develop a Monitoring and Evaluation framework (including a comprehensive set of high level sector indicators together with joint annual sector reviews) and a Capacity Building strategy. It also proposed to address current knowledge and data gaps within KESSP.[31]

4.9 It was noted that district managers had not been actively involved in the design of KESSP and that they would need to be engaged more closely in the development of the detailed work plans "for which they bear implementation responsibility".

Catalytic Fund Grants

4.10 A financing gap of USD 22.5 million was identified (defined in the narrow sense discussed in ¶3.51–3.53 above). A Joint Financing Agreement was then agreed in September 2005 between the International Development Association (IDA), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Government of the Republic of Kenya, (GOK).

4.11 In July 2005 the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee approved an allocation of USD 22.5 million for Kenya. Following a revised assessment of the country's financing gap by the local donor group, this was increased to USD 24.2 million. A formal Letter of

[31] See Chapters 7 and 8 below for more on M&E and capacity development.

Agreement was issued by the World Bank in November 2005, for a single tranche of USD 24.2 million, which was duly disbursed on December 30, 2005.[32]

4.12 It is not clear from the documentation if it was always anticipated that Kenya would have three years of support from the FTI CF. It seems likely that the support was extended in 2006. There were no disbursements in 2006, and there was a hiatus in donor funding. Because of concerns raised about corruption, the World Bank had to bring in auditors to undertake due diligence on all current and proposed programmes, which included the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) in the education sector. Until this was completed, the education PAD could not be presented to the World Bank Board. In the mean time, DFID, which had initially intended to work in conjunction with the World Bank, decided it could not wait any longer and signed an agreement with government in early 2006, releasing the first of five tranches in February 2006. The World Bank was not in a position to present the PAD to its Board until October 2006, by which time it had negotiated a fairly tight "financing gap" with the government for inclusion in the PAD.

4.13 However, while the PAD was being presented to the Board, Kenya requested a further USD 85.4 million from the FTI CF to fill its estimated financing gap for that year. This caused considerable embarrassment to the World Bank country team, and reflected a split in the in-country donor group, who had supported the government submission. However, the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee refused to disburse such a high amount, citing concerns regarding the country's implementation capacity. Following long discussions Kenya's year 2 allocation was doubled to USD 48.4 million, payable in two tranches.

4.14 At the FTI Partnership meeting in Cairo, November 2006, it was agreed to top up the Year Three allocation to USD 48.4 million also payable in two tranches.

4.15 In the meanwhile, the FTI requested more information on the country's education indicators, service delivery targets and gender agenda. Donors also indicated that the country's projected large and fluctuating levels of unmet funding needs should be explained.

4.16 The Grant Agreement for Kenya's year 2 allocation was only signed in March 2007, a year behind schedule. The first tranche of USD 24.2 million was disbursed in May 2007.

4.17 The April 2008 Catalytic Fund Progress Report focused on the 2008 post-election crisis and how it affected the country's overall performance. As already highlighted many children were displaced and several schools were destroyed. However, the government and its partners wanted to move forward. The FTI local donor group and partners discussed the situation, deciding to restart Catalytic Fund funding with disbursement of the first instalment (USD 24.2 million) under the year 3 commitment of USD 48.4 million.

4.18 In May 2008, at the Catalytic Fund meeting, there was request for reassurance that the World Bank was following the same recommendations as agreed by the local donor group for disbursing Catalytic Fund funds.

4.19 The final disbursement of funds under the 3-year agreement took place in December 2008, and was disbursed, as required by the Catalytic Fund agreement,[33] by December 31st, though not without considerable stress to the FTI Secretariat in the MOE. The total amount

[32] Information on FTI CF disbursements can be found in the timeline contained in Annex B, and in Table 6.1 below.

[33] The evaluation team were told by MOE officials that this was a requirement, but they have not managed to identify the documentation in which this was stipulated.

disbursed to Kenya over the 2005–2009 period is currently USD 121 million. This makes Kenya the largest recipient of CF disbursements to date. No further allocations appear to be planned for Kenya to date.

4.20 The process of reapplication to the FTI CF has not progressed in a manner to enable continuity in funding. World Bank staff in-country appear to have thought that, since the KESSP would have to be revised after 2010, and since a Medium Term Review of the KESSP was due to take place in 2008, a bridging arrangement could be negotiated. It was only made clear that this would not be possible in the second half of 2008, by which time it was too late to make an application in time for the second FTI CFSC meeting of that year. The case study team was told while they were in Kenya that it was unlikely that an application meeting the new and more stringent requirements of the FTI would be possible in time for the April 2009 meeting, so that Kenya had no possibility of funding from the CF in 2009. As a result, it is unlikely that finance will be secured to cover the approved short-term spending plan of MOE.

KESSP/ FTI Financing and Monitoring Structures

4.21 There were important service delivery and financial disbursement systems and structures already in place prior to FTI endorsement, which were to have particular significance once CF support was available. The third DFID-supported Strengthening of Primary Education Project (SPRED III) was begun in 2000 and ran till 2005.[34] Under this scheme, a strong system of devolved responsibility to the school level became operational. School Management Committees (SMC) (and their sub-committees) have genuine responsibility for management decisions in provision of learning materials and for a variety of other requirements, and for incurring expenditure in respect of these. This is undertaken under two main categories, the Schools' Instructional Materials and Books Account (SIMBA) and a General Purposes Account (GPA), both of which are disbursed to School Bank Accounts on a per capita basis. For the former, the relevant committees have responsibility for choosing from a centrally determined short list a textbook title for each subject for each Grade. These are all sourced through local booksellers. The GPA works in a similar manner, with the SMC able to decide from a list of eligible expenditures ranging from security fencing and minor repairs to the salary for a guard. To increase transparency and accountability, each SMC is required to display on the exterior wall of the school notice boards which summarise the amounts of money received into the accounts, the amounts spent, and for what purposes, and the amounts retained in the accounts.

4.22 The existence of these arrangements (now operational in all 20,000 public primary schools in the country), meant that when FPE was announced, the systems that supported it were already there. When the World Bank began to provide financial support in 2003, it was able to use this existing system. This scheme was to have especial significance when it was decide to extend it nationwide, as it became a major conduit for rapid, dependable disbursement of CF funds direct to the schools' bank accounts.

4.23 The disbursement to Kenya in 2005 was the first from the Catalytic Fund, and there were no rules and regulations in place to govern how it was managed. The systems developed by the World Bank as supervising agent for the CF in Kenya became "case law" – "practice informed principles".

4.24 During the period 2005–2009 there have been three lead donors in the Education Donor Coordination Group. The first of these was DFID, who were both signed up to the JFA and financial supporters of the FTI at a global level. Unicef took over as lead donor in 2007,

[34] Two earlier phases of SPRED were implemented in the previous decade.

after committing USD 250,000 to the pooled fund, and therefore becoming a member of the JFA. However, although Unicef had a specialist education officer based in Kenya, they had less organisational experience with FTI than the previous lead donor. USAID took over as lead donor in October 2008, and now attends JFA meetings as part of lead donor responsibilities (and to represent the FTI, which, through the CF, provides half JFA funds). However USAID itself does not commingle funding and has not had previous experience of the JFA. It has been a significant learning curve for the education specialist in USAID's staff[35].

4.25 The World Bank has staff in country with experience of working with FTI, and it is a member of the JFA. However, it feels it is inappropriate for it to stand as lead donor, when it is the supervising entity for the FTI CF operation.

4.26 The management and review arrangements for KESSP have been partially implemented. KESSP envisaged an elaborate structure for coordination, implementation and accountability, including a widely representative education stakeholders' forum, a national education advisory council, a consultative GOK-Development Partners' Committee, an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Education and Training and a KESSP Steering Committee. Other entities, including Provincial and District Education Boards are also part of the system of management and oversight. In practice, several of these, notably the stakeholders' forum and the national education advisory council have not been convened. The membership of the KESSP Steering Committee has been altered so that it has become a forum for all the 23 IP Team leaders to consider relevant issues at a monthly meeting. The MOE development partners' committee has been a strong feature, with the MOE Permanent Secretary taking the chair at quarterly intervals, the remainder of the monthly meetings being chaired by the lead donor.

What is the FTI Catalytic Fund Financing?

4.27 The details of the CF financing arrangement are discussed in Chapter 6. However, it is important to note that KESSP is designed to support the education sector as a whole. Certain primary education expenditures within KESSP are attributed to the FTI CF funds, but it is accepted that funds are fungible, and therefore the FTI CF may be seen as supporting the whole range of KESSP IPs, not just the ones that are given a CF label. The KESSP IPs cover the range of EFA objectives and also aspects of secondary and tertiary education.

[35] The evaluation team requested access to minutes of the EDCG both while in Kenya and after the team's return. However these have not been forthcoming. Had access been granted, it would have allowed a greater understanding of the internal processes of the EDCG and also the workings of the annual review.

5 FTI and Education Policy and Planning

Context

5.1 The background to education policy and planning in Kenya has been described in Chapter 3. In general it can be stated that before Kenya's engagement with FTI, education policy and planning was gaining momentum following a lengthy period of political stagnation.[36] One former senior official of MOE said that before 2003, "things were really bad. Government was not committed to acting on education or anything else. In schools, books were not there. They could have classes of 40 children sharing one textbook. Without materials, learning was poor. Head teachers used this as an opportunity to solicit money from the parents, and there was no regulation…We had been seeing a deterioration in the state of education, and thought of developing a plan, had heard of FTI, but couldn't do much about a plan without political will".

5.2 The World Bank PAD for an "Education Sector Support Programme" emphasised:

> The commitment of the Government to a set of education policy goals that are well justified, support broader national development goals and provide ample justification for assistance from by external partners. During the past year, considerable analysis and dialogue have taken place on several key policy issues. These include the explicit pro-poor targeting of investments; increasing the efficiency of teacher deployment and utilization and the stabilization of the wage bill; the protection of the share of primary education in the recurrent budget; the allocation of bursaries through a transparent and explicit pro-poor system; the expansion of secondary education at a rate that is financially sustainable and does not jeopardise quality; the development of strategic plans for TIVET and university education, before considering significant expenditures in these sectors; and ensuring adequate funding for an education HIV/AIDS strategy that includes prevention, care and support for orphans and work place protection for employees. (World Bank, 2006b)

5.3 On the other hand, the World Bank PAD also raised concerns about:

> some significant weaknesses in the KESSP document, as it does not provide specific targets for all of the key policy issues, nor does it describe in sufficient detail all of the processes necessary to ensure the financial viability and strategic feasibility of the program. For several components, the justification and the level of priority for the activity are not clearly established, and the contribution to the broader program development and strategic objectives is not always clear.

5.4 One significant concern related to the very high proportional cost of teachers' salaries (some 4.3% of GDP in 2005). At the time of finalisation of the KESSP, and the endorsement of it for FTI, a study into teacher norms was ongoing. The World Bank PAD called for:

> clear and appropriate policies on teachers' staffing norms are established to assure efficiency in teacher management, utilization and performance. At the primary level, the policy should require that (i) the current total number of teachers be deployed equitably on the basis of enrolment at one teacher per 45 pupils or part thereof, (ii) the current total number of teachers remains constant, (iii) minimum enrolment requirements are set for small schools for different areas, with especially ASAL areas being allowed to have a lower minimum size requirement, and (iv) multi-grade teaching is introduced for small classes with lower enrolments, and they are staffed with teachers trained to use multi-grade teaching approach. A teacher promotion policy is also required to link promotion with performance, instead of automatic promotion of teachers to a higher grade after 5 years of service.

[36] See Chapters 2 and 3 for background.

5.5 The Aide Memoire of the October 2008 JRES noted that "the staffing norms study which was completed in 2005 has not yet been approved by Cabinet", but that "MOE is committed to following-up on this issue". The Aide Memoire concluded that "the teacher balancing study needs to be approved by the Cabinet".

5.6 It was not clear that the relevant approvals of Cabinet had been provided at the time of this FTI evaluation, but it was reported that the Teachers' Service Commission is proceeding with the teacher balancing exercise along the lines of the teacher norms study.

5.7 Amendments to some of the policies and plans envisaged by KESSP have been necessitated by the civil unrest which followed the disputed national election of December 2007.

FTI Inputs and Activities

5.8 In Kenya, FTI and KESSP are, to a considerable extent, looked upon as the same thing. KESSP, while by no means perfect, has proved a fairly comprehensive plan around which to implement a number of programmes prioritising FPE. Although it is somewhat uneven, KESSP is advancing the wider EFA goals, including Adult Basic, ECDE and non-formal education. It is difficult to identify any specific FTI input on the policy and planning side, but the objectives of the two are closely aligned.

5.9 From the donor side, again it is difficult to identify any specific contribution that FTI has made to donor input into planning. Although the policy framework has remained much as it was in 2005, there has been considerable development of the planning of some of the IPs which were addressed rather broadly in the KESSP. In particular there has been development of the post-primary sectors, and primary infrastructure.[37] This has been undertaken by the MOE, but with support from the donor coordination group, which represents all education donors, and has been able to make the case for FTI Catalytic Fund support.

5.10 Thus the FTI appears to have reinforced the KESSP process without having initiated it. Accordingly, judgements about the FTI performance largely ensue from judgements about the KESSP itself.

The relevance of FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.11 The process of developing a sector plan for education went ahead without much clarity about where the resources would come from to finance the resultant plan. A senior MOE official recalled that around that time, preceding the FTI, there were a number of meetings, organised by UNESCO. Donors had been taken to task for cumbersome procedures and because too much aid was going in technical assistance. It became understood that FTI was about how disburse funds so that there was direct utilisation with transparency. It had been agreed that countries needed to develop a sector plan with associated costing. There was already a joint review mechanism (JRM) with donors in operation, which meant that "they were all involved in running the programme; it was not just a plan but how it was implemented that was important".

5.12 From the perspective of MOE, the main role of FTI has been to provide financial, more than intellectual, support for KESSP. It seems that the Minister and senior officials were aware of the potential of FTI to provide funding, and were encouraged to pursue the

[37] FTI Country Information Form, 2007.

development of the sector plan. Throughout much of 2004, there was a twin approach of developing an understanding of what a sector-wide plan implied and at the same time creating the key elements of a plan based on SWAp principles. These processes were supported and contributed to by development partners, and continued to have significant buy-in from a range of stakeholders including and beyond the MOEST.[38]

5.13 At the same time FTI support for KESSP was relevant in terms of policy and planning because the KESSP was strongly directed towards EFA objectives and at the same time strongly reflected Kenyan policies and priorities. No plan is perfect (as the endorsement document noted) but the Kenyan plans were of a high standard, in terms of their financial realism, their whole-sector approach, with attention to the range of EFA objectives, and their inclusion of appropriate cross-cutting issues (which are further discussed in Chapter 10 below).

The effectiveness of FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.14 This study has not identified any additional FTI activities which went beyond the endorsement process itself. "Endorsement" was exactly that, sanctioning the policy development and preparatory work which had been done to bring about the KESSP. On the other hand endorsement (linked to substantial CF resources) was a valuable boost to all the actors at all levels who had worked for and supported the introduction of a five-year sector wide programme and plan for education.

5.15 Another important feature of KESSP has been the annual arrangements for review, undertaken as a Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES), normally in October-November, and a budget workshop, designed to feed into the GOK budgetary cycle, held in February-March. One donor representative suggested that there needed to be more policy dialogue at the JRES, rather than detailed discussion of IP progress. Similarly, the EDCG could usefully discuss policy more often but it tended to be burdened by detailed consideration of the JFA. A working group on planning has been agreed by MOE and EDCG but has yet to be convened. The forthcoming Mid-Term Review of KESSP will provide an opportunity to review the arrangements.

Efficiency

5.16 MOE officials were consistently clear that FTI and KESSP are inextricably related to each other. Operating through KESSP is a highly efficient approach, since it reinforces an existing policy and planning process without creating a separate one.

5.17 Moreover, KESSP is also an efficient vehicle inasmuch as it addresses the range of EFA objectives simultaneously. Thus, although CF funding is seen as providing the necessary resources for basic education, especially primary, the other EFA goals have also benefited as money was released to other IPs, e.g. adult education, NFE and ECDE. At the same time, as one MOE official put it, "all our IPs are inter-related", as large amounts of money allocated to primary have an impact related to adult illiteracy, "so it is very important we should look at all six goals, and ensure/salvage primary sector investment by supporting learning of youths, lest they lose their skills".

5.18 One former senior member of MOE staff recalled that a restructuring of departments in MOE was done to improve management, with a core group of Directors overseeing it.

[38] MOEST became MOE in 2007, following the creation of the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MOHEST).

Previously one subsector had been overemphasised at expense of another (before 2000, secondary education was emphasised more) and there was a need to balance the sub-sectors. Directors were insistent that every subsector must have some support from KESSP.

5.19 This evaluation paid attention to developments in several of the main constituent elements of EFA beyond UPC. Gender balance indicators nationally are quite good at 48/51, but not so in pastoralist communities. There are a number of new policies and plans being implemented, particularly in sub-sectors other than primary. In particular, ECDE, youth, adult and NFE all have or are finalising policies for enhanced provision. These were all foreseen in the initial KESSP planning documentation but were not prioritised in the early years of implementation, due to a shortage of funds. It is not obvious that adequate funds are now available. All of the respondents interviewed on these issues referred to serious shortages in funding for infrastructure and other facilities and for the employment of suitable staff. CF resources are now being allocated to infrastructure at primary school level, which may release funds for infrastructure more generally at district level and below.

5.20 The government's policy on the provision of education is very inclusive, as explained by one senior official, being supportive of "any group of children pursuing the formal primary education curriculum" – under a tree, in a church or mosque –they qualified for funding, so now there are about 300 additional schools, mainly in the slum areas. The capacity to expand equity and access has been greatly enhanced by CF and other external funds. Non-Formal Schools (NFS) have become very important, especially in urban slum areas. There is no policy for NFE, though one is in the final stages of preparation. Issues of registration will be captured in this policy and will therefore help with funding. The policy will put NFS on same footing as public regarding staffing and funding. In the meantime many of these schools are dilapidated and very overcrowded.

5.21 While parents still support ECDE by paying for teachers and learning materials, under KESSP 4,000 schools, initially in ASAL areas, were supported by MOE but the proposal was to reach out to more centres countrywide, especially to "pockets of poverty". Net enrolment in these areas was 35% and the intention is to increase access. All 4,000 are part of existing primary schools. A parent with a child in the ECDE section and a teacher from that section join the primary school SMC to form the Early Childhood Development Management Committee (ECDEMC).

5.22 Adult education was brought under the aegis of the MOE in April 2008 in recognition of its significance for the achievement of wider goals linked to out-of-school children, having been in the Ministry of Gender. This is going to be the first year FY 09/10 for adult education to have an allocation from the KESSP budget. New curricula will be introduced more aligned to the interests and needs of illiterate youths and adults. Adult literacy often takes place in existing schools when outside of regular school hours, so it constitutes double use of the facilities. It is not clear if CF funds can be set against the adult literacy IP.

5.23 Concerns have been expressed, including at the last JRES, that the present structure of the KESSP into 23 discrete Investment Programmes, undermines the importance of mainstreaming priorities such as work on gender and HIV/AIDS across the full programme. (See also Chapter 10 below).

Sustainability

5.24 There is a clear sense of shared ownership of KESSP plans and policies among the senior echelons of the MOE. This ownership is spread quite widely across both the central MOE and Provincial and District Education administrations, including at school level.

5.25 The annual reviews of the KESSP have consolidated this ownership and commitment and the process elements of the KESSP sector wide approach are becoming embedded. While external partners have played and continue to play a significant role in support of the agreed processes, the MOE has demonstrably taken the lead.

5.26 One risk is that after a period of stability, too rapid turnover of the MOE senior officials would undermine knowledge and expertise relating to the KESSP. Another concerns the rapid expansion of the number of Districts in Kenya, which carries the risk that too many new officials will come into post over a short period, diluting understanding and commitment to the key tenets of a sector wide approach in general and the KESSP in particular.

5.27 As noted elsewhere in this report, the sense of ownership and commitment to the education sector is not a consequence of FTI endorsement and funding and therefore is not at any great risk of being undermined by a withdrawal of FTI support. However, it would be the case that the delivery of Kenya government policies and plans would be curtailed if insufficient funds were available.

5.28 An important policy change, foreseen in the Sessional Paper No 1, has been the introduction early in 2008 of Free Secondary Education. This is putting considerable stress on the system in terms of funding, infrastructure and other physical resources, and capacity. The team was able to visit a small number of secondary schools and witness the difficulties faced by the system in responding to this new challenge. In many cases, new secondary schools have been established where there is available space within primary school compounds. In these and in established schools there are new pressing demands for infrastructure, equipment and teachers.

6 FTI and the Financing of Education

Context for FTI Financing

Funding requirements for EFA

6.1 The Kenya government's high level of revenue and education sector expenditure efforts have been described in Chapter 3 above (see ¶3.42). Although more than 90% of sector funding comes from domestic sources, external funding plays a crucial complementary role. Traditionally, external funds have been channelled through the development budget, even when some of the activities funded by aid are recurrent in nature. The main vehicle for supporting the sector is now KESSP, which follows this pattern; it has 23 "Investment Programmes" which cover the range of sector activities. As noted earlier (see Box 3.1 above) "KESSP" is used both to describe the IPs themselves, and to refer to the entire sector expenditure programme, which includes domestic funding of the recurrent budget.

6.2 The process of quantifying the financing gap for education has incited intense debate among stakeholders in Kenya. The annual financing gaps estimated in the KESSP (Table E8) represent the best estimates at the time of the difference between expected expenditure and expected revenue. (This corresponds to the narrow definition of a financing gap – see the discussion in ¶3.51–3.53 above.) However, the government acknowledges that policy developments since the KESSP was produced have had a big impact on the estimated cost of education, particularly with the introduction of free secondary education. These changes are reflected in revised costing models, the financial monitoring reports (FMRs) and the ministerial public expenditure reviews (PERs). The PAD (in its Table 5) rates "lack of efficiency and sufficiency of external support" as a substantial risk (even against the conservative estimate of the financing gap used).

Fiduciary Issues

6.3 Fiduciary concerns have been a major consideration in the design of education sector financing modalities and of the particular disbursement channels used for the FTI CF. The KESSP PAD describes in some detail what the donors' fiduciary concerns were, and how the KESSP implementation and monitoring arrangements are designed to address them. The newly elected government in 2003 had run on a strong anti-corruption platform, however "by mid-2006 there was clear consensus among Kenyans and other stakeholders that the government's efforts had not met expectations". At the same time "it was also generally recognised that progress had been uneven between sectors. Specifically, in the education sector, it was recognised that considerable achievements had been made in strengthening accountability in the primary sub-sector". The World Bank had been required to undertake a special due diligence exercise, which delayed its mobilisation of funding for KESSP (see ¶4.12 above), and this concluded that fiduciary safeguards in the education sector were reasonable. The PAD noted:

> The introduction of FPE was accompanied by significant measure to increase social accountability and improve governance at the primary level. These included the direct and efficient disbursements of funds to primary schools through the commercial banking system; the strong involvement of local communities in the innovative instructional materials program; strengthened monitoring and accounting systems; improved transparency and dissemination of information; a comprehensive consultation process with a wide range of stakeholders; and enhanced accountability, with more disciplinary actions taken against wrong-doers. The effectiveness of such measures in the primary subsector has been documented by several reviews and audits. For example, and independent public expenditure tracking survey had already been completed in 2005, concluding that "Overall, the flow of funds has been efficient, with schools receiving

funds allocated on time. Bottlenecks encountered in the flow are being addressed by MOE. At school level, funds received have been correctly recorded and used for intended purposes. A large majority of schools have put in place systems that ensure transparency and value for money" (World Bank 2006c).

Box 6.1 Estimating the Funding Gap for EFA Targets

The difficulty of estimating the level of resources required to achieve universal primary education, taking into consideration both access and quality, was characterised by one respondent as follows. Since a textbook costs an average of USD 10, and there are over 8 million children in primary school, every decision to provide a child with a single additional textbook costs an extra USD 80 million. Clearly there is room for much debate about the levels of expenditure "required" to achieve EFA targets.

The financial simulations undertaken at appraisal of KESSP had assumed continued substantial economic growth (3.5% p.a. to 2010), combined with maintaining the existing (high) shares of government budget to GDP and of education recurrent budget to the total GOK budget. The PAD noted that:

> Flexibility in education finance comes from a decline in primary school age population that will allow a reduction in the share of primary education in the total recurrent education budget (though not falling below 55% of the total), thereby simultaneously enabling a transfer of resources to secondary education over the same period. (World Bank, 2006b)

An update on sector funding prospects provided in the project information document for the next phase of WB support to KESSP:

> The financing gap for the KESSP is growing due to several reasons. First, GOK analysis of the fiscal situation in the 2009 Budget Outlook Paper portrays a less optimistic outlook for Kenya than had been assumed, in the context of the current financial crisis together with the post-election crisis of early-2007. Second, in the education sector the combination of four aspects are estimated to affect financing: (i) the absence of continued Education for All (EFA)-Fast Track Initiative (FTI) support since the funding came to an end in December 2008; (ii) the austerity measure imposed on all ministries to reduce expenditures by 10 percent in the current year; (iii) the cost increases of the KESSP inputs and activities due to a higher than expected rates of inflation; and (d) additional expenditure requirements due to: (i) the unanticipated needs of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); (ii) the introduction of the Free Secondary Day Education (FSDE) policy in 2008; (iii) the growing food and fuel prices which is leading to a scaling back on the school feeding program; and (iv) the demands from teachers for increased salaries due to a significant erosion in the purchasing power of the Shilling. (World Bank 2009b)

KESSP expenditures

6.4 Expenditure under the 23 IPs of the KESSP is made up of both recurrent and development line items (see Box 3.1 above). The middle scenario of the three cost forecasts that were prepared at the time of its development envisaged expenditure of KES 18.8 billion in 2005/06, rising to KES 24.5 billion in 2009/10 (Table E4).[39] More than one-third of this was expected to be spent directly on the instructional materials and other general expenditure at the school level.

6.5 The KESSP estimates a financing gap for each year from 2005/06 to 2009/10, representing the difference between the estimated total cost of the government's activities in the education sector and the sum of predicted funding from the Government of Kenya and external partners. The annual gap increases from KES 1.9 billion (USD 24.2 million) in 2005/06 to KES 11.5 billion (USD 144 million) in 2007/08, thereafter declining to KES 9.5 billion as the proposed investment begins to increase at a lower rate than the predicted government funding.

[39] Supporting tables are at Annex E.

6.6 Actual expenditure was substantially below the budget in 2005/06, and has increased each year since that date while remaining lower than the projected level. In 2007/08 some KES 19 billion was ascribed to the KESSP, which is equivalent to roughly twice the development budget (Table E5).

FTI Inputs and Activities

Level of inputs

6.7 The financial inputs from the CF are described in Chapter 1, ¶4.10–4.20. By November 2008 Kenya had received some 30% of all Catalytic Fund disbursements (USD 121 million of USD 396.4 million) (FTI 2008).

6.8 It is worth emphasising that throughout the evaluation team's meetings with the government the FTI's value to GOK and the education sector was seen primarily as a direct source of (CF) finance, and that this made FTI a very important multilateral initiative.

Modality

6.9 It was agreed when the first tranche from the Catalytic Fund was allocated that CF funds would enter the joint pool for funding the KESSP, and it has been allocated jointly with other pooled funds since December 2005. Box 6.2 gives the rationale for the modality adopted.

Box 6.2 The (IDA and) Catalytic Fund Modality Adopted

The Catalytic Fund modality echoed IDA's. The KESSP PAD describes the rationale for the modality adopted as follows:

> In considering the appropriate design for supporting the KESSP, various options were considered besides the proposed Sector Investment Credit. One option, instead of an SIC would have been a Development Policy credit with untied budget support. However, it was felt that that option will not presently be appropriate for the education sector in Kenya as: (i) there are still some significant concerns about capacity for governance and financial management in the sector; and (ii) the MOE and MOST still need some intensive assistance and capacity building including in the design of specific programs. On the other hand, it was also felt important to move forward from a "conventional" approach, in which disbursements will be just for discrete works, goods and services on a transactional basis. The instructional materials component of the FPESP has already shown that a broader approach could be adopted successfully, and that there is need to move to a broader programme-based approach which is more efficient and suitable for scaling up investments in the sector. The largely positive experience with both SPRED and the FPESP in building capacity for local management and accountability, including resource transfers via the MOE, have also encouraged development partners to move away from the direct control of projects, increasing Government ownership.

6.10 Disbursements are made against actual, incurred eligible expenditures, based on quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs)

6.11 The bulk of CF funding has been disbursed against transfers to school bank accounts (see Table 6.1 below). CF funds come into Kenya via the Ministry of Finance. Once they are transferred to MOE, the funds are then transferred to individual school bank accounts. Once this transfer is made, the funds can be regarded as disbursed. This process was in place prior to FTI endorsement, but has been a key element in reporting against CF disbursement.

6.12 Similarly, FTI (and the CF) has not substantially affected the monitoring and reporting of KESSP financing (see also Chapter 7 below), because a system was already established when Kenya received FTI endorsement. The release of each tranche of Catalytic Fund resources is dependent on the approval of the first- and third-quarter FMRs, as well as on the submission of an implementation progress report on the previous tranche. This matches the procedure for other funds in the pool including those of the World Bank and DFID. At least 50% of funds from each development partner in the pool are expected to be released in July, at the start of the financial year, after the approval of the FMR for January to March, while a second tranche is expected to be disbursed in November, after the approval of the FMR for July to September. So the addition of the CF into the pooled fund has not altered the existing funding arrangements.

6.13 However, each year the funds from each of the development partners, including the CF, are notionally divided up among the IPs that have been agreed on by the members of the JFA as being "eligible expenditure categories" for the year. This means that for reporting purposes it is possible to ascribe certain activities to the CF, though in practice the funds are fungible. The notional allocation marks the CFI expenditure mainly against IPs for primary education because the CF funds are intended principally to support universal primary education. Linking CF funding mainly to the transfers to school bank accounts has two further advantages: it enables very rapid disbursement (see next paragraph), and it provides assurance that this element of KESSP will be fully funded in a timely manner.

6.14 In the years when there have been disbursements against the Catalytic Fund the money has been ascribed to the components of the KESSP which provide payments directly into primary school bank accounts (Table 6.1). These activities are directly linked in the FMRs and the FTI implementation reports to the achievement of EFA goals and the targets of the Sessional Paper no. 1 of 2005 as well as the KESSP.

Table 6.1 Notional use of FTI Catalytic Fund resources

FTI tranche	GOK Financial year	Date disbursed	Amount (USD)	Amount (KES)	Use
Year 1	2005/06	30 Dec 2005	USD24.2 m	1.755 billion	SIMBA (part of the KES 2.578 billion of capitation grants)
Year 2 Tranche 1	2006/07	30 May 2007	USD23.7 m	1.582 billion	SIMBA (part of the KES 3.311 billion tranche of capitation grants)
Year 2 Tranche 2	2007/08	30 Nov 2007	USD24.2 m	1.542 billion	SIMBA, ECDE Community Support Grant, Primary School Infrastructure, Special Needs Education, HIV/AIDS
Year 3 Tranche 1	2007/08	06 Jun 2008	USD24.2 m	1.552 billion	SIMBA, ECDE Community Support Grant, Primary School Infrastructure, Special Needs Education, HIV/AIDS
Year 3 Tranche 2	2008/09	10 Dec 2008	USD24.0 m	1.901 billion	School-level bank accounts

Source: Disbursement dates and sums are from data provided by the External Resources Department, Ministry of Education. Details of use are from World Bank (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). A formal report on expenditure under the most recent tranche was not published at the time of the visit.

The relevance of FTI to education financing in Kenya

6.15 The provision of resources from the Catalytic Fund is one of the most widely recognised contributions of the FTI in Kenya. The Catalytic Fund has contributed the largest share of resources to the pooled fund, and has been the single largest external contributor to the KESSP in each of its three years of operation to date. By the end of 2007/08 funding from the Catalytic Fund to Kenya totalled KES 6.4 billion (Table E6); in 2008/09 it has disbursed a further KES 1.9 billion.

6.16 Although these resources, together with those of other development partners, are small relative to the total funding provided by the Government of Kenya itself, the Ministry of Education emphasises that these contributions form a large share of overall non-salary expenditure which is necessary for providing infrastructure, instructional materials, equipment and school feeding.

6.17 Since the resources from the Catalytic Fund are absorbed into a pool it is not possible to track the funds separately from other pooled resources.[40] This improves flexibility and increases the possibility for the government to assign expenditure in accordance with its priorities.

6.18 In this way the expenditure of the CF funds may be considered to be relevant to the objectives of the FTI as well as to the objectives of the government. The government has signalled its own emphasis on primary education in its forecast of expenditure under the KESSP, in which the primary subsector is allocated the largest proportion of the resources (Table E4). In absolute terms, development funds into the primary sector were forecast to increase considerably in the immediate years after the establishment of KESSP, and fall somewhat towards the end of the five year period. This was the result of a considerable increase in funds to improve infrastructure.[41]

6.19 The fungibility of funds in the pool means that the notional allocation of the FTI Catalytic Fund to primary education IPs – and, latterly, to ECDE – has enabled the government to free up a portion of its own resources in those areas and channel them to other priority IPs such as for free secondary education. It also means that the Catalytic Fund can be seen to be contributing indirectly to many of the wider EFA goals, not just the goal of access to primary education. (However, it was reported that the broad nature of the KESSP pool funding could be a disincentive to some aid agencies which would want their funds more narrowly targeted towards primary education.)

6.20 Kenya is not reported to have received any direct funding under the FTI's other main fund, the EPDF. However, some members of staff of the Ministry of Education have been able to attend events that were funded by this source without being aware that the money comes from this particular fund. It is possible that the lack of direct funding from the EPDF in Kenya arises not because it is irrelevant to the country's needs but rather because of the limited awareness of its availability. The EPDF is discussed more in Chapter 8 below.

[40] Lavergne and Alba 2003 note that "When funds are fully pooled, as often happens, direct attribution becomes impossible".

[41] The evaluation team would have liked to have been able to compare forecasted fund allocation with outcomes, but the reporting format within the MOE makes that difficult (see Table D2).

The effectiveness of FTI's contribution to financing[42]

6.21 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of (a) whether FTI has increased the funding for UPE (directly or indirectly); (b) whether FTI funds, including the CF, have reached the intended beneficiaries; and (c) whether, if so, they have then been used effectively.

Increased funding

6.22 The first tranche of Catalytic Fund disbursements to Kenya exactly matched the financing gap estimated for that financial year in the KESSP (USD 24.2 million). Since then each tranche has been pegged at the same level. In 2007 and 2008 the Fund disbursed two tranches per year rather than one, i.e. an annual disbursement of USD 48.4 million. This appears to be a compromise between the amount disbursed in the first year and the estimated financing gap recorded in the KESSP for 2006/07, which exceeded USD 85 million.

6.23 Given the scale of FTI CF support for KESSP, it seems unlikely that the same level of external funding would have been reached without the direct funding through FTI.

6.24 However, during the evaluation team's discussions with government and development partners it was not apparent that the FTI Catalytic Fund had catalysed additional funding for education either domestically or among partner countries and agencies. This may be an issue of timing. A possible explanation is that the impetus for increased investment in education had already occurred with the election of President Kibaki and the initiation of free primary education in 2003; it was this that acted as a catalyst for resource inflows, not the formulation of the KESSP and the FTI endorsement two years later. With the KESSP already in place, and negotiations regarding the pooled fund already under way, the Catalytic Fund was able to add to total resources but did not boost the inputs of other partners.

6.25 As noted, there is very little scope for increasing domestic expenditures, except to the extent that economic growth expands the revenue base. While the availability of Catalytic Fund resources has been a great boost to the KESSP and has contributed to the substantial increase in the size of the development budget for education since 2005/06, it has not had a noticeable impact on the government's decision on the allocation of resources to non-salary recurrent spending. Recurrent expenditure remains very high and is constrained by the high share of salaries in the overall budget. It is likely that recurrent expenditure on salaries will continue to rise because in 2007 the government lifted the cap on the total number of teachers, which had been restricted to 235,000 since 1998. An additional 22,000 teachers are due to be recruited by 2010, and there are calls for 38,000 more to meet the demands arising from the increased enrolment after the introduction of free primary and secondary day education.

Reaching beneficiaries

6.26 In many countries, particularly with the well-publicised problems of corruption that Kenya has faced, disbursements of grant funds directly to schools would be regarded as unduly risky. However separate mechanisms exist to maximise the possibility of funds being spent as intended at the school level: these include the establishment of a school management committee, the training of headteachers in planning and procurement, the submission of school budgets to the district education office for review, and the use of

[42] Although this section addresses all FTI financing, there does not appear to have been any financing from the EPDF, so the focus is on CF resources.

inspection and audit processes. The Ministry of Education acknowledges that while it is never possible to eliminate entirely the possibility of malpractice, "the risks are spread".

Effective use of funds

6.27 The easy absorption of funding into primary schools in Kenya, using the system of school bank accounts has been hailed as an example of international best practice. The evidence so far is that schools make good use of the funds to increase the availability of learning materials.[43] The choice of modality for disbursing CF resources at local level has reinforced the ability of schools to allocate their resources within the overall guidelines set by MOE to developing needs and thereby relax constraints on achieving quality primary education, particularly in terms of teaching materials[44].

FTI's contribution to the efficiency of resource mobilisation and use

6.28 FTI's contribution to efficiency can be considered at different levels:

- The SWAp and the pooled funding used to support KESSP are highly efficient processes for providing external support to the sector.
- The first disbursement of CF funding, in 2005, was able to fill a gap at a time when other donors were unable to release the funds they had pledged within the expected timeframe, in the very early stages of the JFA.
- The disbursement mechanisms for the CF component have also been rather efficient. In particular funding to school bank accounts allows very rapid disbursement of CF funds, as well as supporting key components of sector expenditure.

6.29 The existence of bank accounts in every primary school has greatly facilitated the speed and ease with which the resources from the FTI Catalytic Fund have been disbursed to assist service delivery in Kenya. The Ministry of Education reports that, once the necessary government procedures have been met, the funds can be transferred from the central bank directly to the schools within 48 hours. The system of school bank accounts was already established at the time of the introduction of free primary education in 2003 so the CF has not created a new system but has made effective use of an existing disbursement mechanism

6.30 It has been agreed that CF funds can be considered to have been disbursed, and therefore reported on, at the point when the funds have been released to the schools, rather than the point when schools have spent and accounted for all the funds. This, too, has improved the efficiency of the disbursement of the Catalytic Fund because it is not necessary to wait to receive reports from all 18,000 primary schools on the way in which funds have been spent.

6.31 Several respondents consider that the possibility of fast disbursement has been vital to Kenya's ability to receive successive tranches of funding from the Catalytic Fund. It was reported on many occasions that any resources from the Catalytic Fund that are not disbursed by the end of the calendar year may be lost, regardless of when they are made available to the government. The evaluation team was unable to substantiate this finding

[43] The completion report on the WB Free Primary Education Support Project noted that "the implementation of the instructional materials component through disbursement of school grants was extremely effective and efficient" as evidenced by findings of the 2005 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey. (World Bank 2007e p5)

[44] Though constraints in terms of teacher numbers and capacity can only be addressed more centrally.

since neither the grant agreement nor the JFA make reference to such a time limit (GOK, World Bank and DFID 2005, and World Bank 2005) allocation of CF funding to KESSP IPs and on the transaction costs of administering the resources.[45]

6.32 The overall efficiency of CF support was somewhat reduced by the start-up delays described in Chapter 1, and the continuity and predictability of CF support was undermined by the misunderstanding over procedures for securing the next round of CF support. Like other donors, the CF programmes its funds on a relatively short-term basis, and the GOK does not have assured multi-year funding for the education sector.

Sustainability

6.33 The first disbursement of CF funding, in 2005, was able to fill a gap at a time when other donors were unable to release the funds they had pledged within the expected timeframe, in the very early stages of the JFA. Since then the JFA procedures have become more firmly established. The fact that FTI relies on the same reporting mechanisms as other donors in the pooled fund means that, on occasion, an obstacle which impedes release of funds by one donor may impede the release of funds by several others, including the CF. There is a risk that this has negative consequences for the predictability of funding. For example, the first round of donor funding for the financial year 2008/09, which was due to be released in July 2008, was delayed by several months owing to incomplete discussions on donor allocations during the budget review in March; this affected the CF's disbursement as one of the members of the pooled fund. It is not intended to imply, however, that the pooled funding mechanism is inappropriate for CF funds. Indeed, the existence of the CF in the pool was widely viewed in a positive light.

6.34 Perversely, the ending of the inflow of resources from the Catalytic Fund which has supported the KESSP for three of the last four years has itself created a shortfall in funding. The budget for 2008/09 was drawn up on the expectation that the country would be re-endorsed quickly and that another tranche of funding amounting to USD 24.2 million would be available during the period January–June 2009. It is now apparent that this funding will not be available in time. There is therefore perceived to be a "financing gap" for the present financial year caused by the cessation of FTI Catalytic Fund contributions—the opposite effect to that which was intended by the FTI.

6.35 The government will carry out a re-budget to shift resources into the priority areas which had been earmarked for CF support during the remainder of this financial year. The re-budget has not yet taken place. One bilateral donor indicated that it may be able to secure about USD 2.5 million in additional resources to contribute to the pooled fund in the meantime but this is not certain.

6.36 As noted in Box 6.1 above, Kenya will have a continuing, and probably growing, need for external support to basic education in the coming years. In order to reapply for CF funding for the next three years Kenya is expected to have a sector plan and costings in place; but the KESSP is written for 2005–10. The Ministry of Education, together with development partners, is now beginning the process of developing the second phase of KESSP, to cover the period 2011–15. This is being undertaken a year earlier than it might have been, so as to speed up the country's ability to apply for more funds. This suggests that transaction costs could be reduced by realigning the period for which a country is eligible for CF funding to match the duration of the approved sector plan.

[45] The most recent tranche of funding, in December 2008, was reported by the Ministry of Education to have become ready to disburse two days before the banks closed for the Christmas and New Year break.

7 FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

Context

7.1 In Kenya, both KESSP and the IP-ERS were in place with their own M&E systems when Kenya was endorsed by FTI. These systems are discussed in conjunction with the review of FTI inputs and activities.

7.2 Within the KESSP there are two cross-cutting IPs that focus on data issues. The Education Management Information System (EMIS) IP aims to collect, process, analyse and disseminate routine administrative data on education, eliminating duplication from other sources and bringing together district-level information. The M&E IP aims to provide a baseline dataset for the KESSP, carry out cross-checks on EMIS information through field visits, and conduct additional research such as using qualitative surveys to provide a comprehensive monitoring system for progress towards KESSP objectives.

7.3 Both these IPs were defined as "eligible expenditure categories" under the JFA and could therefore be assigned funds from the pool. To date neither IP has been notionally allocated funds from the FTI Catalytic Fund.

FTI Inputs and Activities

7.4 The FTI Framework and Appraisal Guidelines envisage that the FTI can contribute to M&E processes by drawing together the available indicators and highlighting areas for improvement in terms of data accuracy and comprehensiveness at the time of appraising a country's sector plan. The intention is that issues raised in the appraisal may be followed up by all development partners during the implementation of the plan.

7.5 In Kenya, however, a plan for improving M&E was already in place and incorporated into the KESSP at the time the country sector plan was appraised and received endorsement. The appraisal document notes that, "The framework for the monitoring and evaluation process is being developed as part of the KESSP and includes a comprehensive set of high level sector indicators together with joint annual sector reviews" (Kenya MOEST 2005c, p3). It also refers to the need to strengthen the EMIS and suggests that the EMIS data should be supplemented by field visits and cross-checking, a point which it acknowledges is already recognised in the KESSP. The FTI is therefore closely aligned with Kenya's own plans in terms of its emphasis on the importance of robust data, but the well developed thinking in this area meant that the endorsement process was not in a position to add a significant new contribution to the debate.

7.6 **The KESSP results framework and the FTI indicative framework.** The FTI indicative framework, summarised in the annex to the Initiative's overall framework (FTI 2004a), contains some overlap with the KESSP results framework that is outlined in the World Bank Project Appraisal Document for the KESSP (and reproduced as Annex F to the present report). Both propose monitoring progress in education using indicators such as the share of the government's budget that is devoted to education, the primary completion rate and the pupil–teacher ratio. These are the standard indicators that are widely used in monitoring education policy, e.g. in the UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Reports.

7.7 However, the link between the KESSP results framework and the FTI indicative Framework is not made explicit. The benchmarks in the Indicative Framework are not reflected in the KESSP (this is as it should be: the FTI stresses that the framework was intended to be adapted locally). For instance, the KESSP proposes to spend at least 15% of the recurrent budget for primary education on non-salary expenditures, while the Indicative Framework suggests that some successful countries spend an average of 33% on non-salary items.

7.8 The KESSP contains some extra indicators at the primary level which are particularly relevant to the Kenyan context, such as the pupil-textbook ratio and a measure of teaching quality relating to average examination scores in the periodic National Survey of Learning Achievement. It does not include the indicators from the FTI Indicative Framework which relate to the average annual salary of primary school teachers or the number of teachers recruited, both of which are contentious issues in the education sector in Kenya. The KESSP results framework additionally contains several objectives related to non-primary education, such as the transition rate to secondary, and the development of strategies for secondary, technical and university education.

The relevance of FTI to M&E in education

7.9 The demand for accurate and comprehensive data for planning, budgeting and monitoring in the education sector was repeatedly emphasised by government staff at central and district levels as well as by other stakeholders. Procedures have been developed to respond to this demand. The KESSP is accompanied by numerous instruments for monitoring progress in the sector. These include the two annual joint sector reviews (the JRES in October, and the joint budget review in March); 23 logframes, one for each IP; a results framework, outlined in the World Bank Project Appraisal Document for the KESSP (see Annex F); the quarterly FMRs; and an annual Country Information Form to the World Bank. Additionally, the Central Planning and Project Monitoring Unit, a team seconded from the Ministry of Planning to the Ministry of Education, submits an annual progress report on the education sector to the Government of Kenya's National Integrated M&E System (NIMES).

7.10 The Ministry of Education's EMIS unit is aware of the FTI Indicative Framework and reports having adjusted the definition of one of its indicators, the primary completion rate, to match the FTI definition which is also that used more widely by UNESCO.[46] It cites several other sources of indicators which it uses to monitor Kenya's progress in comparison to its regional neighbours. These include the EFA Global Monitoring Report statistics and the results of the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring of Educational Quality (SACMEQ) pupil tests.

7.11 The evaluation team considers that with respect to the development of quantifiable indicators, as with the identification of data needs and capacity development in monitoring, the FTI is in keeping with parts of the KESSP and also with the broader M&E system of the Ministry of Education, but the Indicative Framework was not directly relevant to the agreement of the KESSP results framework because discussions on the latter were already in progress at the time of the FTI appraisal.

Effectiveness of the FTI in improving M&E

7.12 This section first discusses whether the FTI has been effective in bringing to light concerns regarding data which have subsequently been addressed by the government and development partners. It then reviews whether FTI has had an effect in encouraging the use and analysis of data.

[46] Previously the Ministry of Education calculated the primary completion rate as a survival rate, i.e. the proportion of entrants in Standard 1 who reach Standard 8.

7.13 **Rationalisation of indicators.** The first observation of the FTI appraisal is that whilst a lot of attention has been paid to the development of logframes they are sometimes "obscured by too much detail" and there can be a mismatch between the logframe and the narrative which should be rectified. During the evaluation respondents did not refer to any revision to the logframes and the team is not aware that such a revision has yet taken place. The FMRs continue to document progress separately for each IP. For some IPs the "Outline of achievements against planned performance" in the FMR reflects the logframe in the KESSP (or the components listed in the text of the KESSP, where these differ) while for other IPs they include different or additional activities. The JRES aide-memoire of 2006 reaffirms the need to report on progress against the logframe.

7.14 Some participants in the JRESs remarked that measuring progress against a set of indicators is challenging when a single quantifiable set of common targets is not in use for reporting and planning purposes. A performance review of KESSP in August 2007 proposed the use of an "IP component performance monitoring table" which, "assesses the IP goal against component objectives, targets, measurable performance indicators, and performance achievements". The first round of that exercise was conducted at the time but its subsequent use is not apparent.

7.15 **Development of the EMIS at national and decentralised levels.** The further development of the EMIS remains a critical issue for the government and development partners. Every JRES reaffirms the need for more staff in the EMIS unit and urges a strengthening of the system. The KESSP performance review recognises that some limited progress has been made in improving the EMIS system even though there is a considerable shortage of staff to take forward the implementation. The collection of data for the EMIS now faces a double constraint because the decision to decentralise data collection to the district level, which requires training of staff in every district, occurred at the same time that several dozen new districts were created which do not yet have enough staff to carry out their full range of tasks (of which managing data is just one). There is a risk that the quality and comprehensiveness of data may suffer during this period of adjustment.

7.16 **Use and analysis of data.** The Ministry of Education reports using FMRs and the annual ministerial PERs in its planning processes. The FMRs were cited by one member of staff as "one of the best tools" for ministry planning, though the respondent observed that people use them to varying extents and that it can be a challenge to carry out the full exercise. The fact that two of the four quarterly FMRs are triggers to release payments from the pooled fund, including for FTI Catalytic Fund resources, is an incentive for prompt and accurate submission of the reports. However, the quarterly reports submitted by the Central Planning and Project Monitoring Unit to NIMES are compiled separately from the FMRs although they contain some of the same content.

7.17 Reports other than the FMRs and MPERs are not known to be actively used in planning and budgeting processes. The Country Information Form for the World Bank reports on many of the FTI indicative framework indicators, but payments are not dependent upon the observed results. The progress reports that are submitted to NIMES tend to make use of the EMIS for the annual report, which includes more detailed information on attainment of education targets, than the quarterly reports which have a stronger emphasis on financial information.

Efficiency of resource use in M&E

7.18 The KESSP approach, whereby, as far as possible, all partners use a common system of monitoring and reporting, is in principle an efficient one. Although the activities required to improve M&E in the education sector have been clearly stated in many reports it remains a challenge to disburse funds in this area. The EMIS and M&E IPs respectively have a 0.5% and 0.2% share of the planned total expenditure of the 23 IPs in the KESSP (KES 518.7 million and KES 183.3 million). As of the end of the financial year in June 2008, after three years of implementation of the KESSP, the M&E IP still had 98% of its planned expenditure remaining; it had spent only 13% of the amount it had expected to spend by that date. This is by some margin the lowest execution rate of all IPs. The EMIS IP has a much higher execution rate, though it is still not spending at the rate forecast: as of June 2008 it had spent 72% of the amount expected by that date, and 37% of its overall budget.

7.19 Whilst the FTI CF was not expected to contribute directly to the costs of funding M&E activities there is not evidence that, in the time since the KESSP has received FTI endorsement, there has been a significant change in the capacity to monitor progress in the education sector, or in the prioritisation of M&E in the national development plans.

7.20 The decentralisation in data collection systems is too recent to allow for an assessment of the efficiency implications. There are some indications that this could lead to greater coordination in terms of a unified data collection system. However, the evaluation team is very aware that data systems have to be assessed in terms of both collection and use. The investment necessary in capacity development to ensure that data are used effectively at both district and central level does not appear to be addressed at present in the planning process.

Sustainability

7.21 The re-application for FTI CF has created the drive for the Ministry of Education to conduct a range of new analytical activities including the re-costing of the KESSP. The process of reviewing the KESSP may offer an opportunity to rationalise some of the indicators to streamline future monitoring requirements. As KESSP continues, the data systems and requirements associated with it should become increasingly embedded in the way GOK works.

7.22 One issue that has not yet been resolved is the collection of data and the monitoring of progress from schools other than publicly financed schools, and from authorities other than the central government. Senior education staff at sub-national levels are employed on performance-based contracts which include targets such as for enrolment. But the official figures in the EMIS do not yet count enrolment in private or non-formal schools towards the achievement of universal primary education, even though pupils in such schools are often following the national curriculum and taking the same exams as pupils in public schools. The FTI Indicative Framework does not include guidance as to whether its benchmarks refer only to public primary schools, except in a few indicators. Moreover there is limited reporting on the use of funds such as the CDF and the LATF. Until recently data were also collected by other agencies such as the TSC, though starting this year their data will be collected at the district level alongside other EMIS data to improve coordination.

8 FTI and Capacity Development

Context

Initiatives before 2003

8.1 It is difficult to identify much activity in capacity development to manage the education sector in the period leading up to the change of government in 2002. Before 2002 there was generally a lack of sufficient financial resources to do much development work, and there can have been few opportunities to develop expertise in policy and planning.

8.2 However, there were a number of significant activities which aimed at training key members of the education workforce. The DFID "Strengthening Primary Education" (SPRED) project was active from 1991–1996, attempting to raise the quality of teaching and learning in key subjects (Mathematics, Science and English) through in-service teacher training. This was delivered through a national network of Teachers Advisory Centres (TACs), using TAC Tutors, and by improving links between in-service and pre-service training. A follow on SPRED II from 1997 and a final SPRED III from 2000–2005, each built upon and applied lessons learned from the previous phase. From 1996–2000, the Primary Schools Management Project (PRISM) built capacity among a sizeable proportion of the country's primary head teachers.

8.3 From 2001–2004 the MOEST Inset unit ran a successful programme called the School-based Teacher Development programme (SbTD), a component of the SPRED II Project. The aims of the SbTD programme were primarily to "improve the quality and cost effectiveness of teaching and learning in primary schools on an equitable basis".[47] This was to be achieved through "teachers using new skills that promote active learning and through the use of new textbooks". The intention was to improve the teaching and learning environment in all public schools in the country.

8.4 In response to the special challenges of the FPE programme introduced in January 2003, the government decided to extend the SbTD programme to train an additional 36,000 Key Resource Teachers (KRTs) – 18,000 Kiswahili KRTs and 18,000 Guidance and Counselling KRTs (one each in every school in the country). Working with development partners, the School Empowerment Programme (SEP) was designed and developed. An Impact Evaluation of the Phase II SbTD school-based INSET programmes (Kiswahili and Guidance and Counselling Modules) will be conducted soon.

8.5 In addition to the SbTD and School Empowerment INSET programmes, a number of NGOs also provided teacher in-service training. Two of the best known examples were Unicef delivering training on a "Stimulating Classroom Strategy", and the Aga Khan Foundation's Kenya School Improvement Project (KENSIP), with funding assistance from CIDA.

Pre-endorsement capacity building for planning and implementation – central

8.6 From 2003 onwards, there was a new air of optimism and commitment, and a strong and positive response from government Ministers, officials and a wider group of stakeholders to the challenge of devising a new policy framework for education, leading to Sessional Paper No 1 and the KESSP, in 2004–2005.[48] It was important that one

[47] Kenya MOEST 2005d

[48] Sessional Paper No 1 was adopted by the Cabinet in late 2004 and was formally passed by Parliament in January 2005.

Permanent Secretary has been in position to guide the process from that time to the present. Also in post from 2003 to the present was the Education Secretary, the next most senior MOE official, whose function was to lead the technical and professional services of the ministry. The then Director of Policy and Planning (retired since 2008) had been a key contributor to SPRED and PRISM and was therefore in a good position to lead planning of the KESSP[49]. Also, a senior management team of Directors within the MOE, restructured to meet the new needs of the KESSP, remained largely intact till the end of 2007.

8.7 The sector was also well served by committed individuals on the development partner side, especially by a series of experienced education advisers in DFID since the 1990s and from 2003 a very active World Bank Task Team Leader. A number of other representatives of the development partners also provided valuable assistance throughout the period.

8.8 Therefore, while capacity was not strong in any absolute sense, the ministry, assisted by several capable external consultants and development partners, were able to develop a SWAp and produce a KESSP of sufficient quality to meet the criteria for FTI endorsement.

8.9 The report of the external assessor for the FTI endorsement process made a number of important observations in relation to institutional capacity. It noted that the Ministry had already embarked on a short-term capacity building programme to develop the managerial skills of key personnel and that a focal point has been established within the Policy and Planning Directorate to coordinate the short- and medium-term programme, This was deemed essential in view of the fact that capacity building activities were planned in many of the discrete IPs.

8.10 The report also found that attention was also being paid to establishing effective management structures for the KESSP and strengthening organisation-wide systems such as EMIS and ICT.

Pre-endorsement capacity building for planning and implementation – decentralised

8.11 At the same time, however, there were capacity weaknesses across the system. The capacity built at a senior level in the ministry was not replicated at other levels. From the time PRISM ended in 2000, there was minimal training made available to head teachers. The introduction of the school bank accounts meant that huge numbers of heads and School Management Committee members needed training for their new roles as managers and decision makers in respect of allocation of finance through the SIMBA and GPA funding mechanisms. Decentralisation of administrative functions to the District level also created a need for training for new managers and administrators in a wide range of competences, both in planning and implementation.

8.12 The external assessment found that the main emphasis was being placed on training, extending to District Education Boards and District Education Officers, although not to the exclusion of other interventions.

8.13 The Ministry recognised clearly that the development of relevant capacity would be a continuous process throughout the implementation of the KESSP. In this context, the Ministry was aware of a number of gaps that would need to be addressed and the external

[49] It is noteworthy that key senior staff remained in position for all of the crucial period from the beginning of the NARC government in 2003 to 2008, when the KESSP was well established.

assessment identified as the most critical concern the development of a holistic design for the decentralisation of services to the district level and below.

8.14 Another concern of the external assessor was that KESSP specified teachers as the main target for building capacity and referred to the development of relevant policies and processes for recruitment, promotion, transfers and absence management, and pointed out that fundamental issues in relation to teacher norms needed to be addressed.

8.15 The report also stressed the risk that too much reliance was being placed in training as a solution and advocated a holistic approach to capacity building in key entities, e.g. Ministry headquarters, District Education Offices, School Management Committees. This would require a review of management structures, staffing requirements and workloads, relevant organizational processes, as well as skill needs.

Inputs and Activities

8.16 The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) has been the "flagship" for direct FTI support to capacity development. However, it appears that, in Kenya, no-one outside of the World Bank and possibly one or two donors had any knowledge of the existence of the EPDF. Since FTI endorsement MOE staff had participated in a number of events which probably were EPDF funded, but invariably these were identified as World Bank activities. They included study visits to Thailand and other Asian countries, participation in an ADEA conference on secondary education, held in Mozambique, and in an FTI workshop in Uganda. In the latter, representatives from the KESSP Secretariat had made a presentation on the Kenya experiences with the SWAp-based KESSP and FTI.

8.17 Accordingly, FTI's main inputs to capacity development in Kenya should be seen as those embodied in the design and implementation of KESSP, which was the channel for FTI's substantial support through the Catalytic Fund. Capacity building has been included in KESSP as a separate IP (though this is not one of the IPs which the CF has notionally financed) and also mainstreamed across all IPs.

Relevance

8.18 The KESSP approach is to work holistically with a government-owned sector plan and to operate as far as possible through government systems, seeking to use and to strengthen them simultaneously. This is a highly relevant approach to capacity development, and one that fits well with the goals and principles of FTI. However, FTI may have missed an opportunity to engage more systematically in efforts to build capacity in education management and policy and planning (areas which had had little emphasis).

8.19 With regard to the EPDF inputs, it was not clear what the benefits of the study visit to Thailand and other Asian countries were, nor that they related to FTI as such. The FTI workshop in Uganda did deepen the understanding of senior MOE officials in matters related to FTI and SWAps. It also gave the opportunity for these officials to consolidate their own understanding of FTI and SWAp processes through the preparation and presentation of their experiences to the other participants.

Effectiveness

Post-endorsement capacity building for planning and implementation – central

8.20 It is not clear that engagement in the FTI has brought about the desired improvements in harmonisation of approach to capacity building or supported it in areas which need to be prioritised for the attainment of UPC. However, there are some signs of improvement in these respects.

8.21 Historically, because of IMF conditionality, public sector employment was frozen in 1997, as part of SAP. A senior MOE official identified this blockage as a reason for problems in succession planning, with lack of institutional memory becoming a challenge. Indeed the strength gained though a stable senior management team may have turned into a weakness when a significant proportion retired or moved to other posts in 2007–2008. Staff recruitment has opened up again, and the MOE is recruiting additional staff, mainly from the teaching profession, but "it takes time for them to become used to systems".

8.22 One of the concerns which has not yet been adequately addressed is the lack of synergy across the various providers of capacity building. In KESSP there is an IP for capacity building, but most of the other IPs have also identified components of capacity building within them. It was reported that "One of the challenges is the need to plan so as to avoid duplication, different groups wanting to train heads on different aspects." Another interviewee commented that "in capacity building there are competing and multiple trainings".

8.23 The key institution responsible for education management training at central and decentralised levels is the Kenya Education Staff Institute (KESI), It was reported to have not functioned well for several years. However, there were optimistic responses to the fact that it has a new Director, has moved to its own premises and is beginning to build up its staff and other resources.

8.24 Several attempts have been made to develop a coherent plan for capacity building but none of these have been fully adopted. In mid 2005, a KESSP Implementation and Capacity Development Plan was drafted. This had well developed sections identifying requirements for Operationalising the KESSP Coordination, Implementation and Accountability Structure, Head Office organizational Reforms, Capacity Management training, Research and Pilot Studies, and TA. However, little of this plan was implemented.

8.25 A little over a year later, an Annual KESSP Technical Assistance Plan for FY 2006/07 (Kenya MOE 2006a) was produced for the annual JRES, but it was reported to be little more than a wish list of TA requirements for each of the IPs, to be sourced without reference to possible duplication, overlap or on the other hand potential synergy of posts. The plan also referred to preliminary discussions among the donors concerning the establishment of a TA Pooled Fund, indeed this was one of the elements agreed in the Partnership Principles of 2005 (Kenya MOEST 2005f) but it is understood that neither the TA plan nor the pooling arrangement was ever finalised. In 2006 a draft plan was drawn up for the appointment of a Technical Assistance Management Agent (TAMA).

8.26 In the meantime, both pooling and non-pooling donors provide a mix of capacity building, technical assistance and projectised pilot schemes for specific sub-sectors and IPs. These include support for work in the dimensions of HIV/AIDS, Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs), specialised subjects including science and mathematics, disability, and inclusion of various marginalised children, including pastoralists.

8.27 In 2007, a new challenge arose for MOE though the loss of many senior and experienced officers though a combination of retirement and through transfer to newly established ministries.

Post-endorsement capacity building for planning and implementation – decentralised

8.28 Until the present time, it appears that much capacity development at the decentralised level is somewhat piecemeal, ad hoc, and limited by the human and financial capacity of the organisations which have the relevant responsibility.

8.29 As noted above, as yet KESI has not functioned well in its central role as the major provider of capacity building. Its responsibility includes District Education Officers, and quality assurance officers, School Heads and their Deputies, and school Heads of Departments. This is an extremely large and daunting target, considering that there are some 20,000 primary school heads and a similar number of deputies, together with 5,000 secondary school heads and their deputies. Yet IPs are reported to sometimes duplicate exactly what KESI is doing, e.g. quality assurance, gender guidance and counselling, for the same target group.

8.30 A serious capacity gap has emerged recently though the increased number of Districts. In one area which the team visited, Machakos District has been sub-divided into four new Districts. This new trend is putting a severe strain on all aspects of capacity, especially in terms of serious understaffing, with very many posts unfilled. It also is draining experienced staff from other non-administrative duties such as Teacher Advisory Centre (TAC) Tutors. This deals a double blow by removing them from important functional areas of school support and placing them in new positions for which they have little training or preparation.

8.31 The 2007 JRES[50] also highlighted the need for capacity building to respond to the changing roles of DEOs, in terms of decentralisation and the SWAp, specifying particularly their functions as managers and supervisors rather than administrators. "They have, for example, fewer resources available to them directly, but they have a greater responsibility for the management, reporting, disbursing and accounting for funding on the basis of the KESSP objectives. Whilst being abreast of national and sector policies and plans, DEOs need to be able to know the demographic characteristics and range of education indicators in their district and Province. They need to be able to grasp the full implications and impact of gender constructs and of poverty, be able to analyse data, interpret trends and respond and report adequately."

Efficiency

8.32 In summary, it appears that FTI as such has made little or no contribution to capacity building apart from a small number of international events funded by EPDF, which senior officials have attended. It is therefore not very meaningful to assess the efficiency of FTI support to capacity development.

Capacity of the Donor Group

8.33 The increasingly demanding role of the donor group and particularly of the lead donor, especially in the preparation of new applications for CF funding, raises the question of the capacity of the donors for such responsibility. While a number of individuals in the current Education Donor Coordinating Group (EDCG) have substantial knowledge and experience of sector wide approaches, joint funding mechanisms and the FTI, including within the Kenya context, others do not. This raises a concern that at any one time a donor group may lack the capacity to provide the required inputs and in such circumstances could require substantial technical assistance.

[50] Kenya MOE 2007d JRES Aide Memoire.

Sustainability

8.34 There is reported to be rapid turnover of SMC members, headteachers and District officials, and redeployment and re-designation of the latter as a consequence of the generation of new Districts. Taken together, these indicate a significant risk that policies and plans may be jeopardised, as new or redeployed participants in the education system will have missed earlier provision of capacity building. Measures to mitigate the risk will need to include ongoing provision of training and support on an ongoing and continuous basis. Much appears to depend on the ability of KESI to develop a solid base for its own capacity, in order to give the necessary lead on capacity building planning and delivery.

8.35 The rather piecemeal planning for capacity building referred to above is likely to prove unhelpful to a sustainable approach to capacity building.

8.36 Sustainability is also dependent upon more efficient and effective arrangements for the management of Technical Assistance. It must be of concern that little progress has been made both to establish the TA Pooled Fund agreed in the 2005 Partnership Principles, and a coherent TA plan.

9 FTI and Aid Effectiveness

Context

FTI's aid effectiveness goals

9.1 The following goals set out in the FTI Framework document are directly concerned with aid effectiveness:

- *More efficient aid for primary education*, through actions of development partners to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonization in aid delivery and reduce transactions costs for FTI recipient countries;
- *Sustained increases in aid for primary education*, where countries demonstrate the ability to utilise it effectively;

9.2 This chapter inevitably draws on material presented in previous sections of the report. However, this is interpreted in the context of FTI's aid effectiveness goals.

The aid landscape in Kenya

9.3 Prior to 2003, DFID was the only significant donor to the education sector in Kenya. By the end of the Moi era, corruption was significant and most other major donors had stopped supporting government.[51] If they continued to support education in Kenya, it was channelled through the NGO sector. In 2000, DFID provided two-thirds of all bilateral aid to the education sector. The only other significant bilateral donors were Canada and Germany.[52]

9.4 The situation changed dramatically after the election of the NARC government in late 2002. In 2003, both the World Bank (IDA) and the AfDB committed significant amounts of funding (USD 52 million and USD 43 million respectively) to support the government's commitment to free primary education[53]. New bilateral donors, such as Japan and Sweden, made significant commitments. USAID came in with a large commitment in 2004.

9.5 The new government took steps (described in Chapter 3 above) to develop a coherent approach to basic education, including ECDE and secondary, which resulted in the preparation of the KESSP, finalised in mid-2005, and the signing of the JFA.

9.6 The GOK and its development partners have developed a number of instruments to support Paris Declaration principles, such as the KJAS and Partnership Principles (see the discussion of aid relationships in Chapter 1). Although the process of improved donor harmonisation started in 2004, the actual development of instruments has been lengthy, and both the KJAS and the Partnership Principles were signed in 2007, after both the KESSP and the FTI endorsement. The education sector is the longest standing example of sector coordination within Kenya.

[51] DFID, Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes, Country Study: Kenya (2007), Derek Poate et al.

[52] OECDE/DAC statistics.

[53] The WB grant was more than 100 times the usual amount released through a special account at any one time.

FTI inputs

9.7 The negotiations over FTI CF disbursements were taking place at the same time as discussions over the Joint Financing Agreement between GOK, DFID and WB, which was signed in December 2005. The JFA addresses mutual commitments, joint reporting mechanisms and the pooling of funds. The letter of agreement between the FTI and GOK explicitly links the disbursement of CF funds to the JFA.

9.8 In the annual budget meetings, CF funds are allocated to areas of the KESSP budget which address the objectives of FTI. However there is no indication that this in any way alters the overall allocation of budget to the various IPs of the KESSP. The letter of agreement is signed by the World Bank Country Director for Kenya, and the conditions in the grant letter follow the general conditions on World Bank grants and loans. In effect this means that CF funds are treated as pooled funding for an education SWAp, rather than as project funds.

9.9 It is difficult to disentangle the influence of FTI from the more general changes in aid modalities and coordination that were under way in the education sector in Kenya. This is the more so, in that in Kenya, most stakeholders the team interviewed, whether in government, donor community or civil society, saw FTI as an additional source of finance for the KESSP. Comments were made about its governance. One interviewee described it as "another vertical fund", but less distorting, than those in the health sector. However, perhaps because in the crucial first years, the lead donor and the supervisory agent were also the two initial signatories to the JFA, it was not seen as bringing any additional technical support (or constraints) to the processes that government and donors had been working on already.

9.10 For the first two years of the FTI-endorsed KESSP, the lead donor and chair of the Education Donors Coordinating Group (EDCG) had been DFID, a situation which seems to have been arrived at by consensus, derived from the fact that DFID had been a strong and consistent development partner from before the process had begun. In 2007 a change to the arrangements was introduced by which donors agreed to rotate the chair and lead donor role. Decision making processes have continued to be on the basis of consensus. A proposal to introduce a voting system was dropped because it could have been overcomplicated by considerations of who were eligible voters.

The Relevance of FTI

9.11 The SWAp and enhanced donor coordination were well advanced before FTI endorsement was considered. Although these developments were in line with the approach to partnership described in the FTI framework, they were not instigated by the FTI. Rather FTI funding (from the CF) made use of the modality that had been developed, helped to reinforce the SWAp arrangements, and provided very substantial external finance for KESSP (as detailed in Chapter 6 above). Nevertheless, the FTI inputs were highly relevant to the improvement of aid effectiveness.

FTI Influence on the effectiveness of aid

9.12 As noted, FTI CF support did not bring about the changes in education strategy or in the relationships between GOK and aid agencies. The KESSP was a result of the Kenyan government's work, with national stakeholders and with donors, to achieve an integrated approach to basic education, and, as a first priority, implement the commitment to FPE. It was this stimulus which enabled Kenya to have such a rapid and smooth endorsement.

9.13 However, FTI allowed the Kenyan government to maintain the impetus for EFA. It is speculation as to what would have happened had there been a prolonged gap in funding while the World Bank addressed its concerns about corruption in Kenya (not specifically in the education sector, which was given a relatively clean bill of health by the auditors). However the FTI Catalytic Fund ensured continuity in provision of school text books and instructional materials after the funding under SPRED and the World Bank grant had come to an end.

9.14 The initial disbursement from the CF may also have focussed attention on the need for the mechanisms for the JFA to be sorted out. The JFA was signed on December 15th, just two weeks before the first CF disbursement.

FTI influence on the efficiency of aid

9.15 The JFA, which is the mechanism through which the FTI Catalytic Fund funds are disbursed, directly takes the Paris Declaration Principles as their framework. In the JFA, the development partners commit themselves to "strive to reach the highest degree of alignment with the budgetary and accountability system and legislation of Kenya so as to enhance effective implementation and to reduce the administrative burden of GOK".

9.16 In this section, the progress towards implementing the Paris Declaration is examined, firstly as far as the JFA and FTI are concerned, but also in terms of the conduct of other donors, who have not signed the JFA, but are signatories to the partnership principles of the KJAS.

9.17 **Ownership.** For Paris Declaration monitoring, there is one indicator for ownership, the extent to which a country has an operational development strategy that is drawn from a long-term vision and that shapes a country's public expenditure. In the education sector in Kenya, this condition is fulfilled. There are no suggestions that the KESSP is other than a nationally owned education strategy. There is considerable donor support, both financially and technically, to its implementation and monitoring, but both FPE and FSE are populist election commitments, with strong civil society support. KESSP was developed with considerable participation from all stakeholders. (However, not all the governance arrangements described in the KESSP design are actually in place – this applies in particular to the National Education Advisory Council and the Education Stakeholders Forum.)

9.18 **Alignment.** There are nine Paris Declaration indicators on alignment, focusing on the reliability of country PFM systems and procurement systems, their use by donors, greater predictability of aid, avoidance of separate, parallel project implementation units (PIUs), and coordination of support to capacity strengthening. The performance here is more mixed, and may have shown a downward lurch after the post-election violence in 2008.[54]

9.19 The JFA is an example of good practice in terms of financial management and procurement. JFA funds go direct to a GOK Treasury account, and from there directly to the MOE Development Account, and then to the KESSP account. As discussed earlier, CF funds[55] are then disbursed directly to the school accounts, where procurement takes place at the local level. Much of this disbursement mechanism was already in existence before FTI involvement, though the specific KESSP account was created as part of the KESSP process in 2005.

[54] The team were told that prior to the 2007 election, WB procedures were seen as too cautious, but that in 2008, other donors started to impose more restrictions on the disbursement of their own aid.
[55] Other JFA funding is allocated to the relevant IP as decided in the budget allocation meetings in March of each year.

9.20 Donors who are not signed up to the JFA continue to use a variety of modalities and procurement methods. One agency, which is not allowed to commingle funds by law, operates its programmes under an "implementation letter", which authorises the MOE to conduct all aspects of implementation, including TA, except payment (Woods 2007). Others still operate on a project basis, with funds flowing directly to PIUs. One donor is implementing small scale pilot projects, with a view to merging successful approaches into MOE work programmes and scaling up. It is doing this with the full knowledge and cooperation of MOE, and argues that it is the only feasible way of testing innovative approaches, and not inconsistent with either the Paris Declaration, or the KESSP. All donors argue that their support is within the framework of the KESSP, but that either they choose to support particular IPs within KESSP, to reflect their experience and comparative advantage, or that they are constrained by domestic legal obligations to maintain separate funding mechanisms.

9.21 Donors argue that aid is more predictable under KESSP. Certainly the JFA/ KESSP consultative meetings in March focus on the budget, and should agree on the level of development partner support. This is not just for the forthcoming year, but, where possible reflects multi-annual commitments. Several development partners, including those contributing to the pooled fund, provide multi-annual commitments or forecasts of their aid, in at least two cases, synchronised to the lifetime of the current KESSP. However disbursements have been delayed for various reasons, some on the development partner side, such as concerns after the post-election violence, and some as a result of government not providing the formal request on time, or because of delays in reporting.

9.22 **Harmonisation**. The Paris Declaration indicators here concern the use of common procedures, the planning of joint missions and the use of joint analytic work. Here again the picture is mixed. KESSP procedures are used to some extent by almost all donors. The JRES each autumn includes all donors, and some civil society partners, and produces an agreed aide memoire which forms the basis for many donors' reporting on the use of their support. The quarterly FMRs are also widely distributed and used, and are the trigger for disbursement for JFA Development Partners.

9.23 Nonetheless, there are failings in terms of joint analytic work and joint missions. One major development partner in principle conducts its own missions to coincide with the JRES and have input into the joint process, but then a separate review for internal reporting is conducted. However, if for some reason that fails to happen, as it did this past year, then a separate mission (albeit described as light) took place later. This case study team found itself in between that mission, and planned missions by another development partner, also for apparently unavoidable internal reasons, while the mid-term review of KESSP is still in the process of being organised.

9.24 Similarly at least one development partner conducts studies to support their own support to KESSP, as far as we could see without reference to any broader purpose it could address. In Kenya as a whole there have been major improvements in coordination of missions and country analysis. The 2008 survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration shows an increase from 9% to 48% of coordinated missions and form 38% to 68% of coordinated analytic work. Certainly KESSP has encouraged improved coordination in these areas within the education sector. However, there are still improvements which can be made.

9.25 **Managing for Results.** The M&E system of KESSP is used by many of the development partners as the basis for their own review processes, though others, particularly those who provide project assistance, need their own mid-term and/or terminal evaluations. FTI Catalytic Fund, and the JFA, has the combination of the FMRs, on the financial side, and the JRES for assessment of technical progress. However, the JRES has been criticised for not asking the big questions, on outcomes and impact, but rather taking too disaggregated and output oriented an approach. The KESSP mid-term review affords an opportunity to review the effectiveness of the M&E system.

9.26 **Mutual Accountability**. Indicator 12 records whether or not there is a country-level mechanism permitting joint assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. No such mechanism exists either within Kenya as a whole, or within the education sector. The Paris Declaration is usually interpreted as accountability of development partners and partner government to one another. It can, however, be broadened to include partner government's accountability to its own stakeholders. This is an area where the KESSP falls down. Although the process for developing the KESSP appears to have been fairly participatory, the mechanisms for including civil society in review processes appear to be rather ineffective. This is in part due to poor capacity and funding in civil society organisations themselves, and in one particular case due to a perception of lack of confidence in the structures and extent of representation of the organisation. However, it is a serious issue, particularly given the strong political backing for EFA.

9.27 Although criticisms can be made of the KESSP/ JFA structures in terms of how they have encouraged progress towards Paris Declaration principles, it should be noted that KESSP is the most advanced SWAp in place in Kenya, and in the view of a member of the HAC Secretariat, is a model for other sectors.

Sustainability

9.28 In order for the advances in aid effectiveness that have been achieved in the education sector to be sustained, there needs to be a core of specialist capacity in country in development partner offices. High levels of staff turnover, plus pressures on donors to reduce the size of their country offices to contain costs appear to be placing even more pressure on remaining staff. This has implications both for the technical support that MOE gets from their development partners and the role of country offices in FTI processes. The evaluation team saw that delays are already developing in certain key processes as a result of capacity limitations on the side of both GOK and donors.

9.29 Chapter 6 has drawn attention to the uncertainty about the adequacy of medium- to long-term external financing for the education sector. The FTI goal of *sustained increases in aid for primary education* is not assured, with considerable uncertainly about the future levels of funding available from the FTI CF and from FTI partners in general.

9.30 As regards risk, the gains in aid effectiveness that are being made could be threatened by any deterioration in standards of public financial management, or by political instability which could undermine the effectiveness of government institutions and threaten the working relationships between GOK and education sector donors.

10 Cross-Cutting Issues

Context

10.1 Key cross-cutting issues that affect education include equity and access for various disadvantaged groups. The problems of access are greatest for children living in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of Kenya, and for urban slum dwellers. Gender equity is a key dimension, especially in remote areas. HIV/AIDS prevalence is high in Kenya, with major effects on teachers and pupils. Although Kenya is not usually classified as fragile, the post-election unrest of 2007 had serious repercussions for education services. All of these cross-cutting issues are reflected in the strategy and the IPs of KESSP.

10.2 Gender equity has been featured fairly strongly in recent policy documents. A gender policy was developed in 2000, but this has been slow to implement, and there has been poor allocation of resources to further this.

10.3 Social exclusion is increasingly being addressed through social protection programmes in Kenya, and this is an important element in the medium-term plan of Vision 2030. Social exclusion issues are particularly important for populations in ASALs, and these are recognised as particular issues in Kenyan planning documents, including the KESSP. Special needs education is clearly identified as a priority in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2005.

10.4 The preliminary report of the Kenya Aids Indicator Survey[56] of 2007 indicates that 7.4% of adults aged between 15 and 64 are infected with HIV/AIDS. However, prevalence is greater amongst women. Prevalence drops with higher education levels of girls and women, from 10% in those with only primary education to 4% for those with tertiary education. Prevalence rates have dropped since a high of 14% in 2000. 14,500 teachers are estimated to be HIV positive, with between four and six of them dying each day (UNESCO 2008, p121).

10.5 Kenya has not been classified as fragile in most analyses. However the recent post-election unrest shows that ethnicity is still a major issue with potential to destabilise. The outbreak of violence after the 2007 elections coalesced around ethnic lines, and led to considerable displacement of population as people moved back to their traditional areas, and out of areas where there were violent clashes and destruction of property of people regarded as incomers, not supporting the local political hierarchy. There were direct effects on the education system. Some 28 primary schools were burnt down and 39 vandalised, 4 secondary schools were razed to the ground and 21 vandalised, while 5 zonal offices were burnt and 4 vandalised (Kenya MOE 2008a). This had an impact on both school children and teachers. Moreover, 65 Internally Displaced Camps were created in which 50–60% of the residents were children (UNESCO, undated). Although the government set up makeshift classrooms in the camps, learning conditions were difficult and there was an absence of basic learning and teaching materials. Learning quality was thus greatly affected.

FTI Inputs and Activities

10.6 The FTI endorsement process requires plans to be assessed, inter alia, for their attention to gender and HIV/AIDS. Apart from the endorsement process (which was linked to KESSP appraisal), the main FTI input has been CF financial support to the implementation of KESSP. As already noted, FTI CF finance is assigned to certain "eligible expenditures" but also functions as support for KESSP as a whole.

[56] Quoted in Visser-Valfrey 2009a

10.7 KESSP has an IP on Gender and Education, which addresses the need to provide boarding facilities and washroom and sanitary facilities to create gender responsive environments. Although these have not been funded directly by CF, CF funding has allowed government funding to be allocated to this IP.

10.8 Kenya has an education sector policy on HIV/AIDS, which focuses on care and support for OVCs, and workplace conditions for teachers which are responsive to the impact of HIV/AIDS. HIV is one of the 23 IPs in the KESSP and in the latter tranches of the FTI Catalytic Funding, some resources went to the HIV/AIDS programme. HIV and AIDS have been mainstreamed in curriculum at all levels of the education system. There is an HIV/AIDS education sector policy, launched in 2004 which underlies the KESSP IP. This has four goals: prevention, care and support, workplace issues and management of response and advocacy.

10.9 Three IPs address elements of social inclusion: the IP on Non-formal education which covers many schools in urban slums, as well as other schools which do not qualify as formal registered schools; special needs education which provides for children with physical and mental challenges and the IP for Arid and semi-arid lands, for mobile schools to address nomadic populations. Again, CF funds have not been directly allocated to these IPs, but the fungibility of funds has already been addressed in this report.

Relevance

10.10 CF funding has addressed cross-cutting issues in ways which are consistent not only with GOK policy in the area of education, but which also have contributed to the achievement of policy objectives on a broader front, in so far as the way the education sector addresses these issues contributes to government objectives for a fairer society as articulated in Vision 2030.

10.11 Kenya is one of the countries where the responsiveness to HIV and AIDS of endorsed education sector plans has been reviewed (Clarke & Bundy 2008). The review notes that Kenya received assistance with developing its education sector response to HIV and AIDS separately from and prior to its involvement with FTI. Along with Ethiopia, Kenya is assessed as having a much more systematic, clearly defined and comprehensive response than other countries reviewed. Kenya is exceptional in having developed a specific education sector policy on HIV and AIDS, and was the only country reviewed with a sector-specific HIV and AIDS investment programme (the KESSP IP). This was assessed as a best practice that other countries could follow.

Effectiveness

10.12 Gender statistics are generally positive for Kenya, with very similar NERs at public primary school level. However there is a concern, articulated in the 2008 JRES aide memoire, that after good progress had been made, the gender gap may be widening. In some areas, boys are now falling behind girls in achievement in school, though in the North East, girls still are at a disadvantage. The Gender and Education policy still remains to be fully implemented. As part of that process, there needs to be capacity development in all IPs in this area, and there should be more gender disaggregation in the EMIS.

10.13 A four country study into "Improving the Education Response to HIV and AIDS" in 2007 included Kenya.[57] It concluded that stakeholders in Kenya had confirmed that Kenya

[57] UNAIDS/IATT 2007 Improving the Education Response to HIV and AIDS: lessons of partner efforts in coordination, harmonisation, alignment, information sharing and monitoring in Jamaica, Kenya, Thailand and Zambia.

had made important progress in the overall response to HIV and AIDS. Among sector ministries, stakeholders in general emphasised that the MOE stood out because of its early commitment to accelerating the response. The study highlighted a number of achievements in the sector but also pointed to a range of weaknesses, gaps and challenges which remained to be addressed.

10.14 The stigma attached to HIV/AIDS is still very high. The evaluation team noted that, although there were very prominent murals in the school they visited in Kibera, in Nairobi, promoting HIV/AIDS prevention, in rural schools in discussion, the approach focussed on discretion and the rights of both children and teachers to privacy. The 2008 JRES aide memoire notes the need to assess the appropriateness of the approach to mainstreaming HIV/AIDS and gender in the IPs. In particular the need for more gender mainstreaming in the HIV/AIDS IP is noted. As a whole the IP is marked as having made only limited progress.

10.15 The three IPs addressing aspects of social exclusion were rated as having made limited or some progress in the 2008 aide memoire. In most cases, funding was regarded as being too limited to allow for an effective approach, though enrolment had increase amongst the nomadic children and a programme has been instituted to register NFSs with a view to extending public support to them, if they conform to public school standards, for example in the types of textbooks used. However, Nairobi remains a particular problem with very low enrolment rates reported in the urban slums. The 2008 JRES calls for a verification of figures and an action plan for a coordinated effort across IPs to improve outcomes.

10.16 Fragility was not directly addressed in the education sector in the earlier years of CF funding, but it became an issue in 2008, as a result of the post-election violence. Because CF funding is part of the JFA, and is governed by decisions of the EDCG, a harmonised response to the crisis was adopted, which affected disbursement of funds. On the positive side, some donors feel that this coordinated response put pressure on government to come to a solution on the election results. However, this did create an additional disruption to primary schools already having to deal with pupil and teacher displacement.

Efficiency and Sustainability

10.17 Concerns have been expressed, including at the last JRES, that the present structure of the KESSP into 23 discrete Investment Programmes, undermines the importance of mainstreaming priorities such as work on gender and HIV/AIDS across the full programme.

10.18 It is noticeable that in recent assessments of KESSP, the IPs which are rated most highly, primary instruction materials and, to a lesser extent primary infrastructure, have been relatively well funded. (Conversely the FTI appraisal of KESSP noted that the HIV/AIDS IP appeared inadequately funded.) Sustainability of the progress that has been made on cross-cutting issues may well depend on a combination of effective mainstreaming into the other relevant IPs, and increased prioritisation of those IPs which directly address these issues, in particular to develop capacity for effective approaches.

PART D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11 Conclusions

Introduction

11.1 This chapter first gives the evaluation team's overall assessments for Kenya against each of the main high level questions. It then provides a summary of overall conclusions and of conclusions for each workstream. This takes the form of a matrix which identifies the FTI inputs and assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of FTI's contributions.

The High Level Evaluation Questions

Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of Kenya?

11.2 CF support goes into pooled funds in support of KESSP, and as such is completely aligned with government policy. KESSP itself was prepared after election commitments in 2003 and an intensive and inclusive consultative process. EFA continues to be an important commitment for the government, though the dynamic has moved from FPE to include FSE and ECDE.

11.3 Because KESSP addresses the whole range of EFA objectives (including early childhood education, adult literacy etc) and the CF support is to KESSP as a whole, the question of FTI introducing a bias towards UPC at the expense of other EFA objectives does not really arise. Similarly, KESSP addresses the whole education sector and is increasingly concerned with expanding secondary education; this again reduces the likelihood that the focus of CF resources on primary education would lead to distortion of education sector provision.

To what extent is FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, accelerating progress on EFA?

11.4 The approach to EFA is based on the KESSP, which was developed before FTI CF funding was accessed, so FTI has helped implement the existing government approach. Within the 23 IPs of the KESSP, FTI funding has been notionally allocated to a large extent to primary school textbooks and infrastructure. The FTI Catalytic Fund has provided a major share of external support to KESSP during the years it has been operation, and has thereby helped to boost Kenya's efforts towards EFA.

11.5 The (delayed) mid-tem review of KESSP should provide an interim assessment of its overall effectiveness. However, progress has definitely been made towards EFA. The primary net enrolment rate has increased from 77.3% in 2002 (pre-Free Primary Education) to 83.2% in 2005, and 91.6% in 2008. Over the same years the primary completion rate increased from 62.8% through 77.6% and reached 81% in 2008.

11.6 FTI has made a significant contribution in particular by filling a funding gap in the first year of KESSP, which allowed the Ministry to achieve a level of momentum in the first year of implementation, and very substantially so thereafter.

Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?

11.7 At the FTI point of entry, GOK resources for EFA had already been mobilised to an exceptional level. Additional domestic resources are likely to be generated only by economic growth; more efficient use of those resources is the main challenge for Kenya's EFA strategy.

11.8 The volume of CF resources deployed was substantial, both as a proportion of all CF resources and as a share of external financing for KESSP. However, there is little evidence of a catalytic effect whereby FTI endorsement led other donors to increase their financial support to basic education in Kenya. It was almost the converse, in that the CF was brought in because of the efforts of the two existing major donors in the sector (DFID and the World Bank). The momentum which FTI, through the CF, gave KESSP, along with the joint financing agreement (JFA), may have encouraged some donors to pool resources to the education sector, but there is no evidence that the total amount of official development assistance (ODA) increased.

11.9 Because of the way KESSP functions as a SWAp, and because the FTI CF contribution is part of the JFA, it is supporting Paris Principles in the way it is managed and disbursed. It is almost impossible to disentangle the decisions made about the management of CF funding and broader decisions made over the JFA, because the timing and the individuals involved were virtually the same.

Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability

11.10 Box 11.1 summarises the country evaluation team's findings and conclusions, overall and for each stream of analysis, against the principal DAC evaluation criteria.

Box 11.1 Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Kenya
Context: *What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before FTI?*
• The 2002 elections and change of government were a turning point. Free Primary Education (FPE) was an election commitment, and a surge in primary enrolments followed. During the 1990s the Kenya government had greatly strengthened the national revenue base, and the shares of public expenditure for primary education have been consistently very high. (This raises efficiency issues related to the costs of teachers, with their salaries dominating recurrent expenditures.) An important part of the EFA strategy was to decentralise responsibility and funding for school maintenance and instructional materials to School Management Committees (SMCs). • A SWAp, the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) was developed over the period 2004/2005. It contained a costed plan, and addressed the whole education sector, including all elements of the EFA objectives and secondary and tertiary education as well as primary. Its 23 Investment Programmes (IPs) included IPs to address capacity, M&E, and key cross-cutting issues including gender, HIV/AIDS, equity and exclusion. • Prior to KESSP, most donor financing was linked to specific projects, though WB and AfDB had provided substantial funding to primary education on 2003, when the NARC government cane into power. The donor community in Kenya responded to the election of the NARC government by engaging proactively with government and establishing a Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination Group. Education is a sector within the HAC, but the Education Donors Coordinating Group (EDCG) was developed in relationship to KESSP, and its TOR were published after the adoption of KESSP.
Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*
• KESSP was initiated in 2005. Principal players on the donor side included the World Bank and DFID, and they were instrumental in helping Kenya to access the FTI Catalytic Fund as an additional source of funds for KESSP. Systems were set in place to manage the implementation of KESSP, notably the KESSP steering group which meets weekly and includes all the IPs which compose KESSP. M&E systems have been put in place, and biannual joint review processes set up: an annual budgeting meeting and an annual review of progress, including development partners, GOK and civil society. The EDCG has matured over time, and education is regarded by many as the front runner in terms of aid effectiveness, due to the instruments such as the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA), and the close relationship between donors and government. • The FTI CF provided important finance to the implementation of KESSP (USD 120.3 million over four years, about one-third of ODA to education). The FTI did not play a direct role in the establishment of the KESSP, but the request for endorsement involved the FTI in its appraisal. • FTI CF support is part of the JFA pooled funding arrangement; pooled funds may be drawn against any eligible expenditures. It is accepted that funding across KESSP is fungible, and the CF therefore supports the whole sector. However, the CF has been notionally allocated mainly to finance the funds that are decentralised to SMCs. This means that CF finance can be very rapidly disbursed to the schools' bank accounts, and this arrangement, in turn, helps to assure timely funding of a very important element of non-salary expenditures.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">SUMMARY – Kenya</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to relevant? Was the design appropriate?</td><td colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy expenditure and service delivery)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?</td><td>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support translated into results?</td></tr>
<tr><td>FTI support was provided through the CF as pooled funding to the KESSP, a Kenyan developed plan for the sector with the overall objectives of achieving UPE and EFA through enhancing access, equity and quality in primary and secondary education. The support was strongly aligned with Kenyan as well as FTI objectives, and the design was appropriate in supporting basic education within the context of a whole-sector strategy.</td><td>The KESSP was a major advance in education policy in Kenya, and it has resulted in progress towards UPC.
The GOK commitment to FPE and the KESSP strategy had already taken shape prior to FTI involvement, and FTI’s main contribution was a significant share of total ODA provided in support of KESSP.
The design of the FTI CF contribution, with its link to funding of SMCs, was very effective in supporting a key element of the primary education strategy.
Influences on policy, capacity, and monitoring have been less direct (see the separate summaries below). In each case, FTI's influence is as part of the overall KESSP programme and cannot easily be separated out. KESSP represents a significant advance in aid effectiveness for the education sector, which the FTI involvement has helped to consolidate, but there is no evidence that FTI has triggered additional donor funding, apart from the CF resources themselves.</td><td>Operating through KESSP was an efficient modality; the endorsement process was not unduly onerous, and subsequent reporting and monitoring takes place as part of joint efforts.
The chosen mechanisms for disbursement were highly efficient.
There have been some delays and uncertainties in the approval and disbursement of CF funds, but their availability also helped to avoid an interruption in support to school financing.
Lack of clarity about procedures for a second phase of CF support has led to a shortfall in anticipated funds, and GOK does not enjoy medium to long term predictability of support from its education donors.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Outcomes: What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">FTI support has been of relatively short duration (compared for example to the school cycle), and FTI CF has, in effect supported the whole of KESSP. This makes it impractical to attribute specific outcomes to FTI. The (delayed) MTR will provide important perspectives on the performance of KESSP as a whole. However it is clear that KESSP has provided significant support to the education sector during a period when enrolments have been rapidly expanding; completion rates have improved dramatically, from 68% to 81%, and transition to secondary has increased from 46% to almost 60%. There have been gains in early childhood education, and specific efforts to improve access for disadvantaged groups. KESSP includes measures to support quality as well as access (including the strengthening of school materials availability, with which the FTI input has been particularly associated).</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">The GOK commitment to UPC and EFA is high, but the costs are increasing, and resources are being stretched. Overall sustainability will depend on increasing the efficiency of use of domestic resources, as well as the adequacy and reliability of external support. There is scope for further enhancements to aid effectiveness through the education SWAp; the principal risks are that a deterioration in standards of public financial management, or political instability, could undermine the relationship between GOK and its aid partners.</td></tr>
</table>

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning

Context: *What was the situation at level zero with respect to policy and planning? What was happening in country before FTI? Did a sector plan exist? What were the policies?*

- Following the democratic change of government in 2002,and its commitment to Free Primary Education (FPE) there was a period of intense planning culminating in the production of important policy documents including the Sessional Paper no 1 which continues to be the reference for all educational planning and for the SWAp. Planning has been broadly consultative, and education strategies political commitment across parties.
- KESSP (Kenya Education Sector Support Programme) was adopted in July 2005, with objectives of attaining UPE by 2005, and EFA by 2015. Emphasis in the KESSP is put on establishing a professional and accountable management structure to deliver better services and to improve access, quality, equity and relevance of education. KESSP is sector-wide in approach, embracing secondary and tertiary education as well as primary,, and it includes elements to support all the EFA goals.
- Specific Investment Plans were developed within KESSP to address HIV/AIDS, gender, education in the ASALs (arid and semi-arid lands), and to address non-formal schools, which play a particularly important role in urban slums.

Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*

The KESSP process was already under way when Kenya sought FTI endorsement and access to the Catalytic Fund (CF). The government's commitment to EFA goals, and especially to Free Primary Education (FPE) was strongly driven by domestic political priorities. FTI's specific inputs that relate to education policy and planning were thus:

- Endorsement process which essentially sanctioned the policy and preparatory work which had been done in preparing KESSP, but helped to raise still unresolved issues on communication and capacity building. The endorsement process took place in conjunction with the overall appraisal of KESSP. There were some mentions of the Indicative Framework during the endorsement process, but it has not become an integral part of policy and planning for the sector. KESSP is a 5 year comprehensive programme, and emphasis has been on its implementation, rather than any major changes in policy
- CF of FTI, as part of the JFA (Joint Financing Agreement) and working through the EDCG (Education Donor Coordinating Group), has supported more effective planning and management procedures in MOE through the joint review process.
- Management processes in MOE have evolved from the processes outlined in the KESSP to regular meetings of the 23 IPs in the KESSP Steering Group.
- Driven by populist election commitments, Free Secondary Education (FSE) was adopted by the Government in 2008. This strategy was consistent with the overall objective in KESSP to improve access to secondary education

Relevance - *Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?*	**Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:** *What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)*	
	Effectiveness – *To what extent did FTI contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC targets? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of sector policies?*	**Efficiency -** *How economically was FTI support to country level policy and planning translated into results?*
KESSP was highly relevant to EFA objectives and at the same time strongly reflected Kenyan policies and priorities. The FTI approach of reinforcing this process was therefore highly relevant, and an appropriate design.	The development of KESSP preceded direct FTI involvement in the process, so the good quality of KESSP cannot be significantly attributed to FTI. However, the inclusion of FTI CF resources and the need to meet FTI as well as other donors' reporting and review requirements has helped to reinforce the process for review of policy implementation.	FTI inputs to policy and planning were delivered very efficiently, since they formed part of the overall KESSP framework, and did not require a different or additional process. Moreover, the KESSP framework is itself efficient in the sense that it brings the full range of EFA objectives, all levels of education, and the various cross-cutting issue within a common framework of policy and plans.

Sustainability: *Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?*

The policies embodied in Kenya's education sector plans have strong political support, and there are clear incentives for both government and donors to persist with the SWAp approach.
Risks to the continued implementation of the SWAp include:

- Rapid turn-over off staff in recent period threatens knowledge and expertise with respect to KESSP.
- Rapid expansion of the number of districts in Kenya, too many officials coming into post without sufficient understanding of key tenets of a SWAp.
- The risk of political instability which could undermine the effectiveness of government institutions and threaten the working relationships between GOK and education sector donors.

STREAM 2: Finance
Context: *What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before FTI?*
• Kenya has an impressive record in strengthening domestic revenue collection, and has substantially increased the share of expenditure on education, and primary education (exceeding the relevant benchmarks from the FTI Indicative Framework) . External funding for education has been a small percentage of the total, but provides a very important contribution to total education spending. This is especially so because of the high proportion of the education budget that is spent on teachers' salaries, leaving small amounts for investment and even teaching materials. • Prior to KESSP, a SWAp which started in 2005, most donor support in education was in the form of project support. KESSP has enabled a more holistic approach to financing "Investment Programmes" (IPs) for the sector. Pooled funding from a small group of donors (notably DFID and IDA) is pivotal in ensuring efficient funding of KESSP. • A financing gap is estimated annually under the KESSP. However, this "financing gap" is based on a conservative assessment of external funding likely to be available in the near-term; it is not an assessment of the external financing that would be required in the medium to long term to enable EFA targets to be met. • Kenya's PFM system has significant strengths, including a relatively well-integrated medium term expenditure planning system, but there have also been major fiduciary concerns, especially in relation to corruption. The design of IDA (and therefore CF) support to KESSP takes these concerns into account, but is based (a) on an assessment that fiduciary standards in the primary education sub-sector are comparatively strong, and (b) on measures to further strengthen sector management.
Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*
FTI specific inputs: • FTI's main specific input has been through the CF as an additional source of funding for KESSP. In July 2005 the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee approved an allocation of USD22.5 million for Kenya, This was later revised to USD24.2 million, which was disbursed in December 2005. In 2006, Kenya was allocated USD48.4 million for Year 2, and at the FTI Partnership meeting in Cairo of that year, an additional USD48.4 million was allocated for year 3. In total USD121 million was disbursed over the period 2005–2008, making Kenya the largest recipient of CF funding to date. FTI has also provided the largest input to external funding of KESSP over the period. With the World Bank as the supervising entity, CF disbursement conditions have been similar to those for IDA funds. • CF funds are nominally disbursed against a primary education sub-set of KESSP activities, notably the direct provision of funds to primary schools, but in practice KESSP funds are deliberately fungible and the CF thus contributes to financing of KESSP as a whole. Non FTI inputs into country-level financial planning and resource mobilization in the education sector in the period since FTI came in: • The budget cycle includes a 3 year rolling MTEF and annual PERs by each Ministry. GOK and the Education Donors Coordination Group (EDCG) carry out annual budget meetings in March. • There are concerted efforts to strengthen PFM systems, including a USD 35m WB Institutional Reform and Capacity Building project..

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">STREAM 2: Finance</th></tr>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to education finance relevant? Was the design appropriate?</th><th colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</th></tr>
<tr><th>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to a stronger education budget process? To what extent did FTI contribute to the increase in total funds for primary education?</th><th>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support to country level finance for education translated into results?</th></tr>
<tr><td>• KESSP incorporates an effective strategy to achieve UPC and other EFA objects and the CF financial support is therefore highly relevant.
• Catalytic Fund’s use of pooled funding mechanism improves flexibility and allows government to assign expenditure in accordance with its priorities.
• CF finance was allocated to the IPs most closely linked to achieving quality primary education, viz. the SIMBA account for school textbooks and the primary school infrastructure IP. Some funds were also allocated to HIV/AIDS and special needs education.
• Although KESSP funds are fungible, this allocation helps to ensure that key budget allocations for primary education are funded promptly and in full.</td><td>• The education budget process has, since 2003, included a public discussion. However it now also has detailed discussion in the joint review process, which is in greater depth. FTI, as part of the EDCG, has been part of this process.
• Mechanisms exist to maximise the possibility of funds being spent as intended at the school level. The decision to disburse CF directly to schools has ensured that pupils benefit from school books and improved infrastructure.
• Government funding for KESSP has increased by 14% in nominal terms in the 3 year period of CF. External funding has slightly more than doubled over the same period. CF has contributed 37% of external assistance to education over this period, and 2.2% to MOE expenditures.
• However, the Catalytic Fund does not appear to have catalysed additional funding from development partners (conversely, it enable the existing aid partners to draw in additional funding from the CF).</td><td>• The SWAp and the pooled funding used to support KESSP are highly efficient processes for providing external support to the sector.
• The disbursement mechanisms for the CF component have also been very efficient. In particular funding to school bank accounts allows very rapid disbursement of CF funds, as well as supporting key components of sector expenditure.
• Less efficient aspects of the CF support have included:
  ○ Some delays in starting CF funding (though CF funding nevertheless helped fill a gap caused by delays in other partners' funding).
  ○ Disbursement pressure created by an apparent insistence that CF funds be completely drawn down on a calendar year basis. (NB: The evaluation team could not verify that this is a requirement.)
  ○ Misunderstandings over procedures for securing the next round of CF funding, which will cause a hiatus; there will likely be a dip in external funding necessitating reallocations to cover the most essential KESSP expenditures.
• The disbursement procedures for primary education are by and large efficient, though there do on occasion appear to be delays, sometimes due to disbursement delays by development partners, particularly after the unrest in early 2008. Because CF uses direct disbursement channels, most of the support to primary education follows this disbursement procedure
• Like other donors, the CF programmes its funds on a relatively short-term basis, and GOK does not have assured multi-year funding for the education sector.</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• Kenya’s macroeconomic outlook has been affected both by the post-election violence and the global downturn. The GOK is currently in discussion with the IMF for a Rapid Access loan through the ESF. Government commitment is strong, but the financial demands on the budget will also depend on the extent to which government can find efficiency gains, e.g. through the adoption of the recommendations for teacher norms
• The improvements in the budget process appear to be well integrated into both donor and MOE processes.The major donors have linked their assistance to the KESSP, whose current phase runs through to December 2010. It is difficult to predict what assistance will be forthcoming after that date. (Prospects will partly depend on the MTR of KESSP which was due in 2008 but delayed.).
• The CF made a significant contribution towards meeting the narrowly defined funding gap. However, estimates of medium to long term external funding requirements for KESSP have been rising. As of 2008, the funding gap for KESSP was estimated in the JR aide memoire to be KES 16 billion. This compares with KES 1.9 billion when FTI endorsed Kenya. The large increase is attributed to the introduction of FSE and the incorporation of university education within KESSP, as well as unfavourable economic trends.
• Risks: The KESSP PAD identifies both fiduciary aspects (financial management capacity and corruption) and "lack of efficiency and sufficiency of external support" as substantial risks for KESSP. The 2007 JRES identifies a major problem of undercosting of KESSP implementation, and subsequent economic developments will have exacerbated this.</td></tr>
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<tr><td colspan="3">STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to data and M&E? What was happening in country before FTI? Was quality and use of data relevant to the context and to the monitoring needs of the education strategies?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• Extensive monitoring framework in place. Data and M&E were already two of the 23 Investment Programs (IPs) under the KESSP, focusing on EMIS and on M&E, respectively. Monitoring included data collection from schools, field visits and additional studies on quality issues
• The evaluation team did not discover any information about monitoring prior to FTI, but comments on the FTI assessment would indicate that this was minimal. The national monitoring system, NIMES, was still being rolled out in 2007</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Inputs: What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">As noted, KESSP included an M&E framework which embraced the FTI inputs as well. Designation of both IPs as "eligible expenditure categories", though no direct allocation of CF funds to these IPs
FTI -specific inputs were limited to (a) Identification of the need to strengthen EMIS and M&E in the FTI appraisal document (this was already recognised in the KESSP); and (b) Linking of CF disbursements to two of the four Financial Management Reports (FMRs) as a triggers for the release of funds (applies to other non-CF pool funds also)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to data and M&E needs relevant? Was the design appropriate?</td><td colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to Improved collection of data and better information services? To what extent is there better use of data to inform policy and funding</td><td>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support to country data and M&E translated into results?</td></tr>
<tr><td>• The FTI is closely aligned with Kenya's own plans for data and M&E. The emphasis on data and M&E in the endorsement process and eligible expenditures was relevant, but KESSP had already taken the key issues on board. (This included the adaptation of a number of the indicators that appear in the FTI Indicative Framework.)</td><td>These comments relate to the effectiveness of KESSP M&E as a whole.
• FMRs were developed by WB/ JFA, including FTI, as the basis for reporting on pooled funding.
• Overall linking FMRs to disbursements has provided a strong incentive for prompt and accurate submission of reports.
• The MOE uses the information collected for the FMRs and high level staff regard the FMRs as one of the best tools for MOE planning.
• The decentralisation of data collection to the district level requires the training of staff at that level for data collection. We found no evidence in field visits of training staff to use the data collected
• Disbursement of the M&E-related IPs has lagged. Further development of EMIS remains a critical issue for both government and development partners. Every JRES reaffirms the need for more staff in the EMIS section</td><td>• The KESSP approach is efficient in linking M&E systematically to a SWAp, with a common set of indicators and joint review processes.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Data management and M&E are part of the on-going planning, implementation and review cycle of KESSP and therefore integrated in a sustainable manner.
Risks include the low level of funding to the EMIS and M&E IPs and Insufficient staffing of EMIS. The extent to which EMIS covers non-government activities is an outstanding issue.</td></tr>
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<tr><td colspan="3">STREAM 4: Capacity Development</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• Various strong interventions in capacity building had taken place with emphasis on in-service training for head teachers and key teachers in primary schools. The decentralisation of responsibility to school level, with School Management Committees (SMCs) managing funds was an important precursor and built into the KESSP design.
• Capacity was included in the KESSP as a separate IP and also mainstreamed across other components.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Inputs: What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">No comprehensive capacity development plan existed prior to FTI's involvement, and the need for such a plan to be urgently developed was a concern raised in the FTI assessment of KESSP.
However, no FTI-specific inputs to capacity building pre-endorsement were identified, and FTI's contribution post-endorsement was entirely in terms of its support for KESSP as a whole.
A minor exception is that, through EPDF, FTI funded various activities for exchange of experience between Kenya and other countries (these were mostly identified as WB activities rather than as EPDF by interviewees) including study visits to Thailand and other Asian Countries, participation in the ADEA conference on Secondary Education in Mozambique, an FTI workshop in Uganda.

Aspirations to develop a sector-wide capacity development strategy, and plans for a joint TA pool fund have not been put into effect, with the result that donor support to capacity development in the sector remains piecemeal and fragmented. There are weaknesses too n the GOK institutions most involved, USAID has sponsored a nationwide capacity needs assessment with KESI (the Kenya Education Staff Institute), but this has not, as yet, been used by government.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</td><td colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Effects refer to processes, outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services?</td><td>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support to country level capacity building translated into results?</td></tr>
<tr><td>• FTI missed the opportunity to engage more systematically in efforts to build capacity in education management and policy and planning (areas which had had little emphasis)
• re the EPDF activities:
  o It is not clear what the benefits of the study visits to Thailand and other Asian countries have been or how they relate to FTI.
  o The FTI workshop in Uganda did contribute to deepening understanding by MOE officials of FTI and SWAp processes.</td><td>• It is not clear that FTI's engagement has contributed to desired improvements in harmonisation of approach to capacity building or supported areas which need to be prioritised for the attainment of UPC.
• There is still a lack of synergy and coordination across the various providers of capacity building.
• Most capacity building at decentralised level is piecemeal and ad hoc with insufficient follow up.</td><td>• There is no evidence available to allow for an assessment of efficiency of the limited FTI support to capacity building.
• There continues to be a need for more efficient and effective arrangements for the management of TA. (The TA pooled fund agreed in the 2005 partnership principles has not been established and there is no coherent TA plan.)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">The piecemeal nature of capacity building efforts and the rapid turnover of School Management Committee (SMC) members, head teachers and district officials results in a loss of skills and knowledge from capacity building and threatens implementation of policies in general.</td></tr>
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<tr><td colspan="3">STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">The aid effectiveness agenda in Kenya predated the arrival of FTI. It was structured around establishment of the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination Group (HAC) in 2004 A SWAp (KESSP) was being implemented in the sector. Prior to KESSP, most aid to the education sector was delivered as programme aid. Until the change of government in late 2002, relationships between the GOK and development partners were strained. Once the new government was in place, many donors waited to see what would emerge from the processes in the education sector. The WB and AfDB provided substantial loans in 2003 in support of FPE. Kenya held its first in-country CG meeting in 2003, and a Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination (HAC) group was set up in 2004. This predated the KESSP, but the EDCG, set up in 2005, is seen as part of the HAC process, and its focal point in education.
DFID and WB have been very prominent in efforts to improve aid effectiveness in the education sector since 2002/03 and have worked closely with government to achieve this. These agencies wer the midwives for Kenya's access tot he FTI Catalytic Fund .</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Inputs: What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">FTI support to KESSP via CF support took place in parallel with continuing development of aid management mechanism, both generally and for the education sector. In 2007, after a prolonged development period, GOK and development partners signed the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy, which addresses donor support to the IP-ERS.
In accordance with principles of harmonization CF has disbursed its funds through the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) signed in 2005 between the GOK and donors), CF funds are disbursed through government financial systems and FTI is represented in the JR meetings, through the CF supervisory agent, the WB.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Relevance - Was FTI support to aid effectiveness relevant? Was the design appropriate?</td><td colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Effects refer to processes, outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to more coordinated international aid that is more coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?</td><td>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support to aid effectiveness translated into results?</td></tr>
<tr><td>CF funds have been disbursed in support of KESSP and FTI is seen as following (and encouraging) good aid effectiveness practices in disbursement.</td><td>CF funding supported a good pre-existing strategy and helped the Kenya government maintain the impetus for EFA, initially by helping to ensure continuity in funding, then by providing a substantial proportion of the pooled funding for KESSP.
The prospect of CF funds may have helped to accelerate the working out of the JFA mechanisms.</td><td>As compared to 2002, the quality of aid to education has improved, because of the development of KESSP as a framework.
FTI can be seen as having contributed in improving efficiency in the use of development support as the first tranche of CF funding allowed the GOK to maintain the impetus in the sector when donor funding came to a temporary halt, ensuring the continued provision of services (in particular school books)
Through JFA/KESSP consultative meetings around the budget in March each year aid in general (including FTI support from the CF) should be more predictable
However, JFA processes occupy a considerable amount of time of the Education Donor Coordination Group and are not seen as efficient. Donors who are not signed up tot the JFA continue to use a variety of modalities and procurement methods.
Reporting mechanisms continue to be insufficiently harmonised, and this also applies to FTI reporting processes.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">A key FTI goal is to ensure sustained increases in aid for primary education. As noted under the finance workstream, there is still considerable uncertainty about the future levels of funding available from the CF and from FTI partners in general. Risks include: Insufficient capacity on he donor side delaying important processes, e.g. the application to CF for re-endorsement. A more fundamental risk is that gains in aid effectiveness could be reversed by deterioration in fiscal management or by political instability which undermined government effectiveness and the working relationships between GOK and education sector donors.</td></tr>
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<tr><td colspan="3">STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before FTI?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• Key cross-cutting issues that affect education include equity and access for various disadvantaged groups. The problems of access are greatest for children living in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of Kenya, and for urban slum dwellers. Gender equity is a key dimension, especially in remote areas. HIV/AIDS prevalence is high in Kenya, with major effects on teachers and pupils. Although Kenya is not usually classified as fragile, the post-election unrest of 2007 had serious repercussions for education services. All of these issues (except the post-election violence) were recognised in KESSP, which includes several specific IPs addressing them.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Inputs: What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• The FTI endorsement of KESSP acknowledges the inclusion of plans to address HIV/AIDS orphans, pupils in ASALs, NFS and girls in the context of expanding access to primary education FTI specific inputs. It raised a concern about the level of funding for the HIV/AIDS IP.
• After endorsement, there were no FTI-specific activities on cross-cutting issues in education. FTI CF support was part of the pool that supported KESSP as a whole. However, some FTI CF funding was allocated to the HIIV/AIDS IP in 2007 and 2008.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support to cross cutting issues relevant? Was the design appropriate?</td><td colspan="2">Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to improved strategies to address cross cutting issues? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of these strategies?</td><td>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support to cross cutting issues translated into results?</td></tr>
<tr><td>Support to cross-cutting issues was through support to KESSP as a whole and therefore appropriate to the policy adopted by GOK.

An assessment of endorsed plans' treatment of HIV and AIDS concluded that Kenya's plan is exceptionally systematic and comprehensive; the education sector-specific IP on HIV/AIDS is described as a best practice to be emulated.</td><td>• There are concerns that the cross-cutting issues reflected in KESSP have not been as well-funded as other IPs. The attribution of some CF funds to the HIV/AIDS IP may have helped to prioritise it.
• A parallel concern is that issues such as gender are not well mainstreamed across other IPs.</td><td>• Channelling CF funding through KESSP was an efficient modality, but it is beyond the scope of this report to assess the efficiency of all the relevant elements of KESSP.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Sustainability of the progress that has been made on cross-cutting issues may well depend on a combination of effective mainstreaming into the other relevant IPs, and increased prioritisation of those IPs which directly address these issues, in particular to develop capacity for effective approaches.</td></tr>
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12 Recommendations and Reflections

12.1 A striking feature of the Kenya case is that FTI is seen by local stakeholders predominantly as a direct source of funding (through the FTI Catalytic Fund). In part, this reflects the fact that there was already a strong commitment to UPE and an education SWAp had been formulated before FTI's explicit involvement began.

12.2 In many respects, the way in which the FTI Catalytic Fund funding has been integrated into the newly developed KESSP, and aid modalities such as the JFA, is a good example of how Paris Declaration principles such as ownership, alignment and harmonisation can be promoted through appropriate aid mechanisms. More effort should be made to disseminate the Kenyan experience as to how CF funding can be used to promote existing good practice.

12.3 While the MOE in Kenya has, up until now, had quite a smooth relationship with the FTI, this has been very dependent on individuals in the donor community and their own incentives to make the relationship functional. The coming hiatus in funding is an example of how that can break down if there are misunderstandings and time constraints on key individuals in the donor community. Individual personalities will always play an important role in these relationships, but FTI may wish to think more carefully about the role of the local donor community, and possibly engage a little more directly with recipient governments.

12.4 There has been a lack of clarity over the procedures for reapplication for Kenya. It will be a ground-breaker in this area, as it was over its first disbursements. However the process is unlikely to be as smooth as in 2005. The FTI Secretariat and the relevant FTI committees should watch this process carefully, and be prepared to modify it if it seems to be too cumbersome.

12.5 The KESSP covers the period from 2005–2010. Catalytic Fund support was given for the period 2005–2008 (though this seems to have developed in stages, rather than been a decision made at endorsement). It would seem desirable that when funding is given in support of a specific plan, the CF should either commit to supporting that plan throughout its intended period, or should develop an exit strategy, which is articulated in conjunction with the recipient country government and the local donors.

12.6 Kenya's example shows that the concept of a "financing gap" is not straightforward. The "financing gap" depicted in submissions for CF support is a short-term budgetary concept, not the long-term requirement for achieving EFA goals. Moreover, there is an incentive for CF applicants to exaggerate or to understate the estimated financing gap, biasing it in whichever direction is judged likely to maximise the funds allocated.

12.7 The focus on short-to-medium term financial requirements also highlights the fact that the FTI in Kenya has not increased the long term predictability of external financing to meet EFA and MDG targets.

12.8 The case of Kenya raises basic questions over the role of the Catalytic Fund. No-one in Kenya questions the importance of the CF as a financing instrument, nor that it is needed to help the government achieve its objectives, particularly given the capacity building needs of the decentralised governance and management systems in place in the education sector. However, Kenya already has a high proportion of funds currently disbursed from the Catalytic Fund. There are few indications that this has encouraged other donors to join the JFA, or to increase the funding that they give to education in the country. Moreover, Kenya was fortunate to be allocated a very large share of CF disbursements over the period under review. Is this mode of operation of FTI sustainable, either in Kenya or globally, or is it raising expectations that it cannot meet?

Annex A – A Note on Methodology

A1. The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the *Evaluation Framework* (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a), available from the study web-site at: www.camb-ed.com\fasttrackinitiative.

A2. The *Evaluation Framework* includes a detailed programme theory for FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the *Evaluation Framework (Annex E)*. The same theory is being tested at both global and country levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country level).

A3. The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the *Evaluation Framework.* Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note, shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report will also be available for discussion and comment before it is finalised.

A4. Each country study includes a summary matrix which relates overall findings and findings against each workstream to the logical framework for the evaluation. (See the matrix in Chapter 11 of this report.)

A5. For a more retrospective explanation and reflection on the study process and methodology, see the Note on Approaches and Methods which constitutes Appendix V (Volume 4) of the evaluation's final synthesis report.

Figure A1 Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI

Level Zero – Entry Conditions
(to establish the context/baseline prior to FTI)

Education policy/planning	*Education finance*	*Data and M&E*	*Capacity*	*Aid effectiveness*
Quality of education policy and planning in relation to UPC and EFA	Adequacy of international and domestic finance to meet EFA and UPC targets	Quality and use of data relevant for setting and monitoring education strategies	Extent to which capacity is adequate for EFA and UPC targets	Extent to which aid for education is efficiently and effectively provided

Level One – Inputs
(FTI Inputs and Activities)

Global advocacy for UPC Support to country-level education plans	Assessing finance requirements and mobilising domestic and external funds	Assessing data requirements and addressing gaps	Assessing capacity requirements and supporting capacity development	Efforts to improve harmonisation and alignment of aid to education

Level Two – Immediate Effects
(Effects on processes in education sector including role of aid)

Education plans, encompassing UPC targets, that meet quality standards	Education budget process is more comprehensive, transparent and efficient	Improved collection of data and better information services	Coordinated implementation of measures to strengthen capacity	More coordinated international aid that is more coherent with domestic efforts

Level Three – Intermediate Outcomes
(Changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)

Implementation of appropriate sector policies	Increase in total funds for primary education, better aligned with policy priorities	Use of better data to inform policy and funding	Adequate capacity to implement policy and services	Aid that is aligned, adequate, predictable and accountable

Level Four – Outcomes
(effects on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education)

- positive effects on availability of primary education and movement towards UPC target
- positive effects on access and equity (including gender equity)
- positive effects on learning outcomes
- sustainability of primary education provision and its quality

Level Five – Impact
(long term personal, institutional, economic and social effects of expanded primary education)

- enhanced learning, life skills and opportunities for individuals
- stronger local and national institutions
- personal and social benefits in education and other sectors (including health)
- economic growth due to increased human capital

Feedback	External Factors and Assumptions
Experience and learning feed back into subsequent inputs and secondary effects.	External influences (political, economic, other) at global and country level that affect the implementation and achievement of EFA and UPC goals. Assumptions and risks that affect the programme logic of FTI.

Source: Evaluation Framework, Figure 3A.

Annex B – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
pre 1999	Convention against discrimination in education, adopted by UNESCO in **1960**. Set out that there should be no discrimination in access or quality of education. **March 1990** World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.	**December 1991** -Parliament annulled the one party section of the constitution. Kenya had officially established itself as a single party state in 1983 **December 1992**- First elections under multi party democracy. Moi elected for a 5 year term. **February 1996** Under IMF ESAP agreement, Kenya agrees to limit new civil service staff appointments to 3,000 a year. **November 1997**- Moi re-elected because of a divided opposition. Re-election amid charges of electoral fraud, corruption, declining economic indicators. KANU, Moi's party won 113 out of 222 parliamentary seats. **August 1998**, Bombing of US embassy in Kenya, proves Kenya's vulnerability to international terrorism. A decade long decline of the national economy, reaching lowest point of 0.27% growth in 1997.	Mackay Report (**1981**)- Led to the removal of post colonial structure of education. Establishment of 8-4-4 system. **1989**- Government Cost sharing policy: user fees re-introduced having been abolished in 1971. Government pays teachers and administrative cost. Parents contribute to infrastructure, textbooks, school fees etc. **1991**- National Seminar on promotion of basic education **1992** National Seminar on post literacy strategy **1994**- National conference on EFA **1994**- Symposium on Education for the girl child **1998**? Establishment of school bank accounts for textbooks (SIMBA) and general purposes and scheme to disburse directly to these, with school level responsibility for expenditure decisions and accounting.	
1999	Education For All (EFA) Assessment **1999-2000**, involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.	Moi appoints Richard Leakey to head government drive against corruption.	Significant drop in GER following re-introduction of user fees in the decade prior.	

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
2000	United Nations Millennium Summit in **2000**, 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals. World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.		The launch of the Koech report: Mandated to recommend ways and means of enabling the education system to facilitate national unity and mutual social responsibility.	
2001	G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. **July 2001**: G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada	Leakey appears in court to face charges of abuse of power and perverting the course of justice.		
2002	G8 Washington, DC USA. **April 2002**: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community. Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. **April 2002**: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.	Moi forced under constitution to retire. Nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya's first leader, as KANU's candidate for president.		
2002	G8 Kananaskis, Canada. **June 2002**: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI. EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.	**October 2002**: National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) formed from the unification of opposition parties factions which broke away from KANU. NARC is led by Kibaki. **December 2002**: National elections. Kibaki wins 62% of votes. Moi's 24 year rule over. 4 decades of KANU as ruling party, also over.		

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
2003	Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome**, Feb 2003**. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonise donor policies and priorities around country systems FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, **March 2003**: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI.	**Jan 2003**: Government publishes anti corruption bill The Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS 2003–2007) launched. 2003 therefore marks a point of economic recovery for Kenya. ERS anchored on 4 pillars: Economic growth, governance, infrastructure and human development	Introduction of free primary education policy to fulfil government election pledge. Policy seen as a major tool for achieving the objectives of the ERS. Task force formed on free primary education. Introduction of monthly meetings between MOE and donors to take joint action on KESSP preparation.	
2003	The FTI Catalytic Fund (Catalytic Fund) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2–3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country-level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans. FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, **November 2003**: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.	**November 2003**: IMF resumes lending after a 3 year gap, citing anti corruption measures First CG meeting ever held in Kenya, and USD 4.1 billion pledged for the period 2004-2006.		
2004	Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in **November 2004** as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and programme development. FTI Partnership Meeting**, Nov 2004**, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines	**March–July** - Long-awaited draft of new constitution completed. Document requires parliament's approval and proposes curbing president's powers and creating post of prime minister. But deadline for enactment is missed. Turning point: economic recovery **July–August** Food crisis, caused by crop failures and drought.	National conference on education and training. Key policy issues that arose from the conference included - the need to review teacher norms - cost effectiveness of secondary school expansion - Diversification of finance - Review of Early Childhood education etc.	

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
2004			From April 2004 onwards, preparation of a comprehensive sector development programme, taking forward the design of the SKEDS and the Free Primary Education Support Project programmes and laying the foundation for an education SWAp that could be supported financially and technically by all major external development partners active in the education sector in Kenya.	
2005	**March 2005**, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials., who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. UN World Summit New York, **September 2005**: delegates were accused of producing a "watered-down" outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.	Parliament approves draft constitution after days of violence in which protesters say that too much power was being given to the president **November–December** - Voters reject a proposed new constitution in what is seen as a protest against President Kibaki. The president replaces his cabinet; some nominees reject their appointments.	Sessional Paper No 1 of 2005, outlining the policy framework for education research and training **July 2005**- MOE realises the need for a sector wide approach to programme planning. The Kenyan Education Sector Support Programme is introduced (KESSP 2005–2010)	**7 July 2005**- FTI endorsement of KESSP. Strengths and weaknesses identified. KESSP approved for its consultative process, widespread support, "mainstreamed" and results-based management, comprehensive strategies, and focus on quality. However, FTI endorsement process highlights areas of concern: little attention to efficiency gains, no alternative financing sources, no explicit link to monitoring indicators, risky new and experimental programmes, and the fact that training is proposed as the only solution to capacity weaknesses. **July 2005 - November 2006:** World Bank suspends release of funds to education sector while internal "forensic audit" takes place **30 December 2005** - Release of first tranche of FTI funding (USD 24.2 million)

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
2006	Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland. Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, **September 2006**, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.	Positive growth trend continues.	**Oct 2006** KESSP Joint Review of Education Sector (JRES)	**October 2006** Kenya reported annual financial gap of USD 85.4 million. This would triple yearly allocations and create implementation concerns. Based on discussions with in-country donors, the FTI Secretariat recommended that the Strategy Committee double Kenya's Year 2 allocation to USD48.4 million. **November 2006**- Catalytic Fund meeting- The Catalytic Fund SC discussed the allocation recommendations for Kenya at length. The final decision on the country's Year 2 allocation was therefore deferred pending further information from the Kenya donor group. The Catalytic Fund SC made the decision to top up Kenya's Year 3 allocation as requested to reach USD 48.4 million, i.e. an increase of USD 24.2 million.
2007	Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session). Keeping our Promises on Education, **May 2007**, Brussels, organised by the European Commission, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015. It achieved little	Kenyan Vision 2030 launched to move country into middle income status by 2030 .		**May 2007** - The decision on topping up Kenya's Year 2 allocation to reach USD 48.4 million has been made. The grant agreement was signed in March 2007. The first tranche of USD 24.2 million was disbursed in May 2007. **30 November 2007** - The second Year 2 tranche of another USD 24.2 million is disbursed

Date	International Context	Kenyan Context (General events in Kenya)	Education Policy in Kenya	FTI in Kenya
	In **Oct 2007**, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries. They also recommended that the FTI partnership consider how to work more effectively with UNESCO, the World Bank, and other agencies.	**December 2007** – 10th general elections held. Kibaki claims victory and a second term causing a wave of unrest. Opposition say polls were rigged. The main opposition Orange Democratic Movement led by Odinga wins majority in parliament	**Oct 2007** KESSP Joint Review of Education Sector (JRES)	
2008	**September 2008**, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid. Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects. Donors will also give earlier statements of their giving, so that recipients can draw up balanced budgets. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.	**January 2008**: post election violence kills 1500 people following disputes over election results. **February 2008**: Kofi Annan holds talks between Kibaki and Odinga which leads to a power sharing deal. Highest rate of economic growth experience for the first time in two decades- 7%.	Free Secondary Education announced, having been included in all parties' manifestos.	**April 2008** recent post-election crisis has affected the country's overall performance. Many children have been displaced and several schools destroyed. A World Bank Board meeting has been scheduled for permission to release USD 20 million of IDA support to education. (loan or grant?) **6 June 2008** - Disbursement of Year 3, Tranche 1 from the FTI Catalytic Fund (USD 24.2 million) **10 December 2008** - Disbursement of Year 3, Tranche 2 from the FTI Catalytic Fund (USD 24.0 million). MOE reports receiving it on 23 December leaving two days to deliver the funds into the school bank accounts.

Annex C – Interview Schedule

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
Sunday 25 Jan.		
PM	Team assemble and team meeting	Hotel
Monday, 26 Jan.		
11.00	Sarah Wright, Director of the Office of Education, USAID, Kenya	USAID office
13.30	Jonathan Caseley, Consultant, KESSP Secretariat	Hotel
15.00	Charles Obiero, EMIS, MOE	MOE
16.00	Patrick Njogi, Deputy Finance Officer, MOE	MOE
Tuesday, 27 Jan.		
8.00	Mr Macharia, Deputy Director of Finance, MOE	MOE
14.30	Mr Kinyanjui, Director, External Resources Department, Ministry of Finance	MOF
Wednesday, 28 Jan.		
10.00	Professor Karega Mutahi, PS Mr Kimathi Nkanathi, Acting Director, Policy and Planning Mr D K Mwiroba Representing Deputy Head of Human Resources Mr S Nthenge Economist-Central Planning Unit Ms Grace Nthaca MOE Policy and Planning Mrs Joyce Kebathi Director Adult Education Ms Rachel Ndung'u MOE Accounts Ms Nancy Kinyua MOE Accounts Mr P K Njogi MOE Finance Ms E K Mungai KESSP Secretariat Ms Leah Rotich Director Basic Education	MOE
12.00	Mr Kimathi Nkanathi, Acting Director, Policy and Planning	MOE
14.00	Leah Rotich, Director, Basic Education	MOE
16.00	Mike Mills, Lead Economist, World Bank Shobhana Sosale, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank	World Bank Office
Thursday, 29 Jan.		
8.30	Mrs Margaret Thiong'o, Director City Education, City Council Nairobi	City Hall
After the meeting with Mrs Thiong'o, the team went to Kibera, accompanied by City Education officials, and visited Kibera Primary School and Stara School and Rescue Centre, a non-formal school, also in Kibera. As the teachers' strike was still on, we were shown round Kibera primary by the Deputy Head teacher. Stara School was unaffected by the strike.		
18.00	Andino Obondo, Elimu Yetu (NGO Coalition)	Hotel

<table>
<tr><th>Time & Date</th><th>Stakeholders</th><th>Venue</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Friday, 30 Jan.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">The team split. Two members went to Nakuru, accompanied by Mr Mungai of KESSP Secretariat, MOE. They visited the provincial education office, meeting Mr Mohammed Mwinyipembe, the Provincial Director of Education, Rift Valley Province and senior staff, the District Education Office, and five schools.
The other team members went to Machakos, where they visited the District Office, meeting Abdi Hussein Kadir, the District Education Officer, and visited three schools, accompanied by a district quality assurance officer.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Monday, 2 Feb.</td></tr>
<tr><td>8.00</td><td>Prof George Godia, Education Secretary, MOE</td><td>MOE</td></tr>
<tr><td>9.00</td><td>Mrs Concelia Ondiek, Senior Deputy Director of Education (Secondary)</td><td>MOE</td></tr>
<tr><td>10:30</td><td>Agnes Koori, Deputy Chief Economist, Central Planning and Monitoring Unit, MOE</td><td>MOE</td></tr>
<tr><td>10.00</td><td>Mrs Joyce Kibathi, Director, Directorate of Adult and Continuing Education, MOE, and two Assiastant Directors, Milton Mokah and Salim Mungai</td><td>Ministry of Gender</td></tr>
<tr><td>13.00</td><td>Musau Ndunda, Secretary General/ Executive Director, Kenya National Association of Parents (KNAP)</td><td>KNAP offices</td></tr>
<tr><td>16.00</td><td>Mrs Maria Cherono, Deputy Director, Training</td><td>Ministry of State for Youth Affairs</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Tuesday, 3 Feb.</td></tr>
<tr><td>8.30</td><td>Louise Banham, Senior Education Officer, DFID Kenya and Somalia</td><td>DFID</td></tr>
<tr><td>11.00</td><td>Robert Ruggles and Alfred Ojwang, Education Advisors, CIDA</td><td>CIDA</td></tr>
<tr><td>14.00</td><td>Dr Eddah Gachukia, Director, Riara Schools Group</td><td>Riara Springs School</td></tr>
<tr><td>14.00</td><td>Gabriel Lengoiboni Teachers Service Commission</td><td>TSC</td></tr>
<tr><td>19.00</td><td>Inge Vervloesem (MOE Consultant)</td><td>Hotel</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Wednesday, 4 Feb.</td></tr>
<tr><td>11.00</td><td>Dr Wanjiru Kariuki, Kenya Education Staff Institute</td><td>KESI</td></tr>
<tr><td>14.30</td><td>Eldah Onsomu, KIPPRA (and local consultant)</td><td>Hotel</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Thursday, 5 Feb.</td></tr>
<tr><td>7.00</td><td>Miriam Mwirotsi, former Director, Policy and Planning, MOE</td><td>Thorn Tree café. Stanley Hotel</td></tr>
<tr><td>11.00</td><td>William Migwa, ex-Commonwealth Education Fund Coordinator (Action Aid)</td><td>Hotel</td></tr>
<tr><td>14.00</td><td>EDCG, presentation made</td><td>CIDA</td></tr>
<tr><td>14.45</td><td>Amanitta Maiga, Unicef Chief, Education and Young People</td><td>CIDA</td></tr>
</table>

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
Friday, 6 Feb.		
08.00	Mr Kimathi, Acting Director, Policy and Planning - debrief	MOE
10.00	Mohammed Abdullahi, Senior Assistant Director of Education, Non-Formal Education, MOE Susan Munuke, Assistant Director of Education, Non-Formal Education, MOE	MOE
12.30	Wendy Ayres, World Bank, secretary to the HAC	Fairview Hotel

Annex D – Basic Education Indicators

Table D1 Education statistics 2003–2007

	2003	2007
ECDE GER	56.8%	59.3 %
Total number primary schools	19,554	26,104
Total primary enrolment	7,159,523	8,330,148
Primary Boys	3674395	4258616
Primary Girls	3485128	4071532
GER	102.8 %	107.6 %
NER	80.4 %	91.6 %
Drop out		3.5 %
Completion total Boys Girls	68.2 % 71.3 % 65.2 %	81 % 86.5% 75.7 %
Transition to secondary	46.3 %	59.6 %
Secondary number of schools		6484
Total secondary enrolment	881,328	1,180,267
Boys	458,127	639,393
Girls	423,201	540,874
NFE total		121,385
NFE boys		61,555
NFE girls		59,830
Adult basic	108,431	126,724

Source: Education Statistical Booklet 2003–2007 MOE

Annex E – Education sector budget and expenditure

Table E1 Government expenditure 2003/04–2006/07, by sector (KES million)

	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	Share of rec / dev exp. 2006/07 (%)
Recurrent	**207,375**	**231,596**	**253,431**	**302,856**	**100**
General Public services	30,504	43,483	36,493	44,361	15
Transfer of general character between levels of government	3,719	3,952	6,812	6,867	2
Defence	23,397	20,979	24,131	27,282	9
Economic Affairs	24,855	20,941	25,567	36,598	12
Education	71,102	79,968	87,319	93,909	31
Environmental protection	459	1,145	1,941	2,506	1
Health	13,567	14,727	15,899	22,189	7
Housing and community amenities	3,068	2,262	2,495	3,572	1
Public Order and safety	23,935	28,939	27,715	38,759	13
Recreation, Culture & Religion	816	916	1,769	2,619	1
Social Protection	11,953	14,284	23,290	24,194	8
Development	**54,559**	**55,259**	**54,641**	**142,431**	**100**
General Public services	14,244	15,107	14,612	42,644	30
Transfer of general character between levels of government	0	0	0	0	0
Defence	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Affairs	26,563	14,683	22,041	54,843	39
Education	7,037	4,759	6,590	9,994	7
Environmental protection	394	265	416	1,225	1
Health	1,737	1,582	4,191	11,621	8
Housing and community amenities	3,658	2,178	4,986	11,728	8
Public Order and safety	737	1,485	1,318	4,914	3
Recreation, Culture & Religion	125	916	369	2,839	2
Social Protection	64	14,284	118	2,623	2
Total	**261,934**	**286,855**	**308,072**	**445,287**	
Debt Servicing	114,379	108,093	105,523	112,840	

Source: Economic Survey 2007. Note: Government expenditure recorded in the Economic Survey differs slightly to the expenditure totals in the ministerial PERs, shown in the tables below.

Table E2 Ministry of Education budget, 2002/03–2007/08 (KES million)

Budget	**2002/03**	**2003/04**	**2004/05**	**2005/06**	**2006/07**[1]	**2007/08**[2]
Total MOE	**64,117**	**77,011**	**82,504**	**96,722**	**105,262**	**106,166**
Recurrent	61,270	70,808	78,641	86,978	94,770	96,660
310 Admin & planning[3]	*52,353*	*54,520*	*59,141*	*64,264*	*72,485*	*78,802*
311 Basic education	*1,003*	*6,398*	*7,032*	*6,362*	*7,471*	*8,605*
312 Quality assurance and standards	-	-	-	*150*	*163*	*162*
313 Secondary & tertiary	*7,026*	*8,362*	*10,687*	*14,134*	*14,361*	*8,269*
314 Policy & planning	-	-	-	*203*	*290*	*188*
315 Technical	*889*	*1,528*	*1,635*	*1,865*	-	-
315 Adult & continuing ed.	-	-	-	-	-	*634*
Development	2,848	6,204	3,863	9,744	10,492	9,506
Distribution of MOE budget (%)						
Recurrent	95.0	91.9	95.3	89.9	90.0	91.0
Development	4.4	8.1	4.7	10.1	10.0	9.0

Source: 2002/03 to 2005/06 data from Ministry of Education (2007a); 2006/07 and 2007/08 data are from Ministry of Education (2008a). **Notes:** (1) In 2006/07 the mandate for university education was moved to the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, so from that year the budget for university / "technical" education is no longer included in the Ministry of Education's figures. (2) In 2007/08 the Directorate of Adult and Continuing Education moved to the Ministry of Education. (3) The sub-vote "Administration and planning" includes teachers' salaries.

Table E3 Ministry of Education expenditure, 2002/03–2007/08 (KES million)

Expenditure	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07[1]	2007/08[2]
Total MOE	**63,439**	**72,292**	**80,083**	**92,725**	**100,850**	**104,686**
Recurrent	60,892	68,216	77,219	86,276	93,114	95,818
Development	2,548	4,077	2,864	6,449	7,736	8,868
Execution rate (%)[3]						
Recurrent	99.4	96.3	98.2	99.2	98.3	99.1
Development	89.5	65.7	74.1	66.2	73.7	93.3
Total GOK	**214,276**	**263,532**	**299,065**	**360,088**	**421,038**	**-**
Recurrent	182,249	203,861	227,083	267,967	283,396	-
Development	32,027	59,671	71,983	92,121	137,642	-
Distribution of MOE expenditure (%)	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Recurrent	96.0	94.4	96.4	93.0	92.3	91.5
Development	4.0	5.6	3.6	7.0	7.7	8.5
MOE share of GOK expenditure (%)	29.6	27.4	27.1	25.8	24.0	-
Recurrent	33.4	33.5	35.6	32.2	32.9	-
Development	8.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	5.6	-
Gross Domestic Product	**1,022,208**	**1,136,288**	**1,282,505**	**1,445,477**	**1,642,405**	**1,740,949**
Total MOE as % of GDP	6.2	6.4	6.2	6.6	6.1	6.0

Source: 2002/03 to 2005/06 data from Ministry of Education (2007a); 2006/07 and 2007/08 data are from Ministry of Education (2008a). Notes: (1) In 2006/07 the mandate for university education was moved to the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, so from that year the budget for university education is no longer included in the Ministry of Education's figures. (2) In 2007/08 the Directorate of Adult and Continuing Education moved to the Ministry of Education. (3) The execution rate shows expenditure as a proportion of the budget indicated in Table E2.

Table E4 Cost forecast of the KESSP IPs, middle scenario (KES million)

IPs	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	Total
Primary construction	857.56	1655.39	1654.87	1237.95	1215.9	6621.67
ECDE	206.05	605.7	609.715	478.965	467.965	2368.395
Non-formal education	368.9	411.1	381.8	366.7	419.7	1948.2
Special needs education	302	265	292.5	317.8	326.1	1503.4
HIV/AIDS	789.98	980	980	800	701.4588	4251.439
Adult basic education	186.5	207	251.2	304.5	418	1367.2
School feeding, health (de-worming)	1644.05	1733.65	1817.55	1896.05	1997.05	9088.35
Instructional materials, School operations grants[1]	7813.218	6856.669	6899.681	6984.686	7064.441	35618.69
Primary teachers training	310	233.46	257.91	278.37	300.16	1379.9
Primary teachers (in-service training)	316.4	562.5	607.5	643	623	2752.4
ASAL mobile schools	9	18	30	30	30	117
Capacity building (Training)	157	165.1	155.1	180.4	172.9	830.5
EMIS	160.6	115.8	80.6	80.8	80.9	518.7
ICT	85.45	78.45	112.8	72.7	51.95	401.35
Guidance and counselling	79.7	111.3	111.3	59.4	59.4	421.1
Quality assurance	385.5	355	344.6	470	434.3	1989.4
Secondary education including bursaries	1959.4	2438.6	2575.4	2748.3	2913.01	12634.71
Secondary INSET mathematics and science	243.5	279.1	297.2	317.8	337.7	1475.3
TIVET (Excluding operational costs)	465	405	805	840	855	3370
Universities (including ongoing student loans)	1822	2402.3	2614.6	2904.616	3053.001	12796.52
Teacher management	5.2	5.7	4.4	1.9	1.9	19.1
Gender programme	11	11.4	153.2	168.4	139.7	483.7
Monitoring and evaluation	30	33	36.3	40	44	183.3
Total Investment programmes	**18208.01**	**19929.22**	**21073.23**	**21222.34**	**21707.54**	**102140.3**
Additional operating costs (@ 3% of total)	546.2402	597.8766	632.1968	636.6701	651.2261	
Investment programmes including additional	**18754.25**	**20527.1**	**21705.42**	**21859.01**	**22358.76**	**105204.5**

IPs	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	Total
operation costs						
Total teachers salaries	**61,391.0**	**67,518.8**	**73,769.2**	**75,244.6**	**76,749.5**	**354,673.1**
Primary teacher salaries	**38,264.1**	**42,083.5**	**45,979.2**	**46,898.8**		
Secondary teacher salaries	**21,165.5**	**23,278.1**	**25,433.0**	**25,941.7**		
TSC Secretariat	**2,177.0**	**2,220.5**	**2,265.0**	**2,310.3**	**2,356.5**	**11,329.2**
Ministry salaries	**1,595.3**	**1,627.2**	**1,659.8**	**1,693.0**	**1,726.8**	**8,302.0**
Grants to universities	**8,800.4**	**9,152.3**	**8,800.4**	**9,000.0**	**9,000.0**	**44,753.1**
Settlement university pending bills	**460.0**	**400.0**	**417.0**	**-**	**-**	**1,277.0**
Other MOES&T administrative costs (excluding salaries)	**2,877.0**	**2,992.1**	**3,111.8**	**3,236.2**	**3,365.7**	**15,582.8**
Other construction and equipment costs	**490.0**	**900.0**	**900.0**	**-**	**-**	**2,290.0**
Total Spending on Education	**96,545.0**	**105,338.0**	**112,628.5**	**113,343.0**	**115,557.2**	**543,411.7**

Source: MOEST (2005). Note: School operation grants are for public primary and non-formal schools.

Table E5 Actual expenditure under the KESSP IPs, 2005/06–2007/08 (KES million)

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
KESSP expenditure	**6,735**	**14,869**	**19,044**
MOE IPs	6,472	14,653	17,377
non-MOE IPs	263	216	1,667
MOE IPs as proportion of MOE expenditure (%)	**7.0**	**14.5**	**16.6**

Source: Ministry of Education (2006, 2007b and 2008b).

Table E6 Domestic and external contributions to KESSP

Sources	Contribution recorded in fourth quarter FMR						Adjusted cumulative total July 2005–June 2008	
	2005/06		2006/07		2007/08			
	KES m	%	KES m	%	KES m	%	KES m	%
GOK	84,855	94.6	94,848	95.0	97,132	93.3	279,070	94.1
DFID	1,428	1.6	1,075	1.1	1,423	1.4	3,927	1.3
IDA	325	0.4	1,434	1.4	1,241	1.2	3,000	1.0
CIDA	9	0.0	446	0.4	450	0.4	1,331	0.4
VVOB	-	0.0	-	0.0	3	0.0	4	0.0
Unicef	116	0.1	68	0.1	81	0.1	412	0.1
ADB/ADF	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.0	6	0.0
OPEC	12	0.0	177	0.2	223	0.2	411	0.1
FTI	1,755	2.0	1,582	1.6	3,094	3.0	6,431	2.2
WFP	1,224	1.4	0	0.0	403	0.4	1,627	0.5
USAID	-	0.0	210	0.2	0	0.0	210	0.1
Total	**89,724**	**100**	**99,839**	**100**	**104,055**	**100**	**296,429**	**100**

Source: Ministry of Education (2006, 2007b and 2008b). The cumulative total is from Ministry of Education (2008b). Note: For the Government of Kenya, CIDA and Unicef, the cumulative total does not exactly match the sum of the three separate recorded contributions because small adjustments have been made to the figures after initial publication.

Table E7 Share of external contributions to KESSP, by donor (%)

Development partner	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	Total
DFID	29.3	21.5	20.6	22.6
IDA	6.7	28.7	17.9	17.3
CIDA	0.2	8.9	6.5	7.7
VVOB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unicef	2.4	1.4	1.2	2.4
ADB / ADF	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
OPEC	0.2	3.5	3.2	2.4
FTI	36.0	31.7	44.7	37.0
WFP	25.1	0.0	5.8	9.4
USAID	0.0	4.2	0.0	1.2
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: Ministry of Education (2006, 2007b and 2008b). The cumulative total is from Ministry of Education (2008b).

Table E8 Indicative financing gap for education (KES million)

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	Total
Total GOK Funding	**87,634**	**91,974**	**96,530**	**100,358**	**104,338**	**480,834**
Recurrent	86,792	91,132	95,688	99,516	103,496	476,624
Development	842	842	842	842	842	4,210
Total external funding	**6,979**	**6,547**	**4,558**	**2,350**	**1,708**	**22,142**
Total Funding Available	**94,613**	**98,520**	**101,088**	**102,708**	**106,047**	**502,976**
Total Proposed Investment	96,545	105,338	112,629	113,343	115,557	543,412
Financing Gap	**1,932**	**6,818**	**11,541**	**10,635**	**9,511**	**40,436**
Financing Gap in USD m	**24.2**	**85.3**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Source: MOEST (2005).

Figure E1 Share of sub-vote 310 (salaries) in the recurrent budget, 2002/03–2007/08 (%)



Source: 2002/03 to 2005/06 data from Ministry of Education (2007); 2006/07 and 2007/08 data are from Ministry of Education (2008). See also Table E2 below for totals in Kenyan shillings.

Annex F – KESSP Results and Monitoring Framework

(Annex 5 of KESSP PAD – World Bank 2006c)

Results Framework		
Development Objectives	**Baseline Situation, including Indicator Values if available**	**Monitorable Results**
1. Ensure equity of access to basic education	Net Enrolment Ratio at the primary level was 83% in 2005 (84% for boys, 83% for girls). Thus, nationwide, 17% of school-age children who should have been in school were not. However, some provinces, such as North Eastern, were significantly below the national average. Primary completion rate in 2005 was 80% (83% for boys, 77% for girls). However, some provinces, such as North Eastern, were significantly below the national average.	NER close 100% (at least 96%) by 2010, with lagging provinces raised closer to national average. PCR close to 100% (at least 92%) by 2010, with lagging provinces raised closer to the national average
2. Enhance quality and learning achievement.	Scores on periodic National Survey of Learning Achievement Baseline mean scores at Grade 6 (2005): English: 56% Mathematics: 55% Science: 40%	Improved scores.
3. Provide opportunities for further education and training (secondary, TIVET, university).	Transition rate to secondary education of students passing Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) Baseline value: 54% in 2005	Transition rate of 70% by 2010
4. Strengthen sector management.	Policy reforms enhancing efficiency of resource allocations and effectiveness of service implemented with primary education having a sufficient share of the recurrent budget and with a sufficient proportion of the recurrent budget allocation to non salary expenditures. Currently, the respective figures are 57.4% and 14.7% respectively	At least 55% of the recurrent budget for primary education and 15% for non salary expenditures.
Intermediate Outcomes relating to Basic Education		
1. Teacher availability	Pupil/Teacher Ratio in public primary schools was 43:1 in 2005 as a national average, but with considerable disparities among districts, schools, and classes. Percentage of classes in public primary schools with class sizes above 50.	National average PTR of 45:1 Eliminate such classes
2. Textbook availability	Pupil/textbook ratio in public primary schools Lower primary: English, 3:1, math, 4:1; science, 3:1 Upper primary English, 3:1, math, 3:1; science, 3:1	One textbook per subject (English, math and science) per child by 2010.
3. School infrastructure.	Ratio of pupils to permanent classrooms in public primary schools. Baseline; 48.3 in 2005	The ratio of pupils to permanent classrooms decreases significantly.

Results Framework		
Development Objectives	**Baseline Situation, including Indicator Values if available**	**Monitorable Results**
Intermediate Outcomes relating to Secondary Education		
1. Sub sector strategy.	Lack of an agreed strategy for development of this sub sector.	An agreed strategy for secondary education has been produced (target year: 2007).
2. Teacher deployment in secondary education	Need for new staffing norms for secondary schools PTR in secondary education was only 19:1 in 2003 and 21:1 in 2004 (public secondary schools)	Satisfactory revised staffing norms in place and being implemented PTR should increase from baseline value of 21.
Intermediate Outcome relating to TIVET	Lack of an agreed strategy for development of this sub sector	An agreed strategy for the TIVET sub sector has been produced (target year: 2008)
Intermediate Outcome relating to University Education	Lack of an agreed strategy for development of this sub sector	An agreed strategy for university education has been produced, with adequate attention to governance and anti-corruption issues (target year: 2008)
Intermediate Outcomes relating to Sector Management and Financial Resource Allocation	Primary education’s share of the MOE recurrent budget is currently 57%. This share will be maintained at a minimum of at least 55% (despite enrolment growth in secondary, where greater efficiency is needed). Within primary, at least 15% of the budget will be allocated to non-salary school level operations. (Baseline: 15% in 2005/06).	Primary education’s share at least 55%. At least 15%.

Arrangements for Results Monitoring

Development Objectives Indicators	Baseline (2005, unless otherwise stated)	Target Values					Data Collection and Reporting		
		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Frequency	Data Collection Instruments	Responsibility for Data Collection
National average Net Enrolment Ratio	83%	86%	89%	92%	94%	96%	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
PCR close to 100%	80%	83%	86%	88%	90%	92%	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
Improved scores at Grade 6 on national learning assessment	English:56% Math: 55% Science: 40%		Improved over 2005		Improved over 2007		Bi-annual	Learning Assessment	KNEC
Transition rate of students passing KCPE admitted in secondary education	57%	59%	62%	64%	64%	70%	Annual	KCPE; School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
Intermediate Outcome Indicators									
National average Pupil/Teacher Ratio	43:1	43:1	43:1	44:1	44:1	45:1	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
Percentage of classes with class size above 50	Determined in first school questionnaire					Zero	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
Pupil/textbook ratio	Lower primary English; 3:1 Math; 3:1 Science; 3:1 Upper primary English; 3:1 Math; 3:1 Science; 3:1					One textbook per pupil per class	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE

Intermediate Outcome Indicators	**Baseline (2005, unless otherwise stated)**	**Target Values**					**Data Collection and Reporting**		
		2006	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**Frequency**	**Data Collection Instruments**	**Responsibility for Data Collection**
Ratio of pupils to permanent classrooms	48.3					Lower	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
Secondary education subsector strategy			Agreed strategy produced						
New staffing norms for secondary schools			Revised norms in place & being implemented						
Pupil/teacher Ratio in public secondary schools	19:1 in 2003, 21:1 in 2004					Higher	Annual	School questionnaire	Statistics Section, MOE
TIVET sub sector strategy				Agreed strategy produced					
University education sub sector strategy				Agreed strategy produced					
Primary education's share of recurrent budget	57%	At least 55%	At least 55%	At least 55%	At least 55%	At least 55%	Annual	Budgets; Actual expenditures (audited accounts)	Ministry of Education
Percentage of primary education recurrent budget devoted to non-salary school-level operations	15%	At least 15%	At least 15%	At least 15%	At least 15%	At least 15%	Annual	Budgets; Actual expenditures (audited accounts)	Ministry of Education

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