

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Case Study: Ghana

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Summary Information for Ghana

- Currency = New Ghana Cedi (GHC)
- Exchange Rate (11 June 2009) GHC 1 = USD 0.67
- Fiscal Year = Calendar year
- School Year = September to July
- Structure of education system:
2 years kindergarten + 6 years primary + 3 years junior high school + 3 or 4 years senior high school
- Population: 23.5 million (2007)
- Population growth rate: 2% (2007)

Acknowledgements

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Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and by 2009 had been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation was intended to provide an opportunity for reform and change where necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation was required to draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and to make recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness.

The evaluation took place between November 2008 and February 2010. It was independent but jointly supported by a consortium of donors. An Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) was made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society.

The evaluation team was a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The methodology and process for the evaluation are described in Appendix V (Volume 4) of the final synthesis report.

The main outputs of the evaluation, which included nine country case studies and eight desk studies, are listed overleaf.

Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Preliminary Report. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

Burkina Faso	<i>Burkina Faso Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
Cambodia	<i>Cambodia Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
Ghana	<i>Ghana Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
Kenya	<i>Kenya Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
Mozambique	<i>Mozambique Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
Nicaragua	<i>Nicaragua Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
Nigeria	<i>Nigeria Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sulliemman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
Pakistan	<i>Pakistan Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
Yemen	<i>Yemen Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

Ethiopia	<i>Ethiopia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
Malawi	<i>Malawi Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
Mali	<i>Mali Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Moldova	<i>Moldova Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
Rwanda	<i>Rwanda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Uganda	<i>Uganda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
Vietnam	<i>Vietnam Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
Zambia	<i>Zambia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BECE	Basic Education Certificate Examination
BESIP	Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme
BPEMS	Budget and Public Expenditure Management System
CB	Capacity Building
CD	Capacity Development
CF	Catalytic Fund
CP	Country Partner
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DIC	Decentralisation Implementation Committee
DP	Development Partner
EC	European Commission
EdSeP	Education Sector Program (WB)
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management and Information System
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund
EQUALL	Education Quality for All Project
ERPFM	External Review of Public Financial Management
ESAR	Education Sector Annual Review
ESP	Education Sector Plan
ESPR	Education Sector Performance Report
ESPRR	Education Sector Policy Review Report
ESSP	Education Sector Support Programme
ESAR	Education Sector Annual Review
ESTAC	Education Sector technical Advisory Committee
FPMU	Funds and Procurement Management Unit
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
FCUBE	Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education
GAR	Gross Admission Ratio
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GES	Ghana Education Service
GET Fund	Ghana Education Trust Fund
GHC	New Ghana Cedi
G-JAS	Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy
GNAT	Ghana National Association of Teachers
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNECC	Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition
GOG	Government of Ghana
GPI	Gender Parity Index
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPS	Ghana Partnership Strategy
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTZ	German Development Aid
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IF	Indicative Framework
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
IPPD	Integrated Personnel/Payroll Database
JHS	Junior High School
JICA	Japanese International Development Agency
JSS	Junior Secondary School
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDBS	Multi Donor Budget Support
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MOE	Ministry of Education (from 2009)*
MOESS	Ministry of Education, Science & Sport*

MOEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport* [*These titles have changed with successive governments – the current nomenclature is MOE]
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAR	Net Admission Ratio
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NEA	National Education Assessment
NER	Net Enrolment Ratio
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NETF	Norwegian Education Trust Fund
NPP	New Patriotic Party
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PBME	Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring & Evaluation
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PESR	Preliminary Education Sector Report
PIEE	Presidential Initiative on Extended Education (USA)
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PE	Personal Emoluments
QUIPS	Quality Improvements in Primary Schools
SBNS	Sector Budget Support
SE	Supervising Entity
SHEP	School Health in Education Programme
SHS	Senior High School
SMC	School Management Committee
SMTAP	GOG Short and Medium Term Action Plan for PFM
SRIMPR	Statistics Research Information Management and Public Relations
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSS	Senior Secondary School
SWG	Sector Working Group
TAD	Teachers as Agents of Dissemination (wrt HIV/AIDS)
TTL	Task Team Leader
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UBC	Universal Basic Completion
UIS	UNESCO Institute of Statistics
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UPC	Universal Primary Completion
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1 In June 2002 Ghana was one of the first 18 countries to receive an invitation to join the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Partnership and by July the Government of Ghana had accepted the invitation. By August 2003, just over one year later, Ghana had compiled a draft proposal for inclusion in the FTI and in September submitted its application for FTI endorsement to the FTI Secretariat. Key strategies identified in the proposal for attainment of Education for All (EFA)-FTI goals were: (i) construction of new classrooms and rehabilitation of existing classrooms; (ii) teacher training, recruitment and deployment, requiring the provision of area incentives to encourage teacher deployment in remote areas, including teacher accommodation, vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles to facilitate teacher mobility; (iii) provision of learning and teaching materials, including text books; (iv) monitoring, evaluation and supervision; and (v) capitation grants for primary schools.

S2 In line with the procedure for endorsement, an appraisal of the FTI was prepared by the development partners and submitted in November 2003 to the FTI by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS). The Government of Ghana (GOG) was commended for its Education Sector Plan (ESP), the Annual Education Sector Operational Plan and proposal.

S3 In November 2004, the FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) Strategy Committee decided to allocate USD 8m to Ghana to support (i) supplying of basic school text books; (ii) a teacher initiative scheme; and (iii) monitoring and supervision. This was to be the Year One allocation, with disbursement to be made in two tranches. In July 2005, The FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee confirmed the second year (FY06) allocation of USD 11m for Ghana. At the November 2006 FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Meeting, it was decided to top up Ghana's Year Three allocation as requested to reach USD 14.2m, i.e. an increase of USD 3.2m. By November 2007, a total of USD 19m had been disbursed. In December 2007, Ghana requested preparation of the Grant Agreement for the Year Three amount of USD 14.2m, and in January 2008, in line with the new guidelines. At the time of this review (June 2009) the final allocation of CF funds has not yet been paid. Ghana is preparing its new ESP, for the period 2010–2020, but the government has yet to decide whether or not to apply for further EFA-FTI funding. Some use has been made of Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) funds in support of the preparation of the new ESP.

S4 Basic Education has been a major focus of government since the implementation of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) from 1995. It is a key element of successive ESPs, from 2003 to 2010 versions. The structure of basic education has now become 2 (kindergarten) +6 (primary) +3 (junior high school). There has been a move to simplify the lower primary curriculum and to make the junior high school curriculum more general and less pre-vocationally oriented. Focus has properly shifted from emphasis on enrolment to concern with completion of basic education. Gender access to primary is almost 50/50, but slightly lower in junior high school. The Dakar goal relating to adult literacy is neglected, with national literacy static around a worrying 62%.

S5 Development partner contributions have generally reflected the priority for support to basic education in their investments, almost always within the over-arching framework of the ESP, although there are signs that their focus may be shifting now, perhaps to reflect new directions in the revised ESP.

S6 What is very clear, as documented in the Ministry of Education (MOE) own reports on sector performance, is that while upstream planning may be of good quality, the downstream service delivery remains grossly inefficient in relation to the quality of teaching and learning. Sample shockers from the 2008 report include: (i) basic education teacher

absenteeism is at 27%; and (ii) from a school year of 197 days, **average** days worked is 80. All assessments of learning outcomes at the end of primary show very low levels of achievement in core subjects. It is very clear to us that the mere reporting of enrolment, even the substitution of completion data, simply hides the serious under-performance of the sector.

S7 This intensive study has been carried out by a team of four consultants – Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods. An extensive literature search and the preparation of an issues paper were undertaken prior to a two-week in-country investigation. This was inevitably focused on key stakeholders based in Accra, but two district offices were visited and one teachers' college. A country visit note (Allsop et al. 2009) was shared with the interviewees prior to departing from Accra, and subsequently shared with the EOC. The present draft is the product of further intensive work and is also circulated for comment. A first draft of this report was circulated for general comment October 2009. The present final draft takes account of comments received at all stages.

The High Level Evaluation Questions

Objective 1: Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with the current needs and priorities of Ghana?

S8 There is indeed consistency between what the FTI has sought to accomplish and Ghana's needs in relation to the achievement of the EFA/Millennium Development Goal (MDG) goals. Although primary completion and gender equity data suggests strong participation at that level, there are outstanding issues relating to achieving universal basic completion through the three years of junior high school. There are great concerns about the performance of the basic education sub-sector in relation to quality (¶3.12). There are similar anxieties about the very low levels of adult literacy, including among many young adults (¶3.10).

S9 Ghana's policy priorities are expressed through two iterations of Education Sector Plans – 2003 and up-coming 2010. The 2003 Plan was created during a period in Ghana of preoccupation with basic education (roughly from 1995–2004). Therefore it prioritises EFA/MDG goals and at that point takes the FTI aims on board. There is a close congruence between the 2003 ESP, the EFA FTI submission, the Development Partner (DP) assessments, and its 2004 approval. This was subsequently reflected in the use of CF monies in support of chosen components of the Plan. Between 2004 and the time of writing, there has been a noticeable shift of priorities, only one of which, the introduction of compulsory two years of kindergarten, relates to EFA goals. This priority is clearly educationally sound, but questions remain about quality, teachers and funding. The major discourse, surfacing after a 15-year period during which both internal and external pressures insisted on basic education prioritisation, around the soon-to-be-released draft form of ESP 2010–2020 has been around the nature and duration of senior high schooling and technical and vocational education and training (TVET). The FTI, in its present formulation, has little to say in relation to these areas. In its interactions with a country like Ghana, it may well be timely for the FTI to consider a broader perspective on educational priorities, as systems mature.

Objective 2: To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, namely, accelerating progress on EFA?

S10 It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. Throughout the period under consideration, the discourse and practice of promoting EFA has been, quite properly, sited principally with GOG. Its traditional DP constituencies have supported and participated fully. The FTI has had indirect influence with both, but rarely in terms of an overt output. The FTI made modest contributions to the policy/planning and capacity building processes of

MOE/GOG, particularly in the early stages, but that influence is hard to identify in 2009. In relation to progress against key indicators, it is not possible to make attribution to an "FTI effect".

S11 The separate funding modality of FTI CF has made tangible and appropriate contributions. Initially this was important to MOE in order to address a funding gap for EFA-related activities. More recently CF monies have allowed MOE flexibility in its allocations. Overall, the delivery of CF funds has been "anything but fast", and the third cycle of funding, agreed in November 2006, has become subject to much more complex procedures as the process has become more closely aligned with standard World Bank (WB) programming procedures. Why the chosen mode of funding was through what is essentially a project approach is hard to understand, given Ghana's experience with a range of other funding mechanisms both within the education sector and more generally.

Objective 3: Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris declaration ideals?

S12 There is no evidence of FTI influence being effective in harnessing additional resource flows from either the domestic budget or from international sources, with one exception mentioned later in this paragraph. The allocation of monies from all sources to EFA priorities has oscillated during the period of FTI engagement, but no causal, or even correlational, link to FTI influence can be shown. Two agencies – JICA and USAID – did indicate that their head offices had shown great interest in the FTI process, and that in the case of USAID it seemed highly likely that this had been an influence in additional funds of between USD 2m (2008) and USD 5m (2009) being leveraged for EFA-related projects through the Presidential Initiative on Extended Education (PIEE).

S13 The donor/development partner environment in the education sector in Ghana remains highly individualistic. While all DPs site their contributions within the existing ESP and would doubtless claim allegiance to the Paris Declaration ideals, many continue to pick their areas of contribution according to their own traditions and enthusiasms. There are several "allowable" funding modalities in the sector, all of which are in use. Even the existence of a strong Education Sector Annual Review (ESAR) process, which is presented with an in-depth analysis of the sector, has barely reduced the number and intensity of monitoring and evaluation exercises mounted by individual DPs. It is noteworthy that the 2009 ESAR was deemed inadequate by DPs, with particular anxieties expressed regarding the incompleteness of both the presented data and its analysis.

S14 Why does this situation continue in a context where a higher degree of harmonisation might be seen to be beneficial to all parties? Firstly, from the GOG/MOE side, it can be argued that the period from the mid-1990s to the production of the first ESP in 2003 was one where sectoral initiatives were taken by two powerful DPs – WB (BESIP) and Department for International Development (DFID) (Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP)) – who often challenged each other for primacy in the aid discourse rather than government. USAID and JICA, through this period, continued with business as usual. With the preparation of the first ESP, the White Paper on Education, and now the revised ESP 2010–2020, GOG/MOE finally stamped their own authority on the process of educational development. It is in this context and in the absence from the education sector of the voices of those other donors most likely to promote joined-up thinking – the Nordics and Netherlands – that a coherent sector-wide approach (SWAp) has failed to emerge. The result – a situation where a variety of aid instruments are still in use, from the multi-donor budget support (MDBS) approach operating across the social sectors to traditional project modalities – with all the inefficiencies in aid delivery which are well documented. So, in addition to taking control of the policy ground, will GOG/MOE finally use the opportunities of

the Paris and Accra declarations to take full control of the instruments available for maximising the benefits from aid to the education sector? For as long as GOG/MOE and the DPs are locked in the present set of processes, almost rituals, it seems unlikely. And set against this, the role of the FTI in bringing coherence seems likely to remain marginal.

S15 Detailed conclusions for each of the six streams/levels may be located in Chapter 11 (Conclusions) and Summary Matrices for each stream/level are found at Annex G.

PART A: APPROACH

1. Introduction

The Fast Track Initiative¹

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is "accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015" (FTI 2004a p3). It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.² Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, FTI was designed as a compact that "explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' improvements in policy performance and accountability for results" (FTI 2004a p3).

1.2 According to its Framework document (FTI 2004a), the FTI's major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education.
- More efficient aid for primary education.
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education.
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education.
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.

1.4 The 2004 *FTI Framework* set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country level.
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes.
- **Support linked to performance:** The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources.
- **Lower transaction costs:** The FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves).

¹ This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM 2009a, Annex A).

² The Dakar Forum communiqué stated that "No countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources."

- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed). Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI-specific instruments which can provide support at country level:

- The **Catalytic Fund (CF)** set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The Fund had disbursed United States Dollar (USD) 396m to 20 countries as of November 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)** set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8m (of USD 58.5m committed) to over 60 countries as of December 2008.

1.6 The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.7 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at Annex B of this report includes a summary of the main changes in the FTI, as well as its involvement with Ghana.)

Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.8 The FTI partnership step commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the terms of reference (TOR):

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (FTI EOC 2008, ¶12)

1.9 The evaluation was managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process was meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raised. The main outputs are listed on page iv.

Evaluation Methodology

1.10 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI is to disentangle the activities and effects of the FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted is *contribution analysis*. This involves a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence is then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) the FTI may have made to the overall results observed. See Annex A for the evaluation's logical framework.

The Role of Country Studies

1.11 The work programme for the evaluation included nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (FTI EOC 2008 ¶21)

1.12 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with the FTI.³ Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked with the FTI's processes for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies have been conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in the FTI, and it is expected that their reports will be of value to the countries concerned.

1.13 The country studies aimed to take account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), aid effectiveness) which the FTI is intended to have. They aimed to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to the country study.

The Study Process for Ghana

1.14 The country case studies were based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

1.15 Between 18th and 29th May 2009, the team met a range of stakeholders from the government, development partner, NGO and civil society communities. The team visited two districts – Kpando and Accra Metro – and one teacher training college – St. Teresa's at Hohoe. The team would like to thank all those who responded so graciously and carefully to our many questions. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is at Annex C. A Country Visit Note (Allsop et al. 2009) summarised the team's preliminary findings and was circulated to in-country stakeholders on 28 May, and the EOC shortly afterwards.

Outline of this Report

1.16 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (¶1.10 above), this report first reviews Ghana's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B p7), then systematically considers the parts played by the FTI (Part C p31). Conclusions and recommendations are in Part D (p87).

1.17 Part C (p31) is structured according to the five workstreams within the overall evaluation: policy and planning, finance, data and M&E, capacity development and aid effectiveness. Each subsection addresses the context, inputs and activities of the FTI, and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (where possible) within these workstream areas. There is also a chapter on cross-cutting issues. At the end of each workstream section, a short commentary is presented opposite each hypothesis taken directly from the overall evaluation framework.

³ See the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM 2009a, Annex H) for a full explanation of the choice of country cases.

1.18 This country case study aimed to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- All stakeholders in Ghana with an interest in the education sector.
- The FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report.
- The EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee).
- Any other interested parties.

PART B: EFA IN GHANA

2. Ghana Background

Ghana in Brief

2.1 Ghana has a population of 23 million people, of whom around 51% live in rural areas. The average gross national income (GNI) per capita was USD 1,320 in 2007.⁴ There is considerable geographical diversity between the hot and relatively arid north and the hot, humid and relatively fertile south.

2.2 In recent years, Ghana has shown improvement in a range of socio-economic and human development indicators. According to the latest Ghana Living Standards Survey, the proportion of the population defined as poor has declined from 52% in 1991/1992 to 29% in 2005/2006, thus putting Ghana on track to meet Millennium Development Goal 1. However, this decline in poverty is characterised by regional disparity. Poverty continues to be rife in the three northern regions, where the incidence of poverty ranges between 52%–88% compared to 12%–31% in the southern part of the country (#41 Ghana Statistical Service 2007). Life expectancy has also shown improvements; in 2007 the average Ghanaian was expected to live up to 60 years.⁵

2.3 Since 2000, the Ghanaian economy has exhibited a continuous trend of positive growth rates.⁶ In 2007, the annual growth rate reached 6.3% and this was the second consecutive year that growth rate had been in excess of 6% since the 1980s. Between 2000 and 2007, the average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was 5.2%, a figure higher than the sub-Saharan average of 4.8% in the same period. Improved macroeconomic policies, in particular anti-inflationary monetary policy and a consolidated fiscal policy pursued under the Kufuor administration, have contributed to this growth surge.

2.4 In 2009, economic activity is expected to remain strong with GDP growth projected to continue to remain around 6%. This level of growth will be necessary to enable Ghana to accelerate implementation of the poverty reduction strategy (see next section p10) and to remain on the path to middle income status by 2015. With the discovery of oil reserves in 2007, the future growth prospects are looking even brighter for Ghana.

2.5 Solid progress has been made on the political front in the past 17 years. Political liberalisation began in the early 1990s, characterised by initiation of the 1992 Constitution which established the fourth republic, multi party elections, and a return to constitutional rule with an elected administration. Five competitive elections have been held in the fourth republic with each demonstrating elements of change, continuity and the strengthening of Ghana's political landscape.

2.6 The 1992 elections won by the National Democratic Congress under Jerry Rawlings who had ruled Ghana in the last eighteen years under the military regime produced a

⁴ Based on 2007 figures from World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2008). Accessed 7-June-09.

⁵ World Bank 2008.

⁶ This current positive growth trend occurs against the background of decades of unstable growth pattern. Following only a few years of initial positive growth rates after independence, the Ghanaian economy gave way to declining levels of output between 1975 and 1983 owing to a range of internal (political instability, domestic economic mismanagement) and external (declining terms of trade of key export commodities, rising levels of interest rate etc) factors. Average GDP growth rate in this period was at -2.5%. Consequently, in 1983, Ghana implemented the World Banks Structural Adjustment Policies. Although the economy responded positively initially with average growth rate at 5.4%, the policies failed to lay the foundations for sustained growth and throughout the 1990's only a modest degree of success in economic growth was realised.

stalemate and opposition boycott. The 1996 election, again won by Rawlings under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) produced a strong opposition presence in the legislature. The 2000 election produced power change and, for the first time in Ghana's history, one democratically elected party succeeded by another. The New Patriotic Party led by John Kufuor won the election. The 2004 elections in which Kufuor government retained power portrayed Ghana as a maturing democracy and as an example for its African peers.

2.7 In December 2008, Ghana held its latest round of general elections. The first round of presidential voting held on December 7th did not produce a clear winner. A run-off was held on December 28th in which John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won with 50.23% of the vote, only slightly more than his opponent from the ruling National Patriotic Party (NPP), Nana Akufo-Addo, who earned 49.77%. The recent election provided a test of Ghana's democratic strength; despite a very close margin of vote between the two dominant parties, state institutions, particularly the judiciary and the electoral commission, withstood significant tension.

National Development Strategy

2.8 In 2003 Ghana developed the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) as the framework for coordinating social and economic development in Ghana. This was followed in 2006 by the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2006–2009) known as GPRS II. GPRS II introduced a shift of strategic focus, even though many of the actual programmes proposed between 2006 and 2009 are in the same areas as GPRS I. The central goal of the new policy is to accelerate the growth of the economy so that Ghana can achieve middle-income status within a measurable planning period. Reflecting the strong emphasis on economic growth, the main pillars of the strategy are:

- Macroeconomic stability which is guided by the goal of doubling the size of the economy (in terms of real production) and bringing per capita income to middle-income level (from USD 750–USD 1,000) by 2015.
- Accelerated private sector-led growth in which the strategy seeks to systematically address structural constraints at policy and institutional levels which hamper private-sector competitiveness (i) in the agricultural sector in the medium term; and (ii) in the industrial and other sectors over the long term.
- Vigorous human resource development to produce a knowledgeable, well-trained and disciplined labour force with the capacity to drive and sustain private sector-led growth. In this the following broad policy areas have been identified: promotion of formal education and training and skills development; improved access to health care; malaria control and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) prevention and treatment; access to safe water and adequate sanitation; housing and slum upgrading and population management; health education; and the mainstreaming of policies relating to vulnerability and exclusion in human resource development.
- Good governance and civic responsibility which includes policies for strengthening both political and economic governance. Strategies for political governance under GPRS II include strengthening Parliament, enhancing decentralisation, protecting rights under rule of law, ensuring public safety and security, managing public policy, empowering women and vulnerable groups, enhancing development communication, ensuring good corporate governance, increasing access to information, and promoting civic responsibility. GPRS II priorities for enhancing economic governance focus on improved management of fiscal, monetary and international trade policies. GPRS II is a broad strategy document with many strands and consistent goals but the policies outlined to achieve these goals are neither effectively detailed nor prioritised. The change of

administration will undoubtedly affect policy in a number of areas, but is not expected to change the main thrust of GPRS II.

Prioritisation is strengthened in sectoral strategy documents and annual work plans. In Education these are the Education Strategic Plan 2003–2015 (MOE 2003a), the Ten Year Work Plan for Education of 2006 (MOESS 2006d) and the Education White Paper of 2004 (MOE 2004).

Box 2.1 GPRS II and Education

GPRS II and Education

The human resources component of GPRS II emphasises the creation of competent manpower for development in which education plays an important role. It makes provision for improved basic education but also obligatory attendance for all children for 11 years (ages from 4 to 15). The strategy also emphasises quality and efficiency in the delivery of education service and bridging the gender gap in access to education. The prioritised policy objectives for the education sector under the GPRS II, as summarised in the 2006 10 year plan for education are:

- Increase access to and participation in education and training.
- Bridge gender gap in access to education.
- Improve quality of teaching and learning.
- Improve quality and efficiency in delivery of education service.
- Promote and extend the provision of science, maths, technology and ICT education and training.
- Enhance and strengthen the linkages between academic research and all sectors of the economy.
- Mainstream issues of population, gender, health, HIV/AIDS/STI, fire safety, road safety and environment in the curricula of schools and institutions of higher learning.

Economy

2.9 GPRS II anticipates that annual real economic growth will rise from 6% to 8% towards the realisation of middle income status by 2015. This projection is based upon a series of assumptions concerning population growth, inflation and other variables specified in the document. GPRS II also sets out four macroeconomic fundamentals to guide policy:

- Prudent fiscal policy management.
- A monetary policy that is flexible enough to respond to external shocks, promote growth and ensure price stability.
- Real interest rates that enhance effective mobilisation of savings and make credits affordable to the private sector.
- Relatively stable real exchange rates that promote international trade.

2.10 In June 2007 the macroeconomic outlook changed significantly when off-shore oil reserves expected to produce three billion barrels were discovered. However, in the last 12 months, the macroeconomic situation in Ghana has changed considerably for the worse, as an election-year increase in public expenditures has been followed by the global economic downturn.

2.11 The 2008 fiscal deficit rose to 14.9% of GDP, up from 9.2% of GDP in 2007. This was in spite of an increase in nominal tax revenues of 29.8% over 2007. A major factor in the fiscal deficit was increases in the public sector wage bill which rose to 11.5% of GDP, more than 40% higher in nominal terms than in 2007. In an effort to curb this trend, the new administration has signalled in the Budget Statement for 2009 that it will bring the fiscal deficit back to 9.4%.

2.12 Inflation is also increasing. It reached 19.9% in January 2009, up from 12.7% at the end of 2007. During 2009 the inflation rate is targeted to fall back to 15.3%.

2.13 Real GDP growth averaged 6.2% from 2005 to 2007. Although 2008 saw strong continuing real economic growth at the same 6.2% (reported in the 2009 Budget Statement) this was supported by high levels of public expenditures and good performance of the country's main exports (cocoa and gold) which may not continue. Cognisant of the impact of the economic downturn, the 2009 forecast is for slightly lower real GDP growth of 5.9%.

2.14 The implication of the deteriorating macroeconomic position is that real cuts in public expenditure may become necessary. A recent World Bank report (World Bank 2009b) makes the following point which is of relevance to the education sector: if expenditure cuts fall disproportionately on public investment in order to protect public consumption such as wages and salaries, this may lead to reduced growth in the medium term.

Quality of Public Financial Management⁷

2.15 Public financial management (PFM) in Ghana operates under a mature legislative and regulatory framework (Betley 2008) of which much has been recently revised to take account of current best practice. Recent legislation includes the Financial Administration Act of 2003 (FAA); the Auditor-General Act of 2000; the Internal Audit Agency Act of 2003; and the Public Procurement Act of 2003. A Fiscal Responsibility Act is currently proposed.

2.16 In the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Performance Report undertaken in 2006 (World Bank 2006) Ghana was graded well for the orderliness and levels of participation in its budgeting process. Budgets are produced in a timely manner according to a widely circulated timetable (although there was some slippage in the 2009 budget completion as a result of the election in late 2008).

2.17 The public financial management system of Ghana remains heavily centralised although there is increasing activity at district level. Disbursement and reporting of funds is managed by the Controller and Accountant General's Department (CAGD), and funds are disbursed in four categories: Item 1 – Personal Emoluments (PE); Item 2 – Administration; Item 3 – Services; and Item 4 – Investment. Different procedures apply to each category of funding.

2.18 Recent studies have identified areas where public financial management in Ghana require strengthening. The 2006 PEFA (World Bank 2006) allocated "D" ratings for some important indicators including the extent to which the composition of expenditures conforms to the budget; the quality of internal audit; and the availability of information on resources received by service delivery units. Specific public financial management problems include:

- *Lack of credibility of the budget:* particularly in determining expenditure composition, with, frequently, upward revisions to the Personal Emoluments (PE) budget resulting in downward revisions in non-salary provision.

⁷ Much of this short section is drawn from the recent External Review of Public Financial Management (World Bank 2009a) and supplemented by a summary review of public financial management in Betley 2008.

- *Ineffectiveness of medium-term budgeting:* the 2009 ERPFM (World Bank 2009a) reports that at national level:

The MTEF appears to be neither strategic nor medium term. In practice, budget formulation takes the form of annual incremental line item budgeting. The MDAs' MTEF volumes are focussed on presenting detailed items with little or no link to the overall strategic policy context. The emphasis in budget discussions tends to be focussed on implementing the budget according to line items, rather than on how resources are used. The effect of these weaknesses is that prioritisation takes place by default (by item, rather than by policy objective or activity). This undercuts the strategic basis of the MTEF and encourages a non-strategic, incremental approach to budgeting. In effect, there are three separate budget processes with separate processes of prioritisation, namely: (i) medium term fiscal framework: the aggregate (top-down) macro-fiscal framework; (ii) MDAs' budget submissions, effectively incremental and by line-item; and (iii) in-year budget changes.

- *Fragmented flows of funds:* from a variety of government and external sources which make both budgeting and financial reporting highly problematic. In a 2006 review of financial flows in education, Steffersen (Steffersen 2006) identifies 17 different funding flows relevant to the sector.
- *Delayed releases of funds:* resulting from systemic weaknesses in release procedures.
- *A compromised financial reporting system:* resulting from the incomplete implementation of the central financial management information system BPEMS, which after more than 10 years still manages only a small proportion of government spending. This failure has led to the protracted use of manual systems, the widespread and unsafe use of Excel as accounting software and the introduction of a variety of off-the-shelf accounting systems.

2.19 The Government's programme of PFM reform is encapsulated in the Short and Medium Term Action Program, which is approaching the end of its three year implementation period (2006–2009). The Short and Medium Term Action Plan for PFM (SMTAP) encompasses actions in nine areas: Fiscal Policy Management– Macroeconomic Stability; Budget Formulation/Preparation; Budget Implementation; Financial Regulatory and Management Framework; Integrated Payroll and Management System; Aid and Debt Management; Revenue Management; Financial Sector Program; and Capacity Building. With the SMTAP to end this year, a fresh programme is likely to be developed by the new government and it is expected to highlight similar areas.

Aid Relationships

2.20 By way of context, this section looks primarily at aid commitments, arrangements and policy for Ghana as a whole, and follows that with a brief look at aid relationships and arrangements in the education sector specifically. This second area is expanded upon in Chapter 9 of the report.


Aid commitments at national level

2.21 Total aid commitments⁸ increased by just over USD 320m between 1999 and 2007, peaking in 2004. The share of multilateral aid in total commitments fluctuates significantly

⁸ In this section the data used is primarily aid commitments although it is acknowledged that actual disbursements tend to be less than commitments. It is therefore a second best solution. However, the corresponding GMR data set for disbursements does not include multilateral disbursements which are not required to be reported to OECD DAC.

from 1999 and 2002, peaking at 61% in 2001. The proportion (see Figure 2.1 below) was steadier between 2003 and 2007. Its share in 2007 was 14 percentage points lower, at 31%, than it was in 1999. The spike in commitments in 2004 results from Japanese debt relief of approximately USD 1 billion in that year.

Figure 2.1 Total Aid Commitments (constant 2007 USD bn)




Source: GMR external aid database (UNESCO 2009). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a table 36).

Aid dependency

2.22 Between 1999 and 2002 there was a significant variation in aid dependency with the nadir at 7% in 2002. In 2003–2004 there was a dramatic jump when aid dependency rose sharply from 7% to 21% due to the general increases in aid volumes from bilateral donors in that year mainly explained by debt relief, dropping to 12% in 2005 and remaining at similar levels throughout 2007. Cumulative real GDP growth over the period was 50%. Average growth per annum was 4.61% (Table F5).

Figure 2.2 Aid Dependency (commitments/GNI)



Source: UNESCO 2009; World Bank 2008. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a table 36); deflators for GDP from World Bank 2008.

Aid coordination at national level

2.23 From 2000 aid coordination at **national level** strengthened considerably. The November 2005 meeting of the Consultative Group/Annual Partnership Meeting (CG/APM) endorsed the Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS). This was innovative because it devised a results matrix which mapped Development Partner (DP)-funded activities to GPRS II policy priorities. It also incorporated an annual harmonisation action plan; and an overview of external assistance, detailed by GPRS II pillars and sectors. As such, the GPS provided a framework for monitoring the effectiveness of development assistance in supporting GPRS II.

2.24 The GPS was the forerunner to the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) of 2007. This aims to further improve alignment of development assistance with the core business of Government, to intensify harmonisation and to deepen dialogue beyond levels achieved in the GPS. In education, G-JAS partners will focus on increasing access, completion and quality in basic education, particularly the six-year cycle of primary schooling; they will support specific measures such as incentive schemes, to increase girls' enrolment, retention and completion, particularly in secondary education. G-JAS partners will work with the Ministries of Education and Finance to improve efficiency and equity in education financing at all levels, particularly in pursuit of a more sustainable and equitable system of funding for tertiary education.

2.25 Since 2000 financial modality initiatives have also developed at the **national level**. Particularly noteworthy is the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) which commenced in 2003. The MDBS Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) is the basis for MDBS dialogue and includes key education indicators (whose relationship to the FTI Indicative Framework is described later in this report). MDBS donors include World Bank, African Development Bank, the European Commission (EC), Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK).

2.26 MDBS is considered to have strengthened dialogue; contributed to better monitoring; and increased predictability of funds (ODI 2007). However, it represents a decreasing proportion of total aid, and in 2007 represented only 17% of total aid commitments compared with 39% in 2003. This represented just over 6.1%⁹ of 2007 available budgetary resources. In 2008 MDBS is expected to total USD 345m (cf. 2007: USD 285m; and 2006: USD 330m) (GOG PowerPoint Presentation).

Alignment

2.27 A recent study (Betley 2008) uses 2006 data to demonstrate levels of alignment of aid delivery with national systems in Ghana. It reports that for 2006: 50% of total aid disbursements use national planning procedures, while up to 93% of aid resources are presented to parliament in budget documents (although some is outside the Consolidated Fund); 50% of total aid resources are accounted for using national procedures; and 93% of external aid resources were captured in CAGD fiscal reports. Separately the Ghana Submission to OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) reported that for the 2006 Baseline Survey 52% of aid made use of Ghana's procurement systems, a figure that increased slightly to 56% for the 2008 Survey (OECD DAC 2008a, p 20).

Paris Declaration goals in Ghana

2.28 Box 2.2 below shows the summary of progress against Paris Goals at national level which is presented in the most recent OECD DAC summary, showing high levels of ownership, harmonisation and mutual accountability (OECD DAC 2008a, pp20–21). It indicates some of the strengths of Ghana's aid management processes and critical required

⁹ Calculated using average exchange rate for 2007 of USD 1 = 0.9608 GHC.

actions as reported for 2007, including the need to implement the new aid policy. In the key areas of the Paris Declaration Ghana scores either "high" or "moderate" reflecting its status as a country with mature partnerships, where some processes are established and working well, but where others need to be strengthened.

Box 2.2 Ghana: Paris Declaration Challenges and Priority Actions

DIMENSIONS	2007	CHALLENGES	PRIORITY ACTIONS
Ownership	High	Links between strategic plans and budget are not sufficiently clear and strong	Strengthen national capacities for co-ordination, monitoring and management to ensure that resources are allocated judiciously to priority areas
Alignment	Moderate	Donor use of country public financial management (PFM) systems fail to respond to improvements in the reliability of those systems	Government to finalise and implement new aid policy
Harmonisation	High	Increasing complexity of aid architecture	Ensure that sector working groups are active in co-ordination
Managing for Results	Moderate	Time lag in feedback on Annual Progress Report process, delaying it's use in policy formulation	Strengthen systems for monitoring progress in relation to the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II to enable efficient feedback into ensuing year's policy formulation
Mutual Accountability	High	To move further away from the use of policy and process conditionalities	Allow for greater flexibility in analysis of mutual commitments in the spirit of partnership

Source: OECD DAC 2008a

Education sector coordination and modalities

2.29 In recent times education donors have met regularly and often in Sector Group meetings¹⁰ chaired by government. There is a well developed process for sector review in which the Preliminary Education Sector Performance Report (PESPR) is produced by PBME based substantially on regional input and discussed at the joint Education Sector Annual Review (ESAR). It is subsequently revised to produce the Education Sector Performance Report (ESPR) which follows the structure of the ESP, covering the areas of: access to education, quality of education, education management, education finance and finally science, technology and TVET. The ESAR results in an Aide Memoire between the MOE and DPs, outlining next steps and updating the monitoring framework. It should be noted that the most recent ESAR/ESPR process (May/June 2009) was regarded by DPs as disappointingly fragmented and incomplete, largely as a result of the on-going inability of the EMIS process to generate timely, accurate and carefully analysed data.

2.30 The current lead DP is the World Bank which is also the FTI Supervising Entity. The role of lead DP was taken over from Unicef and may well pass to DFID after their new Education Specialist arrives. There is no evidence of formal rotation or other process to determine the lead DP. There is no FTI Local Education Group (LEG) although there is an active sector working group (SWG) based upon the ESAR, the monitoring of the ESP and the frequent Sector Group meetings. Requests for a copy of the SWG Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) went unanswered, and it seems that such a document does not currently exist and meetings proceed by consensus.

¹⁰ The review team examined the minutes of 17 such meetings held between May 2007 and November 2008 – approximately monthly.

2.31 Sector level financial modalities are mostly on budget but none are on-Treasury; they are aligned with ESP but many are individually flexible (e.g. DFID's education sector funds are lightly earmarked with significant flexibility within categories).

3. Basic Education in Ghana

Ghana's Evolving Education System

3.1 The first part of this chapter outlines the development of the education system over the last fifty years, with particular focus on the characteristics and growth of the basic education component thereof. See Box 3.1 for a chronicle of key events and an accompanying commentary.

Box 3.1 Ghana Education Chronology

Date/Event	Commentary
1960 Education Act three years after independence: 6 years primary school + 4 years middle school proposed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Many older Ghanaians remember this as a "golden age" of Ghanaian education, when they thought everyone was literate. Actually, of course, only a small proportion even got to primary school. Around independence, drive for high status white collar jobs reduced momentum of technical/vocational education, then based on the classical apprenticeship approach going back centuries.
1974 Dzobo Report recommended that junior secondary schools (JSS) of three years' duration be introduced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JSS curriculum was intended to be a mix of academic and practical skill development.
1980s Period of economic collapse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serious decline in efficiency and effectiveness of whole schooling system. Around 50% of all trained teachers left Ghana to fill gaps in Nigeria's oil-revenue fuelled schooling expansion.
1987 Education Reform Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduced 6 + 3 + 3: primary + JSS + Senior Secondary School (SSS). Attempted to arrest decline of the whole system.
1992 New Constitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Free, Compulsory, Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) a constitutional right for all children.
1994 National Education Forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunity for all stakeholders to contribute to debate about ways forward for an under-performing system.
1995 Implementation of FCUBE by Education Minister Harry Sawyerr	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pleas by Minister to donors to prioritise support for basic education and to fund through a "basket" approach.
2002 Presidential Commission Report: Meeting the challenges of education in the 21 st century	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seen as setting the scene for the systematic planning of the sector.
2003 Education Sector Plan (ESP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First comprehensive sector plan, 2003–2015. Development supported by Unicef and DFID. Four over-arching policy goals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Equitable access to education Quality of education Educational management Science, Technology and TVET.

Date/Event	Commentary
2004 Education White Paper	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key elements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposes two years of kindergarten for all - Argues for high quality, free basic education - For a more inclusive second cycle.
2005 Grant capitalisation scheme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removes fees from basic education, replacing with a per capita grant going to each basic school.
2007 The New Education Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoted to put teeth into 2004 White Paper. Target of universal primary completion (UPC) by 2015. Four years of senior high school (SHS); for all JHS leavers by 2020.
2008 (November) Education Act passed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost last action of departing government. Independent inspectorate, curriculum and assessment bodies to be set up.
2008/09 Revised Education Sector Plan currently being developed, 2010–2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revision to take in all the policy activity since the 2003 ESP.

3.2 So, the current structure of the public education system in Ghana comprises: 2 years kindergarten + 6 years primary + 3 years junior high school + 3/4 years senior high school. Compulsory basic education therefore extends for 11 years, with MOE attempting to report enrolment data for universal basic completion (UBC). There is an on-going debate, reported later, regarding the most appropriate duration of senior high school, and the degree of specialisation therein. There is a serious likelihood of a two-tier structure of senior high schools emerging, with the traditionally high status schools drawing away from community high schools.

The Contribution of Private Schools

3.3 Private schools make up an increasing proportion of total schools at all levels of the system. Private universities are also a growth area. The following characteristics are typical:

- Private schools are an urban/peri-urban phenomenon. There are relatively few in rural districts. In 2004/05, in Afram Plains District, at primary level, there were only nine private schools and 130 public schools. In the same year, in Accra Metro, there were 451 private schools and 389 public schools.
- Standards vary from excellent to awful. Parents choose private schools because the best are much better supervised by their proprietors than are public schools. Even though the teachers in private schools often lack teacher training, the supervisory structure generates an environment where at the least teachers teach an appropriate number of lessons each week and give and mark homework and tests.
- Middle-class urban parents are the ones most likely to use private schooling, thus depriving the public sector of much needed voices for improvement.

3.4 Table 3.1 below shows, for completeness, the contribution of the private sector at all levels up to Senior High School (SHS). It should be noted that figures are taken from the EMIS, with private schools not required to submit data, although clearly many do so.

**Table 3.1 Public and Private Schools and Enrolment Numbers
(2007/08)**

School type	2007/08 Data	Percentage (%)
Kindergarten: Number of schools		
Public	11,140	72
Private	4,309	28
Kindergarten: Enrolment		
Public	1,046,416	82.9
Private	215,847	17.1
Primary: Number of schools		
Public	13,247	76.5
Private	4,068	23.5
Primary: Enrolment		
Public	2,990,782	82.6
Private	631,942	17.4
Junior High School: Number of schools		
Public	7,267	76.4
Private	2,240	23.6
Junior High School: Enrolment		
Public	1,015,491	82.9
Private	209,473	17.1
Senior High School: Number of schools		
Public	493	70.4
Private	207	29.6
Senior High School: Enrolment		
Public	395,839	87.0
Private	58,842	13.0

Source: Ghana EMIS

Progress Towards EFA

3.5 The data sets and commentary which follow derive from (i) The six Dakar EFA goal; plus (ii) selected EFA/FTI benchmarking indicators. The next seven tables are taken directly from the 2008 Education Sector Performance Report, with additions where possible from the data section of the 2003 ESP and the EMIS report of the relevant year.

3.6 There is a good chance that the ambition to provide kindergarten for all children by 2015 will be close to being achieved (see Table 3.2).

EFA 1: Expanded early childhood education**Table 3.2 Kindergarten Enrolment**

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Enrolment			687,643	778,109	1,065,963	1,142,784	1,262,264
GER (%)	46.4 (ESP data) 21.0 (EMIS data)	22.0 (EMIS)	54.6	60.1	85.3*	89.0	89.9

*This surge in enrolment coincided with the change in GOG policy to make two years of kindergarten available to all children aged 4 and 5 years.

EFA 2: Free and compulsory primary education

3.7 This target can be divided into three sections – Primary intake in P1; Primary completion rate at P6; Repetition rates (Table 3.3). Table 3.4 shows progress on primary completion rate. The GOG target is now to achieve universal primary completion (UPC) by 2015. With present trends this may be possible, though a small rump of hard-to-reach-and-retain young people may remain even then.

Table 3.3 Primary 1 Intake

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Enrol. P1						693,665	741,172
GAR (%)	81.0	87.0	88.2	89.4	92.3	103.2	107.3
Enrol. P1 age 6						464,912	513,013
NAR (%)				26.2	61.7	69.1	74.3

Table 3.4 Primary Completion* at P6

	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Total	77.9%	78.7%	75.6%	85.4%	88.0%
Male	81.7	82.3	78.7	91.2	88.9
Female	74.0	75.1	72.4	79.6	82.4

*This measure of completion rate is calculated by dividing the enrolment in P6 by the population aged 11 years. It does not take account of grade repetition (Table 3.5), being simply the GER for P6. Earlier figures from the ESP 2003 are inconsistent with these – 2002 total: 92.6%, 2003 total: 93.5% – and cannot easily be reconciled. The earlier figures suggest inflation of the primary completion data.

Table 3.5 Repetition Rates

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2010 target	2015 target
Repetition rates in primary school	7.7% (EMIS data)	5.2 (ESP data) 6.3 (EMIS data)	6.4	6.6	8.5	4.25	0

3.8 Although repetition rate figures (Table 3.5) are not outstanding, and still represent significant internal inefficiencies in the system, they reflect Ghana's relatively unusual policy, for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), of automatic promotion.

EFA3: Training and life skills

3.9 Indicators have been reported relating to (i) costed plans for the sub-sector, (ii) enrolment rates. They are not pursued further here.

EFA 4: Adult literacy

3.10 Even with 2.7m learners enrolled in literacy classes in 2007, the literacy rates remains stubbornly low, presenting a serious handicap as Ghana attempts to develop a skills-based economy. Illiteracy among the 15–24 age groups is likely to be unacceptably high on account of the failure of many leaving basic education to achieve adequate literacy and numeracy skills. There is little visibility of the adult illiteracy issue in policy discourse, and our interviews with members of the Non-Formal Education Directorate left a strong impression of a marginalised unit with little political influence.

Table 3.6 Adult Literacy Rate

	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Literacy rate	53.4%	53.7	60.3	61.7	n/a

EFA 5: Gender disparities

3.11 With some caution regarding the junior high school figures, it seems that gender parity is within sight in basic education (see Table 3.7). It is still worryingly the case that girls are less likely to complete both primary and junior high schools than boys.

Table 3.7 Gender Equity at Enrolment

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Kindergarten							
GER (female)						83%	89%
GER (male)						84%	91%
Gender Parity Index (GPI)			0.98	0.98	1.03	0.99	0.98
Primary							
GER (female)	73.5		83.1	84.4	88.8	91.6	93.0
GER (male)	89.1		89.5	90.5	95.3	95.8	97.3
GPI	0.83		0.93	0.93	0.93	0.96	0.96
Junior High School							
GER (female)			65.8	68.1	76.3	73.7	75.3
GER (male)			74.5	77.3	83.5	80.9	82.2
GPI			0.88	0.88	0.93	0.91	0.92

EFA 6: Quality measures

3.12 Familiar quality-related measures include primary PTR (see Table 3.8) and annual instructional hours (see the following section).

Table 3.8 Pupil/Teacher Ratio

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	Target 2015
Kindergarten	24	26				32.8	51.5	25
Primary National	33	32	34	34.9	35.7	33.5	34.1	35
Primary Deprived*	n.a.	n.a.	39.5	41.9	40.2	36.3	38	35
Junior High national	19	18	18.6	19	19.4	17.6	17.4	25
Junior High Deprived*	n.a.	n.a.	20.9	22	22.5	18.9	19.1	25

*Denotes the 53 districts with lowest development indicators

3.13 Several measures of student performance exist in Ghana:

- The Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE), taken at the end of JHS is a norm-referenced examination which gives us only limited understandings about quality. There is perhaps surprisingly little differentiation by region, but boys outperform girls in nine of the ten regions, in some cases by a large percentage.
- The School Education Assessment (SEA) is designed to provide information for school improvement, to circuit supervisors, head teachers and class teachers, School Management Committees (SMCs) and parents.
- The most useful indicator is the National Education Assessment (NEA). Tests collect information on student performance in English and Mathematics in P3 and P6. A score of 35% is considered a measure of minimum competency; a score of 55% denotes proficiency. Table 3.9 below shows student performance in 2005 and 2007. (There are no comparable data for earlier years.)

Table 3.9 NEA Scores, 2005, 2007

	2005			2007		
	Mean	Minimum Competency	Proficiency	Mean	Minimum Competency	Proficiency
P3 English	38.1	50.5	16.4	37.6	50.1	15
P3 Maths	36.6	47.2	18.6	35	42.6	14.6
P6 English	43.1	63.9	23.6	44.2	69.7	26.1
P6 Maths	34.4	42.7	9.8	35.7	46.2	10.8

3.14 Thus, of students who reach P6, just over 1 in 4 achieves proficiency in English, and 1 in 10 in Mathematics. This is a stark statistic of system inefficiency and waste of human capability. A recent World Bank study suggests that the percentage of 15–19 year-olds in Ghana who are fully literate is just 5% (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007).

The State of Basic Education

3.15 Basic education has been a key focus of GOG since the launch of FCUBE in 1995 and it has been a key element of successive ESPs in 2003 and 2009. In general, development partners have followed the GOG lead.

3.16 Inspection of access indicators for basic education shows significant progress over the last decade. More students are enrolling and staying in basic education; there has been a dramatic increase in access to kindergarten education; the traditional gender imbalance is being steadily reduced.

3.17 There has been a substantial investment in infrastructure for basic education – classrooms, latrines, teachers' accommodation – alongside serious attempts to address chronic shortages of textbooks and trained teachers. The lower primary curriculum is being simplified in order to focus on the basic skills of literacy and numeracy. The junior high school curriculum is being re-shaped to be more general and less prevocational in orientation.

3.18 Nevertheless, the outcomes related to children's learning are very disappointing and not moving at all rapidly in the right direction. The most obvious explanation is to be found in two shocking sets of findings from research studies – one on teacher attendance, the other on the extent of engagement in learning activities. The Brookings Institute study (2007) gives the following findings about teacher attendance in primary schools:

- Average teacher absence rate is 27%
- 31% of teachers are absent once in a week
- 26% of head teachers were absent twice a week

3.19 A World Bank study (World Bank IEG 2007) found that Ghanaian students spend less than half the official time engaged in learning activities. The study showed that of the 197 days which comprise the official school year, only 39%, or 80 days, was actually used for time on instructional task. It is not surprising therefore that learning outcomes are so poor. Given that approximately 25% of the entire budget of GOG is spent on remuneration of teachers, there must be serious anxieties about the inefficiency of the system.

A Note on Decentralisation

3.20 For at least twenty years, there has been lively discussion and some action, towards a devolved/decentralised version of the Ghana Education Service (GES), with the promotion of district and school level planning as the long-term objective. Over a similar period there has been enthusiastic support for this process from a number of key DPs – WB, USAID, UNDP, DFID et al. In the latest iteration, the District Education Office of GES will become an agency located within each District Assembly.

3.21 Well-established districts have reasonably adequate human resource and infrastructure provision; a typical district office would have between 50 and 100 Ghana Education Service (GES) staff covering a full range of functions in support of schools. Some districts are quite small in terms of the number of schools they serve and are likely to be sub-optimally efficient. This situation is exacerbated with the increasing sub-division of districts to produce new ones. It was suggested to us that the figure may reach as high as 170 before long, reflecting local political aspirations. "New districts" have almost nothing by way of infrastructure or human resources, but are "twinning" with existing ones which are geographically contiguous. Education Management Information System (EMIS) works at district level and is used for planning. District-level plans are generally well presented and used at national GES level for budget planning. Funding flows to districts are very weak both for administration and the per capita grants for basic education students (This year, by the middle of the final term of the school year, districts have received 1 cedi per pupil (approximately USD 1) with an expectation of 4.5 cedis per pupil). In Kpando District, which the evaluation team visited, all schools have bank accounts in which the per capita grants


are lodged. School-level planning is of variable quality and activity levels of SMCs are inconsistent.

3.22 Knowledge and influence at district level of FTI processes is negligible, but there is a high level of awareness of the CF among those districts that have been direct beneficiaries.

Financing of Education

3.23 Ghana typically allocates substantial resources to education. A table presented in the 2007 Education Performance Report shows that the percentage of national budget allocated to education (GOG and on-budget donor funds only – which exceed 85% of the total in most years) has been steadily increasing, and since 2003 regularly exceeds 25% (see Figure 3.1 below). This is significantly above the benchmark of 20% in the FTI Indicative Framework, although information directly related to the IF (education expenditure as a percentage of total recurrent expenditure) is not presented in the ESPRR.


Figure 3.1 Percentage of National Budget Allocated to Education



Source: Preliminary Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

3.24 Taking into account expenditure from all sources public expenditure as a percentage of GDP shows a more clearly defined rising trend with an especially high percentage of 9.1% in 2007 (see Figure 3.2 below).

Figure 3.2 Total Education Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP



Source: Preliminary Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

3.25 Typically the funds allocated by GOG to education are predominantly allocated to salaries. Table E5 in Annex E shows 2007 expenditure by level of education and category. It shows that in 2007 65% of all resources were spent on Personal Emoluments (PE) with 5% of the total on administration; 10% on goods and services; and 20% of the total on capital expenditures. Seen as a percentage of recurrent spending only, PE represented 81.25% (i.e. 65/80).

3.26 In respect of primary the details are provided in Table 3.10 below. This information is not reported in each year but figures for 2004, 2006 and 2007 are reproduced below, showing that total non-salary recurrent rose from 3.9% of recurrent in 2004 to 7.7% in 2007. This is still far short of the 33% in the Indicative Framework (IF).

Table 3.10 Primary Non-salary Recurrent Expenditures (GHC millions)


	2004		2006		2007	
	GHC m	%	GHC m	%	GHC m	%
PE	147.5	96.1	222.3	84.7	366.7	82.2
Admin	2.3	1.5	4.7	1.8	8.2	1.8
Service	3.7	2.4	17.4	6.6	22.6	5.1
Sub-total recurrent	153.5	100.0	244.4	93.1	397.5	89.1
Investment	0.0	0.0	18.2	6.9	48.4	10.9
Total	153.5	100.0	262.6	100.0	445.9	100.0

**Non-salary
recurrent as % of
total recurrent**

6.0 3.9 22.1 9.0 30.8 7.7

Source: ESPR various years

3.27 Budget execution has always been haphazard. Table E9 in Annex E entitled MOE Ghana – Budget Execution and Variances by Category, 2003–2007 shows that spending has always exceeded budget, but that the overspend has tended to be smaller in recent years. Salaries have always exceeded the budgeted amount in recent years. As a result of these wide variances, the education budget is not considered to be credible, although in aggregate the variances are reducing over time.


Figure 3.3 Adverse Variance as Percentage of Original Budget

Source: ESPR (MOESS 2008a)

3.28 Education in Ghana is financed substantially by GOG resources and Internally Generated Funds (IGF) although GOG monies include Budget Support through MDBS. This is discussed further at Chapter 6 below. Identifiable donor support in 2007 represented 6.8% of the total budget of the sector. Further data on external support to education in Ghana are provided in Chapter 9 below and in Annex F.

3.29 From 2003 to 2007 the mix of expenditure by education level changed. Spending on tertiary education has become more pronounced, increasing from 14% to 23% over the period. Pre-school and Primary taken together constituted 42% of spending in 2003 and in 2007 this had declined slightly to 38.5%. Junior High School spending fell over the same period has fallen from 22% to 16%. This all suggests an increasing emphasis on tertiary education which Ghana sees as consistent with a renewed focus on growth alongside its poverty reduction goals. There is almost certainly an association with popular demand for tertiary education expansion, as witnessed by the burgeoning private tertiary sector. The 2006 ESPRR has a clear statement of the GOG view:

Rate of returns to investment in education in Ghana are not well documented to enable one to speak with authority the path Ghana has to chart in education delivery. Research evidence in Ghana, however, suggests that formal post-basic education, not basic education, has the largest direct impact on incomes. This notwithstanding, formal post-basic education in Ghana is also seen not to be pro-poor and the cost-sharing mechanisms at the secondary and tertiary levels need serious considerations, so that Development Partners, for example, might explore mechanisms by which they can provide funds to support the poor through post-basic education in Ghana and effectively support the new education reform.

Figure 3.4 Trends in Expenditure by Level 2003–2007

Source: Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (the underlying data for this graph are reproduced in Annex E, Table E2). Acronyms: NFED – Non Formal Education Division, TVET – Technical and Vocational Education and Training, SHS – Senior High School, JHS – Junior High School.

3.30 Recurrent spending on primary education as a percentage of total recurrent expenditure on education was projected in the IF to reach 50% by 2015, but with the increased emphasis on tertiary and TVET this looks optimistic, even with the large increase in 2007. Actual percentages from 2002 are shown at Table 3.11 below:

Table 3.11 Recurrent Spending on Primary Education as a Percentage of Total Recurrent Expenditure on Education 2002–2007 (GHC millions)

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Percentage	34.8	39.7	31.6	31.8	31.3	39.1

Source: 2002 to 2005 are as reported in 2006 ESPRR (MOESS 2006a); 2006 and 2007 are calculated by the authors from tables provided in the ESPRRs covering those years

3.31 Meanwhile funding from development partners shows a continuing emphasis on basic education. Table 3.12 below shows the position in 2007 where more than 70% of donor funding is applied to Pre-School, Primary and JSS. However, donor support for tertiary is evident at 16.6% of the total.

Table 3.12 Donor Funding by Level of Education in GHC millions, 2007

Level	Recurrent	Capital	Total	%
Pre School	641.5	1,605.6	2,247.1	2.9%
Primary	16,375.1	19,812.6	36,187.7	47.0%
JSS	5,702.2	11,288.9	16,991.1	22.1%
Sub-total basic	22,718.8	32,707.1	55,425.9	72.0%
SSS	311.8	4,524.7	4,836.5	6.3%
TVET	972.5	0	972.5	1.3%
Tertiary	7,124.0	5,619.7	12,743.7	16.6%
Management & subvented activity	237.1	0	237.1	0.3%
HIV/AIDS	2,292.7	491.7	2,784.4	3.6%
Total	56,375.7	76,050.3	132,426.1	100.0%

Source: ESPRR 2007

3.32 Further data on education finance in Ghana are presented at Annex E.

PART C: THE FTI IN GHANA

4. Overview of the FTI in Ghana

Introduction

4.1 The FTI has its roots in the Dakar Framework for Action for Education for All (UNESCO 2000) adopted at the World Education Forum in 2000, and a series of G8 agreements aimed at operationalising the Millennium Development Goals. Its design developed out of research to understand what made some countries successful in their efforts to reach the EFA targets. The FTI was launched in 2002 as a major effort to mobilise resources to support EFA. More specifically it focussed on achieving the goal of Universal Primary Completion (UPC) through a "compact" of mutual accountability between recipient countries and donor partner countries, linking increased financial support to country improvements in policy performance and accountability for results. In practice, as far as FTI activity in individual countries was concerned, the main responsibility on the donor side was carried by those donors engaged in providing support to the education sector.

4.2 In 2004, an FTI Framework was published which described the consensus which had emerged by that stage, together with guidelines specifying the main parameters of the Initiative's operations (#24). A key element of the FTI Framework was an "Indicative Framework" (IF), a set of policy and financing norms associated with countries' differential progress towards EFA. These technical benchmarks were seen as a common frame of reference for all countries, although the exact mix of policy actions required would be country-specific. In sum the IF encapsulated the core of FTI thinking about what would constitute a credible country Education Sector Plan.

4.3 Rather than be prescriptive, the IF was intended to provide the basis for on-going in-country discussions, policy decisions and review of progress, taking into account the realities of the individual country context.

4.4 It was expected that formal endorsement of a country's ESP by the FTI would galvanise existing donors to increase their support, and potentially also attract new donors. The FTI also established two trust funds – an Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), mainly to support the preparation of sector plans, and a Catalytic Fund which could offer temporary support for their implementation.¹¹ The Catalytic Fund was originally intended as temporary support for "donor orphans" (countries which were receiving limited support from a small number of donors) but it was later expanded to provide more extended funding for which almost all FTI-endorsed countries could be eligible.

The FTI Endorsement Process

4.5 At the time of the FTI launch in June 2002, the first 18 countries, including Ghana, were invited to join the FTI Partnership, having been deemed to be eligible for FTI support on the basis of a completed Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper¹² and a credible education sector plan.¹³ The letter of invitation emphasised the availability of funding and did not make any reference to an endorsement process which would not lead to funding.¹⁴ It indicated that:

¹¹ Further elaboration of these aspects are given below in Chapter 6, The FTI and Education Finance; and Chapter 8, The FTI and Capacity Development.

¹² In the case of Ghana this was the *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002–2004: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity* (GPRS).

¹³ EFA-FTI Progress Report 2004 (FTI 2004b).

¹⁴ World Bank Letter of Invitation to Participate in the EFA Fast Track Initiative. July, 14 2002.

Key features of the initiative are the offer of: i) incremental funding, which can be flexibly used for recurrent expenditures, such as hiring of teachers, as well as capital requirements; and ii) long-term pledges of support to ensure sustained and predictable financing for fast track countries as long as policy progress and results continue to be strong.

In July the Government of Ghana accepted the invitation and by September 2003, just over one year later, Ghana had compiled a draft proposal and submitted its application for endorsement to the FTI Secretariat.¹⁵

4.6 Key strategies identified in the proposal for attainment of EFA-FTI goals were: (i) construction of new classrooms and rehabilitation of existing classrooms; (ii) teacher training, recruitment and deployment, requiring the provision of area incentives to encourage teacher deployment in remote areas, including teacher accommodation, vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles to facilitate teacher mobility; (iii) provision of learning and teaching materials, including text books; (iv) monitoring, evaluation and supervision; and (v) capitation grants for primary schools.

4.7 A review of the integration of global programmes with country-led national programmes conducted in 2006 concluded that:

The alignment of objectives has been particularly close in the EFA-FTI, due in part to fortuitous timing. Ghana's Education Strategic Plan (ESP) was finalised by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports in May 2003, shortly after the creation of the EFA-FTI in 2002. The ESP declared basic education as a primary objective and included relevant education sector recommendations from EFA in a Matrix. Ghana's first poverty reduction strategy (2001–2005) also included access to basic education as a principal aim. Its proposal to join the EFA-FTI was endorsed soon afterwards in 2004 and the disbursement of \$8 million in 2005 was able to complement government expenditures, filling in important gaps in non-salary expenditure (e.g. schoolbooks) (Zimmermann and Drechsler 2006).

4.8 In line with the procedure for endorsement, an appraisal of the ESP was prepared by the education donor group, with Unicef as the lead donor, and submitted in November 2003 to the FTI Secretariat by MOEYS.¹⁶ In the appraisal, the GOG was commended for its ESP, the Annual Education Sector Operational Plan and proposal. Specifically Ghana's ESP was commended in several areas: (i) the use of the Indicative Framework as a benchmarking tool; (ii) the specificity with which policy objectives were translated into targets and strategies; (iii) the clear policy focus on the primary completion rate, with specific annual targets; (iv) the comprehensive discussion of implementation and monitoring issues; (v) a clear policy thrust on girls' education accompanied by an integrated programme; and (vi) the specific and highly compelling "propositions for aid co-ordination" in the education sector.

4.9 The proposal itself was commended for: (i) its informed analysis and reviews of the situation and the challenges confronting the education sector; (ii) the high level of national ownership and wide consultation process in the development and dissemination of the proposal; (iii) creating linkages between the ESP and the country's broader development goals; and (iv) the emphasis on girls' education. However, concerns were raised and recommendations made in terms of (i) commitment and prioritisation; (ii) institutional capacity; and (iii) resource mobilisation, among others.

¹⁵ Ghana proposal for Inclusion into the Education For All Fast Track Initiative, MOEYS, August 2003.

¹⁶ Development Partners' Appraisal of the EFA/FTI Proposal submitted by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Ghana). November 14, 2003. The members of the donor group conducted the appraisal themselves, rather than engaging an external consultant.

Ghana's FTI Financial Framework and Calculation of the Funding Gap

4.10 Early in 2004, Ghana redrafted its proposal for inclusion into the FTI based on recommendations from development partners and the FTI Secretariat,¹⁷ and in February 2004 submitted a final version of the proposal.¹⁸ One major change was the revision of the financing framework undertaken in response to concerns raised over two of the macroeconomic parameters employed: the share of domestic revenues in GDP, and the share of domestic revenue going to the education budget.¹⁹ This maintained the macroeconomic parameters employed at their 2002 levels for the purpose of projecting the resource envelope, since a test of the sensitivity of the model to the simultaneous change in these parameters showed that the impact on the estimated GOG budget for education was insignificant.

4.11 Revising the financial framework also provided the MOEYS with a good opportunity to take advantage of newly available information, including that pertaining to the Ghana Education Trust Fund and HIPC resources, and to distinguish clearly between the gross (domestic) gap in financing for the achievement of Universal Primary Completion and the net financing gap (that remaining after current levels of donor support have been considered). On aggregate, these changes did have a significant impact on the projected financing gaps. It was found that in the previous version of the model the District Assembly Common Fund (DAFC) resources, and share of primary education in GET fund resources, had been significantly overestimated, leading to an understatement of the financing shortfall.

4.12 Other changes made at this point pertained to monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, pre-school education and teacher deployment, retention and management.

Catalytic Fund Grants

4.13 Ten months later, in November 2004, the FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee decided to allocate USD 8m to Ghana to support (i) supplying of basic school text books; (ii) a teacher initiative scheme; and (iii) monitoring and supervision. This was to be the Year One allocation, with disbursement to be made in two tranches. In December 2004, the World Bank received a letter from the Government of Ghana requesting funds and describing a programme of actions, objectives and policies designed to achieve primary education for all children in the country. In February 2005, Ghana received official notice from the FTI Secretariat, notifying the government of grant allocation of USD 8m to be paid in two tranches and in the same month Ghana signed a letter of grant agreement for CF. In May 2005, the first tranche of Year One's allocation was disbursed, USD 4m out of USD 8m. The entire USD 4m was then used for the procurement of core textbooks (Maths, English and Science) and distributed all pupils in the 53 districts previously identified as "deprived".

4.14 It was not possible for this study to ascertain why Ghana was deemed to be eligible for CF funding, as Ghana did not qualify as a "donor orphan" the criterion for inclusion. One well placed respondent indicated that it was because the FTI wanted Ghana to be in the first group of countries. On the other hand, the initial letter of invitation from the FTI refers only to the two criteria of having a full PRSP in place and a fully costed sector plan already being implemented.²⁰

¹⁷ FTI Secretariat Comments on the Primary Education component of the Education Sector Plan, (2004).

¹⁸ MOEYS 2004d. An email on March, 16, 2004 from Unicef, as lead donor, confirmed that "the DP Ghana group has endorsed the Ghana [ES] Plan".

¹⁹ Email from Ato Essuman, Chief Director, MOEYS, to FTI Secretariat, February 4 2004.

²⁰ World Bank Letter of Invitation to Participate in the EFA Fast Track Initiative. June 14 2002.

4.15 In July 2005, the FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee confirmed the second year (FY06) allocation of USD 11m for Ghana. In December 2005, Ghana issued a request for the release of the second tranche of Year One allocation, i.e., USD 4m, stating that this amount would be used for the procurement of motorbikes (USD 2,314,260), bicycles for teachers (USD 331,200), teachers' accommodation (USD 1,052,500), and motorcycles for circuit supervisors (USD 481,350).

4.16 In January 2006, Ghana received official notification that USD 11m had been approved for 2006 following a decision made in the previous July, at the CF meeting. In February 2006, the second tranche of Year One allocation was made, USD 4m being disbursed, to complete the full CF allocation for Year One. It was reported that the funds had been utilised as planned, in support of Ghana's Education Strategic Plan with the objectives to improve quality of teaching and learning and strengthening management efficiency (vehicles and motorcycles), on: teacher training, recruitment and deployment, including the provision of teacher incentives such as teacher accommodation and means of transport (bicycles) to improve teacher mobility and encourage better deployment to deprived areas. Annex F, Table F2 details the expenditure.

4.17 In April 2006 Ghana drew up a proposal for planned utilisation of the funds under Year Two allocation with two focus areas: Equitable access to education: (60%) and Quality of education (40%). In July Ghana received a reply from the World Bank on behalf of the FTI, notifying that a grant allocation had been made of USD 11m, again to be paid in two tranches, of USD 6m and USD 5m.

4.18 The Minister of Education, Mr Owusu Ankomah was invited to the 4th FTI Partnership Meeting to take place in November 2006 in Cairo and in the same month the first tranche of the Year Two allocation, USD 6m, was disbursed. This meant that in 2006 a total of USD 10m was disbursed to Ghana, USD 4m from the second tranche of Year One and USD 6m as the first tranche of Year Two.

4.19 At the November 2006 FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Meeting, it was decided to top up Ghana's Year Three allocation to reach USD 14.2m, i.e. an increase of USD 3.2m. This was done on the basis of a recommendation by the FTI Secretariat, based on consultations with in-country donor groups that selected countries which had been allocated less than requested should receive a top up, following an improvement in financial flows into the CF in 2006.²¹ Ghana was one of six countries to benefit in this way and in December, Ghana received the official confirmation from the FTI that the Year Three allocation had been increased to USD 14.2m in light of the country's unmet financial need, good performance and absorptive capacity. At the same time the CF SC requested more information on education indicators, especially with regard to actual data for year 2002/03, projected education budget and service delivery. It also pointed out that there were no indications of the coverage for the financing framework (whether the entire education sector, basic or primary sub-sectors). Finally, the CF SC indicated that the projected large and fluctuating levels of unmet funding needs should be explained. No record of a response on either of these issues was found, so that this study is unable to ascertain what the financing framework actually did cover, or whether there was any intention to apply CF funds more flexibly within the sector overall. In any case funds disbursed were allocated in support of increased access to and the quality of formal basic education.

4.20 In May 2007, Ghana was selected as a member of the FTI Steering Committee for a period of two years by counterparts from other developing countries, along with Ethiopia, Guyana and Mozambique.

²¹ Minutes of meeting of FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee, Nov 12 2006 (FTI 2006b).

4.21 In September, 2007, the second tranche of USD 5m of Year Two's allocation was made. The full amount of USD 11m for the Ghana EFA FTI Year Two Catalytic Grant was used to support Ghana's ESP, again with the objectives of increasing access to and improving the quality of basic education. By November 2007, a total of USD 19m had been disbursed. Annex F, Table F2 details the expenditure.

4.22 In December 2007, Ghana requested preparation of the Grant Agreement for the Year Three amount of USD 14.2m.²² The proposal for the Ghana EFA FTI Year Three and the status reports for Ghana EFA FTI Grants for Year 1 and Year 2 were circulated to development partners and sector officials.

4.23 In February 2008, Ghana's Minister of Education was informed that the FTI had decided to top up the Year Three allocation, with USD 7,100,000 having been made available. This related to the decision made in December 2006, referred to in ¶4.10 above, in which the CF SC decided to allocate additional funds to six countries, including Ghana. The remaining amount of the Grant had not yet been made available, but it was indicated that it was expected to be made available in one additional instalment of USD 7,100,000.

4.24 In March 2008, the Education Sector Group made up of development partners and sector officials were invited to comment on the draft EFA FTI Grant Agreement. In April, the World Bank Ghana EFA FTI Task Team held an audio meeting to clarify remaining disbursement issues. The meeting was attended by disbursement, financial management, procurement personnel and a representative from the EFA FTI secretariat. Also represented were sector officials from the Planning Division of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports (MOESS). The understanding during this meeting was that because this was a Year Three allocation following Year One and Year Two allocations which had been fully disbursed. A Project Appraisal Document (PAD) would not be required as was the case for new EFA FTI countries like Sierra Leone.

4.25 The meeting concluded with key decisions on: (i) applying World Bank fiduciary guidelines for procurement and financial management to the EFA FTI Catalytic Grant; (ii) providing an update on audits undertaken under Year One and Year Two implementation; (iii) preparing the procurement plan for Year 3; (iv) undertaking a financial management assessment; (v) updating the safeguards assessment; (vi) exploring programmatic versus investment type grants (in line with new WB Guidelines for EFA FTI Grants); (vii) drafting the EFA FTI Catalytic Grant Agreement; and (viii) next steps for EFA FTI Catalytic Grant processing.

4.26 At the time of this review (June 2009) the final allocation of CF funds had not yet been paid. Ghana was currently preparing its new ESP, but the government had not yet decided whether to apply for further EFA-FTI CF funding.

²² The proposed expenditure for Year three is given in Annex E.

5. The FTI and Education Policy and Planning

Context

5.1 The first venture into a systematic policy/planning process followed, after a short interval, on the commitment made in the new constitution of 1992 for mandatory basic education. It was introduced as FCUBE: Free, Compulsory, Universal Basic Education. In 1995, this constitutional commitment was taken forward by the then Minister of Education, Harry Sawyerr. FCUBE had, as its four core objectives:

- Improving quality of teaching and learning
- Strengthening management
- Improving access and participation
- Decentralise the education management system

5.2 It is notable that these four objectives or preoccupations have remained highly visible in all subsequent planning activities of MOE. At meetings in Accra in 1995 Minister Sawyerr pressed his case for a more coherent approach to funding the sector, through "basket funding", but found that the donor/development partner community was not then ready for such adventures. The preparations for FCUBE implementation were assisted by the WB, through its creation of a Basic Education Sector Improvement Project (BESIP) which provided the external technical support for creating an FCUBE workplan.

5.3 Over the next few years, up to the development of the first Education Sector Plan in 2003, the "big three" DPs rather dominated the discourse, albeit in very different styles of interaction. WB through its commitment of an International Development Association (IDA) credit of USD 48m to the support of BESIP (1996–2002), was initially the DP working closest to GOG plans, although its spending during that period was consistently disappointing. In addition, WB made a major and lengthy commitment to supporting non-formal, adult education in Ghana, a different but important dimension of the EFA picture. USAID was equally energetic through its Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS project) (1997–2004) with a value of USD 51m designated entirely for projects within the basic education sector and a focus throughout on quality objectives. In the early BESIP years, DFID maintained its continuity of support for projects in teacher education, distance education and adult literacy (the latter supporting the WB project).

5.4 But DFID, particularly at headquarters, was becoming taken by the emerging dialogue regarding alternative aid modalities, particularly sector-wide approaches (SWAp), following publication of Peter Harrold's seminal 1995 paper – The Broad Sector Approach to Investment Lending (Harrold 1995). So, in 1998, Department for International Development (DFID) officials worked with GOG/MOE officials to create an Education Sector Support Plan (ESSP), which eventually ran from 1998–2005, providing sub-sector budget support to GES for basic education. This rather broke the existing mould of GOG – DP ways of doing business and probably served as a precursor to the later development of a full sector plan in 2003. During this period other DPs made important financial and technical contributions but kept low profiles in policy debates.

5.5 Much that was new followed from the start of President Kufuor's first term of office in January 2001. A Committee on Review of Education Reforms in Ghana, also known as the 2002 Presidential Commission Report, published its findings in October 2002 under the title "Meeting the Challenges of Education in the 21st Century". A further report that was influential, prepared for the development of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) in 2002, titled Education Sector Policy Review Report (ESPRR), published in August 2002. These reports, set alongside the development of the first GPRS, and the prevailing climate

following Dakar goals/EFA/MDGs, led to the subsequent delivery, in May 2003, of the first fully-fledged Education Sector Plan (ESP). Technical assistance for its production was mostly provided by DFID and Unicef. The over-arching mission of the MOE was:

To provide relevant education to all Ghanaians at all levels to enable them to acquire skills that will assist them to develop their potential, to be productive, to facilitate poverty reduction and to promote socio-economic growth and national development

Box 5.1 Key Policy Goals of ESP

1. Increase access to and participation in education and training.
2. Improve quality of teaching and learning for enhanced pupil/student achievement.
3. Extend and improve technical and vocational education and training.
4. Promote good health and environmental sanitation in schools and institutions of higher learning.
5. Strengthen and improve educational planning and management.
6. Promote and extend the provision of science and technology education and training.
7. Improve the quality of academic and research programmes.
8. Promote and extend pre-school education.
9. Identify and promote education programmes that will assist in the prevention and management of HIV/AIDS.
10. Provide girls with equal opportunities to access the full cycle of education.

Source: MOE 2003a

5.6 The ten key policy goal enunciated in the ESP are shown in Box 5.1. In the structuring of the ESP, the goals are usually grouped in four areas of focus:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Equitable access to education | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-school education • Access and participation in education and training |
| 2. Quality of education | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Girls access to education • Quality of teaching and learning for enhanced pupil/student achievement • Academic and research programmes • Health and environment in schools and institutions |
| 3. Educational management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention and management of HIV/AIDS • Educational planning and management |
| 4. Science, Technology and TVET | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and vocational education and training • Science and technology education and training |

5.7 In the ESP it is made very clear (MOE 2003a p11) that Ghana subscribes to the six Dakar EFA goals and that the ESP Work Programme contains the essential features of an EFA work programme as a mainstream component of sector development. But it also reminds the reader that the ESP is a *whole sector* plan. The indicative targets, which included all the EFA indicators, committed MOE to achieving universal primary completion by 2015. The indicator system was designed to address the following requirements for monitoring sector performance:

- The need to have a holistic and comprehensive grasp of the state of implementation in relation to ESP targets.
- The need to maintain focus on problem areas, critical concerns and priorities.

- The need to generate support for educational interventions.
- The need to provide feedback to all stakeholders.

5.8 Discussion of the issues of HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion is found as a cross-cutting issue in Chapter 10.

5.9 The planning processes leading to the production of the ESP were undoubtedly much more strongly owned by GOG/MOE than earlier attempts such as FCUBE. This was partly because there was a basis from a number of review commissions and reports already mentioned. Also, there was a strong determination that technical assistance provided by the DPs should be correctly interpreted as such.

5.10 MOE committed itself to an annual performance review of the ESP process, to be conducted by MOE and its internal and external development partners. It, somewhat optimistically, expected that the annual reviews would eliminate the need for DPs to request separate reviews for individual projects and support programmes.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Education sector policy and planning at country level was lacking;	A coherent ESP was generated in 2003, following strong Ghanaian and DP consultation processes
Development partners were not supporting country processes effectively or efficiently	Prior to the ESP there was no whole-sector framework for support, leaving DP contributions not always making coherent impact

FTI Inputs and Activities

5.11 One of our respondents wrote:

Ghana was lucky with FTI. It got in early when procedures were not rigorous. And it was producing the ESP in May 2003, so it could easily use this as the basis of the "Ghana Proposal for Inclusion into Education for All Fast Track Initiative", dated August 2003. Barbara Bruns liked this, and almost unilaterally agreed to allocate funding to Ghana from the Catalytic Fund. This was despite the fact that Ghana was certainly not a "donor orphan" and that other countries were clearly in more urgent need of support.

5.12 So, the passage from proposal, through scrutiny by DPs and their subsequent feedback, led to an early allocation from the CF, very much on the back of the ESP. So when asked to respond to questions regarding FTI activities relating to (i) strengthening sector policy; (ii) supporting strategies for achieving UPC; and (iii) strengthening planning processes in the education sector, the straightforward answer from senior MOE interviewees is that the FTI made little contribution at that time. The only clear and important influence relates to the FTI benchmarking, which has steadily moved to becoming standard practice for MOE in relation to reporting on targets.

5.13 Since the ESP of 2003, there have been a number of important policy initiatives in the sector. These are summarised in Box 5.2 below.

Box 5.2 Policy Initiatives, 2003–2009

2004 White Paper on the Report of the Education Reform Review Committee (MOE 2004). This document, wholly Ghanaian in development and ownership, has two main objectives: (i) to build upon the ESP commitments and ensure that all children are provided with the foundation of high quality free basic education; and (ii) to ensure that second cycle education is more inclusive and appropriate to the needs of young people in order that they develop both demand-driven and market-responsive skills, which are more able to meet the needs of a growing and diversifying Ghanaian economy. Key recommendations:

- Two years pre-school for all as part of basic education
- Reduced primary curriculum
- JSS to become JHS with a general curriculum
- SSS to become four-year SHS with specialist streams

2005 Per capita grants introduced for all children in basic education. No fees may be levied for basic education

2007 New Education Reform emphasises SHS but targets Universal Basic Completion (UBC of 11 years' duration) by 2015, *not* UPC

2008 (November) Education Act passed immediately prior to closure of the parliament prior to national elections

2008 (September) to 2009 (present) Preparation of Revised ESP, to take account of the various initiatives since 2003, and to re-set the time-frame from 2010–2020

5.14 A draft WB report on countries receiving FTI CF support, based on responses from WB TTLs, concluded that:

The FTI Approach ensures that the programs of Development Partners (DPs) are aligned to country objectives and priorities. The Approach also brought donors together around a consolidated and coherent sector strategy. The development of the integrated investment budget and activity briefs has helped to provide transparency in investment decision (World Bank 2009b).

5.15 The evaluation team have been unable to find evidence that supports this proposition. In Ghana, the programmes of DPs are generally well aligned to "country objectives and priorities", but, quite properly this alignment is directly to the ESP, rather than ventriloquised through an "FTI Approach". Rather, the evidence from this study shows that the FTI Catalytic Fund is seen as a contributor donor among others in support of the ESP. What emerges over the period however, is an institutionalising of the Education Sector Annual Reviews, based on the Education Sector Annual Performance Reports as influential in relation to putting the state of the sector in the "public" domain on a regular basis and in encouraging the DPs to even more closely align their contributions to the needs of the ESP and hence MOE. More will be said about this in the discussion of Aid Effectiveness (Chapter 9 below).

5.16 In relation to stakeholder engagement in policy setting and planning processes, four very different dimensions of the system considered:

- At school and community level, the role of the School Management Committee is clearly defined by legislation, and operationally within the ESP. Discussions at District level revealed that SMCs were not uniformly effective in their roles in school-level planning. Many SMCs were said to be non-functional or very weak, partly due to high turnover of parent representatives, to lack of capacity building for members and other factors. A common descriptor used was "moribund".
- In the preparation of the revised ESP, the following processes have been undertaken or planned by MOE:
 - Internal workshop within PBME led to drafting of the five chapters of the ESP by small teams/individuals within PBME, supported by an external TA.
 - Drafting followed by editing in internal workshops.
 - The PBME team had visits and presentations from appropriate stakeholders, e.g. for complementary education.
 - DPs were consulted and their own documentation used as a resource.
 - The zero draft of both volumes of the ESP was widely circulated in anticipation of ten three-day regional workshops, which were all held on 15-17 April 2009, facilitated by members of PBME. 100+ people participated in each workshop, making more than 1000 in all, with representation from all 160 districts.
 - Reports from the workshops were consolidated by GES and the findings are currently being incorporated into the ESP draft, ready for presentation at the forthcoming annual sector review (late June).
 - Civil society coalitions have become important contributors to the policy debate.

5.17 Senior office bearers of Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC) indicated that CSOs are well represented at the ESAR, preparing a discussion paper which they then present. CSOs have needed to fight to get their issues placed on the agenda of the ESAR, but this is increasingly becoming a tradition. CSOs, represented by the coalition, have fairly regular contact with the minister. For example when "serious" issues arise, when research documents are prepared, such as in organizing the Global Action Week, a resolution is prepared and sent to him. GNECC is happy with the level of advocacy. For example research output produced by the Coalition is shared with the parliamentary select committee in education. There is a degree of maturity in terms of the relationship between CSO and the government evidenced by government asking CSO to take the lead in asking G7 to increase their commitment to the sector.

5.18 The major teachers' union which represents primary teachers, the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), contributes regularly to the ESAR, and has commented on drafts of the revised ESP, etc. They have good relations with the national civil society coalition, GNECC, and have actually supported it financially.

5.19 However, GNAT senior officers had not been well informed about the contribution of the FTI beyond the CF, until earlier in 2009 when one senior officer met FTI Secretariat representatives in Washington. Representatives told the evaluation team that "GNAT had never been involved in discussions relating to the preparation of the FTI proposal, or since".

Hypothesis	Commentary
FTI processes and activities supported the strengthening of policy and planning for EFA and UPC at country level	The evaluation team conclude that there is no evidence that this is the case, with the exception of the strengthening of benchmarking as an FTI introduced process

Relevance

5.20 As has been indicated in the previous chapter, the timing of FTI entry into Ghana in 2003 meant that a respectably coherent sector plan was largely congruent with the needs of an FTI CF submission, receiving acceptance in 2004. Thereafter, the FTI made little or no contribution to the policy generation and planning processes in the education sector. All of the CF funding was used within the framework of the existing ESP, which was the "only show in town" for both MOE and DPs. The CF did not support specific efforts at strengthening policy and planning.

Effectiveness

5.21 There is little doubt that the series of policy initiatives in this decade have led to the construction of a much stronger policy framework within which MOE/GES can operate. That is not to say that there are no areas of dispute. A simple example of this was seen during the country visit, where MOE held a two-day seminar to try to conclude the issue of whether SHS should be of 3 or 4 years' duration. The newspaper headline at the end of the seminar was "No Consensus". The headlining of the future of TVET is another example where consensus on ways forward remains elusive. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement about the shape and direction of the 11 years of basic education, and the target of universal basic completion by 2015.

5.22 As has been indicated in Chapter 3 above describing issues within basic education, there are numerous points at which practice fails to gel with policy priorities. Obvious examples in basic education include failure to pay attention to: the quality of provision for kindergarten; the performance and deployment of teachers in primary and junior high schools; the performance of head teachers as managers and leaders; and the efficient use of scarce resources of classrooms, textbooks and teachers. Year on year, the weaknesses are recited in the Education Sector Performance Report, but little action is taken to address the hardest problems.

5.23 There has been no direct FTI engagement or influence during this latest round of policy development and planning. It is clear that key members of PBME are well aware of the contribution made by the CF funds at critical points in the last few years, but they recognise the distinction between the broader aims of the FTI and the funding inputs from the CF. They clearly work independently of any FTI policy orientations beyond the now embedded EFA/Dakar/MDG goals. As one respondent said:

To be honest, I don't think there has been FTI influence on the latest ESP. This is not to say that there isn't great pride and gladness within MOE on being included in the FTI. I would say there hasn't been any of "we'd better do such-and-such else we may fall off the FTI horizon".

Efficiency

5.24 It has been impossible to identify a causal, or even correlational, link between the volume of FTI inputs in Ghana and improvements in policy definition and planning processes. The inputs from the CF may have provided a more focused approach on quality issues within the plans for basic education. It may just be that the presence of EFA FTI as a project nested within the ESP has some effect in the discourse around the Education Sector

Annual Performance Report, insofar as it provides a constant reminder of EFA priorities within the broader education agenda.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Adoption of education policies and plans which reflect strategic priorities for achieving UPC and draw support from key stakeholders	The last decade has seen genuine strengthening of policies and plans, although there are always dissenting stakeholder voices in Ghana. The influence of the FTI in the latest planning iteration has been very small, even close to zero. The benchmarking developments suggested as deriving from the FTI IF will presumably be retained in the reformed ESP.
Implementation of improved sector policies and plans, with support from all key stakeholders	As is clearly documented in the 2008 Education Sector Performance Report, there remains a huge gap, between the increasingly sound sector policies and plans, and their implementation in Ghana's schools, colleges and classrooms. There is no evidence to suggest that the FTI has had any influence in building stakeholder support for the sector policies since the 2003 ESP. ²³

Sustainability

5.25 The second iteration of the ESP, to cover the period 2010–2020, is very likely to be a much stronger and more durable plan, resulting from the improved confidence, skills and performance of PBME, the key unit in MOE. It should be coherently supported by the DPs, although this cannot be guaranteed. Its implementation depends entirely on raising levels of performance and efficiency, at all levels of the system, from the present low levels. This is only likely to be achieved by strong and sustained leadership, from ministerial level to rural head teachers.

5.26 Key risks to the delivery of the ESP include:

- Lack of continuity occasioned by frequent changes in leadership of key units.
- Lack of stakeholder cooperation, particularly from the teachers' unions.
- Parents with available funds choosing the private sector, leaving the public schools lacking in voices for improvement.
- Individualistic behaviour by DPs.

Hypothesis	Commentary
The FTI has helped to secure improvements in provision, access and quality of basic education which are sustainable	FTI contributions, almost entirely from the CF, have been wholly made within the boundaries of the ESP, thus addressing issues of provision, access and quality of basic education. The sustainability of these contributions is no different in kind or degree from other DP investments in project mode. The new ESP seems likely to be more robust and feasible in practice than its predecessor. That implies increased sustainability, but there remain significant risks to be addressed.

²³ See also the discussion of FTI and aid effectiveness in Chapter 9 below.

6. The FTI and Education Finance

Context

Financing Gaps

6.1 Domestic and external financing constraints have been significant in Ghana both in 1999 and through to the present time: this is in two respects – both in quantity and in "usability". The usability of both domestic and external funds is compromised by unpredictability, delay and lack of flexibility (for both GOG and donor funding). Delay in funding is endemic in Ghana. In respect of the flexibility there is for instance, no scope for reallocating funds from PE to non-salary uses at sector level.

6.2 The ESP methodology relies heavily on the development of a costed plan for UPC and the determination of the Financing Gap associated with that plan, with a view to ensuring that it is funded. It can be useful to determine a Financing Gap where the period is not extensive (otherwise estimates for later years become highly unreliable), where there is a credible programme to monitor the gap thoroughly and regularly, together with a mechanism for deriving future budgets and performance assessments from the plan. Additionally for comparative purposes, revisions to a costed plan must be based upon the original assumptions or state the cost implications of changed assumptions. However, in all cases a Financing Gap for education is arbitrary depending on the targets, standards (including standards of efficiency), levels of education, coverage selected and cost estimates – teachers' salaries are critical in this. Areas in which a Financing Gap is said to fall (capital, recurrent, textbooks etc.) are similarly arbitrary except where funds are heavily earmarked. As a result, all Financing Gaps require careful interpretation.

6.3 In Ghana there are a number of difficulties with the costing of the ESP 2003–2015. Firstly, the period is far too long for any reliable projection, especially in Ghana's fast moving education environment and so it has proved with the significant changes in the White Paper of 2004. Secondly, there has been no effective monitoring. Thirdly, the revised Financing Gap calculated in 2007 was not as comprehensive, used different assumptions and did not specify the effect on cost of those changed assumptions.

6.4 However, the ESP was the first costed plan for Ghana's education sector. This was the first time that long term adequacy of funding for education was systematically assessed. Observing that GOG typically financed 91% of expenditures, and noting that education expenditures were already at 6.2% of GDP, it presented the Financing Gap in 2003 as USD 220m over the 13 year period (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Financing Gap 2003–15

Budget	Amount USD million
Recurrent	183
Capital	37
Total	220

6.5 83% of the shortfall was considered to be in recurrent costs. However, as observed above, this distinction is arbitrary since the allocation of available funds, and especially GOG funds, determines where the shortfall will ultimately lie.

6.6 The shortfall excludes revenue from DPs and averages approximately USD 17m per annum. It represents 8.7% of the total requirement over the period. By contrast, aid to education was reported for years 2000, 2001 and 2002 as USD 32.8m, USD 14.4m and USD 14.7m respectively (Casely-Hayford et al 2007, citing World Bank, but not specifying

whether this was nominal USD or adjusted). This suggests that the gap might already have been substantially covered. However, not all aid expenditures are on elements of expenditure that form part of a calculated financing gap, and indications for the primary sub-sector show that in the earlier years of the period its financing gap was significant. Importantly, given the effective earmarking of financing sources (especially GOG earmarking to salaries) the gap was seen to arise primarily in the requirements for additional textbooks and capital.

Table 6.2 Funding Gaps in the Primary Schooling Priority Area

	2003	2004	2005	2010	2015
Recurrent	-1.23	-4.84	-6.02	2.10	3.10
HIV/AIDS related	-0.05	-2.63	-2.96	-4.81	-6.74
Additional Textbooks	-7.80	-7.79	-7.79	-9.48	-10.21
Capital	-0.31	-11.69	-9.88	-0.29	1.50
Total Primary Sub-sector	-9.39	-26.95	-26.65	-12.48	-12.35
Primary Teacher Education	-0.53	-0.85	-0.93	-0.91	-0.90
Total UPC GAP (USD m)	-9.92	-27.80	-27.58	-13.39	-13.25

Source: ESP 2003 (MOE 2003a), minor arithmetical errors adjusted

6.7 A note on the calculation of the Financing Gap in the ESP indicates that it was calculated without inclusion of any support from DPs, and that for expenditures (MOE 2003a p42):

...the base figures were compiled using actual expenditure data (from MOE budget, donor support and other sources of funding) for 2002 [which were extrapolated] combined with the application of the indicative targets and benchmark parameters set for key factors [such as GER and PTR].

6.8 In particular, the ESP assumed a PCR of 100% by 2010, and a GER for JSS of 90% by 2015. PTR targets were for Primary 35:1 by 2010 and for JSS 25:1 by 2015. In addition there was an associated set of targets relating to pupil:book ratios, classroom construction, and school hygiene standards. Education salaries are a key input, but beyond the statement on extrapolation, the assumptions used for this input are not specified in the ESP document.

6.9 The Financing Gap of the ESP was calculated using FTI methodology, and in particular does not allow figures to be adjusted for inflation, preferring to index recurrent costs to GDP.

6.10 The Financing Gap for the achievement of UPC has not been regularly monitored, although it has been calculated periodically and is being recalculated for the revised ESP 2010–2020. This process has just begun and the basis of the recalculation is at present expected to follow the ESP 2003–2015. An intermediate recalculation was carried out for the 2006 Ten Year Workplan which calculated the gap for basic education to be significantly higher than the Primary gap calculated in 2003, as shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Requirements, Resource Envelopes and Gaps for Basic Education 2006–2015 (USDm)

YEAR	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
REQUIREMENT	521	864	905	948	820	872	875	887	904	917
RESOURCE ENVELOPE	474	488	526	555	586	618	653	690	730	732
GAP	47	376	379	393	234	254	222	197	174	185

Source: MOESS 2006d

6.11 The 2006 recalculation used the same assumptions for PCR, GER and PTRs as the ESP of 2003 with only minor differences, but it is a much briefer document which does not specify its methodology and makes no reference to the FTI method. Moreover it does not present a separate Financing Gap for Primary education. The Financing Gaps it produces are not directly comparable with the ESP 2003–2013 for several reasons, including the abolition of all basic education fees and their replacement with a Capitalisation Grant; and the assumption of a different set of inputs driven by the 2005 White Paper. These included:

- Extension of universal compulsory basic education to include two years of pre-school teaching at the kindergarten level, making basic education in Ghana eleven years in length (KG 2; Primary 6; JHS 3);
- Replacement of JSS with Junior High School (JHS), with a more general, comprehensive curriculum;
- Senior Secondary School (Senior High School – SHS) extended from 3 to 4 years, and diversified into four streams: vocational, technical, agricultural and general education.

6.12 The last does not affect Financing Gaps in Primary or Basic Education directly, but reallocations to finance increased secondary coverage may have occurred, exacerbating the gap in finance of Primary and Basic Education. It has not been possible to determine how each of these policy changes affected the Financing Gap. This is an important outstanding exercise which will also be needed to assess changes resulting from the ESP currently in development.


Hypothesis	Comment
Domestic and external financing constraints were impeding progress towards UPC	This was only true to a limited extent. The Financing Gap identified in the ESP excluded donor support and was only 9% of the total requirement over 13 years. Also, Ghana was "not a donor orphan" at this time and already receiving aid approximately equal to this Gap. Financing Gaps calculated in 2006 show more serious constraints, but result from ambitious widening of coverage and lengthening of the standard education.

Volumes of Aid to Education²⁴

6.13 Looking at aid on a commitments basis, Figure 6.1 shows that aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999–2007, with peaks in 2003 and 2006.

²⁴ The following figures show total (rather than just direct) aid flows to education and basic education. These broader definitions include assumptions about the use of aid flows that are not strictly assigned to education or basic education (following the convention adopted by the GMR): Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level.


Figure 6.1 Total Commitments to Education and Basic Education (constant 2007 USD m)



Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

6.14 Figure 6.2 shows movement in funding sources for education 2003–2007. The vast majority of funding is from GOG (although supported by a significant contribution from Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS)); the second most important source of funding is Internally Generated Funds (IGF) which derive from cost recovery systems. Donor support increased slightly in importance in 2004 and 2005, but in 2007 represented 6.8% of the total, consistent with shares seen in the period prior to the FTI.

Figure 6.2 Funding for Education by Source 2003–2007



Source: Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

The FTI and Education Finance Inputs

6.15 Financial inputs associated with the FTI could take several forms. First, it was expected that endorsement of a country's ESP would lead existing donors to increase their financial support through existing channels, and possibly encourage new donors to provide additional funding. This chapter comments on the existence of these possible effects for

Ghana, and Chapter 9 (aid effectiveness) returns to the issue. More directly, the kinds of input to finance that may be expected from an FTI programme are technical support to education in financial management and/or financial planning; and direct financial support through the Catalytic Fund and/or EPDF. A further possibility is that through use of government systems the modality selected by the FTI can indirectly support the strengthening of financial management, but that has not happened in Ghana because the modality selected was essentially project-based.

6.16 Discussions with staff of the MOE indicate that there has been little direct input to financial management from the FTI (cf. Box 6.1). This is illustrated by the following quote from a senior official who advised that:

You couldn't really say that FTI has done anything to improve financial management capacity. We don't look to them for that since we already have major programs with DFID and the EC. In fact, DFID's SESP project provides £10 million out of a total of £100 million to improve human resource and financial management in MOE HQ. This money is very easy to access. It includes the contract and emoluments of three key advisers; capacity-building in MOE/GES; teaching service management, including study leave and a trainee teacher stipend systems reform; public financial management and payroll reform. However, this is not to be critical of FTI. We arrange things this way because we don't want all DPs trying to do all things.

6.17 It was reported that the financial simulation model was used in the preparation of the ESP 2003–2015, but is not in regular use. It is not known what capacity building approaches were used at that time but they do not seem to have been successful, since current revisions to the ESP are being carried out by international Technical Assistance (financed by the EPDF and DFID) with limited local collaboration.

6.18 The major inputs of the FTI have therefore been the financial contributions of the Catalytic Fund and EPDF. Consequently, the FTI in Ghana is seen primarily as a source of funds (key informants). The CF contributions have been set out in an earlier chapter of this paper but are summarised here in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Catalytic Fund Disbursements

Tranche	USD m	Disbursed
2005	8.0	Yes
2006	11.0	Yes
2007	14.2	No

6.19 Of the USD 19m which has been disbursed USD 3.8m (20%) was spent on textbooks and the remainder on capital items including USD 6.4m (34%) on school construction and rehabilitation and USD 5.3m (28%) on teachers' accommodation. The remaining tranche of USD 14.2m is planned to be spent on textbooks.

6.20 There is no systematic information on EPDF support to Ghana and the 2007 summary records only a conference attended using EPDF funds. The Supervising Entity reports that EPDF spending on behalf of Ghana has been in the region of USD 400,000 to date, but a definitive list of expenditures was not available. There are plans to use EPDF funds in support of the revised ESP currently being developed.

Box 6.1 Public Financial Management and Reporting in Ghana – Key Points

Public financial management in 2003 as judged by budget credibility was not strong. In 2003 and in the years since the GOG budget has regularly been overspent by as much as 40% although in recent years this has ranged from 11% to 15%. In 2004 the overall budget was overspent by 66% but has reduced since then although spending composition varies widely.

In Education:

- There was no preliminary assessment of financial management at commencement of Catalytic Fund support in 2004 since it was using channels already known to the World Bank (the Supervising Entity).
- The evaluation team heard that an MTEF has existed in education since 1995 but that budgets rarely correspond with the outer years of earlier MTEFs because of changes in strategy being made at short notice.
- Financial reporting in MOE is currently delayed. As of the team's departure on May 28th, the 2008 financial report was unavailable. It is not expected to be available until mid year at the earliest. Financial reporting is made more difficult because of fragmentation of sources. Steffersen 2006 (p19) observes that education funding is "still fragmented in many channels with no clear overview of the total funds available".

Hypothesis	Comment
The FTI process put in place a complete set of activities aimed at identifying financial requirements and mobilising domestic and external funding to support EFA and UPC globally and at country level.	Through the Catalytic Fund the FTI provided support relevant to identified financing requirements; it provided no significant support to strengthening systems.

The Relevance of FTI Support to Education Financing in Ghana

6.21 There has been no significant support to financial systems from the FTI in Ghana for reasons indicated above. Such support is considered to be provided adequately by other donors and by GOG internal efforts.

6.22 The World Bank has been at the centre of discussions on strengthening of PFM in education. In support of the 2007 CF tranche a fiduciary assessment and financial management assessment were carried out. However, no diagnostic benefit for GOG was reported and these assessments would have been carried out in any event to support the World Bank EDSEP project.

6.23 Finally, it may be considered that since the FTI does not use routine government systems (it uses a separate PMU which operates within the MOE) that it is not driven by fiduciary risk issues to improve the broader financial management systems of government.

6.24 By contrast the use of Catalytic Fund expenditures themselves has been highly relevant, although the modality was not supportive of systemic improvements and there is no evidence of any catalytic effect (see below and Chapter 9). It is clear that these expenditures focused on the areas where Financing Gaps were identified in the ESP (textbooks and capital items). Discussions with GOG officials revealed that dialogue before the agreements are drawn up always ensures that FTI disbursements are focused on current education needs. One informant advised that the FTI provided funds through the CF for building classroom blocks at Accra Metro and it was "just at the right time".

The Effectiveness of FTI Funding to Education Financing in Ghana

6.25 FTI endorsement and engagement, as well as the Catalytic Fund itself, is intended to catalyse available finance. Figure 6.1 above shows that aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999–2007, with peaks in 2003 and 2006. There has also been an unsteady decline in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid; the lowest points were in 2000 and 2003. FTI endorsement was in 2004 and consequently cannot have played a part in the surge in aid commitments of 2003. However, one major donor says that its HQ is heavily influenced by FTI endorsement, and another indicated significant influence – again through HQ.

6.26 The surge in commitments in 2003 was in all likelihood the result of other major developments. 2003 was the year of the first GPRS, and this had a major influence on aid generally – commitments as a whole doubled in 2003. A recent survey of MDBS (ODI 2007) reports that:

Donors were encouraged by the peaceful transfer of power after the 2000 elections, continuing the democratisation of the preceding decade. They were encouraged too by improvements in the quality of macroeconomic management, resulting in an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by legislation strengthening domestic financial management, and by adoption of the GPRS.

6.27 In the view of the review team this is a more plausible cause of the increased support to education. The chart of disbursement shares at Figure 6.2 above, drawn from data available in Ghana, confirms the view that the catalytic effect on donor funding was non-existent seen in relative terms, as DP support shrank as a percentage of overall funding for education after 2005.

6.28 There is a more general effectiveness question of whether resources are reaching beneficiaries, including CF funds, and the final point of whether these funds are effectively used for quality services. In this respect a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) was recently carried out which focused on selected expenditures in 2006: capitation grants, textbooks, service activity expenditures (Item 3) and investment expenditures (Item 4) in basic education.

6.29 In respect of Capitation Grants, distribution was found to be relatively efficient between MOFEP and GES, and between GES and District Education Offices (DEOs) with no evidence of leakage. However, the CG amount of 3 cedis per student did not always reach schools as intended by GES. DEOs are the main bottleneck for the effective CG distributions. It was thought that several improvements can be made to improve the financial management at the level of DEOs and the key issue is accurate record-keeping from DEOs to school levels.

6.30 Textbook delivery (supported by the CF) was found to suffer from frequent delays in distribution and poor record keeping at DEO and school level which made tracking difficult. Item 3 expenditure in education sector suffered from inconsistent record reporting, frequent delays in fund transfers, and a low percentage of spending. The majority of DEOs received their Item 3 funds in November 2006 and March 2007 when the academic year was already well in session. Based on expenditure returns from Regional Education Offices (REOs), only one third of funds transferred to them was accounted for in expenditure returns. DEOs, on the other hand, disbursed their Item 3 funding as soon as they received it.

6.31 Contemporary enquiries supported the view that resources do not flow easily to school level. At one District visited the Officer had heard on television that the Capitation Grant has gone up to GHC 4.5 (from GHC 3) but had received no official notification. Earlier

in 2009 he had received GHC 1 per head in respect of the first term together with some arrears from 2008.

6.32 Financial difficulties have meant that administration costs (Item 2) for April had not yet been paid out by late May. It was reported that such delays in Item 2 have not occurred in recent times.

6.33 The FTI's contribution to Education Financing has principally been to provide financial resources for the financing of relevant education inputs through the CF. It may have influenced further contributions through its endorsement of Ghana and it has provided some small inputs such as support to the ESP 2003–2013 by use of its financial simulation model.

6.34 It is a peculiarity of the FTI that its focus is on planning and access, but the issues suggested here seem to concern resource flows to the schools and related issues of the quality of service delivery that eventually define effectiveness. It is not clear that the FTI's strategy of tactical procurement and EFA advocacy is ensuring effective education at the school level in Ghana.

6.35 The use of EPDF funds is unclear and their effectiveness cannot easily be assessed. One of the issues raised by informants was that their availability and use is controlled by the World Bank, and that there is little transparency vis-à-vis the GOG. They do not know what EPDF budget is available to Ghana, and this renders the fund difficult to use.

The Efficiency of FTI Funding to Education Financing in Ghana

6.36 FTI support to Education Finance has principally consisted of Catalytic Fund contributions. Arguably the modality with the least transaction costs is the MDBS, but this modality was not considered since it is not education sector specific. In the event a high transaction cost modality is now in use which is threatening the continued engagement of Ghana with the FTI.

6.37 The effectiveness of the Catalytic Fund contributions has been affected by the manner of their disbursement as well as by their use. They have been flexible in allocation, within the limits imposed by the need to disburse and acquit promptly. However, their effectiveness is hampered because they have been progressively more delayed, with serious lateness in distribution of the third tranche. 6.39 below shows timing of releases of the 2005 allocation for which the second tranche was paid in Q1 2006; and the 2006 allocation which was paid in two parts: Q4 2006 and Q3 2007.

6.38 The third CF contribution remained unpaid at May 2009, although an Agreement is understood to have been signed at April 1st, 2009. The delay is attributed to the introduction of rigorous World Bank procedures applied to this third tranche, including the requirement for a full Project Appraisal Document (PAD). Completing this document automatically introduces other procedures, including a fiduciary risk assessment and financial management assessment of the spending agency – in this case the PFMU. None of this was required before and it has been time consuming. It also now requires "no objection" procedures for effectively all procurements, another process likely to result in delays in disbursement. There is a Special Account into which funds are deposited and from which they are spent after "no objection" received and a quarterly reporting system on spending. Procedures are quite typical for a project arrangement. The items to be procured continue to be decided between the Bank and the MOE. However, there are indications that capacity issues in PBME and changes of staff following the 2008 election may have been an aggravating factor.

6.39 The overall perception is that as a result of the changed rules and procedures CF funds have become unpredictable and in that respect difficult to use with relatively high transaction costs.

Table 6.5 Timeliness of Catalytic Fund Releases

Year	Amount USD m	2005				2006				2007			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
		Notification and USD m received				Notification and USD m received				Notification and USD m received			
2005	8.0	N	4.0			4.0							
2006	11.0					N			6.0			5.0	
2007	14.2							N					

Where: N = official notification, and amounts within the highlighted cells are received in the period for which they are intended

6.40 There is nowhere a clear document to suggest why the FTI chose project mode through the FPMU as its modality, and it is thought by present staff of the SE that it was the familiarity of Bank staff with the FPMU that led to its use for CF funds. However, it is clear that another alternative, direct support to the districts in much the same manner as DFID's SESP would have required much longer periods to liquidate and account for funds, undermining the need of the CF to be a quick-disbursing fund.

6.41 A significant part of the CF will have been used for purchases of textbooks which can be quickly and efficiently absorbed by the school system. This is less true for construction inputs which are time-consuming projects.

Hypothesis	Comment
Education sector budget process is more transparent, comprehensive, integrated and efficient	Steady improvements in the budget process are reported, but there is no direct or indirect FTI involvement in this.

Sustainability

6.42 The FTI, through the CF, has provided a contribution to the financing of basic education, but has not improved the sustainability of education financing.

7. The FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Context before FTI Endorsement

7.1 In Ghana, the Education Management and Information System (EMIS) was in place before FTI endorsement. For many years now, EMIS has been at the core of M&E process in the education sector. Information produced by EMIS takes precedence over any other information gathered from other sources²⁵ and EMIS is therefore regarded as a standard reference point for performance monitoring and impact evaluation (MOEYS, 2004).

7.2 The importance of EMIS in the M&E processes within the education sector in Ghana is reflected in the clear synergy that can be found between the development of education policy and the development of EMIS. For example, data collection by EMIS helped to formulate some of the country's earliest national education policies. Similarly, since 2007, EMIS has been aligned to the policy of decentralisation; with the collection of data being devolved to the district level and within this process EMIS data are being used to construct regional and district operational plans and develop budgets for implementation.

7.3 The evaluation team identified a change in the M&E processes with the introduction of the ESP in 2003. This section discusses the changes in the M&E processes before and after the ESP. An assessment of the extent to which these changes can be attributed to the FTI is made.

M&E in Basic Education Sub-Sector Before 2003

Organisational structures and responsibilities for M&E

7.4 The basic education sub-sector²⁶ in Ghana prior to 2003 had well established structures for M&E at central, regional, and district levels. At the central level, M&E fell under the purview of two Divisions within the MOE, namely the Statistics Research Information Management and Public Relations Division (SRIMPR) and the PBME. A clear division of labour existed between the two Divisions; the SRIMPR was responsible for collecting data on education and PBME undertook very basic analysis of these data. At regional and district levels, statistical units and the inspectorate division of the GES were responsible for M&E activities.

7.5 At the central level the SRIMPR carried out all work related to the statistical production chain. The Division was also tasked to give adequate training to circuit supervisors. The PBME undertook analysis of data provided by SRIMPR and ensured that targets set under particular programmes such as FCUBE were being met. At the regional level this division was responsible for assisting the central level staff in training for completing school census forms at the district and school levels and returning completed forms back to centre. District level responsibility was confined to training school head teachers on completing the questionnaires; distribution of the questionnaires; and validation and follow-up of the returned questionnaires. Their role was the most minimal despite being the level most in contact with the school and therefore the primary source of information for M&E process.

²⁵ For example Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) and Multi Cluster Indicator Surveys (MICS).

²⁶ For the tertiary subsector, the statistics unit of NCTE is mainly in charge of compiling, processing and disseminating data on public and private tertiary institutions – universities, technical colleges and polytechnic institutes. The data for technical and vocational institutions are compiled by NACTVET. The NFED also has its own statistics unit which mainly collects data from its own literacy programmes.

Data collection and processing for M&E

7.6 The Statistics Unit of the SRIMPR collected routine quantitative data via EMIS, although the Unit did not have full responsibility for ownership and maintenance of the EMIS system. This was because the computerised EMIS system that was in use was developed by a consultant through donor project support. Although the project was completed, the department still had to rely on the previous consultant to fix problems or to make changes to the questionnaires

7.7 Census forms were sent to schools through regional and district education offices to both public and private institutions. Approximately 90% of public institutions returned their completed forms given that it is an instruction from the Ministry of Education that they should do so. As mentioned earlier, it was not mandatory for private institutions to complete these forms and therefore a proportion did not return them. This affected the completeness of data and the quality of indicators.

7.8 The census cycle began in November, and once the forms were received, the district education officers organised a one-day meeting with head teachers. Four copies of the questionnaire were distributed to the head teachers, each to be returned to the SRIMPR, regional education office, district education office, with the school keeping a copy for reference and validation purposes.

7.9 In each district, schools were expected to return the questionnaires within two weeks to the DEOs. The district statisticians had the role of verifying the completeness and accuracy of the information. The verified questionnaires were then forwarded to the regional offices where EMIS staff reviewed and validated for a second time before forwarding them to the central level, which captured and consolidated the data into a national database. This process was described by those interviewed as being too cumbersome for an already over stretched Division.

7.10 Although the SRIMPR was the main agent of data collection, agencies like the GES collected their own data for internal planning purposes because data from SRIMPR were never available in a timely fashion or the information required was not collected by EMIS. This dual process of data collection was inefficient and resulted in duplication of effort. This also overstretched the scarce resources.

Timeliness of data for M&E

7.11 Before 2003, there were frequent delays in the collection and processing of data at all levels which affected planning. Planning took place between July and September. The data were therefore required before July. However, as one respondent summed up, data was "almost always late". On average administering of the questionnaire should have taken only three to four months from the time the questionnaires were sent to the schools in November through to when they are sent back to the SRIMPR in February. However, due to shortage of funds and delays in releasing budgets, data collection was carried out six months after its expected start time. As such, the processing of the data and subsequently production of the Education Statistics Yearbook, which was supposed to be produced by the end of August to help planning in the next school year, was never on time.

Type of data for M&E

7.12 The type of data that was required for M&E should have included detailed information about the state of schools for construction and rehabilitation purposes, financial information for budget allocation, and sociological information of pupils such as social and economic background of the parents. However, the data collection system did not capture this type of information, leaving an obvious data gap.

7.13 With respect to the indicators of the FTI Indicative Framework, most of the data that related to the student flow indicators were collected. Of the service delivery indicators, data for PTR were collected. The other service delivery indicators regarding average teacher salary and instruction hours were collected by the Integrated Personnel/Payroll Database Unit (IPPD) under the Administrative Division for payroll purposes and therefore these aspects were not monitored. There was no known exchange of procedures or coordination between the SRIMPR and IPPD which would have complemented the monitoring processes.

Use and analysis of data for M&E

7.14 Before ESP (2003), data were used to produce the annual Education Statistics Yearbook. This was the core statistical publication describing the situation of basic education in Ghana. Individual departments and agencies also used data from EMIS to produce their own reports. However, in general, there was very little evidence of the use of the data partly due to their being: i) deficiencies in the quality and coverage of data collected creating a barrier for their further use in analysis; ii) weak capability and expertise for data analysis and lack of human resources in the area of statistics and planning services; and iii) little or no culture or acquired skills in the use of educational statistics among planners. Delay in the production and dissemination of statistics further worsened the situation.

7.15 Before 2003, although data were collected by the statistics unit of the SRIMPR and the analysis undertaken by the PBME Division, there was weak collaboration between the statisticians and policy analysts. Inter-sectoral linkages and coordination among statisticians in the Ministry of Education and other public agencies, such as the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), was also weak. Under SRIMPR, there was a separate research unit, even though no analytical work was done. Although the first part of the statistical yearbook contained some analysis of annual school data with some key education indicators, it was felt that more analysis was needed in order for it to adequately facilitate policy formulation.

Dissemination of results and accessibility

7.16 Except for the publication of the Statistical Yearbook, which was not widely distributed, education data in Ghana were not very accessible. In some years, the Division has been unable to mass produce the report due to lack of funds. This indicated that the government was not in a position to disseminate education data on a large scale. The distribution mechanisms of these publications are not systematic. They clearly lack defined procedures and strategies. Intended or actual users did not always receive the publications, and in most cases, barely enough publications were produced for even internal users. There was no indication of electronic distribution of information.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Monitoring and evaluation of education sector was not prioritised, was weak, fragmented and inadequately linked to the overall goals and national development plans	The above discussion verifies this hypothesis.

Non- FTI Activities and Inputs

7.17 Completely independent of the FTI process, since Ghana's inclusion into the FTI in 2004, a number of activities have aimed to strengthen and improve the capacity for M&E in the education sector.

7.18 In 2004, the UIS received funding from the EC for the project "Developing National Statistical Capabilities for the Monitoring of Education for All". This project was later complemented by the EMIS Enhancement and Extension 2005–2008 project funded by the

World Bank with technical assistance from the UIS. More recently, a research study has been initiated led by IIEP which aims to provide the Ministry with a methodology to periodically monitor the evolution of the costs of the education.

FTI Activities and Inputs

7.19 With the introduction of the FTI in Ghana in March 2004, less than a year after the introduction of the ESP, it was envisaged that at country level the initiative would have an impact on data collection as well as monitoring and evaluation processes along the following dimensions:

- Annual monitoring of the Indicative Framework and other nationally-appropriate targets.
- Strengthening of EMIS.
- Monitoring of donors' progress in increasing the quantity and quality of their assistance to primary education in FTI countries.
- Comparative benchmarking of progress and performance across countries in the Initiative.
- In-country monitoring of progress and dialogue to address non or under performance.

7.20 In Ghana, the evidence of achieving the above objectives is mixed, as will be discussed below.

7.21 In terms of inputs and activities, the FTI has made the following contributions. Firstly, the appraisal of Ghana's FTI proposal highlighted several critical areas for M&E that needed more attention. Of particular relevance was the need for financing the strengthening of M&E activities to be addressed in the proposal. However, the subsequent revision of the proposal in January 2004 still did not address this issue. Secondly, the FTI has contributed the use of the Indicative Framework, which has become an influential monitoring tool in the MOE. Thirdly, CF allocation in the second year was used to procure 53 4x4 double-cabin pick-ups for circuit supervisors.

Hypothesis	Commentary
The FTI recognised the importance of data systems for decision making and supported activities which aimed at strong data collection, reporting and feeding back to decision making.	Whilst FTI inputs have contributed to M&E in terms of the use of the IF and the provision of pick-ups for the 53 districts, these tools for monitoring may not be sustainable. Other non-FTI activities, outlined above, have strengthened data collection, reporting and feedback.

The Relevance of the FTI to M&E in Education

7.22 The IF was perceived to have been very important as a monitoring tool for the education sector. Indicators relating to student flow are consistently reported in the PESPR and subsequently discussed by stakeholders at the ESAR where concerns and recommendations for improvement are flagged up. The IF was also particularly important in shedding light on the need to align teachers' salaries to the recommended 3.5% of GDP given by the IF.

7.23 What was interesting was that, as a widely used tool, only staff at the PBME who use and analyse the IF indicators knew about it by name. Further down the statistical production chain, key members of the SRIMPR had never heard of the IF. However, unlike in Burkina Faso where there was a challenge in getting stakeholders to agree that figures in the IF were simply characteristic of countries that had a "successful" education system, and that they were not quantifiable targets for eligibility for CF, in Ghana the IF is well and properly understood as providing valuable benchmarks rather than rigid norms.

7.24 Since the establishment of the Decentralisation Implementation Committee (DIC) in 2007, supervision and inspection at school level has increased. However, DEOs were said to be facing logistical problems, including lack of vehicles, which made the work of circuit supervisors difficult. Therefore for those districts that received pick-up vehicles procured through CFs, their ability to undertake their supervisory work was made much easier.

7.25 It was evident from the field evaluation that the FTI did provide "tools" such as the IF for monitoring and evaluation. It also improved the capacity of districts to undertake monitoring activities.

The Effectiveness of the FTI in Improving M&E

7.26 Since the introduction of the ESP in 2003, M&E processes in the education sector have improved. The changes that have occurred since the ESP are discussed briefly below and the extent to which these are attributable to the FTI assessed.

Changes in organisational structures and responsibilities for M&E

7.27 There has been a visible change in organisational structure and responsibilities for M&E activities at all levels since 2003. However, no direct attribution can be made to the FTI. As documented in the 2008 PESAR, these changes are a direct and inevitable outcome of the decentralisation process, which has meant that roles have had to be clearly defined.

7.28 At the central level, new relationships have been created with the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) given that, the GSS is the lead agency for the compilation of population data which are the main component for the calculation of a number of indicators for the education sector. Additionally, data collected by GSS, although not without problems, complements the administrative data collected by the education sector. For example, the household survey data on school attendance are triangulated and reconciled against the results of the administrative data as a means of quality assurance.

7.29 At district and regional level statistical and inspectorate units have been merged into an M&E unit with a much broader mandate than before, to include research, monitoring and supervision, planning and administering EMIS. There are therefore greater levels of responsibility for M&E by districts; they are now responsible for the entire statistical production chain from data collection through processing data, analysis and reporting and dissemination.

7.30 This is a positive and welcome aspect to the education sector given that districts are after all the main service delivery agents in the sector, although the burgeoning creation of new districts inevitably means they have a lot of catching up to do.

Changes in data collection and processing for M&E

7.31 Since 2004, there have been several activities which have sought to improve data collection and processing and more generally the capacity of the education sector to carry out M&E activities. These activities have been driven by the needs of ESP and other international goals like the MDGs and EFA. As mentioned above, the EC funded a local statistical capacity building programme in 2004 whose aim was to "build sustainable national

capacities for the monitoring of progress towards EFA and national education sector goals". Activities carried out under this project included a full diagnostic study of the production and use of education statistics in order to identify the areas that need strengthening; and develop a national action plan building on and around the existing capacities and initiatives.

7.32 Complementing the above, the MOE with financial support from WB and UIS put forward a revised strategic plan called the "Expansion and Enhancement Plan". Under this new plan, coverage of the EMIS function has expanded to DEOs improving the sense of ownership of M&E and utilisation of data which was previously lacking. In enhancing EMIS, the MOE is ensuring that the system becomes demand driven and as such attempts have been made to identify new data requirements, such as those associated with HIV/AIDs, disability and education finance.

7.33 Although the FTI framework highlights the strengthening of M&E systems as being a core objective, in Ghana as illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, activities that have aimed to strengthen M&E processes have mostly been independent of the FTI.

Changes in use and analysis of data for M&E:

7.34 The ESP has been accompanied by a number of instruments for monitoring progress in the education sector. Firstly, the PESPR which is a key output of M&E activities has a detailed level of analysis which goes beyond the crude comparisons that were previously reported in the Education Statistics Yearbook.

7.35 Secondly, the ESAR process has also been established to firstly serve as a joint review of sector performance involving all stakeholders in the education sector and secondly to enable an assessment of the progress made in achieving annual targets and in implementing the annual programme of work, as presented in the AESOP. ESAR involves all stakeholders and enhances accountability and transparency within the sector

7.36 Finally, the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee (ESTAC) has been established in order to ensure that donors and stakeholders have an input into the monitoring process, as well as in the subsequent implementation process across the four themes of the ESP. However, by the time of the team visit, this committee had never functioned due to the failure of the MOE to decide upon its composition or precise function. As a consequence this structure is not fulfilling its intended role.

7.37 At district levels, all districts are now mandated to use data collected in the production of District Education Plans, the associated Annual District Education Operational Plan (ADEOP) and Annual District Educational Performance Report (However, due to the lack of technical capacity (and infrastructure capacity), the analyses that are undertaken are crude, and more detail is required). The disbursement of funds to district levels is linked to the timely production of all the above documents.

7.38 To what extent then, are any of the above changes and the use and analysis of data for M&E attributable to the FTI? Given that this period occurred at a time that coincides with Ghana's FTI endorsement in 2004, it would be easy for one to attribute these changes to the FTI. However many stakeholders interviewed were very clear that these changes should not be attributed to the FTI alone. Rather, it was felt that it was the ESP that led to changes that institutionalised a more rigorous culture of monitoring by putting in place several monitoring and review mechanisms.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Data collection on education progress improved, shared with stakeholders and capacity built to inform decision making around policies and plans for achieving UPC	There has been improvement in data collection capacity and greater participation of stakeholders. There is evidence of data informing policy making, planning and funding decisions at central and decentralised level. However, these improvements are as a result of several processes going on in the education sector at the same time such as decentralisation policy, non-FTI statistical capacity building activities and the ESP, which has institutionalised a rigorous culture of monitoring with the introduction of several other monitoring and review mechanisms like the PESAR, ESAR and ESTAC. It is therefore difficult to isolate any contribution that the FTI has made other than the introduction of IF indicators as benchmarks and provision of vehicles at District level.

Efficiency of Resource Use in M&E

7.39 The inputs that have gone into strengthening M&E have been from DPs outside the auspices of the FTI. In contrast to some other countries (e.g. Burkina Faso), Ghana's EMIS system did not benefit from any CF or EPDF funding. Although the FTI mechanism and processes in the form of the IF have been influential, there has been no detailed discussion about the financing of the M&E in either the ESP or in the final FTI proposal, even though the FTI appraisal raised the issue.

7.40 The MOE submits an annual CIF which documents the status of the FTI, but the subsequent release of financing is not linked to this. Generally speaking FTI has tended to "piggy back" on reporting systems that already exist. Indeed this can be viewed positively as it reinforces the fact that Ghana already has a fairly well established monitoring framework and that reporting processes are harmonised along national processes.

Sustainability

7.41 Ghana's recent developments and progress on M&E in the education sector are both exemplary and commendable. Although not without its problems, the EMIS for example has frequently been viewed as an example of good practice in Africa, for decentralised budgeting, planning and supporting reforms at various levels. Given that the changes in M&E processes have institutionalised a robust and rigorous M&E culture, it seems likely that improvements that have been made will survive.

8. The FTI and Capacity Development

Context

8.1 Prior to the engagement of the FTI, there had been a sequence of interventions over many years which had included capacity development elements. In the period immediately before the endorsement of Ghana's ESP by the FTI, there was substantial donor engagement in projects with significant capacity development elements, as summarised in Table 8.1 below. Casely-Hayford et al 2007 have drawn upon World Bank and other documentation to highlight problems which arose in their implementation. The World Bank's Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (BESIP) was intended to be part of a multi-donor support programme to FCUBE, similar to a SWAp. However, "other major donors (the US and UK) did not join the programme but financed their own basic education activities". As a result the education sector had three large donors with very similar projects.

8.2 It was asserted (Casely-Hayford et al 2007) that having three large development partners with three similar projects led to an increase in transaction costs for the GOG, as all three required the engagement of the same limited capacity within MOEYS. At District level, implementation capacity to manage three large parallel education projects was also limited.

Table 8.1 Three Major Donor Funded Projects run in Parallel

Development Partner	Project	Dates	Objectives	Funding
World Bank	Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (BESIP)	1996–2002	To improve the quality of school infrastructure and foster changes in school management to enhance learning outcomes	USD 47.9m
USAID	Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS)	1997–2004	Support to policy reform and school and community development; (1) improving quality of teaching and learning; (2) building capacity for decentralised school management; (3) increasing community involvement in schools; and (4) improving the physical learning environment. Extensive technical assistance and training for teaching staff and community members	USD 53m
DFID	Education Sector Support Project (ESSP)	1998–2005	Provided flexible budget support for the GOG's Whole School Development Programme (WSD), focusing on district and school level interventions.	GBP 50m

Source: Adapted from Casely-Hayford et al 2007

8.3 The ESP (MOE 2003a, p10) drew upon the findings of the 2002 ESR which had conducted a SWOT analysis, identifying strengths and weaknesses in education planning and management. On the positive side, it was "generally agreed" that: community/school partnerships had improved inputs leading to teacher effectiveness and improved pupil

performance; Annual Consultative Panel Meetings provided opportunities for meaningful participation of DPs in the education process; and the MTEF process was well established and working well at central levels. However, it also signalled: structural and capacity problems within the Ministry of Education and its agencies, managerial weaknesses, manpower shortages and lack of supervision; ineffective channels of communication; indiscipline and misbehaviour in local offices; and inequitable resource allocation at Regions and Districts.

8.4 The ESP committed the government to: increase access to and participation in education and training; improve quality by building on already proven initiatives and by improving and augmenting the supply of human and physical resources available to the system, making them more effective, including the improvement of teaching practices, learning conditions and support facilities. There was a specific commitment to promote and extend the provision of mathematics, science and technology education and training.

8.5 Concerns had been expressed about the fact that substantial inputs to the system had not resulted in substantial improvement; for example, the World Bank Education Sector Development Program Project 2004 (EdSeP) project information document indicated that:

The Government's increasing financial, material and human inputs into the system have not resulted in a commensurate increase in outputs. While internal and external financing has increased significantly (at least at the pre-tertiary level), quantitative and qualitative outputs were growing at a lesser pace. This strongly suggests a lack of capacity to manage and use available resources in an effective way. Several factors may explain this situation, including the following:

- (a) The Inter-organisational division of labour in the system is unclear, and leads to conflicts, delays and neglect.
- (b) The Intra-organisational division of labour in key organisations is unclear, and leads to widespread unaccountability.
- (c) The capacity of the MOEYS, the GES and other education organisations to formulate plans and strategies, to lead their implementation, and to coordinate the efforts of the donor community is weak.
- (d) Key resources are not adequately managed.

8.6 There was a clear shared vision of Capacity Development needs for the education sector. In committing to strengthening planning and management, the ESP asserted that "there needs to be significant improvements in administrative capacity, knowledge and expertise and development of skills in prioritisation and targeting (as identified in the GPRS), at all levels of the system. Accordingly there will be considerable emphasis upon capacity building and the development and use of management tools during the plan period" (MOE 2003a, p17).

8.7 A number of strategies were proposed in the ESP to address capacity constraints in education planning and management. These included (among others):

- Clarification of the roles of the Ministry of Education and the GES.
- Strengthening monitoring mechanisms and accountability measures including performance appraisal and institutional performance reviews for management at ministry, agency, regional, district, school and institutional levels.
- Development of public awareness programmes on the basic elements of the Education Act to sensitise all stakeholders on their rights and responsibilities in the provision, management and administration of education.
- Identify HRD needs and competencies at all levels of the management system (central and non-central) and provide targeted training to upgrade the technical competence of selected staff.

- Preparation and distribution to districts and schools of guidelines for drawing up School Improvement Plans.
- Identification of "good practices" for all levels of management.
- Preparation and publication of operational manuals, including guidelines for harmonising "good practice", for use at all levels of educational management.
- Preparation of detailed work programmes for desk officers at all levels of management, systematic management training of head teachers, and enforcement of all rules and regulations pertaining to the delivery of education.

8.8 The ESP identified measures for addressing capacity issues in relation to HIV/AIDS. Equity and inclusion issues were also to be addressed, as was gender, through such measures as establishment of special education screening centres and distance education centres, new training in TTC courses, strengthening of the Girls' Education Unit, including Regional and District Girls' Education teams.

8.9 Education Sector Capacity Building was one of three main components of the World Bank Education Sector Development Program Project (EdSeP), launched in 2004 and due to complete late 2009 (USD 78m from WB plus USD 10m from GOG). This component involved an assessment of actual capacity, determination of gaps, and the implementation of actions to address them. It also aimed to support the re-organisation of the entire education sector, with the aim of streamlining the various functions to minimise operational overlaps. (Extract from Press Release of March 16 2004).

8.10 There was no coherent process for monitoring capacity in the sector. The Annual Education Sector Operational Plan (AESOP), already in place independently of the FTI, formed a basis for monitoring progress. As part of the budgetary preparation process each year it could be used to determine whether or not the activities planned for that year had been undertaken. This information would be used to estimate progress, and to find explanations for poor progress. The AESOP would then be reviewed for the following year, with the annual budget/MTEF reflecting the revised AESOP.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Poor capacity was hampering the development of education plans and programmes and affecting progress on achieving UPC	Although there was a strong tradition of education planning, this tended to be piecemeal rather than holistic and was not accompanied by a coherent programme of capacity development

FTI Inputs

8.11 The Ghana submission for FTI endorsement identified a number of problems in capacity, including the following:

The capacity of staff to implement the plan could be a problem, if adequate training is not given. Firstly, regional/district offices and divisions and agencies of the Ministry will likely require training so as they can prepare comprehensive and detailed work programmes, identifying individual contributions to the implementation of the ESP. Subsequently, a number of new systems and processes which are likely to emerge as part of the implementation (for example local procurement processes for textbooks) will fail if those who are expected to use them are not adequately trained. Given the crucial role that staff in Regional and District Education Offices will play in the implementation of the ESP, this problem could be particularly acute at this level, but capacity shortages at MOEYS and GES HQ level should not be forgotten.

8.12 The submission envisaged that

Resources may also be used to enhance management, planning and implementation capacity at all levels of the education system, and to support teacher training, both to the benefit of primary education and also in strengthening management capacity in DEOs, particularly in the areas of supervision, inspection, monitoring and evaluation, and in schools through continuation of the ongoing head teacher training programmes.

8.13 The comments provided by the donor group also highlighted serious capacity concerns. It was stated that

Over the past three years progress has been made to strengthen MOEYS/GES capacity to improve the management of education services. These achievements have not included a review of the overall administrative/management structure, performance and possible levels of over staffing. These will need to be addressed over the implementation period. However, current systems, capacity and performance remain fragile and are likely to be severely tested by the demands for delivering an expanded programme. Initiatives such as EdSeP should contribute to increasing capacities over a period of time, but immediate action is required to establish/reform/strengthen key systems, e.g. procurement of resources, improved teacher deployment/management, monitoring and evaluation and financial management including auditing of pooled external funding.²⁷

8.14 In the event, FTI provision was made in support of activities to plan for, support and monitor capacity development. Direct support was provided in the form of CF funds allocated to an incentive scheme to encourage teachers to teach in underserved areas. This included construction of houses and the provision of 1358 motorcycles and 8280 cycles for the teachers' incentive scheme. Also, to support the strengthening of monitoring and supervision at District level, 53 pickup vehicles were purchased for use in the 53 Districts identified by MOE as deprived. Overall, these inputs were a significant contribution to the placing of teachers in rural areas, underpinned by relevant support to the DEOs. On the other hand there was insufficient attention to the provision of training and support necessary to enable the DEO supervisory staff to fulfil their role. The current study was unable to determine the rationale by which the decisions were taken as regards what would be funded by the CF and what would be funded by government itself or donors.

8.15 Support from the CF funding was not provided to address many of the serious concerns identified in the development partners' appraisal as quoted above, and an approach was taken in line with the MOEYS submission, which envisaged that, in general,

...continued support from our Development Partners in this area (for example, the ongoing National Capacity Enhancement project of Unicef, and the Capacity Building Component of the soon to commence Education Sector Project supported by the World Bank) would assist in alleviating this problem.

8.16 Three-year rolling Annual Education Sector Operational Plans (AESOPs), to accompany the Education Strategic Plan 2003–2015 (ESP), have been produced from 2003 onwards. These have itemised all activities foreseen in each of the three year cycles. In each case, the first year was to be prioritised, with the next year's activities becoming a priority in due course. Unfortunately, although the AESOPs do identify the ministry department or agency responsible for carrying out the activities, they do not show either where the relevant funding would come from or which donor would be responsible for funding or implementation. In the event much of the capacity development continued to be provided through the above mentioned donor funded projects, together with other project elements funded by JICA, DFID and other development partners, all in parallel to inputs eventually funded by the FTI CF.

²⁷ Development Partners Appraisal of the EFA/FTI Proposal by MOEYS, Ghana. 2003

8.17 When the first AESOP (2003–2005) was produced, no FTI funding was envisaged in the immediate future, but in the second iteration (2004–2006) it was stated that the "activities listed under Section 2 (Primary), Section 7 (Teacher Education) and Section 10 (Management and subvented Agencies) contain the activities to be undertaken to implement Ghana's Education for All Fast Track Initiative proposals". However, this second document did not identify the actual CF funding inputs to be linked to specific activities.

Inputs Supported by EPDF

8.18 The Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF), the precursor of the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), made a number of contributions to capacity development in 2003–2005, which included Ghana as a beneficiary. These were mainly regional events, including:

- A sub-regional workshop for Anglophone West African countries, held in Ghana, to discuss and analyse the interaction between Education and HIV/AIDS and the existing and planned education sector responses (August 2004);
- The Third ECD African International Conference, to address ECD in the context of EFA and HIV/AIDS pandemic, held in Ghana (June 2005).

8.19 There was also, however, an NETF contribution of USD 258,000 to support the "Education Sector Development Sector Program to improve access, GER and completion rates" within Ghana itself (2004–2009). It was not possible to obtain details of how this support was utilised, but it seems it may have been used to augment IDA inputs in respect of the EdSeP. No other documentation giving further detail of activities or funding was available. The NETF Annual Report itself is based on aggregated narrative information and data.

8.20 The EPDF was established in 2006, derived largely out of the pre-existing Norwegian Education Trust Fund. The official records for the EPDF (regional annexes 2006, 2007 and 2008) are not sufficiently detailed to highlight specific support received by Ghana (estimated roughly at USD 405,000, of which USD 210,000 was through the regional programme over 2006–2008).

8.21 A representative of the World Bank advised that there had not been much access to EPDF up until now but that the figure of USD 400,000 indicated by the overall EPDF report spent was about right. USD 150,000 had been spent supporting some work for the 2009 budget and a further USD 250,000 had been applied for and was approved recently. He also reported that USD 400 000 had been earmarked for Impact Evaluation. Ghana participated in EPDF-funded regional activities in 2007 and 2008. These included World Bank Institute training courses²⁸ and EFA FTI Capacity Development workshops. Currently EPDF is supporting the development of a new ESP to cover the period 2010 to 2020. A breakdown of these figures from the World Bank was unavailable.

Hypothesis	Commentary
The FTI promoted a harmonised approach to capacity development and supported capacity development in areas which constitute a priority for achieving UPC	There was little discernible harmonisation of approach and The FTI made no input into such an approach. The FTI did support capacity development for access for learners in rural areas through provision of housing and transport; also for supervision.

²⁸ WBI Course "Accountability, Governance and Quality of Decentralized Education in Africa" (Uganda, Ghana, Kenya).

Relevance

8.22 The contributions of the FTI CF to capacity development were relevant to the priorities of the education sector and of the country, as they were targeted at improving supervision and monitoring, mainly at the District level, and also at creating incentives for teachers to serve in deprived rural areas, where there were clear capacity gaps. In addition, the manner in which the support was provided was appropriate to need and context, especially as other providers (notably World Bank and USAID), were supporting other elements, notably training and support for enhanced administration and management. Government systems were used throughout. On the other hand, the inputs funded by the FTI CF did little to address the serious concerns raised in the endorsement process regarding capacity and systems, particularly at regional and district levels.

8.23 Ghana did benefit directly and indirectly from FTI/EPDF supported activities; i) Ghana attended a seminar in Singapore valued as a learning experience, as it focussed on Technical Education, which Ghana wanted to focus on; but ii) declined to attend a "clinic" in Mauritius as it was too close to elections and also there were negative feelings about the way the WB handled the funds and issued invitations (both according to a senior MOE official). Appropriate senior staff from MOE had attended a course in Dar es Salaam in 2006 designed to train them in the application of a simulation model for post-basic education, as it had been understood at the time that there was a move in EFA-FTI towards post-basic education.

8.24 Two other Ghana-specific activities supported by EPDF were described by a World Bank official as a) "quick and dirty" background studies to assist GOG prepare for the 2009 budget; and b) on how to harmonise the ESP with the White Paper. In fact the latter involved substantial discussions in the Sector Group²⁹ (of government officials and development partners). During 2007, several discussions about the use of the EPDF were held in Sector Group meetings.³⁰ At the 2007 Annual sector review, it had been agreed that there was a need to harmonise the ESP and the Education Reforms and that it would be necessary to request EPDF for funds to provide Technical Assistance and support with Financial Analysis and Cost Estimates. This led to a thorough explanation of the ESDP and its workings by the World Bank officer (who was also lead donor).

8.25 These discussions led ultimately to a decision to use EPDF funds to commence work on a revised ESP. Pending the funds being made available, other (unspecified) donors funded the engagement of a full time consultant to begin preparatory work for the revision. In the meantime concerns were expressed by senior MOEYS officials about the amount of time and effort that was being expended in preparation of the bid for EPDF funds. In November 2008, the donor meeting was informed that the work by EPDF-funded consultants would begin in January 2009 and this indeed did happen.

8.26 A number of respondents were questioned about awareness and use of the FTI Capacity Development Guidelines. Almost no-one knew of their existence, and those who did were certain that no use had been made of them in Ghana.

²⁹ The Sector Group consists of senior government officials and representatives of the main development partners.

³⁰ Minutes of Donor Group Meetings; July 31, 2007, August, 29, 2007, October 1,8,29 2007, December 10, 2007, February 25, 2008, March 31, 2008 and November 3, 2008.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Support to the education sector oriented towards developing capacity in agreed-upon priority areas of the education sector plan and increasingly harmonised	Support from CF was oriented to agreed priority areas, but EPDF support tended to be unaligned to Ghana's specific needs. Harmonisation was not improved

Effectiveness

8.27 In general there is a lack of visibility of, and emphasis on, capacity limitations and capacity development requirements in many of the plans and reports relating to the ESP and the FTI. A number of specific elements have CD aspects linked to them, but there is no cumulative picture of CD requirements. It can be concluded that the FTI made a rather modest contribution to the implementation of measures to strengthen capacity. The FTI did affect positively those specific elements of the system which the CF helped to fund, but this did not result in much overall improvement in the areas of weakness identified during appraisal.

8.28 The overall approach to the strengthening of capacity is not more harmonised as a result of the FTI. There is no overall vision, plan or budget for capacity development. It was reported that there is no-one at PBME who coordinates CD, and several respondents viewed CD as rather piecemeal and ad hoc. Provision tends to be one-off and time-bound so that the need to provide an ongoing, annual training and support programme, e.g. to new head teachers, is not met. It was reported that the issue of how capacity building could be done in a more coherent way had been discussed between Government and development partners. One participant reported that "there is no capacity building plan up until now...it needs to bring everything into the one framework but this is probably impossible, everyone has their own timetable". However, induction of new District Directors of Education is an exception to this, possibly driven by the large number of new Directors coming into the system as a result of the creation of new Districts.

8.29 The above is relevant to the wider issue of aid effectiveness. No clear influence of the FTI has been seen in this respect. Individual development partners have continued to provide support which to a considerable extent is in silos and have been unable to agree with government an overall strategy for capacity development. Further commentary on Aid Effectiveness is provided in Chapter 9.

8.30 There is no strong over-arching technical assistance strategy. The approach is for a number of capacity needs to be identified and then for individual development partners to offer to support these. There are many instances where capacity gaps are identified, but unmet due to budget constraints. These are not usually identifiable as relating to the FTI. Capacity development to meet identified needs depends heavily on the extent to which individual donors agree to provide finance. If donors do not come forward then the CD requirements are not met, or are met to a lesser degree. There is a risk in this approach that the outcomes will be skewed in directions favoured by individual development partners rather than in line with government sector priorities. For example, it was reported that there are significant capacity shortfalls in key sections of MOE, such as EMIS, and financial management. As one senior ministry official put it, "as donors fund the bits they want to, there are always areas of CD we cannot afford". The FTI has not contributed directly to solving these problems in terms of financial resources, human capacity development, or modification of procedures. They are more likely to be provided for by a bilateral donor. On the other hand, some donors, such as JICA, have focussed directly on building capacity by

working alongside central Ministry staff within MOE before rolling it out to Districts. This is very effective, but not specifically seen as relating to the FTI or as a response to the FTI.

8.31 Monitoring of CD is carried out to some extent through the annual review process, the National Education Sector Annual Reviews (NESAR), conducted by representatives of government, donors and civil society. These are contributed to by the government's own annual Preliminary Education Sector Performance Review reports (2004–2008). However, the latter have called attention to serious weaknesses in the form of many examples of failure to follow up recommendations to address capacity weaknesses. The fact that these are clearly identified as part of an annual review process but are then not addressed should be a matter of concern to all the stakeholders. However, there is no evidence that any significant improvement in performance has resulted, it therefore calls into question the seriousness and value of the annual review process as a key dimension of monitoring and evaluation of the ESP's progress.

8.32 Key capacity for the management and delivery of basic education is not in place across the system. Undoubtedly there are individuals who are highly skilled and experienced in fulfilling their functions. But the level and pace of decentralisation, together with the rapid increase in the number of new Districts formed by dividing up the pre-existing ones, has led to a situation where Districts are not appropriately resourced. They have neither skilled staff nor even in many cases the necessary complement of staff, suitable accommodation or sufficient funds to function. For example, in one District visited there were experienced staff, but the budget was so constrained that they were unable to function satisfactorily in terms of supervision or provision of training courses. They also had to spend time trimming back their annual work plan to accommodate it to shrinking resources.

8.33 Technical Assistance from other donors was rated as very significant by one respondent. EFA-FTI was seen as an initiative to combine resources, e.g. the WB EdSeP provided CD for EMIS, DFID and others had helped develop the 2003 Strategic Plan, major work on quality had been supported by USAID and the Irish Trust Fund had assisted teacher development. However, this "combination" of resources did not take place in any meaningful sense; they were free standing and were not brought together in a matrix or other framework which would have provided reassurance that they were coherent or complementary. This risked unnecessary overlap and the possibility that important gaps in capacity would not be filled. It is unclear why this situation was allowed to develop and be maintained, but it does support a view that in general, the ESP components were responded to in a piecemeal fashion. Although the ESP had elements of a SWAp, the tradition of an education development landscape dominated simply by projects has continued. There is no evidence of the government trying to influence donors to harmonise their CD inputs.

8.34 One criticism of EPDF was that it only built capacity to accomplish short term projects—"last minute, fly by night". Recently it "did match up one national with one international consultant, but this did nothing to build Ministry capacity". However, this seems to have been a somewhat unjust criticism in the light of the attention paid to the EPDF by the Sector Group as indicated above.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Key capacity gaps in the sector addressed ensuring good quality policy, planning, budgeting, implementation and reporting in priority areas of the education plan	Significant capacity gaps remain at all levels. There was no coherent vision and approach to identifying and filling capacity gaps

Efficiency

8.35 The contribution of the FTI CF funds to the capacity building elements, such as provision of vehicles and motor bicycles has been achieved quite efficiently. However, one development partner representative said that "it's a lot of work for a small amount of money".³¹ At the same time, lack of harmonised contributions and of a more comprehensive vision of CD, has led to problems in delivery of the intended benefits, e.g. in one district, where motorcycles had been provided for circuit supervisors, transport was reported to be still a major issue, as fuel supplies had been restricted. Supervisors reported having to scale back both their supervision visits and their training activities as so little funding was available to deliver the actual activities. Supervisors are supposed to make three visits to each school per term; some were reported to go more frequently (but during a school visit the accompanying district officer (in charge of supervision) said classroom observation was only conducted when there was a promotion issue. Their own training had also been reduced significantly– "there has been no money this year from GES for training".

Sustainability

8.36 Sustainability of CD contributions in the current situation is problematic. The GOG approach has been to conceive almost all CD interventions as project based and therefore time-bounded by the life of the project. Once a particular initiative comes to its planned end, the funding disappears, since it was not incorporated into the GOG budget. As one senior MOE official put it, "CD is a long term issue but it is not favoured". The arrangement between development partners and government to support specific elements to the exclusion of others has engendered a lack of responsibility on all sides for a holistic, sector wide approach to CD.

8.37 As noted above, the ESP of 2003 highlighted serious structural and capacity problems within the Ministry of Education and its agencies. Ghana's submission for FTI endorsement also drew attention to risks that the achievement of the ESP's objectives would be endangered if capacity weaknesses were not satisfactorily addressed. The response by the donors to the submission included a concern about institutional capacity. Key partners such as the World Bank also stressed capacity weakness and the need to develop strategies to address them. Therefore, it is unfortunate, to say the least, that Ghana has not developed or implemented a coherent capacity development plan for the education sector. To achieve sustainability, Ghana needs to embrace a coherent approach to capacity weakness on a sector wide basis, as otherwise progress in all other dimensions of the sector could be significantly constrained.

³¹ This remark relates to the fact that all countries seeking FTI endorsement are required to go through the same procedures, even though the financial benefits which accrue can be quite modest in the context of a country's overall financing envelope, as the case with Ghana.

9. The FTI and Aid Effectiveness

Context

9.1 National aid arrangements and policy were discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter focuses specifically on the education sector and as well as presenting additional material, draws on material presented in previous sections of the report. However, it is presented and discussed here in the context of aid effectiveness.

FTI Goals


9.2 The following goals set out in the FTI Framework document are directly concerned with aid effectiveness:

- *More efficient aid for primary education*, through actions of development partners to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonisation in aid delivery and reduce transaction costs for FTI recipient countries;
- *Sustained increases in aid for primary education*, where countries demonstrate the ability to utilise it effectively.

Major donors in education

9.3 Figure 9.1 below shows the shares of disbursements by donor in 2007 excluding debt relief contributions (from HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)). The underlying data are shown at Table E7 in Annex E (although the percentages shown in that table differs slightly because it does not include CF contributions). DFID disbursed the largest amount in 2007 by a considerable margin. CF disbursements in 2007 were the highest of any year and reached 11.4% of the total. The information given is based upon disbursements recorded in country and is likely to understate total donor spending on for instance, directly contracted Technical Assistance or gifts in kind.


Figure 9.1 Percentages of Aid to Education Disbursed by Donor in 2007



Source: Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

9.4 The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has declined from 80% to 67% over the period, showing a sharp decline in 2000 with only a slight upwards variation between 2001 and 2007 (Figure 9.2 below).

Figure 9.2 Share of Multilateral Aid in Aid to Education and Basic Education, and of Aid to Basic Education in Total Aid to Education, 1999–2007



Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

Aid coordination

9.5 It is difficult to establish the aid effectiveness position ten years ago in 1999, but in spite of Ghana's pioneering role in SWAp,³² aid coordination seems to have been poor: the 2003 evaluation of ESSP (1998–2003) cited in Casely-Hayford et al 2007, noted that:

...considerable support is provided to the education sector. However... there has been extremely poor donor co-ordination. With few donors committed to support a sector wide approach, the typical project approach is cost inefficient and leads to duplication of efforts and systems.

9.6 Casely-Hayford et al 2007 also observe that the closeness of the relationship between DPs and the GOG on the one hand, and amongst DPs on the other, has fluctuated since the mid-1980s:

It was reasonably good during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as DPs were able to align support to the 1987 education reform, following the lead of the World Bank. During the mid-1990s to 2002 partnerships amongst DPs deteriorated and hence DP partnership with the GOG, while generally aligned to FCUBE, was uncoordinated. 2003 signalled the start of a better partnership with the GOG's GPRS 1 and ESP documents providing a clear strategy that DPs could get behind, and closer partnership arrangements like the MDDBS emerging.

³² The Ghana health sector introduced joint Common Management Arrangements in support of the Medium Term Health Plan as early as 1996. In Education, Casely-Hayford et al 2007 report that the World Bank Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (BESIP) of 1996 as originally designed was close to a SWAp, and that SWAp thinking was current at that time, but that the emergent SWAp suffered as a result of donor competition.

Hypothesis at level zero	Commentary
Aid to basic education was fragmented, fell short of needs and was insufficiently targeted to global and national priorities	Contemporary reports suggest that this is a fair characterisation for the period 1999 to 2003.

9.7 There is an active SWAp in the education sector. It is based upon the ESP and monitoring of the ESP through the ESAR process including a 3-day annual ESAR meeting. The Sector Group nominates a lead DP (currently World Bank). Sector Group meetings are regular, government-led and substantive. The ESAR is carried out thoroughly, culminating in an extensive annual Performance Report (the ESPR) and a joint Aide-Memoire setting out a plan of action for the coming year.

9.8 Ghana's ESP 2003–2015 is a critical part of the current SWAp and it is likely to have been influenced in part by the 2000 EFA promise of resources for plans (which is cited as an influence in the ESP itself amongst a number of other influences including numerous national influences and antecedent documents). Senior planning staff report that in that period EFA was much discussed.

9.9 The SWAp itself is aligned primarily with the ESP 2003–2015, but also with other key documents and processes including at national level GPRS I and II, and at sector level EFA and the education MDGs. It also participates in frameworks such as the MDBS and the Sector Group proposes appropriate education targets and triggers for the release of the performance-based elements of budget support. In particular the current 2008–2010 MDBS PAF includes as indicators:

- Improving access as measured by NER percentages both nationally and in deprived districts.
- Bridging the gender gap as measured by Gender Parity Indices for Basic, JHS and SHS.
- Improving the quality of teaching and learning as measured by core textbooks in deprived districts and improvements in English and Maths pass rates.
- Improvements in Science and Technology Education as measured by TVET indicators including costed plans and enrolment rates.

9.10 Since 2000 there have been a number of positive aid coordination developments in the education sector: there has been a DP coordinator in MOE since 2002; the first costed, whole-sector ESP was prepared in 2003; there have been regular DP meetings although with varying intensity (17 DP/MOE meetings in 2007 and 2008); and there have been regular joint reviews since 2004 followed by a jointly produced Education Sector Performance Review Report.

Aid modalities

9.11 Sector level financial modalities are all on plan and mostly on budget, which is to say they are notified to GOG and included in the National Estimates presented to Parliament. However, none are on-Treasury in the sense of Sector Budget Support, except in so far as they are spent through the Funds and Procurement Management Unit (FPMU) which adopts project-determined rules and procedures but notifies spending to MOFEP. Modalities are aligned with ESP but many are individually flexible (e.g. DFID, FTI CF). There is no sector pool and no Sector Budget Support aside from DFID's shadow-aligned process, which provides flexible funding to schools through a network of parallel government-managed bank accounts against individual school and district plans. Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were rationalised as early as 1998 to form a single MOE FPMU which manages donor funds

in separate bank accounts following the rules of individual donors and earmarked funds. MDBS continues at national level and whilst the sector contributes substantially to education dialogue within it, the flow of funds associated with MDBS is fully intermingled with other GOG funds.

FTI Inputs

9.12 The members of the Sector Group function as a Local Donor Group but do not see themselves as having any particular relationship to, or origin within, the FTI. Such GOG/DP groups have existed in the Ghana education sector since the mid 1990s with varying levels of engagement and attendance. The GOG/DP meeting does not include any regular attendance from civil society representatives. It is significant that the FTI is discussed at Sector Group meetings largely in the context of CF funding, and especially its allocation and/or timeliness, but not at all in the area of policy. There has thus been little explicit FTI activity related to the strengthening of aid effectiveness: the main influence of the FTI has been through the FTI CF project.

The Relevance of the FTI to Aid Effectiveness

9.13 As described above, there were clear shortcomings in the coordination and efficiency of aid to education Ghana; there was therefore a need to improve the quality as well as the quantity of aid to basic education, and the FTI objectives summarised in ¶9.2 above were relevant for Ghana. However, as discussed below, the influence for the FTI in this sphere has been rather limited.

9.14 It is clear that there have been a number of improvements in the delivery of aid to Ghana nationally and within the Education Sector from 2000 (the EFA conference) to the present time. However, it is difficult to disentangle the many reasons for this and to state with any certainty what role the FTI played. First, because the aid effectiveness goals of EFA/FTI (as opposed to its education agenda) were both drawing from and feeding into contemporary thinking on aid delivery in the period 2000–2003. Although this was pre-Paris (March 2005) it was the period of the Rome Declaration (2003) and ideas of harmonisation, alignment, ownership and mutual accountability which these accords formalised had been gaining currency since the 1990s. Second, because as the authors of a recent note on MDBS indicate (ODI 2007), there were other supporting factors including the development of GPRS I. As noted in ¶9.12 above the main influence of the FTI has been through the CF project.

Hypothesis	Commentary
The FTI resulted in a review of current practice to promote better coordination, harmonisation and alignment among stakeholders in education at global and country levels.	There has been a process of continual review and several initiatives in coordination, harmonisation and alignment among stakeholders in education at global and country levels. Influences are difficult to disentangle. However, documentary evidence and interviews led us to assess that the primary impetus was the wider Paris agenda and the limited influence of the FTI has come indirectly via the HQs of Development Partners.

The FTI and Paris Declaration Principles – the Effectiveness and Efficiency of aid

9.15 The FTI's espousal of the Paris Declaration is not immediately apparent in Ghana. The modality chosen for the disbursement of the first two allocations from the Catalytic Fund, although notionally quick disbursing, was strictly project-based and earmarked for specific procurements through the Funds and Procurement Management Unit (FPMU) of the MOE because as one DP advised "donors wanted the money earmarked to give them confidence". The exact basis of the earmarking decision and the decision to use the FPMU, which was taken in 2004 is no longer clear, although the Supervising Entity (World Bank) stressed that the mechanism of the FPMU was well understood and was used by other World Bank projects at the time. Its use therefore saved time in due diligence activity. Certainly, the SE has confidence in the FPMU which is the conduit for both the CF and a range of World Bank projects. It is also a former World Bank PMU, now incorporated into the MOE as a donor finance management unit.

9.16 MOE response to the modality selected was not recorded, however informants recall that the primary need was for timely delivery of the items to be procured and that the modality was secondary.

9.17 In spite of the above, CF funding is always related back to the ESP and is thus aligned with it. The most fully aligned modality – the MDBS – was not considered appropriate because it is not education-specific.

Ownership

9.18 For Paris Declaration monitoring, there is one indicator for ownership, the extent to which a country has an operational development strategy that is drawn from a long-term vision and that shapes a country's public expenditure. In Ghana as a whole that vision is set out in GPRS II which is a wholly-owned government document, and in the education sector the ESP, as modified by the government White Paper, can claim a similar status. CF spending and FTI activities broadly support the ESP and the White Paper (although the government programme places significant emphasis on tertiary and technical/vocational education which the FTI does not) and are thus compatible with the principles of national ownership in the Paris Declaration.

Alignment

9.19 There are nine Paris Declaration indicators on alignment, focusing on the reliability of country PFM systems and procurement systems, their use by donors, greater predictability of aid, avoidance of PIUs, and coordination of support to capacity strengthening.

9.20 Catalytic Fund procurement and disbursement is now partially aligned since funds are disbursed through the FPMU which is a part of the MOE. However, some members of the Education Sector Group are unable to use government systems at all and continue to disburse and procure according to their own procedures. Only one donor (DFID) provides what could be considered flexible Sector Budget Support but this runs through a designated channel with separate bank accounts which reach the district level. One donor which is traditionally engaged in projects only has sought to make them increasingly aligned with government activities in the same areas and is now contributing funds to MDBS as well.

9.21 The FTI's contribution to aid effectiveness is undermined by reported deficiencies in delivery of CF and EPDF funds as reported under education finance above, in particular: that CF funds are late and considered by GOG as unpredictable; the CF funds are easy to allocate but under new rules have very high transaction costs for access; the EPDF is not

fully transparent, with budgets not revealed to MOE; and that sector specificity prevents the FTI from supporting MDBS with CF funds.

Harmonisation

9.22 The Paris Declaration indicators here concern the use of common procedures, the planning of joint missions and the use of joint analytic work. The picture is positive but mixed. The Draft Aid Policy of Ghana sets out a procedure for Sector Working Groups, with the Education Group meeting many of the intentions. For the last five years they have carried out joint reviews and produced a joint Aide-Memoire with recommendations for the coming year. Key indicators on Education are a part of the MDBS PAF. GOG reports that DPs respect the Mission Free period. Sector Group meetings which support harmonisation have been frequent over the last two years, are well attended, and led by government.

9.23 Nonetheless, there are failings in terms of joint analytic work and joint missions which include the FTI. The recent assessment of financial management and fiduciary risk which was carried out to cover CF requirements was a separate exercise overseen by the SE.

Managing for Results

9.24 The M&E system of the ESP is used by all DPs as the basis for their own review processes, and the Education Sector Performance Reports contain a full analysis. However, most DPs carry out their own reviews on their key programmes in addition, and this is particularly true of the "flagship programmes" of the three major donors. This current review is an example of an FTI-specific evaluation with similar objectives to the above.

Mutual Accountability

9.25 Indicator 12 records whether or not there is a country-level mechanism permitting joint assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness.

9.26 The recent Draft Aid Policy proposes that there should be an annual review of progress on its implementation covering all aspects of the Paris Declaration, but it is not clear that this has yet happened. The review is expected to bring together GOG, including Parliamentarians, DPs and CSOs. However, there is no such mechanism specifically within the education sector and it is not part of the Annual Education Sector Performance Report.

Hypothesis	Commentary
Partners modify their way of operating globally and at country levels to ensure better coordination, harmonisation and alignment	There is evidence that some modifications are under way, especially with a common plan, stronger coordination, and joint assessment of education performance. However, many major donors continue to operate project modalities. FTI CF modalities are only partially aligned and funds are unpredictable with increasing transaction costs

Reasons for limited progress

9.27 It is not clear why in a reasonably mature SWG environment with regular meetings and an established joint appraisal system, there continues to be a predominance of earmarked non-pooled support. The only un-earmarked support is to the MDBS (which is supported by education donors who see it as part of their support to education: DFID, World Bank, JICA and Netherlands). DFID's education sector support funds are lightly earmarked with significant flexibility within agreed categories.

9.28 The limited support to MDBS by education donors is because it is not education specific and there is a sense (expressed clearly by USAID) that money given to MDBS does not come back to the sector sufficiently. Although it was not spoken it is clear that GOG money, including MDBS, supports salaries and not non-salary expenditure. Finally, current reports (ODI 2007) raise several questions about the effectiveness of the MDBS dialogue. Education donors supporting MDBS see earmarked funding as a way to balance their portfolios.

9.29 Second, there is a continuing concern amongst the DPs that critical non-salary items are not getting funded and this feeds the emphasis on earmarked contributions. Finally, Sector Budget Support depends upon effective dialogue. Many of the DPs interviewed expressed concern that recommendations arising from the intensive appraisal process are not implemented.

10. Cross-cutting Issues

Context

10.1 Key cross-cutting issues for Ghana are: gender equity, HIV/AIDS and exclusion. All of these themes are represented in the ESP (2003) and will presumably have at least equal status in the revised ESP (2010–2020).

10.2 Gender equity is clearly visible in the existing ESP (Provide girls with equal opportunities to access the full cycle of education). It is likely that DP agendas and the EFA/MDG targets are influential, alongside FTI benchmarks.

10.3 HIV/AIDS prevalence in West Africa is significantly lower than in Eastern and Southern Africa. UNAIDS figures for 2007 suggest that adult HIV prevalence in Ghana is 1.9%, which means that 260,000 men, women and children are living with HIV. (Although Clarke and Bundy (2004) quote a prevalence of 3.1%. The UNAIDS 2007 figures use newer modelling which has generally resulted in a downward adjustment of prevalence figures) The Education Sector has responded to the challenge of prevention in several ways, with a clear presence in the ESP (Identify and promote education programmes that will assist in the prevention and management of HIV/AIDS). An HIV/AIDS Sectoral Plan (2006–2010) was developed for all interventions in the education sector (MOESS, 2006). The FTI endorsed country plan includes:

- Information on HIV/AIDS education prevention.
- Subsidies to orphans (both maternal and dual).
- Impact mitigation (but this is limited to planning for increase in teachers' salary bills).

10.4 It does not give information on work place policies. No costings are given for peer education programmes, health or nutrition (Clarke and Bundy 2004).

10.5 This is now subsumed in the broader plans of the National Aids Council. Teachers, schools and students have been targets for several programmes, summarised in the recent MOE publication "A study of the Education Sector's response to HIV/AIDS in Ghana" (MOESS 2008b).

10.6 Exclusion in Ghana has a particular geographical dimension. The three northern regions have traditionally been disadvantaged in respect of educational provision, with resulting weakness in achievements. Since independence in 1957, many efforts have been made to address this issue, with some success, but there is still a challenge to the system. More recently, 53 districts (out of a growing number, currently around 138) have been designated as "deprived". The designation is based on a cluster of indicators including education-oriented ones taken from the EMIS; it is being used to provide targeted funds and other support mechanisms. A particular problem for Ghana is the burgeoning number of districts, often created for "political" reasons, which may result in educational units which are too small to be run economically. NGO activities to enrol hard-to-reach children, such as Shepherd Schools and School for Life, both community-led schools, are being mainstreamed by GES as their efficiency is shown to be much higher than "normal" schools.

10.7 National provision for those children with special educational needs is enshrined in sector plans, but often seems to be addressed in a cautious way, largely through a conventional approach by provision of special schools for children with special educational needs. Some moves are being taken towards the inclusion of students in mainstream schools, but this is in its infancy. The Special Education Division appears to rely on DPs to a

great extent for both financial and technical help in their activities. They have received assistance from EQUALL, GTZ and USAID.

10.8 School feeding has been identified as a key measure to attract and retain poor and malnourished children in school. The approach of the Ghana School Feeding Programme has been to supply take home rations (corn soy blend, palm oil and salt) to primary students in the three Northern regions. It seems likely that the revised ESP will extend the scope of this programme.

FTI Inputs and Activities

10.9 The FTI endorsement process requires that the country plans address issues of gender equity and HIV/AIDS. This requirement is met in Ghana's ESP. The donor scrutiny of the proposal acknowledged that the ESP gives appropriate recognition to the needs of all social groups and to the crucial dimension of the mainstreaming of girls' education. The only hint of criticism is in the comment "More consideration should be given to alternative learning systems for the hard-to-reach out-of-school children, especially young girls." As has already been discussed, the production of the ESP in 2003 and the FTI submission in the same year were closely linked. Thereafter, FTI CF funds were used within the boundaries of the sector plan, but, as it transpired, were not *specifically* attributed to any one activity in the areas of gender, HIV/AIDS and exclusion. It could be argued that the use of CF funds for a variety of supporting measures for teachers in rural schools shows a linkage with exclusion due to rural remoteness.

Relevance and Effectiveness

10.10 Statistics for gender participation in Ghana are generally encouraging. Although the 2005 MDG goal was missed, there is every sign that by 2015, gender equity will be reached in relation to representation in schools at all levels. Data trends have already been presented in Table 3.7. The introduction of the capitation grant in 2005 is likely to have had a significant influence on girls' participation. Girls remain more likely to drop out at the junior high school level, but the GPI at kindergarten and primary levels is close to 1.0. A number of DPs, led by Unicef and several NGOs, have specifically supported programmes to strengthen girls' participation.

10.11 The performance of girls still lags behind boys on some measures. In, for example, the BECE examination at the end of JHS, analysis by region shows that boys outperform girls by a margin of between 11 and 25 percentage points in nine of the ten regions of the country. Only in Greater Accra region do girls marginally outperform boys. However, in the NEA, in 2007, girls did slightly better than boys in English in P3 and P6. Boys significantly outperformed girls in Mathematics at both P3 and P6.

10.12 MOE has shown a commitment to addressing the educational dimensions of HIV/AIDS by setting up an HIV/AIDS Secretariat with the MOE, which works closely with the School Health in Education Programme (SHEP). The Secretariat managed a major programme of teacher sensitisation during the middle of the decade – the "Teachers as agents of dissemination and change" project (TAD), which reached over 150,000 teachers. It is not clear how follow-up on this programme has been sustained in the workplace, the schools and classrooms. The Secretariat is working closely with Unicef and SHEP in its "Alert Schools" programme, which rewards schools that reach certain standards of vigilance in relation to broad areas of health education, obviously inclusive of HIV/AIDS.

Efficiency and Sustainability

10.13 Much of the MOE and NGO work in these important areas is traditionally dependent upon one or other channels of DP funding. Despite the prominence of these cross-cutting issues in the ESP, it is disappointing that more urgent priorities often get ahead of them in GOG budget allocations, with government confident that willing DPs will respond in such sensitive areas. This suggests that joint DP and FTI interests in gender equity, in the context of EFA/MDG, keeps the profile high, rather than a strong commitment from GOG.

10.14 It is valuable that the EMIS, in addition to routinely reporting gender disaggregated data, is now collecting HIV/AIDS related data at school level.

10.15 The evaluation team noted that the HIV/AIDS Secretariat were only very slightly aware of the FTI, and have not been consulted in relation to the preparation of the new ESP.

Part D: Conclusions and Recommendations

11. Conclusions

Introduction

11.1 This chapter first gives the evaluation team's overall assessments for Ghana against each of the high level evaluation questions. It then provides the conclusions for each stream of analysis. It is supplemented by an analytical summary matrix which identifies the FTI inputs and assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the FTI's contribution (see Annex G).

The High Level Evaluation Questions

Objective 1: Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with the current needs and priorities of Ghana?

11.2 There is indeed consistency between what the FTI has sought to accomplish and Ghana's needs in relation to the achievement of the EFA/MDG goals. Although primary completion and gender equity data suggests strong participation at that level, there are outstanding issues relating to achieving universal basic completion through the three years of junior high school. There are great concerns about the performance of the basic education sub-sector in relation to quality (§3.12). There are similar anxieties about the very low levels of adult literacy, including among many young adults (§3.10).

11.3 Ghana's policy priorities are expressed through two iterations of Education Sector Plans – 2003 and up-coming 2010. The 2003 Plan was created during a period in Ghana of preoccupation with basic education (roughly from 1995–2004). Therefore it prioritises EFA/MDG goals and at that point takes FTI aims on board. There is a close congruence between the 2003 ESP, the EFA FTI submission, the DP assessments, and its 2004 approval. This was subsequently reflected in the use of CF monies in support of chosen components of the Plan. Between 2004 and the time of writing, there has been a noticeable shift of priorities, only one of which, the introduction of compulsory two years of kindergarten, relates to EFA goals. This priority is clearly educationally sound, but questions remain about quality, teachers and funding. The major discourse around the soon-to-be-released draft form of ESP 2010–2020 has been around the nature and duration of senior high schooling and TVET. This discourse has been subdued throughout the period 1995 (launch of FCUBE) to 2009, partly as a result of prominent GOG voices (notably Education Minister Harry Sawyerr), but largely from DP adherence to the EFA/MDG agenda. Many senior Ghanaian politicians and civil society figures have never accepted the lack of attention to senior high schools, hence the current vehement debate about three/four year duration and the likely introduction of a two-tier system of SHSs. The FTI, in its present formulation, has little to say in relation to these areas. In its interactions with a country like Ghana, it may well be timely for the FTI to consider a broader perspective on educational priorities, as systems mature.

Objective 2: To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, namely, accelerating progress on EFA?

11.4 It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. Throughout the period under consideration, the discourse and practice of promoting EFA has been, quite properly, sited principally with GOG. Its traditional DP constituencies have supported and participated fully. The FTI has had indirect influence with both, but rarely in terms of an overt output. The FTI made modest contributions to the policy/planning and capacity building processes of MOE/GOG, particularly in the early stages, but that influence is hard to identify in 2009. In relation to progress against key indicators, it is not possible to make attribution to an "FTI effect".

11.5 The separate funding modality of the FTI CF has made tangible and appropriate contributions. Initially this was important to MOE in order to address a funding gap for EFA-related activities. More recently CF monies have allowed MOE flexibility in its allocations. Overall, the delivery of CF funds has been "anything but fast", and the third cycle of funding, agreed in November 2006, has become subject to much more complex procedures as the process has become more closely aligned with standard WB programming procedures. Why the chosen mode of funding was through what is essentially a project approach is hard to understand, given Ghana's experience with a range of other funding mechanisms.

Objective 3: Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris declaration ideals?

11.6 There is no evidence of FTI influence being effective in harnessing additional resource flows from either the domestic budget or from international sources, with one exception mentioned later in this paragraph. The allocation of monies from all sources to EFA priorities has oscillated during the period of FTI engagement, but no causal, or even correlational, link to FTI influence can be shown. Two agencies – JICA and USAID – did indicate that their head offices had shown great interest in the FTI process, and that in the case of USAID it seemed highly likely that this had been an influence in additional funds of between USD 2m (2008) and USD 5m (2009) being leveraged for EFA-related projects through the Presidential Initiative on Extended Education (PIEE).

11.7 The donor/development partner environment in the education sector in Ghana remains highly individualistic. While all DPs site their contributions within the existing ESP and would doubtless claim allegiance to the Paris Declaration ideals, many continue to pick their areas of contribution according to their own traditions and enthusiasms. There are several "allowable" funding modalities in the sector, all of which are in use. Even the existence of a strong Education Sector Annual Review process, which is presented with an in-depth analysis of the sector, has barely reduced the number and intensity of monitoring and evaluation exercises mounted by individual DPs.

11.8 Why does this situation continue in a context where a higher degree of harmonisation might be seen to be beneficial to all parties? Firstly, from the GOG/MOE side, it can be argued that the period from the mid-1990s to the production of the first ESP in 2003 was one where sectoral initiatives were taken by two powerful DPs – WB (BESIP) and DFID (ESSP) – who often challenged each other for primacy in the aid discourse rather than government. USAID and JICA, through this period, continued with business as usual. With the preparation of the first ESP, the White Paper on Education, and now the revised ESP 2010–2020, GOG/MOE finally stamped their own authority on the process of educational development. It is in this context and in the absence from the education sector of the voices of those other donors most likely to promote joined-up thinking – the Nordics and Netherlands – that a coherent SWAp has failed to emerge. The result – a situation where a variety of aid instruments are still in use, from the MDBS approach operating across the social sectors to traditional project modalities – with all the inefficiencies in aid delivery which are well documented. So, in addition to taking control of the policy ground, will GOG/MOE finally use the opportunities of the Paris and Accra declarations to take full control of the instruments available for maximising the benefits from aid to the education sector? For as long as GOG/MOE and the DPs are locked in the present set of processes, almost rituals, it seems unlikely and set against this, the role of the FTI in bringing coherence seems likely to remain marginal.

Key Findings by Stream and Level

11.9 For an explanation of the "levels" of the Evaluation Framework, used in the following sections, the reader is referred to Annex A.

Stream 1 Education Policy and Planning

11.10 (Level 0) Even in the period from 1995 to 2003 during which there was very considerable activity in pursuit of UBE through the GOG-led FCUBE programme, there was no whole-sector framework for support. This encouraged individualism, even competition, in the contributions of the major DPs, resulting in a failure of their contributions, both technical and financial, to always make a coherent impact. To some extent this was rectified in 2003 by the generation of the first ESP, following strong Ghanaian (both governmental and civil society) and DP consultation processes.

11.11 (Level 1) It can be concluded that there is no evidence that FTI inputs, processes and activities supported the strengthening of policy and planning for EFA and UPC at country level, with the exception of the introduction of benchmarking as a requirement of the FTI scrutiny process (§5.12, §5.15, §5.17).

11.12 (Level 2) The last decade has seen genuine strengthening of policies and plans for the sector, enshrined in the 2003 ESP. The ESP does reflect strategic priorities for achieving UPC and has been widely supported by stakeholders. In the current revision of the ESP, there has been a much wider range of stakeholder voices but a diminution of the focus on achieving UBC, as other competing claims, particularly from the senior secondary and tertiary levels, expect to be heard. The influence of the FTI in the latest planning cycle has been very small.

11.13 (Level 3) As is clearly documented in the 2008 Education Sector Performance Report, there remains a huge gap between the increasingly sound sector policies and plans, and their implementation in Ghana's schools, colleges and classrooms. While enrolment statistics generally improve, the quality and quantity of schooling being offered to young people in basic schools remains unacceptably low.

11.14 (Level 4) The FTI contributions have been entirely made within the boundaries of the 2003 ESP. The revised ESP seems likely to be more robust and feasible in practice than its predecessor. That implies increased sustainability, but there remain significant risks to be addressed particularly in relation to implementing strategies for quality enhancement at school level.

Stream 2 Education Finance

11.15 (Level 0) Domestic and external financing constraints were only impeding progress towards UPC prior to 1999 to a limited extent. The ESP 2003–2015 was the first comprehensive attempt to assess the financial needs of education in Ghana. The Financing Gap it identified excluded donor support and was only 9% of the total requirement over 13 years. Ghana was not a "donor orphan" and was already receiving aid approximately equal to this gap. Financing Gaps calculated in 2006 show more serious constraints mainly as a result of revised and more ambitious policies.

11.16 (Level 1) The FTI has provided no significant support to strengthening financial management systems in Ghana, since these have been supported by other programmes. However, it was reported that the FTI financial simulation model was used in the development of the ESP 2003–2015. The FTI's impact on Ghana has been primarily through the provision of CF finance and this is considered by GOG to be its principal contribution.

11.17 Through the Catalytic Fund the FTI provided support to identified financing requirements. Catalytic Fund contributions have been highly relevant, focussing on funding gaps in the ESP, notably textbooks and capital requirements such as classrooms and teachers' accommodation. However, the effectiveness of CF contributions has been less than it might have been because disbursements have become increasingly late and the process stalled completely in 2007/2008. The new application process involves high transaction costs, undermining efficiency in aid delivery.

11.18 EPDF also operates in Ghana, although there was little activity prior to 2007, since when approximately USD 400,000, of which USD 280,000 was earmarked in 2008 to generate a Country Status Report, has been reported as spent, but different messages were received from the WB education team. Initially, the judgment was that a CSR was not required "because they already had all the information", but now this stance has been modified to "Ghana was now talking of doing one because there is now a need to pull it together... they were preparing for a CSR last year (2008)". No itemisation of this expenditure was available from the SE, and the Fund is considered by senior government officials to be non-transparent since they do not know what is available to Ghana. It is seen more as a pool of money available to the World Bank.

11.19 (Level 2) The education sector budget process is reported to improve steadily although funding remains fragmented and disbursements continue to be delayed. In particular, there is much better reporting of financial and performance outcomes since 2003. However, there has been no FTI involvement in this.

11.20 (Level 3) The FTI in Ghana has not catalysed additional donor funds in the manner that had been hoped. The donor contribution to education has fluctuated since 2003 but within a steady range.

11.21 Many of the difficulties faced by education in Ghana concern implementation, and this is also true of finance: financial planning is stronger than disbursement and reporting. By contrast, the focus of the FTI is on planning and access, rather than resource flows to the schools and related issues of the quality of service delivery that eventually define effectiveness. It is not clear that the FTI's strategy of tactical procurement and EFA advocacy is ensuring effective education at the school level in Ghana.

Stream 3 Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

11.22 (Level 0) Prior to 2003, M&E processes in the education sector had several weaknesses with respect to data collection and processing, timeliness, use and analysis of data and dissemination of output.

11.23 (Level 1) With respect to FTI inputs and activities, although the appraisal of Ghana's FTI proposal highlighted the need for financing the strengthening of M&E activities to be addressed in the proposal, the subsequent revision of the proposal in January 2004 still did not address this issue. More directly the FTI has contributed the use of the IF, which has become an influential monitoring tool in the MOE; also, the provision of pick-ups for 53 districts for the use in M&E of circuit supervisors.

11.24 (Level 2) Since 2003, there has been an improvement in M&E processes, and several other monitoring tools such as PESAR, ESAR and ESTAC have been institutionalised. However, these improvements have occurred against the background of the ESP, as well as other activities which have aimed at strengthening M&E in the education sector. Consequently, it is hard to attribute these recent improvements to the effectiveness of FTI engagement.

11.25 (Level 3) There has been no significant reporting requirement made of the MOE apart from the submission of an annual CIF which documents the status of the FTI. Although this reduces transaction cost for MOE, it could be interpreted as accountability for results on the part of the FTI.

Stream 4 Capacity Development

11.26 (Level 0) Prior to the FTI, there had been a sequence of interventions over many years which had included capacity development elements, contributing to the improvement of capacity at all levels (¶8.1). There was strong tradition of planning but this tended to be piecemeal. The ESP identified structural and capacity problems within the Ministry of Education and its agencies, including managerial weaknesses, manpower shortages and lack of supervision (¶8.3). Other concerns had been expressed, including (in World Bank project documentation) strong indications of a lack of capacity to manage and use available resources in an effective manner (¶8.5). The ESP therefore proposed a number of a number of strategies to address capacity constraints in education planning and management. In the meantime there was no coherent process for monitoring capacity in the sector (¶8.7–8.8).

11.27 The FTI submission also drew attention to the risks inherent in low capacity, especially in regional and district offices, which would need to develop proper comprehensive and detailed work programmes, and which would be required to operate new systems and processes. It was envisaged that FTI CF resources could be used to enhance management planning and implementation capacity at all levels of the education system, to support teacher training, and strengthen management capacity in DEOs, particularly in the areas of supervision, inspection, monitoring and evaluation (¶8.11–8.13).

11.28 (Level 1) Direct support was provided in the form of FTI CF funds allocated to an incentive scheme to encourage teachers to teach in underserved areas. This included construction of houses and the provision of motorcycles and cycles for a teachers' incentive scheme. Also, to support the strengthening of monitoring and supervision at District level, vehicles were purchased for Districts identified by MOE as deprived (¶8.14). The intention was that development partners would support the broader aspects of CD; the World Bank devoted a large component of its EdSeP to CD; USAID emphasised building capacity for decentralised school management. Overall, there was little attempt to ensure that CD inputs were complementary, so that they tended to continue to be piecemeal (¶8.16).

11.29 The Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF) made a number of contributions to capacity development in 2003–2005, which included Ghana as a beneficiary. These were mainly in regional activities, but one significant contribution was made in support of an Education Sector Development Programme, possibly in preparation in the EdSeP. The official records for the EPDF are not sufficiently detailed to highlight specific support received by Ghana (estimated roughly at USD 405,000, of which USD 210,000 was through the regional programme over 2006–08) (¶8.18–8.19). Currently EPDF is supporting the development of a new ESP to cover the period 2010 to 2020;³³ it also funded some background studies to assist GOG prepare for the 2009 budget and on how to harmonise the ESP with the White Paper (¶8.21).

11.30 (Level 2) The overall approach to the strengthening of capacity is not more harmonised as a result of the FTI. There is no overall plan, budget or overall coordination for CD. Provision continues to be piecemeal, ad hoc, one-off and time-bound, linked to the interests and priorities of donors, so that some significant needs are unmet (¶8.28, ¶8.30).

³³ Provision of WB costing expertise.

11.31 (Level 3) Monitoring of CD is carried out to some extent through the annual review process; recent reports have called attention to serious failure to follow up recommendations for addressing capacity weakness (§8.31).

11.32 In the absence of an overall plan for CD, with the result that many CD inputs appear weakly linked to key sectoral needs, the gains which result from coherence are not generally achieved. As yet there is little concern for establishing a sustainable and coherent model of CD, and there is no awareness or use of the FTI Capacity Development Guidelines (FTI 2008a) in this respect, viz:

Capacity development cannot be limited to short-term training activities. This implies fostering the institutional environment and organisations in a comprehensive, strategic way, including managing change. In the education sector, this means linking the EFA implementation strategy to a solid capacity development strategy at all levels from the classroom to central administration, including civil society and the private sector.

See §8.30, §8.36 and §8.37 for more detailed discussion.

Stream 5 Aid Effectiveness

11.33 (Level 0) Contemporary reports suggest aid to basic education in the period 1999 to 2003 was fragmented, fell short of needs and was insufficiently targeted to global and national priorities.

11.34 (Level 2) There has been a process of continual review in the sector. There have also been several initiatives in coordination, harmonisation and alignment among stakeholders in education at global and country levels. These have included the introduction of a DP coordinator in MOE since 2002; the first costed, whole-sector ESP which was prepared in 2003; regular DP meetings although with varying intensity (17 DP/MOE meetings in 2007 and 2008); and there have been regular joint reviews since 2004 followed by a jointly produced Education Sector Annual Performance Report.

11.35 Sector level financial modalities are mostly on budget but none are on-Treasury; they are aligned with ESP but many are individually flexible (e.g. DFID, FTI). There is no sector pool and no Sector Budget Support aside from DFID's shadow-aligned process. Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were rationalised as early as 1998 to form a single MOE FPMU.

11.36 Although influences are difficult to disentangle the primary impetus was the wider Paris agenda. The influence of the FTI has come indirectly via the HQs of Development Partners.

11.37 (Level 3) There was a surge in aid to education in 2003. FTI endorsement may have played a part in this with some donors noting that the FTI was a strong influence at that time. However this is difficult to disentangle from other causes. 2003 was also the year of the first GPRS, and this had a major influence on aid generally – commitments as a whole doubled in 2003, and increased sharply again in 2004. In the view of the review team the GPRS is a more plausible cause of the increased support to education (§6.25–§6.27).

11.38 The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has declined from 80% to 67% over the period, showing a sharp decline in 2000 with only a slight upwards variation between 2001 and 2007. This would suggest that the FTI's influence on education priorities has been limited when set against competing Ghanaian priorities.

11.39 There is evidence that partners are modifying their way of operating globally and at country levels to ensure better coordination, harmonisation and alignment. In particular the education sector in Ghana has a common plan, strong coordination, and joint assessment of education performance. Coordination meetings are frequent. However, major donors

continue to operate project modalities. FTI modalities are only partially aligned and funds are unpredictable with increasing transaction costs

11.40 The FTI's espousal of the Paris Declaration is not immediately apparent in Ghana. The mode chosen for the disbursement of the Catalytic Fund is strictly project-based because one DP advised "donors wanted the money earmarked to give them confidence". Certainly, the Supervising Entity has great confidence in the FPMU which is the conduit for both the CF and a range of World Bank projects. However, CF funding is always related back to the ESP and is thus aligned with it. The most fully aligned modality – the MDBS – was not considered appropriate because it is not education-specific.

Stream 6 Cross-Cutting Issues

11.41 Across the education sector, there is a high level of awareness and engagement with issues of gender equity, from both MOE and DPs, with DPs such as Unicef and a number of NGO/CSO organisations having been continuously involved for many years. Through kindergarten and primary the GPI is close to 1, while this weakens at junior high school, and more so in subsequent stages. The achievement of boys and girls is noticeably differentiated in national assessments, along the classical lines of boys achieving better in science/maths and girls in language-related subjects.

11.42 As with gender equity, HIV/AIDS is properly considered in the ESP, with a sound if limited strategic plan emerging soon after, to guide the work of the HIV/AIDS Secretariat. Useful activities have been funded by committed DPs but, in a country with relatively low levels of incidence, whole-hearted commitment to taking the full range of preventive measures is still lacking. There is no evidence that FTI perspectives were important in the promotion of either gender equity or HIV/AIDS education.

11.43 The FTI CF has made a significant contribution in relation to exclusion, with its very practical inputs within the sector plan, e.g. teacher accommodation, transport for circuit supervisors. These inputs have been focused on the three northern regions and the 53 "deprived" districts.

12. Recommendations and Reflections

12.1 This chapter begins with three framing comments:

- All the evidence that has been taken into account shows clearly that MOE/GOG is firmly driving forward the policies and planning relating to EFA which are enshrined in successive iterations of the ESP. DPs, of which the FTI is seen as one among many, have, in their own ways supported these developments in this decade. No evidence of an "FTI approach" has been found.
- To all Ghanaian stakeholders, the FTI is associated with support to the elements of the ESP which relate closely to EFA/MDG goals, through the CF. This association certainly persists down to the level of districts, and to CSO and union stakeholders.
- The evaluation team have been unable to locate a significant FTI influence in the development of the revised ESP, 2010–2020.

12.2 Contributions from the CF have now virtually been completed, and EPDF funding has so far contributed little in the context of the FTI focus on EFA.

12.3 If, therefore, GOG pursues any openings for continuity in its relationship with the FTI, presumably in the context of the implementation of the ESP 2010–2020, there will be an opportunity to revisit the nature of the partnership. As indicated below, particular focus might be given to (i) strengthening DP harmonisation within the ESP, and (ii) reviewing funding modalities.

12.4 If there is to be a dimension of the partnership where the FTI contributes to dialogue about policy and planning priorities, then the nature and channels of communication will undoubtedly need to change (see ¶12.6 below).

12.5 If the other dimension is additional funding, then the modalities employed thus far need to be reviewed (see ¶12.7 below).

12.6 Within the next few months, MOE/GOG will finalise their ESP for the next decade. It will reflect a shift in emphasis away from the dominance of the basic education cycle towards a more holistic view of the development of all levels of the sector. If the FTI is to engage in policy discourse, it will need to take cognisance of this legitimate Ghanaian position and be ready to respond to this new challenge.

12.7 If further funding is sought, the first priority must be to put back the "fast" into "fast track initiative", as Ghana's recent experience has been of interminable delays and the steady escalation of the number of hurdles to be negotiated prior to the arrival of funds. So, it seems unlikely that future funding should be delivered through what has in effect become a WB project modality. Ghana has several ways of absorbing donor funds which do not depend on this approach, notably sector budget support (SBS) and the multi-donor budget support (MDBS), and these options should be thoroughly explored. Also, if there is to be any future funding, there should be a compact between the FTI and the recipient government that the "rules of engagement" should not be altered during the lifespan of that country's funding.

12.8 This would probably be facilitated if consideration were to be given to a change in the DP responsibility as the Supervising Entity, perhaps to one of the DPs outside the "big three".

12.9 More specifically, but rather urgently, a key focus for any future FTI engagement should be a commitment to the treatment of capacity development as a sector wide concern which needs a plan for capacity development and technical assistance which incorporates all major requirements and takes account of overlaps and potential synergies. Given the attention paid in policy and planning documents to capacity weaknesses and commitments to address them, it is striking that a coherent approach has not yet been introduced.

12.10 Finally, the FTI partnership globally may wish to reflect on the reasons why FTI activities in Ghana have tended to neglect the broader ambitions of the FTI (as summarised in Chapter 1) and come to be narrowly focused on the FTI as a discrete source of finance through the CF. Some of the factors involved (e.g. the HQ perspectives of the main aid agencies involved, and the role, and capacity, of the FTI secretariat to monitor and influence country-level performance) are beyond the scope of an individual country case study but will be followed up in the evaluation's main report.

Annex A Note on Methodology


A1. The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM 2009a), available from the study web-site at: www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

A2. The Evaluation Framework includes a detailed programme theory for the FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM 2009a). The same theory is being tested at both global and country levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country level).

A3. The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM 2009a). Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note (Allsop et al. 2009), shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report was also available for discussion and comment before it was finalised.

A4. Each country study includes a summary matrix which relates overall findings and findings against each workstream to the logical framework for the evaluation. (See Annex G).

A5. For a retrospective explanation and reflection on the study process and methodology, see the Note on Approaches and Methods which constitutes Appendix V (Volume 4) of the evaluation's final synthesis report.

Figure A1 Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of the FTI

Source: Evaluation Framework, Figure 3A.

Annex B Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
1950-1960		<p>1957: Ghana is the first in SSA to gain independence under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah who established a unitary socialist state. Regime marked by increasing levels of authoritarian rule</p>	<p>1951: Accelerated Development Plan for Education. This plan laid the foundation for six years of free and compulsory education primary education in Ghana although households were to be responsible for the cost of stationary, textbooks etc.</p>		
1960-1970		<p>1960: New constitution is adopted, changing Ghana from a parliamentary system with a prime minister to a republican form of government headed by a president.</p> <p>1964: Constitutional referendum changed the country to a one-party state.</p> <p>1966-1981 Periods of successive political coups and economic decline</p> <p>1966: Nkrumah overthrown in coup</p> <p>1969: Marks the beginning of the Second Republic. New constitution facilitated transfer of power to civilian government led by Kofi Busia. Busia is faced with mounting economic problems and undertakes drastic devaluation of the currency and liberalises controls to attract foreign investment and to encourage domestic entrepreneurship.</p>	<p>1960: Education Act- GOG continues the commitment to free and compulsory education, though this is extended for a further four years into middle school with effect from September 1961. Specifically, the act stated that "every child who has attained the school-going age as determined by the Minister shall attend a course of instruction as laid down by the Minister in a school recognised for the purpose".³⁴ Enrolment doubled in five years and Ghana gained recognition for having the most developed Education system in Africa.</p>		

³⁴ Government of Ghana, 1961.

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
1970-1980		<p>1972: Continuous decline in Ghanaian economy. Busia ousted in military coup led by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong. Under Acheampong, mismanagement continues and he is forced to resign. Akuffo takes over.</p> <p>1979: The Akuffo government is overthrown in a violent coup by a group of junior military officers of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings as its chairman.</p> <p>1979 September: Third republic begins. AFRC accept new constitution and hand over power to Limann.</p>	<p>1974: Realisation that the type and quality of education inherited from colonial era did not meet the needs of the country. Dzobo Report set the pace for reviewing Ghana's educational system. It proposes the introduction of junior secondary school to teach academic and practical skills.</p>		

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
1980-1990		1981: Limann ousted in military coup led by Rawlings under PNDC after two years of weak government and economic stagnation.	Late 1970 and early 1980's: Participation in basic education declines partly due to a downturn in the national economy and to a degree of political instability. The proportion of GDP devoted to education had declined from 6.4% in 1976 to about 1.7% in 1985 (World Bank, 1996). Schools also face severe administrative and performance problems. These included lack of trained teachers; lack of materials; books and teaching aids; inadequate infrastructure; poor pay for teachers; high drop-out rates; low enrolment rates; poor educational management and administration; and a general lack of financing for education. There is also a large scale exodus of qualified teachers to Nigeria where new found oil wealth was funding a rapid expansion of basic education (50% of trained teachers)		<p>1986–1991: World Bank Health and Education Rehabilitation Project; education component was USD 6.1m to primary school text books; USD 13.1m support to stationery (exercise books, pens etc), though not all to the basic education level.</p> <p>1986–1994: The Bank supported Ghana's education sector with two sector adjustment credits (i) Education Sector Adjustment Credit (EdSAC) I (1986–1991 USD 38.3m) (ii) EdSAC II (1990–1994 USD 53.2m)</p> <p>These were directly concerned with the education reforms initiated in 1987 and were largely concentrated on basic education. About two-thirds of support under the two EdSACs was spent on hardware, such as buildings, equipment, furniture, and vehicles.</p>

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
		<p>1983-92: Economic recovery programme: Ghana adopts Structural Adjustment programmes with stringent conditionality. The economy started to recover from a negative growth rate of about 5% in 1983 to positive 6% in 1986. Some conditionalities had serious consequences for the education sector. Pupil teachers were retrenched; cash and carry and cost sharing in education conditionalities were harmful to families and led to chronic under-investment in education, resulting in reduced enrolment, poor quality outcomes.</p>	<p>1987: Education Reforms Programmes: Introduced with support from the World Bank with the objective of improving the educational quality. It was (i) based on recommendations from the Dzobo report; (ii) to tackle decline in educational performance in previous decade. Reform restructures education to comprise of 6 years primary, 3 years junior secondary and 3 years senior secondary education. The replaces the 6-4-7 systems previously in place. Additionally, new content of education with emphasis on vocational and technical subjects for all children up to junior secondary</p>		
1990–1993	<p>March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p>1992 March: A new constitution is put forward to establish the Fourth Republic. It declares Ghana to be a unitary republic</p> <p>April 1992 – Referendum approves new constitution paving the way for introducing a multiparty system. Previous ban on party politics is lifted.</p> <p>November 1992: First presidential election held. (Parliamentary elections held in December) Elections were marred by manipulation and fraud leading to an opposition boycott of the second round in which voters elected parliamentary representatives.</p> <p>January 1993: Ghana's fourth republic inaugurated. JJ Rawlings elected as president. Rawlings had ruled Ghana in the previous 18 years under the PNDC military regime.</p>	<p>1992: Basic education made mandatory under the New Constitution. The constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana Article 39(2) mandates "the provision of free, compulsory and universal basic education." The Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) policy in Ghana, introduced in 1992.</p> <p>1993: District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) set up as a statutory budget item (paid for from 5% of central government revenue) of which 20% is recommended for education infrastructure.</p> <p>1993: Weakness of 1987 reforms comes to fore. Reforms seen to have failed to achieve quality targets and exposed the education sector to public criticism. Government set up the Education Reform Review Committee.</p>		<p>1990–2005: USAID Primary Education Program (PREP) (USD 35m) – 90% of funding was budget support. Focus on software (e.g. teacher training and national assessment), but about 30% of funding allocated to textbooks.</p> <p>1992–1997: World Bank Literacy and Functional Skills Project (USD 27.8m).</p> <p>1992–2004: World Bank National Functional Literacy Programme (USD 23.7m).</p>

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
1994-1999		<p>1994– Ethnic clashes in northern region over land ownership. 1,000 people die and over 150,000 displaced.</p> <p>June 1994– Northern Peace agreement signed.</p> <p>1995– Government imposes curfew in Northern Region as renewed ethnic violence results in a further 100 deaths</p> <p>1996– National elections. Rawlings re-elected 57.2% of votes cast. Elections seen as peaceful, free, and transparent by domestic and international observers.</p> <p>1996– Introduction of Ghana Vision 2020. Blue print for Ghana's development which aims to turn Ghana into a middle income country by the year 2020</p>	<p>1994: The work of above committee culminates into a National Education Forum. Forum provides an opportunity discussion of the problems of the sector identified by the committee e.g. poor teaching quality, lack of funding and lack of parental involvement. This forum seen as an important landmark in education sector analysis as it provided stakeholders the opportunity to examine the strength and weakness of 1987 reforms and make recommendations (Agyeman 2000)</p>		<p>1993–1998: World Bank Primary School Development (PSD) Project – objective to increase learning achievements and enrolments in primary schools. About 85% of funds spent on educational infrastructure (e.g. classroom blocks, head teacher's bungalow). The project was restructured at the mid-term review to better support the FCUBE (see below); but changes made little difference to the allocation of funds (with most still spent on hardware).</p> <p>1995 Unicef Ghana: National Programme of Action for the Survival, Protection and Development of Children.</p>

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Ghana Case Study

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
			<p>1995: Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) reforms implemented. FCUBE aimed to achieve UPE by 2005, and to improve girls' enrolment. FCUBE also included a cost sharing scheme to cover non-tuition fees, under which parents were expected to bear limited expenses. No child was turned away for non-payment of fees. FCUBE had three core objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving quality of teaching and learning through the review and revision of teaching materials, new measures on teacher incentives, and a focus on in-service teacher training. • Strengthening management at both central and district level; and • Improving access and participation especially through schemes that encouraged girls' participation at primary level 		<p>1997–2004 USAID: USAID Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) (USD 51.8m) – 26% of funding was budget support; 74% was allocated to the improvement of 367 schools. Intended to support the GOG FCUBE programme.</p> <p>1998–2005: DFID Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) (GBP 50m). Focus on basic education in support of FCUBE. Using a sub-sector budget support approach, ESSP funds were disbursed via the Ghana Education Service (GES) in support of the Whole School Development (WSD) programme and focused on district and school level interventions.</p>

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
			<p>The World Bank's supported FCUBE through a Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (BESIP) (1996–2002, USD 47.9m) that was meant to help improve the quality of school infrastructure and foster changes in school management to enhance learning outcomes.</p> <p>FCUBE strategy seen as unsuccessful parents could not afford to pay the levies charged by the schools. Despite the policy of fee-free tuition in basic schools, many districts charged levies as a means of raising funds, for example, for school repairs, cultural and sporting activities. This had the effect of deterring many families, particularly the poorest, from sending their children, especially girls, to school.</p>		
1999	Education For All (EFA) Assessment 1999–2000 , involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.	1999 – major terms-of-trade shock when prices for its two main exports, gold and cocoa, plunged, while petroleum prices increased.	1999 : National Education Forum led to the creation of the Development Partner Co-ordination Unit of the MOEYS to co-ordinate the activities of all the Development Partners supporting the Education Sector		

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2000–2001	<p>United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.</p> <p>World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.</p> <p>G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. July 2001: G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada</p>	<p>2000– Rawlings' term of office is over. Main opposition party, New Patriotic Party led by John Kufuor wins elections. For the first time in Ghana's history, one democratically elected president was succeeded by another. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP won 99 of the 200 seats while the NDC returned 92 seats.</p> <p>2001 January – Kufuor's first term of office. He inherits an economy plagued by inflation running at 41%.³⁵ Budget deficit and external and domestic debts stood at unsustainable levels. This macro-economic context had a negative impact on expenditure in social sectors and poverty reduction activities as the Government found it increasingly difficult to meet its counterpart funding obligations to donor supported projects, including the social sectors.</p> <p>2001 February – Petrol prices rise by 60% following the government's decision to remove fuel subsidies</p> <p>2001 April– Government receives debt relief from IMF and World Bank. Previous government had refused debt relief package as a matter of national pride.</p>	<p>2001– Ghana Education Trust Fund (GET fund) was established by an act of Parliament (Ghana Education Trust Fund Act, 2001 Act 581) on 25th August 2001 to assist nationwide with financing of education; to provide for the management of funds and for financial related matters. GET Fund set up (a statutory budget paid for from 2.5 percentage points of the 12.5% VAT) – but most (up to 90%) of funding goes to tertiary education.</p>		<p>2000–2005: Japan (JICA) Science, Technology and Mathematics in Basic Education (STM) project – to support FCUBE mainly in teacher training (US USD 6.49m).</p> <p>2000–2002: Japan grants for school block construction (USD 0.5m) – project funded 80 classroom blocks</p>

³⁵ AfDB 2005 Ghana: Evaluation of Bank assistance to the education sector.

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2002	<p>G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community.</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135m Euro to set the process in motion.</p>	<p>2002 May – President Kuffuor inaugurates reconciliation commission to look into human rights violations during military rule.</p>	<p>2002 January– The Committee on Review of the Education Reforms in Ghana.</p> <p>2002 October – The Committee on Review of the Education Reforms in Ghana issued its report, "Meeting the Challenges of Education in the Twenty First Century". This is also known as the 2002 Presidential Commission Report.</p>	<p>2002 June 14: Ghana is one of the first 18 countries to receive a letter to participate in the FTI. Letter explains the essence of the FTI and the eligibility criteria to joining the FTI. The letter also elaborates on the financial and technical support that Ghana will receive should it decide to join the FTI.</p> <p>2002 July 16: Ghana accepts letter of invitation from FTI secretariat.</p>	
2003	<p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of the FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>				

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2003	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, Feb 2003. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonise donor policies and priorities around country systems</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting – Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for the FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for the FTI.</p>	<p>2003 February Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I (GPRS I) This is the framework for coordinating social and economic development in Ghana, informs government programmes in all sectors, and sets out a number of priorities. Strong emphasis on poverty reduction and improving living standards. Education seen as a key poverty reduction strategy. Education programmes seek under GPRS I to enhance access and to improve quality of free and compulsory universal basic education.</p>	<p>2003 May: Education Strategic Plan launched informed by GPRS I, the 2002 Presidential Commission Report the EFA, Dakar Goals and the MDGs. ESP developed with support primarily from DFID and Unicef. The ESP was designed to provide "relevant education to all Ghanaians at all levels to enable them to acquire skills that will assist them to develop their potential, to be productive, to facilitate poverty reduction and to promote socio-economic growth and national development" (MOE 2003a).</p>	<p>2003 August: Ghana puts together first draft of proposal for inclusion into the FTI.³⁶</p> <p>2003 September 5th Ghana submits application for FTI endorsement to the FTI secretariat</p> <p>2003 November: DPs' appraisal of the FTI proposal submitted by the MOEYS.³⁷</p>	<p>Since 2003: Multi Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS); Denmark, Germany, Holland, UK, Canada, Switzerland and France (since 2005), alongside the World Bank, the IMF, the AfDB and the EC providing some of their assistance as direct budgetary support (in the form of Poverty Reduction Budget Support) to finance Government (GPRS) priorities, including in education. Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) is designed to support the speedy implementation of the GPRS, particularly in the three relatively disadvantaged regions in the north of the country.</p>

³⁶ Key strategies identified in the proposal for attainment of EFA-FTI goals are construction of new classrooms and rehabilitation of existing classrooms

³⁷ GOG commended for its ESP, the Annual Education Sector Operational Plan and proposal. Specifically Ghana's ESP is commended in several areas (i) the use of the Indicative Framework as a benchmarking tool, (ii) the specificity with which policy objectives are translated into targets and strategies, (iii) the clear policy focus on the primary completion rate, with specific annual targets, (iv) the comprehensive discussion of implementation and monitoring issues, (v) a clear policy thrust on girls education accompanied by an integrated programme, and vi) the specific and highly compelling "propositions for aid co-ordination" in the education sector.

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2003	<p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2–3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that the FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.</p>		<p>The ESP has four main areas of focus (MOE 2003a):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Equitable access to education; 2. Quality of education; 3. Educational management; 4. Science, technology and TVET. <p>The ESP has ten policy goals like increasing access to and participation in education and training, improving the quality of teaching and learning for enhanced pupil/student achievement, promoting good health and environmental sanitation in schools and institutions and others. (See Annex B for more details)</p>		

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2004	<p>Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and program development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, Nov 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>	<p>2004 December– National elections. Remarkable turn out (85%) and John Kufuor under NPP re-elected winning 129 out of 230 parliamentary seats. The elections were seen as a measure of democratic strength in a country that continues to be held up as an example for its African peers.</p> <p>2004– Ghana meets the conditionality of enhanced HIPC and obtained a stock of debt treatment from the Paris Club which included at least 90% debt cancellation.</p> <p>2004– GDP growth rate is highest – 5% for the first time in a decade. The inflation rate decreased from 40.5% by the end of 2000 to 10.5% at the end of first quarter, 2004.</p>	<p>2004: the MOE set up the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee (ESTAC), along with thematic groups for the following areas: equitable access to education; quality of education; education management; science and technology; and TVET. The aim of the committee was to "oversee the work of the thematic groups and to take overall responsibility for advising and following through on the proposals of the ESP".</p> <p>2004–White Paper in Education reform: Objective of the white paper is twofold. (i) to build upon the ESP commitments and ensure that all children are provided with the foundation of high quality free basic education (ii) to ensure that second cycle education is more inclusive and appropriate to the needs of young people in order that they develop both demand-driven and market – responsive skills, which are more able to meet the needs of a growing and diversifying Ghanaian economy.³⁸</p>	<p>2004 January : Ghana redraft proposal for inclusion into the FTI based on recommendations from development partners and Secretariat.</p> <p>2004 February: Final version of Ghana's proposal submitted. Revisions made taking account of recommendations from DPs.³⁹</p> <p>March 16: DPs endorse Ghana's Education Sector Plan.</p>	<p>2004-2009: World Bank Education Sector Project (EdSeP) includes a component to build capacity at all levels of the educational system between and within organisations in the sector quality of leadership and management in the sector; another component is a pilot programme scheme which applies to basic education.</p> <p>2004: USAID Education Quality for All – EQUALL Project.</p>

³⁸ Ministry of Education, Science and Sports, Ghana, "Linking ESP and the White Paper Reform", November 2005.

³⁹ One major change was the revision of the financing framework; maintaining the macroeconomic parameters employed at their 2002 levels for the purpose of projecting the resource envelope, since a test of the sensitivity of the model to the simultaneous change in these two parameters showed that the impact on the estimated GOG budget for education was insignificant. Revising the financial framework also provided the MOEYS with a good opportunity to take advantage of newly available information, Ghana Education Trust Fund and HIPC resources, and to distinguish clearly between the gross (domestic) gap in financing for the achievement of Universal Primary Completion and the net financing gap (that remaining after current levels of donor support have been considered). On aggregate, these changes did have a significant impact on the projected financing gaps. It was found that in the previous version of the model the DACF resources, and share of primary education in GET fund resources had been significantly overestimated, leading to an understatement of the financing shortfall. Other changes pertain to monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, pre-school education and teacher deployment, retention and management.

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2004			<p>The White Paper, among other things, proposed the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Universal and compulsory basic education should be extended to include two years of pre-school teaching at the kindergarten level, making basic education in Ghana eleven years in length (2 years KG, 6 years primary, 3 years junior high school). At the primary level fewer subjects would be taught so that "grounding in the basic skills [literacy, numeracy, problem-solving skills and creative arts]... would be improved" (MOE 2004 p6). 	<p>2004 November 12,⁴⁰ Catalytic fund strategy committee allocate USD8m to Ghana to support basic school text books, teacher initiative scheme and monitoring and supervision. This is Year One allocation. Disbursement to be made in two tranches.</p> <p>December 16: Bank receives letter from Ghana requesting funds for CFs and describing a programme of actions, objectives and policies designed to achieve primary education for all children in the country.</p>	

⁴⁰ Minutes of the catalytic fund strategy committee meeting of November 12 2004.

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2004			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The present Junior Secondary School (JSS) system, that includes an element of pre-vocational and pre-technical skills training, will be discontinued. In place of the current JSS, will be the renamed "Junior High School" (JHS), with a more general, comprehensive curriculum. Senior Secondary School will be renamed "Senior High School" (SHS), extended from three to four years, and diversified into four streams: vocational, technical, agricultural and general education. The government intends to partner with the private sector to promote formal apprenticeship training programmes, with government assuming "full responsibility" for the first year of the programme. 		

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2005	<p>March 2005, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates were accused of producing a "watered-down" outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p>		<p>2005: Grant capitalisation scheme: Government has taken a bold step forward by abolishing all fees introduced as part of a wider strategy to decentralise education provision. Under this system, every public kindergarten, primary school and junior secondary school receives a grant of about USD 3.30 (30,000 cedis) per pupil per year. Schools are not permitted to charge any fees to parents. This bold policy measure has led to an immediate increase in enrolment (approximately 10 percentage points for NER) and a related increase in demand for teachers, school infrastructure and teaching and learning materials, but it has also put more demand on the institutional support system.</p> <p>2005: Ghana School Feeding Programme : NEPAD "Home Grown" SFP concept, which aims to contribute not only to the improvement of the education service delivery but also to agricultural development and the reduction of malnutrition among school aged children.</p>	<p>2005 Feb 10, Ghana receives official notice from the FTI Secretariat advising to notify government of grant allocation of 8million to be paid in two tranches.</p> <p>2005 Feb 17: Ghana signs grant agreement for CF.</p> <p>2005 May 4: First tranche of year one allocation is disbursed. 4million out of 8m is disbursed. Entire 4m used for the procurement of core textbooks (Maths, English, Science) and distributed all pupils in 53 deprived districts.</p> <p>2005 July⁴¹: Confirmation of second year allocation for Ghana. The strategy committee confirmed the second year (CY06) allocation of USD11m for Ghana.</p> <p>2005 December: Ghana request for release of second tranche of year one allocation. GOG states that this amount will be used for the procurement of motorbikes (2,314,260), bicycle for teachers (331,200), teachers accommodation (1,052,500), motorbikes for circuit supervisors (481,350).</p>	

41 FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Minutes of Meeting of July 2005.

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2006	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.</p> <p>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting that took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the 12th of November 2006. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors, such as Mozambique, to qualify. **</p>	<p>2006 June– Ghana qualifies for the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI). Ghana's debt to the IFIs is cancelled.</p> <p>2006 October– IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) expired it has expressed the desire of embarking on an IMF Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to maintain the macroeconomic gains made in recent years.</p> <p>October to September 2006– Record year for cocoa production.</p> <p>2006 June– Visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promises to lend Ghana about USD66m to fund development projects.</p>		<p>2006 January 5th – Ghana receives official notification that USD 11m has been approved for 2006 following a decision made in July at the CF meeting.</p> <p>February 7th: Second tranche of year 1 allocations made. USD 4m disbursed.</p> <p>Full Catalytic funds for Year one now disbursed. All together EFA FTI Year 1 Catalytic Grant was used to support Ghana's Education Strategic Plan with the objectives to improve quality of teaching and learning and strengthening management efficiency:</p> <p>(i)Teacher training, recruitment and deployment, including the provision of teacher incentives such as teacher accommodation and means of transport to improve teacher mobility and encourage better deployment to deprived areas.</p>	<p>2006: Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) – some support to construction and rehabilitation of educational facilities, especially at the KG and primary levels.</p> <p>2006-2009: DFID Support to Education Strategic Plan (SESP). Focus on basic education. The goal of SESP is the achievement of the MDGs relating to education. The SESP forms part of DFID's long term commitment to provide GBP 10m to educational development in Ghana each year until 2015, subject to satisfactory performance on agreed sector outputs and Millennium Development Goals targets. 80% of total DFID support now through the MDBS mechanism.</p>

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2006		<p>2006– Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2006–2009) – The GPRS II is very much focused on developing Ghana to the status of a middle income country by 2015. Strong emphasis on economic growth.</p> <p>The main pillars of this strategy are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human resource development and basic services • Good governance and civic responsibility • Agriculture and private sector competitiveness for growth. <p>Human resources areas of the GPRS II, emphasises on the creation of competent manpower for development of the country whereby education obviously plays an important role. Emphasis is not only on basic education but also obligatory attendance for all children for 11 years (ages from 4 to 15) secondary school content. The Strategy also puts a great deal of emphasis on quality and efficiency in the delivery of education service and bridging the gender gap in access to education. (See Annex C)</p>		<p>–31 6-unit teacher accommodation blocks for primary teachers constructed (USD 2.5m).</p> <p>–1,358 motorbikes were procured and distributed to districts to facilitate school supervision; 828 motorbikes for districts-6 motorbikes for each of the 138 districts; and additional 530 motorbikes for circuit supervisors-10 motorbikes for each of the 53 deprived districts.</p> <p>–8,280 bicycles were procured and distributed to teachers as incentives for teaching in deprived areas; 60 bicycles per district for each of the 138 districts.</p> <p>(ii) Teaching and learning materials, specifically basic education textbooks for pupils.</p> <p>–core textbooks (Maths, English, Science) were procured and distributed all pupils in 53 deprived districts (4m).</p> <p>(iii) Monitoring, supervision and inspection of educational facilities, processes and outcomes.</p> <p>–53 4X4 double-cabin pick-ups procured for school supervision at the cost of USD 1.06 (moved to be procured year 2 allocation).</p> <p>2006 April : Ghana draws up a proposal for planned utilisation of the funds under year two allocation with 2 focus areas:</p>	

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2006		<p>2006– Ghana signs a five-year, USD 547m anti-poverty compact with the United States' Millennium Challenge Corporation. The compact focuses on accelerating growth and poverty reduction through agricultural and rural development.</p>		<p>Equitable access to Education: (60%) and Quality of education (40%).</p> <p>2006 May 3: Ghana receives letter from the FTI about the closure and cancellation of year one account.</p> <p>2006 July– Ghana receives official letter from WB on behalf of the FTI, notifying that grant allocation of 11m to be paid in two tranches. First in the amount is USD 6m and second USD 5m.</p> <p>2006 October– Minister (Owusu Ankomah) is invited to 4th partnership meeting to take place in November in Cairo.</p> <p>2006 November 6th: 6m is disbursed – First tranche of year 2 allocation.</p> <p>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Minutes of Meeting of November 12, 2006 The CF SC made the decision to top up Ghana's Year 3 allocation as requested to reach USD 14.2m, i.e. an increase of USD 3.2m .</p>	

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2006				<p>The CF SC requested more information on education indicators, especially with regard to actual data for year 2002/03, projected education budget and service delivery. Moreover, there were no indications of the coverage for the financing framework (entire education sector, basic or primary sub-sector?). Finally, donors indicated that the projected large and fluctuating levels of unmet funding needs should be explained.</p> <p>The FTI Secretariat recommends that the Strategy Committee give its approval for topping up individual country allocations for Ghana,</p> <p>December 2006: Ghana receives official letter from the FTI that Year 3 increased to USD 14.2m in light of the country's unmet financial need, good performance and absorptive capacity following the decision made in CF strategy meeting.</p>	

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2007	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p>	<p>Feb 2007: The Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS, 2007) was published. In terms of education, G-JAS partners will focus on increasing access, completion and quality in basic education, particularly the six-year cycle of primary schooling, and specific measures, such as incentive schemes, to increase girls' enrolment, retention and completion, particularly in secondary education. G-JAS partners will work with the Ministries of Education and Finance to improve efficiency and equity in education financing at all levels, particularly in pursuit of a more sustainable and equitable system of funding for tertiary education. Partners are working with government to develop a SWAp within which support will be provided.</p> <p>March 2007– Half a century of independence.</p>	<p>2007: The New Education Reform: This reform introduced 4-year Senior High School (SHS) system that will offer General Courses (Arts, Business and Science); and Technical, Vocational and Agriculture (TVET) options for entry into tertiary institutions or the job market. All students in SHS will study the core subjects, and TVET students will now be able to progress to any level, polytechnic or university. The inability to do so at the moment is a major weakness in the TVET education system. The reform focuses on Universal Basic Completion (UBC) by 2015 instead of just Universal Primary Completion (UPC), and by 2020 all JSS graduates will be exposed to Senior Second Cycle education or training.</p>	<p>2007 May – Ghana is selected as a member of the steering committee by counterparts from other developing countries along with Ethiopia, Guyana and Mozambique. This is a two-year appointment.</p> <p>2007 September 24th Second tranche of year 2 allocation is made – USD 5m</p> <p>The full amount of USD 11m (eleven million United States dollars) for EFA FTI Year 2 Catalytic Grant was used to support Ghana's Education Strategic Plan with the objectives and focal areas:</p> <p>(i) Improve the quality of basic education.</p> <p>–Twenty-two 6-unit teacher accommodation blocks for primary teachers in 22 out of the 53 deprived districts constructed (USD 1.7m).</p> <p>(ii) Increase access to basic education.</p> <p>–150 3-unit classroom blocks (450 classrooms) in 106 out of 138 districts constructed to respond to the increased enrollments (16.6% between 2005 and 2006) with the abolition of fees and the introduction of capitation grants (USD 5.6m).</p>	

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2007	<p>In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on May 23, 2007: CF funding for Mozambique approved</i></p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Dakar, December 10 2007 (see annex D for details)</i></p>	<p>June 2007– Major off-shore oil discovery announced. Oil will turn Ghana into an "African tiger". Total 3 billion barrels.</p> <p>September 2007– The worst floods for more than 30 years cause widespread devastation, destroying much of the annual harvest.</p>		<p>–rehabilitation of existing schools (USD 776,500)</p> <p>–10,350 dual desks (23 dual desks per classroom) and teacher tables and chairs provided for the 450 newly constructed classrooms (USD 396,000+USD 27,500).</p> <p>2007 November: total of USD 19m has been disbursed till date.</p> <p>2007 December 5th World Bank received a request from the Government of Ghana to prepare the Grant Agreement for the third year amount of USD 14.2m (request from GOG and report on status of implementation).</p>	

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Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2008	<p>September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid. Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects.. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p>	<p>2008 January– Host of African cup of Nations and associated high public sector expenditure.</p> <p>2008 December– National elections. First round of elections held on December 7. Eight candidates contested in the election but none of the candidates achieved over 50% of the vote. A runoff was held between NPP candidate Nana Akufo Addo and NDC candidate John Atta Mills on December 28, 2008 in which Atta Mills claimed victory.</p>		<p>2008 January 16 In line with the new guidelines (draft circulated by HDNED in an e-mail dated January 26, 2008), the proposal for the Ghana EFA FTI Year 3 and the status reports for Ghana EFA FTI Grants for Year 1 and Year 2 were circulated to development partners and sector officials. (See Annex E for proposed breakdown of use of Year 3 funds).</p> <p>2008 Feb: Ghana receives letter informing minister of the FTI decision to top up year three allocation. Ghana informed that an amount of the Grant equal to seven million one hundred thousand United States Dollars (USD 7,100,000) has been made available to the EFA-FTI-CTF. The remaining amount of the Grant has not yet been so made available, but is expected to be made available in one additional instalment of seven million one hundred thousand United States Dollars (USD 7,100,000).</p> <p>2008 Feb : Ghana receives official letter from the FTI advising minister of the closure of year 2 account effective from the 31st December 2007</p>	

Annex B: Timeline of Key Events

Date	International Context	Ghana Context	Education Policy in Ghana	The FTI in Ghana	Other donor activities in Ghana
2008				<p>2008 March 31, the Education Sector Group made up of development partners and sector officials were invited to comment on the draft EFA FTI Grant Agreement prepared by LEGAL.</p> <p>2008 April 2, the EFA FTI Task Team held an audio meeting to clarify remaining disbursement issues. The understanding during this meeting was that because this is a Year 3 allocation following Year 1 and Year 2 allocations which had been fully disbursed, a Project Appraisal Document (PAD) will not be required as was done for new EFA FTI countries like Sierra Leone. The meeting was attended by disbursement, financial management, procurement and a representative from the EFA FTI secretariat. Also represented were sector officials from the Planning Division of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports (MOESS).</p> <p>The meeting concluded with key decisions on: (i) applying World Bank fiduciary guidelines for procurement and financial management to the EFA FTI Catalytic Grant; (ii) providing an update on audits undertaken under Year 1 and Year 2 implementation; (iii) preparing the procurement plan for Year 3; (iv) undertaking a financial management assessment; (v) updating the safeguards assessment; (vi) exploring programmatic versus investment type grants (in line with new WB Guidelines for EFA FTI Grants); (vii) drafting the EFA FTI Catalytic Grant Agreement; and (viii) next steps for EFA FTI Catalytic Grant processing.</p>	
2009		January 2009 – Atta Mills sworn in as president			

Annex C Interview Schedule

Time & Date	Stakeholders	Venue
Monday, 18th May		
	Mr Kwame Agyapong Apiadu-Agyen, Planning officer and DP Coordinator, MOE	Alisa Hotel
2pm	Ms Eunice Dapaah, Senior Education Specialist, World Bank Ghana Office	World Bank Ghana Office
2pm	Mr Peter Darvas, Senior Education Specialist, World bank Ghana office	World Bank office
7pm	Ms Kirsten Majgaard, Economist, World Bank	Alisa Hotel
Tuesday, 19th May		
1pm	Mr Kofi Nti, Director of Finance, MOE	MOE
3pm	Mr Tony Arthur, Project Accountant, FPMU	FPMU office
	Mr Samuel Adu, Director, Basic Education, GES	GES
	Mr Kofi Nante, Director– Teacher Education Division, GES	GES
Wednesday 20th May		
9am	Mr Charles Otoo, Financial Controller, GES Mr Samuel Bannerman– Mensah, Director General, GES	GES
Thursday 21st May		
8am	Mr Ato Edii, Education Planner, GES	GES
9am	Mr Thomas Hutton Coleman, EMIS Coordinator, MOE	MOE
9am	Mr Charles Otoo, Financial Controller, GES	GES
12pm	Mr Malcolm Watson, Decentralisation Consultant, PBME	Hotel
2pm	Mr Robert Degraft– Hanson, Financial Management Specialist, World Bank	World bank Ghana office
2pm	Ms Hilda Egan, Coordinator, HIV/AIDS Secretariat	HIV/AIDS Secretariat
	Mr Emmanuel Amuah (Fiifi), Budget Officer, GES	GES
8pm	Dr Leslie Casely–Heyford, Development Consultant, Associates for Change	Hotel
Friday 22nd May		
8am	Mr Ato Edii, Education Planner, GES	GES
9am	Ms Mama Owusu, Education Adviser	JICA Ghana office
12 pm	Mr Thomas Hutton Coleman, EMIS Cordinator, MOE	MOE

VISIT TO DISTRICTS Kpandu District office Ms Dora Agorsor, Director, Kpandu District office Karmula Anthony , Assistant Director, Human resource management Oscar Dovlo, District accountant Afordoanyi Beneyo, PRO Afordofe Paul M Tagboto William Y Assistant Director Planning St. Theresa Teachers Training College Angelina Tandoh– College principal Prosper Addo– Deputy Principal Jordan Hlordze– Education and psychology Tsorche Bismark– Physical education and health		
Monday, 25th		
10am	Mr Bright Appiah, Executive Chair, Ghana National Education Coalition	Alisa Hotel
	Mr Leslie Tettey, National Coordinator, Ghana National Education Coalition,	Alisa Hotel
11:30 am	Mr Madeez Adamu Issah, Project officer– Education	Unicef Ghana office
Tuesday, 26th Feb.		
9am	Dr. D. Pealori, Head of Budget, PBME, MOE	MOE
10am	Mr Agyakwa, Budget officer, PBME, MOE	MOE
9:30 am	Mr Michele Savini, PBME, ODI fellow	MOE
10:30	Mr Matthew Karikari– Ababio, PBME, Head of Unit PME	MOE
VISIT TO ACCRA METROPOLITAN EDUCATION DIRECTORATE Bismark Gyamesi, Accra Metropolitan District Education Office – Assistant Director EMIS Unit S.O Awuku, Accra Metropolitan District Education Office– Budget office		
2:30 pm	Dr Eric Johnston, Education Adviser, USAID	USAID
Wednesday, 27th		
8am	Ms Angela Brown Fahart, Technical advisor, Human Development, MOFEP	MOFEP
8am	Mr Samuel Manteaw, Director, HR Division	GES
3pm	Mr Charles Tsegah, Director Planning MOE Ghana	Alisa Hotel
Thursday, 28th		
9am	Mr David Pedley, Governance Adviser, DFID Ghana	DFID, Ghana office
Friday, 29th May		
9am	Hon Alex Tettey Enyo, Minister for Education	MOE
2pm	Mr Peter Darvas, Senior Education Specialist Ms Eunice Dapaah, Senior Education Specialist	World Bank, Ghana

Annex D Basic Education Indicators

Table D1 Education Statistics 2003/04–2007/08

	2003/04	2007/08
Kindergarten GER (%)	54.6	89.9
Primary Schools (public)	12,406 (2004/05)	13,247
Primary enrolment	2,418,696	2,990,782
Primary GPI (F/M)	0.93	0.96
Primary Completion Rate (%)	77.9	88.0
Junior High Schools	6637 (2004/05)	7,267
JHS enrolment	828,517	1,015,491
JHS GPI (F/M)	0.88	0.92
JHS Completion Rate (%)	58.0	67.7
Adult Literacy Rate (%)	53.4	61.7 (2006/07)

Source: MOE EMIS reports 2004 and 2008

Annex E Education Finance

Trend Data

Table E1 Trends in Education Expenditure by Source

Sources	2003				2004				2005			
	Allocation		Actual		Allocation		Actual		Allocation		Actual	
	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%
Government	259,884,400	94%	377,700,300	92.7%	328,918,824	96%	446,650,231	79%	501,961,500	93%	561,860,500	77.2%
GOG	259,884,400	94%	337,700,300	82.9%	328,918,824	96%	391,845,227	69%	389,541,500	72%	485,553,900	66.7%
GETFund		0	40,000,000	9.8%		0%	54,805,004	10%	112,420,000	20.8%	71,556,600	9.8%
SIF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,750,000	0.7%
Donor	17,704,199	6%	18,392,700	4.5%	13,416,300	4%	42,009,203	7%	37,513,900	7%	65,360,100	9.0%
Donor Agency	17,704,199	6%	18,392,700	4.5%	13,416,300	4%	42,009,203	7%	37,513,900	7%	61,875,100	8.5%
EFA Catalytic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,485,000	0.5%
IGF	-	-	-	-	-	-	52,837,803	9%	-	-	69,017,500	9.5%
Debt Relief	-	-	11,331,300	2.8%	-	-	27,422,902	5%	-	-	31,295,600	4.3%
HIPC	-	-	11,331,300	2.8%	-	-	27,422,902	5%	-	-	31,295,600	4.3%
MDRI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	277,588,599	100%	407,424,300	100%	342,335,124	100%	568,920,139	100%	539,475,400	100%	727,533,700	100%

Sources	2006				2007				2008	
	Allocation		Actual		Allocation		Actual		Allocation	
	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%
Government	662,920,200	77%	766,953,900	82%	929,157,700	84.3%	1,031,466,577	81.0%	952,925,648	81.3%
GOG	532,320,200	62%	648,325,700	69%	759,157,700	68.9%	867,133,297	68.1%	841,352,648	71.7%
GETFund	130,600,000	15%	115,188,400	12%	170,000,000	15.4%	164,333,280	12.9%	111,573,000	9.5%
SIF	-	-	3,439,800	0.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Donor	87,392,700	10%	25,271,400	2.7%	56,244,100	5.1%	86,948,363	6.8%	66,527,668	5.7%
Donor Agency	73,714,200	8%	22,485,400	2.4%	46,124,100	4.2%	77,000,096	6.0%	52,299,268	4.5%
EFA Catalytic	13,678,500	2%	2,786,000	0.3%	10,120,000	0.9%	9,948,267	0.8%	14,228,400	1.2%
IGF	81,284,000	9%	102,238,400	11%	111,839,800	10.2%	110,689,258	8.7%	105,856,632	9.0%
Debt Relief	30,000,000	3%	44,560,500	5%	4,500,000	0.4%	44,435,287	3.5%	47,385,000	4.0%
HIPC	30,000,000	3%	44,560,500	5%	4,500,000	0.4%	40,207,305	3.2%	16,485,000	1.4%
MDRI	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,227,982	0.3%	30,900,000	2.6%
TOTAL	861,596,900	100%	939,024,200	100%	1,101,741,600	100%	1,273,539,485	100%	1,172,694,948	100%


Source: Education performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

Table E2 Trends in Education Expenditure by Level

Sources	2003 Expenditure		2004 Expenditure		2005 Expenditure		2006 Expenditure		2007 Budget Allocation		2007 Expenditure		2008 Budget Allocation	
	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%	GHC	%
Pre-school	9,886,200	2%	23,176,164	4.0%	25,029,905	3.4%	37,144,800	3.9%	48,332,000	4.3%	42,797,283	3.4%	52,587,715	4.5%
Primary	163,533,900	40%	183,091,696	31.6%	220,115,936	29.9%	262,627,200	27.6%	422,028,400	37.9%	445,933,605	35.0%	430,750,620	36.7%
JHS	91,035,300	22%	92,704,656	16.0%	131,038,919	17.8%	159,921,600	16.8%	206,223,900	18.5%	206,990,933	16.3%	218,345,091	18.6%
SHS	63,024,400	15%	115,301,416	19.9%	153,124,131	20.8%	150,382,800	15.8%	101,724,400	9.1%	160,788,917	12.6%	153,243,335	13.1%
TVET	4,531,200	1%	6,373,445	1.1%	8,834,084	1.2%	8,599,900	0.9%	26,621,300	2.4%	8,236,942	0.6%	21,990,638	1.9%
SPED	1,647,700	0%	2,317,616	0.4%	2,944,695	0.4%	3,835,600	0.4%	5,966,300	0.5%	3,894,322	0.3%	9,653,886	0.8%
NFED	3,707,300	1%	9,270,466	1.6%	13,987,300	1.9%	6,736,900	0.7%	6,841,900	0.6%	5,709,015	0.4%	6,593,694	0.6%
Teacher Education	16,477,000	4%	21,437,952	3.7%	28,710,774	3.9%	33,119,000	3.5%	38,188,800	3.4%	33,132,980	2.6%	44,152,204	3.8%
Tertiary	57,257,500	14%	121,674,900	21.0%	144,290,045	19.6%	214,564,500	22.5%	224,249,900	20.1%	292,931,474	23.0%	226,161,748	19.3%
Management & Subvented	411,900	0%	2,897,021	0.5%	7,361,737	1.0%	73,438,400	7.7%	33342100	3.0%	70,339,643	5.5%	9,216,017	0.8%
HIV/AIDS	411,900	0%	1,158,808	0.2%	736,174	0.1%	2,474,300	0.3%	-	0.0%	2,784,370	0.2%	-	-
Total	411,924,300	100%	579,404,140	100%	736,173,700	100%	952,845,000	100%	1,113,519,000	100%	1,273,539,485	100%	1,172,694,948	100.0%

Source: Education performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

Figure E1 Trend in Education Spending by Source 2003-2007



Unit Costs

E1. The following table outlines the cost per student for each level of education. The calculations are done without Investment and thus they include Items 1-3 (Personnel Emoluments, Administration and Service).

Table E3 Unit Costs


Level		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Primary	Total Expenditure GHC	163,533,900	183,091,600	220,115,900	262,627,200	445,933,605
	Recurrent Expenditure GHC	149,037,700	168,808,000	176,628,700	244,403,000	397,483,245
	Enrolment	2,418,696	2,445,913	2,727,044	2,870,656	2,990,782
	Per Capita GHC	67.61	74.86	80.72	91.49	149.10
	Unit Cost GHC	61.62	69.02	64.77	85.14	132.90
JHS	Total Expenditure GHC	91,035,300	92,704,656	131,038,919	159,921,600	206,990,933
	Recurrent Expenditure GHC			118,188,095.17	150,829,606	186,357,252
	Enrolment	828,517	853,230	951,673	969,351	1,015,491
	Per Capita GHC	109.88	108.65	137.69	164.98	203.83

Level		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
	Unit Cost GHC	-	-	124	156	184
SHS	Total Expenditure GHC	63,024,400	115,301,416	153,124,131	159,921,600	206,990,933
	Recurrent Expenditure GHC			122,687,131.99	97,101,087	80,673,952
	Enrolment	328,426	333,002	367,242	387,850	395,839
	Per Capita GHC	191.90	346.25	416.96	412.33	522.92
	Unit Cost GHC	-	-	334.08	250.36	203.80
TEVT	Total Expenditure GHC	4,531,200	6,373,445	8,834,084	8,599,900	8,236,942
	Recurrent Expenditure GHC			5,339,436.90	8,531,910	8,192,626
	Enrolment	18,672	21,424	20,303	18,432	
	Per Capita GHC	242.67	297.49	435.11	466.57	n/a
	Unit Cost GHC	-	-	263	462.89	n/a
Tertiary	Total Expenditure GHC	57,257,500	121,674,900	144,290,045	214,564,500	292,931,474
	Recurrent Expenditure GHC			118,353,536.45	140,148,141	210,776,551
	Enrolment	89,942	99,752	111,893	121,490	
	Per Capita GHC	636.60	1,219.77	1,289.54	1,766.11	n/a
	Unit Cost GHC	-	-	1,057.74	1,153.58	n/a

E2. The per capita cost is the total expenditure on that level of education divided by public enrolment at that level. The unit cost is the recurrent expenditure divided by public enrolment at that level. The unit cost and per capita cost are both increasing by level of education. That of tertiary exceeds that of primary by a factor of more than ten. At each level, both the per capita cost and the unit cost are increasing over time.

Table E4 Trend of National Expenditure on Education

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
GDP	6,526,200,000	7,762,000,000	9,701,800,000	11,490,320,000	13,974,584,000
Actual Education Expenditure (Total)	407,424,300	568,920,139	727,533,700	939,024,200	1,273,539,485
Actual Education Expenditure as a % of GDP	6.2%	7.3%	7.5%	8.2%	9.1%

Figure E2 Trend in Education Spending by Level 2003–2007**2007 Data**

E3. The following table provides a breakdown of total expenditure in 2007 by level of education. Primary education captures the largest proportion of all expenditure at 35% of total expenditure. It is important to note that this means the MDBS target of 35% expenditure on primary education was achieved. The second largest proportion of expenditure is tertiary with 23%. Comparing this to the expenditure on tertiary for GOG (less than 1%) demonstrates that the funding for tertiary is coming from other sources of expenditure. JHS and SHS received 16% and 12% respectively. These shares continue to be larger than that of pre-school, demonstrating government's commitment to secondary education over pre-school education (this narrative is from the Education Sector Performance Report 2008 MOESS 2008a).

Table E5 2007 Expenditure by Level of Education and Category

SUB-SECTOR	PE	ADMIN.	SERVICE	INVESTMENT	TOTAL	%
PRE-SCHOOL	35,385,018	1,097,778	1,593,961	4,720,523	42,797,282	3.4%
PRIMARY	366,675,325	8,202,332	22,605,586	48,450,360	445,933,605	35.0%
JSS	169,855,120	4,339,992	12,162,139	20,633,680	206,990,932	16.3%
SHS	61,705,986	3,944,597	15,023,367	80,114,965	160,788,917	12.6%
TVET	5,679,258	1,276,866	1,236,501	44,316	8,236,942	0.6%
SPED	3,050,753	594,898	235,638	13,030	3,894,322	0.3%
NFED	2,122,089	3,338,995	247,930	-	5,709,015	0.4%
TEACHER EDUCATION	31,736,267	1,184,596	192,116	19,999	33,132,980	2.6%
TERTIARY	145,788,431	28,317,158	36,670,960	82,154,922	292,931,473	23.0%
MGT & SUBVENTED AGENCIES	386,174	14,040,742	34,850,720	21,062,005	70,339,643	5.5%
HIV/AIDS	-	-	2,292,671	491,698	2,784,369	0.2%
TOTAL	822,384,427	66,337,959	127,111,594	257,705,502	1,273,539,484	100.0%
% of Total	65%	5%	10%	20%	100%	

Source: ESPR 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

E4. Table E6 shows total expenditure in 2007 by source and spending category. Personal Emoluments account for 65% of the total expenditure in the education sector. Administration, Service and Investment account for 5%, 10% and 20% respectively. GOG funds are the bulk of the expenditure at 68%, followed by GETFund expenditure at 13%. Internally Generated Funds (IGF) provide 9% of expenditure and donors 6% (this narrative is from the Education Sector Performance Report 2008).


Table E6 2007 Expenditure by Source and Category

Sources	PE	ADMIN.	SERVICE	INVESTMENT	TOTAL	%
GOG	817,805,020	40,316,553	5,764,221	3,247,501	867,133,296	68.1%
Donor	-	-	33,656,907	43,343,188	77,000,096	6.0%
IGF	4,579,406	26,021,406	62,768,162	17,320,282	110,689,257	8.7%
GETFund	-	-	-	164,333,280	164,333,280	12.9%
HIPC	-	-	20,694,321	19,512,982	40,207,304	3.2%
EFA Catalytic Fund	-	-	-	9,948,266	9,948,266	0.8%
MDRI	-	-	4,227,981	-	4,227,981	0.3%
TOTAL	822,384,427	66,337,959	127,111,594	257,705,502	1,273,539,484	
% of Total	65%	5%	10%	20%	100%	

* MDRI: Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative

Source: ESPR 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

Figure E3 Education Expenditure by Source 2007



Source: ESPR 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

E5. Table E7 below shows donor funding in 2007 by source. Recurrent accounts for 44% of donor expenditure, and capital 56%. DFID is the biggest donor with 38%, followed by the World Bank (IDA) with 14% and the EC with 10%. DFID expenditure is large this year because off-budget support for both 2006 and 2007 was spent in 2007 (this narrative is from the Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)).

Table E7 Donor Funding 2007 by Source

Donor	Recurrent	Capital	Total	%
Netherlands	7,129,465.00	-	7,129,465.00	9.3%
European Commission	-	7,724,197.00	7,724,197.00	10.0%
Unicef	899,566.57	1,126,940.91	2,026,507.48	2.6%
USAID	6,596,594.29	-	6,596,594.29	8.6%
DFID	14,257,466.51	15,014,864.00	29,272,330.51	38.0%
JICA	1,864,250.72	4,206,922.67	6,071,173.40	7.9%
IDA	1,227,969.04	9,227,641.74	10,455,610.78	13.6%
BADEA	-	1,421,173.38	1,421,173.38	1.8%
ADB	198,306.37	4,224,717.83	4,423,024.20	5.7%
French Embassy	306,662.91	396,731.02	703,393.93	0.9%
WFP	1,176,626.46	-	1,176,626.46	1.5%
Total	33,656,907.87	43,343,188.55	77,000,096.43	100%

Source: ESPR 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

Table E8 Donor Funding by Level of Education, 2007

E6. This table shows donor expenditure in 2007 by level. Primary again captures the highest percentage with 47%, followed by JHS at 22% and tertiary at 17% (this narrative is from the Education Sector Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)).

Level	Recurrent	Capital	Total	%
Pre-school	641,551.93	1,605,602.78	2,247,154.72	2.9%
Primary	16,375,116.43	19,812,567.50	36,187,683.93	47.0%
JSS	5,702,176.40	11,288,917.72	16,991,094.12	22.1%
SSS	311,816.96	4,524,740.56	4,836,557.52	6.3%
TVET	972,489.32		972,489.32	1.3%
SPED			-	0.0%
NFED			-	0.0%
Teacher Education			-	0.0%
Tertiary	7,123,966.98	5,619,661.37	12,743,628.35	16.6%
Management & Subvented	237,118.56		237,118.56	0.3%
HIV/AIDS	2,292,671.29	491,698.62	2,784,369.91	3.6%
Total	33,656,907.87	43,343,188.55	77,000,096.43	100%

Source: ESPR 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

**Table E9 MOE Ghana – Budget Execution and Variances by Category
2003–2007**

	Budget	Actual	Variance	Variance
	GHC m	GHC m	GHC m	%
2003				
Government	259.9	377.7	(117.8)	(45.3)
Donor	17.7	18.4	(0.7)	(4.0)
IGF	-	-	-	NA
Debt relief	-	11.3	(11.3)	NA
Total 2003	277.6	407.4	(129.8)	(46.8)
2004				
Government	328.9	446.7	(117.8)	(35.8)
Donor	13.4	42.0	(28.6)	(213.4)
IGF	-	52.8	(52.8)	NA
Debt relief	-	27.4	(27.4)	NA
Total 2004	342.3	568.9	(226.6)	(66.2)
2005				
Government	502.0	561.8	(59.8)	(11.9)
Donor	37.5	65.4	(27.9)	(74.4)
IGF	-	69.0	(69.0)	NA
Debt relief	-	31.3	(31.3)	NA
Total 2005	539.5	727.5	(188.0)	(34.8)
2006				
Government	662.9	766.9	(104.0)	(15.7)
Donor	87.4	25.3	62.1	71.1
IGF	81.3	102.2	(20.9)	(25.7)
Debt relief	30.0	44.6	(14.6)	(48.7)
Total 2006	861.6	939.0	(77.4)	(9.0)


	Budget	Actual	Variance	Variance
	GHC m	GHC m	GHC m	%
2007				
Government	929.2	1,031.5	(102.3)	(11.0)
Donor	56.2	86.9	(30.7)	(54.6)
IGF	111.8	110.7	1.1	1.0
Debt relief	4.5	44.4	(39.9)	(886.7)
Total 2007	1,101.7	1,273.5	(171.8)	(15.6)

Source: compiled by authors from figures in Education Performance Report 2008 (MOESS 2008a)

Annex F Ghana external aid data⁴²

Total Aid Flows


Figure F1 Total Aid Commitments (constant 2007 USDbn)



Source: Table F3

F1. Total aid commitments increased by just over USD 320m between 1999 and 2007, with its highest peak in 2004. The share of multilateral aid in total aid presents a significant fluctuation between 1999 and 2000, peaking at 61% in 2001, and a more steady fluctuation between 2003 and 2007. Its share in 2007 was fourteen percentage points lower, at 31%, than it was in 1999.

Figure F2 Aid Dependency (commitments/GNI)




Source: Table F4

F2. Aid dependency rose over the period, increasing from 4% to 11%. Between 1999 and 2002 there is only a slight variation in the increase of aid dependency, but there was a

⁴² The following charts and tabulations rely on the data used in the 2009 GMR (which cover the period 1999-2007 in the case of commitments and the period 2002-2007 in the case of disbursements, in constant 2007 USD). The original source of these data is the OECD DAC creditor reporting system (CRS). The multilateral data in the GMR external aid database is incomplete because the EC was the only multilateral agency reporting data on disbursements to the OECD DAC secretariat (although IDA provided unofficial data). For this reason disbursements are not reported on here.

dramatic jump in 2004 when aid dependency rose sharply from 12% to 20% due to the general increases in aid volumes that year, dropping again to 11% in 2005. Cumulative real GDP growth over the period was 50.0%. Average growth per annum was 4.61% (Table F5).


Figure F3 Share of Total Aid Commitments by donor 2007



Source: Table F7


F3. The biggest donor to Ghana in terms of total aid commitments in 2007 was the United States, although historically this donor was less important (commitments in 2007 amount to just under 47% of total commitments between 1999–2007). Over the period 1999–2007 the most significant donor was the IDA, closely followed by the United Kingdom.

Figure F4 Share of Total Aid Commitments by Donor 1999–2007



Source: Table F7

Aid to Education

Figure F5 Total Commitments to Education and Basic Education (constant 2007 USDm)

Source: Table F6

F4. Aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999–2007, with peaks in 2003 and 2006. There has also been an unsteady decline in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid; the lowest points were in 2000 and 2003. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has declined from 80% to 67% over the period, showing a sharp decline in 2000 with only a slight upwards variation between 2001 and 2007.




Figure F6 Share of Multilateral Aid in Aid to Education and Basic Education, and of Aid to Basic Education in Total Aid to Education, 1999–2007

Figure F7 Share of Total Commitments to Education by Donor 2007

Source: Table F8

F5. The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2007 was the Netherlands commanding a 32% share (with its 2007 commitment amounting to over 40% of its total commitments) but also showing a consistent presence and remaining among the top five most prominent donors over the period 1999–2007. The United Kingdom also featured in the list of top five donors in 2007 showing a significant contribution of 38% over the years and securing the most prominent position over the period 1999–2007. The AfDF, the Netherlands and the United States fill out the remaining top five donors in 2007.


Figure F8 Share of Total Commitments to Education by Donor 1999–2007

Source: Table F8

F6. In terms of aid to basic education the pattern as per total aid to education is repeated, with the Netherlands commanding a significant 46% share of aid to basic education in 2007. The United Kingdom also features as prime donor in 2007, followed by IDA and the United States making similar levels of contribution. Over the course of the period 1999–2007, the United Kingdom remains the primary donor to basic education with a 45% share, followed by the IDA with a considerable contribution of 21%. The Netherlands'


commitments amount to 11% and are spread out with small variations until 2007 (when its contributions amount to over 63% of its total commitments). The United States' commitments also present little variation amounting to 10% of the total share throughout the period 1999-2007. The EC fills out the remaining top five donors.

Figure F9 Share of Total Commitments to Basic Education by Donor 2007



Source: Table F9

Figure F10 Total Commitments to Basic Education by Donor 1999–2007



Source: Table F9

Direct Aid to Education


F7. Total aid to education and basic education are calculated according to the GMR conventions that apportion certain amounts of General Budget Support (GBS) and aid to education that isn't specified by level. Table F1 below details the breakdown of aid to education by category, as well as presenting the figures for General Budget Support and Total aid to education and basic education.

Table F1 Direct Aid to Education (constant 2007 USDm) – Commitments

Category	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Education unspecified	2.27	0.49	1.74	1.50	2.31	23.25	6.32	223.52	59.16
Basic education	152.52	10.52	10.63	9.37	89.60	49.18	23.25	25.44	74.08
Secondary education	18.09	6.06	1.34	0.91	2.40	43.42	3.66	3.72	4.15
Post-secondary education	8.28	7.04	7.63	7.75	76.92	43.38	15.11	15.56	7.19
General Budget Support	138.53	213.56	334.33	58.95	522.83	284.30	297.51	512.19	218.38
10% GBS	13.85	21.36	33.43	5.90	52.28	28.43	29.75	51.22	21.84
20% GBS	27.71	42.71	66.87	11.79	104.57	56.86	59.50	102.44	43.68
Total aid to education	208.87	66.83	88.20	31.33	275.80	216.09	107.84	370.68	188.25
Total aid to basic education	167.51	32.12	44.93	16.02	143.03	89.23	56.16	188.42	125.50

Notes: total aid to education = all direct aid to education + 20% GBS; total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 50% Education unspecified + 10% GBS.

Catalytic Fund

Figure F11 Total Contributions from the Catalytic Fund (current USDm)

Source: Table F2

F8. Contributions from the Catalytic Fund came in just three years. In 2005 and 2006 allocations were at USD 8m and USD 11m respectively, with grant agreements for the full allocation attached to each year separately. In 2007 allocations totalled USD 14.2m but no corresponding grant agreement has been made thus far. Disbursements lagged behind grant agreements, amounting to USD 4m in 2005 and USD 10m in 2006, with the remaining USD 5m disbursed in 2007 thus completing the disbursement of funds from the two grant

agreements. Over the period 2005–2006 The share of CF funding (allocations) in total aid commitments to basic education is 14% and 6%, respectively. The FTI's share in basic education as reported in Figure F9 above is based on grant agreements, but because allocations for 2006 matched grant agreements for 2006, this figure of 6% is the same as that reported above.

Table F2 Contributions from the Catalytic Fund (current USDm)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Allocations	0	8	11	14.2	0	0	0	0
Grant agreement amounts	0	8	11	0	0	0	0	0
Disbursements	0	4	10	5	0	0	0	0
Allocations (constant 2007 USD m)	0.00	8.48	11.30	14.20				
Share of CF funding in total aid to basic education (%)	0.00	15.10	6.00	11.31				

Source: Fast Track Initiative, Catalytic Fund

Table F3 Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Commitments 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USD bn)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral	0.741843	0.5531005	0.5058959	0.567337	1.008624	1.814731	0.962171	1.051264	1.16064
Multilateral	0.612295	0.3466146	0.8015494	0.209992	0.528339	0.828951	0.600305	0.465049	0.514564
Total	1.354138	0.8997151	1.3074453	0.777329	1.536963	2.643682	1.562476	1.516313	1.675204
Share of multilateral aid in total aid (%)	45.2166	38.5249	61.3065	27.0146	34.3755	31.3559	38.4201	30.6697	30.7165

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table F4 Aid Dependency Ratio (commitments/GDP constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral (%)	7.3	5.3	4.6	5.0	8.4	14.4	7.2	7.4	7.7
Multilateral (%)	6.1	3.3	7.4	1.8	4.4	6.6	4.5	3.3	3.4
Total (%)	13.4	8.6	12.0	6.8	12.8	21.0	11.7	10.7	11.1

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database (UNESCO 2009); World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36); deflators for GDP from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008).

Table F5 GDP (current and constant 2007 USD m) and GDP Deflator

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
GDP (current USD m)	7710	4977	5309	6160	7624	8872	10720	12715	15147
Inflation (annual %)	13.9712	27.2301	34.8179	22.8186	28.7044	14.3502	14.9637	12.7241	14.8225
GDP Deflator (1=2007)	0.22	0.28	0.37	0.46	0.59	0.67	0.77	0.87	1.00
GDP (constant 2007 USD m)	10101	10474	10893	11384	11976	12646	13392	14249	15147
Real GDP growth (%)		3.7	4.0	4.5	5.2	5.6	5.9	6.4	6.3
Cumulative GDP growth over the period 1999–2007	50.0%								
Average annual growth over the period 1999–2007	4.61%								

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008).

Table F6 Total Aid to Education and Basic Education (constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total aid to education									
Bilateral	153.5346	66.08425	30.32325	30.36585	180.7954	37.95769	64.88591	336.7442	152.3851
Multilateral	55.33124	0.7506712	57.8769	0.96577	95.00276	178.1306	42.95407	33.93126	35.86609
Total	208.86584	66.8349212	88.20015	31.33162	275.7982	216.0883	107.84	370.6755	188.2512
Aid to basic education									
Bilateral	118.375	31.37424	15.70833	15.05521	113.5414	18.95773	34.26261	171.4005	107.5346
Multilateral	49.13241	0.750671	29.22583	0.96577	29.49187	70.27686	21.89421	17.01773	17.96423
Total	167.5074	32.12491	44.93416	16.02098	143.0333	89.23459	56.15682	188.4182	125.4988
Share of multilateral aid in total aid to education (%)	26.49%	1.12%	65.62%	3.08%	34.45%	82.43%	39.83%	9.15%	19.05%
Share of multilateral aid in aid to basic education (%)	29.33%	2.34%	65.04%	6.03%	20.62%	78.76%	38.99%	9.03%	14.31%
Share of aid to basic education in total aid to education (%)	80.20%	48.07%	50.95%	51.13%	51.86%	41.30%	52.07%	50.83%	66.67%

Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

Table F7 Total Aid Commitments by Donor (constant 2007 USDm)

Donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total aid commitments 1999–2007
AfDB	27.51589	75.02343	143.1492	110.5046	140.9421	100.3481	151.6359	105.2143	0	854.33352
Australia	0.656663	0.4588442	0.0041712	0	0.044222	0.405906	0.36409	0.220717	0.246113	2.4007264
Austria	5.454016	1.714671	3.557605	0.353235	2.03045	28.68528	0.575701	0.075326	0.138837	42.5851206
Belgium	0.577041	0.3891715	0.1851089	0.280591	0.254367	5.083432	1.902015	42.73412	22.56145	73.9672966
Canada	32.61657	21.36316	28.07204	14.61588	37.63833	287.0912	17.26957	5.592916	11.99378	456.253446
Denmark	70.97374	7.524022	18.85073	16.74013	194.4361	83.42015	7.085343	52.47962	88.9731	540.482935
EC	221.1271	31.32947	146.8383	63.89418	16.93602	144.626	148.3389	50.11944	149.6935	972.90291
Finland	0.091872	0.1388219	1.337848	0.236364	0.238374	0.327142	0.227103	0.083157	0.520192	3.2008735
France	5.051906	46.14801	67.29285	9.246367	4.965604	63.12039	148.6579	126.8131	43.36446	514.660587
Germany	132.6981	31.01237	32.51583	26.09918	95.81371	48.69176	326.95	44.23946	50.21607	788.23648
Global Fund	0	0	0	10.29342	5.692999	0	39.21162	50.06582	20.32641	125.590269
Greece	0	0	0	0.062003	0	0.035244	0.427499	0.011053	0.160329	0.6961277
IDA	343.8712	220.8009	484.0317	0	353.0912	571.3438	247.2455	245.8533	305	2771.2376
IFAD	15.55672	15.35946	18.06788	15.85085	0	0	0	0	22.725	87.55991
Ireland	0	0.6186741	0.477196	1.847965	1.763444	1.340325	1.534611	2.562274	3.732306	13.8767951
Italy	1.33856	0.7910545	0.1042899	1.174019	1.308385	14.48836	3.486115	0.530071	1.222144	24.442998
Japan	112.0275	66.20407	19.92481	9.81443	44.71907	947.6035	19.83054	33.96286	52.25042	1306.3372
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0.062061	0.062464	0.061734	0.05587	0.2421286
Netherlands	33.25933	119.6875	166.9404	225.8717	38.93634	30.78951	138.1986	26.73837	186.2783	966.70005

Donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total aid commitments 1999–2007
New Zealand	0	0	0	0.055225	0.014215	0.038653	0.073431	0.201052	0.120327	0.5029023
Norway	3.465773	5.576017	2.626579	0.612822	2.522154	1.497811	0.646617	0.606012	1.609965	19.1637495
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.001186	0.0011855
Spain	23.00695	10.2738	9.974915	23.26126	30.87831	28.96168	21.78783	1.043167	27.02083	176.208742
Sweden	2.038988	0.3661503	0	0	0	0.352466	34.19708	0.180689	0.331484	37.4668568
Switzerland	0.440543	1.333181	0	17.0801	0.246064	16.89653	1.831312	19.04752	6.264378	63.1396281
UNAIDS	0	0	1.54499	0.278631	0.445027	0.284081	0.61258	0.313694	0.656281	4.1352833
UNDP	4.22455	0	0	0	0	4.902225	4.872327	7.261351	6.269361	27.529814
UNFPA	0	0	3.452772	4.484618	6.365388	2.585638	2.962544	1.335517	2.222903	23.40938
Unicef	0	4.101346	4.464604	4.685747	4.865942	4.861259	5.425366	4.885689	7.670832	40.960785
United Kingdom	241.1006	161.3571	81.71474	155.0054	463.5465	182.1045	157.9898	597.6084	107.7953	2148.22234
United States	77.04453	78.14388	72.31677	64.98035	89.26798	73.73511	79.07332	96.47246	555.7829	1186.8173
Total	1354.138	899.7151	1307.445	777.3291	1536.962	2643.682	1562.476	1516.313	1675.204	13.27326

Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

Table F8 Total Commitments to Education by Donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to education 1999-2007
AfDF	0	0	0	0	55.27536	42.09232	14.4041	0	0	111.77178
Australia	0	0.2984318	0	0	0	0.14259	0.045511	0	0	0.4865329
Austria	0.21505	0.2025211	0.1073664	0.096538	0.093055	0.088019	0.076396	0.072528	0.11009	1.061564
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0.001402	0	0	0.376289	0	0.377691
Canada	0.026332	6.369543	1.09969	0.014273	1.059225	0	0	0	0.046542	8.6156049
Denmark	0	0	1.57528	0	9.826583	1.079999	1.436179	9.366979	3.619594	26.904614
EC	12.39766	0	24.31181	0	1.482501	18.02679	0	0	13.41547	69.634231
Finland	0.079112	0.0273174	0.0844286	0.107567	0.022043	0	0	0.00694	0	0.3274076
France	4.33909	2.032363	1.900994	1.224282	0.93276	1.335665	2.312227	11.64385	2.045246	27.7664771
Germany	11.48352	4.557582	6.73634	7.494544	11.47804	11.25562	12.2524	10.16255	8.636766	84.057362
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0.035244	0.034088	0.011053	0.091882	0.1722677
IDA	42.93359	0	32.35666	0	37.15967	117.0414	27.71562	33.82705	22	313.03399
Ireland	0	0.0367641	0.1516362	0.250817	0.13283	0.247529	0.23459	0.502716	0.320964	1.8778473
Italy	0	0.0025033	0.0121452	0.010854	0	0.073113	0.005721	0	0.004107	0.1084431
Japan	6.149022	3.128737	0	0	5.794408	5.682605	5.978608	5.252095	5.489276	37.474751
Netherlands	15.94538	20.23824	9.732213	2.666669	2.080914	4.784689	20.05165	12.84696	60.23278	148.579495
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.031247	0.026704	0.0579514
Norway	1.003961	0	1.142247	0.347621	0.297712	0	0.122114	0.36902	1.247123	4.5297983
Spain	0.16681	0.2469196	0.0918723	0.150681	20.75034	0.092451	0.384426	0.680164	2.840453	25.4041166

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to education 1999-2007
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	3.079717	0	0.016797	0	3.0965138
Unicef	0	0.7506712	1.208431	0.96577	1.085231	0.970105	0.834344	0.104206	0.450617	6.3693758
United Kingdom	104.7209	22.51966	0.8469517	9.735371	120.0743	0.53116	13.65468	266.7784	56.67355	595.534973
United States	9.405432	6.42367	6.842086	8.266635	8.251814	9.529295	8.29732	18.62664	11	86.642892
Total	208.8658	66.83492	88.20015	31.33162	275.7982	216.0883	107.84	370.6754	188.2512	1553.88559

Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

Table F9 Total Commitments to Basic Education by Donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to basic education 1999–2007
AfDF	0	0	0	0	5.988914	0	7.202052	0	0	13.190966
Australia	0	0.2984318	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2984318
Austria	0	0.0112445	0	0	0	0.002609	0.009747	0	0.010867	0.0344681
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0.000701	0	0	0.027915	0	0.0286154
Canada	0.022279	0	0.549845	0.006935	0.529613	0	0	0	0.023271	1.1319425
Denmark	0	0	0.543021	0	7.445731	0.54	0.71809	4.683489	3.619594	17.5499241
EC	6.198828	0	11.83907	0	0.741251	9.013395	0	0	6.707735	34.5002785
Finland	0.039556	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00694	0	0.0464955
France	0.805987	0.0508967	0.1681593	0.200706	0.060506	0.074433	0.903111	5.40642	0.320346	7.9905644
Germany	2.340112	0.1085818	1.964121	0.121337	0	1.072879	1.248343	1.751107	1.489159	10.0956399
IDA	42.93359	0	16.17833	0	21.67647	60.29336	13.85781	16.91353	11	182.85309
Ireland	0	0.0367641	0.0795539	0.171339	0.13283	0.123765	0.150065	0.293027	0.198756	1.1860997
Italy	0	0	0.0027612	0.005427	0	0	0	0	0	0.0081883
Japan	3.074511	1.564368	0	0	2.673295	3.426708	1.805191	1.874753	2.346523	16.765349
Netherlands	1.14941	10.11912	4.866107	1.305095	1.040457	2.382599	7.804298	4.788465	57.49493	90.950481
Norway	0.246886	0	0.0217693	0.037689	0	0	0	0	0	0.3063447
Spain	0	0.0975279	0	0.072358	0.015351	0	0.142175	0.535745	2.694385	3.5575412
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	1.539859	0	0.016797	0	1.5566558

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total commitments to basic education 1999–2007
Unicef	0	0.7506712	1.208431	0.96577	1.085231	0.970105	0.834344	0.104206	0.256498	6.1752563
United Kingdom	101.2908	12.66363	0.6709046	4.867685	93.39114	0.26558	13.18427	133.3892	28.33677	388.05998
United States	9.405432	6.42367	6.842086	8.266635	8.251814	9.529295	8.29732	18.62664	11	86.642892
Total	167.5074	32.12491	44.93416	16.02098	143.0333	89.23459	56.15681	188.4182	125.4988	862.92915

Source: UNESCO 2009. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (OECD DAC 2008a annex table 36).

Annex G Analytical Summary Matrix

Summary Matrix: Ghana		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From 1995, with the FCUBE initiative, there was significant momentum towards UBE. The emergence of the post-Dakar EFA agenda simply served to reinforce this momentum. This ambition was supported in a rather uncoordinated way by the major DPs, with significant resources. A fully-fledged SWAp agenda did not emerge. Significant progress was made towards achievement of the access goals of Dakar, particularly for primary schooling. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to the conjunction of the development of the first robust education sector plan (ESP 2003) and the submission of the FTI CF proposal, there were certainly influences from the FTI IF, particularly in the emphasis on benchmarking. This influence has continued to the present but is no longer identified with the FTI. The FTI did not, of itself, identify or address policy and planning issues, except indirectly through the appraisal process for the CF application, which was carried out by DPs in Ghana. The delivery of the ESP meant that, from that point, all DP contributions to the sector were sited within the plan's boundaries. Even so, DP behaviour often remained individualistic in style, with several funding modalities in use. During the same period, an EMIS of reasonable quality was developed. It is now effective in use as a tool for planning to district level. The emergence of the MDBS approach was important, but was not encompassed by the FTI CF as it is not focused solely on the education sector. The FTI has made a small contribution to the development of the revised sector plan, through the EPDF resource. 		
Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to the sector relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically was FTI support translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As FTI support was entirely delivered within the ESP, there is real coherence with the support to EFA/Dakar/MDG goals being pursued by GOG. The FTI CF funds were used to support a variety of basic education priorities within the plan, relating directly to access and equity, but only indirectly to quality. In that the design was responsive to a part of GOG plans, it was appropriate, but it did not respond to other elements of GOG priorities, including JHS and the recent addition of early childhood education. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the aftermath of the Dakar meeting in 2000, and the lead-up to the development of the ESP, it was most likely the case that the FTI's particular take on the achievement of EFA did have an influence, though this is extremely hard to pin-point with clear examples. From 2004 onwards, FTI influence is not visible in the elements listed above, as a variety of Ghanaian stakeholders pursue their concerns, about to be revealed in the revised ESP for 2010 to 2020. Aid to education from the major DP funders remains highly individualised, although the Paris declaration has influence, particularly through directives from DP headquarters. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI support, through the three cycles of CF contributions, has been anything but "fast", the third cycle falling foul of re-defined and significantly enhanced submission requirements. Over the five years, the funding modality has moved closer to that of a WB project approach, with high transaction costs and significant levels of irritation on the part of GOG. The third cycle funding of USD14.2m, agreed in principle by the FTI in November 2006, has yet to be disbursed. CF contributions have represented a very small proportion of external aid to the education sector, typically between 6–9%. The targeting of received funds has been generally good, with increasing recognition that the CF, with its expectation of completion of spend annually, is not the ideal mechanism for infrastructure development.

Summary Matrix: Ghana	
Outcomes: What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI has made modest but valuable contributions to elements of the ESP relating to the achievement of UBE – now eleven years and incorporating kindergarten (2 years), primary (6 years) and junior high (3 years) – but while access (and gender equity) is significantly improved, the challenge of raising quality at all levels remains very elusive. Sustained leadership and the need to take tough decisions in relation to the management and disposition of the teaching force is probably the "medicine", but there is little evidence of a determination to tackle the very poor performance of teachers and their students. Capacity development at all levels of the education sector remains a significant challenge. As other priorities – strengthened senior high schools and TVET – emerge in the revised 2010 ESP, there is a real risk that the need to strive for quality in basic education will drift away. Meanwhile, the dismal record of adult education remains an affront to a country with such high ambitions for removing its people from poverty. 	
Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insofar as the ESP in revised form charts the course for the sector over the next ten years, the changes will relate directly to the effectiveness of its implementation over that period. It will owe little during this period to the first phase of FTI investment in Ghana. If there is further FTI engagement and financial investment, it is likely to be against a different set of priorities. It is to be hoped that in relation to financing, much more streamlined modalities will be utilised. 	

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to policy and planning? What was happening in country before the FTI? Did a sector plan exist? What were the policies?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Even in the period from 1995 to 2003, during which there was very considerable activity in pursuit of UBE through the GOG led FCUBE programme, there was no whole-sector framework to guide planning on realistic time-scales. Much of the initiative was held by the major DPs, whose contributions were often uncoordinated, even individualistic both technically and financially. As a result they often failed to make a coherent impact. To some extent this was rectified in 2003 by the generation of the first ESP, following strong Ghanaian (both government and civil society) and DP consultation processes. The ESP covered all levels of the education system, and consistently addressed EFA priorities. The ESP was then available as a key document in the preparation of the FTI submission, also in 2003. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Essentially, the FTI provided important funding through the CF to support specific elements of the ESP. All of these contributions were sited firmly within the EFA agenda. The planning momentum rested with MOE, with increasing dialogue and engagement with DPs. All DP contributions could be located within the ESP. 		
Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of the FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency?</i> (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC targets? To what extent did the FTI contribute to implementation of sector policies?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically was FTI support to country level policy and planning translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no evidence that FTI processes and activities supported the strengthening of policy and planning for EFA and UPC at country level, with the possible exception of the emphasis on benchmarking in the submission process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The last decade has seen genuine strengthening of policies and plans for the sector. The ESP does reflect strategic priorities for achieving UPC and has been widely supported by stakeholders. The current revision of the ESP seems likely to have somewhat diminished focus on the EFA goals, as other priorities come to the fore. The influence of the FTI in the latest planning cycle has been very small. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is not appropriate to separate FTI support from that of other agencies in relation to the implementation of the ESP. As is clearly documented in the 2008 Education Sector Performance Report, there remains a huge gap between the increasingly sound sector policies and plans, and their implementation in Ghana's schools and classrooms. While enrolment statistics show steady improvement, the quality and quantity of schooling being offered to young people in basic schools remains unacceptably low.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI contributions have been entirely made within the framework of the 2003 ESP. The revised ESP seems likely to be more robust and feasible in practice than its predecessor. That implies increased sustainability, but there remain significant risks to be addressed, mostly related to delivery close to the locus of teaching and learning. 		

STREAM 2: Finance		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic and external financing constraints were only impeding progress towards UPC at level zero to a limited extent. The ESP 2003–2013 was the first comprehensive attempt to assess the financial needs of education in Ghana. The Financing Gap it identified excluded donor support and was only 9% of the total requirement over 13 years. Ghana was "not a donor orphan" and was already receiving aid approximately equal to the identified Gap. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
FTI specific inputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI has provided no significant support to strengthening financial management systems in Ghana, since these have been supported by other programmes. It was reported that the FTI financial simulation model was used in the development of the ESP 2003–2015. The FTI impact on Ghana has been primarily through the provision of CF finance and this is considered by GOG to be its principal contribution. EPDF – approximately USD400,000 has been reported as spent. No itemisation of this expenditure was available from the SE. 		
Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to education finance relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to a stronger education budget process? To what extent did the FTI contribute to the increase in total funds for primary education?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically was FTI support to country level finance for education translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Catalytic Fund contributions have been highly relevant, focussing on funding gaps in the ESP, notably textbooks and capital requirements such as classrooms and teachers' accommodation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of CF contributions has been compromised because disbursements have been increasingly late. Disbursements stalled completely in 2007/2008 It is not clear that the FTI's strategy of tactical procurement and EFA advocacy is ensuring effective education at the school level in Ghana. Effectiveness of CF contributions will depend on quality of downstream education processes and quality of management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The new application process for CF involves high transaction costs, undermining efficiency in aid delivery.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
The FTI, through the CF, has provided a contribution of financing of basic education, but has not improved the sustainability of education financing.		

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to data and M&E? What was happening in country before the FTI? Was quality and use of data relevant to the context and to the monitoring needs?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic education had well established structures for M&E at central, regional and district level although the bulk of the M&E processes (data collection, processing, analysis and dissemination) took place centrally, carried out by the SRIMPR and PBME Divisions. There were frequent delays in the collection and processing of data. Data were required before July for planning, but it was almost always late. An obvious data gap existed. Detailed information about the state of schools, financial information and sociological information of pupils was required. However, data collection system did not capture this type of information. In terms of the IF indicators, most of the data that related to student flow indicators were collected. However, of the service delivery indicators, those regarding average teacher salary and instruction hours were collected by the IPPD unit under the Administrative division of the GES for payroll purposes and therefore not monitored. Little evidence of the use of the data due to: i) deficiencies in data collected creating a barrier for their further use in analysis, ii) weak capability and expertise for data analysis and lack of human resources in the area of statistics and planning services; and iii) little or no culture or acquired skills in the use of educational statistics among planners. Weak analytical capacity; Statistics Yearbook contained crude analysis. Also weak coordination between statisticians and policy analyst Lack of dissemination of statistical products at all administrative levels of education. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p>FTI specific inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The appraisal of Ghana's FTI proposal highlighted the need for financing the strengthening of M&E activities to be addressed The IF has been an influential monitoring tool, many of its bench marks monitored Part of Year two CFs used to procure 53 4X4 double-cabin pick-ups for circuit supervisors <p>Non- FTI inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2004: the UIS received funding from the EC for the project "Developing National Statistical Capabilities for the Monitoring of Education for all". 2005: EMIS Enhancement and Extension 2005–2008 project funded by the World Bank with technical assistance from the UIS. 2008: research study has been initiated led by IIEP which aims to provide the Ministry with a methodology to periodically monitor the evolution of the costs of the education system. 		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IF was perceived to have been very important as a monitoring tool. The Indicators relating to student flow are consistently reported in the PESPR and at the ESAR The IF was particularly important in shedding light on the need to align teachers' salaries to the recommended 3.5 times GDP Pick-up vehicles procured through CFs, improved the ability of circuit supervisors to undertake their supervisory work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Since 2003, there has been improvement in many aspects of the M&E processes. There has been a decentralised organisational structure and responsibility for M&E, collection and processing of data which has now devolved to district level, as has the use and analysis of data. There is also a more institutionalised and rigorous culture of monitoring with the introduction of several other monitoring and review mechanisms like the PESAR, ESAR and ESTAC. These changes have occurred against the background of the ESP as well as other activities which have aimed at strengthening M&E in the education sector consequently; it is hard to attribute these recent improvements to the effectiveness of the FTI. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The inputs that have gone into strengthening M&E has been from DPs outside the auspices of the FTI initiative. There has been no significant reporting requirement made of the MOE apart from the submission of an annual CIF The FTI has tended to "piggy back" on existing reporting systems that already exist.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ghana's recent developments and progress on M&E in the education sector are both exemplary and commendable Given that the changes in M&E processes have institutionalised a robust and rigorous M&E culture, it seems likely that improvements that have been made are likely to survive. 		

STREAM 4: Capacity Development

Context: *What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?*

- Ghana has had a history of interventions including elements of capacity building over many years, and a tradition of strong planning. However, these tended to be piecemeal.
- The ESP identified key capacity constraints and signalled an intention to overcome them. However, there was no specific plan to deal with the CD challenge.

Inputs: *What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*

The FTI submission strongly identified the risks inherent in low capacity, especially in regional and district offices, which would need to develop comprehensive and detailed work programmes, and which would be required to operate new systems and processes. . It was envisaged that FTI CF resources could be used to enhance management planning and implementation capacity at all levels to support teacher training, and to strengthen management capacity in DEOs, particularly in the areas of supervision, inspection, monitoring and evaluation.

Direct support was provided in the form of CF funds allocated to an incentive scheme to encourage teachers to teach in underserved areas. This included construction of houses and the provision of motorcycles and cycles for the teachers' incentive scheme. Also, to support the strengthening of monitoring and supervision at District level, vehicles were purchased for use in 53 Districts identified by MOE as deprived.

Other non-FTI contributions were significant, including large components in projects supported by the World Bank, USAID, DFID and JICA. However, although the ESP was envisaged as a sector wide approach, at no point were there a comprehensive or coherent capacity development or technical assistance plans.

NETF made a number of contributions to capacity development in 2003–2005, mainly at a regional level, which included Ghana as a beneficiary, e.g., a sub-regional workshop for Anglophone West African countries, held in Ghana, to discuss and analyze the interaction between Education and HIV/AIDS and the existing and planned education sector responses (August 2004); the Third ECD African International Conference, to address ECD in the context of EFA and HIV/AIDS pandemic, held in Ghana (June 2005). Also an NTEF contribution of USD 258,000 to support the "Education Sector Development Sector programme to improve access, GER and completion rates" within Ghana itself (2004–2009). This presumably was used to augment IDA inputs in respect of the EDSEP.

There has been little access to EPDF till recently but an allocation of USD 400,000 was indicated, supporting work on the 2009 budget, to harmonise the ESP and the government's White Paper, and for preparatory studies for the next ESP (2010–2020). Ghana benefited directly and indirectly from EPDF supported activities; i) Ghana attended a seminar in Singapore valued on Technical Education, a specific priority for Ghana; ii) senior MOE staff member attended a course in Dar Es Salaam in 2006 designed to train them in the application of a simulation model for post-basic, as it had been understood at the time that there was a move in EFA-FTI towards post-basic.

Annex G: Analytical Summary Matrix

STREAM 4: Capacity Development		
Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to Policy and Planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Effects refer to processes, outcomes refer to changes in sector policy and planning)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically was the FTI support to country level capacity building translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FTI CF supported inputs were relevant, but little or no contribution was made by the FTI to meeting the need to establish a coherent policy and approach to CD generally, and as a result the latter did not emerge. • The FTI CF funded activities tended to be at the margins of the system, i.e. infrastructure in underserved areas and logistical support for supervision in the same areas. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EPDF supported Singapore engagement was relevant given Ghana's interest in TVET. Also, the regional conference on a costing simulation model was relevant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FTI-supported inputs achieved their intended but rather limited goals to an extent, especially in provision of infrastructure and hardware – housing and vehicles. However, in the absence of a more holistic approach to CD, much of this investment was put at risk and undermined by a failure to secure other elements of the necessary provision, e.g. fuel for vehicles • The FTI's engagement has not contributed to desired improvements in harmonisation of approach to capacity building or supported areas which need to be prioritised for the attainment of UPC. • There is still a serious lack of synergy and coordination across the various providers of capacity building and government seems not to prioritise this. • Most capacity building at all levels, including decentralised levels is piecemeal and ad hoc with insufficient follow up. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no evidence available to allow for an assessment of efficiency of the FTI support to capacity building. • Overall, "it's a lot of work for a small amount of money" • Little progress has been made in devising a coherent and efficient scheme for the provision of capacity development and technical assistance.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<p>Some of the inputs funded by the CF, such as teachers' housing, will remain available over the longer term, but other interventions are likely to have little long term effect as capacity has not been built to any extent. The piecemeal, short term nature of capacity building efforts, combined with rapid expansion of the District administration and rapid turnover of senior staff results in a loss of skills and knowledge from capacity building and threatens implementation of policies in general.</p>		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before the FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contemporary reports suggest aid to basic education in the period 1999 to 2003 was fragmented, fell short of needs and was insufficiently targeted to global and national priorities. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p>FTI specific inputs to improving aid effectiveness:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are no inputs to aid effectiveness that can be specifically attributed to the FTI <p>Non-FTI specific inputs to improving of aid effectiveness during the period since FTI came in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a process of continual review in the sector. There have also been several initiatives in coordination, harmonisation and alignment among stakeholders in education at global and country levels. These have included the introduction of a DP coordinator in MOE since 2002; the first costed, whole-sector ESP which was prepared in 2003; regular DP meetings although with varying intensity (17 DP/MOE meetings in 2007 and 2008); and there have been regular joint reviews since 2004 followed by a jointly produced Education Sector Annual Performance Report. Sector level financial modalities are mostly on budget but none are on-Treasury; they are aligned with ESP but many are individually flexible (e.g. DFID, FTI). There is no sector pool and no Sector Budget Support aside from DFID's shadow-aligned process. Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were rationalised as early as 1998 to form a single MOE FPMU. There was a surge in aid to education in 2003. FTI endorsement may have played a part in this with some donors noting that the FTI was a heavy influence at that time. However this is difficult to disentangle from other causes. 2003 was also the year of the first GPRS, and this had a major influence on aid generally – commitments as a whole doubled in 2003, and increased sharply again in 2004. In the view of the review team the GPRS is a more plausible cause of the increased support to education. 		
Relevance – <i>Was FTI support to aid effectiveness relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency?</i> (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to more international aid, and to aid that is better, coordinated and more coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How efficiently was aid delivered?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI's espousal of the Paris Declaration is not immediately apparent in Ghana. The mode chosen for the disbursement of the Catalytic Fund is strictly project-based although flexible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influences are difficult to disentangle and the primary impetus was the wider Paris agenda. The limited influence of the FTI has come indirectly via the HQs of Development Partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI modalities are only partially aligned and funds are unpredictable with increasing transaction costs
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI has not resulted in significant improvements in aid effectiveness, so the question of their sustainability does not arise. 		

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion)		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key issues of gender equity and HIV/AIDS education embedded in 2003 ESP. Clarke & Bundy suggest that all aspects not covered in HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan. Long-standing issue of disadvantage in access to schooling in three Northern regions. Children with special educational needs generally taught in specialist schools; only tentative inclusive approaches. 		
Inputs: <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI did not engage in specific dialogue with respect to cross-cutting issues, apart from the Clarke & Bundy study. FTI CF inputs all delivered within the ESP. None of these specifically identified with Cross-Cutting issues, though provision of enhanced support to teachers in the three Northern regions contributes to solving access questions. 		
Relevance – <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to cross-cutting issues relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did the FTI contribute to improved strategies to address cross-cutting issues? To what extent did the FTI contribute to implementation of these strategies?</i>	Efficiency – <i>How economically was FTI support to cross-cutting issues translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The donor scrutiny of the FTI proposal was very positive about the attention paid to cross-cutting issues in the ESP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beyond some surmised influence through the overall EFA profile on the creation of the ESP, and the influence of the development of the FTI submission, no contributions to strategy can be identified. On implementation, the FTI CF project did have an equitable focus on more deprived districts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not applicable.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is likely that progress towards a GPI of 1 across the three levels of basic education will continue satisfactorily. There is some anxiety about levels of support for the delivery of HIV/AIDS plans, as the profile of the work is insufficiently high and very dependent on donor inputs. 		

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