

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative**

## **Country Case Study: Burkina Faso**

**Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret,  
Clare O'Brien and Serge Bayala**

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## Summary Information for Burkina Faso

- Currency = CFA Franc (FCFA)
- Exchange Rate (31 December 2008) USD 1 = FCFA 479.27
- Fiscal Year = January–December
- School year = September–June
- Structure of education system:  
6 years primary + 4 years lower secondary + 3 years upper secondary
- Population: 14.78 million
- Population growth rate: 2.9% p.a.

## Acknowledgements

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Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

## **Preface**

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and by 2009 had been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation was intended to provide an opportunity for reform and change where necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation was required to draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and to make recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness.

The evaluation took place between November 2008 and February 2010. It was independent but jointly supported by a consortium of donors. An Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) was made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society.

The evaluation team was a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The methodology and process for the evaluation are described in Appendix V (Volume 4) of the final synthesis report.

The main outputs of the evaluation, which included nine country case studies and eight desk studies, are listed overleaf.

## Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from [www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/](http://www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/).

### EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

*The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

### PRELIMINARY REPORT

*Preliminary Report.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

### FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

*Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

### FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

Burkina Faso	<i>Burkina Faso Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
Cambodia	<i>Cambodia Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
Ghana	<i>Ghana Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
Kenya	<i>Kenya Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
Mozambique	<i>Mozambique Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
Nicaragua	<i>Nicaragua Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
Nigeria	<i>Nigeria Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sulliemman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
Pakistan	<i>Pakistan Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
Yemen	<i>Yemen Country Case Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

### COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

Ethiopia	<i>Ethiopia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
Malawi	<i>Malawi Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
Mali	<i>Mali Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Moldova	<i>Moldova Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
Rwanda	<i>Rwanda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
Uganda	<i>Uganda Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
Vietnam	<i>Vietnam Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
Zambia	<i>Zambia Country Desk Study.</i> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank	-
ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa	-
AENF	Literacy and non formal education	<i>Alphabétisation et éducation non formelle</i>
AFD	French Development Agency	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
AME	Mothers' association	<i>Association des mères éducatrices</i>
APE	Parents' association	<i>Association des parents d'élèves</i>
APENF	Association for the promotion of non formal education	<i>Association pour la promotion de l'éducation non formelle</i>
BPE	Education project bureau	<i>Bureau des projets éducation</i>
BREDA	Regional education bureau for Africa	<i>Bureau Régional pour l'Education en Afrique</i>
CAD	Development Aid Committee	<i>Comité d'Aide au Développement</i>
CAP		<i>Certificat d'aptitude pédagogique</i>
CAPEs	The Burkinabé Centre for analysing social and economic policies	<i>Centre d'Analyse des Politiques Economiques et Sociales</i>
CASEM	Ministerial Board	<i>Conseil d'Administration du Secteur Ministériel</i>
CAST	Special Treasury Account	<i>Compte d'Affectation Spéciale du Trésor</i>
CCEB/BF	Group of NGOs involved in basic education	<i>Cadre de concertation des ONG et associations actives en éducation de base au Burkina Faso</i>
CD	Capacity Development	
CDMT	Medium Term Expenditure Framework	<i>Cadre de dépenses à moyen terme</i>
CEB	Basic education lowest administrative level	<i>Circonscription d'éducation de base</i>
CEBNF	Centre for non formal education	<i>Centre d'éducation de base non formelle</i>
CEP		<i>Certificat d'études primaires</i>
CF	Catalytic Fund	-
CGAB	General framework for budget support	<i>Cadre Général d'organisation des Appuis Budgétaires</i>
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	
CID	Integrated expenditure system	<i>Circuit Intégré de la Dépense</i>
CIFE	Integrated external finance system	<i>Circuit Intégré des Financements Extérieurs</i>
CIR	Integrated revenue system	<i>Circuit Intégré des Recettes</i>
CONEA	National coordination for aid effectiveness	<i>Coordination Nationale pour l'Efficacité de l'Aide</i>
CONFEMEN	Conference of the education ministries in francophone countries	<i>Conférence des Ministres de l'Education des Pays ayant le Français en Partage</i>
COGES	Management committee	<i>Comité de gestion</i>
CPAF	Permanent centre for literacy and training	<i>Centre permanent d'alphabétisation et de formation</i>
CSLP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	<i>Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i>
CSR	Country Status Report	
DAF	Finance and administration department	<i>Direction Administrative et Financière</i>
DAMSE	Department for allocation of school materials	<i>Direction de l'allocation de matériels spécifiques aux écoles</i>
DDEB	Department for the development of basic education	<i>Direction pour le Développement de l'Education de Base</i>
DEP	Department for research and planning	<i>Direction des Etudes et de la Planification</i>
DGAENF	General department for literacy and non formal education	<i>Direction générale de l'alphabétisation et de l'éducation non formelle</i>
DGCOOP	General department for cooperation	<i>Direction Générale de la Coopération (Ministry of Economy and Finance)</i>
DGEB	General department for basic education	<i>Direction générale de l'enseignement de base</i>
DMP	Procurement department	<i>Direction des Marchés Publics</i>

DPs	Development Partners	-
DPEBA	Provincial department for basic education and literacy	<i>Direction Provinciale de l'Education de Base et de l'Alphabétisation</i>
DPEF	Department for promotion of girls' education	<i>Direction de la Promotion de l'Education des Filles</i>
DPO	Development Policy Operation	
DREBA	Regional department for basic education and literacy	<i>Direction Régionale pour l'Education de Base et l'Alphabétisation</i>
DRES	Regional Education Departments	
DRH	Human resources department	<i>Direction des Ressources Humaines</i>
EC	European Commission	
ECF	Expanded Catalytic Fund	
EDI	EFA Global Development Index	
EFA	Education For All	
ENEP	National school for primary teachers	<i>Ecole nationale des enseignants du primaire</i>
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee	
EPT/PA	Education For All/ Fast Track	<i>Education pour tous/procédure accélérée</i>
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund	
EPT	<i>Education for all</i>	<i>Education Pour Tous</i>
ESP	Education Sector Plan	
FCFA	CFA Franc (currency)	<i>Francs de la communauté financière africaine</i>
FONAENF	Fund for literacy and non formal education	<i>Fonds pour l'alphabétisation et l'éducation non formelle</i>
FSDEB	Fund for support to the development of basic education	<i>Fonds de Soutien au Développement de l'Education de Base</i>
FTI	Fast Track Initiative	<i>Initiative Fast Track (IFT)</i>
GAP		<i>Groupe d'animation pédagogique</i>
GBS	General Budget Support	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate	
GMR	Global Monitoring Report	
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country	
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	
HQ	Headquarters	
IDA	International Development Association	
IDB	International Development Bank	
IF	Indicative Framework	
IMOA-EPT	Fast TRACK initiative – Education For All	<i>Initiative de Mise en Œuvre Accélérée – Education pour tous</i>
INSD	National Institute for Statistics and Demography	<i>Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie</i>
LDG	Local Donor Group	
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation	
MASSN		<i>Ministère de l'Action Sociale et de la Solidarité Nationale</i>
MCMPF	Office of the President	<i>Ministère Chargé de Mission auprès du Président du Faso</i>
MDG	Millennium Development Goal	
MEBA	Ministry for basic education and literacy	<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base et de l'Alphabétisation</i>
MEF	Ministry of finance and economy	<i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i>
MESSRS	Ministry of secondary education, higher education and scientific research	<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement Secondaire, Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique</i>
MJE	Ministry of youth and employment	<i>Ministère de la Jeunesse et de l'Emploi</i>
MIS	Management Information System	
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework	

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	
NETF	Norwegian Education Trust Fund	
OCDE	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development	<i>Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques</i>
ODA	Official Development Assistance	
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development	
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee	
OMD	Millennium Development Goal	<i>Objectif du Millénaire pour le Développement</i>
ONG	Non Governmental Organisation	<i>Organisation non gouvernementale</i>
OPM	Oxford Policy Management	
OSEO	Swiss Labour Assistance	<i>Oeuvre Suisse d'Entraide Ouvrière</i>
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children	
PA	Action plan	<i>Plan d'action</i>
PAD	Project Appraisal Document	
PAP	Priority action plan	<i>Plan d'action prioritaire</i>
PASEC	Programme of analysis of education systems for CONFEMEN	<i>Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN</i>
PCR	Primary Completion Rate	
PDDEB	Ten year plan for the development of basic education	<i>Plan Décennal de Développement de l'Education de Base</i>
PDDDES	Ten year development plan for secondary and tertiary education	
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability	
PFC	Common financing procedure	<i>Protocole de Financement Commun</i>
PFM	Public Financial Management	
PIP	Public Investment Programme	<i>Programme d'Investissements Publics</i>
PIU	Project Implementation Unit	
PN/ETFP	National Policy for Technical Education and Vocational Training	
PNRC	National Policy for Capacity Development	
PRGB	Plan of Action to Strengthen Budget Management	
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit	
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan	
PPTE	Highly indebted poor countries (HIPC)	<i>Pays pauvres très endettés</i>
PTA	Parent Teacher Association	
PTR	Pupil-Teacher Ratio	
RESEN	Country Status Report	<i>Rapport d'Etat d'un Système Educatif National</i>
SBS	Sector Budget Support	
SIGASPE	Integrated system for administrative management and salaries of state personnel	<i>Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat</i>
SISED	Statistical information system for education	<i>Système d'Information Statistique de l'Education</i>
SND	National service for development	<i>Service national pour le développement</i>
SNDIPE	National Strategy for an Integrated Development of Early Childhood	
SP PDDEB	Permanent Secretariat for the PDDEB	<i>Secrétariat Permanent pour le PDDEB</i>
SP PPF	Permanent Secretariat for the monitoring of programmes and financial policies	<i>Secrétariat Permanent pour le suivi des Programmes et Politiques Financières</i>
SRFP	Strategy for strengthening of public finance	<i>Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques</i>
SSA	sub-Saharan Africa	
STELA	Technical Secretariat for the Effectiveness of Aid	

SWAp	Sector-wide approach	
TOR	Terms of Reference	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	
UPC	Universal Primary Completion	
UPE	Universal Primary Education	
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund	<i>Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development	
USD	United States Dollar	
VIH/SIDA	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	<i>Virus de l'immunodéficience Humaine/Syndrome d'immunodéficience Acquis</i>
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union	<i>Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA)</i>
WB	World Bank	
WFP	World Food Programme	



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

S1. This is one of seventeen country studies being carried out as part of the mid-term evaluation of the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The FTI was launched in 2002 by a partnership of donors and recipient countries to "accelerate progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015". The FTI has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent evaluation to see whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself.

### The Context for the FTI in Burkina Faso

S2. The Ten Year Basic Education Development Plan (PDDEB, 2000–2009) was adopted in 1999, following a decade of growing interest in education in Burkina Faso. It aimed to achieve a Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 70% and a literacy rate of 40% by 2009. The second phase of PDDEB (2008–2010) was adopted in 2007. It aims to achieve UPC by 2020. The 2007 Education Policy Law introduced a new definition of basic education that covers pre-primary education, primary education, post-primary education (the first cycle of secondary school, technical and vocational education and training), non-formal basic education and adult literacy, and promotes compulsory free education for children between 6 and 16.

S3. Overall the period saw a strong focus on primary education by donors and government, which led to a dramatic improvement in primary enrolment rates and a reduction in gender inequalities. Challenges remain with regard to achieving UPC, reducing inequalities and improving the quality of education. The primary completion rate rose from 19% to roughly 40% between 1991 and 2006/07. Despite some progress between 1994 (18.9%) and 2007 (28.7%), adult illiteracy remains a huge problem for the country, and the PDDEB 2015 target of having 40% adult literacy looks set to be missed. Regarding learning outcomes, preliminary results from the 2007 PASEC survey seem to show a strong deterioration of Burkinabé pupils' performances in literacy and numeracy. The likely downturn in PASEC results between 1996 and 2007 could be related to the shift from an elitist to a more universal system in Burkina Faso. Most of the 2015 EFA targets look set to be missed (except gender parity in GER) and the country is definitely off track for the achievement of UPC by 2015.

S4. The quality of budget preparation and execution has improved significantly since 2000, both at national level and within the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA). A coordinated approach to support improved Public Finance Management (PFM) for basic education has been defined. The share of the budget going to education and primary education increased significantly in the 90s, stabilising in the last decade. Nevertheless, given the strong increase in the national budget in the 2000s this represents a significant scaling up in absolute value. Domestic education expenditure has increased from 2.5% of GDP in 2000 to 3.7% in 2007. Analysis of expenditure per pupil illustrates the relatively high cost of primary and higher secondary, as opposed to the relative under-funding of lower secondary. Between 2000 and 2009, external resources in support to MEBA have nearly doubled, which is a sharp increase compared to the previous ten years. The share of the MEBA budget financed domestically, however, is similar in 2009 to that of 2000, at 74%. In terms of aid modalities, aid to education evolved from exclusively project-based support until 2002, to programme based approaches coordinated through the BPE (*Bureau des Projets Education* – common PIU) until 2004, to a mix of projects and support through the CAST-FSDEB pooled fund (*Compte d'Affectation Spéciale du Trésor – Fonds de Soutien au*

*Développement de l'Education de Base*) from 2005 onwards. The CAST-FSDEB represented 45% of total education sector ODA in 2007.

### **The FTI in Burkina Faso**

S5. Burkina Faso was among the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI Partnership, as early as June 2002. The Burkina Faso request was endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meetings, on November 27<sup>th</sup> 2002. However, due to the "donor orphan" clause, Burkina Faso was not able to access Catalytic Fund resources following its endorsement. Nevertheless, two donors (European Commission and France) set up programmes "in the name of the FTI" in the years following endorsement.

S6. Subsequent to the revision of the criteria for access to Catalytic Fund financing in 2007, the Government was persuaded to prepare a new request on the basis of its newly endorsed PDDEB II (phase 2 covering 2008–2010). This second request is based on the objective set out in the PDDEB II to achieve Universal Primary Completion in 2020, and requested financial support from the Catalytic Fund in order to fill the financing gap identified for the basic education sub-sector (USD 144.9 million) between 2009–2011.

S7. Following the positive evaluation of the request made by local donors, an amount of USD 102 million was endorsed by the Steering Committee, covering 2009–2011 through a DPO (Development Policy Operation) under the supervision of the World Bank (WB). The choice of Sector Budget Support (SBS) as an aid modality was mainly due to the combination of the fact that the WB could not participate in the pooled fund since its withdrawal in 2007 and the refusal (by Government and other local donors) that FTI funding be provided through a traditional WB project modality. The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) support will be the first full-fledged SBS programme for basic education, and in Burkina Faso as a whole.

### **The FTI and Education Policy and Planning**

S8. The FTI Indicative Framework (IF), the promotion of an education country status report (RESEN) and the use of an education financial simulation model constitute the "core FTI inputs" to help define credible education policies and strategic planning. Although these three instruments were initially developed by the World Bank, they are seen as a prerequisite to the development of a credible and costed education sector plan required for FTI endorsement.

S9. The FTI focus on completion rather than enrolment (or UPC rather than UPE) allowed a reassessment of the performance of the education system of Burkina Faso and the remaining distance the country has to cover in order to reach MDG 2 by 2015. The FTI's focus on the primary cycle was particularly relevant in a country where enrolment and completion rates were among the lowest in Africa. The expansion to include adult literacy was also relevant to Government priorities and needs in 2002. In 2008 the extension of the areas to be covered by CF funding to the whole of basic education was consistent with i) progress made at primary level between 2002 and 2008; ii) the growing body of evidence of a positive impact of early childhood development on attendance and retention at primary level; iii) the anticipated pressure on the post-primary cycle; and iv) the persistence of challenges in adult literacy.

S10. Different levels of policy dialogue have been boosted by the FTI's procedures, in particular by the negotiation of the 2008 request: dialogue between the four Ministries in charge of the education sector, dialogue between MEBA and social partners, dialogue between MEBA and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The FTI's procedures and analytical tools supported the planning efforts of the basic education sub-sector to move closer to what could be called a "credible" plan enabling additional funds to be invested. Even though controversial, the FTI Indicative Framework and related processes have been used for policy reforms in Burkina Faso.

S11. Finally, the main risk to the sustainability of the improved education policy and planning processes lies in the fact that they are so far restricted to MEBA only, and will need to be further expanded to the whole sector and to the decentralised entities. The use of non-earmarked SBS as an aid modality for the CF support has so far been one of the catalysts for this evolution.

### **The FTI and Education Financing**

S12. Although no actual financing has yet been received by Burkina Faso from the CF, it is worth emphasising that throughout the evaluation team's meetings with government and local donors, it was evident that the FTI's value to Government and the education sector was seen primarily as a source of finance. FTI inputs on the financing side can be summarised as (i) 2002–2007: preparation of the request and catalytic effect on donor funds following the endorsement; (ii) 2008–2009: preparation of the request and endorsement for CF financing; (iii) small financial input from EPDF; and (iv) the financial simulation model, indicative framework and RESEN 2007–2009 (Country Status Report).

S13. The experience in Burkina Faso of the two requests for CF monies shows that the definition of the financing gap as implied in the Dakar conference (being the difference between available resources and additional external finance needed to achieve UPE by 2015) led to the setting of unrealistic targets compared with the country's implementation constraints.

S14. Between 2002 and 2006, the catalytic effect on donor aid promoted by the initiative was only marginally additional, and with significant delays – disbursements starting up to five years after the endorsement. The adoption of the PDDEB, donor coordination mechanisms and joint review missions, had more of a catalytic effect on donor aid to basic education than the FTI endorsement itself.

S15. During this period, the FTI also contributed to the improved mobilisation and use of domestic resources for basic education through enhancing the capacity of MEBA to request additional funding, and stimulating debate and reflection on the efficiency of the education budget.

S16. Between 2009 and 2011, CF funds should cover the financing gap as identified in the 2008 request. Nevertheless, the additionality of CF finance over national budget and other donor support remains to be assessed, in particular given the absence of other donor commitments after 2010. The choice of SBS for CF funding is relevant in the context of existing aid modalities, the dynamics at the local level, and Burkina Faso's financing needs. The extension of CF funding to the whole basic education sub sector, in line with the 2007 reform of the education system, contributes to the move toward an education sector-wide approach (SWAp) in the coming years and promotes a global analysis of the education budget.

S17. The main risks to the sustainability of increases in the financing of education are the low resource base for mobilising domestic resources, the nascent fiscal decentralisation, donor pressures to increase the speed of budget execution (including the pressure related to the disbursement of the 2009 tranche of the CF-financed DPO) and the lack of medium to long term predictability of donor support to basic education.

### **The FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation**

S18. Burkina Faso has long been familiar with collecting and using data on education for monitoring. The main weaknesses were in the timeliness, quality and disaggregation of data, and the financial constraints to further dissemination. The introduction of the PDDEB coincided with an increased demand for timely data, among both government and external partners. Education indicators are currently monitored at national level in three main locations: the CSLP (*Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté*), the matrix for budget support and the PDDEB.

S19. With regard to FTI inputs, the FTI appraisal was not used to highlight the country's "data gap" and therefore, it does not set out any areas for improvement in M&E.

S20. The rounds of discussion on the Indicative Framework – for example in the production of the 2000 RESEN and the request for FTI endorsement – brought to light two important indicators which had not previously been part of the policy discourse in Burkina Faso: the Primary Completion Rate and the level of teachers' salaries.

S21. The process of elaborating the matrix of conditionality for the forthcoming Catalytic Fund support through a DPO offers the opportunity of establishing a comprehensive monitoring framework for basic education. Nevertheless, it should be ensured that it does not imply additional transaction costs but builds upon existing procedures, and that adequate coordination mechanisms are set up between national, sectoral and sub-sectoral M&E.

S22. It is said that the FTI does not create any additional reporting requirements by Government or the donors since, according to interviewees, no regular reports are exchanged between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat in Washington. However, the lack of such information exchange between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat may be symptomatic of a wider problem with communication (see ¶S35).

### **The FTI and Capacity Building**

S23. Since the launch of the PDDEB, planning and management capacities at central, regional, provincial and school levels have been continuously challenged. A task force was set up by the Secretary General of MEBA in October 2008 to deliver a "gradual plan for Capacity Development of MEBA". However, while capacity development has been a recurring concern systematically re-emphasised during each of the joint reviews since 2003, the development partners have not found a way to collectively address the issues.

S24. The FTI inputs in terms of capacity development were of three types: i) discussions on Capacity Development (CD) issues during the preparation, negotiation and appraisal of fast track strategies to achieve UPC; ii) the activities supported by the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) (and its predecessor the Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF)); and iii) the dissemination of FTI guidelines on capacity development.



S25. The contribution of the FTI to building capacity in the sector, beyond the initial identification of critical CD issues, appears to have been negligible. The activities targeted under NETF and EPDF were relevant for Capacity Development as they principally related to the management of education service delivery, but they have mainly supported upstream and few downstream activities, in the absence of a Government plan for CD in the education sector. The FTI CD guidelines were shared, but have not been used by the LDG to engage with education ministries for sustainable capacity development. The FTI's most effective contribution has been the part-funding of the 2007–2009 RESEN which was intended as a capacity-building exercise in data analysis and not simply a fast exercise to produce the required data.

S26. The transaction costs associated with the implementation of an EPDF-supported activity are perceived as too high with regard to the amount it may grant. The use of EPDF funds for the RESEN is mainly due to the WB's willingness to have the report funded by another entity, in order to make it more acceptable – although it appears that no one outside of the WB and possibly one or two donors had any knowledge of the existence of the EPDF or knew that the RESEN had been funded by the EPDF.

S27. The FTI procedures highlight the need for development partners to be technically competent in order to play an active role in education sector dialogue and clarify the increased responsibilities of local donors and in particular, the lead donor. However, if the move towards budget support continues to be married with aid agencies reducing their staff capacities in education, such increased reliance on local donors may be jeopardised.

S28. Finally, the choice of SBS as an aid modality represents a potentially significant input over the coming years for strengthening capacity by using country systems, minimising parallel requirements and thus limiting the demands made on existing capacity.

### **The FTI and Aid Effectiveness**

S29. The FTI inputs in terms of aid effectiveness were of three types: (i) negotiation of the requests and evaluation by the Local Donor Group (LDG); (ii) discussion on aid modalities in 2008 and preparation of the DPO; and (iii) pilot on the Donor Indicative Framework and study on aid effectiveness in the education sector in Burkina Faso.

S30. The requirement by the FTI for the LDG to assess the request presented by Government provided a concrete opportunity for donors to apply the Paris Declaration principles. Its added value over existing procedures is in the fact that donors and government had to discuss one "common" programme (as opposed to each donor having its separate programme). It was therefore a unique opportunity to boost existing coordination mechanisms.

S31. Although the choice of SBS as a modality for CF funding was mainly linked to an internal dynamic at local level, it also provided a welcome opportunity for some donors and for the MEF to put forward their preference for SBS. The experience of the CF with SBS is seen as a pilot, which could allow some donors to move their own support from the CAST-FSDEB to SBS.

S32. Aid predictability in the sub-sector remains very limited, both in the short and the medium to long term. FTI-CF support is a positive example providing funding for three years (in reality, closer to two and a half years). It is currently the only information MEBA has on aid committed for 2011. Nevertheless, it also contributes quite negatively to short term

predictability. In the first year of its implementation, commitment came too late for inclusion in the budget and the (foreseen) disbursement late in the budget year is leading to undue pressure on execution.

S33. The Donor Indicative Framework piloted in Burkina Faso in 2004 and the study on aid effectiveness carried out in 2008, which aimed at enhancing the FTI's contribution on the issue of mutual accountability, had no clear added value over local procedures and have not been used in any significant way.

S34. The experience of Burkina Faso demonstrates the influence of having the World Bank as supervising entity on the choice of aid modalities. First, the WB seems unable for internal fiduciary reasons to contribute to pooled funds. As a consequence FTI funding using such a mechanism is ruled out. Second, the WB's Sector Budget Support modality (Development Policy Operation) requires substantial preparatory work. Although some of these due processes were waived in the case of Burkina Faso, it is not clear if this will become systematic for all FTI-CF-financed DPOs or if this was only a one-off occurrence.

S35. As far as the FTI-related procedures are concerned, they are considered by most interviewed as very heavy and at times confusing, with high transaction costs for Government as well as for donors. Most donors – apart from the WB – shy away from taking on the role of the FTI-CF supervising entity for this reason. The lack of clarity (documents required, procedures for developing DPO) and of communication (letters in English, lack of information on EPDF and other FTI inputs) between the Partnership and the Government is most critical, and is one of the main challenges to improve the efficiency and visibility of FTI support to Burkina Faso. It is significant in this respect that Burkina Faso has felt the need to apply to represent its peers at the Board of the Partnership in order to access adequate information.

### **Cross-Cutting Issues**

S36. Issues of equity are particularly important in Burkina Faso, where the education system is in transition from a formerly elitist system to one focused on universal primary education. The mid-term evaluation of the PDDEB notes its positive performance, in particular in reducing gender inequalities and in enhancing access. Nevertheless, inequality remains high: the differences in school completion rates between richer and poorer quintiles (45.2%) is higher than the differences between rural and urban (33%) and by gender (11%). Rural illiteracy (80.5%) is much higher than urban illiteracy (36.6%).

S37. HIV prevalence in Burkina Faso has decreased from 7.2% in 1997 to 4.2% in 2002, but seems higher in the education sector than in the population as a whole. In the education sector, a strategy to fight against AIDS was finalised in 2007.

S38. The FTI inputs on cross-cutting issues consist of the IF indicators; the guidelines for appraisal of the Education Sector Plans (ESP) by the Local Donor Group (LDG); the funding of the RESEN in 2007–2009 and the financial support indirectly through its catalytic effect or directly through future CF funding. The RESEN was particularly relevant in providing hard evidence and in-depth analysis of gender, income, geographical inequalities, and in particular, outlining the inefficient allocation of national resources vis-à-vis these inequalities, leading to policy decisions. The indicators monitored in the IF were already included in the PDDEB. Overall, initiatives in support of girls' education, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the fight against inequalities were mainly related to a dynamic pushed by other stakeholders, in Government, among civil society, and by other donors (Unicef in particular).

## Overall Conclusions

S39. **Relevance.** The focus on UPC, on primary then basic education, and on the efficiency of education expenditure are all relevant. Added to these key factors is the choice of SBS for CF support. However, the rigid approach to the IF and the 2002 definition of the financing gap led to a missed opportunity to strengthen education plans and their costings; the more flexible approach taken in 2008 was more appropriate. The FTI inputs for capacity development and data/M&E were relevant but insufficient compared with the objectives set by the Initiative. The Capacity Development guidelines may have been relevant but have not been used as a basis to develop a common understanding of CD issues, enhance donor coordination or foster a joint approach between MEBA and education donors.

S40. **Accelerating progress on EFA.** FTI has contributed to enhanced planning and policy reforms, catalysing an "intellectual revolution" on the way to analyse, conceive and implement a sound credible plan for primary education. It has enhanced the focus on universal primary education. Nevertheless, this contribution takes place in the context of an existing dynamic at local level (PDDEB and the reform of the education sector, the PRSP, aid coordination in support of PDDEB, PFM reforms, etc) which has constituted the main driver of accelerated progress on EFA over the past decade. Overall, it was mainly in the requirement for requests to be presented to the Partnership and the CF in 2002 and in 2008 that the FTI contributed to an acceleration in existing dynamics.

S41. **Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness.** The FTI has contributed, albeit modestly, to increased domestic and international resources in support of basic education, along with other major pre-existing drivers such as the Government focus on primary education from international conferences, the General Budget Support (GBS) and the HIPC focus on the social sectors. Between 2002 and 2009, the catalytic effect on donor support was minimal. The FTI has also strengthened the existing dynamic towards better aid effectiveness and donor coordination through its process of appraisal of the requests and discussions on aid modalities for CF funding. It is now leading the way in the move towards SBS and fully aligned aid modalities. The main risk is the lack of predictability of donor aid to basic education, and the risk of donors moving out of the sub-sector.

## Reflections

S42. Key issues arising from the Burkina Faso country case study include: (i) the need for improved communication between the FTI Secretariat and Government on FTI requirements, procedures, and funding modalities; (ii) the value of a more flexible approach: in the use of IF benchmarks; the definition of the financing gap; the coverage of FTI support; and in enabling better alignment with existing procedures; (iii) the dilemma posed by the role of the CF: the objective of catalysing additional donor support seeming to jeopardise the achievement of the further objective of filling the financing gap and improving the predictability of finance; and (iv) the implications of the choice of the WB as supervising entity on FTI visibility and the choice of aid modalities

S43. In terms of recommendations to feed into the wider set of recommendations from the evaluation, the Burkina Faso case study highlights the need for:

- Direct communication from the FTI Secretariat to the partner country and a stronger FTI Secretariat both to fulfil this task and to provide adequate feedback and support to country-level processes.

- Ensuring a broader ownership of FTI capacity development support (outside the WB); a more pro-active support to further donor coordination in addition to the FTI CD guidelines; support focused on implementation as well on preparation of plans; and long term support focused on building capacity, as opposed to shorter support focused on a specific output.
- Ensuring the possibility for alternative supervising entities for the Catalytic Fund, other than the World Bank, is actually considered seriously at country level. This would involve both adequate and timely support from donor HQs and further clarification and simplification of the role of supervising entities, as well as a stronger involvement of the FTI Secretariat in supporting the local donor group and providing adequate information.
- Finally, further reflexion is needed on the action of the FTI to ensure better long term predictability of aid, both for the CF and for education ODA as a whole, and on the requirement for additionality of CF support. Regarding the CF in particular, better long term predictability involves a reflexion on aid modalities and conditionality, on the process for renewal of CF support, and on the criteria for allocating CF funding. Regarding additionality, this would involve a closer monitoring of existing donor and government commitments to support education and basic education.

S44. The matrix at Annex J provides a detailed summary of findings and conclusions on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability for the whole study and also by workstream.

## **PART A: APPROACH**



# 1 Introduction

## The Fast Track Initiative

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative<sup>1</sup> (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is "accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015" (FTI 2004a p3). It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.<sup>2</sup> Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the FTI was designed as a compact that "explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' improvements in policy performance and accountability for results" (FTI 2004a p3).

1.2 According to its Framework document (2004), the FTI's major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education
- More efficient aid for primary education
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.

1.4 The 2004 FTI Framework (FTI 2004a) set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country-level.
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework (IF)), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes.
- **Support linked to performance:** The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources.
- **Lower transaction costs:** The FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves).
- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

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<sup>1</sup> This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a, Annex A).

<sup>2</sup> The Dakar Forum communiqué stated that "no countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources" (World Education Forum 2000).

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed). Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI-specific instruments which can provide support at country-level:

- The **Catalytic Fund**, set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The Fund had disbursed USD 396 million to 20 countries as of November 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)** set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8 million (of USD 58.5 million committed) to over 60 countries as of December 2008.

1.6 The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.7 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at Annex B of this report includes a summary of the main changes in the FTI, as well as its involvement with Burkina Faso).

## Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.8 The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the MDG target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. The main outputs are shown on page iv.

## Evaluation Methodology

1.9 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI is to disentangle the activities and effects of the FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted is *contribution analysis*. This involves a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence is then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) FTI may have made to the overall results observed.

## The Role of Country Studies

1.10 The work programme for the evaluation included nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (FTI EOC 2008, ¶21)



1.11 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with the FTI.<sup>3</sup> Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked the FTI's procedures for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies are being conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in FTI, and it is expected that their reports will be of value to the countries concerned.

1.12 The country studies aimed to take account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and M&E, aid effectiveness) which the FTI is intended to have. They will aim to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. (See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to country studies.)

## **The Study Process for Burkina Faso**

1.13 The country case studies are based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

1.14 The visit to Burkina Faso took place between the 4<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2009. The Country Study team consisted of Mailan Chiche (Country Study Team Leader), Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala.

1.15 The team met a range of stakeholders from the Government – at both central and deconcentrated level, in particular, representatives from the four ministries involved in basic education (MEBA, MESSRS, MASSN, MJE) and from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The team also met with donor, NGO and civil society representatives, and visited public primary schools in both the Ziro province in Centre Ouest Region, and the Zoundwéogo province in Centre Sud Region. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is at Annex C. A Country Visit Note summarised the team's preliminary findings and was circulated to in-country stakeholders on May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2009.

## **Outline of this Report**

1.16 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (§1.9 above), this report first reviews Burkina Faso's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B), then systematically considers the parts played by the FTI (Part C). Conclusions and recommendations are in Part D.

1.17 Part C is structured according to the five workstreams within the overall evaluation: policy and planning, finance, data and M&E, capacity development and aid effectiveness. Each subsection addresses the context, inputs and activities of the FTI, and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (where possible) within these workstream areas. There is also a chapter on cross-cutting issues.

1.18 This country case study aims to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- All stakeholders in Burkina Faso with an interest in the education sector.
- The FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report.

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<sup>3</sup> See the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a) Annex A for a full explanation of the choice of country cases.

- The EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee).
- Any other interested parties.

## **PART B: EDUCATION FOR ALL IN BURKINA FASO**



## 2 Burkina Faso Background

### Burkina Faso in brief

2.1 The Government of Burkina Faso (GBF) is striving to improve conditions of life in a nation with a rapidly rising population that currently stands at about 14 million people, of whom almost half are under the age of 15. The country is ranked 176th of the 177 countries in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) Human Development Index in 2007/08 (UNDP 2007).

2.2 In terms of geographical constraints, the country is largely arid and the northern part is located in the dry Sahel region. It is landlocked and in contrast to other countries in the region, it is not strongly endowed with natural resources. Its main export is cotton.

2.3 As for its economy, Burkina Faso has been through a process of wide-ranging macroeconomic and monetary reform over the course of the last two decades. The change of regime in 1987 signalled a move away from a socialist model to a more market-oriented economic policy. Until 1994 real economic growth was negative, but a devaluation of the currency in that year resulted in a remarkable acceleration of growth: in the following decade the economy grew by an average of some 5.6% per year (World Bank 2005a). The country achieved the HIPC completion point in 2000.

2.4 Despite this progress, Burkina Faso remains poor, with an estimated *per capita* GDP of just over USD 1,200 (purchasing power parity) in 2006 (UNDP 2007). The proportion of the population living below the poverty line was largely unchanged in the 10 years after 1994. The most recent available figures (for 2003) indicate that some 46% of the population is deemed to live in poverty, compared with 45% in 1994. There are significant regional differences.

### Institutional framework

2.5 In 1991 a constitution was introduced which proclaims that Burkina Faso is a democratic, unitary and secular state in the form of a republic. The country has a Parliament with a single chamber, the National Assembly. The last presidential elections were held in 2005, and the next ones are due in 2010.

2.6 Since 2004,<sup>4</sup> the country is divided into 13 regions, 49 urban communes (of more than 25,000 inhabitants), and 302 rural communes (with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants). Regions and communities are decentralised entities. Provinces remain under the regional level as deconcentrated entities.

2.7 Local government bodies have administrative and financial autonomy: they can acquire income and collect taxes and receive external donations. However, they may not take out loans without a guarantee from the Government. A decree of June 30<sup>th</sup> 2006 outlined the transfer of competences and resources to urban communes in the areas of pre-primary and primary education, health, culture, youth, sport and leisure. The transfer of skills and resources is still only partial and has just been initiated. The total amount of transfers to local governments set out in the 2007 budget is only 1.2% of the budget. In 2009 the first earmarked transfers for basic education and water and sanitation were made.

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<sup>4</sup> Law N° 055-2004/AN on territorial administration reformed the previous system prevailing since 1991.

## National development strategy

2.8 In 2000, Burkina Faso adopted its *Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté* (CSLP – alias PRSP), which was then revised in 2003. A new PRSP is now in preparation, to cover 2011–2015. The four pillars of the current PRSP are: (i) accelerating growth and promoting equity; (ii) guaranteeing access to basic social services for the poor; (iii) broadening the employment and income opportunities for the poor; and (iv) promoting good governance at all levels. Since 2004, a three-year rolling Priority Action Plan (PAP) is defined in line with the PRSP priorities, and progress on the implementation of the PAP is assessed annually.

2.9 Another key reference document in terms of the national development strategy is the five-year programme of the President of the Republic (2006–2010), made during the build-up to the elections in 2005 (Compaoré 2005), which refers specifically to the need to accelerate progress on access and quality of education, with a particular emphasis on primary education.

## Quality of public financial management (PFM)

2.10 The legal framework for public finance is broadly set down by Act No. 006-2003/AN of January 24th 2003 outlining financial laws. These texts agree with the directives of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in the field of public finances. They comprise a series of classic provisions in Francophone public finance prior to the adoption of budget programmes (Lanser 2008 and LINPICO 2007).

## Budget cycle

2.11 A national Medium Term Expenditure Framework (**MTEF**) has been prepared since 2000, and is used as a basis for initial discussions on indicative envelopes before the budget circular is sent. Preparation of the MTEF starts in January. It takes into account the outcomes of the PRSP annual review which takes place usually around April. The final MTEF is validated by the Council of Ministers.

2.12 The **budget** preparation process itself starts in May with the budget circular sent by the President to all ministries and institutions, providing, among other things, an indicative envelope for the coming year. All institutions submit their budget proposals to the MEF by mid-July. Since 1997,<sup>5</sup> key ministries (including the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA)) are required to prepare "**budget-programmes**". Nevertheless, these budgets are not used past the budget preparation stage, and this has led to a lack of motivation and sometimes the setting up of parallel "activity-based" budget preparation and execution monitoring as is the case in MEBA with the PDDEB (*Plan Decennal de Développement de l'Éducation de Base*) action plan and budget (see ¶3.19).

2.13 Following discussions in the budget commission, the draft Finance Law is prepared between mid-July and mid-August, and presented to the Council of Ministers. The draft must be presented to the National Assembly at the latest by the last Wednesday of September. The Finance Law is then voted on by the Assembly by the end of the year.

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<sup>5</sup> Budget circular N° 97-054/PRES of 26 May 1997.

## Main PFM issues and reform process

2.14 The GBF is actively pursuing a policy of strengthening public finance management. In 2002, it launched the Plan of Action to Strengthen Budget Management (PRGB), focusing on budget management. In 2006 the scope of the reform was extended to cover all public finance through the Strategy for Strengthening Public Finance (SRPF).

2.15 The PEFA report (LINPICO 2007) notes that the **budget preparation** process is robust and structured and that the annual budget calendar is respected. The **budget classification** is drawn up according to international standards. Modification of the classification is under way, and it is expected that the budget programme will be implemented at national level by 2012. It should also be noted that an important part of the Finance Law (22% in 2006) is classified as "inter-ministerial expenditure" and therefore not under any specific budget agency.

2.16 The implementation of the budget is relatively well organised. However, there are a number of weaknesses. As to the aspect of **predictability**, there is a systematic overestimation of income tax, taxes and customs duties in relation to collection capacity. This leads to significant budget amendments during the year on the expenditure side. The low tax collection ratio is one of the main weaknesses of the Burkina Faso budget. It was 12.5% of GDP in 2007, which is considerably below the WAEMU benchmark of 17%. Improved tax collection is a major priority for Government, illustrated in its commitment to increase the tax collection ratio to 13.8% in 2011 (IMF 2009). Key measures taken include the definition of a tax policy strategy and the creation of a tax policy unit. The stock of payment arrears is low in accordance with payment delays as defined by the WAEMU.

2.17 The regulatory provisions concerning **public procurement** have been reworked since 2003 and are now in line with international standards for the most part. As the reforms are fairly recent, the new code is still not sufficiently well known or applied.

2.18 A major weakness outlined in the 2007 PEFA is the frequent use of the **simplified procedure** instead of the normal procedure for budget execution, which leads to significant delays in reporting and in the provision of proof as to the use of funds. According to the 2007 PEFA, this procedure (similar to an advance with ex-post justification) is used excessively in the budget. It is justified for transfers and subsidies and in the context of "*maitrise d'ouvrage déléguée*"<sup>6</sup>, but it is also used for other purposes, creating un-necessary fiduciary risk.

2.19 Regarding the **monitoring** of budget expenditures and the accounting system, Burkina Faso uses several computerised systems, the Expenditure Information System (*Circuit Informatisé de la Dépense* – CID since 1999–2000) and software for integrated public accounting. For revenues, the Integrated Revenue System (*Circuit Intégré des Recettes* – CIR) is in the process of being set up for operation. The system used for wages and salaries, the SIGASPE is not yet interconnected with the CID. The registration of ODA is still not computerised. The Ministry of Finance is in the process of developing the Integrated System for External Finances (*le Circuit Intégré des Finances Extérieures* – CIFE).

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<sup>6</sup> Delegation of the management and oversight of school construction by the MEBA to a separate entity (public agency, NGO).


2.20 Monitoring and external checking of public finances by the **Court of Auditors** is insufficient, but has been reinforced over the years. The Court was set up in 2002, and inherited a heavy backload of unaudited accounts from its predecessor, the former Chamber of Auditors of the Supreme Court. The Court of Auditors still has minimal capacity, and the number of magistrates is limited. Its work is generally of good quality, but productivity remains low.

## Aid relationships<sup>7</sup>

### ODA levels

2.21 Burkina Faso relies heavily on Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 2007, total ODA corresponded to 47% of all anticipated expenditure, and 15.2% of GDP. The following graph shows a sharp increase in ODA from 2000 onwards: ODA per inhabitant has nearly doubled between 2000 and 2007, from USD 33 to USD 61 per inhabitant.

**Figure 2.1 Total ODA to Burkina Faso 1997–2007 (USDm)**




Source: GBF 2007b, DG COOP, MEF

2.22 General Budget Support (GBS) represents 29% of ODA received by Burkina Faso in 2007. The rest was in the form of investment projects (63%), pooled funds (7%), and food aid (1%). GBS has increased progressively from 26% to 29% of total ODA between 2002 and 2007, which represents a doubling in absolute value from USD 126m in 2002 to USD 249m in 2009 (GBF 2007b). Its share in the financing of the national budget has nevertheless decreased from 22% in 2001 to 12% in 2007. Currently, nine donors provide GBS: Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, World Bank, African development Bank (AfDB), and the European Commission (EC).

<sup>7</sup> See Lanser 2008 and GBF 2007b



**Figure 2.2 Finance Law – Sources of Financing (FCFam)**

Source: DG COOP data on GBS, GBS evaluation (2000–2002) and Finance Laws (2003–2007)

2.23 It should be noted that ODA amounts vary according to the source of the data. The amounts are systematically higher according to the statistics of the OECD DAC, which are based on commitments, while those of the DGCOOP/UNDP are based on expenditure. The differences are explained by commitments which were not carried out and by unrecorded disbursements. The amounts received from multilateral DPs according to the DGCOOP are systematically higher than those noted in OECD statistics. For bilateral Development Partners (DPs) it is the opposite (Lanser 2008).

2.24 The most important DPs are by far the World Bank and the EC. After that, sources differ, but France, AfDB, Netherlands and Denmark follow. These six donors represented nearly 70% of total ODA in 2007, while all multilaterals provided 60.9% according to DG COOP.

### Aid coordination mechanisms

2.25 Overall coordination is done within the PRSP monitoring framework, in particular, the six joint technical and thematic commissions set up for that purpose.

2.26 Coordination of GBS donors is done within the CGAB (*Cadre Général des Appuis Budgétaires*) since 2005 (until 2004 Joint Budget Support for the implementation of the PRSP). This framework not only supports the implementation of the PRSP but also aims to strengthen public finance management with the implementation of the SRFP. Progress is regularly appraised during joint periodical reviews by all national and international partners. Attempts have been made over the past few years to better align CGAB and PRSP processes, and sector and national review and coordination processes.

2.27 In several sectors there are coordination frameworks, with initiatives to move towards sector wide approaches. Sector strategies exist for basic education, health, gender, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation. Other strategies are being drawn up in rural development (agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry), the environment and employment.

2.28 Achieving the objectives of the Paris Declaration is taken very seriously by all parties. Government responsibility for this is held by the National Coordination for the Effectiveness of Aid (*Coordination nationale pour l'efficacité de l'aide* – CONEA) which is attached to the DGCOOP, and the DPs have created the Technical Secretariat for the Effectiveness of Aid (STELA). CONEA drew up the National Plan of Action on Aid Effectiveness, approved in 2007.

2.29 According to the 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, 45% of ODA (including GBS) was disbursed using national procedures. The 2007 PEFA exercise estimates that approximately 51% of total aid uses national procedures, and 26% of project/programme aid does. The 2007 PEFA also considers that, in line with DGCOOP estimates, approximately 80% of project aid appears on the Finance Law, which represents a significant improvement over the past few years. (See also Annex I for more information on the degree of alignment of various aid modalities in support to the education sector with national planning, budgeting and expenditure procedures.)

### 3 Basic Education in Burkina Faso

#### Education system

3.1 **Schooling system.** The formal Burkina Faso education system starts with six years of primary education, then four years of lower secondary and three years of upper secondary. It is preceded by two to three years of pre-school education. Annex E provides the educational pyramid.

3.2 **Institutions.** The responsibility for public education is shared across four ministries with significant overlapping responsibility:

- The Ministry for Social Action and National Solidarity (MASSN), in charge of pre-primary education.
- The Ministry for Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA), responsible for primary education, non formal education, training centres for primary teachers (ENEPs).
- The Ministry for Secondary and Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESSRS), responsible for secondary and tertiary education.
- The Ministry for Youth and Employment (MJE), in charge of vocational training.

3.3 **At local level,** the MEBA coordinates deconcentrated offices in 13 regions (Regional Directorate for Basic Education and Literacy –DREBA), 45 provinces (Provincial Directorate for Basic Education and Literacy – DPEBA) and 367 districts (Basic Education Circles - CEB). Such geographical organisation is replicated for the MESSRS but only at regional level. The efforts to strengthen supervision and inspection functions have led to a strategy of close supervision (*encadrement de proximité*), results-based management, and school improvement plans. Following the decentralisation reform, some educational responsibilities have been transferred to the local governments (communes – see ¶2.7 above).

3.4 Regarding **civil society**, there are 10 teachers' unions for primary teachers, but no formal appropriate framework for dialogue between the Government and the social partners. The Parents' Association (APE) and the Association of Mothers who Educate (AME) are involved in the functioning of the educational establishments, both formal and non formal, but their participation is often hampered by the illiteracy of members, and by their lack of experience in managing funds. In recent years, the decision has been taken to improve community participation in primary schools through the establishment of school-based management committees (COGES). As of today, COGES are far from operational, and their role vis-à-vis APE/AME is not fully clarified/understood.

3.5 **Role of the private sector.** The increase in enrolments at every level of education since 2000 is partially explained by the development of the private sector. The percentage of pupils in private schools in 2007 is 14% at primary level, 36.2% in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle of secondary, 33.9% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle of secondary, 76% in technical education and vocational training, and 16.5% in higher education.

## National education strategy

**3.6 The 1990s was a decade of growing interest for education in Burkina Faso.** The development of education has been established as one of the major priorities, enshrined in the 1991 constitution which stipulates that all citizens have the right to education. The 1996 Education Policy Law establishes basic education as a national priority, compulsory schooling for the 6–16 age group and the right of everyone to education without discrimination by sex, social origin, race or religion. In 1999, a national Forum on Literacy was organised to discuss the "*faire-faire* strategy" (a strategy of outsourcing) to supplement state activities and the idea of establishing a national fund for literacy and non formal education (FONAENF).

**3.7 The Ten Year Basic Education Development Plan (PDDEB, 2000–2009) was adopted on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1999.<sup>8</sup>** The PDDEB has four components: i) increasing the supply of basic education, including alternative education, and reducing socio economic, regional and gender disparities; ii) improving the quality, relevance and effectiveness of basic education and developing coherence and integration between the various levels and styles of education; iii) promoting literacy teaching and new alternative forms of education as factors that promote development and support the development of formal basic education; and vi) building capacity to lead, manage and assess centralised and decentralised sector structures, as well as the ability to coordinate external assistance. The PDDEB aimed to achieve a GER of 70% and a literacy rate of 40% by 2009.

**3.8** The GBF only launched the PDDEB in September 2002, three years after the completion of the design. Delays were due to the preparation of the programme's implementation mechanisms as the MEBA had never been in charge of piloting and managing such a complex programme before.

**3.9 Transition phase and the new policy law on basic education (2006–2007).** In 2006–2007, the mid-term review of the PDDEB and the completion of the country education status report came at an opportune time to support the Government in a significant reflection on basic education. The new Education Policy Law<sup>9</sup> introduces a new definition of basic education that covers pre-primary, primary, and post-primary education (the first cycle of secondary school, technical and vocational education and training), non-formal basic education and adult literacy. Compulsory free education, however, applies only to primary and post-primary education (6–16). This reform implies a harmonisation the between primary and secondary levels and forces all four ministries to work closely together (e.g. MASSN and MEBA on the issue of pre-school; MEBA and MESSRS on the organisation of post-primary and MESSRS and MESSRS and MJE for the development of vocational training).

**3.10 The second phase of PDDEB (2008–2010) was adopted in October 2007.** It kept the objectives of phase one: i) to improve access, equity, and expand the coverage of basic education; ii) to improve the quality, efficiency, and relevance of basic education; and iii) to strengthen sector management and monitoring in the context of the decentralisation of basic education services. More attention was paid to quality and management issues, and coverage was expanded in line with the new law.

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<sup>8</sup> Through decree number 99-254/PRES/MEBA.

<sup>9</sup> *Loi d'Orientation de l'Education* passed on 30th June 2007.

3.11 In parallel to the update of PDDEB, **other sub-sector policy** documents were prepared. The MASSN developed the National Strategy for an Integrated Development of Early Childhood (SNDIPE) along with a five year implementation plan (PQEPE 2008–2012) adopted in 2007. The National Policy for Technical Education and Vocational Training (PN/ETFP) was adopted in 2008. The MESSRS completed in September 2005 a draft for a ten year development plan for secondary and tertiary education (PDDES 2005–2014) which provided some guidance for the activities of the ministry. Within the framework of the national health policy a policy paper on health education was developed.

3.12 **Towards one coordinated vision for the education sector – the new Policy Letter.** The 2<sup>nd</sup> Education Policy Letter (2008–2015) (GBF 2008b) establishes key policy directions for the whole education system, determines the goals for each sub-sector and defines seven key principles, which could be summarised as follows: a controlled expansion of pre-primary through community-based involvement; a continuous expansion of primary towards universalisation while guaranteeing quality; a massive expansion of post-primary education through the development of new vocational training opportunities to reinforce the link between training and employment in a global perspective of upgrading the economy and socially and professionally integrating young people; and student flow regulation at the upper levels of the education system to focus on the quality of service delivery and improve external efficiency (see Annex G for a synthesis of goals and strategies).

## Progress towards EFA

3.13 Before adopting the PDDEB, Burkina Faso had one of the weakest education systems in the world. In the 2001 EFA Development Index Burkina Faso was ranked at the bottom. Since that time there has been some truly impressive growth. Annex D provides a summary of the key basic education indicators, and Annex F provides a comprehensive overview of progress towards EFA goals, and is summarised below.

3.14 **Progress since the 1990s.** A dramatic shift upwards is discernible between the 90s and the 2000s. The annual growth rate of enrolment for primary between 2001/02 and 2006/07 was 10.7% and the total number of children enrolled in primary increased from 938,238 to 1,561,256. The number of primary schools nearly doubled. The primary completion rate (PCR) rose from 19% to roughly 40% between 1991 and 2006/07. The low completion rates in basic education were due to low internal efficiency (high repetition and drop-out rates). At primary level, the introduction of automatic promotion across each two-year cycle allowed the decrease in repetition rates between 1997/98 and 2006/07 from 17% to 11.7%. The PCR<sup>10</sup> for boys is 47.2% against 36.2% for girls in 2007, but the gender gap (i.e. 11%) is smaller than the urban/rural gap (33%) or poverty gap (45.2%). The PCR for poor rural girls is still at a very low level, 12%, and it won't be possible to achieve UPC in Burkina Faso without major improvements in this category (Ndao et al 2000).

3.15 Burkina Faso has made little progress against adult illiteracy and the PDDEB 2015 target of having 40% adults literate is set to be missed. Despite some progress between 1994 (18.9%) and 2007 (28.7%), the fight against adult illiteracy remain a huge problem for the country, especially in rural areas where the literacy rate is only 19.5% in 2007 against 63.4% in urban areas.


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<sup>10</sup> The Primary Completion Rate in Burkina Faso is calculated as the rate of enrolment in last year of primary (P6)

3.16 Regarding learning outcomes, the preliminary results of the 2007 PASEC survey (see Chapter 7 for more details) seem to show a strong deterioration of Burkinabé pupils' performance in literacy and numeracy – hence the strong focus of the PDDEB II on quality issues. The expected decline in the PASEC results between 1996 and 2007, however, require a cautious interpretation, as they are likely to reflect the dramatic changes in pupil characteristics with the shift from an elitist to a more universal system in Burkina Faso. Statistics on some of the supporting inputs for quality improvements similarly illustrate how much more progress is still required. Three mathematics textbooks are allocated, on average, for four pupils (a ratio of 0.75), and more than one reading textbook for two pupils. The pupil-teacher ratio of 52 in 2005/06 is above the African average of 43 but still far from the FTI indicative benchmark of 40 for 2015. The number of instructional hours is far below the 950 hours identified in the countries which achieved UPC upon which the FTI's Indicative Framework (IF) was established. Burkinabé pupils receive an average of 475 hours of instructional time against the 850 which are officially planned at primary level.

3.17 In a study carried out by Pôle de Dakar and MEBA, pupil performance does not appear to be correlated with unit costs per pupil invested at the school level<sup>11</sup> (see Figure 3.1 below). Some schools appear to have adequate resources but do not show good results (those situated below on the right), while other schools allocated only modest means achieve better results (those situated above on the left). The graph is a reminder that learning outcomes are not simply determined by resource inputs, but depend on the complex ways in which resources are actually used in a school situation. This is not an unusual finding, but it illustrates the room for manoeuvre to move to an effective results-based management system in Burkina Faso.

**Figure 3.1 Lack of Correlation between Unit Costs and Learning Outcomes in Public Primary Schools**




Source: Pôle de Dakar & MEBA 2009

Note: Average score (on 100) at the national assessment 2005/06. Cost of teachers used as proxy for unit costs.

<sup>11</sup> Cost of teachers was used as a proxy for unit costs.

**3.18 Prospect for meeting EFA goals.** The EFA diamond indicates the position of Burkina Faso related to four EFA goals on a single chart: goals one (pre-primary gross enrolment rate - GER), two (primary completion rate), four (literacy rate of population aged 15 and above) and five (girls-boys parity index in primary education). In Burkina Faso most of the 2015 EFA targets look set to be missed (except gender parity in gross enrolment rate which was supposed to be achieved by 2005) and the country is definitely off track for the achievement of UPC by 2015. The progress to be achieved in enrolment, survival and completion remains considerable and the Government has decided to postpone the achievement of EFA goals: the UPC target is now intended to be achieved by 2020.

**Figure 3.2 EFA Diamond for Burkina Faso**



Source: UNESCO/BREDA, Burkina Faso Country Sheet, Pôle de Dakar.

## Finance for education

### Public Finance Management in the education sector

**3.19 Overall, the quality of budget preparation and execution has improved significantly since 2000.** The definition of the PDDEB and its attached annual action plan, along with the preparation of a "budget programme" and a MEBA MTEF as of 2004, have all contributed to a better linkage between planning and budgeting and improved transparency. The multiplicity of instruments (action plan, budget programme, MTEF, PIP) and the highly deconcentrated structure of the MEBA have led to heavy procedures and sometimes disconnect in time between the different instruments. This situation has improved in recent years, with the alignment of the preparation of the budget and the action plan (in timing and in content), and the progressive harmonisation of these different documents into a single programme-based budget classification.

**3.20** The lack of **predictability**, in particular at deconcentrated levels (resources arriving late in the budget year and not in the amounts planned), may progressively undermine the credibility – and therefore the quality – of the planning instruments. This concerns both the national budget (the budget revision in 2007 brought the MEBA budget down from FCFA 25.4bn to 20.9bn, a 17% decrease) and the external funding, in particular, the CAST-FSDEB (see Box 3.1).

3.21 With regard to budget execution, one of the key weaknesses lies in the execution of **investment expenditure**, due to a combination of weak mastering of procurement procedures and low capacity of building companies. Efforts have been made both at national level (new procurement procedures,<sup>12</sup> requiring each ministry to produce a procurement plan in January) and at the MEBA level (a new procurement directorate, a shift to "*maitrise d'ouvrage déléguée*"<sup>13</sup>), which have significantly improved the execution rates of investment expenditures in recent years and should contribute to improved transparency in future years.

3.22 In terms of **reporting**, the implementation of delegated credits to the DREBA and DPEBA, in particular since 2004, has contributed significantly to the accountability, transparency, and efficiency of the budget at local level (World Bank 2005b). One key weakness outlined by the 2007 PEFA, however, is the lack of timely and systematic reporting from deconcentrated levels (DPEBA, CEB, schools) on actual expenditure (See PEFA indicator PI-23) (LINPICO 2007).

3.23 A **coordinated approach to support improved PFM for basic education** has been defined through the "Plan for the improvement of financial management of the MEBA and CAST" 2008–2010. The implementation of this plan is to be funded through the CAST-FSDEB, and should start in 2009.

3.24 Public Financial Management in the education sector is strongly influenced by the existence and the specificities of the CAST-FSDEB, which uses some but not all of the national budget execution processes. (see Box 3.1)

### **Overall education expenditure**

3.25 Information on education and basic education financing is presented in Annex H.

3.26 The total education budget has increased steadily from FCFA 70.8bn in 2000 to 182.9bn in 2009 (including all sources of financing). Domestic education expenditure has increased from 2.5% of GDP in 2000 to 3.7% in 2007. As a share of the national budget, domestic education expenditure has remained more or less stable at 18–19%, after a slight drop to 16% in 2005–2007.<sup>14</sup>

3.27 **Composition.** The RESEN 2007–2009 outlines the different shares of the educational sub-sectors: higher education represents 22.1% of current expenditure in 2006, in line with the average for the continent; secondary education, however, represents only 17.3% of current expenditure in 2006, which is one of the lowest for the continent (considerably below the average of 36%). The bias of education sector expenditure towards the primary level will need to be addressed in future years, given the strong increase in demand for secondary and vocational education, logically following the strong increase in primary level access over the last ten years.

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<sup>12</sup> decret n° 207/244/PRES/PM/MFB of 9th May 2007

<sup>13</sup> Delegation of the management and oversight of school construction by the MEBA to a separate entity (public agency, NGO).

<sup>14</sup> Reminder: this excludes the budget of the MASSN, for which no information is available on the amount going to pre primary



**Box 3.1 CAST FSDEB: History and Processes**

CASTs (*Comptes Spéciaux d'Affectation du Trésor*) is a procedure defined in the PFM legislation. It provides for the possibility of derogating key PFM principles: the non-hypothecation of revenue to expenditure and yearly budgeting. CAST revenues are attributed to a set of precisely defined expenditures. Non-spent CAST money at the end of the fiscal year is automatically carried forward to the next fiscal year. Finally, any additional, unforeseen revenue does not need a revision of the Finance Law to be incorporated in the CAST.

Although the general tendency is to remove CASTs, the 2007 budget still has four, the most significant of which is the "Fund for the support of the development of basic education" (CAST-FSDEB). The "Special fund for economic and social growth", for HIPC funds, was closed by the Finance Act in the 2007 budget.

The CAST FSDEB was set up after the closure of the BPE (common PIU for education projects) on 31st December 2004. Its objectives were to move towards more harmonised and aligned aid to the MEBA. It was a compromise between donors that would have moved to SBS directly and donors who were reluctant to do so.

As such, the CAST cannot be considered as SBS<sup>15</sup> since it derogates from mainstream practices of the national budget. Its main added value for donors, nevertheless, is to allow expenditure tracking and visibility, to ensure earmarking of funds for PDDEB expenditure, to allow for execution over more than one fiscal year and finally, to provide for specific additional audits.

The *Protocole de Financement Conjoint* signed in November 2005 by four donors (France, Canada, Denmark and Netherlands) provides the overall framework for the management of the CAST-FSDEB, including common disbursement conditions for all participating partners. Belgium, Sweden and the World Bank signed in 2006.

The CAST-FSDEB supports the implementation of the PDDEB, and therefore, primary education and literacy (MEBA) until 2007 and the whole basic education sub-sector as of 2008.

Contributions to the CAST are disbursed on an account at the BCEAO, named FSDEB, which was opened on 1st July 2005. Funds are then transferred to the main treasury account based on need. This account is managed by the Treasury.

A management guide has been designed for the CAST (MEBA 2006d) which specifies that the "normal procedure" should be used for expenditures at the central level, and the "simplified procedure" should be used for expenditures at deconcentrated levels or by non-government entities (*maîtrise d'ouvrage déléguée*; transfers to APE; transfers to NGOs). Most of the CAST-FSDEB expenditure uses the simplified procedure (only 12% of the 2006 action plan expenditures were implemented through the "normal procedure").


In theory, the CAST-FSDEB intends to promote improved predictability through disbursement of the first of the two annual tranches early in the budget year, based on an assessment of performance during the October joint mission. Disbursement of the second annual tranche is foreseen for July.

To date, 6 donors have contributed to the CAST-FSDEB: Canada, Netherlands, France, Unicef, Denmark, and Sweden. Belgium and the World Bank came out of the fund in 2007 and 2008 (the former stopped its support to Burkina Faso overall, and the latter, for fiduciary reasons). Switzerland is currently in the process of joining the CAST-FSDEB.

The CAST-FSDEB has certainly proven to be additional to national resources, which have grown significantly over the period of its existence. However, its resources have not comprised additional aid, but rather have substituted for existing aid, compensating for the decrease in project aid.

Source: Authors

<sup>15</sup> For the purposes of the overall Sector Budget Support in Practice study (Mokoro and ODI 2009), Sector Budget Support is defined as those aid programmes where: (i) aid uses the normal channel used for government's own-funded expenditures. Aid is disbursed to the Government's finance ministry (or "treasury"), from where it goes, via regular government procedures, to the ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs) responsible for budget execution; (ii) the dialogue and conditions associated with the aid are predominately focused on a single sector.

**Figure 3.3 Evolution of the total education budget (2000–2009)**

Source: CID (MEBA, MESSRS) and MJE

3.28 The RESEN 2007–2009 also provides valuable information on **expenditures per pupil** per level of education in Burkina Faso in 2006, compared with the situation in Burkina Faso in 1999 and the averages for 12 comparable countries. It illustrates the relatively high cost of primary and higher secondary, as opposed to the relative under-funding of lower secondary. The relatively high cost of technical and vocational education is linked to the lack of development of this sub-sector and the relatively low number of pupils. It should also be noted that primary teacher training colleges (ENEP) are significantly more costly than higher education. Overall these figures show that significant progress was made to improve the efficiency of expenditure compared to 1999, in particular in primary education.

**Table 3.1 Estimate of Actual Expenditure Per Pupil Per Level of Education (2006)<sup>16</sup>**

	Pre primary	Primary	Secondary			Technical and vocational	Teacher training (primary)	Higher education*
			collège (a)	lycée (b)	Total (a) + (b)			
Expenditure per pupil (FCFA)	81,200	38,525	44,668	144,781	61,173	418,320	789,178	498,034
In % of GDP/per capita	35.1%	16.6%	19.3%	62.5%	26.4%	180.7%	340.9%	215.2%
<i>Index primary =1</i>	2.11	1.0	1.2	3.8	1.16	10.9	20.5	12.9
Burkina Faso 1999		25.0%	30.0%	84.0%		n/a	n/a	550.0%
Average 12 countries		11.0%	26.1%	58.1%		124.5%		224.1%

Source: RESEN \* excluding higher education abroad and scientific research

3.29 **Other sources of funding** for the education sector include NGO support, financing by the local administrations (communes), and financing by communities, in particular contributions paid by parents to Parent Associations (APE). These sources of financing are not included in the present analysis. Spending by families was estimated at approximately FCFA 43.5bn or 33% of the total recurrent expenditure in 2006. Average educational expenditure of families increased from FCFA 9,971 in primary to FCFA 119,079 in secondary technical education (Pôle de Dakar & MEBA 2009).


<sup>16</sup> Salary expenditure on the MEBA payroll for staff not working on education, and FCFA 6.5bn salary corrections not taken into account

## MEBA budget

3.30 The total MEBA budget – which covers primary education and literacy – has increased by nearly 275% between 2000 and 2009, from a total of FCFA 42.6bn to 117.7bn (including HIPC, CAST-FSDEB, projects and national budget).<sup>17</sup> The share of the *national budget* has decreased from 74% of the total MEBA budget in 2001 to 48–55% between 2002 and 2007, compensated for by earmarked HIPC resources, illustrating the fungibility of these resources. With regard to external financing, it has increased over the period from FCFA 15.3bn in 2000 to 43.4bn in 2008, with a slight decrease to 30.4bn in 2009. The sharpest increase took place in 2002–2005, in the form of additional project financing. From 2005 onwards, the CAST-FSDEB started to provide more harmonised aid, better aligned with national procedures. However, Figure 3.4 shows that this support was not fully additional but rather compensated for a decrease in traditional project support.

3.31 At the national level, domestic MEBA expenditures have represented a stable proportion of around 11% of domestic expenditure. In 2009 MEBA recurrent expenditure (financed by the national budget, HIPC, and the CAST-FSDEB) represents 64.8% of total recurrent educational expenditure. This is significantly above the IF benchmark of 50%, and according to the RESEN 2007–2009, the largest share on the continent (the average for which was 44% in 2006 for six years' primary).


**Figure 3.4 MEBA Sources of Financing (2000–2009)**



Source: see CID (see annex Annex H). Commitments data for projects and salaries; pre-payment data for HIPC and budget

3.32 Figure 3.5 presents the evolution of the MEBA budget per primary pupil. Domestic resources increased from FCFA 30 to 67 thousand per pupil between 2000 and 2006, while external resources increased even more sharply from FCFA 17 to 50 thousand per pupil, in parallel with a sharp increase in the number of pupils. Overall the amount per primary pupil increased by an average of 16% per year over the period.


<sup>17</sup> The 2009 finance law does not include FTI CF resources yet.

**Figure 3.5 MEBA Budget Per Pupil in Primary, in FCFA (2000–2006)**

Source: authors' calculations based on CID data on MEBA budget and HIPC funding (annex H) for budget data and on RESEN data for number of pupils

**3.33 MEBA budget by nature of expenditure.** Personnel expenditures trebled between 2000 and 2009 (whereas the MESSRS personnel budget doubled over the same period). The RESEN 2007–2009 calculates that recurrent expenditure excluding teachers' wages represents 42% of total recurrent expenditure, which is higher than the average on the African continent (27.4% in 2006) and as compared with the IF benchmark (33%). Just the same, the larger part of these expenditures is on non-teachers' wages, leaving little room for non-wage recurrent expenditure. Investments have tended to decrease proportionately since 2004-2005, from more than 50% of MEBA expenditures to less than 25% in 2009. This is partly due to implementation constraints and lower execution rates for investment expenditure, and partly due to the shift in aid modalities from projects to the CAST-FSDEB, which enables a more realistic classification of externally financed expenditures.

**3.34 Deconcentration.** The MEBA is one of the most deconcentrated ministries (recurrent transfers increased from 5.3% of total MEBA expenditure in 2000 to 12.8% in 2009). The following graph illustrates the breakdown of the 2007 budget and CAST-FSDEB expenditures per implementing body. The "infrastructure op" column represents the construction agencies (Faso Baara and four NGOs) that were selected to carry out "*maîtrise d'ouvrage déléguée*" for school construction.

**Figure 3.6 Share of National Budget and CAST-FSDEB in 2007, per Implementation Agency**


Source: Rapport Annuel de Suivi du PDDEB 2007 (MEBA 2008a)

**3.35 Budget execution.** Overall, MEBA budget execution has been good: domestic execution rose from 88% to 97% between 2004 and 2007. MEBA benefits from the close monitoring of its budget execution by those donors contributing general budget support. Capital budget execution has been the most problematic aspect throughout the period, though it has improved in recent years (from 38% in 2005 to 60% in 2006).

### External aid to education

**3.36** From the information provided by DGCOOP<sup>18</sup> (on actual disbursements), aid to education in 2001 represented 11.4% of total ODA, decreasing progressively to 8.5% in 2005 but then increasing to 13.4% in 2007. The graph below shows the increase in external aid to education and its significant reorientation towards the primary sub-sector between 2005 and 2007.

**Figure 3.7 Breakdown of ODA to Education per Sub-Sector (USDm)**



Source: DG COOP data (*Rapport sur la Coopération au Développement 2002, 2005 and 2007*)

Note : disaggregated data not available for 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006 – only available for year when report was available

**3.37 Aid modalities.** Aid to education evolved from exclusively project-based support until 2002, to programme based approaches coordinated through the BPE (common PIU) until 2004, and then to a mix of projects and support through the CAST-FSDEB pooled fund from 2005 onwards. According to DGCOOP information, the CAST-FSDEB represented 45% of total education sector ODA in 2007. See Box 3.1 for more details.

**3.38** The EC introduced a basic education tranche, linked exclusively to basic education conditionalities, within its GBS programme in 2005 (*Appui Budgétaire pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté 2005–2008*) which is often considered as a form of **SBS** (but is counted in ODA figures as GBS). Experience of the MEBA with SBS aid to date has not been entirely satisfactory. There has been a lack of predictability, limited additionality, and heavy transaction costs. In any case, the FTI-CF will be the first fully-fledged SBS programme in support of basic education, and in Burkina Faso as a whole.


**3.39** Although it does not provide support targeted at the education sector, the **GBS** framework (CGAB CSLP) includes education policy measures and performance indicators in its monitoring framework (Van der Linde 2008). Articulation between the GBS and SBS monitoring frameworks would merit clarification in future years, particularly if the share of SBS increases.

<sup>18</sup> This section is based on data provided by DG COOP, MEF. Note: information provided by DG COOP includes all sources of financing including NGO support when available, and is based on disbursements.

3.40 Currently, six donors support the MEBA through the CAST-FSDEB, seven others through separate projects (AfDB, IDB, Japan, WFP, Switzerland, USAID, World Bank). Some donors support the CAST-FSDEB but through separate projects (Unicef, France, Netherlands). Annex I synthesises the alignment of different types of ODA to education with national planning, budget and expenditure procedures.

3.41 Finally, overall more than 100 NGOs support the education sector. They are grouped within the *Cadre de concertation des ONG et associations actives en éducation de base au Burkina Faso* (CCEB/BF) which was set up in 1995. Figure 3.8 provides an illustration of the share of key donors supporting the education sector overall in 2007.

**Figure 3.8 Share of Direct External Contributions to the Education Sector in 2007**



Source: GBF 2007b, DGCOOP, MEF

3.42 **Predictability.** Overall, predictability of aid has improved since the early 2000s, when most donor projects in support of education suffered low execution rates and delays related to non-objection procedures. One of the main objectives of the CAST-FSDEB was to foster more predictable aid. In practice, one of the main weaknesses of the CAST-FSDEB has been the lack of predictability of its funding, both in terms of the amounts and in terms of their timing. Funding for 2005 arrived in December 2005, funding for 2006 foreseen for January arrived in March, July and December, and funding for 2006 foreseen for July arrived only partially and not until January 2007. Funding for 2007 arrived only partially due to fiduciary issues linked to the audit of the BPE and to the exit of the World Bank during the year, and the first tranche was disbursed between April and August, the second tranche between October and December (MEBA 2008).

3.43 The long term predictability of external aid in future years remains very limited. As of mid 2009, the MEBA has no information whatsoever on future aid commitments after 2010, except from the FTI/CF support which lasts until 2011.

## **PART C: THE FTI IN BURKINA FASO**





## 4 Overview of the FTI in Burkina Faso

### The FTI endorsement process

#### 2002–2003: First request and endorsement

4.1 Burkina Faso was among the first 18<sup>19</sup> countries invited to join the FTI Partnership, as early as June 2002.<sup>20</sup> This invitation was based on the fact that Burkina Faso had adopted its first PRSP in 2000 and had developed a comprehensive basic education plan: the PDDEB 2000–2010 was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1999. In the initial invitation letter, mention was made that one of the key objectives of the initiative was to offer the possibility to endorsed countries to receive additional "flexible", "long term" and "predictable" aid for primary education programmes to finance both additional recurrent and investment expenditure. This additional finance was to be announced as available from early 2003.

4.2 Following this invitation, the Burkina Faso Government, and in particular the MEBA, prepared an FTI request on the basis of the PDDEB, but presenting "accelerated" objectives, i.e. in line with the FTI Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks.

4.3 A letter from the FTI Secretariat<sup>21</sup> informed Burkina Faso of the rules for the evaluation of country requests as defined during the 24th October 2002 meeting of FTI contributing donors – the evaluation was to be carried out before the November Partnership meetings if Burkina Faso was to present its request as foreseen. This letter requested that an evaluation of the proposal be carried out in country by local donor representatives, under the leadership of the lead donor, Canada. Despite the short timeframe, an evaluation was carried out by local donors in coordination with Government. Nine donors and partners were involved: Canada, Belgium, France, Netherlands, the EC, the WFP, Catholic Relief Service (Cathwel), Plan International, and the WB. The FTI Secretariat was informed of the positive results of this evaluation just in time for the Brussels Partnership meetings, which took place on November 27th 2002.<sup>22</sup>

4.4 **The Burkina Faso request was endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meetings**, along with six other countries. Further exchanges of letters<sup>23</sup> clarified that "the donors felt that seven countries were at the stage where a long-term commitment to meet the financing requirements for basic education could now be made" and informed the Government that "work is now under way to identify more precisely the commitments by individual donors to the implementation of Burkina Faso's Fast-Track proposal" (December 2002); "encourag[ed Burkina Faso] to discuss with the Donors' local representatives how best to move ahead with the operational details and implementation schedule for [its] proposal, in light of implementation capacity, a final review of the resulting cost estimates, consistent with the indicative framework, and a review of the corresponding financial requirements, taking into account ongoing external support" and informed the Government

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<sup>19</sup> In addition, five large countries (Bangladesh, DRC, India, Nigeria and Pakistan) were also invited "for analytical and technical support".

<sup>20</sup> Letter from World Bank to MEBA Minister, 20th June 2002 (World Bank 2002)

<sup>21</sup> Letter from FTI Secretariat to MEBA Minister, 30th October 2002

<sup>22</sup> Letter from MEBA Minister to FTI Secretariat, 26th November 2002

<sup>23</sup> Letter from FTI Secretariat to MEBA Minister, 10th December 2002; Letter from FTI Secretariat to MEBA Minister, 22nd January 2003; Letter from FTI Secretariat to MEBA Minister, 2nd April 2003 – translated by authors

that "at the international level, work is also under way... to identify more precisely the financial contributions and modalities of individual Donors to support the implementation of [the Burkina Faso] proposal." (January 2003).

4.5 Finally, a letter dated April 2003 informed the Government of the outcomes of the Paris meetings held in March 2003. It mentions that

Regarding financial commitments for the 7 endorsed countries, needs for 2003 are largely covered, and a significant part of 2004 estimated needs has been mobilized", and that "a principle agreement has been reached to ... mobilize the total resources needed everywhere where needs have been identified, if the country's performance remains satisfactory. ... Additional resources will be mobilized through locally based donors in relation with their respective headquarters.<sup>24</sup>

4.6 Following this exchange of letters, there was no direct interaction between the FTI Secretariat and Burkina Faso until 2006. Due to the "donor orphan clause", despite the endorsement of its request, Burkina Faso did not have access to the Catalytic Fund resources. Two donors (France and the EC), however, established programmes "in the name of FTI" in the following, post-endorsement years. Nonetheless, it should be noted that most Government interviewees consider the financial contribution of the FTI following the 2002 endorsement as non-existent and that the additionality of these two programmes, compared with past support from these donors was negligible. The first disbursements, in any event, were not made until 2005 and 2007, respectively (see Chapter 6 for more information).

#### **Box 4.1 The Catalytic Fund, the Donor Orphan Clause and Evolution of the Expanded Catalytic Fund**

The CF was established in 2003 as a multi-donor, multi-recipient trust fund.

Between 2004 and 2006 the CF was open to so-called "donor orphan" low income countries (i.e. having fewer than five donors disbursing more than USD 1m annually) with an endorsed education sector plan (ESP). Under this concept, it aimed to provide transitional short term funding for up to three years. It was expected that this would help to establish a good performance record to attract increased and longer-term support through regular bilateral and multilateral channels ("catalytic effect").

However over time it was recognised that (i) this strategy had not worked; and (ii) for many countries access to additional funding from the CF was a major incentive for seeking FTI status.

2007 marked the start of the second phase of CF operations. The Expanded Catalytic Fund concept was approved in May 2007 to enable the CF to support all endorsed ESPs with insufficient funding, making the donor orphan criterion redundant. The CF was opened up to all IDA eligible countries. Its other explicit aim was to provide more predictable long-term financing, and provision was made to extend the implementation period from year-to-year to three years.

*Source: Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a*

4.7 Overall, local stakeholders judged the process of drafting the first request to the FTI and the subsequent as both confusing as well as involving high transaction costs. Letters exchanged were alternately in French and English, and with WB and FTI headings. Requirements evolved – as the process was defined by the FTI Secretariat: as regards the content of the request, the evaluation process, and significantly, resource mobilisation. Finally, the role and objective of the Indicative Framework (IF) was made very clear. It was understood as a set of "conditionalities" and strict guidelines to be followed in order to gain access to additional funding (see chapters 5 and 9 for more details).

<sup>24</sup> Translation by authors

## **2006–2009: Funding request and endorsement for funding by Catalytic Fund**

4.8 In 2006, during the Cairo Partnership meetings, the GBF – and its new Minister for Basic Education – pleaded for a revision of the criteria for access to Catalytic Fund financing. Following the revision of these criteria in 2007 and the establishment of the Expanded Catalytic Fund, as well as an improvised meeting between representatives of the Burkina Faso Government on mission in Washington and the FTI Secretariat, the Government was persuaded to prepare a funding request for the CF on the basis of its newly endorsed PDDEB II (phase II covering 2008–2010).<sup>25</sup>

4.9 This second request was based on an in-depth analysis of the education sector (Country Status Report, or RESEN, partly financed by the EPDF), and a long term vision of the sector based on the financial simulation model. It laid out the objective set in the PDDEB II, to achieve Universal Primary Completion in 2020, and it requested financial support from the Catalytic Fund in order to fill the financing gap identified for 2009–2011 for the whole basic education sub-sector.

4.10 The request was developed during the course of 2008, in close collaboration with all donors and partners involved in basic education. In line with the reform of the education system defined in the newly adopted *Loi d’Orientation de l’Education*,<sup>26</sup> the second FTI request encompassed the whole basic education sub-sector, i.e. including pre-primary, primary, post primary (first three years), technical and vocational training (post primary level), literacy and non-formal education. It therefore covers more than the PDDEB II which was adopted before the *Loi d’Orientation* in 2007 and does not include vocational training. It also covers more than the existing pooled fund CAST-FSDEB which does not cover post primary or vocational training. The preparation of the request, therefore, involved not only the MEBA (primary and literacy) but also three other ministries concerned: MESSRS (post primary and technical and vocational), MASSN (pre primary), and MJE (vocational training). The Ministry of Finance and Economy was also closely involved in the preparation of the request and in subsequent discussions.

4.11 Following the positive evaluation of the request by local donors (on the basis of an assessment carried out by an independent consultant), the World Bank and lead donor (Netherlands) presented it to the meeting of the Catalytic Fund Steering Committee held in Oslo in December 2008. The document initially prepared requested USD 144m to be disbursed through the existing pooled fund set up for the sub-sector (CAST FSDEB). Following last minute negotiations and agreement between the Government, the local donors and the World Bank, the request presented in Oslo finally was for USD 125m in the form of sector budget support, through a Development Policy Operation (DPO) under the supervision of the World Bank. An amount of USD 102m was endorsed by the Steering Committee, covering 2009–2011. See Chapter 6 and 9 for more information.

4.12 It should be noted that Burkina Faso’s Education Sector Plan was not formally re-endorsed since it had been endorsed previously in 2002. The 2008 process entailed the endorsement by the CF Steering Committee of the financial request.

4.13 At the time of drafting this report, discussions were continuing between the Government, the World Bank and other local partners on the precise modalities of this

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<sup>25</sup> Letter from MEBA Minister to FTI Secretariat, 12th March 2008; Letter from FTI Secretariat to MEBA, 26th March 2008. MEBA 2008d

<sup>26</sup> *Loi d’Orientation de l’Education* n° 013-2007/AN, adopted on July 30th 2007 by the National Assembly

programme (the matrix of policy measures, the amounts of the tranches and the associated capacity building programme financed by the WB). Key staff from the four ministries and from the MEF participated in a two-week mission in Washington at the end of April 2009 in order to revise the policy matrix and key elements of the programme. The first disbursement is planned for the second half of 2009.

#### Box 4.2 The DPO Modality

Burkina Faso is the first country that will benefit from CF financial support in the form of SBS implemented through a WB Development Policy Operation. The newness of this instrument is partly the reason behind the delays in the design of the CF programme. DPO procedures have been adapted (there is no Project Appraisal Document (PAD) but increased consultation with other local donors), both in order to speed up the process and to recognise the fact that the WB is but the supervising entity, not the source of funds.

While the exact modalities of the DPO are still in negotiation, some key features can already be outlined:

- Non-earmarked sector budget support disbursed directly into the Treasury account
- Annual tranches, disbursed on the basis of performance assessment during the second joint mission (October)
- Performance assessment on the basis of a 3-year matrix of policy measures agreed at the beginning of the programme
- Possibility of waiver or update of the policy matrix to avoid suspension of disbursements if progress is judged satisfactory
- No formal requirement for additionality but monitoring of budget allocations to basic education in line with 2009–2011 MTEF
- Reporting requirements aligned with existing procedures
- Complementarity with other GBS programmes (in particular WB PRSC which is also a DPO)

*Note: the DPO programme document was not available to the team at the time of the drafting this report*

*Source: Authors*

4.14 In addition to having been selected as supervising entity for the FTI-CF support, the World Bank was chosen as lead donor for the basic education sub-sector as of January 2009. This was mainly a consequence of no other donor being willing or able to mobilise the necessary capacity for this role, despite the fact that the WB had just come out of the pooled fund due to fiduciary concerns. This meant that CF funding couldn't be disbursed through the pooled fund if the WB were named as the supervising entity. The choice of the WB as lead donor – a breach of the implicit rule that lead donors should be among the donors funding the pooled fund – was made (by the other donors) both for capacity reasons and to ensure an active involvement of the WB in donor coordination mechanisms even though it had come out of the pooled fund.

4.15 Overall the process of preparing the second request, its endorsement and programme negotiation have already taken nearly one and a half years and were still on-going at the moment of writing this report. Requirements for the request itself have evolved, with additional documents being asked for at the last minute (CDMT) and other documents requested which in the end have not been necessary (FTI action plan). A video conference had to be held with the FTI Secretariat to clarify the precise requirements of the documents to be attached to the request. This lengthy process was also due to the need to finalise the RESEN and agree on the framework for the financial simulation model (in particular, the population data) as well as to discussions between Government, the local donors and the World Bank on the choice of aid modalities (between the CAST-FSDEB and sector budget support). See Chapter 9 for more information. The Indicative Framework, which was at the centre of misunderstandings during the first request, has not been mentioned as such in the second request. Nevertheless, it is used for guidance, as a

benchmark, in particular, for resource allocations, teachers' salaries and unit costs. Burkina Faso's situation vis-à-vis the IF is assessed in the RESEN, and most indicators are mentioned in the PDDEB II.

## **Funding from the FTI Catalytic Fund and the EPDF**

### **Burkina Faso funding from the FTI Catalytic Fund**

4.16 The USD 102m of funding from the Catalytic Fund approved in December 2008 for the years 2009–2011 meant that Burkina Faso would receive the fourth largest allocation from the CF<sup>27</sup> (representing 7.2% of the total CF allocations since its creation in 2003).

4.17 Burkina Faso will be the first country to benefit from a sector DPO under the supervision of the WB, with CF financing. The usual WB process for preparing a DPO was adapted and made more flexible (as explained in Box 4.2) following a request by local donors and Government. As a result, some processes had to be clarified and defined, which led to some confusion and delays. The choice of SBS as an aid modality was mainly due to the combination of the fact that the WB could not participate in the pooled fund since its withdrawal in 2007 and the refusal (by Government and other donors) that CF funding be provided through a traditional WB project (investment lending) modality. Although the MEBA had expressed initial preference for the CF funding to go through the pooled fund, both the MEF and some key donors (Netherlands and Denmark among others) were willing to use FTI CF funding to make the additional step towards more aligned aid modalities and the use of country systems.

### **Burkina Faso and the FTI capacity building trust funds: Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF) and Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)**

4.18 Burkina Faso was allocated funding from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund,<sup>28</sup> in particular, to finance the 2000 RESEN (Country Status Report). It was also allocated an amount of USD 1.3m in 2006, but this amount was never used (see chapter 8).

4.19 In recent years, the country accessed financing from the EPDF in order to support the RESEN (2007–2009) and the preparation of the DPO programme funded by the Catalytic Fund (see Chapter 8 for more details).

## **Burkina Faso and the FTI governance**

4.20 During the April 2009 Copenhagen Partnership meetings, Burkina Faso was elected to represent its peers at the Board of the Partnership. It will sit on the Board until June 2011. This is seen as a major opportunity for the country, both for gaining a better understanding of FTI processes and opportunities, and to support more efficient and relevant actions of the Partnership.

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<sup>27</sup> After Madagascar (USD 145m), Guinea (USD118m) and Kenya (USD 121m)

<sup>28</sup> The NETF is the precursor to the EPDF for Sub Saharan Africa. It was launched in 1998 and funded by Norway. It was replaced in 2006, merged with the EPDF, consolidating Norwegian funding with that of other FTI partners. As such, the NETF cannot be considered as an FTI input.



## 5 The FTI and Education Policy and Planning

### Context

5.1 Chapter 3 highlights the salient features in education policy and planning prior to 2002 (as Burkina Faso prepared its first proposal to join the EFA-FTI partnership that year) and in 2008 (as Burkina Faso decided to re-engage with the FTI through a funding request to the FTI Catalytic Fund in 2008). Overall the period saw a strong focus on primary education by donors and Government, which led to a dramatic improvement in primary enrolment rates and a reduction in gender inequalities, although challenges remain daunting with regard to achieving UPC, reducing inequalities and improving the quality of education. The move towards stronger coordination between the four ministries involved in the education sector should also be underlined, as well as the progressive improvement in the content and coverage of plans and strategies in the education sector.

5.2 In particular with regard to the PDDEB, the second phase has clearly drawn on the lessons from the implementation of the PDDEB I:

- Better communication around PDDEB down to deconcentrated level.
- The long term vision included reference to MDG 2 but was readjusted to achieve UPC by 2020. The knowledge base for policy development was consolidated on the basis of the findings of the RESEN (Ndao et al 2000). The available resources for basic education and the costing of expenditure for particular education reforms have been better estimated.
- The linkages between the programming tools and the budget have improved (see Chapter 6).
- The long term basic education vision was better translated into short term plans. The timeliness of annual action plans improved. Moreover top-down planning has been coupled with a bottom-up planning approach, improving the participatory nature of the whole process. Schools, DPEBA and DREBA are preparing annual plans which are consolidated at each relevant level.

### Non-FTI inputs and activities over the period

5.3 Three non-FTI activities are worth mentioning in the area of policy dialogue and strategic planning in education.

5.4 **Education sector commission for PRSP.** Within the PRSP framework, six sector commissions, chaired by the heads of ministerial departments, were asked to ensure that sector policies were in line with the national poverty reduction strategy, to assess progress in implementing sector policies and to prepare implementation status reports. This inter-ministerial framework provided the internal incentive for strategic planning in order to align education sector priorities with poverty reduction strategies. MEBA was one of the front line ministries identified to operationalise the PRSP through the implementation of PDDEB.

5.5 **PDDEB bi-annual joint reviews.** Within the education sector, the basic education sub-sector led by MEBA is the most advanced in institutionalising a policy dialogue framework between a wide range of education stakeholders through PDDEB bi-annual joint reviews. The joint reviews of PDDEB merge high level education policy issues (e.g. the operationalisation of free basic education; the impact of decentralisation reforms on school management) with micro planning and the management of activities (e.g. approval of annual action plans; the review of specific donor disbursement mechanisms). See Chapter 7 for more details.

**5.6 PDDEB thematic working groups.** In parallel with the joint reviews, four joint thematic groups have been established on "access", "quality", "piloting and capacity development" and "financial management". They are in charge of analysing particular themes to be reported on during the joint review (preparation of evidence-based documentation) and to ensure the follow-up and implementation of recommendations from the previous review.

## FTI inputs and activities over the period

**5.7** The Dakar declaration (World Education Forum 2000¶48) asserts that "no countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources". The Declaration made by the President of the World Bank in Dakar emphasised that "no country with a credible education development program should be unable to implement it because of a lack of resources" launching the quest for "credible plans". It led to the elaboration of the FTI Indicative Framework, the promotion of education Country Status Report (CSR/RESEN) and the use of an education financial simulation model. Although these tools were initially developed by the World Bank, they are strongly promoted by FTI procedures – as was the case in Burkina Faso: the RESEN was seen as an essential pre-requisite to develop the analytical basis for a credible Education Sector Plan required for endorsement by the FTI (essentially by the WB, as an afterthought by other donors), and the financial simulation model is seen as a key instrument to ensure good quality costing. The FTI IF, the RESEN and the financial simulation model constitute the "core FTI inputs" to help define credible education policies and strategic planning (FTI 2006b). We review each of these three inputs in the light of Burkina Faso's experience.

**5.8 Indicative Framework.** The analysis of the education system of Burkina Faso through the policy parameters included in the FTI Indicative Framework started during a World Bank seminar held in Tunisia in July 2002 and attended by MEBA officials. The idea was to discuss in detail the implications of Burkina Faso's eligibility for the FTI. The breakdown of expenditure per student at primary level highlighted the following in Burkina Faso: high teachers' salaries (in units of per capita GDP) and high pupil teacher ratios despite some progress during the 90s (see Table 5.1). In 2002, the level of teachers' salaries prevented the recruitment of new teachers into the system and implicitly maintained high pupil teacher ratios in schools. It was argued at the time that Burkina Faso had made the choice of teachers over the choice of children in its policies.

**Table 5.1 Disaggregation of the Expenditure per Student at Primary Level**

	Salaries of teachers (per capita GDP)		Pupil-Teacher Ratio		Unit Cost (per capita GDP)	
	1993	1998	1993	1998	1993	1998
Burkina Faso	8.2	6.8	58	49	0.21	0.22
French speaking African Countries	5.6	-	49	-	0.15	
English speaking African Countries	3.6	-	39	-	0.10	
Low income Asian Countries	2.5	-	38	-	0.08	

Source: World Bank 2002, "Deux études pour la scolarisation primaire universelle dans les pays du Sahel en 2015".

**5.9** At the heart of the discussions in September 2002 was the position of Burkina Faso vis-à-vis the IF (especially the indicator on teachers' salaries as a multiple of per capita GDP) and the way towards a better alignment with the IF benchmarks in the period to 2015. The World Bank argued that the credibility of Burkina Faso's FTI request would rely upon the objective criteria of the IF. Letters from the FTI Secretariat to Government also implied that



the request was to be "consistent with" the IF benchmarks.<sup>29</sup> The systematic reference to the IF to guide policy reforms aimed at addressing the key efficiency constraints in Burkina Faso was difficult for the Government to accept. It perceived the discussion as pressure to cut expenditure (recurrent expenditure through teachers' salaries, and capital expenditure through unit costs in school construction) and identified the IF as a new set of conditionalities in the same vein as those established during the structural adjustment period.

5.10 However, in 2002, MEBA was just starting the implementation of PDDEB and did not want to lose any opportunity to acquire additional resources that might enable the scaling up of the Plan. So finally, it submitted a request to the FTI in line with the IF 2015 benchmark and the objective of achieving UPC in 2015 (see below).

5.11 **Education Country Status Report.** The first education country status report (CSR/RESEN) was done in Burkina Faso in 2000, financed by the NETF and the World Bank and carried out by the World Bank. The main findings highlighted that Burkina Faso was far from being on track to reach the education MDGs and reiterated that the expansion of primary education was constrained by high unit costs. The findings of the RESEN were not well received at the time, especially the focus on the high salaries of teachers in relation to per capita GDP.

5.12 Given the difficult past experience with RESEN, it was decided in 2006 that the new CSR would not be entirely financed by the World Bank, and that support from the EPDF would be requested to promote the neutral character of the study. Secondly, the RESEN would be managed as a capacity building exercise in data analysis. Launched in 2007, it took around 18 months for the education sector analysis to be completed.

5.13 **The Education Finance and Cost Simulation** is a programming tool elaborated simultaneously with the education Country Status Report/RESEN.

5.14 **Simulation model and FTI proposal in 2002.** The simulation model was first presented by the WB to the GBF during the preparation of the FTI request in September 2002. The baseline year was established using the data gathered and analysed in the 2000 education RESEN. The WB explained at the time that the use of the simulation model to justify a high funding gap was not the purpose of the model and could play against the credibility of Burkina Faso's proposal to the FTI. For each policy parameter targeted, the FTI proposal referred to policy measures already included in the PDDEB (e.g. for the reduction of the repetition rate: the organisation of the primary education into three sub-cycles with an option of repetition at the end of each sub-cycle only; for teachers' salaries: the transfer of educational establishments to local governments).

5.15 **Simulation model and policy discussions between 2003 & 2007.** Following a request from MEBA to better master the simulation model, UNESCO/BREDA, through the Pôle de Dakar organised a training session of key MEBA staff (especially PDDEB Secretariat staff) in March 2004. The purpose of the mission – financed by the WB – concerned the feasibility of EFA in Burkina Faso and examined the cost drivers and trade-offs in basic education policy.

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<sup>29</sup> Umansky and Crouch 2006, in Buse 2007: "In certain countries, like Burkina Faso, the government and the Ministry of Education, in particular, perceived pressure from donors to move toward certain indicative benchmarks such as those that correspond to domestic funding for education and teacher salary levels."

**5.16 Simulation model and FTI-CF request 2008.** Following the update of the education CSR (RESEN) in 2007/09, the baseline year of the simulation model was updated to 2006. In parallel, the improved availability of data on technical education and vocational training, secondary education (cycle 1 and 2) and tertiary education made possible the extension of the model to cover all levels and types of education. The principal levers of education policy were then manipulated to define the new long term vision for the education sector for 2020. The simulation exercises highlighted the cost implications of the new law on basic education. The simulation model also served as a basis for phase two of the PDDEB and for the preparation of the request to the Catalytic Fund.

## **The relevance of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning**

**5.17** The main role of the FTI in Burkina Faso until 2009 has been to provide "intellectual" more than "financial" support to education policy and planning. Its intellectual influence can be unpacked looking at its focus i) on UPC for the monitoring of education system performance at primary level; ii) on primary education in the framework of EFA goals; iii) on high level policy trade-offs; and iv) on costs and efficiency in the use of resources. Each of these focal areas has been relevant in the case of Burkina Faso to the extent that they were appropriate to the country's needs and priorities and adequate to identify policy gaps.

**5.18 Focus on the three dimensions of UPC (completion, quality and equity).** The focus on completion rather than enrolment (or UPC rather than UPE) allowed a reassessment of the performance of Burkina Faso's educational system and the remaining distance the country must cover in order to reach MDG 2 by 2015. The GBF used to document primary GER and gross intake rate in grade one to assess performance of the primary education sub-sector in the PDDEB. These rates used to give a more favourable picture of the education situation, minimising the efforts required and the reforms to be implemented to scale-up the system. While representing a much more demanding target, completion was relevant to challenge retention in the primary cycle (Burkina Faso had high repetition rates of around 18% in 2002 leading to significant drop-out). Although initially the issue of completion was raised during the 2000 RESEN, the shift of focus towards UPC was accelerated by the preparation of the 2002 FTI request, in particular through the discussions around the IF benchmarks.

**5.19** In addition, focusing on completion took into consideration the quality dimension in primary education service delivery. Based on the evidence that a minimum of six years of schooling was necessary for pupils to become literate adults, the emphasis on primary completion helped challenge the teaching-learning process in primary school and to promote reflection on factors affecting educational quality. This focus helped balance considerations of access (the primary focus of PDDEB) with those of quality. Given the fact that 80% of the Burkinabé population remained illiterate in 2000 and that the MEBA was investing public resources in adult literacy and non formal education for youth, such a focus was relevant.

**5.20 Focus on primary and the sequencing of education investments towards the EFA goals.** Burkina Faso had the lowest primary completion rate in the world at the turn of the century. Therefore, the FTI's focus on the primary cycle was particularly relevant in a country where scarce resources needed to be invested where the highest returns could be achieved for the individuals and the society as a whole.

**5.21** During the preparation of the first request to the FTI in 2002, discussions had taken place in the country concerning the possibility of including adult literacy and non-formal education in its request, given the high priority placed on these sub-sectors by Government

(and included in the PDDEB). Two arguments worked in favour of such inclusion: i) the immediate need to increase the stock of human capital in the country as a necessary condition for development (PRSP); and ii) the intergenerational educational impact of parental education (as educated parents were more likely to send their children to school). It was then argued that additional funding for UPE would release funds which could be invested in adult literacy and non formal education. The priority given to primary was not supposed to distort investments away from the other EFA goals.

5.22 In 2008 the GBF included pre-school, primary, post-primary, adult literacy and non-formal education in its FTI request to the Catalytic Fund. This request corresponded to the recent evolution in the education sector (new law on Basic Education) and to the coverage of phase two of the PDDEB. The extension of the areas to be covered by the FTI was consistent with: i) progress made at primary level between 2002 and 2008; ii) the growing set of evidence of a positive impact on attendance and retention at primary level of early childhood education; iii) the anticipated pressure on the post-primary cycle; and iv) persistence of challenges in achieving adult literacy (the very low progression of the adult literacy rate).

5.23 The **economic approach underpinning the FTI** and illustrated in the Indicative Framework's indicators on resource mobilisation and costs (average teachers' salary as a multiple of per capita GDP and the unit cost of an equipped classroom) was not initially well received in Burkina Faso. The fact that communication around the FTI's processes was almost exclusively done through the World Bank did not help, because of the past difficult experience of structural adjustment programmes during the 90s. The FTI Indicative Framework benchmarks were seen as a new set of conditionalities for the education sector. The perception at the time was that the country had to comply with the IF in order to get additional resources. However, the passage from a solely pedagogic perspective to a more balanced approach, integrating the economic dimension of the education system, modified radically the vision of the education system in Burkina Faso. The FTI's contribution helped link the dynamics of the education system to those of the economy (e.g. how to recruit and pay more teachers to ensure a credible move towards a quality primary education for boys and girls) and the society (e.g. questions around the purposes of education at each cycle, the continuity of education from pre primary to tertiary for all children and the external efficiency of the system).

## The effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning

5.24 **Boost to policy dialogue on strategic issues.** The various FTI procedures (request formulation and appraisal using Indicative Framework, RESEN evidence and finance and cost simulation model) helped improve dialogue on key policy issues as well as build consensus on the strengths and weaknesses of the education system and the necessary reforms to be implemented. Different levels of policy dialogue have been boosted by FTI procedures:

- *Dialogue between the four Ministries in charge of the education sector.* The anticipated broader coverage of FTI support in 2008 stimulated high level discussions between MEBA, MASSN (pre primary), MESSRS (post-primary) and MJE (vocational training). The discussion around student flow parameters across levels and types of education (e.g. from primary to vocational training and to post-primary) is one example of a strategic policy issue that was debated. The FTI procedures clearly boosted the horizontal liaison of the technical departments (e.g. planning units) of the four ministries, involving senior staff for the first time in discussions of a common vision for the education sector.

- *Dialogue between MEBA and social partners (APE, teachers' unions).* The results of the education country status report and their dissemination to a wide range of education stakeholders, including social partners, helped reinforce dialogue based on factual data (e.g. on the one hand, MEBA needs to recruit more than 5,000 teachers per year to cope with high demand without increasing the PTR; but on the other hand, 25% of the teaching staff on the MEBA payroll occupies non-education-related posts in Government).

**Table 5.2 Channels of FTI Influence Towards Good Practices in Strategic Planning**

"Old practices"	"Good practices"	Channels of FTI's influence
<b>PROCESS</b>		
Technical exercise done by a small team sometimes outside MOE; weak communication between MOE & other ministries; weak consultation of national education stakeholders or development partners. MOE dependant on fiscal trade-offs made by MOF.	Consensus building exercise around key policy reforms with broader range of stakeholders incl. development partners. MOE in position to inform/influence fiscal decisions	-Draft FTI proposal and appraisal processes (2002 & 2008) -Education Country Status Report (2008)
<b>CONTENTS</b>		
Setting-up of unrealistic goals/targets inconsistent with each other (e.g. Intake Rate and PCR: 100% for the same year).	Ambitious but realistic education goals/targets coherent with each other.	-Education Country Status Report (2008) -Education Finance and Cost simulation Model (UPC postponed to 2020)
Disconnect between long term vision (if one exists) and medium-term/short term policies.	Short/medium term strategies derived from long term vision for the education sector.	-Education Finance & Cost simulation Model
Sub-sector education policies disconnected with each other (e.g. goal of PCR 100% not integrated in post-primary policies); or successive unrelated projects.	Integrated sector-wide policies with anticipation across levels of education of the enrolments' dynamics.	-Draft FTI proposal and appraisal procedures (2008) with an extension of FTI's support to pre-primary, post-primary, vocational training, technical education, adult literacy & non-formal education -Education Finance & Cost simulation Model
No priorities/Implicit policy trade-offs (e.g. primary teachers' salary versus pupil/teacher ratios).	Setting up of priorities /Explicit policy trade-offs.	-Indicative Framework -Education Country Status Report -Education Finance & Cost simulation Model
"Opinions" inform policy making (e.g. "multigrade classes /contract teachers are bad for quality").	Evidence-based education policy reforms.	Education Country Status Report.
Input-oriented plan.	Results-oriented education policies/strategies.	-Indicative Framework -Education Finance & Cost simulation Model
On costs and finance -Non-costed shopping list per level of education -Focus on investment projects (eg: school/classroom; textbooks etc.) -Focus on external aid	On costs and finance -Costed education strategies -Both recurrent and investment expenditure taken into consideration -Both domestic and external resources included	-Indicative Framework -Education Finance & Cost simulation Model

Source: Authors

5.25 **Improvement of strategic planning for credible plans.** Table 5.2 above summarises the FTI's influence in the process of moving from "old practices" to "good practices" in strategic planning, looking at the consultation process, the knowledge base underpinning sector policy, the strategic long term direction (goals), the linkages of medium term/short term plans with a long term vision, the linkages across sub-sectors, the setting of priorities, and the finance and cost elements.

**Table 5.3 FTI and Induced Policy Reform in Burkina Faso**

Indicative Framework indicators on Student flow and Education service delivery	Policy reforms stimulated
<b>Student flows</b>	
Intake into first grade, total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Supply side policies: increase of school availability &amp; capacity through double shifts and multi grade classes; reduction of grade repetition, recruitment &amp; training of more teachers</li> <li>-Demand side policies: <i>mobilisation</i> campaign for girls enrolment; subsidisation of PTA's fee for girls in grade 1, support to school canteens established by communities</li> </ul>
Primary completion rate, total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Supply side policies: completion of schools to offer the whole cycle of primary from grade 1 to grade 6; improvement of environmental conditions (water &amp; sanitation for boys and girls)</li> <li>-Demand side policies: community mobilisation</li> </ul>
% repeaters among primary school pupils	-Communication campaign for head teachers and teachers to help understand the adverse effects of high repetition rates (drop-out)
<b>Service delivery</b>	
Pupil-teacher ratio in publicly-financed primary schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Equitable deployment of teachers among schools/classes: regionalisation of teachers' recruitment coupled with better allocation within provinces;</li> <li>- Redefinition of multi grade class policy in rural areas with low population density ( e.g. focus on training of teachers, supervisors &amp; inspectors, revision of allowances scheme to prevent anarchic opening of multi-grade classes, phasing-out multi grade classes with new constructions</li> </ul>
Average annual salary of primary school teachers:	-Volunteer teachers' scheme to complement the 3000 contract teachers recruited annually. (2500 volunteers will be recruited annually from 2009 for three-year contracts )
Recurrent spending on items other than teacher remuneration as % of total recurrent spending on primary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Free textbooks and supplies to all children</li> <li>- Free teachers' guides for all teachers</li> </ul>
Annual instructional hours	-Focus on the increase in the total number of instructional hours through sensitisation of school teachers, adjustment of school time table to fit local contexts and community <i>mobilisation</i>
Private share of enrolments % of pupils enrolled in exclusively privately-financed primary schools	Support and collaborate with non government schools
Unit cost of an equipped classroom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Diversification of school construction operators</li> <li>-Support to poor communities to build and expand facilities</li> </ul>

Source: Authors

**5.26 Stimulation of policy reforms.** Despite being controversial, the FTI Indicative Framework and related procedures have been used for policy reform in Burkina Faso, in particular, during discussions concerning requests to the FTI in 2002–2003 and in 2008–2009 (see Table 5.3 above)

**5.27 Contribution to the acceleration of progress.** It is reasonable to think that the "intellectual revolution" induced by the FTI's procedures since 2000 on the way to analyse, conceive and implement a sound credible plan for primary education, contributed, along with other existing processes, to the acceleration of progress towards UPC. The FTI's contribution – in particular through discussions around the 2002 and 2008 requests, accelerated the focus on UPC, promoted a more thorough linkage of objectives with policies, inputs and costing, and provided a comprehensive framework for analysis and discussion of cost drivers in the education sector.

## **Efficiency of the FTI's contribution to education policy and planning**

**5.28 Regarding FTI procedures (request/appraisal),** Burkina Faso provides a good example that adequate communication matters once a new initiative is launched at global level to ensure its full buy-in by identified beneficiaries at the local level. While in 2002 the rules of the game were not clearly established to operationalise the new compact for education, the in-country process was rushed<sup>30</sup> creating confusion (linkages between the FTI, PDDEB and the EFA plan) and resistance (the IF seen as new set of conditionalities for donors to provide aid to education). The ineligibility of Burkina Faso to the Catalytic Fund and the vague understanding of what the quality label of the FTI could offer through a catalytic effect reinforced the fact that the FTI was seen as a missed opportunity at that time.

**5.29 Regarding the analytical tools** promoted by the FTI to enhance a sound education strategy and to prepare credible plans, they became internalised only when supported and promoted over a long period of time. It took 18 months for the 2007–2009 analysis to be completed, but the diagnostic analysis is now used as a basis for the Education Sector Strategy, whereas the 2000 RESEN, which was carried out in a few months, was much less efficient in promoting policy change. It took several short term support missions over six years for the simulation model to become a strategic tool manipulated by the planning and M&E departments of MEBA (DEP and SP/PDDEB), but it is now the reference tool which underpins sector-wide integrated strategies.

## **Sustainability**

**5.30 Regarding policy, ownership** in the education sector improved and is likely to continue with the high level priority given to the sector in the country's political agenda. There is a shared long term vision for the education sector which will help streamline gradually strategies and policies implemented in each of the sub sectors. The recent involvement of the four ministries in charge of the education sector for the preparation of the Catalytic Fund application is likely to be strengthened in the future. The choice of non-earmarked SBS for CF support has catalysed the move towards a strengthened sector wide policy dialogue.

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<sup>30</sup> Burkina Faso was invited to join the newly established global partnership in June 2002, accepted the invitation in August, received a 3 day World Bank support mission in September, drafted and submitted its proposal in October which was then positively appraised by LDG in November and endorsed at the end of 2002. See Chapter 4 for more details.

5.31 At the basic education level, there is a common understanding of the challenges ahead, an open and constructive dialogue on the priority areas to be addressed and a wide range of technical and financial partners supporting the system. The risks are attached to the potential failure in the implementation of the strategies. A strong focus is required on capacities at all levels to ensure the efficient management of the exponential numbers of schools, teachers and teaching and learning materials. If the rapid expansion of the system is damaging for quality, this might have an adverse effect on further demand for primary education. Moreover the strategy selected to promote training opportunities for those completing primary school and to release the pressure on upper basic education requires that the innovation of relevant TVET cycles for ages 12–15 is quickly operationalised. The sustainable reduction of adult illiteracy relies upon the above-mentioned conditions.

5.32 Regarding strategic planning, the role model provided by MEBA is valued internally by the MEF and other education ministries, and MEBA is likely to retain its comparative advantage with the programme-based approach. The major challenge for MEBA is to lead the movement towards a sector wide, integrated planning process and the extension of PDDEB to a development plan linked to a medium term expenditure framework for the whole sector.

5.33 At a micro planning level, the transfer of responsibilities and resources to local governments to deliver education services introduces a new actor in the planning loop. The linkages between the routine planning activities implemented by the regional and provincial directorates and the emerging ones at decentralised level have not been clearly thought through to improve the credibility of the annual planning exercise.





## 6 The FTI and the Financing of Education

### Context for FTI financing

**6.1 Resources and PFM.** Chapter 3 provides a detailed overview of education finance since 2000, both domestic and external, and of PFM issues. Box 6.1 below outlines the influence of GBS and HIPC funding on the education and basic education budget. HIPC funding was an important precursor to the impetus for increasing expenditure on basic services, as well as a precursor in terms of providing targeted resources to basic education through a CAST.

#### Box 6.1 GBS and HIPC Influence on Budget Allocations for Basic Education

In the 90s, the WB and EC programme aid operations were usually linked to targets for social sector spending (seen as a safeguard during structural adjustment).

Since 1998, the conditionality attached to the HIPC funds, right from the outset, was related to the fact that the bulk of the additional expenditure would be made in the basic social sectors. Regarding basic education, this involved classroom construction, recruitment of contract teachers, scholarships and textbooks in 20 of the most disadvantaged provinces – 2000/01. The total HIPC envelope varied between 1.6% and 6.2% of the total budget, including external financing, over 2000–2004.

In parallel, GBS conditionality in the 2000s has included a strong focus on MEBA budget and budget execution.

GBS remains the key to success in creating the PDDEB, because these new schools could not work if, at the same time, the general budget of the State was unable to assume responsibility for the remuneration of thousands of new teachers who have had to be recruited to respond to the expansion in pupil numbers. The teacher salary bill has in fact grown by 15.3% per year [over 2000–2004], which could never have been achieved with the domestic resources of the Burkinabé budget alone. Moreover, we know that it is highly improbable that either projects or classic sector approaches could assume responsibility for these salary costs, because the costs are permanent, by definition, and always exceed the time horizon of the projects.

The HIPC effect is undeniable with regard to the volume of resources available to the basic social sectors. Due to absorption problems this effect is somewhat less in terms of expenditures, but still significant.

Source: Lanser et al 2006. Box B3.1 p39, and p78

**6.2 Financing gap.** The PDDEB 2000–2009 does not identify a financing gap as such, but considers the availability of financial resources as a constraint among others, which it proposes to enhance through increasing the share of the MEBA budget in the total budget, increasing the focus of external aid on primary education, increasing the participation of local populations and reducing unit costs. According to the PDDEB, proposed resource mobilisation measures will provide enough resources to finance the plan.

**6.3** The second phase of the PDDEB (PDDEB II 2008–2010) provides a renewed estimate of the financing needs based on revised targets and on the enlargement of the PDDEB coverage to the whole basic education sector (except technical and vocational training). Using the financial simulation model, the PDDEB II identifies financing needs, i.e. the gap between existing resources and estimated needs to achieve the PDDEB objectives.

**6.4** Both in the PDDEB I and in the PDDEB II, assessments of financing needs are based on objectives set out in the PDDEB. Therefore, they do not correspond to the financing gaps as referred to in the Dakar Declaration nor in the GMRs, which, broadly define the gap as the difference between current levels of expenditure on (basic) education

and the levels of expenditure that would be necessary to sustain achievement of (some or all) of the EFA goals.<sup>31</sup>

## FTI inputs and activities

6.5 On the financing side, FTI inputs can be summarised as: (i) 2002–2007: preparation of the request and the catalytic effect on donor funds following the 2003 endorsement; (ii) 2008–2009: preparation of the request and endorsement for CF financing of USD 102m over 2009–2011; (iii) a small financial input from EPDF; and (iv) the financial simulation model, the indicative framework benchmarks and RESEN 2007–2009. Although no actual financing has yet been received by Burkina Faso from the CF, it is worth emphasising that throughout the evaluation team's meetings with the Government and the LDG, the FTI's value to Government and the education sector was seen primarily as a source of finance.

6.6 **The 2002 request** was aligned with the benchmarks of the IF, since this was the understanding of FTI requirements at the time (see chapter 5 and 7). It presents an acceleration of progress towards EFA compared to the PDDEB drafted three years earlier. In particular, the main differences between the 2002 FTI request and the 2000–2009 PDDEB are the following: objective to decrease the share of primary education in the overall education expenditure to 55% in 2015 in the PDDEB revised to 50% in the request; GER target increased from 80% in 2015 in the PDDEB to 100% in 2015 in the request. The request also introduces the objective to reach a PCR of 100% in 2015. Finally, the request includes a significant decrease in the teacher salary for new recruits to 3.6 times GDP/capita, in line with the IF benchmark. The financing gap identified in the 2002 request (using the financial simulation model developed through the 2000 RESEN financed by the World Bank) would therefore be more closely in line with the financing gap as conceived in the Dakar Declaration. Nevertheless, as recognised by most interviewees, the objectives set out in the request were highly unrealistic and over-ambitious. As a result, the 2002 request was not used as a reference for the remainder of the implementation of the PDDEB.

6.7 **Catalytic effect.** Following the endorsement of the request in 2003, two donors provided support "in the name of FTI". France set up two projects in support of EFA and the PDDEB signed in 2003: one financed by AFD for USD 10.7m, and one financed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry for USD 15.8m. The EC included a "FTI basic education tranche" in its GBS programme (5m Euros per year maximum). Nevertheless, both France and the EC had previous programmes in support to basic education,<sup>32</sup> and it was unlikely that they were going to stop their support. The catalytic effect was therefore both a rebranding of existing support and an increase in the average annual amount of disbursements (from USD 2.1 to USD 8.8m per year for France and from USD 2.1 to USD 5m per year for the EC). Its overall effect on the amount of financing available was marginal compared to total ODA to basic education – USD 82m in 2005. In addition, both programmes started disbursements with significant delays after the 2003 endorsement: France, in December 2005 and the EC, in July 2007.

6.8 Other donors began contributing to the education sector between 2002 and 2006, such as Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan and the USA, or significantly scaled up their support to basic education such as the WB, Canada and the Netherlands, but none clearly made the link between their support and the FTI. In the case of Denmark, for

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<sup>31</sup> See Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009b Box 2.3.

<sup>32</sup> France: *Programme d'appui à l'enseignement de base 1996-2002*, USD 2.3 m and *Projet d'Amélioration de l'Offre Educative au Burkina Faso 2001-2005*, USD 8.5m. EC: *Programme d'Appui au Secteur de l'Education de Base 1999-2004*, USD 10,7m.

example, the choice to support the education sector in Burkina Faso came both from progress in developing and implementing the PDDEB, and from HQs, in relation to commitments made at international conferences, and was therefore not related specifically to the endorsement of the country's request by the FTI. Overall, according to data from the Finance Law provided by MEBA, financing needs/projections set out in the PDDEB 2000-2009 were met over the period. Even the financing needs identified in the 2002 FTI request were met. This should nevertheless be tempered by the fact that the data from the Finance Law only provides information on donor commitments, and that execution rates of foreign aid projects in the early years of the PDDEB were particularly low. See Table H.4 in Annex H for more details.

**6.9 The preparation of the 2008 request** implied a re-evaluation of the financing gap of the PDDEB II, in order to take into account the reform of the education sector, to update population data with the 2006 preliminary census results and to re-evaluate needs as of 2008. Unlike in 2002, the objectives outlined in the PDDEB II were used as a basis for the request and were not updated to match EFA goals. The financing gap calculated, therefore, is based on an achievement of UPC in 2020 and not in 2015, and encompasses pre-primary, post-primary, technical and vocational training.

**6.10** The financing gap was initially estimated at USD 144.9m for 2009–2011. A revised estimate of USD 125m was presented at the CF Steering Committee meeting and a final amount of USD 102m was finally endorsed. The minutes of the meeting mentions that the amount endorsed was determined through a "revised step-down formula", without further explanation.<sup>33</sup> Other explanations for this revised amount, provided by interviewees during the mission, are changes in other donor commitments, and changes in exchange rates. See Chapter 4 for more details. According to the CDMT 2009–2011, foreseen FTI CF financing for the period would represent respectively 10.1%, 9.4% and 7.3% of total expenditure to education in 2009, 2010 and 2011,<sup>34</sup> and 16.5%, 18.7% and 0.3% of total MEBA expenditure, increasing to 21.2%, 23.5% and 0.5% of MEBA expenditure financed through the budget (including GBS and SBS).

**6.11 Mobilisation of domestic resources.** The financial simulation model and the RESEN analysis, developed and used in preparation of the 2002 and 2008 requests (see Chapter 5), have both contributed to strengthening the link between plans, objectives, and financing needs, and thereby support the capacity of MEBA to argue for an increased share of national resources. The IF indicators were also used as a guideline in the elaboration of the financial simulation model, both in 2002 and in 2008. Discussions around IF indicators and benchmarks, and outcomes of the RESEN, promoted analysis of intra and inter-sectoral trade-offs and a stronger focus on cost efficiency issues. Finally, the choice of SBS as a financing modality for the CF meant that both MEF and MEBA gave stronger attention to these issues in the preparation of the request and of the subsequent DPO programme.

## **The relevance of the FTI to education financing in Burkina Faso**

**6.12** The **objective of the FTI to fill the financing gap** to allow scaling up of progress towards the EFA goals – and in particular MDG 2, was relevant to Burkina Faso. The objective to mobilise additional funds thanks to a catalytic effect on existing donor support following the endorsement of the strategy by the FTI partnership was also relevant in a country where a significant number of donors were already involved in the education sector.

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<sup>33</sup> FTI Catalytic Fund Committee Meeting Oslo, Norway—December 13-14, 2008 Minutes

<sup>34</sup> Using an exchange rate of FCFA464 for USD 1, and assuming a breakdown of funds per year as per the request

6.13 Nevertheless, experience of the two requests in Burkina Faso shows that the **definition of the financing gap** as implied in the Dakar conference (the difference between resources available and the financing needs to achieve UPC by 2015) leads to the setting of un-realistic targets compared to the country's implementation constraints. As a result, the 2002 request appears as un-realistic. Based on the lessons drawn from the 2002 request, the 2008 request's estimation of financing needs remains in line with the PDDEB II objectives of achieving UPC by 2020. As recognised by most stakeholders, this approach is more realistic and takes into account both implementation capacity (limits to the number of schools possible to build, to the number of teachers possible to hire) and the Government's willingness to keep aid dependency within reasonable limits.

6.14 **The choice of SBS for CF funding** as of 2009 is relevant in the context of existing aid modalities and the dynamic at the local level, and of Burkina Faso's financing needs. The choice of SBS will allow CF funding to contribute to increases in recurrent expenditure funded by the national budget such as the scaling up of teacher recruitment and recurrent expenditure at school level. It also contributes to the existing dynamic towards more aligned aid modalities in support of the PDDEB, representing the next step four years after the launch of the CAST-FSDEB. The choice of SBS appears relevant in a context where most donors involved in the education sector also provide GBS (Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, France, Denmark, WB, AfDB, and EC), where budget allocation and execution processes are credible and transparent, and where the education planning, budgeting and M&E systems have been considerably strengthened over the past years.

### Box 6.2 Advantages of the Move to SBS

The transition to SBS should be envisaged because the functioning of the CAST will require numerous, lengthy and costly changes to be improved. This instrument could not adapt to the further deconcentration of credits that would allow a true improvement of the management and quality of the education system ...

Today, the deconcentrated activities funded by the state are executed at all levels, in respect of the national PFM procedures. ...the execution of the recurrent budget in the MEBA is good. The fears that non-spent investment credits would be lost in the shift from the CAST to SBS could be resolved in different ways, such as through more realistic investment planning, programming investments on budget and the creation of a special account in the Treasury for investment spending, transfers of classroom construction resources to decentralised entities. ...

The transition to SBS would have many advantages, among which are:

- Minimising the use of the simplified procedure (see Box 3.1)
- Reducing the workload for the MEBA while focusing its effort on the execution of the national budget as a whole
- Effective deconcentration of resources related to increased fungibility of resources, thanks to the use of the budget classification

Source: Extracts from the Rapport de Capitalisation du CAST, Ziegler 2007, p 40-41

6.15 Finally, the **extension of CF funding to the whole basic education sub sector**, in line with the 2007 reform of the education system, contributes to the move towards an education sector wide approach in the coming years. By providing resources to all four ministries, the CF funding promotes a global analysis of the education budget, a first step towards ensuring balanced budget allocations across the sector.

## The effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to financing

6.16 Effectiveness can be considered in terms of (a) whether the FTI has increased the funding for UPE (directly or indirectly); (b) whether the FTI funds have reached the intended beneficiaries; and (c) whether, if so, they have then been used effectively.

## Increased funding

6.17 **Between 2002 and 2006, the catalytic effect on donor aid** promoted by the initiative did take place, although with significant delays and not in the amounts expected. Clearly, the adoption of the PDDEB, setting up of the donor coordination mechanisms and joint review missions, had more of a catalytic effect on donor aid to basic education than the FTI initiative itself. Nevertheless, in total, the financing needs identified in the PDDEB 2000–2009 and in the 2002 FTI request were covered, thanks to a significant increase in both domestic and external resources (see Table H.4). In any case, it should be noted that most interviewees on the government side and on the donor side (with the exception of France and the EC) consider that there was no financial effect of the FTI following the endorsement of the first request.

6.18 In addition, the **FTI has contributed to improved mobilisation of domestic resources for basic education and to an enhanced understanding of allocation tradeoffs**. Along with other internal and external factors such as HIPC and GBS funding and conditionality. Its focus on the identification of a financing gap, and its co-financing of the RESEN in 2007–2009 (and associated financial simulation model) are among the elements (along with the definition of the PDDEB itself and its annual action plans) that have contributed to a stronger voice of MEBA in budget negotiations with MEF – as mentioned during discussions with MEBA DAF department and with MEF. A positive aspect of the FTI input in Burkina Faso has been the relatively strong involvement of the MEF in the negotiation of the FTI request and DPO, mainly due the choice of SBS as an aid modality. Within the MEBA budget itself, the 2000 RESEN – used as a basis for the preparation of the 2002 request – helped outline the high imbalance between GER, expenditure per pupil and learning outcomes at primary level (see Figure 3.1), and the need to enhance the efficiency of primary education expenditure. Table 3.1 illustrates improvements in that regard since 1999. Finally, it should be noted that the CF support is expected to have a significant effect on financing the MASSN and MJE budgets. The MASSN, for example, expects available finance for pre-primary to double compared to previous years.

6.19 However, the IF benchmarks on resource mobilisation have not contributed to the increased resources to education and basic education, since Burkina Faso was already allocating more than the benchmarks, and the main constraint was elsewhere, in increasing the resources available in the budget. The relatively weak involvement of the DG Budget itself in the process implies that further work may be needed to ensure that commitments in terms of increased domestic resources (in line with the IF) materialise in coming years.

6.20 **In 2009–2011, CF financing, in theory should cover the financing gap as identified in the 2008 request.** Nevertheless, the following elements should be taken into account:

- Figures on ODA to basic education seem to indicate a decreasing trend in 2009 over previous years (see Figure 3.4). It will be important to monitor whether existing donor support is maintained at current levels in order to ensure additionality of FTI-CF support, in particular from 2010, since so far, there are no formal donor commitments to basic education after 2010. The calculation of the 2011 financing gap was based on an estimation of donor support on the basis of the average of the past three years.
- The final results of the 2006 census came out after the 2008 request was finalised. The financing needs in the request were calculated on the basis of an estimate by the World Bank. The Government has now updated the calculation of the financing gap on the basis of the final census results, which implies a small increase in the amount of the financing needs. Nevertheless, the DPO – although not yet adopted – is based on the

amount endorsed in December 2008, and therefore does not take into account the latest figures.

- The mechanism for monitoring additionality of CF funding (and increase in basic education funding from the national budget) will be defined in the DPO documentation.

6.21 So far, no provision has been made for the update of the amount of the financing gap and therefore of CF support. It could be useful to clarify the conditions for Burkina Faso to potentially receive additional CF funding should the need arise during the implementation of the current programme (in particular in the case of a shortfall in donor aid in 2011). Nevertheless, this poses the question of the role of the CF, which would then become more a "donor of last resort" than a catalyst for increased donor aid.

## Reaching beneficiaries

6.22 The FTI has contributed in two different ways to funding the education sector: through a catalytic effect and the corresponding increase in EC and French support in 2003–2007, and through the yet to come CF funding on 2009–2011. While France's support was disbursed through the CAST-FSDEB, both the EC and the CF funds are in the form of SBS.

**6.23 CAST-FSDEB** (see Van der Linde 2008, Gagnon 2006, and Ziegler 2007). One of the key objectives of the CAST-FSDEB was to ensure the more efficient transfer of funds to the local level.<sup>35</sup> On the downside, direct transfers of funds from the CAST-FSDEB to the DPEBA level follows the "simplified procedure", which is not in line with mainstream budget procedures and creates a substantial amount of work at the DPEBA level to manage these funds, according to specific procedures outside the CID. It also creates additional fiduciary risk and the risk of misreporting. Finally, lack of in-year predictability of CAST resources at deconcentrated levels (due to lack of predictability of donor funding and to heavy procedures for mobilising CAST funding) has been particularly harmful to budget execution and the availability of funds at local level (Ziegler 2007).

6.24 **SBS.** The move to SBS implies that the funds will use the usual budget processes for transfers to local level: (i) funds managed by DREBA, DPEBA and teachers' salaries; and (ii) the nascent fiscal decentralisation process.

6.25 Funds in the MEBA budget executed directly at deconcentrated levels – currently mainly funds for schools' operating budgets, DREBA, DPEBA and CEB. The funds themselves are not transferred to the local level, but are paid to service providers by the Treasury, following the classic budget execution process. The recent decentralisation of "ordonnancement" to the regional level by MEF has improved the speed and efficiency of expenditure at the local level. Concerning teachers' salaries, they are paid in the nearest bank or in cash at the provincial level. Nevertheless, a significant number of teachers still prefer to have their bank accounts in Ouagadougou (for various reasons, including mobility, and the possibility to ask for loans) and travel monthly to the capital to withdraw part of their salaries, with the obvious consequence on absenteeism.

6.26 Finally, it should be noted that, contrary to the practice in other countries (Kenya, Rwanda), no funds are transferred directly to the school level in Burkina Faso. This could

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<sup>35</sup> It contributed directly to the significant increase in transfers to deconcentrated entities through financing of "cartables minimum" (minimum school material for each pupil), "fonds écoles" (teaching material and school recurrent costs), payment of APE fees for all girls enrolled in 1st year of primary, and funds for the GAP (teacher training).

evolve in the future, thanks to the setting up of the COGES, which – if and when effective – could oversee the use of funds in schools.

### Effective use of funds

6.27 The FTI itself did not have a direct influence on PFM in the education sector. Nevertheless, it benefits from all the key reforms in this area over the past decade: strengthening of the budget preparation process, reform of public procurement and the creation of a public procurement directorate in MEBA, improved monitoring of budget execution (see Chapter 3 for more details). In future years, it is expected that CF funding will contribute to the strengthening of existing systems and structures for PFM in basic education, mainly thanks to the use of SBS as an aid modality, and potentially, thanks to the WB project for capacity strengthening linked to FTI CF funding (see Chapter 8 below).

### The FTI's contribution to the efficiency of resource mobilisation and use

6.28 The FTI's contribution to efficiency can be considered in terms of the process for preparing and negotiating the requests and subsequent programme, and in terms of the choice of aid modality for the CF funding.

6.29 In terms of **process**, many interviewees assess the efforts put into the preparation and negotiation of the 2002 request as excessive compared to the marginal financial benefit derived from it. The 2008 request is also considered a lengthy process. Eighteen months currently separate the start of the request preparation from the payment of the first tranche of CF funding (if it is done in July as planned), of which seven months will have passed between the endorsement of the request and the disbursement of the first tranche, this time devoted to the preparation of the DPO. This timeframe appears disconnected from the very concept of acceleration promoted by the initiative.

6.30 Finally, the **choice of SBS as an aid modality** for CF funds – despite a heavy preparation process – should minimise transaction costs during implementation, thanks to the use of national procedures (budget preparation, execution, accounting, audit and reporting). Nevertheless, this new aid modality comes on top of existing ones, in particular the CAST-FSDEB and various projects. Therefore, it does not provide the diminution of overall transaction costs for aid management in the education / basic education sector that might otherwise have been expected. This may happen in future years if the positive experience of the CF with SBS attracts more donors to provide SBS and leads to a phasing out of other aid modalities. The transition from projects and CAST-FSDEB to SBS will nevertheless need to be carefully managed.

### Sustainability

6.31 Key issues regarding the sustainability of the FTI contribution to increased resources for basic education comprise the weak prospects for domestic resource mobilisation, the nascent fiscal decentralisation process, and the lack of medium term predictability of other donor support.

6.32 Regarding **domestic resource mobilisation**, efforts are being made by the Government to improve the efficiency of tax collection and support a stronger growth rate. Nevertheless, it is recognised by all that Burkina Faso will remain highly aid dependent for many years to come.

6.33 The **fiscal decentralisation process** launched in 2009, which involves significant transfer of resources to the communes for basic education purposes, represents a significant risk in terms of "the evaporation of resources for basic education" and inadequate fund management. Although the Government and MEF are taking a sound, pragmatic, progressive approach, the main risk stems from the pressure for "disbursement" in particular, coming from donor programmes which disbursed late in the year, such as CF support in 2009.

6.34 Regarding **donor support**, the lack of medium term predictability of donor support to basic education (all commitments end in 2010 apart from the FTI-CF) pose serious threats on (i) the government's capacity to implement measures with significant recurrent cost implications required to reach EFA, if it has no assurance of future funding after 1 to 2 years; (ii) the validity of medium term planning instruments such as the MTEF when there are no projections of donor aid on the medium term; and (iii) the additionality of FTI support if existing donor support is not maintained at current levels (see chapter 9 for further discussion of predictability).



## 7 The FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

### Context before FTI endorsement

7.1 This section discusses how Burkina Faso carried out M&E for basic education before PDDEB, i.e. before 2002, and how the process has changed since that time. Subsequent sections assess the extent to which the changes can be attributed to the FTI.

### M&E in the education sector before 2002

7.2 **Organisational structures for M&E.** Burkina Faso has long been familiar with collecting and using data on education for monitoring. It has developed structures at central and local levels to respond to the requirement for data processing and analysis. MEBA has a statistical unit within the DEP which is responsible for routine data collection and periodic surveys. Every local education office at regional and provincial level (the DREBA and the DPEBA) has a statistical service, as does the inspection unit (the Circonscription d'Education de Base, CEB). The MEBA collaborates also with the national statistical office, the Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD). These structures were already in place before the start of the PDDEB and the endorsement of Burkina Faso by the FTI.

7.3 Burkina Faso is part of the group of Francophone education ministries in Africa (*Conférence des Ministres de l'Education des Pays ayant le Français en Partage, CONFEMEN*), which set up a regional education monitoring system (*Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN, PASEC*) in 1991 in recognition of the lack of reliable data on the education sector. The absence of data had been highlighted in the Education for All meeting in Jomtien the previous year. Burkina Faso was among the first group of nine countries to undertake a PASEC assessment, in the academic year 1995/96, with the aim of understanding how performance outcomes are affected by the learning environment and also improving M&E capacity and permitting standardised comparisons across countries (MEBA & CONFEMEN 1998). The test examines competence in French and mathematics in the second and fifth years of primary school, and assesses the impact of variables at the level of the pupil, the class and the school.

7.4 Burkina Faso is also a member of the group of Francophone West African countries which collaborates in improving education statistics through the *Système d'Information Statistique de l'Education (SISED)*, managed by the Pôle de Dakar in the UNESCO regional office for education (*Bureau Régional pour l'Education en Afrique, BREDA*) in Senegal. The SISED brings about the collaboration of statistical bureaux in each country, and implements the actions proposed by the Working Group on Education Statistics which is part of the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). Together the countries have been developing a common management information system (MIS) since 1995 (MEBA, 2008). The school is used as the basic unit of data.

7.5 **Data collection.** MEBA collects routine administrative data and also conducts periodic surveys of the education sector such as the PASEC assessment described above. With regard to routine data the ministry conducts an annual survey of schools (*enquête annuelle*) every year in December or January, i.e. after the first term of the academic year when student numbers have stabilised. The questionnaire collects information on the amenities in the school and the community, the classrooms and their condition, the teaching staff, and the number of pupils and their family background. It also provides a space for head teachers to write a qualitative assessment of the challenges faced by the school. A similar annual questionnaire is circulated each year by the DEP/MESSRS to secondary schools,

passing through the regional directorate (the DRES) to the school. Heads of schools are provided with training in filling in the questionnaire in order to improve accuracy.

7.6 The burden of data collection prior to PDDEB is not considered to have been particularly demanding, in the opinion of interviewees, and the process was perhaps less strategic than it is today. The data that were collected were not always found to be useful, and in these instances the questionnaire was revised over time to make it more relevant. For instance, there is no longer a requirement to draw the school site in the annual survey.

7.7 **Data analysis.** Before the PDDEB (and also for some years after), the school questionnaires from the annual survey were collated by the deconcentrated education structures and forwarded to MEBA for analysis, aggregation and input into the MIS at national level. This is reported to have lessened the incentive for regional structures to be sure of having obtained accurate information since the figures they provided were not separately visible in the published results.

7.8 **Dissemination of results.** The data were made accessible in the statistical yearbook (*annuaire statistique*) published by MEBA in collaboration with the INSD. These have been published since the 1980s and are all available electronically from at least the academic year 1991/92 onwards. MEBA is seen by the INSD as being "among the best" in its production and use of data since it is one of the few ministries which produces a regular statistical yearbook.

7.9 **Use of data.** The use of data is affected by both its demand and supply. A review of national statistical capacity (Paris21 2004) observed that demand for data was greater with international partners, than within the government, but that this pattern was changing at central level because of initiatives requiring regular monitoring of results such as the CSLP. The tendency was therefore moving in favour of greater use of data for monitoring and planning. At a local level, with a largely illiterate population and limited access to media, demand for information is much lower.

7.10 On the supply side, the Paris21 2004) review highlighted difficulties in Burkina Faso with periodicity of data, timeliness, methodological clarity, and the production of metadata and the cost of publications. All of these challenges can depress the demand for data still further. Many of these are relevant in the case of education statistics. At least three supply-side factors constrained the effective use of education data for planning purposes before the PDDEB. First, the results of the annual survey of schools took up to a year to be analysed owing to a shortage of funds for monitoring and evaluation. Second, data were published in aggregate form at national level and not by region or by province, as mentioned above, so they tended to be more useful for identifying long-term trends than for day-to-day planning by the DREBAs and DPEBAs. Third, the financial constraints affected not only analysis but also publication of results, so only a limited number of statistical yearbooks were published.

## Evolution of M&E since 2002

7.11 **Data collection.** The introduction of the PDDEB coincided with an increased demand for timely knowledge of results, among both government and external partners. In response to this demand for data on schools in the current academic year MEBA introduced a rapid school survey (*enquête rapide*) in 2002, which takes place in November. It is a shorter survey which aims mainly to capture the number of pupils, teachers and teaching materials per class. The data are collected by the CEBs. This has helped to overcome the delays in data processing. The analysis of the *enquête annuelle* and the *enquête rapide* has been

accelerated so that all data are analysed and published by the end of March, in time to feed into planning processes.

7.12 In the meantime, as noted above, the *enquête annuelle* has been revised to maintain its relevance to current needs. The evaluation team was not able to compare the current version of the questionnaire with that from 2002 or earlier. However, in addition to the issues outlined in ¶7.5 the current questionnaire includes questions on cross-cutting issues such as the gender of each pupil and whether or not they are classified as orphans or victims of AIDS. It also lists the students that are repeating the class. So it provides data for standard indicators that can be used nationally, such as in the CSLP, and also internationally, for the UNESCO Global Monitoring Report.

7.13 For a long time the *enquête annuelle* was distributed only to formally recognised schools, but in 2005 an investigation by MEBA revealed more than 800 private schools, including religious institutions, whose information was missing from the database. From 2006 onwards the private schools have been included, which ensures that their contributions can be counted towards the total achievement in education. In secondary education the collection of data reportedly does not yet cover facilities that fall outside the authority of the DRES, including any run by other line ministries, nor does it cover some schools that are not formally registered (MEBA 2008b).

7.14 The routine collection of administrative data continues to be complemented by occasional surveys and synthesis reports of existing data. A follow-up PASEC assessment was carried out in 2006 (only preliminary findings available). The most comprehensive survey has been the national surveys of the education system (the country status reports known as the *Rapport d'Etat du Système Educatif National*, RESEN) in 2000 and 2007-2009, carried out in collaboration with the Pôle de Dakar which monitors progress in education in sub-Saharan Africa (see also Chapter 5). These reports follow a standardised format in all countries. In 2002 five topics were covered: the social and macroeconomic context; an analysis of enrolment and demand-side issues; costs and budgeting; internal efficiency, including quality; and equity. In 2007 it also covered the external efficiency of education, i.e. its impact and the collective benefit of education on other sectors such as health.

7.15 The MEF is beginning a revision of the national system of monitoring away from a focus on inputs and outputs (e.g. the number of schools constructed) and towards a better analysis of impact and performance. This change of emphasis will have an effect on all sectors, including education.

7.16 **Indicators.** Education indicators are found in three main sources at national level. These are the CSLP, the matrix for budget support (CSLP-CGAB) and the PDDEB (see Annex G for a comprehensive list of indicators).

- The **CSLP**'s education objectives cover the full spectrum of basic education, now defined as age 3 to 16, and also technical and university education, non-formal education and adult literacy. The priority action programme (PAP) for 2008–10, for example, includes 10 measures on education, mostly not specific to basic education: e.g. teacher training, improving efficiency in public expenditure and strengthening the ability of local communities to manage education services. The PAP does refer to the indicators of the PDDEB.
- The **CGAB–CSLP**, signed in January 2005, includes a matrix of general conditions, measures and indicators which was adopted in July 2005. The matrix sets out activities and targets for the next three years and is revised each year. The indicators were

intended to match the existing CSLP and PAP results indicators, and the implementation reports for monitoring the CSLP were expected to be used for the CGAB-CSLP as well. However, the number of indicators in the matrix varies greatly every year and in 2007 had reached 100, of which half were not included in the CSLP (Gerster and Somé, 2008). The 2008–10 matrix contains one measure and four indicators (comprising seven sub-indicators) relating to education. There is an attempt this year to try to rationalise the matrix for the CGAB-CSLP and that of the CSLP.

- The **PDDEB** contains the most detailed set of targets and indicators in basic education. The overall objectives remained the same between phases I and II of the PDDEB but some of the quantitative targets were revised, such as the increase in gross enrolment from a target of reaching 70% in 2010, as foreseen in phase I, to 78% in 2010, as foreseen in phase II.
- Indicators monitored in these three instruments are consistent overall, although no mechanism exists to ensure their coherence.

**7.17 Data analysis.** The lack of regional disaggregation has been addressed. In the academic year 2007/08 the monitoring system was deconcentrated in four pilot regions (Ouagadougou, Centre Sud, Centre Ouest and Plateau Central), and in 2008/09 this has been extended to all regions. The DREBAs retain the school questionnaires, sending summary data to the centre, and can create their own statistical publications for the region. It is planned to disaggregate results further, to the commune, so that decentralised structures of local government may be held accountable.

**7.18 Dissemination of results.** Education data are now published regularly in a variety of documents. These include:

- the statistical yearbook (and regional equivalents);
- the *carte éducative*, produced since 2003/04. This produces geographical maps of the status of education indicators by province. It includes both historical trends and also future projections of indicators using the simulation model. In 2007/08 staff of the DREBA and DEPBA were trained in the production of the maps, the calculation of indicators and the use of the model (MEBA 2008b);
- the *tableau de bord*, a synthesis of key indicators (and regional equivalents);
- the publication "National Education in Figures" ("*L'éducation nationale en chiffres*"). The first volume of this annual publication was produced in 2008 with the support of the EC statistical capacity-building project, *Projet d'appui au renforcement des capacités statistiques*. It brings together the data from three of the main ministries supporting the education sector—MASSN, MEBA and MESSRS—into a single document. Data are provided in the form of a time series across several years, and also disaggregated by gender and region; and
- submissions relating to national policy processes e.g. the CSLP, CSLP-CGAB and PDDEB. These include reports for the biannual joint reviews, the PDDEB implementation report, and MEBA's annual implementation report for its action plan.

The first three of these are available on a compact disc produced annually by MEBA. Financial data on education, as in other sectors, are available on demand through the CID.

**7.19 Use of data.** The faster processing and dissemination of information from the two annual surveys has improved the supply of data for planning. The joint reviews of the education sector have used the results of the rapid assessment as a basis for discussion in their March/April meeting, and the results of the full annual survey for the November meeting.<sup>36</sup> The information is used to assess progress since the last meeting and to highlight

<sup>36</sup> From 2009 these meetings are expected to be held annually instead of twice a year.

areas for action. Where time-series survey data exist, such as in the PASEC assessment, comparisons are made between the surveys and these are reported by interviewees to have an impact on decision-making. One example of this is the observation that quality of learning declined between the two PASEC assessments of 1998 and 2006 (preliminary findings): in 1998 about 60% of students reached the acceptable minimum score of 40% in the French and mathematics tests, while in 2006 only 35% reached this minimum score. This finding has been used to promote a stronger emphasis on quality issues.

7.20 However, there remain opportunities to further improve the demand for data, particularly by decision-makers who have only recently gained access to relevant information. For example, in one province visited by the evaluation team the statistics office of the DREBA and DPEBA said that they share information with locally elected representatives at commune level but that it was not certain whether those representatives acted on the results.

## FTI inputs and activities

7.21 The FTI Framework and Appraisal Guidelines envisage that the FTI can contribute to M&E processes by drawing together the available indicators and highlighting areas for improvement in terms of data accuracy and comprehensiveness at the time of appraising a country's sector plan. The intention is that issues raised in the appraisal of the sector plan, in preparation for FTI endorsement, may be followed up by all development partners during the implementation of the plan.

7.22 In the case of Burkina Faso the FTI appraisal was not used to highlight the country's "data gap" and it therefore does not set out areas for improvement in M&E. However, separately from this, the FTI has made three contributions to M&E. These are:

- the promotion of the **indicative framework** which was widely known about and discussed, though not always by name;<sup>37</sup>
- the part-funding of the **2007–2009 RESEN report** using EPDF funds; and
- the elaboration of the **matrix of conditionality** for budget support from the forthcoming Catalytic Fund disbursement.

7.23 The effect of the lack of discussion on data gaps in the appraisal, and the merits of the three activities that were undertaken, are discussed in the following subsections.

## The relevance of the FTI to M&E in education

7.24 The FTI appraisal in 2002, being a very light-touch document, is not strongly focused on suggesting improvements in M&E in education. Its emphasis is more on a critique of the M&E components of the FTI process (the shortcomings of the indicative framework) than on the data needs of Burkina Faso. It notes that the country's submission does provide a standard for monitoring progress and evaluating achievements, without citing how it does so, and states that indicators and means of verification have been defined. Without referring to the existing state of M&E systems and the way that the FTI submission will affect them, it observes that, "There is local consensus to the effect that the evaluation and control methods are regarded as reasonably adapted and sustainable", and notes that the PDDEB itself has a framework for M&E. In this respect the appraisal does not contribute substantially to the understanding of M&E in the country.

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<sup>37</sup> In contrast to the findings of the Mid Term evaluation of the EFA FTI Kenya country case study Thomson et al 2010

7.25 However, the rounds of discussion on the indicative framework leading up to the submission of Burkina Faso's bid for endorsement have been very relevant to the needs of the basic education subsector. In particular, the indicative framework brought to light two important indicators which had not previously been part of the policy discourse in Burkina Faso. These are the primary completion rate and the level of teachers' salaries. The focus on primary completion, rather than enrolment, is particularly valuable in Burkina Faso where completion rates are very low. The attention to the level of teachers' salaries, too, is a significant contribution to the policy debate in a country where the average teacher's salary stood at almost seven times *per capita* GDP at the end of the 1990s (see Table 5.1 above).

7.26 The challenge has been in getting all stakeholders to agree that the figures quoted in the Indicative Framework are simply benchmarks characteristic of countries that have a "successful" education system, and not that they are quantifiable targets in the form of strict conditions that must be met in order for a country to become eligible to receive resources from the Catalytic Fund. The perception that the benchmarks are conditions, which remains widespread among policy makers who submitted Burkina Faso's request for FTI endorsement, endows the quantitative targets with a much greater importance than was intended. In the report by Bruns *et al.* (2003) which proposed the first indicative framework the authors warned against a rigid application of the indicators:

While the indicative benchmarks can provide a useful point of reference for all countries, there will be many cases where they are culturally, institutionally, or financially inappropriate. The ultimate value of this framework is as a guide to the direction of reform, not as a dictate regarding where it should end. (Bruns et al 2003 p15)

7.27 This confusion from the Government about the purpose of the Indicative Framework may have been fed by a lack of clarity on the part of the external partners. It seems that, with Burkina Faso's endorsement coming at an early stage in the history of the FTI, there was not yet an agreement on the purpose of the Indicative Framework. The appraisal of Burkina Faso's submission to the FTI, in November 2002, cited as a strength of the proposal that, "Proposals and long-term trends (statistics) [are] in line with the indicative framework" Local Donor Group Burkina Faso 2002).

7.28 Much of this discussion took place during the production of the first RESEN report, so, while the discussions themselves can be said to have had a big impact on the selection of indicators it is not certain that this can be attributed exclusively to the FTI.

7.29 The matrix of conditionality for the 2009 DPO does not introduce new targets but rather identifies actions that contribute to the achievement of existing plans. It promotes the demand for data in that it requires evidence of indicators such as survival rates and instructional hours. It also promotes supply, requiring the production and dissemination of regionally disaggregated *tableaux de bord*. However, it does not have a strong emphasis on improving the system for M&E in education and in this sense is not expected to be strongly relevant for determining the direction taken by M&E activities.

## **Effectiveness of the FTI in improving M&E**

7.30 How effective has the FTI been in supporting the transformation of the M&E system from its situation in 2002 to its current status? As with the analysis of other gaps, because the FTI endorsement took place at the same time as the introduction of the PDDEB and the establishment of the twice-yearly joint reviews of the education sector, it is not possible strictly to separate the effectiveness of the contribution of the FTI from that of other initiatives that were taking place simultaneously. However, the team has reviewed the likely influence of the FTI inputs, taking into consideration other initiatives that were under way at the time.

7.31 The elaboration of the FTI proposal in 2002, and the preparation of the request for the Catalytic Fund in 2008, are reported by several respondents to have had a good effect on M&E, as on aid effectiveness in general. This is because they required Government and external stakeholders to come together to confirm their acceptance of the set of indicators and targets listed.

7.32 In terms of supporting the capacity for monitoring in the national and local government structures, several significant projects in statistical capacity-building have been undertaken by other partners – mainly in relation to their GBS programmes – which have dominated this aspect of M&E. These have directly supported the process of deconcentrating the production and analysis of data to the regions. The EC provided support to local statistical capacity-building in a project from June 2005 to June 2008. The EC was cited by one respondent as the main driver of improvements in M&E for education, and in creating a demand for timely and accurate data. The World Bank-funded "Development of National Statistical Systems" project, 2005–09, run by the INSD, includes a component to train head teachers in M&E. The INSD has also trained 12 statisticians who will be seconded directly to the regions to support M&E systems at that level. So the FTI has not been required to fill a major gap in this respect.

7.33 The FTI's most effective contribution in terms of building capacity has been the conduct of the 2007–2009 RESEN report which, as mentioned earlier, was intended as a capacity-building exercise in data analysis and not simply a fast exercise to produce results. For this reason the process of producing the 2007 analysis has been slower and more methodical than the 2002 report. The closer collaboration of the ministry in the production of the report has resulted in stronger ownership of the findings. The outcomes of the earlier RESEN report, especially regarding the salaries of teachers, were neither welcomed nor, at times, fully understood.

7.34 The discussions surrounding that early RESEN report and the indicative framework have, however, been effective in entrenching the concept of the primary completion rate as a key indicator in monitoring progress towards universal primary education. Many respondents stated that little attention had been paid to this indicator until that time. This has had the effect of encouraging a realistic recognition of the fact that universal primary completion—rather than enrolment—cannot be achieved by 2015, given the financial, human resource and material implications of an increase from just 36% in 2007 (MEBA 2007c).

7.35 There remain many challenges in the *use* of data which indicate that the FTI has not yet been fully effective in influencing this area. While large amounts of data are collected it is still not certain that they are able to be analysed. This applies, for instance, to the qualitative section of the *enquête annuelle* which describes the particular difficulties faced by each individual school. Other data that are analysed and disseminated are not used by their recipients, such as the information received by many communes about their local area.

## **Efficiency of resource use in M&E**

7.36 There is no evidence that FTI endorsement has resulted in increased expenditure on M&E by Government or development partners. This may be because the discussion of the data gap was not a major feature of the proposal for FTI endorsement. The use of EPDF funds for the RESEN (instead of WB funds since the WB funded the previous exercise), and probably also the fact that it was carried out by the Pôle de Dakar instead of by WB staff, relates also to the willingness of the WB to avoid being the only promoter of this instrument, in order to make it more acceptable given the difficult 2002 experience – although the fact

that this exercise was not funded by the WB but by the EPDF was not known to Government stakeholders interviewed.

7.37 The FTI is said not to have created any additional reporting requirements by Government or donors since, according to interviewees, no regular reports have been exchanged between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat in Washington. There is an expectation that once Burkina Faso begins to receive resources from the Catalytic Fund it will be required to account for them and that this may result in the need to produce an extra report, but this is speculation. In any case, this is considered to be a reasonable price to pay in order to receive substantial extra resources.

7.38 This has both a positive and negative interpretation. On the one hand, it is good that the implementation reports and *aide-mémoires* of the joint annual reviews, the PDDEB implementation reports and the production of updates for the CSLP and CSLP-CGAB can continue to serve as the main reference documents for M&E in basic education. On the other hand, the lack of data exchange between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat may be symptomatic of a wider problem with communication which is discussed more in Chapter 9 below.

## **Sustainability**

7.39 It seems likely that the M&E processes that are in place at the moment in Burkina Faso will continue since they have been established, reviewed and revised over many years already. They are well integrated into government-wide planning and budgeting processes such as the CSLP and the CSLP-CGAB. However, it is not clear that units at local level feel strongly the necessity for producing the amount of data that is required of them, which is considered to be heavy: one respondent observed that "they have had enough". The process of collecting information will be more sustainable if the need for data is apparent.



## 8 The FTI and Capacity Development

### Context

#### Before 2002

**8.1 No comprehensive CD strategy at national level.** While the issue of capacity development was central to the implementation of PRSP, there was no comprehensive strategy or framework elaborated at national level to guide activities in this crucial area.

**8.2 Huge administration and management challenges at basic education level.** In the education sector, the preparation of the PDDEB brought to light considerable concerns regarding CD. The World Bank PAD for a Basic Education Sector Project (2002) emphasised:

The education sector employs the single largest group in the civil service but MEBA's ability to use these human resources cost-effectively is hampered by its weak capacity for personnel planning and management, supervision of teachers, monitoring resource use, evaluating learning outcomes, and identifying weak school for timely remedial action. Procedures, guidelines, data and information sharing are weak at all levels... The ministry is not short of staff but short of skills and the division of labour among and within the various directorates is inadequate and often not clear thereby hampering decision making and reducing accountability. The coverage and effectiveness of the inspectorate system needs improvement as each school inspector and pedagogical advisor is supposed to supervise about 120 and 150 teachers respectively (World Bank 2001 p6).

**8.3 Interventions of donors channelled and managed through PIUs.** The Education Projects Bureau (BPE) established by the previous WB projects in the 1990s, was a project implementation unit responsible for the management of Canadian, Dutch and WB projects. The BPE was put in place due to a lack of capacity on the part of the *Direction de l'Administration et des Finances* (DAF) within MEBA and was tasked to provide technical backstopping to the DAF for the management of counterpart resources and assist it in the preparation of the consolidated budget. Other bilateral (e.g. France) and multilateral partners (e.g. Unicef, AfDB) were operating through their own parallel project implementation units.

**8.4 Emerging support to CD from the donors.** During the two years preparatory period before the effective launch of the PDDEB, Canada and the Netherlands financed a Support Plan (Plan d'accompagnement) to reinforce management capacity at central level (focus on SP/PDDEB) and local levels (focus on DPEBA). The respective contributions of Canada/CIDA and the Netherlands were USD 500,000 and USD 2m. In parallel, Canada supported an organisational audit of the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy which was conducted by the consulting firm Core Advice.<sup>38</sup> The study recommended the restructuring of the MEBA and redefined job profiles. The organisational audit led to the restructuring of the

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<sup>38</sup> Core Advice, *Plan de formation des cadres et de gestion et d'administration*, April 2001  
Core Advice, *Definitions de fonctions par structure du MEBA* (Definition of functions by units for MEBA), August 2001.

Ministry two years later in 2003.<sup>39</sup> The World Bank Basic Education Sector Project (World Bank 2001, p35) also supported ministry wide (MEBA) capacity building, cutting across all organisational units.

## Evolution of CD since 2002

**8.5 Towards a national strategy for capacity development.** The Burkinabé Centre for analysing social and economic policies (CAPES)<sup>40</sup> was tasked in 2007 by the MCMPF<sup>41</sup> to elaborate a national policy for capacity development (PNRC)<sup>42</sup> to reinforce the implementation of the PRS. It emerged because capacities seemed to have been the binding constraint to implement more deeply the poverty reduction strategy and because of pressure from donors for the development of a global capacity development strategy to help support their investments in this domain. The draft PNRC was submitted in September 2008. The PNRC set the stage for participatory dialogue around a CD strategy, conducted a short capacity gap analysis, suggested key principles for action, identified potential areas of interventions and defined a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the CD process. Nine domains were covered, one of which was the education and literacy sector.<sup>43</sup>

**8.6 Persistent CD issues in the basic education sub-sector.** Since the official launch of the PDDEB (2002), planning and management capacities at central, regional, provincial and school levels have been constantly challenged. The MEBA has experienced difficulties i) in keeping up with the rapid development of the system generating additional needs in infrastructure, equipment, teachers, textbooks etc.; ii) in supporting the deconcentration and decentralisation processes, asking for a redefinition of roles and responsibilities along with adequate financial transfers; and iii) in involving a wide-range of emerging education stakeholders (local governments, COGES, etc.) for better accountability. The main CD challenges faced by each category of staff to ensure effective delivery of primary education services are: (i) data analysis for planning purposes; (ii) teacher management – deployment, with more than 3000 new teachers per year; (iii) teacher training, reduced to one year and in-service training; (iv) teacher supervision, through the inspection system; (v) financial management, in particular with separate processes for CAST-FSDEB and the national budget, and the need for capacity building at central, deconcentrated and decentralised levels; and (vi) school-based organisations' (APE, AME, COGES) capacity in planning and financial management.

**8.7** During the PDDEB mid-term review (2006), it was acknowledged that Phase one of the plan did not pay sufficient attention to CD issues. As a response, Phase two included a more detailed capacity building component. However, a comprehensive capacity development strategy in the basic education sub-sector is yet to be elaborated. A task force was set up in October 2008 to deliver a "gradual plan for CD of MEBA".<sup>44</sup> However it is not clear whether the same arrangements have been established in the other ministries in

<sup>39</sup> Decree 2003/103/PRES/PM/MEBA of 4 March 2003 relating to the organization of the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (supplemented by order 2003-00142/MEBA/SG relating to the organization and operation of the DREBA)

<sup>40</sup> *Centre d'Analyse des Politiques Economiques et Sociales*

<sup>41</sup> *Ministère Chargé de Mission auprès du Président du Faso*

<sup>42</sup> *Politique Nationale de Renforcement des Capacités*

<sup>43</sup> The other sub-sectors covered were: i) rural development and food safety, ii) water and sanitation, iii) health, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS, iv) private sector; v) road, energy and NTIC, vi) public finance; vii) democratic governance and viii) social protection.

<sup>44</sup> The MEBA task force was established on October 27th, 2008 and comprises 20 members: 13 representatives of MEBA-central staff (Cabinet, SG, SP/PDDEB, DRH, DAF, DEP, DGAENF, DGCRIF, DGEB), 1 representative of MEBA-local staff (DREBA) and 6 representatives of unions (SNEAB, SYNAPAGER, FESEB, SATEB, SNEP).

charge of delivering basic education services (MESSRS, MASSN and MJE) and how CD efforts are coordinated across levels of education under basic education. Moreover, the linkage of the CD strategy for Basic Education with the proposals included in the CD strategy for the implementation of the PRSP is yet to be formalised.

**8.8 Uncoordinated support from development partners.** While capacity development was a recurring concern systematically re-emphasised during each of the joint reviews since 2003, the development partners did not find a way to collectively address the issues. The Burkina Faso background paper for GMR 2008 provided a brief summary of donors' difficulties in supporting CD since 2002: "the technical and financial partners have not always met the Ministry's implicit and explicit requests for support and the Ministry did not implement a capacity building strategy concomitantly with the first phase of ten year plan. It must be acknowledged that despite their long experience of project management, the technical and financial partners and their executing agencies have been less skilful and effective in supervising and closely supporting activities designed to build the capacities of local officers responsible for the implementation of development plans" (Vachon 2007).

## FTI inputs and activities

**8.9** FTI inputs in terms of capacity development were of four types: i) discussions on capacity development issues during preparation, negotiation and appraisal of Fast Track strategies to achieve UPC; ii) activities supported by the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), and by its predecessor the Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF), although the NETF is not an FTI input *per se*; iii) dissemination of the FTI guidelines on capacity development; (iv) the choice of SBS as an aid modality for CF funding.

**8.10 CD issues in FTI requests and related appraisal processes.** The FTI Framework (FTI 2004) and Appraisal Guidelines (FTI 2006) envisage that the FTI can contribute to CD processes by highlighting CD areas to look at during the appraisal of a country's education plan. This was done in both the 2002 and the 2008 requests.

**8.11 NETF-EPDF.** From 1998 to 2006, the Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF), managed by the WB, supported activities involving Burkina Faso through its three modalities:<sup>45</sup>

- Regional studies and strategies. 2 studies concerned Burkina Faso: i) "study quantifying the resources necessary to achieve the MDGs"; and ii) "study on contractual teachers";
- Knowledge sharing and consensus building. Burkina Faso attended the "Conference on contractual teachers in Francophone Africa"<sup>46</sup> and the IEMAC<sup>47</sup> workshops which looked at the action plans to ensure better consistency of resource allocation across schools and the transformation of resources at school level into learning outcomes;
- Technical and analytical support to national teams. NETF financed the first Education country status report in Burkina Faso undertaken by World Bank staff in 2002 and the support mission in Burkina Faso for the preparation of the first FTI proposal in 2002.

**8.12** In 2006, NETF had secured USD 1.3m to i) help the department of human resources of the MEBA implement the regionalisation of teachers' management in line with civil service

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<sup>45</sup>See Norwegian Education Trust Fund Annual Report, p15 ([http://www.worldbank.org/afr/netf/pdf/netf\\_05\\_AR.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/afr/netf/pdf/netf_05_AR.pdf))

<sup>46</sup>This conference discussed challenges, strategies and policies in support of sustainable program for teacher recruitment, training and deployment. EPDF financed follow-up of Bamako declaration in each of the targeted countries.

<sup>47</sup>IEMAC: Improving Education Management in African Countries

reforms and ii) provide material support to basic education districts (CEB) to increase the frequency of school visits. These resources were not used by MEBA and were lost, due to a combination of a change in management in the MEBA (new Secrétaire General) and a lack of ownership by the various stakeholders in MEBA.<sup>48</sup>

8.13 The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) has built on NETF objectives and modalities to become the "flagship" for direct FTI support to capacity development. However, it appears that in Burkina Faso no-one outside of the World Bank and possibly one or two donors had any knowledge of the existence of the EPDF. The EPDF supported two main activities, both attached to the first objective of EPDF.<sup>49</sup> The first was the Education country status report (RESEN) conceived as a capacity building exercise on data analysis. It is worth noting that the MEBA did not know that the CSR was partly financed by EPDF and attributed it entirely to the World Bank. The second was the preparatory work undertaken in 2008 and 2009 for respectively the Catalytic Fund grant application and the associated negotiation on policy triggers for disbursements. A third request is in preparation for the second half of 2009 focusing on a communication plan for PDDEB 2, which is one of the activities foreseen in the PDDEB II and in line with the recently adopted MEBA strategy for social mobilisation.

8.14 **Capacity development guidelines.** Whereas the FTI's initial focus had been mainly on financing sound education sector plans, in 2006 it broadened discussions to systematically address the capacity within countries to implement these plans and make EFA a reality. The FTI Partnership endorsed the guidelines in April 2008.<sup>50</sup> They were disseminated in Burkina Faso by the World Bank to the LDG and MEBA, but were not read by most donors interviewed, let alone formally discussed or used. The bulk of attention of both donors and the Government in 2008 (when the guidelines were shared) was on the preparation of the request for the Catalytic Fund.

8.15 **Choice of SBS as an aid modality.** The use of SBS by the Catalytic Fund implies a shift to a full use of country procedures in terms of budget allocation, preparation, execution and reporting, as opposed to the CAST or projects that involve additional and specific processes (see Annex I for more information).

## Relevance of the FTI in the area of capacity development

8.16 The relevance of CD is appraised looking at i) the capacity issues to implement a fast track strategy; ii) the evolving approach of the partnership towards CD; and iii) the kind of activities supported by NETF/EPDF which involved or were designed for Burkina Faso.

8.17 **Fast tracking strategies and capacity development.** The objective of the FTI to address capacity issues is highly relevant to the goal of accelerating progress towards UPC, since capacity constraints have been identified both in donor projects and in Government plans (PDDEB) as major constraints on reaching the MDGs.

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<sup>48</sup>It took 9 months for the World Bank to close this activity.

<sup>49</sup>The four objectives supported by EPDF are the following: i) Supporting sustainable education sector plan; ii) Strengthening government technical and institutional capacity to develop and implement policies; iii) Improving the understanding of issues that are key constraints to reaching EFA and iv) Strengthening governments' political commitment, consensus and ownership through policy dialogue and consensus building.

<sup>50</sup> The CD guidelines can be downloaded on <http://www.education-fast-track.org/content.asp?ContentId=541>

8.18 The two FTI requests and appraisals indirectly highlighted the country's "capacity gap". Concerns were raised on the three following issues:

- Logistics: the volume of activities generated by the fast tracking strategy would be too high to be handled solely by the MEBA which would need to call upon regionalised/ decentralised entities and NGOs in an approach involving delegation of services;
- Human resources management: the employment of thousands of new teachers on a new basis (contract teachers by decentralised entities in 2002, volunteers in 2008) would require significant institutional changes;
- Procurement and financial management: donors suggested in 2002 that the BPE would be the principal entity for the management of external funds during a transition period. This was an implicit recognition that the financial department of MEBA was not ready to absorb and process additional funds without fiduciary risks. The choice of SBS for channelling forthcoming Catalytic Fund resources was also coupled with a specific capacity building programme in procurement and PFM exclusively financed by the WB.

8.19 **From "capacity gap" to "systemic approach" towards CD.** The FTI CF guidelines develop a wider view of CD looking at individual, organisational and institutional issues. Many of those interviewed see the idea of using common CD guidelines as an integrative force that brings together a large number of stakeholders who believe that CD is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of an ESP. However, many interviewees also mention the remaining confusion as to the exact coverage and meaning of CD, and the lack of a common ground between donors and Government on definition as well as on the adequate content of a capacity building plan.

8.20 **Relevance of activities financed under NETF and EPDF.** The activities targeted under NETF and EPDF were relevant for CD as they principally related to the management of education service delivery. They focused on the management of primary teachers who are crucial for scaling up progress towards quality education. Their effective management was even more relevant (e.g. RESEN showed that 22% of teachers' appointments in schools for 2006/07 were not explained by the number of pupils in the schools and that 25% of primary teachers were not teaching).

8.21 **Strengthening capacity through using country systems.** The decision to use SBS for CF funding is highly relevant in that it both alleviates the burden on existing capacity (minimising the requirement for specific reports, nomenclature, procedures) and, in theory, contributes to the strengthening of the systems by using them and thus increasing the focus on such strengthening as opposed to designing parallel mechanisms to minimise fiduciary risk (see Williamson and Kizilbash Agha 2008 and Mokoro 2008a).

## **Effectiveness of the FTI's contribution to capacity development**

8.22 This section first discusses whether the FTI's contribution has been effective in bringing to light concerns regarding CD which have subsequently been addressed by the Government and development partners. It then reviews whether FTI's contribution has had an effect in encouraging DPs to strengthen their own capacities to improve quality and efficiency of the partnership they offer.

### **FTI's influence on addressing CD issues: A missed opportunity?**

8.23 The contribution of the FTI appears to have been relatively negligible to building capacity in the sector beyond the initial identification of critical CD issues:

- The appraisal guidelines helped assess the robustness of PDDEB against available capacity but the "capacity dimension" did not receive as much attention as the other

constituent elements of the credibility of the plan submitted (e.g. financial gap). Moreover it is difficult to attribute to the FTI the responses delivered by development partners to address some of the "capacity gaps" emphasised during appraisal. In fact they would have probably undertaken the same kind of support as parallel concerns guided their actions.

- The two successive trust funds available for capacity development activities have mainly supported upstream activities (e.g. RESEN and related simulation model in 2007/09 which was a successful capacity building exercise on data analysis, M&E and strategic planning) but few downstream activities. The only direct activity targeted under NETF was in 2006, aimed to help implement the teacher management reform at regional level which has not been implemented;
- The FTI CD guidelines have not been used by the LDG to engage with education ministries for a sustainable capacity development strategy aligned with PDDEB and PNRC framework. However, this FTI tool was only approved one year ago.
- As illustrated in Box 8.1 below, coordination of donor support to CD has not improved significantly since 2002, although information sharing has admittedly progressed. The only significant coordination mechanism is the Strategy for strengthening of PFM (*Plan d'Amélioration des Services Financiers 2008–2010 PASF, MEBA – MEBA, 2009b*), but it has not yet started implementation.

### Box 8.1 Patchy Support of DPs to Finance and Planning Departments of MEBA

► Financial management (DAF/MEBA). The support to the DAF was mainly linked to the closure of the BPE in 2004, and the transfer of its competencies to the MEBA DAF and DEP. The financial partners set up the CAST-FSDEB (see Box 3.1), which used most but not all national PFM processes. Such an arrangement required specific capacity building activities at central and local levels. A specific unit was established within the DAF of MEBA to ensure the day to day management and follow-up of external commitments. A French technical assistant was posted full time to this unit from 2005. In parallel, the 45 DPEBAs received training for the management of CAST resources according to specific procedures outside the existing budget software.

On the one hand, the resources invested in these efforts would have had a more significant and sustainable impact if they had directly supported capacity development for the management of the national budget. The recent choice of a budget support modality for the channelling of the forthcoming FTI catalytic funds should contribute to strengthen the procurement and financial management capacities based on country systems. On the other hand, CAST donors have demonstrated that they could pool their efforts to strengthen MEBA's procurement and FM capacities based on MEBA's plan (i.e. "Plan d'Amélioration des services financiers 2008/10").

► Planning and statistics (DEP/MEBA). This support was accelerated by the strong appetite of donors for reliable data and M&E systems to justify their investments in the sector and monitor performance. France, JICA and EC provided long term TA for school mapping and production of the statistical yearbook. Canada provided short term expertise to help assess learning achievements. While there was no technical assistance plan, there were informal arrangements within the local donor group and MEBA to coordinate these inputs.

The support to the above-mentioned departments could be extended in the future following recommendations of a recent study supported by EC making proposals for a CD plan for DAF and DEP of MEBA both at central and local levels (Bellange et al 2009).

### The FTI's influence on donor's capacities

8.24 FTI procedures brought to light the necessary qualification and specialisation in education of the technical and financial partners in order to play an active role within the partnership established in the education sector. Indeed, the FTI Framework and Appraisal procedures require specific educational expertise from the local donor group in order to assess the soundness of an education plan, the size of the financial gap, the management

capacity of a fast track strategy, etc. This expertise is not always available within the local donors' group (e.g. the 2008 appraisal of the Catalytic Fund request was done by an independent consultant).

8.25 Moreover, FTI procedures helped define the roles and responsibilities of a lead donor and clearly revealed the workload attached to this position – although providing no adequate response on this issue. While there are more than 10 bilateral and multilateral donors involved in the education sector, no one in 2008 challenged the choice of the World Bank as the lead for the future (combining the position of lead donor with the position of FTI CF supervising entity).

## **Efficiency of the FTI's contribution to capacity development**

8.26 EPDF and transaction costs. The transaction costs associated with the implementation of an EPDF– supported activity are perceived by the WB as too high with regard to the amount it may grant. "The EPDF request requires the same amount of work as an IDA credit-supported activity for a smaller allocation, it is not cheap money!".<sup>51</sup> This may explain the very low incentive for the World Bank to communicate about the EPDF, to process the application and implement the resulting EPDF allocation following World Bank administrative procedures. Moreover, it doesn't seem that other local donors have been involved in the potential use of EPDF funds at country-level.

8.27 EPDF and additionality. It is not clear whether the financing of the Education Country Status Report (RESEN) undertaken 2006–2009 should be considered as an additional source of funds or whether EPDF has displaced resources. Indeed, the previous education CSR, produced in 2002, was entirely financed by NETF.<sup>52</sup> However a fundamental distinction can be made between the exercises. The first CSR focused on "the product" (i.e. the diagnostic analysis of the education system itself) and was completed in a very short period of time, while the second CSR focused on the "process" (i.e. capacity building in data analysis) and was carried out over a period of 18 months.

## **Sustainability**

8.28 While the contribution of FTI to upstream activities has been institutionalised, a key gap remains for tackling implementation capacity. The rapid expansion of the education system in Burkina Faso is challenging the leadership capability, effective division of responsibility between central and decentralised levels, and *mobilisation*, deployment, use and management of resources (financial, human, physical and information). There is a growing mismatch between what the ministries of education are meant to do, especially MEBA and what they are able to do. This jeopardises the effective implementation of policies and plans making capacity the binding constraint to delivering EFA goals.

8.29 The provision of CF support through un-earmarked SBS as of 2009 implies that, as opposed to project funding, which may subsidise specific CD-related elements of an education strategy, it will be Government's choice how much to allocate of its own budget to CD.

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<sup>51</sup> WB Task Team Leader Education

<sup>52</sup>There is a clear tendency for the World Bank to become increasingly dependent on trust funds to finance basic analytical work and advisory services to the countries. This is particularly true as the institution's budget is almost entirely tied to country-programs squeezing analytical work programs.

8.30 The Government is currently taking action to coordinate capacity building efforts across sectors in Burkina Faso. Indeed the donors supporting the education sector are the same ones participating in a coordinated capacity support in the area of public financial management. The internal incentive provided by the Government coupled with the experience acquired by donors in the area of PFM could help to shape the capacity building programme and activities in the education sector.

8.31 Regarding the capacities of the donor group, the processes promoted by the FTI are highly demanding and require qualified education staff. The difficulty of involving local donors in high level policy dialogue in the education sector at country-level may increase in the future if the move towards budget support promoted by the channelling of Catalytic Fund resources through DPOs contributes to aid agencies reducing their staff capacities in the education sector.



## 9 The FTI and Aid Effectiveness

### Context

#### The FTI's aid effectiveness goals

9.1 The following goals set out in the FTI Framework document (FTI 2004a) are directly concerned with aid effectiveness:

- More efficient aid for primary education, through actions of development partners to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonisation in aid delivery and reduce transaction costs for FTI recipient countries.
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education, where countries demonstrate the ability to utilise it effectively.

#### The aid landscape in Burkina Faso

9.2 **In financial terms**, ODA to basic education has increased nearly twofold since 2000, but has remained stable in its share of total MEBA expenditures. Chapter 2 provides an update on overall ODA in Burkina Faso, while chapter 3 covers ODA to education, with a specific focus on basic education.

9.3 **The main evolution of ODA to basic education since 2000 has been the change in aid modalities**, from projects to a pooled fund to sector budget support, and the institution of strong donor coordination mechanisms and a joint performance assessment framework. This evolution has concerned only the basic education sub-sectors so far, but is progressively starting to spill over in other sub-sectors, in particular secondary education and technical and vocational training. It has also been emulated in other sectors, in particular health, HIV&AIDS, gender and water & sanitation.

9.4 Until 2004, aid to basic education was entirely in project mode, financing mainly investment expenditure and technical assistance.<sup>53</sup> Over this period, aid to education was dominated by five main donors: the WB, AfDB, Canada, Netherlands, and France. Between 2002 and 2004, the WB, Canada and Netherlands set up a "*panier commun*", which implied a common PIU, the BEP, and could be seen as the beginning of a programme-based approach in support of the PDDEB. Their support nevertheless remained in a project modality. France, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden joined in progressively.

9.5 In 2002, the first Partnership Framework was signed by all donors involved in the sector. It set out key principles for donor coordination, information sharing and increased aid effectiveness. In particular, it set the framework for the joint review missions ("*missions conjointes de suivi*"). The first joint mission took place in March 2003, and these missions have taken place twice yearly since then. Joint missions discuss the PDDEB financial and technical implementation reports, as well as a list of 18 performance indicators. They assess progress towards the implementation of the recommendations of previous missions. They became progressively more institutionalised and better organised, with timely provision of reports by Government and timely information on future support and commitments from donors. Joint missions rely on the work of four thematic working groups (access, quality, piloting and financial issues), which meet regularly throughout the year (some more than

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<sup>53</sup> There had been experiences of co-financing, for example the WB 4th education project (1991-1998) was co-financed by the EC, Canada and Norway; the EC PASEB project was co-financed by Netherlands.

others), assess progress and report to the joint missions. Participants in these thematic groups and in the joint missions include Government representatives (MEBA, MEF), donors, and civil society representatives (teacher unions, APE, AME, NGOs).

9.6 In 2004, following fiduciary concerns, the BPE was closed and its competency transferred to the DAF and DEP of the MEBA, as well as to the SP PDDEB. The audit of BPE activities subsequently led the Government to reimburse certain donors in 2005–2006. In order to avoid some donors shifting back to a traditional, project-based approach, donors and Government then set up a pooled fund in support of the PDDEB, the CAST-FSDEB. See Box 3.1 for more details. The departure of the WB from the CAST-FSDEB in 2008, mainly for fiduciary reasons, as WB procedures would have required derogating from the CAST-FSDEB (and national) procedures in terms of public procurement, caused serious confusion amongst all stakeholders, as to the exact reasons for this exit and to its implications for the future of the CAST-FSDEB.

9.7 A revised version of the Partnership Framework was signed in 2007.

9.8 Following the reform of education, the CAST-FSDEB was extended to cover other parts of basic education. The March 2009 joint review revised the joint review framework, shifting from two to one review of basic education per year, in March, complemented by one review of the whole education sector, in October.<sup>54</sup>

9.9 In 2009, the World Bank was designated lead donor for basic education and terms of reference were drawn up for its role.

## FTI inputs

9.10 The FTI inputs in terms of aid efficiency were of three types: (i) negotiation of the requests and evaluation by the LDG; (ii) discussion on aid modalities in 2008 and preparation of the DPO; (iii) the Donor Indicative Framework for which Burkina Faso was a pilot in 2004 and the study on aid effectiveness in the education sector in Burkina Faso in 2008.

9.11 **Evaluation of the request by the local donor group.** The FTI requires the local donor group to assess the requests presented by Government and present them to the Partnership. Donors are provided with a set of guidelines on the content of the evaluation. In 2002, the evaluation was carried out by the donor group and in 2008 by a consultant hired for that purpose.

9.12 **Discussions on aid modality for CF funding.** In 2008, the preparation of the request involved intense discussions on the aid modality proposed for CF funding. The initial request, favoured by MEBA and a few bilateral donors, proposed a disbursement through the CAST-FSDEB, in order to maximise synergies with existing processes, ensure full additionality of funds to basic education, minimise transaction costs and ensure the timely availability of funds (given that the process was already functional). In the meantime, the WB was appointed as supervising entity for the FTI support, given that no other donor was ready or had the capacity to manage the potential FTI CF funding. The departure of the WB from the CAST-FSDEB made the initial request (for CF funds to go through the CAST) impossible, if the WB was to remain supervising entity. On the other hand, neither Government nor the other donors would have accepted CF funding to be implemented

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<sup>54</sup> Aide Memoire of the 13th Joint Review Mission, (MEBA 2009a).

through a traditional WB project modality, as this would have seemed like a major step backwards, and MEF favoured a budget support programme.

9.13 A video-conference was organised with the FTI Secretariat in October 2008, which expressed no preference for a particular aid modality but helped clarify that all options were open. Ensuing negotiations led to the agreement to use SBS as the modality, through a DPO, as foreseen in the FTI aid modality framework.<sup>55</sup> The choice of SBS for CF funding, therefore, stems both from external circumstances (the departure of the WB from the CAST-FSDEB and no other donor being willing to act as supervising entity) and from the clear decision by Government and the local donors that they would not accept CF support in the form of a project. The WB position on this issue appears neutral: the WB's main constraint was the impossibility of joining the CAST-FSDEB (coming from the requirements laid down at WB headquarters), and it was willing to compromise on DPO procedures in order to accommodate this last minute decision and avoid unnecessary delays (see Box 4.2 and ¶9.14). It should be noted that the use of DPOs for sector budget support ("sector DPO") – as opposed to GBS in the form of a PRSC – is relatively new for the WB and as a result, involves significant transaction costs and "learning by doing" by the WB team. Finally, the strong resentment created by the WB's exit from the CAST-FSDEB (by Government and the local education donors) may also have contributed to the greater flexibility in the WB's move to SBS.

9.14 Regarding the (last minute) choice of the DPO as an aid modality for the CF, local donors expressed concern with regard to:

- Coherence: the WB came out of the pooled fund for fiduciary reasons, which could influence its willingness to move to a DPO. In addition, the WB already supports Burkina Faso through a DPO (the PRSC), and has a separate project in support of basic education.
- Delays: concerns about the possibility of preparing a DPO within a short timeframe, adjusting its requirements to use existing studies and avoiding additional analytical work.
- Alignment: concerns about the alignment of the DPO's review, reporting and monitoring mechanism with existing ones. Concerns about the alignment of the WB project supporting the strengthening of public procurement attached to the FTI programme with the existing "*Plan d'Amélioration CAST-FSDEB et de la Gestion des services (période 2008 – 2010)*".

Although some of these concerns have been addressed (minimisation of analytical work, openness of the DPO preparation), others remain valid and should be addressed when the DPO is finalised.

9.15 **Analytical input.** In 2004, Burkina Faso was selected as a pilot for the "Donor Indicative Framework" (see Box 9.1). The FTI published in 2009 a study on aid effectiveness in selected FTI countries,<sup>56</sup> which included a specific case study of aid effectiveness in the education sector in Burkina Faso.

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<sup>55</sup> FTI Catalytic Fund. Current and future aid modalities and instruments (FTI 2008h)

<sup>56</sup> Making aid more effective by 2010. 2008 survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration indicators in selected FTI countries. (FTI 2009a) and *Efficacité de l'aide dans le secteur de l'éducation. Etude FTI 2008 Burkina Faso* (FTI 2008c)

## The relevance of the FTI

9.16 **The objective of the FTI in terms of strengthening aid effectiveness in the education sector** was particularly relevant in the context of the PDDEB 2000–2009. The PDDEB itself outlined the "need to move away from the project-based approach which presents numerous drawbacks, the main ones being risks of interruption between two projects, the short term life span of interventions compared to development needs, the lack of coherence between different partners' interventions due to an insufficient coordination of the services, and the excessive and uncoordinated requests made by donors of MEBA staff".<sup>57</sup> The PDDEB, therefore, invited donors to move towards more harmonised and coordinated approaches, and to use country systems instead of multiple PIUs.

9.17 **The requirement by the FTI for the local donor group to assess the request** presented by Government was also relevant in that it provided a concrete opportunity for donors to apply the Paris Declaration principles.<sup>58</sup> It required a common position of the LDG both on the evaluation of the request (2002 and 2008) and on the choice of an aid modality (2008). Its added value over existing procedures is the fact that donors and Government were discussing one "common" programme (as opposed to each donor having its separate programmes to coordinate). It was, therefore, a unique opportunity to strengthen existing coordination mechanisms and bring them one step forward.

9.18 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the focus of the 2009–2011 **CF financing the whole basic education sub-sector** – in line with the reform of the education system outlined in the *Loi d'orientation* of 2007 and in the PDDEB II – is particularly relevant to the Government's objective to move towards a Sector Wide Approach in the coming years.

## The FTI's influence on the effectiveness of aid

9.19 The FTI has contributed both directly and indirectly to the improvement of aid effectiveness in basic education in Burkina Faso, through the inputs identified above (negotiation and evaluation of requests, discussions on aid modality). It has contributed to strengthening the existing dynamic of aid coordination and alignment, which has led to significant improvements over 2002–2009, on most of the Paris Declaration indicators and contributes to improved coordination in other subsectors and other sectors – as detailed in the following paragraphs.

9.20 **Ownership.** The launch of the PDDEB and the new donor coordination mechanism has undeniably contributed to improved ownership by the MEBA of its priorities, and improved capacity to coordinate donor support (Vachon 2008). The new modalities of coordination between Government and donors, initiated through the joint missions and the CAST-FSDEB, have allowed the development of a dialogue based on trust and more joint work (through the thematic working groups), jointly agreed conditions for donor disbursements (through the PFC and joint missions aide memoire recommendations), and improved transparency and information sharing. Constraints remain mainly in terms of capacity (both on donor and Government sides – at a central and deconcentrated level). In terms of an FTI contribution, the focus on country-led processes (endorsement by local donor group, focus on country plan) was particularly relevant. Nevertheless, lack of flexibility in the 2002 endorsement led to a rushed process and the requirement of a request in line with the IF benchmarks, which did not contribute to strengthening country ownership. In 2008, the process was more flexible, but the refusal by the CF that Government present its

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<sup>57</sup> PDDEB 2000–2009 p1 of introduction, translation by authors

<sup>58</sup> The Paris Declaration Principles are used as a reference for assessing the state of aid effectiveness, while acknowledging the fact that the Paris Declaration as such was endorsed in 2005

own request to the Steering Committee (instead of the WB and lead donor) did not send the appropriate message.

**9.21 Alignment.** In terms of planning, the PDDEB has become the main reference for all donor support, whatever the aid modality. The annual drafting of the PDDEB action plan, and its adoption in a CASEM meeting, have also contributed to improved alignment of donor support (again whatever the modality) to PDDEB priorities and activities. As outlined in the P. Vachon study for the 2009 GMR (Vachon 2008, p.17), the action plan has evolved from being a compilation of the activities of every stakeholder to, progressively, a guiding tool, planning activities in the year to come. In terms of alignment with national procedures, the creation of the CAST-FSDEB in 2005 clearly represented progress towards more alignment with national processes, in particular, since donor financing through the CAST replaced former project financing. Nevertheless, the CAST continues to use parallel processes at various levels, which create additional transaction costs (specific reporting, auditing, specific nomenclature), potentially diverts energies towards strengthening systems in parallel with national ones, and may also provide elements for strengthening national systems (moving towards a programme budget). Finally, it should be underlined that since its inception, the CAST was seen by quite a few donors (among which, the Netherlands and Denmark) as a transition mechanism from project-mode to more aligned aid modalities such as SBS.

**9.22** Although the choice of SBS as a modality for CF funding was mainly linked to an internal dynamic at the local level (the WB coming out of the CAST-FSDEB, the lack of capacity of other donors to manage FTI support), it also provided a welcome opportunity for some donors and for the MEF in particular, to put forward their preference for SBS. The flexibility provided by the FTI initiative and the CF in terms of aid modalities enabled the local dialogue to mature towards an agreement on an SBS modality – the main concerns as outlined above being the requirements of the specific modality of a WB DPO more than with the choice of SBS *per se*. The experience of the CF with SBS is now monitored closely by other donors. It is seen as a sort of pilot which could enable some of them (Denmark, the Netherlands) to move their own support from the CAST-FSDEB to SBS.

**9.23** Annex I presents a further analysis of the alignment of existing aid modalities in the education sector (projects, CAST-FSDEB, SBS) with national planning, budgeting and expenditure processes. In particular, it outlines the step forward represented by the move to SBS in terms of alignment with national processes. This shift from a sub-sector pooled fund to SBS is potentially a very significant one and may create major opportunities for strengthened policy dialogue, domestic accountability and financial management processes (Williamson and Kizilbash Agha 2008). This step forwards remains nevertheless conditional on the design of the precise modalities for the DPO (in particular, alignment of the matrix of measures with existing plans and policies, alignment of the review process with the existing processes, absence of earmarking of funds, enabling alignment with the national budget allocation and execution processes).

**9.24 Harmonisation and Coordination.** The following are all elements of improved coordination and harmonisation of aid to basic education since 2002: the signing of the *Cadre de Partenariat*,<sup>59</sup> the organisation of the joint review missions, the organisation of the work of the LDG through a lead donor and participation in thematic working groups, the creation of the CAST and the signing of the PFC which led to the definition of common conditionalities and disbursement mechanisms.

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<sup>59</sup> Current signatories of the Partnership framework are : France, WB, Canada, Switzerland, EC, WFP, Netherlands, Unicef, UNFPA, Japan and the CCEB (coordination of NGOs)

**9.25 Managing for results** – Burkina Faso has long been familiar with collecting and using data on education for monitoring. The introduction of the PDDEB, the joint review mechanism and the move to an increased focus on results in GBS programmes led to a stronger demand from Government and donors. Data quality, coverage, timeliness and dissemination has improved significantly since 2002, but the burden of reporting has increased both at central and decentralised levels, leading to the need for streamlining different reports and monitoring mechanisms. The FTI's most effective contribution in terms of strengthening the focus on results has been the conduct of the 2007–2009 RESEN report which was both an effective capacity-building exercise in data analysis and a useful tool to strengthen the quality of data analysis both by donors and by Government. See Chapter 7 for further details

**9.26 Mutual accountability.** The FTI has used existing mechanisms for donor coordination and stakeholder participation in the education and planning processes. The existing local education group, which involves donors as well as local and international NGOs, and civil society representatives, were part of the discussion on FTI endorsement in 2002 and on the request to the Catalytic Fund in 2008. The joint reviews and associated processes provide a framework for mutual accountability and annual performance assessment. They provide the opportunity to discuss donor performance (amount and timing of disbursements) as well as government performance (implementation of recommendations from former reviews, key output indicators, key outcome indicators). Over time since their creation in 2003, joint education reviews have involved a wider range of stakeholders, in particular teacher unions, parent and civil society organisations, which broadens the scope of mutual accountability. Although the FTI has not contributed directly or indirectly to these mechanisms, it does benefit from them for the monitoring and implementation of CF funding.

**9.27** No formal framework has been defined (in the form of a "performance assessment framework") for monitoring donor and government performance. CF funding may contribute to an evolution in this direction thanks to the DPO policy and results matrix. This matrix, if articulated properly with the national level matrixes (CGAB, PRSP, SRFP) could form the basis of a future sector level monitoring framework. On the donor side, Burkina Faso was part of the pilot initiative launched by the FTI on a "Donor Indicative Framework", which could have served as a basis to develop a donor accountability framework (see Box 9.1). As a follow up to the DIF initiative, the FTI carried out a study on the Paris Declaration Indicators in the education sector in Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, interviews during the country visit provided evidence that neither one of these instruments was used as a basis for sector dialogue, and the DG COOP Directorate in charge of aid effectiveness, which carried out the Paris Declaration survey, had neither been involved nor informed.

**9.28** Finally, **aid predictability** in the sub-sector remains very limited, both in the short and in the medium to long term. The FTI CF support provides a positive example through providing funding for three years (actually closer to two and a half years FTI CF support, however, also contributes quite negatively to short term aid predictability: in the first year of its implementation, the first tranche of the DPO is only expected to be disbursed in July, at the earliest, which is late in the budget year, given the amount of funding and the length of the public procurement process (commitments close on the 20th November). The funding was endorsed in December 2008, too late for inclusion in the 2009 Finance Law. A ministerial decree will have to be made to allow expenditure to be incurred, before being regularised through the revised Finance Law.¶3.42 and ¶3.43 provide further information on the predictability of external finance in support of basic education. The weak predictability, both in the current year and in the medium term, substantially impacts the credibility of planning documents such as the action plan – in particular at deconcentrated levels (Ziegler

2007) – the MTEF and the financial simulation model. It may also influence the willingness of Government to take policy decisions which may have longer term financial implications.

### Box 9.1 The Donor Indicative Framework Pilot

Between June and September 2004, the FTI piloted a comprehensive survey of alignment and harmonisation in four countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Niger) to address the issue of donor accountability in the FTI. The FTI Harmonisation Working Group developed, together with the Secretariat, an instrument for the survey called the Donor Indicative Framework (DIF), with the objective to support FTI partners in their harmonisation efforts and to monitor harmonisation practices and financial commitments at the country-level.

DIF indicators were based on relevant OECD DAC indicators and the indicators developed by the EC and EU in relation to the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (February 2003).

The synthesis report of the pilot, produced by the Working Group, was presented to the FTI Partnership Meeting in Brasilia in November 2004. It recommended rolling out the DIF so as to support further efforts to improve alignment and harmonisation and that independent monitoring of the DIF be undertaken. It also recommended that the DIF should become a more flexible tool adaptable to country specificities.

The DIF initiative took place between the Rome and Paris agreements on aid effectiveness. Since the Paris agreement would define aid effectiveness indicators, the FTI decided that it would not be effective for each sector to define its own. Rather, the preference was to integrate the DIF with the OECD DAC and use the comparative advantage of the FTI partnership to help roll out the Paris agreement at the country-level, i.e. help to integrate those indicators into country-level monitoring of aid effectiveness performance. The FTI was invited to participate in the Paris meeting and in the follow-up working groups on the identification of indicators. (Buse 2007 p14, FTI 2004c).

## The FTI's influence on the efficiency of aid

9.29 Regarding **aid modalities**, the experience of Burkina Faso shows that the fact that the World Bank is the supervising entity has a clear influence on the choice of aid modalities. First, it is difficult for the WB to join in pooled funds such as the CAST-FSDEB, for fiduciary and internal reasons, which, as a consequence, makes it difficult for FTI funding to go through these pooled funds.<sup>60</sup> This may be a significant issue, in particular, when the option of SBS is not available. Second, the WB's DPO involves heavy processes in terms of programme negotiation, analytical work, which implies missions abroad (two weeks in Washington for several key staff of the MEF, MEBA, MESSRS, MASSN and MJE). Although some of these due processes were waived in the case of Burkina Faso, it is not clear if this will become the case for all FTI CF-financed DPOs or if this was only a one-off example, due to the impossibility of the WB to join the CAST which "forced" the choice of a DPO.<sup>61</sup>

9.30 Regarding **FTI procedures** as a whole (preparation and evaluation of requests, preparation of the CF financed programme), it is considered by most interviewed as a very heavy and at times confusing process, with high transaction costs for Government as well as for donors. Most donors – apart from the WB – shy away from taking responsibility for the FTI-CF as a supervising entity, partly because of what they see as a heavy process that they do not have the capacity to manage. The lack of clarity and deficit of communication between the Partnership and the Government is most notable (letters and documents in English, lack of information on EPDF, last minute changes in the documents required for the request), and is one the main challenges to improve the efficiency and visibility of FTI support to Burkina Faso. Confusion also arises in particular in relation to EPDF funding, which was understood by Government stakeholders to be WB funding without knowing it

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<sup>60</sup> The same issue arose in Mozambique for the same reasons. See Handley 2008 and Bartholomew et al 2010

<sup>61</sup> The process followed (waiving the PAD for example) differs from the process outlined in World Bank 2008h

was related in any way to the FTI. It is significant that Burkina Faso has felt the need to apply to represent its peers at the Board of the Partnership in order to access adequate information.

9.31 These heavy processes imply delays and make the alignment with national procedures difficult or nearly impossible, in particular for the disbursement in the first year of the programme to be financed by the CF. It should nevertheless be highlighted that the use of SBS in the form of a DPO was a novelty for the WB, for the CF and for Burkina Faso, which clearly contributed, in part, to the delays.

## **Sustainability**

9.32 The existing aid coordination mechanism has been running for more than six years, and is well entrenched and owned both by Government and by donors. The existence of terms of reference for the joint reviews and for the lead donor role should contribute to the sustainability of the existing donor coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms have also proven their ability to adapt to new challenges and an evolving context, in particular through the modifications endorsed during the 13th joint mission. Nevertheless, in order for the advances in aid effectiveness that have been achieved in the education sector to be sustained, there needs to be a core of specialist capacity in country in development partner offices. High levels of staff turnover, plus pressures on donors to reduce the size of their country offices to contain costs, appear to be placing even more pressure on remaining staff. This has implications for donors' involvement in the thematic working groups, and for the quality and content of the dialogue on education sector policies and performance, in particular now that the move to SBS progressively shifts the focus from a detailed analysis of outputs to a dialogue on systems, policies and performance. A strengthened link between sub-sector, sector and national level processes such as the CSLP review and the budget cycle would also contribute to enhanced sustainability of the current aid coordination and joint review mechanisms.

9.33 The FTI goal of *sustained* increases in aid for primary education is not assured, with considerable uncertainty about future levels of funding available from donors. There is no clarity either on the possibility of government accessing similar future funding from the CF after the end of the current programme, and what would be the basis for renewed CF funding. There was some understanding within MEBA that good performance in meeting the targets specified in the policy matrix would ensure future CF support, but there does not seem to be any evidence of this.

9.34 As regards risk, the fact that some donors envisage moving to SBS based on the lessons learnt from the FTI CF experience could pose a challenge to the unity and strength of the existing donor coordination. In particular, there is a risk that the March joint review becomes the "project donor review" and the October education sector review the "budget support donor review".

9.35 The gains in aid effectiveness that are being made could also be threatened by any deterioration in the standards of public financial management, or by political instability which could undermine the effectiveness of Government institutions and threaten the working relationships between Government and basic education donors.



## 10 Cross-Cutting Issues

### Context

10.1 Key cross cutting issues considered in the framework of this report include equity - including gender, revenue and geographical issues – and HIV/AIDS. Issues of equity are particularly important in Burkina Faso, where the education system is in transition from a formerly elitist system to one built around the objective of universal primary education.

10.2 Regarding equity, the RESEN 2007–2009 (Chapter 6) provides a thorough overview of the evolution between 1997/98 and 2005/06:

- Gender parity in the GER at primary level increased from 0.71 to 0.87. Inequalities in the PCR related to gender also decreased. Just the same, despite the fact that in most parts of the world girls seem to perform better than boys, in Burkina Faso, the surveys conducted of student learning outcomes showed the reverse, highlighting a specific gender problematic in Burkina Faso.
- The difference in school completion rates between the richer and poorer quintiles (45.2%) is higher than the difference between rural and urban areas (33%) and between genders (11%). The lower representation of girls in the higher levels of education is less pronounced than their lower representation in the lower revenue quintiles and among rural children.
- Differences observed at secondary level are higher than differences at primary level.
- Inequalities between regions are very high: Centre region has a GER in P6 of 67.1% against 13% in the Sahel region, and a national average of 32.8%. Out of the four regions that had GERs in P6 lower than 15% in 1996, three increased above that level.
- Rural illiteracy (80.5%) is much higher than urban illiteracy (36.6%). More worryingly, analysis of the RESEN shows that in Burkina Faso, 10% of the most educated children consume 50% of public funding for education, against 44% and 33% in Francophone and Anglophone African countries.

10.3 The main measures taken in the PDDEB with regard to reducing inequalities are: (i) free text books (decision taken in 1996 but operationalisation in 2006); (ii) paying APE contributions for girls in the first year of primary; (iii) specific support for school construction and functioning in 20 priority provinces (with the lowest enrolment rates); (iv) "cartable minimum" – provision of basic school material for all children; (v) increasing the number of female teachers; and (vi) multiplication of school feeding programmes. The PDDEB II also envisages enhancing the fee-free policy by providing for APE contributions in order to avoid children dropping out of school for financial reasons.

10.4 The mid-term evaluation of the PDDEB notes the positive performance of PDDEB implementation, in particular in reducing gender inequalities and in enhancing access in the 20 priority provinces. Nevertheless, inequality between priority provinces and non priority provinces remains high (respectively 58.4% and 80.6% GER in primary)

10.5 **HIV prevalence** in Burkina Faso has decreased over the past decade, from 7.2% in 1997 to 4.2% in 2002. Analysis carried out in 2006 shows a higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS among pupils than in the rest of the population. Government adopted a Strategic framework for the fight against AIDS (2001–2005 and 2006–2010), promoting a multi-sectoral approach. In the education sector, a strategy to fight against AIDS has been finalised in 2007, with the support of the Netherlands and the WB. It focuses on care to affected MEBA and MESSRS personnel, and on care to HIV/AIDS orphan pupils. Phase II of the PDDEB focuses its actions against HIV/AIDS on (i) sensitisation for APE/AME/COGES; (ii) training

for teachers and educators; (iii) care for affected personnel and pupils; and (iv) strengthening the curricula on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections, as well as family planning at all levels. According to the PDDEB mid-term evaluation, training and sensitisation on HIV/AIDS is still mostly done by NGOs.

## **FTI inputs and activities**

10.6 In terms of FTI inputs with regard to cross-cutting issues, they consist of the indicators monitored in the IF (in particular, the gender disaggregation of key indicators), which guided the preparation of the 2002 request; the guidelines for appraisal of the Education Sector Plan by the LDG; the appraisal of endorsement and requests by the LDG, which focus specifically on issues related to gender, HIV/AIDS, and inequalities; the funding of the RESEN in 2007–2009 and the financial support indirectly through a catalytic effect or directly through the future CF funding.

## **Relevance**

10.7 The situation of Burkina Faso with a PCR of nearly 40% puts into perspective the question of enhancing access for "hard-to-reach children". The majority of children still do not complete primary school, and should therefore remain the main focus of stakeholders in the education system. Inequalities are progressively reduced, not because of a specific focus on "hard-to-reach children" but mainly thanks to overall progress towards universalisation of primary education. The focus of the FTI on issues of equity, gender, and HIV/AIDS is therefore relevant but should be put into perspective in relation to the situation of Burkina Faso with regard to access and the achievement of primary completion.

10.8 The RESEN, co-funded by the EPDF in 2007–2009, was particularly relevant in providing hard evidence and in-depth analysis of gender, income, geographical inequalities, and in particular outlining the inefficient allocation of the national resources vis-à-vis these inequalities. It has proved very useful in influencing the policy decisions in the PDDEB II, in the "*Loi d'orientation*" and subsequently the 2008 request to the FTI. Discussions on inefficient allocation of national resources have probably contributed to some key policy decisions, such as the decision to decentralise the competition for primary school teachers at the regional level, deconcentration of the provision of manuals and books at the DPEBA level, and changes in the policy towards the 20 priority provinces towards stimulation of demand and sensitisation.

## **Effectiveness**

10.9 The study carried out by the FTI partnership on the coverage of HIV/AIDS issues in the education sector plans of FTI-endorsed countries (The EFA-FTI: Responding to the Challenge of HIV and AIDS to the Education Sector, Clarke and Bundy 2004, p23) outlines that while Burkina Faso was among the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS in the group of the first 12 countries endorsed by the FTI, it included one of the most comprehensive approaches to addressing the issue of HIV/AIDS in its plan. However, the study also stresses that in no case is there sufficient detail to adequately assess the response to the three key themes of HIV prevention, responding to the needs of OVCs or impact mitigation.

10.10 With regard to the contribution of the FTI, the study – carried out in 2004 – finds that:

The coverage of issues [in the comments that have been made in the assessment processes by both FTI Secretariat and local donor groups] is not consistent or comprehensive. Some comments reflect only what is already included in the education sector plan and thereby explicitly or implicitly endorse this. In a few instances specific comments are made in the form of recommendations, encouragements or suggestions (Clarke and Bundy 2004).

10.11 It is nevertheless fair to say that the evaluation of the 2008 request to the CF by the LDG (carried out by a consultant) provides a more thorough evaluation of the coverage of HIV/AIDS in the PDDEB II and other government plans. However, even taking into account the improvement in the discussion on HIV/AIDS in the assessment of the Education Sector Plan and of the request to the CF, it cannot be said that this has in turned influenced Government's policy decisions or focus on these issues. Initiatives in support of girls' education, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the fight against inequalities were mainly related to a dynamic pushed by other stakeholders, in Government, in the civil society, and by other donors (Unicef in particular).

10.12 With regard to the indicators monitored in the IF, they were already monitored in the PDDEB (2000–2009 and 2008–2010), which analyses girl enrolment rates in particular, and inequalities between regions and quintiles. The IF contains no indicator related directly to HIV/AIDS.

10.13 Finally as mentioned above, the RESEN exercise (supported by the EPDF in 2007-2009) had a more evident influence on policy choices, by providing an enhanced understanding and analysis of inequalities that were then used to develop the PDDEB II.

## **Efficiency and sustainability**

10.14 The move of towards SBS fostered by the CF funding, if it progressively replaces CAST-FSDEB and project funding, may in future contribute to strengthening the focus of the national budget on issues of equity and girls' education, and thereby strengthen the sustainability of such initiatives. Currently, some the most financially significant measures such as payment of APE contributions for girls in P1 are financed by the CAST-FSDEB. Nevertheless, it also implies that – contrary to project funding – the CF cannot directly fund cross-cutting issues but will rely on policy dialogue with Government to ensure they are adequately addressed in the national budget.



## **PART D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**



## 11 Conclusions

### Introduction

11.1 This chapter first gives the evaluation team's overall assessments for Burkina Faso against each of the high level evaluation questions. It then provides a summary of the overall conclusions and of the conclusions for each stream of analysis. In addition, Annex J provides a summary of the conclusions in the form of a matrix which identifies the FTI inputs and assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the FTI's contribution.

### The high level evaluation questions

#### **Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of Burkina Faso?**

11.2 The FTI's objectives in terms of support to sound sector policies, more efficient aid for education, sustained increases in financing for basic education and increased accountability for sector results are very much in line with the needs identified in Burkina Faso's ten year plan for the development of basic education (PDDEB 2000–2009).

11.3 More specifically, the FTI's "intellectual influence" on policy and strategic planning is relevant to the needs of Burkina Faso to accelerate progress towards UPC. The focus on UPC instead of UPE encouraged a reassessment of the performance of the education system. The focus on primary education in 2002 and on the whole basic education sub-sector in 2008 was in line with the policy and evolution of the education sector, as well as with the need for a progressive approach to overcoming institutional fragmentation. The focus on cost-efficiency led to an "intellectual revolution" in the analysis and conception of education sector policies and priorities. The increased flexibility in the second request (2008) allowed genuine alignment with existing plans and objectives.

11.4 The choice of SBS for the upcoming CF financing (2009–2011) is also in line with Burkina Faso's financing needs, and with the existing dynamic in terms of aid effectiveness and aid modalities. This choice is related to the FTI's objective to strengthen aid effectiveness and promote better alignment with country processes.

11.5 On the downside, the benchmarks promoted by the Initiative – definition of the financing gap to achieve UPC in 2015, Indicative Framework – were misinterpreted in Burkina Faso in 2002 as conditionalities for accessing additional funding. This led to the preparation of an unrealistic request in 2002, not aligned with existing plans and objectives – a missed opportunity. With improved understanding of these tools over the years, and enhanced Capacity Development component in the second RESEN carried out by the Pôle de Dakar over a longer period of time, the IF indicators and benchmarks have been used in a more flexible manner for the 2008 request.

11.6 FTI inputs for capacity development, data and M&E were relevant but insufficient in addressing the specific needs of Burkina Faso. Activities financed by NETF and EPDF were more relevant (in particular the RESEN financed by NETF in 2000 and co-financed by EPDF in 2007–2009), but focused mainly on upstream policy issues (support to planning and programme preparation) rather than on downstream issues (analytical work relating to the monitoring of implementation, and capacity building for implementation), in the absence of a Government plan for capacity development in the education sector. The CD guidelines may

have been relevant but were not used as a basis to develop a common understanding of CD issues, enhance donor coordination or foster a joint approach between MEBA and education donors.

**To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, accelerating progress on EFA?**

11.7 The FTI's support to Burkina Faso since 2002 has helped strengthen an existing dynamic of improved planning and budgeting, enhanced donor coordination and focus on primary education. The fact that this dynamic existed before the FTI contribution to Burkina Faso clearly provided a very positive framework for FTI inputs and enhanced their usefulness.

11.8 The specific value added of FTI's inputs was in stimulating policy debate and providing tools to analyse performance and identify high level trade-offs in the education sector (intra-sectoral allocations, efficiency of allocations, and unit costs). These contributed to improved linkages between long term vision and short term planning, evidence based policy reforms, linkages between sub sectors and sector costing. They also stimulated key policy reforms such as teacher policies, school construction modalities, management of schooling input, etc.

11.9 In terms of both capacity building and accountability for results, the funding of the RESEN by the EPDF was the most effective input the FTI delivered. It contributed to building capacity in terms of data analysis, analysis of the efficiency of the education budget, and education planning.

11.10 Overall, it was mainly in the requirement for requests to be presented to the Partnership and the CF in 2002 and in 2008 that the FTI contributed to an acceleration in existing dynamics. These requests provided an opportunity for putting into practice the tools promoted by the FTI and for donors and Government to discuss their policy implications.

**Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?**

11.11 The FTI has contributed, albeit modestly, to increased domestic and international resources in support of basic education. The FTI's contribution reinforced an existing dynamic (from international conferences, structural adjustment/budget support and the HIPC focus on social sectors). Endorsement by the FTI has had a catalytic effect on external aid to basic education, although this effect has not been significantly additional, was delayed, and remains small compared to the overall increase in ODA to basic education.

11.12 FTI analytical tools also contributed to enhanced analysis of the efficiency of the education budget, and to improved capacity of MEBA to argue for increased resources in the national budget process. The IF benchmarks on resource mobilisation did not contribute to increased resources from the national budget, since the budget allocations in Burkina Faso were already meeting the IF benchmarks on resource mobilisation.

11.13 The CF funding starting in 2009 should contribute directly to filling the financial gap, although the risk remains of donors moving out of the sector/sub-sector from 2011.



11.14 The FTI process has provided a significant opportunity for donors and Government to discuss and agree on a common programme and thereby enhanced coordination and dialogue. In particular, it has broadened the dialogue on basic education to encompass not only the MEBA but all relevant ministries. More recently, it has fostered a debate on aid modalities and will lead the way in moving from harmonised (pooled fund) to fully aligned (SBS) aid modalities.

11.15 Nevertheless, the FTI contribution has failed to promote sustained increases in ODA for basic education. Predictability of ODA to basic education is limited both in the medium term (no commitments after 2010) and in the short term (disbursements late in the fiscal year – including the first year of the CF funding in 2009, actual disbursements differing from commitments).

## **Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**

### **Education policy and planning**

11.16 The FTI's input in terms of policy and planning mainly consisted of the IF, the RESEN (financed by EPDF in 2007–2009) and the associated financial simulation model. Although these three instruments were initially developed by the World Bank, they are closely associated with FTI processes. They were seen as a prerequisite to the development of a credible and costed education sector plan required for FTI endorsement.

11.17 The FTI's objectives and procedures were relevant to the needs of Burkina Faso in terms of putting the emphasis on UPC as opposed to UPE only, promoting the focus on primary education in 2002 (enlarged to basic education as a whole in 2008), and fostering a closer analysis of the cost drivers and cost efficiency within the sub-sector.

11.18 The FTI's inputs did contribute to enhanced planning and policy analysis in basic education, more inclusive policy dialogue (between the four education ministries, with civil society, with the Ministry of Finance), and strengthened focus on key policy trade-offs (teachers' salaries, school construction unit costs, expenditure per pupil per level of education). The presentation of a request to FTI in 2002 and to the CF in 2008 promoted an acceleration of existing dynamics at the sector level. Although the deadline for the preparation of the requests may have proven useful in accelerating existing processes, the analytical tools promoted by the FTI became internalised only when supported over a long period of time, whereas the rushed process in 2002 created confusion, frustration, and resulted in a lack of ownership.

11.19 Finally, the main risk to the sustainability of the improved policy and planning processes lies in the fact that they are so far restricted to MEBA only, and will need to be further extended to the whole sector and to the decentralised entities.

### **Financing of education**

11.20 The FTI's inputs in terms of finance include both direct financing by the EPDF and by the CF (to start in 2009), and indirect support to increased mobilisation of resources through (i) a catalytic effect on donor support following the 2002 endorsement; and (ii) the RESEN, financial simulation model, IF and endorsement process.

11.21 Between 2002 and 2009, the catalytic effect on donor support was minimal: funds were only marginally additional to existing support, and disbursements took place three to five years after the endorsement. Between 2009 and 2011, the CF is expected to contribute significantly to filling the financing gap identified for basic education, although uncertainties on levels of donor support after 2010 may put this into question. Throughout the period, FTI-related tools (RESEN, financial simulation model and less so the IF benchmarks) have contributed, along with other major input from GBS donors, HIPC, the PRSP and Government commitment, to the strong increase in internal resources for basic education. The FTI mainly contributed to improved costing of the basic education plans and objectives and a stronger link between MEBA and MEF due to the choice of SBS as an aid modality.

11.22 Overall, the FTI's contribution to financing of education so far has been rather inefficient: pressure to identify an unrealistic financing gap based on unrealistic objectives in 2002; a heavy process for endorsement in 2002 leading only to a marginal catalytic effect; long delays for the mobilisation of CF support through a DPO in 2008–2009.

11.23 Finally, the main risks are the low resource base for mobilising domestic resources, the nascent fiscal decentralisation process and related pressures from donors to increase the speed of disbursements (including pressure related to the disbursement of the 2009 tranche of the CF-financed DPO) and the lack of medium to long term predictability on donor support to basic education.

## **Data and M&E**

11.24 The FTI has not contributed extensively to the strengthening of M&E and data management in Burkina Faso. The main drivers for the improvements in data quality, timeliness, and analysis since 2002 were by the PDDEB and associated joint reviews, the PRSP and GBS donors, and support by individual donors. The appraisal of the ESP by local donors for the FTI has not focused particularly on "data gaps".

11.25 The most significant contributions of the FTI to data and M&E issues have been the IF, which has promoted a stronger focus on key indicators such as PCR, and the co-financing of the RESEN by the EPDF, which has provided in-depth analysis of the education sector and strengthened analytical skills within the planning department of MEBA. However, initial misunderstandings as to the "indicative" nature of the IF benchmarks have caused a lot of confusion. They may be related to the early endorsement of Burkina Faso and to the lack of consistency on the part of the donors and the FTI as to the role of the IF benchmarks.

11.26 In terms of efficiency, it is expected that the currently low level of transaction costs involved in reporting to the FTI will increase with the launch of the DPO. One key issue to be addressed in the near future will be the role of the DPO matrix of conditionality in the sector and sub-sector monitoring framework, and the need to ensure coherence between national and sector monitoring processes and indicators.

## **Capacity development**

11.27 The FTI's contribution to capacity development in Burkina Faso has been minimal. Despite the strong relevance of the issue of capacity to accelerating progress towards EFA in Burkina Faso, and the strong need for enhanced donor coordination on that issue, neither the appraisal process nor the CD guidelines have been effective in this area. EPDF (and NETF) funding focused mainly on upstream activities (planning and programme preparation), which is relevant but insufficient. The most effective tool for capacity building

promoted by the FTI has been the EPDF-funded 2007–2009 RESEN. The FTI was also effective in outlining the need for enhanced donor capacity at local level, although providing no adequate response. Finally, the choice of SBS as an aid modality represents a potentially significant input over the coming years for strengthening capacity by using country systems and minimising parallel requirements.

### **Aid effectiveness**

11.28 The FTI's contribution in terms of aid effectiveness was highly relevant, through the requirement for the LDG to assess jointly the Education Sector Plan and through the discussions on aid modalities around the 2009–2011 CF funding.

- In terms of its contribution to the Paris Declaration indicators, the FTI's inputs have had a rather negative effect on ownership, in particular through lack of clarity on the status of the IF benchmarks and the refusal by the CF that Government (instead of donors) present its request at the CF steering committee meeting in 2008.
- With regard to alignment, the choice of SBS as an aid modality was induced by external circumstances (WB exit from the CAST-FSDEB and the subsequent resentment by Government and the LDG), by the heaviness of FTI-related processes (leading to the impossibility of any donor apart from the WB to take up the role of supervising entity), and by the clear decision by Government and the donors that they would not accept CF funding using a project modality. Although the FTI Secretariat was not proactive in supporting this decision, it offered the necessary flexibility to allow this significant step from the existing pooled fund mechanism to a more aligned aid modality.
- The Donor Indicative Framework piloted in Burkina Faso in 2004 and the study on aid effectiveness carried out in 2008, which aimed at enhancing the FTI's contribution on the issue of mutual accountability, had no clear added value over the local processes and have not been used in any significant way.
- The issue of predictability of donor support (both currently and in the medium term) remains a major concern in Burkina Faso. Not only has FTI not contributed to any improvement, but in addition, CF support foreseen for 2009–2011 is a major cause of destabilisation. It was endorsed too late for inclusion in the budget law and the 2009 disbursement will occur very late in the budget year.
- Finally, the process for the two requests and preparation of the DPO in Burkina Faso have been high in transaction costs, confusing, and evidence of weak communication between the FTI Secretariat and the Government. It is significant in this respect that Burkina Faso has felt the need to apply to represent its peers at the Board of the Partnership in order to access adequate information.

### **Cross-cutting issues**

11.29 The FTI's contribution to adequate coverage in the education sector plans of equity, gender and HIV/AIDS issues has been minimal. The IF has not had a significant impact, nor have the appraisal processes. Only the RESEN, partly financed by the EPDF, has contributed to improved understanding and to policy decisions, in particular on equity issues.

11.30 Annex J summarises the country evaluation team's findings and conclusions overall, and for each stream of analysis, against the principal DAC evaluation criteria.



## 12 Recommendations and Reflections

12.1 In many ways, Burkina Faso has been a pilot country for the FTI: among the first countries endorsed in 2002, the first country to receive support in the form of a DPO in 2009. Although it has not yet received a direct financial contribution from the Catalytic Fund, Burkina Faso has a long history of "learning by doing" with the Initiative, and has potentially, by its experience, helped pave the way for other countries.

12.2 There is much to be learned by comparing the two endorsement processes undergone by Burkina Faso, to understand how the FTI's contribution has evolved. It has moved from a rigid approach towards more flexibility (the use of the Indicative Framework, the definition of the financing gap, the coverage of FTI support), but has remained a heavy process with high transaction costs. The evolution towards more flexibility has enhanced its alignment with country needs and existing procedures and its relevance: The FTI's contribution in 2002–2003 was described to the team as "*arrivant comme un cheveu sur la soupe*" (something of a fly in the ointment to existing processes). The heavy transaction costs imply that only the significant CF contribution makes it worthwhile, both for donors and for Government.

12.3 A key lesson to be drawn from Burkina Faso's experience with the FTI is the importance of communication, in particular between the FTI Secretariat and Government, and the need for more clarity on requirements (documents needed for the request, adapted DPO process for CF funding), on processes, and on existing funding modalities, in particular the EPDF.

12.4 Another issue is the need for further reflection on the role of the CF. If the CF aspires to fill the financing gap to achieve EFA, then the decision in 2008 to provide only part of the amount requested and endorsed by local donors for the period 2009–2011 does not make sense. In the same vein, in the event of a shortfall in donor support to basic education in the future, the CF should consider increasing its allocation to Burkina Faso accordingly. Finally, the CF should then consider providing support over a much longer time period: until 2020 in the case of Burkina Faso, which would be coherent with the requirement for long term costing and an education sector plan (until 2020), and potentially significantly enhance the room for policy decisions and the credibility of medium term planning. Nevertheless, this would also constitute the recognition that the objective to catalyse additional donor support is secondary, and that the CF becomes a "donor of last resort". This would also imply an acceptance by recipient countries that long term external financing is required for them to accelerate progress towards and achieve EFA goals, and therefore that aid dependency ratios may remain high over several years.

12.5 The role of the World Bank as a supervising entity also deserves further consideration, in particular its implications in communication (frequent confusion between FTI and WB, exacerbated by overlapping (and sometimes conflicting) roles of the WB as supervising entity for the CF, managing EPDF funds, providing policy advice and donor to the education sector through its own projects; lack of visibility of the EPDF) and aid modalities (difficulty for the WB to participate in pooled funds, heavy processes for DPO preparation, negotiation and implementation). Although there are advantages for the FTI and CF to have one "preferred" supervising entity (identical procedures in all countries, lighter requirements on the FTI Secretariat and CF for supervising the supervising entities), the privileged relation between the FTI and the World Bank should not be a constraint in achieving the FTI's objectives, in particular, aid effectiveness and alignment with country processes. Potential ways forward include: providing support to donors in order to allow

them to take on the role of supervising entity for the FTI CF; clarifying the "waivers" to the DPO due processes when financed by the CF and ensuring that the "FTI-DPO" is in line with FTI objectives.

12.6 Other key findings include the weakness of the FTI's contribution on capacity building and M&E issues, as well as on enhanced predictability and sustainability of aid to basic education.

12.7 In terms of lessons learned from the Burkina Faso case study for the wider set of recommendations in the evaluation as a whole, the findings outlined above highlight the following:

- Need to set up a stronger mechanism for communication. This involves direct communication from the FTI Secretariat to the partner country and to the donor group as a whole. It requires a stronger FTI Secretariat both to fulfil this task and to provide adequate feedback and support to country-level processes. This stronger communication (on the use of the IF, on aid modalities, on FTI aid effectiveness objectives, on the scope of FTI CF financial support) should aim to avoid misinterpretations or excessive rigidity in the use of FTI guidance – thereby minimising transactions costs associated to FTI processes – and pro-actively promote FTI objectives in country.
- Regarding capacity development, the redesign of the EPDF currently under way could draw useful lessons from Burkina Faso's experience: the necessity to ensure a broader ownership of FTI capacity development support (outside the WB); the need for a more pro-active support to further donor coordination in addition to the FTI CD guidelines; the need to consider support focused on implementation as well on preparation of plans; and the higher added value of long term support focused on building capacity, as opposed to shorter support focused on a specific output.
- Need to ensure the possibility for alternative supervising entities for the Catalytic Fund, other than the World Bank, is actually considered seriously at country-level. This implies ensuring donor capacity is not a constraint, which would involve both adequate and timely support from donor HQs and further clarification and simplification of the role of supervising entities, building on lessons from the Netherlands experience in Zambia. It also requires a stronger involvement of the FTI Secretariat in supporting the local donor group and providing adequate information.
- Finally, further reflexion is needed on the action of the FTI to ensure better long term predictability of aid, both for the CF and for education ODA as a whole, and on the requirement for additionality of CF support. Regarding the CF in particular, better long term predictability involves a reflexion on aid modalities and conditionality, on the process for renewal of CF support, and on the criteria for allocating CF funding. Regarding additionality, this would involve a closer monitoring of existing donor and government commitments to support education and basic education.

12.8 Key risks for Burkina Faso to address in the near future are (i) the move towards a sector wide approach and a sector plan – which should provide the framework for future donor support to the education sector and longer term commitments; (ii) the need to strengthen performance and formalise the coordination between national and sector level processes (joint reviews, matrices); and (iii) the need to enhance the coherence of PFM in the education sector while minimising transaction costs, by ensuring a smooth transition between CAST/project financing and SBS financing of the sector.





## Annex A – A Note on Methodology


A1. The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a), available from the study web-site at: [www.camb-ed.com/faithtrackinitiative](http://www.camb-ed.com/faithtrackinitiative).

A2. The Evaluation Framework includes a detailed programme theory for the FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the Evaluation Framework (Annex E). The same theory is being tested at both global and country-levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country-level).

A3. The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the Evaluation Framework. Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note, shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report will also be available for discussion and comment before it is finalised.

A4. Each country study includes a summary matrix which relates overall findings and findings against each workstream to the logical framework for the evaluation (see the matrix in Annex J of this report.)

A5. For a more retrospective explanation and reflection on the study process and methodology, see the Note on Approaches and Methods which constitutes Appendix V (Volume 4) of the evaluation's final synthesis report.

**Figure A.1 Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of the FTI**

Source: Evaluation Framework, Cambridge Education, Mokoro &amp; OPM 2009a, Figure 3A.

## Annex B – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
1980-1990		<p>In the two decades after independence (1960-1980), the landlocked, former French colony of Haute Volta sustained growth of real per capita income of 1.2 % per annum. In 1982, the country entered a revolutionary phase and was renamed Burkina Faso. Economic policies were modelled on Pan-African socialist theory, and included a strong emphasis on investment in human development, food self-sufficiency, equitable income distribution and nationalisation of private sector entities. Food production expanded and strong progress was made in literacy and basic education. However, poor macroeconomic and fiscal management had serious consequences for growth. An overvalued currency within the common currency zone exacerbated this problem, and real per capita growth from 1980 to 1994 (a turning point in which the currency was devalued by 50%) was a dismal -0.5% per annum.</p> <p>A change of regime in 1987 launched a "rectification" of the revolution, including a shift toward more market-oriented economic policies and re-engagement with the international community.</p>		
1990-1999	<p><b>March 1990</b> World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p>The Government of President Blaise Compaoré – who was elected in 1991 and again in 1998 – implemented policies of trade, market and price liberalisation with support for structural reform from the World Bank and other development partners. Although growth began to accelerate following the devaluation, there was little change in poverty incidence in the late 1990s, as well as stagnant social indicators on health and education. Weak growth over more than three decades also resulted in an unsustainable debt overhang by the late 1990s when Burkina Faso</p>	<p><b>June 2, 1991</b> – Burkina Faso's new constitution stipulates that all citizen have the right to education</p> <p><b>Sept 1994</b> -- National Congress on Education (<i>Etats généraux de l'éducation</i>)</p> <p><b>May 6, 1996</b> – The education law of 1996 (<i>Loi d'orientation d'éducation</i>) established the goal of universal education <u>without making it compulsory</u></p>	

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Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
		became one of the first countries eligible for the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries initiative.	<p><b>September 1996</b> – Introduction of the Basic Education Coordination Framework, to promote dialogue between the Government and the NGOs which currently comprises more than 100 NGOs</p> <p>In <b>1996</b> the GBF requested the Bank's assistance in the area of post-primary education to support the implementation of its 10-year plan (1996-2005). This resulted in a targeted operation, the <i>Post-Primary Education Project</i> (PEPP I), launched in <b>June 1997</b> and ending in April 2004.</p>	
<b>1999</b>	Education For All (EFA) Assessment <b>1999–2000</b> , involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.	As an early entrant into the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Burkina received debt relief under both the original and the enhanced HIPC Initiative in the amount of USD 424m in <b>end-1999</b> Net Present Value (NPV 2005) terms	<b>20 July 1999</b> <i>Plan décennal de développement de l'éducation de base</i> (Ten Year Basic Education Development Strategy, PDDEP) was adopted through decree number 99-254/PRES/MEBA	
<b>2000</b>	United Nations Millennium Summit in <b>2000</b> , 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.	<p>In <b>2000</b>, Burkina became one of the first countries to prepare a full <i>poverty reduction strategy</i>, or <i>Cadre Strategique de Lutte contre la Pauvrete</i> (CSLP).</p> <p>In <b>2000</b>, Government adopted a <i>transport sector strategy</i> to systematically upgrade and maintain the priority road network and expand rural feeder roads.</p>	PDDEB started being publicised in <b>2000</b> , garnering wide support from the donor community for implementation. Use of a rolling, medium-term expenditure framework was introduced for planning and donor alignment, and a decision was taken to focus Government donor intervention in the 20 provinces with lowest primary enrolment rates. A national programme was adopted to accelerate girls' education, and public-private partnerships to expand secondary education were piloted.	
<b>2001</b>	G8 Meeting – Genoa, Italy. <b>July 2001</b> : G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada	Burkina qualified for a topping-up debt relief assistance of USD129 million in <b>end-2001</b> NPV terms (2005). The total relief provided reduced the NPV of Burkina's outstanding debt by nearly 50% at the Completion Point	<b>May 2, 2001</b> -- Education Policy Letter (Décret n°2001-179/PRES/PM/MEBA du 2 mai 2001)	
<b>2002</b>	G8 Washington, DC USA. <b>April 2002</b> : The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).		<p><b>March 2002</b> – Establishment of a fund to support literacy and non formal education (FONAENF)</p> <p><b>April 2002</b> – National Conference on Education (<i>Assises nationales sur l'éducation</i>).</p>	<p><b>June 20 2002</b> Burkina Faso is invited by the WB on behalf of the FTI to prepare proposals for FTI endorsement and financing, along with 17 other countries.</p> <p><b>October 8, 2002</b> the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy completes its proposal</p>

Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
	<p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. <b>April 2002</b>: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.</p> <p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. <b>June 2002</b>: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>		<p><b>Sept 2002</b> – PDDEB was launched officially. It was then executed in three phases (2002-2005, 2006-2007 transition and phase II in 2008-2010)</p> <p><b>Sept 2002</b> – Signature of a Partnership Framework (<i>Cadre Partenarial</i>) between MEBA and a dozen of multi and bilateral education donors.</p> <p><b>2002</b> – Publication of National Action Plan for EFA in line with Dakar forum recommendation to get a national plan before Dec. 02.</p> <p><b>2002</b> – Finalisation of education sector analysis (RESEN) following World Bank country status report methodology</p>	<p>to receive FTI approval and funding</p> <p><b>November 2002</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Submission of Burkina Faso proposal to EFA-FTI Partnership (document called "Requête sur l'EPT; procédure accélérée")</li> <li>- Positive joint assessment of Burkina Faso EFA-FTI proposal by local donor's group</li> <li>- Short assessment of Burkina Faso EFA-FTI proposal by FTI Secretariat Burkina Faso is one of the first seven countries to be endorsed by FTI Brussels meeting</li> </ul>
<b>2003</b>	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, <b>Feb 2003</b>.</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, <b>March 2003</b>: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for the FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of two-three years to enable countries lacking resources at country-level but</p>	<p>Per capita income growth increased over previous periods to around 2.6 percent per annum, contributing to an estimated 8 percent decline in the poverty headcount between 1998 and <b>2003</b> -- led by cotton-producing rural areas. Despite this recent progress, Burkina remains one of the poorest countries in Africa, with per capita income of USD 350 and a poverty incidence of 46% in <b>2003</b>.</p>	<p><b>March 2003</b> - First Joint follow-up monitoring mission (<i>Mission Conjointe de Suivi</i>) to monitor progress and challenges in the implementation of PDDEB. From then, the joint follow-up missions will be organised on a bi-annual basis</p>	<p><b>March 10 2003</b> letter from WB to Burkina Faso, encouraging the country to consult with its local donor community to finalise the operational details and implementation schedule for its programme, review the cost estimates, and review the resource requirements. It also encourages Burkina Faso to liaise with the World Bank Country Director and Fast-Track Secretariat on the <i>mobilisation</i> of funds by the international Donor community.</p> <p><b>November 22 2003</b> Oslo CF Strategy Committee Meeting. It was deemed with its relatively large number of donors in education, the country did not qualify for Catalytic Fund (CF) support on the basis of the "Donor Orphan" criteria.</p>

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Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
	<p>with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, <b>November 2003</b>: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.</p>			
2004	<p>Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) was established in <b>November 2004</b> as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and programme development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, <b>Nov 2004</b>, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>	<p>A revised CSLP (PRSP) for 2004-2006 was discussed at a Donor Roundtable in <b>March 2004</b>, adopted by Government in <b>November 2004</b></p> <p><i>Real GDP grew at a rate of 6.0% per annum in the 2000–2004 period -- a strong performance reflecting Burkinabé' commitment to reform and astute management of exogenous shocks. Growth was led by expansion of cotton production and exports, and by associated increases in cereal production.</i></p> <p>A Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) conducted by IMF staff indicated that Burkina's debt outlook has worsened at <b>end-2004</b> relative to the projections made at the Completion Point. While the NPV of debt to exports ratio had been projected to stand at 193% in 2004, it stood at 207 percent according to the updated DSA</p> <p>Public Expenditure Review, <b>June 25, 2004</b></p>	<p><b>January and April, 2004</b> - Organisation of 2 High Level Government workshops on Education</p> <p><b>December 21, 2004</b> - The New law on Local Governments (<i>loi portant Code des Collectivités Territoriales n° 055-2004/AN</i>) transferred competencies for building &amp; management of primary schools, literacy centres and non formal education centres.</p> <p>The Bureau d'Execution des Projets which was the main PIU in MEBA is closed.</p> <p>The <i>loi de finance 2005</i> (December 2004) creates a Special Appropriation account of the Treasury to which the supports previously managed by the BPE will be transferred</p>	<p><b>Nov 2004</b></p> <p>- 2nd EFA-FTI Partnership Meeting in Brasilia, Brazil : a Burkinabé delegation lead by Minister/MEBA attends the meeting (along with Permanent Secretary of PDDEB, Director of administration and finance/MEBA and Director of studies and planning/MEBA)</p>
2005	<p><b>March 2005</b>, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials. Who committed their</p>	<p>Burkina Faso's new CSLP presented to the World Bank Board along with a fifth Poverty Reduction Support Operation in <b>May 2005</b>.</p>	<p><b>March, 2005</b> – Update of the Partnership Framework between donors and national authorities in charge of basic education and early childhood</p>	<p><b>Dec 2005</b> - 3rd EFA-FTI Partnership Meeting in Beijing, China: Burkina Faso doesn't take part of the meeting (tbc)</p>

Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
	<p>countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, <b>September 2005</b>: delegates were accused of producing a "watered-down" outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p> <p><i>Meeting of the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Beijing (China) on December 2, 2005</i></p>	<p><b>2005 November</b> - President Compaore wins a third straight term in office.</p>	<p><b>July 2005</b> The Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) Board of Directors approved up to USD12.9 m in Threshold Programme assistance for Burkina Faso's Threshold Country Program that focuses on improving performance on the "Girls' Primary Education Completion Rates" indicator.</p> <p><b>Nov 24, 2005</b> – Signature of joint Fund Protocol (<i>Protocole de Financement Commun</i>) between Ministry of Finance &amp; Budget and donors involved in pooled fund devoted to support PDDEB, effectively setting up a pooled fund exclusively devoted to support the ten year strategic plan for basic education (<i>CAST/FSDEB</i>)</p>	
<b>2006</b>	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, <b>September 2006</b>, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education MDGs</p> <p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the <b>12<sup>th</sup> of November 2006</b>. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors to apply.</p>		<p><b>May 16–18, 2006</b> - Burkina Faso joined the Initiative entitled Improving Education Management in African Countries initiative (IEMAC/AGEPA) during its third regional workshop taking place in Dakar. The World Bank, jointly with the governments of France, Ireland and Norway support this pilot programme to explore specific ways to enhance two aspects of education management, focusing on primary education: (i) consistency in the distribution of resources to schools, particularly teachers; and (ii) effectiveness in the transformation of tangible resources at the school or classroom level into student learning outcomes</p> <p>2006-2007 transition period of the PDDEB. A mid-term review of PPDEB was carried out in 2006 which drew attention to Plan's strength and weaknesses and made recommendations for the next phase</p>	<p><b>Nov 2006</b> - 4th EFA-FTI Partnership Meeting in Cairo, Egypt: to check if Burkina Faso was invited</p>

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Burkina Faso Case Study

Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
2007	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, <b>May 2007</b>, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on <b>May 23, 2007</b></i></p> <p>In <b>Oct 2007</b>, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Dakar, <b>December 10 2007</b></i></p>	<p>Economic growth continued to slow down from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.0% in <b>2007</b> due to a fall in cotton production and adverse terms of trade shocks.</p>	<p><b>January- Dec 2007</b> – On going diagnostic assessment of education in Burkina Faso. It is an update of education sector analysis (<i>RESEN</i>) to highlight education system performance since 2000. This analysis is the result of a capacity building process in sector analysis mobilising staff from MEBA, MESSRS, MASSN supported by World Bank and UNESCO-BREDA/Pôle de Dakar.</p> <p><b>June 27, 2007</b> – Update of Partnership Framework (<i>Cadre partenarial</i>) between donors and Govt to support PDDEB financing &amp; implementation</p> <p><b>July 30 2007</b> a new <i>Education Orientation Law</i> (Loi d'Orientation de l'Education) was adopted as part of a general educational reform which introduces universal compulsory free education. The new Law introduces a new definition of basic education that covers pre-school education, primary education and post-primary education (the first cycle of secondary school). Compulsory free education concerns only primary and post-primary education (6-16).</p> <p><b>October 2007</b> Presentation of phase II (2008-2010) of the <i>PDDEB (Plan Decennal de Développement de l'éducation de base)</i></p> <p><b>December 2007</b> - Adoption of a national policy for early childhood integrated into the wider strategy for basic education</p> <p><b>2007</b> - Harmonisation of PDDEB expenditure lines with State budget nomenclature to facilitate tracking of expenditure</p> <p><b>2007</b> - MEBA &amp; MESRS set up a committee to look after HIV/Aids infected teachers &amp; student as well as HIV orphan</p>	
2008	<p><b>September 2008</b>, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid.</p> <p>Donors agreed to donate half of</p>	<p>The previous years' economic deceleration combined with a sharp increase in food prices and overall inflation, bread discontent and caused riots over the high cost of living in some cities between <b>February and May 2008</b></p>	<p><b>2008-2010</b> Second phase of the PDDEB</p> <p><b>Feb 2008</b> - A simulation model on finance &amp; costs of the education system is derived from</p>	<p><b>March 2008</b></p> <p>-March 12: MEBA/Minister informs the FTI Secretariat about the ongoing process to improve and re-submit BF proposal for FTI support following discussions held in</p>



*Annex B: Timeline of FTI Events*

Date	International Context	Burkina Faso Context	Education Policy in Burkina Faso	FTI in Burkina Faso
	<p>aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p>	<p><b>2008 April</b> - Two-day general strike follows weeks of protests about high living costs and call for wage increases.</p> <p>Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to nearly 10 percent of GDP in <b>2008</b>. Foreign budget support is estimated to provide around FCFA120 billion in 2008. Around 85 percent of it is covered by members of the budget support donor group (<i>Cadre Général d'Organisation des Appuis Budgétaires – CGAB</i>), including the African Development Bank, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the European Union, together with IDA.</p>	<p>RESEN analysis which helps draft the financial framework for education system policies (<i>Note de cadrage</i>)</p> <p><b>July 9, 2008</b> - Adoption of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Education Policy Letter (<i>Lettre de Politique Educative</i>) for 2008-2015</p> <p><b>July 23, 2008</b> - Adoption of the national policy for Vocational and Technical Education and Training (<i>PN/ ETFP</i>)</p>	<p>Washington with a Burkina Faso delegation</p> <p>-March 26: FTI Secretariat answered MEBA encouraging BF re-submission in the second half of 2008</p> <p><b>Sept 2008</b></p> <p>- Completion of documentation required to benefit from FTI support in line with phase 2 of the Ten Year Strategic plan (PDDEB) and 3 year MTEF (2009–2011)</p> <p>-Appraisal and re-endorsement of Burkina Faso proposal for FTI-CF support by LDG</p> <p><b>October 2008</b> lead donor in Burkina requests Bank to carefully consider allocation mechanism (Development policy Operation- DPO)</p> <p><b>October 27 2008</b>, Burkina Faso re-applies for FTI funding 2009-2011 (after its first unsuccessful application)*. According to country estimates, the net global financing gap (therefore the grant request) for 2009-2011 is USD 144,917 m.</p> <p><b>November 10, 2008</b> Lead Donor in Burkina sends letter to the FTI requesting that country proposal be accepted even if complete PAD is not available yet. Discussions over allocation mechanism.</p> <p><b>December 13 2008</b>, Proposal is made official at the Oslo Strategy Committee Meeting. Preferred grant modality: Development Policy Operation (Sector Budget Support)</p> <p>Proposal is accepted during the meeting.</p> <p><b>December 22 2008</b> Allocation decision communicated to Burkina Faso: USD 102m allocated for 2009-2011</p>

## Annex C – List of Persons Met

Organisation	Name	First name	Function
<b>DONORS</b>			
Agence Française de Développement	Sawadogo	Anne Marie	Chargée de programmes
Ambassade des Pays Bas	Kabore	Laurent	Conseiller Adjoint en Education
Ambassade des Pays Bas	Moussa	Cissao	Conseiller Adjoint en Education
Ambassade du Canada	Ouedraogo	Alfred	Chargé de Programme Education
Ambassade du Canada	Nébié	Auguste	Chargé de programmes
Ambassade du Canada	Jacques	Lamonde	Chef de la Coopération
Ambassade du Danemark	Ouedraogo	Abdoulaye	Charge de programmes
Ambassade du Danemark	Vagner	Jytte	Conseillère en éducation
Banque Mondiale	Kamano	Pierre Joseph	Sr Education Specialist
Coopération Autrichienne	Coulibaly	Jean Martin	Chargé de programmes
Coopération Suisse	Zongo	Alfred	Chargé de programmes
Délégation Commission Européenne	Borchard	Arnaud	Chef section économie
Unicef	Bationo	Bernadin	Administrateur National Chargé d'Education
Unicef	Tamini	Franck	Administrateur adjoint de l'éducation chargé du jeune enfant
Unicef	Georges	Kafando	Administrateur adjoint de l'éducation chargé de l'éducation des filles
<b>International NGOs and donor coordination</b>			
OSEO	Zaongo	R. Dieudonné	Chef DAAP
Plan International	Ouedraogo	Maurice	Conseiller en Education
Secrétariat Technique pour l'Efficacité de l'Aide	Ouattara	Baly	Spécialiste en gestion de l'aide publique au développement et harmonisation
<b>GOVERNMENT Central level</b>			
INSD	Ouedraogo	Robert-Mathieu	Chargé d'Etudes
MASSN	Tamini	Pascaline	Ministre Action Sociale et Solidarité Nationale
MASSN DAF	Compaore	Boureima	DAF
MD/AENF	Maiga	Ibrahim	Chef de Cabinet
MD/AENF	Ouédraogo	Chantal Jeanne	Conseiller Technique
MEBA	Bonkougou	Odile	Ministre Enseignement de Base
MEBA	Zaba	Noraogo Innocent	Secrétaire Général
MEBA	Bado	Martine	Chargée de la Mobilisation sociale et sensibilisation
MEBA	Bagré	Pauline Marie	Chargée de la Mobilisation sociale et sensibilisation
MEBA	Bazié	Jean-Paul	Cabinet
MEBA	Dao	Bayé	DG CRIEF
MEBA	Kaboré	Cathérine	Cabinet
MEBA	Yaméogo	Ismael	Secrétariat Général
MEBA DAF	Ouattara	Yacouba	Chef de service charge des financements extérieurs
MEBA DAF	Bado		DAF - Chef comptable
MEBA DAF	Ouattara	Arsène	DAF - Service financements extérieurs
MEBA DAF	Traore	Bénéfou	DAF
MEBA DAMSE	Yoni	Charles	DAMSE
MEBA DDEB	Kinda	Emma	DDEB
MEBA DEP	Ramdé	Jean	Chef de Service Statistiques et carte éducative
MEBA DEP	Sanou	Salimata	Chargée d'etudes
MEBA DEP	Konaté	Seydou	DEP
MEBA DEP	Zombré	Ignace	Chargé de Service
MEBA DG AENF	Goabaga	Emmanuel	DG AENF


Organisation	Name	First name	Function
MEBA DMP	Salou	Marie Aubine	Directrice des Marchés Publics MEBA
MEBA DPEF	Guigma	Marie Claire	Directrice de la promotion de l'éducation des filles
MEBA DPEF	Toé	Jean Claude	Chef service administratif et financier/DPEF
MEBA DRH	Belloum	Saydou	DRH - Responsable du Contentieux Administratif
MEBA DRH	Ouedraogo	Seni	DRH - Responsable de la Gestion Prévisionnelle des Personnels
MEBA DRH	Traore	Alassane	DRH
MEF	Sangaré	Amadou	Conseiller Technique
MEF DG Budget	Millogo	Evariste	Direction des collectivités territoriales
MEF DG Budget	Ouédraogo	Hamado	DGEB
MEF DG Budget	Soulama	Vieux Abdoul Rachid	Directeur de la programmation budgétaire
MEF DG Budget	Koné	Dramane	DG du Budget
MEF DG Budget	Ouba	Tanguy	DG-COOP/ UE
MEF DG Budget	Ouedraogo	Aissata	Chef de service réglementation et documentation
MEF DG COOP	Millogo	Adama	DG COOP, responsable suivi-évaluation
MEF DG COOP	Thiombiano	Nazaire	DG-COOP/ Directeur p.i de la Coopération multilatérale
MEF DGEP	Malgoubry	Marie Eugène	DGEP - Directrice CSLP
MEF SP PPF	Traore	Karim	SP PPF
MEF Trésor	Kékélé	Maboudou	Fondé de Pouvoir du Payeur Général
MESSRS	Joseph	Pare	Ministre
MESSRS DEP	Ki	Jacques	DEP
MJE	Koutaba	Justin	Ministre de la Jeunesse et de l'Emploi
MJE - Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi	Kabore	Benoit	Directeur Général
MJE - Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi	Bello	Moussa	
MJE - Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi	Yameogo	Eric	
MJE DG FP	Bakyonon	Denis Ambroise	DG de la formation professionnelle MJE
MJE DG FP	Bakyonon	Ambroise Denis	Directeur Général de la Formation Professionnelle
SP PDDEB	Zida	Edmond	Chef de service coordination et suivi des composantes
SP PDDEB	Abou	Rémi	Chef de service alphabétisation non formelle
<b>Government – deconcentrated level and schools</b>			
DREBA	Sawadogo	Sanata	DREBA Centre-Sud
CEB	Zoma	Adama	CEB Manga
DPEBA	Zoré	Adama	DPEBA Zoundweogo
DREBA	Déné	Harouna	Statisticien DREBA Centre - Sud
DPEBA	Batiga	Edmond	DPEBA Ziro
School	Compaore	Sabine	Directrice Ecole communale A de Manga
CEB - Ziro	Ouédraogo	Issiaka	Inspecteur et coordonnateur de CEB
School	Sawadogo	Ibrahim	Directeur Ecole B
<b>Civil society representatives</b>			
Comité Syndical francophone de l'éducation et de la formation	Kafando	Jean	Administrateur Général
Conseil National des APE	Koama	Germain	Président
AME	Gnangao	Bintou	Responsable AME Ecole B
APE	Nana	Louis	Président APE Ecole B

## Annex D – Basic Education Indicators

Table D1 Education Statistics 2003–2007

	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	sources
<b>number of pupils</b>											
pre primary	-	-	-	12 369	12 749	13 014	20 805	24 375	27 192	-	RESEN
primary	776 397	816 130	851 936	901 291	938 238	1 012 150	1 139 512	1 270 837	1 390 571	1 561 258	RESEN
secondary	166 900	173 205	189 689	199 397	212 572	237 893	266 057	295 412	319 749	352 376	RESEN
superior	-	-	-	-	15 676	18 200	ND	27 942	30 488	33 515	RESEN
ENEP	2 354	3 340	3 911	3 857	3 966	4 197	2 133	2 547	2 712	-	RESEN
<b>TBS</b>											
pre primary	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1,1%	1,1%	1,1%	1,7%	1,9%	2,1%	0,0%	RESEN
primary	39,7%	40,1%	40,5%	41,8%	42,7%	45,3%	50,2%	55,0%	59,1%	64,9%	RESEN
boys	46,9%								70,7%		RESEN
girls	32,3%								58,9%		RESEN
parity boys / girls	0,7								0,8		RESEN
secondary	10,2%	10,1%	10,5%	10,6%	10,7%	11,4%	12,2%	13,0%	13,6%	14,5%	RESEN
<b>Repetition rate</b>											
primary	17,0%	17,7%	17,0%	17,6%	17,5%	15,1%	13,0%	11,9%	12,0%	11,7%	RESEN
lower secondary	28,4%	29,7%	27,1%	25,4%	29,5%	26,7%	25,0%	23,9%	24,7%	25,9%	RESEN
higher secondary	24,3%	25,0%	23,7%	24,8%	27,0%	25,3%	20,9%	21,4%	21,8%	24,3%	RESEN
<b>Access and completion</b>											
Access in first grade primary	40,7%						68,4%		81,3%		RESEN
parity boys/girls	0,71								0,87		
Access in last grade primary (taux d'achèvement du primaire = taux d'accès au CM2)		24,4%					27,1%		32,8%		RESEN
boys		27%							36,9%		
girls		18,7%							28,7%		
parity boys/girls	0,69								0,78		
"best performing" region (centre)		56,7%							67,5%		
"least performing" region (sahel)		5,3%							13,0%		
Access in first grade secondary										20%	RESEN
<b>Teacher pupil ratio</b>											
Teacher:pupil ratio primary						47				55	RESEN
Teacher:pupil ratio secondary						42				86	RESEN
<b>Learning outcomes (PASEC)</b>											
Learning outcomes (PASEC)	60,0%									34,8%	RESEN
% of CM1 students that have more than 40% good answers to the test											

## Annex E – Burkina Faso Educational Pyramid



Source: UNESCO/BREDA, 2008, Burkina Faso Country Sheet, Pôle de Dakar.

- *Pre-school education* which comes both under the MASSN and the MEBA is provided to children between the ages of three and six. There is very little provision for formal pre-school education which is confined to urban centres. The number of pre-school and pre-school children has risen recently owing primarily to non formal community-based or private sector initiatives.
- *Primary education* caters theoretically for children between the ages of 7 and 12. It is a six years cycle divided into two year sub cycles (CP1-CP2; CE1-CE2, CM1-CM2) provided by both public and private schools, the latter can be organised on a non religious or religious basis. The medium of instruction is French and the primary school certificate (CEP) is delivered at the end of the cycle. The use of national languages is currently being tested and studies on ways and means of using them more widely are in progress.
- *Non formal basic education* concerns all organised forms of educational provision dispensed outside the formal school system, primarily literacy courses and training activities designed to improve living standards and provide continuing vocational education. Non formal education is providing in Permanent Literacy and Training Centres (CPAF) for illiterate adults and by other means such as the Non Formal Basic Education centres (CEBNF) for out-of school young people between the ages of 9 and 15.
- *General Secondary Education* consists of two cycles, the first covering a four year period for a theoretical age group between 13 and 16 (*collèges* or lower secondary school) at the end of which a certificate entitled *Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle* (BEPC) is delivered and the second covering a three year period (*lycées* or upper secondary) for a theoretical age group between 17 and 19 leading to the *Baccalauréat* school leaving certificate.
- *Technical and Vocational Secondary Education*. Vocational education comprises three cycles starting by an initial four year cycle, followed by a middle two year cycle and ending by a three year cycle. Technical education is accessible after completion of lower secondary and consists in a three years cycle.
- *Tertiary education* is provided in three kinds of institutions: public universities (Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso and Koudougou), higher education institutes and the special higher education institutes, mostly private, with competitive entrance examinations known as *grandes écoles*.



## Annex F – Progress towards EFA

F1 Before adopting the PDDEB, Burkina Faso had one of the weakest education systems in the world. In the 2001 EFA Development Index Burkina Faso was ranked bottom. Since that time there has been some truly impressive growth. Annex D provides a summary of key basic education indicators.


### Goal 1: Early Childhood Care and Education

F2 The recent evolution of enrolments shows very steady growth for the various orders of education with figures particularly important for pre-primary. The annual growth rate of enrolment in pre-primary is estimated at 20.8% between 2001/02 and 2005/06; the total number of children enrolled increased from 12,749 to 27,192 over the period. The breakdown for 2004/05 shows that of 24,375 individuals registered in pre-primary, 33.2% of children enrolled (8,094/24,375) were in the public, 43.1% (10,507/24,375) in the private and 23.7% (5,774/24,375) in the non-formal sectors. Nevertheless, the pre-primary GER grew only slowly from a low base. It was only 1.1% in 2000/01 and reached 2% in 2005/06. It is especially between 2002/03 and 2003/04 that the pre-primary GER increased, shifting from 1.1% to 1.7%.

### Goal 2: Universal Primary Education

F3 The annual growth rate of **enrolment for primary** between 2001/02 and 2006/07 was 10.7% and the total number of children enrolled in primary increased from 938,238 to 1,561,256. Looking backwards and comparing enrolment growth rates in the decades of the 1990s to the current decade (2000s) a dramatic shift upwards is discernible. Never in the history of Burkina Faso has such rapid change been achieved. The number of schools almost doubled in Burkina Faso in ten years (i.e. +81% between 1998 and 2007) which help the reduction in the average distance travelled to school.

F4 Increases in **primary completion rate** are significant but not precisely in step with enrolments, and the road to UPC is still challenging. The primary completion rate rose from 19% to roughly 40% between 1991 and 2006/07 but it still remains one of the lowest in African countries. In Burkina Faso, where eight out of ten children enrol in primary school in 2006/07, only four of them complete the sixth year of basic education, considered to be the minimum level required to make literacy and numeracy irreversible. Thus 20% of children still not access school and out of 80% of those who attend grade one, 60% drop out before grade six. Moreover, only 20% access grade seven (first year of lower secondary); 10.7% grade 10 (last year of lower secondary) and 6.3% access grade 13 (last year of upper secondary) – see Figures below.



F5 The low completion rates in basic education are partly due to **low internal efficiency** (high repetition and drop-out rates). At primary level, the introduction of automatic promotion rules across a two year cycle (PR1-PR2; PR3-PR4; PR5-PR6) explained the decrease in repetition rates between 1997/98 and 2006/07 from 17% to 11.7%. At secondary level, the repetition rates remain high and compare unfavourably with other SSA countries.

### Goal 3: Learning needs of young people and adults

F6 Non-formal education is neglected in terms of public funding but remains the primary route for learning for many disadvantaged youth and adults. In less than ten years the **enrolment in non-formal education programs** increased significantly. Between 1997/98 and 2005/06 the number of learners registered in Permanent Centres for Literacy and Training (CPAF) in Initial Literacy programme (AI) increased from 119,529 to 188,475 which represents an annual growth rate of 5.6% over the period. With regard to the Further Basic Training, the number of learners enrolled shifted from 31,817 in 1997/98 to 117,571 in 2005/06 with an annual growth rate of 17.7% over the period.

**Figure F.3 Non Formal Education Access and Quality Indicators (2001/02 –2005/06)**

Indicators	Year 2001/02	Year 2005/06	Variations
Enrolment in Initial Literacy (AI)	106,640	188,475	+77%
Women (%)	(57.5%)	(61%)	(+4%)
Enrolment in Further Basic Training (FCB)	31,433	117,571	+274 %
Women (%)	(46%)	(52%)	(+9 %)
Number of Permanent Centres for Literacy and Training (CPAF)	4,601	11,586	+152%
Number of learners evaluated in Initial Literacy Training	88,483	170,264	+82%
Number of women	52,111	105,626	55.5%
Women (%)	59%	62%	+3.5%
Number of learners evaluated in Further Basic Training	25,789	101,679	76%
Number of women	12,125	55,729	43,603
Women (%)	47%	55%	7.8%
Number of registered new literates	20,743	89,687	69%

Source: Vachon 2007.



F7 The review of literacy and non formal education showed that diverse approaches are offered by the State and the private sector (NGO, association, projects) to help young people and adults acquiring knowledge and skills which can allow them to effectively contribute to the development of their country. However, the lack of data makes it hard to assess literacy training alternative schemes and the cost-effectiveness of investments in non formal education.

#### **Goal 4: Adult literacy**

F8 Educational attainment across the population is low. Burkina Faso has made little progress against adult illiteracy and the PDDEB 2015 target of having 40% adult literate looks set to be missed. Despite some progress between 1994 (18.9%) and 2007 (28.7%), the fight against adult illiteracy remains a huge problem for the country, especially in rural areas where the **literacy rate** is only 19.5% in 2007 against 63.4% in urban areas.

F9 An analysis on the 2003 household survey (EDS) shows that, for the adults aged 22 to 44 years old, the likelihood of being literate after six years of schooling is only 45%, against the African average of around 60%. Fewer than half of the adults who claim six years of schooling can easily read a simple text. Only after nine years of schooling (almost a full basic education cycle) does the percentage reach 100%. This result reflects the performance of the education system between 10 and 30 years ago, and underlines that the quality of education in primary school was problematic even in a elitist system.

#### **Goal 5: Gender**

F10 Girls score worse than boys on most indicators. Although the country's gender parity index moved from 0.71 in 2000 to about 0.90 in 2007, it is still one of the lowest on the continent. The UPC for boys is 47.2% against 36.2% for girls in 2007, nevertheless the gender gap (i.e. 11%) is less important than the urban/rural gap (33%) or poverty gap (45.2%). UPC for poor rural girls is still at a very low level, 12%, and it will be possible to approach UPC in Burkina Faso without major improvement for this category.

F11 Moreover, in contrast to a world-wide tendency for girls to perform better than boys, the surveys on student learning outcomes in Burkina Faso showed the reverse.

F12 Kaboré et al 2003 showed that there is a strong correlation between the percentage of females in the teaching force and the percentage of girls in primary schools in Burkina Faso. So, the more a school has women teachers, the higher the enrolment, survival and completion rates of the girls are. Female teachers at the primary level make up only a small percentage of the teaching force which is well below the SSA average of 45%. The same study also shows that variations in the gender parity index by school are correlated with the existence of toilets for girls (i.e. gender index is higher in schools equipped with toilets separated for boys and girls).

## Goal 6: Quality

F13 Education quality is defined as the extent to which an education system contributes to a student's cognitive, creative and emotional development<sup>62</sup> This definition fits closely with EFA goals that lay special emphasis on improving education quality in order that "recognised and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills" (World Education Forum 2000).

F14 Burkina Faso participated in the **learning outcomes assessments** undertaken by the CONFEMEN/PASEC in 1996 and 2007 which allow comparisons with other African countries against quality achievements at primary education level. The survey highlights the proportion of pupils reaching a threshold of at least 40% of good answers to the test of French and mathematics. The PASEC considers that this indicator is relevant to capture the proportion of pupils in grade five who reach a suitable learning level, the underlying idea being that all the pupils should reach this threshold. Burkina Faso is classified in 2<sup>nd</sup> position of the 1<sup>st</sup> wave of evaluations undertaken by the PASEC between 1995 and 1998. Approximately 60% of the Burkinabé pupils of grade five (CM1) reached the 40% threshold of good answers. Such result should not minimise the fact that still 40% of pupils registered in grade five failed to perform at the French and Mathematic tests. Unfortunately the results from the 2007 survey are not yet fully available, but the preliminary results seem to show a deterioration of Burkinabé pupils' performance in literacy and numeracy.

F15 The factors recognised as important in impacting educational quality are known as supporting inputs, enabling conditions at school level, teaching-learning process, school climate and children's characteristics. In Burkina Faso's case, it is fundamental to pay attention to the **characteristics of children** entering school since 1999/00. Research has found that in all countries the socio-economic background of students is a very important determinant of learning outcomes at all levels of education. It is therefore important to recognise that education expansion often means that poorer groups gain access to education for the first time. Research suggests that unless specific actions are taken to provide additional support to these new students there will be a widening of inequality in terms of education outcomes and the quality of education will decline. The likely decline in PASEC results between 1996 and 2007 should then be cautiously interpreted and related to dramatic change in children's characteristics with the shift from an elitist to a more universal system in Burkina Faso.

F16 **Supporting inputs.** There is relatively little information in Burkina Faso on the *involvement of parents and the community* in schools. But the recent decision to establish school-based management committees tasked to deliver teaching and learning materials through local governments' subsidies might reinforce the involvement of community in schools provided clear responsibilities are defined between the "new" SBMC and the "old" PTA.

F17 **Adequate teaching and learning materials.** Pupils and teachers continue to lack access to basic learning materials. On average, there is an allocation of three mathematic textbooks for four pupils (ratio of 0.75) and more than one reading textbook for two pupils. Wide disparities exist between **public** and private schools and within private schools. Moreover the textbooks are not allocated to the classes following effective needs, around 50% of the allocation of textbooks is based on criteria other than the number of pupils (see Figure F.4).


<sup>62</sup> For a more detailed discussion on defining education quality, see for example, UNESCO 2004.

**Figure F.4 Textbook Allocations in the Schools of Burkina Faso in 2006/07**

	Average number of textbook per pupil	Consistency between textbook allocation and number of pupils (R <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Mathematic textbook (7 046 schools)</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.508</b>
Public (5 920 schools)	0.82	0.513
Private Catholic (112 schools)	0.75	0.408
Private Conventional (319 schools)	0.56	0.486
Private Protestant (80 schools)	0.44	0.318
Private Muslim (615 schools)	0.19	0.357
<b>Reading textbook (7 591 schools)</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.495</b>
Public (6 960 schools)	0.60	0.484
Private Catholic (121 schools)	0.63	0.519
Private Conventional (332 schools)	0.79	0.572
Private Protestant (87 schools)	0.57	0.401
Private Muslim (682 schools)	0.32	0.399

Source: Education Sector Plan, Draft, 2008.

F18 *Adequate deployment of teachers.* The pupil-teacher ratio is 52 in 2005/06 above the African average of 43 and still far from FTI indicative benchmark of 40 for 2015. Pupil teacher ratios suggest that classroom overcrowding is not anecdotal; however overcrowding is higher in urban areas where pupil teacher ratios can reach up to 100 in primary schools. Linked to the level of PTR is the distribution of primary teachers across schools which appear to be uneven as 22% of teachers appointments cannot be explained by the number of pupils in the schools.<sup>63</sup> As illustrated by Figure F.5, a school of 400 pupils could operate with a number of teachers ranging from 4 to 14 according to schools. Despite the regionalisation of teacher recruitment, the disparities in the allocation of teachers remain important at school level. In the same region/province some schools suffer from a serious shortage of teachers while others have more than the number of pupils enrolled requires.. At basic education level it emerges that approximately 25% of the staff do not teach while the average is 15% in sub-Saharan Africa. At secondary education level, the CSR highlighted that 39% of the teaching workforce do not teach against 30% in sub-Saharan Africa.

**Figure F.5 Allocation of Teachers to Public Primary Schools 2006/07**

Source: Pôle de Dakar & MEBA 2009


<sup>63</sup> A country like Guinea presents a much lower percentage: 10%

F19 Spending on professional development activities such as in-service teacher training has been low in Burkina Faso. The teachers are supposed to exchange on their teaching practices and get support from supervisors through the system of the educational support group (GAP) but few of them seem functional. While there is no specific information on the frequency and characteristics of in-service training it appears that this is not providing the support to teachers necessary to improve their mastery of the subjects they are teaching and the methods they use to teach.

F20 **Teaching-learning process.** The number of instructional hours is low in Burkinabé primary schools and far from the 950 hours identified in the countries which achieved UPC upon which was established the FTI's indicative framework. The Burkinabé pupils receive an average of 475 hours of instructional hour against 850 officially planned at primary level. The amputation of the teaching time due to late entrance/early exit coupled with teachers and pupils' absenteeism strongly penalises the learning of pupils.

F21 More challenging, the performance of pupils at school level does not appear to be correlated with the resources invested in the schools. Some schools benefit from substantial resources but do not show good results (those situated below on the right), while other schools being allocated modest means have better results (those situated above on the left). Figure F.6 illustrates the room for manoeuvre to move to an effective results-based management system in Burkina Faso.

**Figure F.6 Lack of Correlation between Unit Costs (based on teacher salary) and Learning Outcomes in Public Primary Schools**



Note: Average score (on 100) to then national assessment 2005/06

Source: Pôle de Dakar & MEBA 2009.

F22 It is often argued that the practice of hiring non-civil-service teachers to rapidly increase the size of the teaching force could have a negative impact on quality in the future. In Burkina Faso there is no empirical evidence of a significant statistical difference between the contractual teachers and the civil servant teachers on learning outcomes.<sup>64</sup>


<sup>64</sup> PASEC undertook such analysis in Niger in 2001/02; the study shows that civil service teachers were not performing better than the non civil service teachers. See "Les enseignants contractuels et la qualité de l'enseignement de base au Niger : quel bilan ?" [http://www.confemen.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport\\_Niger\\_thematique-10.pdf](http://www.confemen.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport_Niger_thematique-10.pdf)

## EFA Development Index (Global, African)<sup>65</sup>

F23 The EFA Global Development Index (EDI) published by UNESCO/HQ in the Global Monitoring Report 2009 reflects four Dakar goals. It incorporates the total primary net enrolment rate, the adult literacy rate, the gender specific EFA index and the survival rate to grade 5. Burkina Faso is ranked 127 out of 129 just in front of Niger and Chad in 2006 (last year documented). The value of EDI is 0.538 in 2006 against 0.429 in 2001 where Burkina was rated last.<sup>66</sup>

F24 The EFA African Development Index (EDI Africa) published by UNESCO/ Regional Office for Africa resumes the position of the country related to three Dakar goals. It consolidates universal primary completion, girls-boys parity and literacy of the 15+ age group. The EFA African development index is 21.3 for Burkina Faso against 13.5 in 2000. The extent of movement is noticeable but Burkina Faso improved its ranking only by one place (see Figure F.7)

Figure F.7 EFA Development Index



Source: UNESCO/BREDA, 2008, Education For All in Africa, Top Priority for Integrated Sector Wide Policies, p 355

## Prospect for meeting EFA goals

F25 The EFA diamond indicates the position of Burkina Faso related to four EFA goals on a single chart: goals one (pre-primary gross enrolment rate), two (primary completion rate), four (literacy rate of population aged 15 and above) and five (girls-boys parity index in primary education). Its size gives a visual indication of the current situation and the efforts needed to achieve these goals (see below Figure F.8).


F26 In Burkina Faso most of the 2015 EFA targets look set to be missed (except gender parity in gross enrolment rate which was supposed to be achieved by 2005) and **the country is definitely off track for the achievement of UPC by 2015**. At primary education

<sup>65</sup> If an Education for All Development Index is to measure overall progress towards EFA, its constituents should ideally reflect all six Dakar goals. In practice, however, this is difficult, since not all the goals have a clear definition or target. For example, Goal 3 – learning and life skills programmes – is not yet conducive to quantitative measurement. For rather different reasons, Goal 1- early childhood care and education- cannot easily be incorporated because the data are insufficiently standardized across countries, and they are, in any case, available for only a small minority of states. Moreover, there is no a target value for this goal. Accordingly, for the time being, the EFA Development Index (EDI) only incorporates indicators for the four goals of universal primary education, adult literacy, gender parity and the quality of education.

<sup>66</sup> Between 1998 and 2001, EDI change was -0.252% (see 2005 GMR(UNESCO 2004), p139)

level, if the current dynamics remain, the primary completion rate could reach approximately 54% in 2015. With barely more than one child in two who would accomplish the primary cycle in six years, the current conditions do not allow to get closer enough to the objective of UPC with a 100% completion rate. The progress to be achieved in enrolment, survival and completion remains considerable and the Government has decided to postpone the achievement of EFA goals: the UPC target is now supposed to be achieved by 2020.

**Figure F.8 EFA Diamond for Burkina Faso**



Source: UNESCO/BREDA, Burkina Faso Country Sheet, Pôle de Dakar.

## Annex G – Synthesis of Goals and Strategies per Level and Type of Education

	Goals/Targets	Key Strategies
Pre-Primary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GER: 4.3% by 2010; 8.3% by 2015 (against 2.1% in 2006) with enrolments stabilised around 100,000 by 2015 (against 6,500 in 2006)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Controlled expansion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of community-based interventions (73% of children enrolled in pre-school will be in community-based kindergarten by 2015 against 24% in 2006) with state support: contribution to classroom constructions to cover 30% of annual needs; provision of pre-school kits; training &amp; supervision of staff who will be paid by the communities.</li> </ul>
Primary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GIR: 83% by 2010; 100% by 2015</li> <li>• PCR: 70% by 2015; 100% by 2020 with enrolments rising from 1.2 million in 2006 to 3.3 million by 2020</li> <li>• PTR: 51 by 2010; 45.5 by 2020 ( against 55 in 2006)</li> <li>• Book/pupil ratio: 1 by 2010</li> <li>• Number of instructional hour/year: 800 by 2015</li> <li>• Repetition rate: 8% by 2015 ( against 12% in 2006)</li> <li>• % of literate pupils after completion of grade 6: 70% by 2010</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Continuation of expansion with particular emphasise on reduction of disparities...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completion of existing schools to offer educational continuity from grade one to grade six and reduction of the distances to schools /Diversification of building frameworks to scale-up provision of news classrooms through delegation to agencies, local governments, community-based organisations, NGOs, etc. (an average of 4000 classrooms are required to be built annually against 2000 in 2006)</li> <li>• Construction of houses for teacher to attract and maintain them in the disadvantaged areas</li> <li>• Improvement of school environment and learning conditions (toilets separated for boys and girls, boreholes etc.)</li> <li>• Recruitment of more than 5000 new teachers annually, some of which with the new volunteers' status (2500/year for a three year contract). The number of teachers will shift from 22,000 in 2006 to 72,000 by 2020 out of which 64,600 civil service teachers)</li> <li>• Support to private sector ( but the share of private sector will decrease from 13.7% in 2006 to 10% from 2015)</li> <li>• Targeted measures in least developed provinces (priority areas for investments etc.)</li> <li>• Implementation of social <i>mobilisation</i> &amp; communication strategy, especially in areas where girls indicators remain low</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u> ...while reinforcing quality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase of the number of instructional hour through gradual elimination of double flow and the introduction of flexible school time considering school local contexts</li> <li>• Increase capacity of teacher training centres (ENEPs) with construction of two additional centres (ENEPs need to cater for 5000 teachers against 2500 in 2006), reform of pre-service teacher training for a better balance between theory and teaching practice and revitalisation of in-service teacher training</li> <li>• Continuation of the free provision of teaching and learning materials to schools and pupils</li> </ul>

	Goals/Targets	Key Strategies
Vocational Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• to accommodate for 40% of pupils completing primary cycle (against 0 in 2006) with enrolments shifting upwards from 31,000 in 2009 to 105,000 in 2020</li> <li>• to accommodate for 50% of student completing non formal basic education with enrolments shifting from 11,000 in 2009 to 17,300 in 2015</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Massive expansion to relieve pressure on lower secondary</p> <p><u>Quality:</u> High focus on linkages between training and employment in informal sector</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of short duration training centres and/or apprenticeship and work-based learning schemes in partnership with the private sector</li> <li>• Development of specific schemes for those coming from primary and those from lower secondary</li> <li>• Set-up M&amp;E system to update vocational programmes in due time</li> </ul>
Technical education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No specific goal/target</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Expansion with special emphasise on ensuring equitable access to technical education across the country ( at least one technical CEG in each province) and promoting technical education amongst girls</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Better integration of private sector through public subsidies</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u> High focus on quality improvements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insure linkages between technical education and the needs of the formal sector labour market</li> <li>• Recruitment of a sufficient number of qualified teachers</li> <li>• Intensification of the educational and didactic equipment</li> <li>• Development of a partnerships between schools and enterprises</li> </ul>
Literacy & Non Formal Basic Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welcome 30% of those who drop-out in the primary cycle by 2015 (22,000 in 2009; 35,000 in 2015; But 0 in 2020 target year of PCR)</li> <li>• Gradual coverage up to 2015 of 50% of illiterate adults 15-45 group age as of 2006 (2 million)</li> <li>• Literacy rate: 40% by 2010</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Expansion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of 150 equipped classrooms/year for literacy and basic training (CPAF) and a total over the period of around 170 centres with three classes for non-formal basic education (CBENF)</li> <li>• Continuation of the "<i>faire-faire strategy</i>" and reinforcement of alternative education schemes</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of learning outcomes in CPAF and CEBNF</li> <li>• Better supervision</li> </ul>



*Annex G: Synthesis of Goals and Strategies per level and type of education*

	Goals/Targets	Key Strategies
Lower Secondary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GER: 47% by 2020 ( against 17% in 2006)</li> <li>• Effective transition primary–lower secondary: 50% by 2015 (against 61% in 2006), with a multiplication by 3.6 of new entrants over the period (246,000 by 2020 against 68,000 in 2006) for a total enrolment rising from 159,000 in 2006 to 568,000 by 2020</li> <li>• Repetition rate: 10% by 2015 ( against 25% in 2006)</li> <li>• Student-teacher ratio: 60 by 2020 (against 86 in 2006)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Student flow regulation in the public sector and promotion of private sector subsidised by the State ( private sector will accommodate 36.5% of student enrolled in lower secondary by 2020 which is a multiplication by three of student enrolled in private CEG over the period )</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction and renovation of 900 equipped classrooms/year over 2006–2020</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u> High focus on quality improvements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Better use of existing teachers with workload rising from 18.5 hours/week in 2006 to 22 hours/week by 2020</li> <li>• Better use of teachers holders of their position and less use of replacement teachers ("vacataires")</li> <li>• Provision of teaching and learning materials to CEG and students</li> <li>• Increase of number of instructional hours allocated to students from 22/week in 2006 to 26 in 2015</li> <li>• In-service training of teachers and supervisors</li> </ul>
Upper Secondary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GER: 8% by 2015</li> <li>• Effective transition rate from lower-secondary to upper-secondary: 24.5% by 2020 ( against 46.3% in 2006) with enrolments rising from 31m400 in 2006 to 72,600 in 2020</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Student flow regulation in the public sector and promotion of private sector subsidised by the State (share of private sector moves from 32% in 2006 to 35% in 2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction and renovation of equipped classrooms and laboratories</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u> High focus on quality improvements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same strategies adopted for lower secondary education.</li> </ul>
Tertiary Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of student per 100,000 inhabitants: 300 by 2015 (against 228 in 2006)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Access:</u> Student flow regulation in the public sector ( from 27,500 student enrolled to 40,000 in 2015) coupled with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of private sector (from 5,000 student in 2006 to 10,000 in 2015)</li> <li>• Distance learning</li> </ul> <p><u>Equity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revision of scholarship attribution to target poorer background students</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality:</u> High focus on quality improvements for a better external efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of "Excellency Centres" in areas where there is a high demand in the country (hydrology, chemical sciences, etc.)</li> </ul>

Notes: GER: Gross Enrolment Rate; GIR: Gross Intake Rate; PCR: Primary Completion rate; PTR: Pupil-Teacher ratio;

Source: From Education Policy letter July 2008 (GBF 2008b) and related policy documents

# Annex H – Education Sector Expenditure 2000–2009 (MEBA, MESSRS, MJE, MASSN)

Table H.1 Analysis of the Education Budget

Source: CID (MEBA, MESSRS, MASSN, MJE)

<i>million FCFA</i>	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	notes (source)
<b>MEBA</b>											
<b>Budget (Finance Law)</b>	42 663	38 831	53 344	67 815	79 036	80 731	83 938	92 653	100 580	102 940	Finance Law
Title I personnel	20 935	21 734	22 260	29 052	33 237	35 365	41 063	43 812	55 789	62 394	initial estimates (dotation)
Title II recurrent expenditure	2 371	2 549	2 898	2 957	3 479	4 011	6 128	6 947	7 597	9 315	payment orders (except 2009)
Title III current transfers	2 260	2 061	2 296	3 358	3 688	4 819	4 212	4 368	6 800	7 997	payment orders since 2006 (exc.2009)
Title IV investments/capital exp.											
domestic financing	1 725	2 285	4 626	1 352	4 014	2 179	6 270	8 563	9 477	7 520	payment orders (except 2009)
projects	15 373	10 201	21 265	31 095	34 619	34 355	26 266	28 962	20 916	15 714	initial estimates (dotation)
<b>HIPC</b>			5 727	4 649	10 905	6 821	3 154				<b>Integrated to the Finance Law in 2007</b>
Title I personnel			5 727	4 649	2 118	440	200				initial estimates (dotation)
Title II recurrent expenditure					502	304	999				payment orders
Title III current transfers					331	0	0				payment orders
Title IV investments/capital exp.					7 954	6 076	1 955				initial estimates (dotation)
<b>CAST</b>						8 382	18 359	18 333	22 564	14 729	<b>Created in 2005</b>
Title I personnel						517	517	563	0	123	initial estimates (dotation)
Title II recurrent expenditure						429	544	3 941	3 204	1 309	payment orders (except 2009)
Title III current transfers						3 333	6 146	5 200	6 030	7 050	payment orders since 2006 (exc.2009)
Title IV investments/capital exp.						4 103	11 151	8 629	13 330	6 247	payment orders (except 2009)
<b>total MEBA (all funding sources)</b>	<b>42 663</b>	<b>38 831</b>	<b>59 071</b>	<b>72 464</b>	<b>89 941</b>	<b>95 933</b>	<b>105 451</b>	<b>110 986</b>	<b>123 144</b>	<b>117 670</b>	
<b>MEBA own resources (Budget &amp; HIPC)</b>	<b>27 290</b>	<b>28 630</b>	<b>37 806</b>	<b>41 368</b>	<b>55 322</b>	<b>53 196</b>	<b>60 826</b>	<b>63 691</b>	<b>79 664</b>	<b>87 227</b>	
<b>MEBA ext. fin. (projects &amp; CAST)</b>	<b>15 373</b>	<b>10 201</b>	<b>21 265</b>	<b>31 095</b>	<b>34 619</b>	<b>42 737</b>	<b>44 624</b>	<b>47 295</b>	<b>43 480</b>	<b>30 443</b>	
<b>MESSRS</b>											
Title I personnel	6 646	7 294	7 753	8 726	9 608	10 206	11 361	11 911	13 445	15 856	initial estimates (dotation)
Title II recurrent expenditure	644	615	684	615	1 435	905	938	1 293	1 385	2 301	payment orders (except 2009)
Title III current transfers	9 683	11 514	10 719	12 858	13 392	17 302	20 550	21 179	22 594	26 787	payment orders since 2006 (exc.2009)
Title IV investments/capital exp.											
domestic financing	1 632	2 909	3 170	3 191	2 319	1 600	1 747	3 905	4 380	5 725	payment orders (except 2009)
projects	9 542	10 106	9 055	10 193	12 186	7 267	8 120	19 662	21 984	6 318	initial estimates (dotation)
<b>total MESSRS</b>	<b>28 146</b>	<b>32 437</b>	<b>31 381</b>	<b>35 582</b>	<b>38 939</b>	<b>37 280</b>	<b>42 715</b>	<b>57 950</b>	<b>63 789</b>	<b>56 987</b>	
<b>total MESSRS own resources</b>	<b>18 604</b>	<b>22 332</b>	<b>22 326</b>	<b>25 389</b>	<b>26 753</b>	<b>30 013</b>	<b>34 596</b>	<b>38 288</b>	<b>41 804</b>	<b>50 669</b>	
<b>total MESSRS external financing</b>	<b>9 542</b>	<b>10 106</b>	<b>9 055</b>	<b>10 193</b>	<b>12 186</b>	<b>7 267</b>	<b>8 120</b>	<b>19 662</b>	<b>21 984</b>	<b>6 318</b>	

*Annex H: Education Sector Budget and Expenditure*

<i>million FCFA</i>	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	notes (source)
<b>MJE</b>											<b>Ministry created in 2006</b>
Vocational & technical education exp								2 130	2 954	2 891	
<b>MASSN</b>											<b>ENTIRE MINISTRY FOR INFO ONLY</b>
Title I personnel			1 201	1 492	1 398	1 640	2 005	2 031	2 170	2 556	initial estimates (dotation)
Title II recurrent expenditure			123	117	191	233	307	383	439	361	payment orders (except 2009)
Title III current transfers			625	792	891	1 135	1 438	1 709	1 570	1 877	payment orders since 2006 (exc.2009)
Title IV investments/capital exp.											
domestic financing			126	116	807	1 288	779	1 139	1 539	570	ordonnancement (sauf 2009)
projects			502	881	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>total MASSN</b>			<b>2 575</b>	<b>3 397</b>	<b>3 287</b>	<b>4 297</b>	<b>4 528</b>	<b>5 262</b>	<b>5 718</b>	<b>5 364</b>	
<b>total MASSN own resources</b>			<b>2 074</b>	<b>2 517</b>	<b>3 287</b>	<b>4 297</b>	<b>4 528</b>	<b>5 262</b>	<b>5 718</b>	<b>5 364</b>	
<b>total MASSN external financing</b>			<b>502</b>	<b>881</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>Total National budget</b>	<b>364 840</b>	<b>391 869</b>	<b>473 254</b>	<b>590 053</b>	<b>687 545</b>	<b>779 337</b>	<b>911 759</b>	<b>998 842</b>	<b>984 170</b>	<b>1 039 892</b>	Source 2000 to 2002: GBS evaluation Source 2003 to 2008 : revised Finance Law except 2005, 2008 and 2009 initial Finance Law;
<b>Current expenditures</b>				<b>266 255</b>	<b>370 484</b>	<b>400 654</b>	<b>451 508</b>	<b>502 274</b>	<b>499 897</b>	<b>539 763</b>	
<b>Capital expenditures own resources</b>	<b>225 611</b>	<b>263 767</b>	<b>304 941</b>	<b>42 733</b>	<b>77 477</b>	<b>95 312</b>	<b>120 687</b>	<b>143 198</b>	<b>182 948</b>	<b>194 396</b>	
<b>Capital transfers</b>				<b>77 014</b>	<b>2 194</b>	<b>3 000</b>	<b>7 530</b>	<b>19 040</b>	<b>13 710</b>	<b>7 001</b>	
<b>Capital expenditures ext financing</b>	<b>139 229</b>	<b>128 102</b>	<b>168 313</b>	<b>204 051</b>	<b>237 390</b>	<b>280 371</b>	<b>332 034</b>	<b>334 330</b>	<b>287 615</b>	<b>298 732</b>	

Source: MEBA, MESSRS, MJE, MASSN

**Analysis of the education budget**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GDP (current) in bn FCFA	1832	2061,92	2292,88	2492,05	2698,4	2555,48	2695,58	2798,92		
Total Education expenditure (excl MASSN) as a share of GDP	3.9%	3.5%	3.9%	4.3%	4.8%	5.2%	5.5%	6.1%		
Domestic education expenditure (excl MASSN) as a share of GDP	2.5%	2.5%	2.6%	2.7%	3.0%	3.3%	3.5%	3.7%		
Domestic MEBA expenditure as a share of domestic total budget	12.1%	10.9%	12.4%	12.1%	12.3%	10.7%	10.6%	9.9%	11.7%	11.9%
Domestic education expenditure (excl MASSN) as a share of domestic total budget	20.3%	19.3%	19.7%	19.4%	18.3%	16.8%	16.7%	16.1%	18.2%	19.2%
Total MEBA expenditure as a share of total expenditure	11.7%	9.9%	12.5%	12.3%	13.1%	12.3%	11.6%	11.1%	12.5%	11.3%
Total Education expenditure (excl MASSN) as a share of total expenditure	19.4%	18.2%	19.1%	18.3%	18.7%	17.1%	16.3%	17.1%	19.3%	17.1%
Total MEBA as share of total education (excl MASSN)	60.3%	54.5%	65.3%	67.1%	69.8%	72.0%	71.2%	64.9%	64.9%	66.3%
Domestic MEBA as a share of domestic education	59.5%	56.2%	62.9%	62.0%	67.4%	63.9%	63.7%	61.2%	64.0%	62.0%
Total recurrent education expenditure (excl MASSN) in % of total recurrent expenditure				23.4%	18.3%	19.4%	20.5%	20.2%	24.0%	25.2%
Total recurrent MEBA expenditure in % of total education recurrent expenditure (excl MASSN)	60.1%	57.6%	63.4%	64.3%	64.0%	63.4%	64.5%	64.0%	66.3%	64.8%
Total MEBA wages in % of total education wages (excl MASSN)	75.9%	74.9%	78.3%	79.4%	78.6%	78.1%	78.6%	78.8%	80.6%	79.8%
Total MEBA investment exp in % of total education investment	60.5%	49.0%	67.9%	70.8%	76.3%	84.0%	82.2%	66.2%	62.4%	71.0%
Total MEBA external financing in % of total education external financing	61.7%	50.2%	70.1%	75.3%	74.0%	85.5%	84.6%	70.6%	66.4%	82.8%

Table H.2 Share of MEBA Budget per Source of Financing

Per source of Financing	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Own resources	64%	74%	54%	51%	49%	48%	55%	57%	65%	74%
HIPC			10%	6%	12%	7%	3%			
CAST						9%	17%	17%	18%	13%
Projects	36%	26%	36%	43%	38%	36%	25%	26%	17%	13%

Domestic	64%	74%	64%	57%	62%	55%	58%	57%	65%	74%
External	36%	26%	36%	43%	38%	45%	42%	43%	35%	26%

Table H.3 Share of MEBA Budget per Source of Financing and per Type of Expenditure

Per type of expenditure	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Share of personnel expenditures	49%	56%	47%	47%	39%	38%	40%	40%	45%	53%
share of non wage recurrent	11%	12%	9%	9%	9%	13%	17%	18%	19%	22%
Share of investment	40%	32%	44%	45%	52%	49%	43%	42%	36%	25%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table H.4 Comparison of PDDEB 2000–2009 Financing Needs and Actuals

In bn FCFA	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	TOTAL
MEBA budget PDDEB estimates	30.63	35.3	40.66	46.86	53.96	62.16	71.63	82.56	95.1	109.59	628.5
MEBA budget actual	27.3	28.6	37.8	41.4	55.3	53.2	60.8	63.7	79.7	87.2	535.0
<b>Difference</b>	<b>-3.33</b>	<b>-6.7</b>	<b>-2.86</b>	<b>-5.46</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>-8.96</b>	<b>-10.83</b>	<b>-18.86</b>	<b>-15.4</b>	<b>-22.39</b>	<b>-93.5</b>
ODA PDDEB estimates	14.93	16	17.15	18.38	19.7	21.11	22.63	24.25	26	27.86	208.0
ODA actual (CAST+projects)	15.4	10.2	21.3	31.1	34.6	42.7	44.6	47.3	43.5	30.4	321.1
<b>Difference</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>-5.8</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>113.1</b>
<b>Total difference (positive=excess)</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>-12.5</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>-19.8</b>	<b>19.7</b>

Source: MEBA, PDDEB 2000-2009.

Table H.5 Evolution and Structure of Education Sector Budget

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Annual evolution</b>										
MEBA: domestic budget (incl. HIPC)		4.9%	32.1%	9.4%	33.7%	-3.8%	14.3%	4.7%	25.1%	9.5%
MEBA: externally financed budget (incl. Projects & CAST)		-33.6%	108.5%	46.2%	11.3%	23.5%	4.4%	6.0%	-8.1%	-30.0%
MEBA total		-9.0%	52.1%	22.7%	24.1%	6.7%	9.9%	5.2%	11.0%	-4.4%
MESSRS		15.2%	-3.3%	13.4%	9.4%	-4.3%	14.6%	35.7%	10.1%	-10.7%
MJE									38.7%	-2.1%
<b>Share of each Ministry (excl MASSN)</b>										
Share MEBA	60.3%	54.5%	65.3%	67.1%	69.8%	72.0%	71.2%	64.9%	64.9%	66.3%
Share MESSRS	39.7%	45.5%	34.7%	32.9%	30.2%	28.0%	28.8%	33.9%	33.6%	32.1%
Share MJE								1.2%	1.6%	1.6%
total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Financing structure overall education budget</b>										
Share of domestic finance (incl HIPC)	64.8%	71.5%	68.8%	64.1%	66.2%	65.7%	67.5%	63.9%	68.5%	82.3%
Share of external finance	35.2%	28.5%	34.1%	39.0%	36.3%	37.5%	35.6%	39.1%	34.5%	20.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	102.8%	103.1%	102.6%	103.2%	103.1%	103.1%	103.0%	103.0%

Source: MEBA, PDDEB 2000-2009.

## Annex I – Dimensions of Aid on Budget in the Education Sector

Dimensions of aid on budget		Projects	CAST-FSDEB	SBS (EC, FTI)
<b>On plan</b>	<i>Aid spending integrated into strategic planning and supporting documentation for policy intentions behind the budget submissions.</i>	ODA projections well integrated in PDDEB and in preparation of PDDEB action plan, which includes three separate columns: budget, CAST-FSDEB and projects and NGOs. SBS appears in the "budget" column.  Both the PDDEB action plan and the budget programme prepared by MEBA provide information on the objectives of the expenditure (although each use a different nomenclature)		
<b>On budget</b>	<i>External financing and its intended use reported in the budget documentation.</i>	Appear under title V (investments). No detail per nature of expenditure. Good coverage for projects managed by Government entities. Projects implemented directly by donors not included	Appears in annex to the Finance Law (resources & expenditure per nature)	Appears in the expenditure side along with the national budget
<b>On parliament</b>	<i>External financing included in the revenue and appropriations approved by parliament.</i>	ODA is part of the Finance law debated by the National Assembly, but rarely debated.		
<b>On treasury</b>	<i>External financing disbursed into the main revenue funds of government and managed through government's systems.</i>	Projects managed outside treasury on separate accounts	Specific FSDEB account at BCEAO, managed by Treasury. Executed only partly through CID – most outside it	Passes through treasury and executed through the CID like the national budget
<b>On accounts</b>	<i>External financing recorded and accounted for in government's accounting system, in line with government's classification system.</i>	Separate accounting	Separate accounting for expenditures at deconcentrated level, through maitrise d'ouvrage déléguée and to NGOs. Reconciled ex post	Uses national accounting procedures and nomenclature
<b>On audit</b>	<i>External financing audited by government's auditing system.</i>	Separate audit	Uses the national audit system and requires an additional annual audit by a private firm	Uses national audit system
<b>On report</b>	<i>External financing included in ex post reports by government.</i>	Specific reports produced	MEBA produces six monthly PDDEB financial and technical implementation reports, including all sources of financing. Additional information required due to CAST separate process and execution over several years.	

## Annex J – Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Burkina Faso
<p><b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i></p> <p><b>Prior 2002:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Burkina Faso was ranked bottom on the EFA development index (Primary: GER 40%; PCR: 24.4%).</li> <li>Ten year plan for basic education (PDDEB) developed in 1999, implementation starts in 2002, aiming at achieving GER 70% and literacy rate 40% in 2009. At sector level, high institutional fragmentation (four ministries), and absence of a sector vision. No comprehensive Capacity Development strategy either national or at education sector level.</li> <li>Donor coordination nascent through common PIU, project based aid only.</li> <li>In 2002: ODA to education=10.8% of total ODA, of which ODA to primary education 22%.</li> <li>Education data long been collected by government. Statistics offices at all levels of government. Burkina Faso member of CONFEMEN monitoring system, PASEC, and Pôle de Dakar.</li> <li>Routine data: annual school census in Dec/Jan for about 20 years. Data analysis and dissemination done at central level. MIS since 1995. Surveys: PASEC to test learning outcomes, 1998. RESEN 2000. Supply-side challenges (delays, disaggregated analysis).</li> </ul> <p><b>Evolution since 2002</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Significant progress on access, challenges remain ahead on completion, quality, equity (in 2009 Primary GER 65%; PCR: 40%) – on track for UPC by 2020.</li> <li>Reform of education sector: expansion of basic education to post primary, pre primary, TVET; compulsory fee free basic education (6–16). PDDEB II 2008–2010.</li> <li>Nascent sector coordination, sector MTEF, improved planning outside basic education sub-sector.</li> <li>Increase in share of ODA to education (13.4%) and in share of basic education within this (24%). Share of external financing in MEBA budget remains stable.</li> <li>Signature of Partnership Framework in 2002. Creation of the CAST-FSDEB pooled fund in 2005. Represents 45% of funding for primary education in 2007. 6 donors fund it in 2009 (France, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Unicef, Canada). Other support to the education sector include Japan, Luxembourg, AfDB, China, WFP, UNDP. Belgium and WB came out of the CAST in 2007 and 2008.</li> <li>Twice-yearly joint (sub)sector reviews of PDDEB, since 2003. Moving to annual review from 2009, complemented with annual sector review. four thematic working groups to prepare joint missions.</li> <li>Overall budget execution is in line with allocations, improvements in execution of investments. MEBA prepared its first MTEF in 2004. <i>Plan d'amélioration de la gestion financière du PDDEB</i> (2007).</li> <li>Routine data: Rapid school survey introduced in 2002. Non-government schools added, 2006. Surveys: Follow-up PASEC assessment 2006. RESEN 2007–2009. Carte éducative published since 2003/04.</li> <li>Indicators: In CSLP, CSLP-CGAB, PDDEB, monitored in annual action plans and implementation reports.</li> <li>Remaining major challenges in Capacity Development (teacher management, deconcentrated and decentralised level, financial management). No comprehensive strategy developed since 2002.</li> </ul> <p><b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FTI request in 2002, LDG appraisal. IF benchmarks considered as conditional benchmarks to access funds – IF and CSR/RESEN (WB financed) stimulate discussions on efficiency of expenditure (unit costs, average teacher salary as multiple of per capita GDP) and promote focus on UPC. Use of financial simulation model to calculate financing needs, strengthen linkages between long term goals and physical &amp; financial inputs. Little discussion of data gap in FTI appraisal.</li> <li>Catalytic effect on France and EC support (France through the CAST-FSDEB, EC through "FTI-EFA" tranche in its GBS programme); effect on domestic resources.</li> <li>RESEN in 2007–2009, funded by EPDF: diagnostic of education sector, update of the simulation model to calculate financing gap, analysis of budget efficiency.</li> <li>FTI funding request in 2008 (USD 144 million over 2009–2011): definition of financing gap, discussions on aid modalities and LDG appraisal.</li> <li>Funding from the CF endorsed in Dec 2008: USD 102m over mid 2009–2011, in the form of sector budget support, with WB as supervising entity. DPO to be developed, including matrix of conditionality.</li> <li>NETF inputs: i) Regional studies on "quantifying resources necessary to achieve MDG" &amp; on "contract teachers"; ii) Knowledge sharing and consensus building: "contract teachers" &amp; "education management"; Analytical support (CSR, support to 2002 proposal to FTI) &amp; in-country technical support on teacher management/deployment and supervisors efficiency.</li> <li>EPDF inputs: mainly CSR/simulation model and support to DPO preparation.</li> <li>FTI- Capacity Development guidelines: disseminated by WB to LDG and Govt; FTI survey of Paris Declaration in education (Burkina Faso study) in 2008; Burkina Faso pilot for the Donor Indicative Framework.</li> </ul>



## Annex J: Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Burkina Faso		
Relevance - Were the objectives of the FTI support to relevant? Was the design appropriate?	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency?	
	Effectiveness – To what extent did the FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?	Efficiency - How economically was the FTI support translated into results?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The "intellectual" influence of the FTI on policy and strategic planning was relevant to country needs and policy failures to address education MDGs: Focus on UPC, focus on primary (FTI-2002) and whole basic education (FTI-2008), focus on high level policy trade-offs (inter-sector &amp; intra-sector resources allocation, unit costs).</li> <li>Objectives to mobilise additional finance for primary education relevant to the needs, but calculation of financing gap based on attainment of UPC in 2015 led to unrealistic request in 2002. 2008 request based on UPC in 2020.</li> <li>CF support as SBS for whole basic education sub sector relevant to needs in terms of filling financing gap and financing of recurrent expenditures, and support evolution towards SWAp.</li> <li>FTI appraisal by LDG not very relevant to M&amp;E, but relevant in bringing to light concerns regarding CD for the management of a fast track strategy, and relevant as unique opportunity to strengthen coordination and dialogue.</li> <li>FTI-CD guidelines and the evolving approach of FTI from "capacity gap" to "systemic approach" relevant but not operational.</li> <li>Activities undertaken through NETF and EPDF: i) CSR/Resen highly relevant; ii) focus on effective teacher management highly relevant following recruitment of thousand new type of teachers, share of salaries in current expenditure, existing efficiency gains.</li> </ul>	<p>The FTI's inputs contributed directly to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Boost <b>policy dialogue</b> on strategic issues (between MEBA and MEF; between education ministries, with technical, social and financial partners).</li> <li>Improved <b>strategic planning for credible plans</b> (revision of goals, linkages between long term vision and short term planning, evidence based policy reforms, linkages between sub-sectors, costing, etc).</li> <li>Stimulated <b>policy reforms</b> (teacher policies, school construction modalities, management of schooling inputs, etc.).</li> <li><b>Catalytic effect</b> on ODA to basic education effective after 2003 endorsement but not fully additional, delays in disbursements, and most increase in financing to basic education not directly related to the FTI. Effect on domestic resources for basic education (through RESEN, financial simulation, discussion on financing gap, IF indicators).</li> <li>2009 CF funding effective in increasing funding to basic education in theory, but need to be confirmed in practice (additionality of CF funding, risk that other donors move out of sector as of 2011, potential need to re-evaluate financing gap). Significant effect of 2009 CF funding (to be confirmed) on MJE and MASSN budget for education.</li> <li>The FTI has contributed to <b>recognition of PCR</b>, not enrolment, as key indicator. PDDEB II indicators changed to incorporate indicative framework considerations.</li> <li><b>RESEN</b> effective for capacity-building in data analysis &amp; long term planning. Otherwise, the FTI's contribution doesn't seem to have been successful to help shaping adequate answers from government and development partners to tackle critical CD issues.</li> <li>The FTI contributed to the <b>evolution of donor coordination</b> (i) preparation of FTI requests, which provide an opportunity to "put the Paris Declaration in practice"; (ii) discussions on aid modalities in the context of the 2008 request, which may lead to an evolution of some donors to SBS in the future. The basic education sub sector is used as an example to develop similar mechanism in the education sector and other sectors.</li> <li>Short term predictability has improved over the period but remains unsatisfactory. FTI CF support, arriving late in the budget year in 2009 does not contribute positively. Medium to long term predictability of aid still weak, no forecasts on commitments after 2010 except FTI until 2011.</li> <li>High FTI influence on donors' capacities. The FTI's processes reveal the acute need for qualified education staff in-country.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicative Framework misunderstood and poorly explained in 2002. Seen as conditionality for receipt of funds. Gave FTI a bad reputation.</li> <li>Regarding the analytical tools promoted by FTI (IF, CSR, simulation model): they required a great amount of time to be fully internalised by relevant planning &amp; M&amp;E department of ministries, necessary condition for effective use.</li> <li>Process for preparing FTI requests very heavy and intensive. No other donor than the Bank felt they had the capacity to manage the process as supervising entity.</li> <li>Choice of SBS modality for CF support (2008) very efficient, since it is aligned with national procedures and processes. Negotiation of programme nevertheless heavy in transactions costs (due to novelty and to DPO modality). 6 months since endorsement and still no disbursement.</li> <li>Major communications problems between Secretariat and Government (letters in English, lack of clarity on the content of the requests leading to high transaction costs).</li> <li>Apparently no reports exchanged between Burkina and FTI Secretariat.</li> <li>High transaction costs for processing EPDF applications with regard to potential allocations- low incentive to communicate about and use EPDF. No distinction between activities financed through NETF and EPDF: EPDF doesn't seem to provide additional resources to fill a "financing gap" for CD activities.</li> <li>Regarding aid modalities, the experience of Burkina Faso shows that the fact that the World Bank is the supervising entity has a clear influence on the choice of aid modalities: may be problematic to join in a pooled fund; heavy process for preparing a DPO.</li> </ul>

SUMMARY – Burkina Faso	
Outcomes: What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?	
Increased funding, enhanced planning and focus on key policy reforms promoted by the FTI contributed – along with other inputs - to the <b>acceleration of progress</b> towards UPC since 2002. Potential for enhanced contribution of the FTI through CF funding and choice of SBS as aid modality.	
Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?	
<p>Factor of sustainability: Ownership in the education sector improved (agreement on education sector diagnosis, unified long term vision, policy dialogue and consensus building on key strategies/policies), strong increase in national resources to basic education. M&amp;E processes well integrated into planning and budgeting processes. Existing donor coordination structures now operating since 6 years and–well owned and entrenched in existing processes.</p> <p>Key risks include: i) Institutional fragmentation; ii) Effective establishment of TVET cycles to address pressure on post primary; iii) effectiveness of quality focus of PDDEB2 to improve learning outcomes; iv) the emergence of new education stakeholders to be integrated into planning loop ( local governments, school-based management committees); v)mobilisation of domestic resources: the tax ratio remains considerably below UMEOA target; vi) mobilisation of external resources: risk of donors moving out of sub sector; vii) growing mismatch between what the Ministries of education are meant to do, especially MEBA and what they are able to do viii) donor's capacities. The move towards budget support may cause aid agencies to reduce their staff capacities in the education sector; ix) risk that the move to SBS splits or weakens existing sector coordination; x) Need to increase in-year predictability and provide longer term projections for financing to the education sector as a whole.</p> <p>Short term risk on implementation capacity, in particular for 2009 given the late arrival of the funds and the pressure to disburse.</p>	

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to policy and planning? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i>		
<p><b>Prior 2002: Burkina Faso was ranked bottom on the EFA development index (Primary: enrol: 800.000; GER 40%; PCR: 24,4%) – off track for UPC by 2015</b></p> <p>- <b>Education Sector:</b> Education was yet to become a major priority on the political agenda despite inclusion in PRSP; Inter-ministerial coordination was weak, High institutional fragmentation (4 ministries in charge of education); Absence of a national vision that looked at education and training in an integrated manner; Not all the sub-sectors were clear about their long term/medium-term objectives, their strategies and the mix of policy measures to achieve them; Policy dialogue not integrated nor inclusive.</p> <p>- <b>Basic Education sub-sector:</b> MEBA with the support of a pool of 3 donors (WB, Canada and Netherlands) was the first sub-sector to design (1999) and implement (from 2002) a ten year development plan for basic education with high focus on primary education quantitative expansion. 2 quantitative goals stated: a gross enrolment rate of 70% and a literacy rate of 40 % by 2009.</p> <p><b>Evolution since 2002: Progress on access, challenges remain ahead on completion, quality, equity (Primary: enrol: 1.5m; TBS 65%; PCR: 40%) – on track for UPC by 2020</b></p> <p>- <b>Education sector:</b> Education shifted upwards in the political agenda and a common vision for the education system emerged through 2008 Education Policy letter which stated continuous movement towards universalisation at primary, expansion at post-primary through adequate TVET cycles and student flow regulation at upper levels to focus on quality and external efficiency.</p> <p>- <b>Basic Education sub-sector:</b> New education Policy Law (2007) expanded basic education to cover pre-primary, primary, post-primary (lower secondary and TVET) and non formal basic education and adult literacy to operationalise the compulsory free basic education (6–16). MEBA launched PDDEB phase 2 with and disseminate good practices of programme-based approach to other education ministries.</p>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p><b>FTI specific inputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FTI processes to promote policy dialogue and help building consensus on reforms:</b> FTI submission /funding request in 2002/08 and their related endorsement/appraisal processes obliged both Gvt &amp; partners to focus on strategic issues and identify path for reforms (goals/targets; strategies/policies/measures; cost &amp; finance; CD; M&amp;E).</li> <li>• <b>FTI analytical tools to support the preparation/strengthening of sound education sector policy</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Indicative Framework</i> introduced new indicator (UPC) &amp; policy parameters (average teacher salary as multiple of per capita GDP) primarily understood as conditional benchmarks to access funds before informing policy.</li> <li>- <i>Education country status</i> report (RESEN) helped provide/consolidate evidence on education system (access,/completion, quality, equity, finance, internal and external efficiency, management) to inform policy-decision.</li> <li>- <i>Financial Simulation model</i> helped understand i) linkages between long term goals and physical and financial implications, ii) interactions between levels of education and made explicit high level policy trade-offs.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Non FTI inputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Education sector commission for PRSP</b> provided the internal incentive for strategic planning in order to align education sector priorities with poverty reduction strategies.</li> <li>• <b>PDDEB bi-annual joint reviews</b> merged high level education policy issues ( e.g. impact of decentralisation process) with micro planning and management of activities (e.g. approval of annual action plan).</li> <li>• <b>4 PDDEB thematic working groups</b> analysed particular themes to be reported during the joint review and ensured follow-up and implementation of recommendations from the previous review.</li> </ul>		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<p>1/The "intellectual" influence of FTI on policy and strategic planning was relevant to country needs and policy failures to address education MDGs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on <b>UPC</b>- relevant to reassess performance of BF towards quality &amp; equity.</li> <li>• Focus on <b>primary</b> (FTI-2002) and whole <b>basic education</b> (FTI-2008) relevant with gradual sequencing of education investments.</li> <li>• Focus on <b>high level policy trade-offs</b> (inter-sector &amp; intra-sector resources allocation, unit costs) was relevant to identify country-specific policy gaps.</li> </ul> <p>2/ The <b>economic approach</b> underpinning the FTI has been challenged in a country which experienced structural adjustment programs and IF benchmarks were seen as a new set of conditionalities to reduce public expenditure.</p>	<p>FTI's analytical tools used to prepare and endorse proposals/requests:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Boosted <b>policy dialogue</b> on strategic issues (with finance &amp; planning; between education ministries, with technical, social and financial partners)</li> <li>• Improved <b>strategic planning for credible plans</b> (revision of goals, linkages between long term vision and short term planning, evidence based policy reforms, linkages between sub-sectors, costing recurrent+capital, etc).</li> <li>• Stimulated <b>policy reforms</b> (teacher policies, school construction modalities, management of schooling inputs, etc.).</li> <li>• Contributed to the <b>acceleration of progress</b> towards UPC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FTI processes:</b> i) 2002 rushed process (6 months) creating confusion (linkages between FTI, PDDEB and EFA plan?) and resistance (IF = a new set of conditionalities?). FTI seen as a missed opportunity; ii) 2008 too heavy &amp; long process (18months) to support existing plans/strategies. But design of CF programme will be used as an updated road map for implementation of PDDEB2 in line with 2008 Education Policy letter.</li> <li>• Regarding the <b>analytical tools</b> promoted by FTI (IF, CSR, simulation model): they required a great amount of time to be fully internalised by relevant planning &amp; M&amp;E department of ministries, necessary condition for effective use.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<p>Ownership in the education sector improved (agreement on education sector diagnosis, unified long term vision, policy dialogue and consensus building on key strategies/policies) and the road to achieve UPC is paved. <b>Key risks</b> include: i) Institutional fragmentation which may undermine implementation of new basic education law ; ii) Effective establishment of TVET cycles for primary outgoing to address pressure on post primary; iii) effectiveness of quality focus of PDDEB2 to improve learning outcomes and maintain high demand on primary; iv) at micro level the emergence of new education stakeholders to be integrated into planning loop ( local governments, school management committees</p>		

STREAM 2: Finance		
Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before FTI?		
<p><b>Country-level</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First national MTEF in 2000. In 2002 adopted an action plan to strengthen budget administration (PRGB), upgraded in 2006 into a three year sector wide approach to PFM reform (SRFP).</li> <li>• Overall tax collection ratio evolved from 10.9% in 2003 to 12.5% in 2007, still short of UMEOA target of 17%. Fiscal decentralisation process starting 2009.</li> <li>• Total ODA to Burkina Faso USD 486 m in 2002 (23.9% of GDP, and 41 USD per inhabitant) and increased to USD 861.9 m in 2007 (15% of GDP, USD 61 per inhabitant).</li> <li>• Burkina Faso reached HIPC decision point in 1997 and completion point in 2000. First HIPC credits became available in 2001, earmarked for priority expenditures (including basic education).</li> <li>• Increased focus on social sectors in GBS/Adjustment programmes over the 90s. Increased amounts of GBS in 2000–2002 to reach 32% of total ODA in 2002 and stabilise around 28% of total ODA in 2007.</li> <li>• April 2002: signature of the 1st protocol on coordination of budget support: SBC-CSLP, later transformed in CGAB-CSLP.</li> </ul> <p><b>Education sector</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2002, overall ODA to education sector 10.8% (USD 49.5m) of total ODA, down from 17% in 1998 despite an increase in absolute value. Approx 22% of ODA to education allocated to primary education (USD 10.7m). Increase in ODA to education to USD 115m (13.4% of total ODA) in 2007. Within this, 23.9% is direct support to primary education (USD 74m).</li> <li>• From 2000, external support to basic education was designed to support the implementation of the PDDEB through coordinated project modality ("noyau dur": World Bank, Netherlands, Canada). Suppression of the BPE in 2004 and creation of the CAST – FSDEB pooled fund in 2005. From 3 donors contributing to the CAST (France, Netherlands, Denmark) to 6 in 2009 (France, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Unicef, Canada). Other support to the education sector includes Japan, Luxembourg, AfDB, China, WFP, and the UNDP.</li> <li>• Overall budget execution is in line with allocations. The MEBA budget execution rates are good, irregular on investment.</li> <li>• MEBA prepared its first MTEF in 2004. <i>Plan d'amélioration de la gestion financière du PDDEB</i> (2007). Creation of a <i>Direction de Passation des Marchés</i> within MEBA (2009).</li> </ul>		
Inputs: What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparation of the FTI request in 2002 – discussions on the indicative framework (teacher salaries in particular), joint discussion with all education donors around the request.</li> <li>• Indirect input: AFD (2003) and EC support as contribution to EFA / FTI: catalytic effect of first endorsement. EC support is done through a specific tranche for the FTI in its GBS programme. AFD contributes to the CAST.</li> <li>• RESEN in 2007–2009, funded by EPDF: diagnostic of education sector, update of the simulation model to calculate financing gap, analysis of budget efficiency.</li> <li>• Preparation of the FTI request in 2008 (USD 144 million over 2009–2011): definition of financing gap, discussions on aid modalities and other donor support, discussions involving heavily MEF.</li> <li>• Funding from the CF endorsed in Dec 2008: USD 102 million over mid 2009–2011, in the form of sector budget support, with WB as supervising entity.</li> </ul>		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objectives of FTI support (mobilising additional finance for basic education) relevant to the needs.</li> <li>• Calculation of financing gap based on attainment of UPC in 2015 led to unrealistic request in 2002. 2008 request based on achievement of UPC in 2020.</li> <li>• CF support as SBS relevant to needs in terms of filling financing gap and financing of recurrent expenditures</li> <li>• CF support to whole basic education subsector relevant to sector dynamic and needs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Catalytic effect effective after 2003 endorsement but not fully additional, delays in disbursements, and most increase in financing to basic education not directly related to FTI</li> <li>• 2009 CF funding effective in increasing funding to basic education in theory, but need to be confirmed in practice (additionality of CF funding, actual increase in basic education budget, risk that other donors move out of sector as of 2011, potential need to re-evaluate financing gap).</li> <li>• Significant effect of 2009 CF funding on MJE and MASSN budget for education.</li> <li>• Effect of FTI on increased mobilisation of domestic resources for basic education (through RESEN, financial simulation, discussion on financing gap, IF indicators and benchmarks)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process for preparing FTI requests very heavy and intensive. No other donor than the WB felt they had the capacity to manage the process as supervising entity.</li> <li>• Choice of SBS modality for CF support (2008) very efficient, aligned with national procedures and processes. Negotiation of programme nevertheless heavy in transactions costs (due to novelty and to DPO modality). 6 months since endorsement and still no disbursement.</li> <li>• Major communications problems between Secretariat and Government (letters in English, lack of clarity on the request).</li> </ul>
Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?		
<p>Factor of sustainability: Strong commitment at national level, and strong increase in national resources to basic education. Risks include: (i) Mobilisation of domestic resources: despite ambitious objectives and pro-active Government action, the tax ratio remains considerably below UMEOA target; (ii) Mobilisation of external resources: risk of donors moving out of sub sector; (iii) Coordination between 4 ministries involved in basic education, and with MEF (disbursements of the DPO linked to conditionalities related to all ministries); (iv) Short term implementation capacity, in particular for 2009 given the late arrival of the funds and the pressure to disburse; (v) Medium term sustainability (what after the current FTI support and given no visibility on future donor support after 2010)</p>		

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to data and M&amp;E? What was happening in country before the FTI? Was quality and use of data relevant to the context and to the monitoring needs?</i>		
<p>Pre-2002:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education data long been collected by government. Statistics offices at all levels of government. Burkina Faso member of CONFEMEN monitoring system, PASEC, and Pôle de Dakar.</li> <li>• Routine data: annual school census in Dec/Jan for about 20 years. Data analysis and dissemination done at central level. MIS since 1995. Surveys: PASEC to test learning outcomes, 1998.</li> <li>• Dissemination: statistical yearbooks in education since 1980s. RESEN 2000. Data aggregated nationally, not by local area. Used more for long-term trends. Data collection requirements not so heavy.</li> <li>• Data use: Demand for data increasing at central level, less at local level. Supply-side challenges – sometimes survey results were a bit late for planning because they took up to a year to be analysed (delays through shortage of financing for M&amp;E). Also financial constraints meant limited distribution of publications.</li> </ul> <p>Context since 2002:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Routine data: Rapid school survey introduced in 2002 in response to demand for immediate data on current year. Non-government schools added, 2006. Surveys: Follow-up PASEC assessment 06.</li> <li>• Indicators: In CSLP, CSLP-CGAB, PDDEB, monitored in annual action plans and implementation reports.</li> <li>• Analysis: Regional analysis in place since 2007/08. Twice-yearly joint (sub)sector reviews of PDDEB, since 2003. Moving to annual review from 2009. Analysis becoming increasingly time-consuming.</li> <li>• Data use: Acceleration of analysis of two school surveys so that all completed by March. Publication of statistical yearbook (annuaire statistique) at end March.</li> <li>• Dissemination: <i>carte éducative</i> (regional map) published since 2003/04. Annual <i>tableau de bord</i>. Data shared with communes though they are reported not to make regular use of it yet.</li> <li>• INSD World-Bank-funded Dev of National Stat Systems Project 2005–2009 includes training head teachers in M&amp;E. INSD has also trained 12 statisticians to be seconded directly to the regions.</li> <li>• EC funded support to local statistical capacity-building in ARCS project (Statistical Capacity-Building Project June 2005 to June 2008).</li> </ul>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p>FTI specific inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Little discussion of data gap in FTI appraisal.</li> <li>• Indicative framework brought to the attention of the government a range of new indicators that were not previously much discussed e.g. primary completion rate, teachers' salaries. This last caused a lot of controversy, particularly following discussions which were not well understood by local stakeholders.</li> <li>• Co-financing of the RESEN country status report 2007–2009 (managed by Pôle de Dakar) through EPDF fund. An earlier RESEN report (2000) had been funded entirely by the World Bank.</li> <li>• Elaboration of matrix of conditionality for budget support.</li> </ul>		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FTI appraisal not very relevant to M&amp;E.</li> <li>• Indicative Framework misunderstood and poorly explained. Seen as conditionality for receipt of funds. Gave the FTI a bad reputation. Focus of indicative framework on salaries and PCR relevant to improve fiscal sustainability of policies and better impact.</li> <li>• Support to RESEN is highly relevant, widely cited.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FTI submission, 2002, and funding request, 2008, obliged partners to work together to agree targets.</li> <li>• Increased focus on results since about 2002 with PDDEB. The FTI has contributed to recognition of PCR, not enrolment, as key indicator. PDDEB II indicators changed to incorporate indicative framework considerations.</li> <li>• RESEN effective for capacity-building in data analysis.</li> <li>• Challenges remain in encouraging use of data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No evidence of increased resources on M&amp;E because of the FTI.</li> <li>• Apparently no reports exchanged between Burkina and FTI Secretariat. M&amp;E exchanges e.g. JRES implementation reports and aide-memoires, PDDEB implementation reports, all happening without the FTI.</li> <li>• Use of EPDF funds for RESEN 2007–09 substituted World Bank funding (may have been intentional to avoid associations with structural adjustment).</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place data and M&amp;E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• M&amp;E processes well integrated into planning and budgeting processes.</li> <li>• But burden of data collection and analysis may not be sustainable if demand for information is not apparent.</li> </ul>		



#### STREAM 4: Capacity

**Context:** *What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?*

**Prior 2002:** No comprehensive CD strategy at national level; Huge administration and management challenges at basic education level; Interventions of donors channelled and managed through PIUs; Emerging support to CD from donors.

#### Context since 2002:

1/ Capacities in basic education are not in place: MEBA has experienced difficulties i) in keeping up with the rapid development of the system generating additional needs in infrastructure, equipment, teachers, textbooks etc.; ii) in accompanying deconcentration and decentralisation processes asking for a redefinition of roles, responsibilities along with adequate financial transfers and iii) in involving a wide range of emerging education stakeholders (school-based management committees) for better accountability.

Approaches to CD (Government and Donors)

- Government: growing interest for effective sector CD strategies aligned with PRSP; bottlenecks at administration/management levels as well as persistent issues in teacher/ supervisors/ inspectors workforce & school-based stakeholders.
- Donors: gradual removal of PIUs and patchy support to CD (assessment studies, TA, etc.) focusing on planning/statistics and procurement/financial departments of the MEBA at central and local levels.

**Inputs:** *What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?*

#### FTI specific inputs

- CD issues discussed during FTI proposals/requests & endorsement/appraisal processes (2002/03 and 2008/09).
- NETF inputs: i) Regional studies on "quantifying resources necessary to achieve MDG" & on "contract teachers"; ii) Knowledge sharing and consensus building: "contract teachers" & "education management"; Analytical support (CSR, support to 2002 proposal to FTI) & in-country technical support on teacher management/deployment and supervisors efficiency.
- EPDF inputs: mainly CSR/simulation model and support to DPO preparation.
- FTI-CD guidelines: disseminated by WB to LDG and Govt.

Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<p>• <b>FTI request/appraisal processes</b> relevant in bringing to light concerns regarding CD for the effective management of a fast track strategy. Emphasise on logistics (school constructions); HR management (thousands of new type of teachers to be yearly recruited) and procurement &amp; FM.</p> <p>• <b>FTI-CD guidelines</b> and the evolving approach of the FTI from "capacity gap" to "systemic approach" are perceived to be relevant but not operational. Long process for an urgent matter</p> <p>• <b>Activities undertaken through NETF and EPDF</b>: i) CSR/Resen highly relevant; ii) focus on effective teacher management highly relevant following recruitment of thousand new type of teachers, share of salaries in current expenditure, existing efficiency gains.</p>	<p>• <b>Low FTI influence on addressing CD issues.</b> The FTI's contribution doesn't seem to have been successful to help shaping adequate answers from government and development partners to tackle critical CD issues. Only success story is CSR/simulation model for capacity building in data analysis &amp; long term planning.</p> <p>• <b>High FTI influence on donor's capacities.</b> The FTI's processes reveal the acute need for qualified education staff in-country.</p>	<p>• <b>High transaction costs</b> for processing EPDF applications with regard to potential allocations- low incentive to communicate about and use EPDF.</p> <p>• <b>No distinction between activities financed through NETF and EPDF</b>: EPDF doesn't seem to provide additional resources to fill a "financing gap" for CD activities.</p>
<p><b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i></p>		
<p>• <b>Regarding CD issues.</b> While the contribution of the FTI to upstream activities has been institutionalised, a key gap remains for tackling implementation capacity. There is a growing mismatch between what the Ministries of education are meant to do, especially MEBA and what they are able to do. This jeopardises the effective implementation of policies and plans making capacity the binding constraint to delivering EFA goals.</p> <p>• <b>Regarding donor's capacities.</b> The move towards budget support may cause aid agencies to reduce their staff capacities in the education sector.</p>		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
Context: What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before the FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?		
<p>Country-level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Move from Structural Adjustment to General Budget Support started in 2000, following the first PRSP. Coordination took place around PRSP annual reviews.</li> <li>•Pooled fund set up in the health sector, and in preparation for decentralisation, gender, water and sanitation.</li> </ul> <p>Education level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Before 2002, ODA to education exclusively in the form of projects (WB, AfDB, Netherlands, Canada, France). Disbursement rates very low, lack of coordination and weak alignment with national processes.</li> <li>•2004–2004 : WB, NL, Canada coordinated their support through a common PIU (<i>Bureau des Projets Education</i>), later joined by France, Sweden, Belgium and Denmark.</li> <li>•2002: signature of Partnership Framework, SP PDDEB starts its activities. PDDEB Annual action plan prepared annually, as well as financial and technical report on the implementation of the PDDEB.</li> <li>•2003 : first joint mission Since then, 2 missions per year, in April–June and October–November. 4 thematic working groups set up: access, quality, piloting and financing.</li> <li>•2004 : BPE closed ; 2005 : signature of the <i>Protocole de financement Commun</i>, creation of the CAST – FSDEB. 6 donors currently provide funds through the fund: Netherlands, France, Canada, Unicef, Sweden, and Denmark.</li> <li>•Several donors continue providing project support (USAID, Japan, WFP, China, UNDP). Switzerland is expected to join the CAST-FSDEB in 2009. 2005: EC starts SBS for basic education (specific FTI tranche in its GBS).</li> <li>•2007: revised cadre de partenariat signed.</li> </ul>		
Inputs: What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Preparation of the first FTI request in 2002: LDG required to carry out common evaluation of request.</li> <li>•Preparation of the second FTI request in 2008: LDG required to carry out common evaluation and reach agreement with Government on aid modality.</li> <li>•Choice of SBS for CF financing due to: (i) internal WB regulations that prevent it from using the CAST; (ii) donor and Government pressure to avoid using a WB project modality; (iii) willingness from the MEF and some key donors (EC, Netherlands) to use SBS. This financing will fully use national processes, finance both recurrent and investment expenditures, and provide funding on 2,5 years, starting July 2009, to the whole basic education sub sector.</li> <li>•2004: Burkina Faso pilot for Donor Indicative Framework; 2008: Study on aid effectiveness including Burkina Faso.</li> </ul>		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•The FTI's <u>objective</u> to strengthen donor coordination and improve aid effectiveness in the sector were relevant and consistent to the needs identified both in the PDDEB and in the CSLP.</li> <li>•The FTI <u>requirement for LDG joint evaluation</u> of requests and choice of aid modality for CF funding provides unique opportunity to strengthen coordination and dialogue.</li> <li>•<u>Financing through SBS to whole basic education sub sector</u> in line with Government reform of education sector.</li> </ul>	<p>The FTI contributed to the evolution of donor coordination in the basic education sub-sector through (i) preparation of FTI requests, which provide an opportunity to "put the Paris Declaration in practice"; (ii) discussions on aid modalities in the context of the 2008 request. The whole dynamic of donor coordination contributed to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Better <u>ownership</u>, alignment, <u>harmonised</u> and coordinated processes, improved <u>accountability</u> (joint missions, thematic working groups, CAST-FSDEB).</li> <li>•Short term <u>predictability</u> has improved over the period but remains unsatisfactory. FTI CF support, arriving late in the budget year in 2009 does not contribute positively.</li> <li>•Medium to long term predictability of aid still weak, no forecasts on commitments after 2010 except FTI until 2011.</li> <li>•The FTI has fostered dialogue on <u>aid modalities</u>, which may lead to an evolution of some key donors (NL, Denmark) to SBS in the future.</li> <li>•The basic education sub sector is serving as an example to develop similar mechanism in the education sector and other sectors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Regarding <u>aid modalities</u>, the experience of Burkina Faso shows that the fact that the fact that the World Bank is the supervising entity has a clear influence on the choice of aid modalities: may be problematic to join in a pooled fund; heavy process for preparing a DPO.</li> <li>•Although some of these due processes were waived in the case of Burkina Faso, it is not clear if this will become systematic for all FTI CF-financed DPOs or if this was only a one-off example.</li> <li>•Regarding the <u>FTI-related process</u> as a whole (preparation and evaluation of requests, preparation of the CF financed programme), it is considered by most interviewed as a very heavy and at times confusing process, with high transactions costs for Government as well as for donors. The lack of clarity and deficit of communication between the Partnership and the Government is most notable (letters and documents in English, lack of information on EPDF, last minut changes in the documents required for the request), and is one the main challenges to improve the efficiency and visibility of FTI support to Burkina Faso.</li> <li>•most donors – apart from the WB – shy away from taking responsibility of the FTI CF as supervising entity partly because of what they see as a heavy process that they do not have the capacity to manage.</li> </ul>

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>
Key strengths are: (i) existing donor coordination structures now operating since 6 years and—well owned and entrenched in existing processes; and (ii) the definition of TORs for the lead donor and joint missions are useful tools in ensuring sustainability. Key risks are: (i) that the move to SBS splits or weakens existing sector coordination; Need to increase in-year predictability and provide longer term projections for financing to the education sector as a whole, to facilitate national budget preparation and arbitrages; (iii) Weak or non-existent donor coordination in other sub-sectors; Need to improve the link between sector level coordination and national level coordination.

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion)		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before the FTI?</i>		
<p>Gender parity on the GER in primary increased from 0.71 to 0.87 between 1997 and 2007. Nevertheless, there is a specific gender problem in Burkina Faso, where girls seem to perform worse than boys. Difference in school completion rates between richer and poorer quintiles (45.2%) is higher than difference between rural and urban (33%) and between genders (11%). Inequalities between regions are very high, nevertheless worse-off regions catching up over the period. Rural illiteracy (80.5%) much higher than urban (36.6%).</p> <p>Analysis of the RESEN shows that in Burkina Faso, 10% most educated children consume 50% of public funding for education, against 44% and 33% in francophone and Anglophone African countries.</p> <p>The main measures taken in the PDDEB with regard to reducing inequalities are: (i) free text books (decision taken in 1996 but operationalisation in 2006); (ii) paying APE contributions for girls in first year of primary; (iii) specific support for school construction and functioning in 20 priority provinces (with lowest enrolment rates); (iv) "cartable minimum" – provision of basic school material for all children; (v) increasing the number of female teachers; (vi) multiplication of school feeding programmes.</p> <p>Over the past decade, HIV prevalence decreased from 7.2% in 1997 to 4.2% in 2002. Higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS among pupils than in the rest of AIDS has been finalised in 2007; It focuses on care to affected MEBA and MESSRS personnel, and on care to HIV/AIDS orphan pupils.</p>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did the FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p>The indicators monitored in the IF (in particular the gender disaggregation of key indicators), guided the preparation of the 2002 request;</p> <p>the guidelines for appraisal of the requests by the LDG, which focus specifically on issues related to gender, HIV/AIDS, and inequalities;</p> <p>the funding of the RESEN in 2007-2-009 and the financial support indirectly through catalytic effect or directly through the future CF funding.</p>		
Relevance	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes	
	Effectiveness	Efficiency & Sustainability
<p>The majority of children still do not reach the end of primary school, and should therefore remain the main focus of the stakeholders in the education system. Inequalities are progressively reduced, not because of a specific focus on "hard-to-reach children" but mainly thanks to overall progress towards universalisation of primary education.</p> <p>The RESEN, co-funded by the EPDF in 2007-2009, was particularly relevant in providing hard evidence and in-depth analysis of gender, income, geographical inequalities, and in particular outlining the inefficient allocation of the national resources vis-à-vis these inequalities.</p>	<p>Indicators monitored in the IF were already monitored in the PDDEB (2000–2009 and 2008–2010).</p> <p>The RESEN exercise (supported by the EPDF in 2007–09) had a more evident influence on policy choices.</p> <p>Other initiatives in support to girls education , the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the fight against inequalities were mainly related to a dynamic pushed by other stakeholders, in Government, in the civil society, and by other donors (Unicef in particular)</p>	<p>The move of towards SBS fostered by the CF funding, if it progressively replaces CAST-FSDEB and project funding, may in future contribute to strengthening the focus of the national budget on issues of equity and girls education, and thereby strengthen sustainability of such initiatives.</p>



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