



EVALUATION

Finland's Development Cooperation Country
Strategies and Country Strategy Modality



Evaluation on Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation

2016/3b



EVALUATION

EVALUATION OF FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION COUNTRY STRATEGIES AND COUNTRY STRATEGY MODALITY

Mozambique Country Report

Nick Maunder (country team coordinator)

Aili Pyhälä

Stephen Turner

Mokoro Ltd in collaboration with Indufor Oy



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2016/3b

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADPP	Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo
ALI	Department for Africa and the Middle East of MFA
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa
BS	Budget Support
CBO	Community-Based Organisations
CDG	Country Development Goal
CEP	Country Engagement Plan
CS	Country Strategy
CSM	Country Strategy Modality
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPP	Development Policy Programme
DR	(Country) Development Result
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
EOM	Electoral Observation Mission
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESP	Mozambique Education Sector Plan
EU	European Union
EUR	euros
FASE	Support to Education Sector
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
FO	Finland's Objective
FORECAS	Forest Research Capacity Strengthening in Mozambique
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FRELIMO	Mozambican Liberation Front
G19	G19 group of Programme Support Partners
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoM	Government of Mozambique
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approaches
HoC	Head of Cooperation
HQ	Headquarters
ICI	Institutional Cooperation Instrument
IESE	Institute for Social and Economic Studies
IIAM	Agrarian Research Institute of Mozambique
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation

JPO	Junior Professional Officer
KEO	Department for Development Policy of MFA
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MASA	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MASC	Mechanism to Support Civil Society
MCT	Ministry of Science and Technology
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Finland)
MINEDH	Ministry of Education and Human Development
MITADER	Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development
MONAP	Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Programme
MOSTIS	Mozambican National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAO	National Audit Office (Finland)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAP	Programme Aid Partners
PARP	Plano de Acção de Redução de Pobreza
PEDSA	Mozambique Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (2010-2019)
PFM	Public Finance Management
PNISA	Mozambique Agricultural Investment Plan
PROAGRI	National Programme for Agriculture Development
PRODEZA	Zambézia Province Rural Development Project
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SFRM	Sustained Forest Resource Management
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SO	(Finland's) Specific Objective
STIFIMO	Programme of cooperation in science, technology and innovation
SUNAFOP	National forestry programme
RBM	Results-Based Management
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UEM	Eduardo Mondlane University
UFF	Humana People to People

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNU-WIDER	United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research
USD	United States dollar

ABSTRACT

This evaluation was commissioned by Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs to contribute to improved results-based management and the implementation of Finnish development policy in Mozambique. The evaluation covers the period 2008-2015 and compares the results-based Country Strategy introduced in 2012 with the preceding Country Engagement Plan. The evaluation is based on a Theory of Change approach and draws on findings from a review of documents and statistics, semi-structured interviews and field visits. The report provides conclusions and recommendations on both the Mozambique Country Strategy and the Country Strategy Modality.

The relevance of Finland's bilateral aid to the priorities of the Mozambique government, the development context and Finland's Development Policy Programme is found to be generally high. Effectiveness was highest in the education sector, whilst evidence on impact and sustainability, across all three sectors of education, agriculture and good governance, was limited. Sources of inefficiency in the design and delivery of bilateral aid were identified but not quantified. Coherence and coordination were strong, but complementarity with other Finnish development instruments was found to be insufficiently developed.

The Country Strategy Modality was found to be relevant to a range of managerial needs and contributes to the increased relevance and effectiveness of aid. While the use of the CSM has improved reporting and visibility, it is less clear that it has been used for managing by results.

Recommendations are given on the scope of future bilateral cooperation in Mozambique, including the development of private sector engagement, improving complementarity between Finland's development instruments, strengthening the strategic component of the country strategy and its use for results-based management.

Keywords: Mozambique, Finnish development assistance, Bilateral aid, Country Strategy, Evaluation

SUMMARY

Background and purpose

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) in 2012 to promote Results-Based Management (RBM) in country programming, and to enhance Finnish aid effectiveness and accountability. Under the CSM process Country Strategies (CSs) were developed, which defined objectives and a framework to monitor results. The MFA has contracted this independent evaluation of the CSM and CSs in six of Finland's seven key bilateral cooperation partner countries, including Mozambique. The scope of the evaluation covers the period 2008-2015, comparing the results-based CS introduced in 2012 with the preceding Country Engagement Plans (CEPs).

The purpose of the overall evaluation is twofold: to improve the results-based management approach in country programming for management, learning and accountability purposes; and to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. The country-level evaluation focuses on evaluating the CS which entails assessing the performance of programmes and projects and other interventions anchored by the CS objectives and results areas, but it is not an evaluation of the individual projects and aid instruments.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation uses a Theory of Change (TOC) approach, where the critical assumptions linking inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts are tested through the evaluation. The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM agreed with the MFA during an inception phase, including several Mozambique-specific questions.

The evaluation took place from September 2015 to April 2016, with a visit to Mozambique in February 2016 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki. Various sources of information and evaluation tools were used to enable triangulation of research findings including: document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions and a site visit to Zambézia Province to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback. The preliminary findings and emerging conclusions and recommendations were presented and discussed in separate feedback meetings with the Mozambique country team, development partners in Mozambique and MFA in Helsinki.

Findings on the Country Strategy

Relevance. The CS is highly relevant to national policy as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARP 2011-2014). However, national ownership of the PARP was weak and the Government of Mozambique (GoM) stressed the relevance of donor support to small and medium enterprise development - along

with increased commercial ties and direct investment by Finnish companies. The poverty reduction focus of the CS is highly relevant to the national development context as Mozambique remains one of the world's poorest countries. The improvement of both education and rural livelihoods is essential to sustainable poverty reduction. There is wide agreement that systems and institutions of governance offer inadequate standards of accountability, transparency and integrity, and require support.

The CS clearly reflects the Finnish 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP) priorities and is particularly relevant to addressing two of the four DPP priorities: democracy and accountability, and human development. The main Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) partners perceived Finland's bilateral aid as relevant and providing added value.

The CSM was found to contribute to the relevance of Finland's bilateral aid by facilitating periodic reflection on the country context. However, the CSM process is not inclusive of external stakeholder inputs, which could stimulate further strategic innovation.

Effectiveness. Results at the level of Finland's Specific Objectives varied by sector. In the agriculture sector results were registered amongst individual beneficiary households, but it is hard to demonstrate links to aggregate outcomes at the District level - let alone the Provincial or National level. In the education sector progress has been made in reducing regional and gender disparities in basic education and in a strategy for bilingual basic education. Under the enhanced state-society accountability goal Finland has contributed to improved public financial management and audit function through the Tribunal Administrativo and General Budget Support (GBS), while the new Good Governance Programme has been slow to start.

To some extent Finland has been able to successfully leverage results from the relatively modest amounts of bilateral aid through policy dialogue and advocacy. This process can influence the decision-making and use of more significant resources by the GoM and other donors. However, influencing objectives and strategies for implementation were inadequately defined and results poorly monitored or reported on. It was noted that the effectiveness of policy influence is closely associated with the quality of advisors and staff placed in the Embassy.

There is some evidence that the introduction of an RBM approach through the CSM has encouraged more effective aid programming with a greater focus on the results of bilateral aid and an improved emphasis on monitoring the effectiveness of interventions over time.

Impacts. While progress has been made towards several of Finland's Specific Objectives, it is not possible to demonstrate the links to higher level impacts. Increases in aggregate agricultural production are explained by increased area of cultivation, rather than increased productivity. Access to education has improved but the quality of basic education has not, with poor teaching standards and standards of school management. Indicators show no clear improvement in governance and human rights and a decline in the rule of law over the

2012-2015 period. At the goal level, a lack of recent, key data makes it hard to draw conclusions on progress towards the Development Goal of reducing poverty - and assessing Finland's contribution to any change appears impractical.

The attempt of the CSM to define a results chain that links the interventions all the way to Country Development Goal has proved problematic. Limited data availability, the relative scale of Finland's contribution and time lags in responses have all proved major constraints.

Efficiency. A number of good practices in the CS have promoted efficiency including the choice of implementing partners, participation in basket funding arrangements, the efficient use of staff resources and reasonably good disbursement rates. Conversely, heavy, rigid and slow procedures for appraising and approving new projects and programmes - along with inadequately defined decision-making responsibilities - have significantly reduced overall efficiency. Cost efficiency is also deteriorating in line with a reduced country aid allocation.

Significant gaps in risk identification and mitigation planning in the CS were identified - with consequences for loss of efficiency - and the CSM could contribute to improved efficiency through strengthened risk identification, mitigation and management.

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. The internal coherence of the CS was found to be at an appropriate level, with strong inter-sectoral coherence, but limited opportunities for coherence between the CS sectors. The CS is strongly aligned to government systems, while active participation in a range of donor coordination structures ensures good harmonization.

The CS interventions are found to have limited complementarities to, or with, other forms of Finnish development cooperation. In particular, there appears to be strong potential for mutual reinforcement between the CS and Finnish NGO projects and the various trade and commercial instruments. The CSM has not provided an effective platform for developing more meaningful complementarities between these different instruments.

Human rights-based approaches and cross-cutting objectives. The CS acknowledges the importance of Human Rights-Based Approaches (HRBA), gender, equality and climate sustainability in underpinning the goals and objectives. These commitments are reflected to varying degrees in the actual interventions and are least evident in promoting climate sustainability. The CSM appears to have added little over the DPP in ensuring the integration of human rights and the cross-cutting objectives.

Sustainability. It is too early to draw conclusions regarding the sustainability of the CS results. However, the evaluation found that the design and implementation of the CS has adopted approaches in each of the sectors which were designed to promote sustainability. The evaluation did not find that the CSM influenced the sustainability of the CS.

Findings on the Country Strategy Modality

The CSM is relevant to a range of needs of managers in the country teams. It encourages a reflection on the strategy and more clearly defines the scope of

the bilateral aid programme to facilitate managerial decisions. It promotes communication between the Embassy, the MFA regional department and senior managers in MFA. It improves overall accountability, and increases the visibility of development aid in Finland as a way of protecting a declining and vulnerable area of expenditure. The relevance of using the CSM to promote RBM was mixed, as the principles of RBM were already more firmly embedded in some sectors.

The CSM improved results reporting and accountability by introducing a ‘serious reporting system’. The processes associated with the CSM are not seen as particularly onerous by staff and it is not clear that they impose any additional costs over alternative report formats.

The use of the CSM for managing by results is limited. It provides a useful instrument for following up on progress in the programmes as the CSM has introduced the system of processing reports. But significant limitations were also found, especially the feasibility of linking interventions to higher level results. However, the CSM does not give sufficient or credible evidence of results to drive decision making. The summary mode of RBM currently used – the matrix of indicators appended to the annual CS report – is not a substitute for thorough mid-term and final evaluations of each constituent project, carried out with rigorous adherence to standard evaluation criteria.

Adopting the results-based management approach requires a continuous investment in capacities for Results-Based Management at the country level. However, the evaluation also found that further investment is needed to reinforce problematic areas of the process: the formulation of objectives, results chains and indicators and risk management.

Main Findings	Conclusions	Main Recommendations
<p>The current sectors are relevant, It is also apparent that there is an added value from the experience and knowledge gained through a sustained engagement in a sector. However, with budget and staff cuts, remaining in all sectors will affect the portfolio efficiency and effectiveness. The evaluation did not find obvious synergies in operating simultaneously in multiple sectors and there seems little intrinsic advantage in terms of added value.</p> <p>Introducing new sectors is not likely to result in a more effective or relevant aid portfolio.</p>	<p>Overall Finland’s bilateral aid portfolio has been – and remains – relevant to Mozambique. However, a significant degree of variation was found in the relevance and effectiveness between sectors. Budget and staff cuts the current sector spread is likely to become less effective and efficient. (Conclusions #1 and #8).</p>	<p>1) The number of sectors supported in the CS should be reduced to maintain meaningful levels of finance and ensure adequate technical capacity to engage in policy influence.</p>
<p>Improving education is a highly relevant to the overall goal of poverty reduction. National data indicate progress in reducing regional disparities and in girls’ access to education.</p> <p>A bilingual education strategy is in place, but there are differing views on the relevance of the goal of promoting bilateral education given the huge investment (and associated opportunity costs) needed to develop materials and train teachers.</p>	<p>Finland’s sector support to the education sector has been particularly effective with demonstrable results. However, the absorptive capacity of the Ministry is a constraint. (Conclusion #5)</p>	<p>2a) The education sector should remain at the core of the bilateral aid programme, principally through a continuation of sector support to the Ministry of Education to promote equal access to quality, basic education.</p>

Main Findings	Conclusions	Main Recommendations
<p>Whilst imperfect, some progress can be seen in improving public financial management and audit functions, including improved functioning of the institutions supported. The withdrawal of Finnish support from the audit institution on account of irregularities in project implementation has affected national audit coverage and results achieved up to withdrawal were promising. The Institute for Social Studies is judged by informants to be making a valuable and high-quality contribution to policy debates.</p>	<p>The continued investment in governance systems is relevant to building accountability, transparency and integrity. Finland may have an added value in this area, but needs to adapt administrative and processes and be tolerant of the associated risks (Conclusion #6).</p>	<p>2b) Support to good governance should be continued along the lines of the previously identified programme components.</p>
<p>Finland's interventions in the agriculture sector have results mainly at the individual beneficiary / household level including interventions to develop farmers' clubs and support for laboratory facilities. The evaluation found limited results of support to sector level programmes due to design and implementation challenges.</p>	<p>The long-standing engagement in the agriculture sector has so far failed to deliver meaningful results at scale. Prospects for future results and sustainability of impacts are poor (Conclusion #7).</p>	<p>2c) Support to the agriculture sector should be phased out following the completion of existing contractual commitments.</p>
<p>GBS has been evaluated as broadly effective in Mozambique. It, and the sector budget support in education, offered the most effective means to Finland to play a role that is larger than its financial contribution. The current political and economic context implies that GBS will again become more important as a source of financing for public services.</p>	<p>The decision of Finland to leave the GBS group will diminish the visibility and influence of Finnish aid. There is an important 'window of opportunity' to use GBS to influence governance and build the institutions of accountability (Conclusions #3 & #4).</p>	<p>3) Finland should carefully consider re-engaging in GBS with a primary objective of maintaining high-level policy influence with the GoM in promoting good governance and human rights.</p>
<p>The five-year national plan emphasizes economic development. The government has expressed a desire to increase commercial ties with Finland and direct investment by Finnish companies. There is very little attention given – either strategically or practically – to links with Finland's private sector support instruments, insofar as they exist, and to their potential for reinforcing the country strategy objectives.</p>	<p>Finland's new DPP, the interests of the Mozambique government and the economic context suggest that a much stronger emphasis should be placed on economic development (Conclusion #2).</p>	<p>4) The new CS should prioritize a comprehensive private sector development plan that clearly states how trade and commercial instruments should work in conjunction with bilateral aid.</p>
<p>The Embassy lacks a flexible tool to directly finance NGO and civil society projects in country. Several of the Finnish NGO projects managed directly from Helsinki have potentially important interactions with the country strategy. Planned support to CSOs in the bilateral portfolio appears to have significant similarities to support already provided through KEPA via the CSO instrument.</p>	<p>NGO operational experiences and perspectives are an important input to developing the policy positions and advocacy work undertaken by the Embassy. Integration of Finnish NGO projects into the objectives and implementation of the CS could generate synergies and reduce overlaps and inefficiencies (Conclusion #10).</p>	<p>5) The embassy should consider reintroducing the Fund for Local Cooperation to selectively finance strategic NGO projects that complement CS objectives and activities.</p>

Main Findings	Conclusions	Main Recommendations
<p>A number of interventions were terminated early on account of irregular use of Finnish Funds, affecting both portfolio effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation found cases where the design and implementation might benefit from improved risk analysis. Risk analysis in the CS was cursory.</p>	<p>A more comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation plan could have helped reduce the number of interventions terminated early (Conclusion #9)</p>	<p>6) Risk management processes within the Country Strategy should be strengthened.</p>
<p>Finland has been able to influence government and donor partners and leverage its financial contributions through policy dialogue. The most consistent perception of Finland's added value is that Finland contributes through leading donor coordination. The quality of its Embassy staff and willingness to take on leadership positions is seen as a key driver of yielding influence disproportionate to its financial contributions.</p>	<p>Combining sector-based financing with policy influence is essential to achieving leverage and impact. In turn, influencing depends on experienced, well-qualified and effective technical staff (Conclusion 8).</p>	<p>7) Development cooperation experience should be introduced as a core selection competency for appointing relevant MFA positions within the Embassy.</p>

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Origin and context of the evaluation

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) - a country strategy planning and management framework - in 2012 within the context of the 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP). This was also driven by the 2011 results-based management (RBM) evaluation of Finnish development cooperation. From 2013 onwards the CSM has been implemented in the seven long-term partner countries of Finland, namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.

The CSM is a key instrument to introduce RBM in country programming and to enhance Finnish aid effectiveness and accountability. Before 2013 (in 2008-2012) country programming was set out as Country Engagement Plans (CEPs), which were not results-based. From 2013 the country strategies (CSs) that resulted from the CSM were required to set out goals and objectives with appropriate measures to track achievements.

In mid-2015 the MFA contracted Mokoro Limited and Indufor Oy to undertake an evaluation of the CSM and CSs (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia). The results from the evaluation will inform adjustments to the CSM and the new CSs, and contribute to improved upwards results reporting within the MFA and beyond, including to the Parliament of Finland. The full terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation are at Annex 1 and also apply to the Mozambique country evaluation.

1.2 Purpose and objectives of the country evaluation

This country evaluation has a double purpose:

- to evaluate, for both accountability and learning purposes, Finland's bilateral cooperation with Mozambique since 2008. As such, this is a free-standing report, to be published separately, and it will elicit a separate management response from the country team;¹
- to contribute towards the evaluation of the CSM, as part of a multi-country study (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia).

¹ TOR: "The country reports will be discussed with partner countries and the management response drawn up on this basis. The follow up and implementation of the response will be integrated in the planning process of the next phase of the country strategy."

The CSM - introduced in 2012 - introduced RBM to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of Finnish aid.

The purpose is to evaluate both Finland's bilateral cooperation with Mozambique and the contribution of the CSM approach.

The **objective** of the country evaluation is

- to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS portfolio of interventions² by assessing the relevance of Finland's interventions and of the strategic choices made in the CS, as well as the performance of the CS Portfolio against these choices;
- to provide evidence on the feasibility of the CSM for the purposes of the results-based management of the MFA.

The principal features of the evaluation are set out below.

- The **temporal scope** of the evaluation is the period 2008 to 2015. Although there is particular interest in the country strategy modality which was introduced only in 2012, it is necessary to consider a longer period (a) because many of the interventions taking place during the post-2012 period were designed and commenced earlier, and (b) as stated in the TOR, "in order to understand the strategies as they are now and to evaluate the change and possible results of current country strategies, it is essential to capture the previous period as a historical context".
- The **content scope** of the evaluation considers Finnish bilateral funding to Mozambique in the context of Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole and Finland's role as part of the donor community. However, it focuses directly only on the instruments that come within the scope of the Country Strategy as set out in Chapter 4 below. The evaluation, however, is not an evaluation of individual components separately, but of the programme as a whole.
- **Summative and formative dimensions.** The evaluation aims to explain the strengths and weaknesses of past performance and to make forward-looking recommendations at country level, as well as providing inputs to formative CSM recommendations.
- **Users.** The MFA country team and desk officers will be primary users of the country evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. Country teams comprise responsible persons both in the regional department unit in Helsinki and in the Embassies. The main audience for - in other words, the direct users of - the evaluation are the MFA Department for Development Policy, the regional departments and their units (for the Americas and Asia, and for Africa and the Middle East) overseeing the CSs in the long-term partner countries, and Finland's embassies in long-term partner countries.

The evaluation therefore looks separately at (i) whether the CS Portfolio is performing given the target country strategy objectives and development results; and (ii) the contribution that the CS/CSM made to this performance.

² The term **CS portfolio of interventions** (or more concisely "CS portfolio") is used as shorthand for the actually implemented / ongoing set of interventions and activities as framed by the CS, notwithstanding the instrument through which they are funded or whether they originated from the CEP. Evaluating the country strategy means in significant part evaluating this CS Portfolio against the evaluation criteria, to test the validity of the CS logical model and assumptions, and by extension the bulk effects of Finland's CS-directed interventions in Mozambique.

The second focus on the country strategy modality is in turn at two levels: the difference the introduction of the CS (country strategy) approach made to the content and implementation of the Mozambique programme; and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CSM as a RBM methodology to manage the Mozambique CS Portfolio.

The evaluation findings on the CS Portfolio follow this approach by first assessing the CS Portfolio as such, and then considering the difference that the country strategy approach has made.

1.3 Approach and methodology

The Mozambique country strategy evaluation approach and methodology followed the overall approach and the evaluation plan and criteria set out in the TOR and the Inception Report (November 2015). The IR methodology elaborated the key country evaluation instruments, data collection and validation methods, and processes. We discuss evaluation instruments and data collection and validation methods used for the Mozambique report in the summary below. More detail is provided in Annex 2.

1.3.1 Evaluation instruments

The country evaluation uses a set of inter-related evaluation instruments. These are:

The CS level theory of change (TOC)

The Mozambique TOC is elaborated in section 4.3. The TOC sets out the intervention logic of the CS Portfolio, as framed by the CS, as a result chain with explicit (in the CS) and implicit assumptions, which operates within the Mozambique context. The evaluation team drew on the assumptions in the logic frameworks, interviews with the country team, and a review of the context to adapt the generic assumptions for the country TOCs provided in the Inception Report, for Mozambique.

The TOC allowed the country evaluation team to track whether the theory of how Finland will affect country development results, as expressed in the CS logic model, was valid given the degree to which it was realised in practice, given the CS Portfolio. Assessing CS Portfolio against the TOC involved five dimensions:

- i. Assessing whether the CS objectives and the interventions to implement them in the CS Portfolio represent the right choices, or was relevant given Mozambique's context and Finland's development policy objectives. This is assessed in the relevance section (see 5.1);
- ii. Assessing whether the CS interventions took place (inputs and outputs materialised), and whether they delivered their planned results (the intermediate outcomes of the TOC). This is assessed in the effectiveness section (see 5.2).

- iii. Assessing whether these results can be argued to have contributed to Finland's specific objectives (the TOC outcomes). The evaluation examined Mozambique-specific pathways for the contribution, which included both what the interventions were and how they were implemented, as well as leveraging through policy dialogue and uptake of models. The findings against this dimension are also presented in the effectiveness section (see 5.2).
- iv. Assessing whether there is evidence to support the CS logic framework hypothesis that the specific objectives, as realised through the interventions, would contribute to the CS objectives (the second TOC outcome result) and target development results (the TOC Impact result). This is assessed in the impact section (see 5.3).
- v. Assessing how well the CS Portfolio achieved the results:
 - was it efficient in translating Finnish resources to results (assessed in section 5.4)?
 - is it sustainable (section 5.5)?
 - is effectiveness and impact supported through complementarity with other Finnish aid instruments, internal and external coherence, and coordination with partners at country level (section 5.6)?
 - how well did it achieve Finnish cross-cutting development policy objectives?

The country TOC furthermore made a distinction between the performance of the CS Portfolio (expressed by the CS level TOC in section 4.3) and the performance of the CSM as an RBM methodology influencing that programme.

Evaluation and judgement criteria

The Mozambique evaluation uses the same criteria as the other five country strategy evaluations to make findings. These operate at two levels. Firstly, as set out above against the TOC result chain, the evaluation uses an adjusted set of OECD DAC evaluation criteria to systematise the dimensions in which the performance of the CS Portfolio is evaluated. These criteria and their definitions are provided in Annex 2. Secondly, within each dimension the methodology set out judgement criteria which guided the teams in collecting and analysing evidence against the evaluation criteria. These are set out as part of the evaluation matrix, also provided in Annex 2.

The evaluation matrix and evaluation questions

The evaluation was framed by the evaluation questions provided in Annex 2. The evaluation matrix acknowledged the inter-related nature of the CS Portfolio evaluation and the CSM evaluation, and thus made explicit in an integrated matrix which questions were to be examined to assess the performance of the CS Portfolio against the evaluation criteria, and which related to the performance of the CSM. The judgement criteria provided guidance on how to interpret the questions, and what would count as evidence.

The evaluation uses OECD DAC evaluation criteria to evaluate the performance of the CS Portfolio.

In addition the TOR highlighted a number of country-specific issues to be addressed within the evaluation process:

- To what extent has the Country Strategy responded to the changing country context in Mozambique?
- Is the Country Strategy balanced enough in terms of the chosen priority sectors?
- To what extent does the Country Strategy complement the work of other donors and what is the strategy's value added?
- As the donor dependency of Mozambique is decreasing, the evaluation should give medium-term strategic recommendations for Finland's cooperation in Mozambique.

It should be noted that the evaluation matrix frames the assessment of CSM influencing performance on the CS Portfolio, against whether it was a relevant methodology; whether it contributed to CS Portfolio performance against the evaluation criteria (CSM effectiveness); whether it is efficient; and whether it is sustainable.

Analytical devices

Finally, the evaluation utilised contribution analysis, process analysis, logical reasoning, and causal mechanism validation by expert and stakeholder feedback, as analytical methods to assess both the performance of the CS Portfolio against the TOC and evaluation questions, and assess the CSM. Contribution analysis was applied where the distance between CS Portfolio results and the CS objective analysed allowed it to occur. Where the team identified a contribution gap, it used logical reasoning to identify plausible causal mechanisms, which was validated by expert and stakeholder feedback.

For the evaluation, a contribution gap refers to the recurring circumstance in all the CSs when the size of the Finnish intervention; the results chain length to the target development result; data availability; and/or the time needed for the result to occur following an intervention, would affect whether the results from comprehensive contribution analysis would yield useful and valid information for the MFA. The use of different analytical instruments to evaluate the chain was aimed at usefully evaluating the performance of the CS portfolio interventions to the level of their direct outcomes. Higher up the results chain, the task was to check that the Finnish interventions are sensibly aligned with Finnish and country general objectives, and that the assumptions about their contribution to country-level results remain valid.

The team used process analysis and causal mechanism validation through the stakeholders involved to assess the influence of the CSM on the content and delivery of the CS Portfolio.

1.3.2 Data collection and validation

The Mozambique country evaluation team was able to use mixed information sources to generate and triangulate the evaluation findings. These are referenced throughout the report. These included:

- **Document sources:** country CSM documentation and reports; existing intervention reviews and evaluations; and relevant secondary literature from non-MFA sources including government documents and evaluations or reviews undertaken by other partners. The exact document sources are referenced throughout the report.
- **Statistical information sources:** the report uses analysis of financial and other statistics collected from the MFA and other sources. References are provided throughout the report.
- **Semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions:** This included individual interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions. In view of the confidentiality assurances provided to respondents, respondents are not identified linked to each reported observation. However, Annex 3 provides a full list of people interviewed.
- **Site visits** to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback, in alignment with the TOR requirement for participatory evaluation.

Triangulation was done between sources, where possible, but also within a source-type. The data and findings were validated through a country-based and Helsinki-based country evaluation validation workshop. For Mozambique this workshop was attended by government representatives, donor partners and the Embassy country team.

1.4 Evaluation process

The evaluation took place during the period September 2015 to April 2016. The team comprised Nick Maunder (Country Team Coordinator), Aili Pyhälä and Stephen Turner (team members).

The first desk study phase was undertaken after the kick-off meeting on September 10th, 2015. The context analysis, TOC and emerging hypotheses as well as a detailed work plan for the evaluation were presented in the inception report submitted to MFA in November, 2015.

The country mission took place on 10th-26th February. The field mission examined all of the sectors and projects included as part of the 2014-2017 CS. As the Mozambique bilateral aid portfolio comprises a relatively small number of interventions the evaluation was able to examine each of the programmes and projects in the CS portfolio.

The mission included field visits to projects, beneficiaries and government offices in Zambézia Province. An internal debriefing of Embassy of Finland staff was undertaken on 22nd February³ and a validation workshop was organised for external stakeholders in Maputo on the same day. The Embassy debriefing included members of the Mozambique team based in Helsinki who connected via video link. A final validation workshop was then conducted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) headquarters on 16th March.

³ The debriefing was organised early to accommodate the travel schedule of the Ambassador.

The evaluation field mission examined all of the sectors and projects included in the 2014–2017 CS.

The evaluation process was participatory and consultative to ensure that key Finnish stakeholders at various levels could contribute to the evaluation process. This included providing information for evaluation and commenting on the various outputs such as the draft inception report, interview plan, mission findings, and draft final evaluation report.

The evaluation team interviewed approximately 90 stakeholders⁴ in Mozambique and Helsinki. This included Government of Mozambique (GoM) staff in the counterpart Ministries, implementing project staff, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), other development partners and civil society members.

The key MFA staff involved both with the CEP and with the current CS were interviewed, including people who were directly associated with the transitioning from CEP to CS and with drafting the CS in 2012.

1.5 Limitations to the country evaluation

The evaluation faced a number of challenges, both in evaluating the CS Portfolio against CS objectives, and evaluating the CSM influencing of the programme and the CSM process. Several challenges were common to all the country evaluations. Table 1 summarises the main challenges and how the evaluation team sought to mitigate them.

⁴ This excludes large numbers of community-level beneficiaries

Table 1: Evaluation challenges and their mitigation

Challenge	Mitigation
CS PORTFOLIO EVALUATION CHALLENGES	
<p>The contribution gap: Assessing the effectiveness and impact of a small donor’s CS Portfolio, against high level country strategy development result targets presented challenges. These were highlighted in the inception report. Comprehensive contribution analysis is not useful in these circumstances.</p> <p>Finland’s contribution to ODA in Mozambique is very small, which has posed difficulties in observing contributions to CS development results areas.</p> <p>Portfolio assessment challenge: Throughout the evaluation the team was challenged by summing the performance of individual interventions, towards an assessment of the CS Portfolio result chain.</p> <p>This was also difficult to assess because of the small relative contribution of Finland.</p>	<p>The ‘contribution gap’ in the Mozambique country strategy occurs particularly between the country CS objectives and the target development results. In some cases the team also identified a gap between the project immediate results and the specific objectives.</p> <p>Otherwise, the relatively close links between the interventions and specific objectives made it more possible to deploy contribution analysis.</p> <p>To deal with the contribution gap and portfolio assessment challenges the team:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - investigated how policy dialogue and the provision of successful models were able to leverage specific interventions by influencing other partners, including government, to direct their resources to similar objectives. - The country team used logical reasoning to identify the plausible mechanisms for contribution, and then validated these through expert and stakeholder feedback, to check on the feasibility of the result chain. - The country team used available evaluations and reviews of individual interventions, but focused on the extent to which performance was achieved across the portfolio. This was eased by the methodology which assessed the CS Portfolio against the CS objectives, as well as the application of the complementarity, coherence and coordination criteria.
<p>Availability of validated information and statistical data related to interventions: The inception report envisaged that the CS Portfolio evaluation would be able to draw on existing documentation and the CSM reports. This however was not always the case.</p> <p>As a result, there was not always sufficient information available to make assessments of all the programmes.</p> <p>The CS annual reports were only of limited value, given issues with whether the results matrix adequately measures performance and the stability of the indicators. For example, policy dialogue measures and outcomes are not adequately reported. In Mozambique result information on other Finnish instruments listed in the CS was not available.</p> <p>Annual results reporting provided information on results but the information was not always valid because of inadequate quality of the selected indicator, or challenges in obtaining reliable data for the concerned indicator.</p> <p>In addition, there was little data available to assess value for money of the programme, as this was not adequately addressed in most evaluation reports.</p>	<p>The fieldwork aimed to address these challenges, as much as on reviewing the findings of existing reviews and evaluations. Selection of site visits, selection of respondents and interview content therefore paid attention to filling these gaps.</p> <p>The team used the deskwork and fieldwork phases to supplement CSM report data as much as possible from other sources to form views on results at the outcome and impact level. Where gaps still remain is reflected against the specific criteria in Chapter 5 below.</p>

Challenge	Mitigation
CS PORTFOLIO EVALUATION CHALLENGES	
<p>Evolving CS: Compared to other focal countries the portfolio of interventions included in the CS was both manageable and sufficiently distinct from the preceding CEP interventions to facilitate the evaluation process. However, evaluating the CS was somewhat of a ‘moving target’; in Mozambique the CS itself was revised during the evaluation period, indicators were adapted on an annual basis and reporting against indicators was only partial.</p>	<p>Ambiguities in the evolving nature of the CS were resolved by using the 2014–2017 CS as a fixed reference point for the evaluation (see chapter 4).</p>
<p>Short time lapse since the introduction of the CS (for the CS Portfolio evaluation): The degree to which the CS Portfolio can be assessed against CS objectives can be challenged, given that there has been little time for results to emerge.</p>	<p>The TOC approach facilitates assessment of the relevance of selected objectives and measures in the CS, and of the plausibility that Finnish-supported activities will lead to long-term impact against these by looking at the intermediate results achieved. The country team used logical reasoning and impact hypotheses, supported by stakeholder and expert feedback to assess the likelihood that results will emerge from interventions initiated under the CS. For interventions inherited, the time frame from 2008 onwards makes it possible to chart changes in the country portfolio and to assess effectiveness of the portfolio and its components. Even if the results thus observed do not stem solely from CS period activities, the information on effectiveness and impact (or not) from an intervention stream against the CS objectives was judged still valuable for the MFA country team.</p>
CSM EVALUATION CHALLENGES	
<p>Short time lapse since the introduction of the CS, and the inheritance of some of the CS Portfolio from the CEP period (for the CSM evaluation): Given that the CS inherited the Mozambique CS Portfolio to some degree and because there has only been one full iteration of the CS, there were limited data for the team to assess whether the CSM is able to influence the CS Portfolio for better performance.</p>	<p>The team applied process analysis to track when changes were introduced in the CS Portfolio, and consistently enquired why these changes were made and whether they could be attributed to the CSM. This allowed it to discern first signals of CSM effectiveness, or lack of them.</p> <p>This analysis was supplemented by discussing respondents’ views on the likely impact of the CSM on future intervention design, given how CSM processes have been experienced so far.</p>

1.5.1 Risks to the country evaluation

The evaluation faced a number of risks, as discussed below:

Factual and analytical gaps, misinterpretation and weaknesses in evaluation outputs due to the scope of the evaluation: The evaluation process included two Mozambique validation workshops to correct factual errors and address misinterpretation. A full set of comments from MFA stakeholders on the draft report has also been taken into account. In addition, an internal quality and external peer review took place, and have been taken into account in this final report version.

Inconsistency across country studies: This risk is mostly at the synthesis level. In the Mozambique evaluation the risk was addressed by using the country evaluation guidance, common templates for collecting data, common approaches to analysis, common criteria and common reporting templates. The Mozambique team leader also attended two team workshops, and made adjustments to the methodology and assessment provided in this report, based on common understandings reached at the workshops.

The evaluation process included two Mozambique validation workshops to correct factual errors and address misinterpretation.

2 COUNTRY CONTEXT

2.1 Overview of the country and development performance

Mozambique is a low-income country with a population of 27 million. Following independence in 1975, Mozambique experienced a civil war (1977-1992) and has since gone through a relatively stable post-war period as the government has embarked on an ambitious economic, social and political reform agenda. The past two decades have been marked by acceleration in economic growth, which has averaged seven percent annually, with Mozambique consistently producing the second highest year-on-year GDP growth rate among the non-oil-exporting countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This has been achieved through high levels of new foreign direct investment (FDI), stimulated in part by the discovery of gas and mineral resources, as well as strong macroeconomic management and significant donor support.

The rapid economic expansion experienced by Mozambique has so far has only had a minimal impact on poverty reduction, with rising inequalities between regions and urban-rural disparities. Economic growth has not translated into an improvement of human development indicators for Mozambican people and the sharp initial reduction in poverty following the end of the conflict in the 1990s has not been sustained. Mozambique has low levels of economic integration and distribution and as a result remains one of the world's poorest countries, ranking 180 out of 188 countries in the 2014 Human Development Index.

There is a general consensus that there was a deterioration of commitment to good governance and the rule of law under the previous government which had implications for both the level and types of donor assistance (e.g. move away from general and sectoral budget support). This is supported by a sharp deterioration in Mozambique's comparative ranking in various governance indicators, e.g. the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators where Mozambique fell (in percentile terms) from 41.4 percent in 2010 to 27.9 percent on control of corruption in 2014; from 66.8 percent in 2009 to 32.0 percent in 2014 on political stability and absence of violence and from 39.3 percent in 2010 to 21.6 percent in 2014 on the rule of law.

The 2014 Presidential and National Assembly elections gave the dominant political party, Frelimo, another five-year mandate under President Filipe Nyusi, who succeeded Armando Guebuza. Regional challenges to Frelimo's overall political control come not only from the continued strength of former rebel group Renamo in central Mozambique but also from the rise of alternative opposition in the form of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), who enjoyed significant political gains in the 2013 municipal elections. The question now is whether governance will be strengthened under Nyusi and the new set of Ministers appointed at the end of 2014.

Rapid economic expansion over the last two decades has had little impact on poverty.

A deteriorating commitment to good governance has had implications for the level and types of donor assistance.

2.2 National development strategies, plans and programmes

The key framework document for external assistance to Mozambique has been the Plano de Acção de Redução de Pobreza (PARP) for 2011–2014, which was the third national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PARP aimed to foster more inclusive growth by reinvigorating the poverty reduction agenda. It was structured around three general objectives: to boost production and productivity in the agriculture and fisheries sector; to promote employment; and to foster human social development. The PARP was extended for 2015, but a decision has been taken not to develop a further PRSP.

In April 2015, the government adopted a new five-year plan (Plano Quinquenal do Governo) to cover the period 2015–2019. This is now the main focus for donors in terms of orienting their future development cooperation programmes in Mozambique. Wider scenarios for the long-term development path for Mozambique are discussed in the Agenda 2025, adopted by the GoM in 2003 and currently under revision. A new National Development Strategy 2015–2035 (Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento) was approved by GoM in 2014 to guide the country's development over the next 20 years.

There are also several sectoral or thematic national strategies and programmes of relevance to the Mozambique CS:

- Mozambique Education Sector Plan (ESP III) 2012–2016
- Mozambique Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA) 2010–2019
- Mozambique Agricultural Investment Plan (PNISA) 2014–2018
- National Forestry Programme 2009–2014
- Mozambican Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy (MOSTIS) 2006–2016

The Vision of Public Finance (2012) anticipates development assistance ending by 2025. The outlook for the performance of Mozambique's economy remains positive, with sustained growth of 8.1 percent expected in 2016⁵ (Almeida Santos et al. 2015), driven by public expenditure and foreign investment. Mozambique's economy is focused on big projects and the extractive sectors remain an important economic driver. The government is focused on increasing revenues and domestic participation and, as a growing regional hub offering passage to the Indian Ocean to its landlocked neighbours, is targeting infrastructure investment along key growth corridors. Legal barriers to the growth of hydrocarbon and mining sectors are being removed. In particular, there are high hopes for the emerging liquefied natural gas industry in Mozambique.

⁵ Newer growth estimates are lower than this. The World Bank's Overview (World Bank, 2016) for Mozambique states: "Real GDP growth is expected to continue decelerating through 2016 and into 2017 at 6%, driven by falling exports revenues, rising import costs and reduced FDI."

The GoM is gradually becoming less aid dependent due to growing domestic revenues.

Finland provided 1.2 percent of ODA to Mozambique in 2014.

Unequal economic growth and high levels of unemployment are the greatest developmental challenges.

2.3 Donor policies and community in Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the most ‘popular’ countries for donors, with at least 47 different bilateral and multilateral official development agencies in operation. Total gross Official Development Assistance (ODA) peaked at USD 2.4 billion in 2013 according to OECD-DAC figures. While the aggregate levels of ODA have increased over 2008–2013, the GoM is gradually becoming less aid dependent due to growing domestic revenues. In part, this is due to increasing levels of new foreign direct investment. Latest IMF projections show gross aid flows as a percentage of GDP declining from 10.1 percent in 2013 to an estimated 7 percent of GDP by 2020.

The top three donors to Mozambique in the period 2008–2013 were the USA, IDA (World Bank) and the EU. Other key donors have included the UK, Canada, Portugal and Sweden (see section 2.4 below), though in recent years the importance and influence of non-traditional donor countries such as China, India and Brazil has been increasing, with Japan now the third largest donor to the Mozambican government. The GoM has been actively fostering a range of investment, trade and development partnerships with governments and investors from these countries. Mozambique is also a pilot country for the UN reform initiative ‘Delivering as One’ which seeks to improve the coherence and efficiency of UN agency interventions.

Finland’s share in this total was 1.2 percent of ODA in 2014 (OECD DAC 2016), and the percentage share has been declining in recent years as other major bilateral and multilateral partners have increased their portfolios in Mozambique.

2.4 Main development challenges


Despite the relatively high and consistent GDP annual growth rates, Mozambique faces a range of significant development challenges:

- Unequal economic growth and high levels of unemployment remain the greatest developmental challenges to Mozambique. Despite an increase in capital-intensive foreign investment, benefits have been poorly linked to the rest of the national economy or labour markets with the majority of Mozambique’s labour force engaged through the informal market or in subsistence farming. 87 percent of the population are characterised as under-employed (Almeida Santos et al. 2015) with investment yet to target employment-generating sectors. There has been a sluggish improvement in Mozambique’s social development indicators.
- There is a low level of integration of the national economy - with a series of regional economies running from North to South. Further integration of a geographically, ethnically and increasingly politically diverse country is going to remain a significant challenge for government and donors alike.

- A significant challenge to the equitable distribution of economic growth is the concentration of political and economic power, which threatens accountable democratic processes of governance in Mozambique. Whilst political stability has improved, the threat of corruption and the sporadic outbreak of politically-motivated violence and unrest remains strong.
- The commitment of foreign investment to Mozambique is encouraging for the country's sustained economic growth. Yet it also faces serious obstacles, not least the country's inadequate infrastructure which cannot keep up with the demands of investors.
- Malnutrition rates remains stubbornly high: 46 percent of children under five were estimated to be stunted in 2011 (UNICEF/WHO/WHO) compared to 50 percent in 2001. Poor nutrition has irreversible consequences such as impaired cognitive development, and improving nutrition is a precondition to achieving goals of eradicating poverty and hunger, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and combating disease.
- Mozambique also ranks third amongst African countries for vulnerability to climatic shocks, with food-insecure populations most at risk to recurrent flooding and drought. One report concludes that "Despite the enormous gains it has made, Mozambique remains very fragile. Natural disasters - such as the recent floods, which destroyed 650 km² of cropland in the provinces of Zambézia and Nampula take a huge toll on the country's ability to feed itself" (Vines et al. 2015).
- Mozambique also faces a severe HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2014 the prevalence rate of the disease in adults aged 15 - 49 was 10.9 percent, the eighth highest in the world, with an estimated 1.5 million people living with HIV (UNAIDS 2014).

The threat of corruption and the sporadic outbreak of politically-motivated violence remains strong.

Figure 1: ODA flows to Mozambique in 2008–2014



Source: OECD DAC

Several donors, heavily influenced by HQ level policy, have moved away from budget support in recent years.

The G19 group of Programme Aid Partners (PAP) was established in the 2000s to promote better donor coordination and has become the main focus for annual bilateral negotiations with the government (the Joint Review process) on a range of policy and programming issues. The G19 included agencies which provide a proportion of their funding as budget support and provided the main forum for dialogue with the GoM on a range of governance and human rights issues. Finland chaired the G19 donor group in 2009-10.

Finland's recent decision to discontinue provision of general budget support (GBS) in 2015 (see section 4.1) means that they will only remain a member of the donor group until the time of the next joint review process in April 2016. Several donors have moved away from budget support toward off-budget support in recent years.⁶ The G19 has now contracted to the G14 with the withdrawal of Belgium, The Netherlands, Finland, Spain and Norway.⁷ As an increasing numbers of donors do not contribute to budget support (BS), including major donors such as the US and Japan, a proposal has been submitted to the GoM to establish a wider aid coordination group separate from GBS. However, there are no signs of this yet being formed at the time of this evaluation.

⁶ For the sake of consistency the report refers to the coordination group of donors providing GBS as the 'G19', irrespective of the number of members at any specific time.

⁷ The reasons given for the withdrawal from GBS are mixed, but appear to be predominately based on an HQ level policy decision to disengage from budget support. Whilst this justification was compounded by governance issues within Mozambique, several of the donors in country expressed regrets over this decision.

3 EVOLUTION OF FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

3.1 Historical overview of Finnish development cooperation in Mozambique

Finnish NGO support to Mozambique predates independence when non-military and political support was provided to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in its struggle for independence from Portugal. In the immediate post-independence period, Finnish support was channelled mostly in the context of Nordic collaboration.

The Finland government entered into development cooperation with Mozambique in 1984. Since 1987, Mozambique has been one of the main recipients of Finnish bilateral aid and a key partner country. Early cooperation was mainly directed toward large-scale transport infrastructure and assistance to the health sector was also significant. In addition, Finland has provided long-standing bilateral support to the focal sectors retained in the CEP and CS:

1. Finnish support to the agricultural sector began in 1977 with the establishment of a joint Nordic project, the Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Programme (MONAP). This was followed by the National Programme for Agriculture Development (PROAGRI) in 2005-2008 and a bilateral rural development programme in Zambézia province (PRODEZA), 2006-2010.
2. Finland supported bilateral forestry activities in Zambézia and Inhambane from 1999-2005.
3. Finnish support to education began through a joint Nordic programme in the 1980s. The first bilateral education project was launched in 1998.
4. Finland has been providing general budget support to Mozambique since 2003. The initial objective was to aid the implementation of the PARP and support Mozambique in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through execution of the state budget.

A comprehensive timeline of MFA engagements in Mozambique and key national events during the evaluation period can be found in Annex 4. MFA engagements in Mozambique are summarised in Figure 2 below.

Since 1987, Mozambique has been one of the main recipients of Finnish bilateral aid and a key partner country.

Figure 2: Timeline of Finland's bilateral interventions 2005–2016

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Agriculture and Forestry												
PROAGRI II												
PRODEZA I & II, Zambezia Province rural development project												
Support to Agriculture sector policy and investment plan (PEDSA & PINISA)												
National Forestry Sector Programme (SUNAFOP)												
Forecas (ICI)												
ADPP Farmers Clubs												
Education and Science, Technology and Innovation												
Bilateral support to the education sector programme (since 2002)												
Support to the Ministry of Science and Technology												
Support to Ministry of Science and Technology - STIFIMO												
Support to Education Sector (FASE III)												Educational Troika
Human Rights and Governance Support												
Institute for Social Studies (IESE)												
Tribunal Administrativo												
Electoral Observation Mission												
Scaling-up Research and Capacity Building for Improved Development Policy												
Good governance support to Parliament and Provincial and Municipal Assemblies and												
Support to Civil Society (under development at time of evaluation)												
General Budget Support												
GBS (donor since 2003)											Donor group chain	

3.2 Country Engagement Plan (CEP) 2009–2011

The Mozambique Country Engagement Plan (CEP) 2009–2011 (also referred to as the Mozambique Country Participation Plan) is a five-page document setting out the framework for relations between Finland and Mozambique. The main drivers of the focus areas selected for inclusion in the CEP are given as the context, the foundation of existing engagement, the poverty reduction strategy of the GoM, international agreements (including the UN Millennium Development Goals and Paris Declaration), Finland's 2007 DPP and the country negotiations held with the GoM in March 2009.

The CEP outlined support in three sectors:

1. Agriculture and Forestry: with indicated support to the PROAGRI II agriculture sector programme, sector support to the national forestry Programme, a bilateral forestry project (SUNAFOP) and the Zambézia Rural Development Project (PRODEZA).
2. The Knowledge Society: support to the Education Sector Programme (FASE) and new projects in Science, Technology and Education (realized as STIFIMO) and a bilateral education project (anticipated but never implemented).
3. General Budget Support.

The CEP contained a large degree of continuity with the pre-existing aid programme. Support to the health sector was discontinued in 2010 in the interests of donor harmonization and agreement that each donor would concentrate on a maximum of three sectors. The CEP placed increasing attention on bilateral projects to complement budget support mechanisms. New projects were tentatively identified in forestry and education, and the agriculture project PRODEZA was extended. Table 2 below sets out the CEP budget from 2009 to 2011.

Table 2: Initial CEP budget 2009–2011

	2009	2010	2011
General budget support	7 000 000	7 000 000	7 000 000
Education Sector Pooled Fund (FASE)	5 000 000	6 000 000	6 000 000
Health Sector Programme (PROSAUDE)	6 000 000	3 600 00	0
Agriculture Sector Programme (PROAGRI)	4 000 000	5 000 000	6 000 000
Forestry (channelled mostly through PROAGRI)	750 000	2 800 000	2 900 000
Tribunal Administrativo	750 000	750 000	500 000
Other project-based support	3 650 000	3 300 000	8 100 000
Local appropriation	820 000	820 000	820 000
TOTAL	27 970 000	29 270 000	31 320 000

3.3 Summary of key earlier evaluation findings for 2008–2012

There were no evaluations of overall Finnish bilateral development cooperation with Mozambique in the period 2008–2012 (i.e. pre-dating the introduction

of the Country Strategy) and the last comprehensive country evaluation dates from 2002. There are several project and programme evaluations.⁸ Mozambique was also used as a country case study for various global evaluations of sectoral Finnish cooperation (agriculture, complementarity, disaster risk reduction (DRR), forestry). Findings from key evaluations and reviews in the period are summarized below.

Support to rural development in Zambézia Province (PRODEZA) Mid Term Review (2009)

The evaluation reached a very negative conclusion on overall performance. Key findings were a lack of tangible results, a poor sustainability trajectory, and a lack of integration into government planning and lack of collaboration with government institutions. Implementation was geographically scattered, and without a comprehensive strategic approach outcomes were not leveraged. Contract management was inefficient and reduced the sustainability of the project's activities. The evaluation recommended changing to a value chain approach, to be complemented by minor infrastructure interventions. Overall a better mainstreaming of gender was needed as well as a greater comprehension of local cultures.

Support to National Forest Programme: project document appraisal (2009)

This project document appraisal verified the strength of the constraint analysis and the project's relevance, feasibility and sustainability. The project was found to be relevant to Mozambican policy frameworks and it was suggested that greater linkages to employment and income generation would strengthen overall synergies with national priorities. A need for greater support to the research and training component was recognised and an analysis of the impact of land, forest and wildlife subsectors to economic growth was recommended.

Natural Disasters and Climate Change in Finnish Aid from the perspective of Poverty Reduction 2000–2009 (2009)

Mozambique and a group of Caribbean countries were the case studies for this evaluation. Key findings were that the tangible effectiveness of Finland's contributions to disaster risk reduction remained limited. Finnish interventions in DRR had almost exclusively focused on strengthening meteorological services, with little attention to sectoral users of information which impacts the effectiveness of disaster preparedness. The project modality was evaluated to be more efficient in building capacity, as budget support (BS) was seen to be too undirected - although positive results through BS were seen in Mozambique. A key finding was that only when diverse interventions in development aid are connected strategically can DRR have an effect at the community level. Such overarching strategic connections are not realistic for Finland to achieve alone; therefore, broader horizontal cooperation between stakeholder departments and agencies in partner countries should be encouraged. A second key recommendation was for Finland to articulate its support to DRR initiatives through a strategy paper as, so far, views had not been coherent due to a lack of clear policy guidelines.

⁸ See page 78 for a list of references and other documents consulted.

Agriculture in the Finnish Development Cooperation 1995–2008 (2010)

Mozambique was a country case study for this multicountry evaluation. The key findings were that Finland could do more to integrate projects into national systems as well as combining agricultural development with economic activities in rural development. The report advocated value chain development as an intervention strategy. Other general findings were that agricultural aid to Mozambique was relevant to the direct needs and priorities of the rural poor, which included addressing HIV/AIDS as part of the design. Weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) made it hard to accurately measure its effectiveness, though it was certainly hampered by poor linkages with agricultural research, and a recommendation was made for Finland to consider supporting agricultural and development research bodies/forums. Crop productivity was found to have increased in Mozambique, though there were insufficient efforts to bring together agriculture and climate change issues. Project costs and efficiency were negatively impacted by stringent administrative and financial procedures.

Finnish Support to Forestry and Biological Resources: Mozambique country report (2010)

This evaluation encompassed the SFRM, PRODEZA and SUNAFOP programmes with reference to PROAGRI. The evaluation noted that Finland continued to play a key role in the forestry sector, building capacity of government institutions and NGOs as well as enhancing linkages between the government, private sector and civil society and playing an important donor coordination role. A noteworthy success was the role Finland played in helping communities to access revenues from concession licences. To improve the monitoring of sustainability of Finnish aid, there was a need to introduce robust impact assessment and poverty reduction data collection. The evaluation also raised concerns over the environmental impact arising from a lack of enforcement of concession management plans that stipulate a need for reforestation. A recommendation therefore was to increase environmental education around linkages between ecological cycles in forestry programmes. The evaluation also found that Finland had the opportunity to add value in developing incentive schemes for those interested in the pulp and paper industries.

IESE Strategic Plan 2008–2011 Mid-Term Evaluation (2010)

A mid-term evaluation of IESE (Institute for Social and Economic Studies) was a condition of donor funding, stipulated at the start of the four-year funding cycle. The evaluation findings were overwhelmingly positive: during the review period the IESE had “burst onto the Mozambican scene” in terms of opening up space for frank dialogue, contributing to the development of civil society and filling a void created by the absence of other research institutes. It encouraged discussion around key national concerns and was strengthening the intellectual class - a completely unique Mozambican institute that had more than fulfilled its design promises. There were two key concerns around sustainability, the first in terms of finance as the IESE was not state-supported and was wholly financed by donors. Without the promise of evolving into a self-supporting project, as is usually a key criterion for donor support, financial sustainability needed to be addressed urgently. The second key concern was in terms

of the institute's internal stability and sustainability: it required a better process to balance the core business of producing critical research as well as the administrative and management systems required to enable that. The evaluation suggested that to achieve this required more funding and a slowing down of intellectual outputs in order to achieve a sustainable equilibrium. The main recommendation was for another four-year funding period to follow the current one.

**Complementarity in Finland's development policy and cooperation:
Mozambique case study 2004–2012 (2013)**

Mozambique was a desk review for this global evaluation of the complementarity found in Finland's CS Portfolio and interventions.

External complementarity. The evaluation found alignment with national priorities in sectors such as education, health and agriculture, as well as through bilateral projects. Other areas pursued which were not development objectives for the GoM were a human rights-based approach and support to civil society organisations (CSOs). Overall there was good collaboration with other development partners but no move was made to achieve complementarity with non-traditional development partners who were playing an increasingly significant role.

Internal complementarity. The programme demonstrated broad alignment with Finland's development policies and complementarity between country projects and programmes, which became further coherent as several bilateral programmes were phased out. However, policies provided by the Department for Development Policy did not provide sufficient guidance on how to ensure external and internal complementarity. NGO and projects from the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) were not always complementary with recipient partner goals and CS Portfolio priorities, unlike the two Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI) programmes. Operational efficiency was impeded by dual centralised decision-making and country-level planning and implementation and by general staffing shortages. Cross-cutting issues were addressed in planning, but monitoring targets were missing from implementation.

As an active G19 member, Finland has also been part of a number of joint donor budget support evaluations. This included the joint **evaluation of budget support to Mozambique 2005–2012** which found that overall budget support had been successful; it had enabled the mass expansion of education provision, supported GDP growth and macroeconomic stability, and improved public finance management (PFM) and to a lesser extent governance. It was concluded that this therefore justified the risks in providing direct budget support. However, the evaluation also found that BS no longer exerted a significant influence on the overall effectiveness of aid and, over the period, performance indicators had plummeted. The report commented that a firm recommitment to the aid effectiveness principles would be needed if these were to be revived.

4 COUNTRY STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH MOZAMBIQUE

4.1 Overview of the Mozambique Country Strategy

The Country Strategy (2014-2017) is the reference document for the evaluation and reflects a minor update of the original 2013-2016 CS.⁹ The objectives of the strategy are firmly aligned with the national poverty reduction strategy. The Country Development Goal (CDG) and the country Development Results (DRs) in the CS logic model are drawn directly from the PARP. The overall objective of Finnish development assistance to Mozambique is to “support the GoM to combat poverty, promote inclusive growth, and reduce the socio-economic and political vulnerability of the country”.

Under these higher-level results, Finland’s Objectives (FOs) and Specific Objectives (SOs) articulate the subset of objectives that Finland aims to contribute to, along with the associated interventions, as set out in Table 3. The CS draws on a range of analyses and frameworks in determining the strategic choices. This includes an analysis of the political, economic and social context, the priorities of the 2012 DPP, experience from Finland’s previous development cooperation in Mozambique, and donor harmonization and division of labour.

⁹ Alterations are mostly minor and include rewording to reflect actions and activities that have been carried out, rolling the budget forward one year, and detailing one new outcome (the Farmers’ Club project with ADPP).

Table 3: Mozambique CS objectives, inputs, instruments and resources

Country development results / Finland's Objectives	Specific Finnish objectives	Inputs, instruments and resources
<p>DR: Increased Production and Productivity of Agriculture and Fisheries</p> <p>FO: Increased agricultural production and improved livelihood strategies</p>	<p>→ increased small-scale rural entrepreneurship</p> <p>→ improved food security for farmer families</p> <p>→ enhanced value chain for agricultural products, including increased production and improved market access</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRODEZA II Rural development project in the province of Zambézia • ADPP (Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo) farmers Club project supporting agricultural production of poor rural households and small-scale rural entrepreneurship • Forest Research Capacity Strengthening in Mozambique (FORECAS) implemented by ICI instrument • General Budget Support • Projects of Finnish NGOs supporting this sector, financed partly by MFA • Policy dialogue with Ministry of Agriculture¹⁰ and participation in donor fora, including multilaterally
<p>DR: Human and Social Development</p> <p>FO: Improved education</p>	<p>→ support to the improvement of the quality and expansion of basic education through funding to the education sector programme FASE (Education Sector Support Fund)</p> <p>→ support to the implementation of MOSTIS (Mozambican Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sector support to education (FASE) contributes to the comprehensive development of the sector as set out in the new Education Sector Strategic Plan 2012–2016 (ESP III) • STIFIMO programme of cooperation in science, technology and innovation General Budget Support • Projects of Finnish NGOs supporting the education sector, financed partly by MFA • Policy dialogue with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science and Technology and participation in donor fora at the country level and multilaterally

¹⁰ The Ministry of Agriculture (previously MINAG) was renamed the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA) in 2014 while some of its responsibilities were transferred to a new Ministry of Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER).

Country development results / Finland's Objectives	Specific Finnish objectives	Inputs, instruments and resources
DR: Good Governance, Macro-Economic Policies and Public Financial Management FO: Enhanced state-society accountability	→ improved public financial management and audit function	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Budget Support • Support to IESE (the Independent Institute of Economic and Social Research) • Support to Tribunal Administrativo (State audit court) • Planned support to wider democracy and strengthening the capacity of the agents for change (such as civil society, media, African Peer Review Mechanism) • Projects of Finnish NGOs (in particular, KEPA), financed partly by MFA • Political dialogue and participation in the framework of EU and G19 • Dialogue and technical work in relevant joint working groups at the country level and at multilateral fora
	→ strengthening of official oversight and monitoring mechanisms	
	→ increased civil society organisation and media participation	

The CS shows a high degree of continuity with the preceding CEP. The core sectors of agriculture (and forestry), education (and science and technology) and GBS were carried forward in the CS. However, a significant change in the CS is the introduction of a new good governance programme and corresponding objectives.

While the CS continued to deliver the majority of bilateral assistance through BS, the CS saw a progressive decline in the share of resources delivered through this modality. By the start of the CS, sector support in agriculture had ended as a result of the weak impact (see section 3.3). Support to GBS was lowered in 2014 (from EUR 7 million to EUR 6 million) and was stopped in 2015 principally as a consequence of a reduction in the overall bilateral development cooperation budget.

The CS moved away from bilateral aid projects implemented in conjunction with government. As a result of negative mid-term reviews, two bilateral projects were concluded and not renewed in 2014: STIFIMO (supporting the Ministry of Ministry of Science, Technology, Higher and Technical-Professional Education) and PRODEZA II (supporting the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security).

The CS identifies the need to increase collaboration with democratic institutions and non-state actors, including the private sector and civil society to enhance the governance of public resources. New bilateral project initiatives were identified to work with a diverse set of implementing partners; support to the Farmers' Club project implemented through the NGO ADPP and cooperation with a range of civil society actors foreseen under the state-society accountability FO.

The CS continued the main focal sectors from the preceding CEP and added a new good governance programme.

The CS is structured around three areas: agricultural production and rural livelihoods; education; and state-society accountability.

4.2 Description of the main interventions under the CS

The CS supports the three country development results of the PARP and is structured around three main priority areas; agricultural production and rural livelihoods; education;¹¹ and state-society accountability.

The key interventions included in the CS are briefly described below in terms of objectives, scope and intended results. They are presented in the context of their specific Development Result:

Development Result One: Increased Production and Productivity of Agriculture and Fisheries

- **PRODEZA II rural development project in the province of Zambézia (2010–2015)**

Finland supported rural development in Zambézia province through the Prodeza project (Support to Rural Development in the Zambézia Province) since 2006. The implementation period for PRODEZA II was 2010–2014 with a subsequent one-year extension. The project focused on the Mocuba and Maganji da Costa districts with the aim of enhancing agricultural value chains and food security, and fostering local economic development. The overall objective was to reduce rural poverty, with a particular focus on women.

- Building on the lessons from the Prodeza I Mid-Term Review, Prodeza II was designed to focus on encouraging local economic growth through the development of agricultural value chains, while also supporting local food security for poorer members of the rural community in the target districts and promoting good governance and decentralisation.

The programme was managed by a Project Management Unit located in Mocuba and nearly all activities were implemented by five service providers or implementing partners, mainly NGOs. Finland provided a grant of EUR 7 million for technical and financial assistance, with a planned contribution from the Government of Mozambique of about EUR 2.6 million.

- **ADPP Farmers' Clubs for Wealth Creation Amongst Small Holder Farmers (2014–2018)**

This project is implemented by the Mozambican NGO partner, ADPP, which has been supporting Farmers' Clubs since 2007. The overall objective of the project is to reduce rural poverty and stimulate wealth creation in small-scale farming families in four districts of Zambézia and Sofala provinces. The goal is for farm family incomes to rise by 75 per cent during project implementation.

¹¹ Science, technology and innovation was included as part of the FO in the 2012 CS, but dropped in 2013 with the planned closure of STIFIMO..

- ADPP provides training and technical assistance through its network of farming instructors in production, irrigation, storage, processing, marketing and value chains, as well as supporting access to micro-credit for the implementation of farmers' own development projects. With Finnish support, the project aims to establish 312 clubs, each of 40-50 members with 62 farming Instructors. The farmers will be directly involved in goal setting, planning and information sharing and will be the driving force in the production planning and production results monitoring. This is to ensure local ownership as well as to raise the management capacity of the farmers to continue production at a desired level after the project's termination.

- **Forest Research Capacity Strengthening in Mozambique (FORECAS) (2012–2015)**

FORECAS, delivered through the Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI), was Finland's last forestry sector activity, with funding indicated for 2014 in the CS. The project aimed to improve sustainable forest management research through capacity building of the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) and the Agrarian Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM) to conduct applied research applicable to local stakeholders. The project was jointly implemented by the National Resources Institute Finland with the Steering Committee of SUNAFOP assuming a supervisory role.

The priority areas of the FORECAS project were partly defined in the Mozambique strategy for Agrarian development (PEDSA), the National Forestry and Wildlife Programme and the IIAM and UEM's strategy research plan and SUNAFOP project document. The capacity building aimed to improve three areas in forestry research: growth, yield and wood technology research; information dissemination and technology transfer services; and support services for forestry research, including research data management, information services and research management. A second phase of FORECAS has been approved for 2016–2018.

Development Result Two: Human and Social Development

- **Support to Education Sector (FASE) (2012–2017)**

Support to Education Sector Support Fund (FASE) began in 2003, although sector support to education dates back to 2002. Under the CS Finland provides financial support to the implementation of the GoM's third Education Sector Strategic Plan 2012-2016 (ESP III) with the aim of reducing poverty and improving access to quality basic education for all. The funds support the strengthening of the institutional and financial management capacity of the education sector. The CS budget indicates a total of EUR 34 million between 2014 and 2017. An MoU was signed between the GoM and cooperating partners in 2012. In 2015, Finland increased its financial support to FASE from EUR 7 to 9 million per year, with the aim of further promoting bilingual education.

- **Science, Technology and Innovation (STIFIMO) (2010–2014)**

Finland provided support to the science, technology and innovation sector in Mozambique over the period 2010–2014 through the STIFIMO programme, implemented by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) with the support of a technical assistance team. The programme supported the MCT in the implementation of the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy (MOSTIS) and was also aligned with the National Industrial Policy Strategy.

STIFIMO provided financial support to the three principal activities of the MOSTIS: capacity building of key science, technology and innovation institutions; improving cooperation in the four target areas of ICT, technology transfer, water and biotechnology; and establishing a funding and support service for science and technology based innovation.

Development Result Three: Good Governance, Macro-Economic Policies and Public Financial Management

- **Tribunal Administrativo (2011–2014)**

Finland provided capacity building support to the independent Audit Court (Tribunal Administrativo) to contribute to improved PFM, through improved audit capacity. The Tribunal Administrativo is constitutionally mandated to audit all public funds in Mozambique and is therefore a key instrument for promoting good governance and due process in public life, particularly as state funds increase through foreign direct investment and related tax revenues.

- **Electoral Observation Mission (2014)**

Finland contributed EUR 400,000 to the EU-implemented Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) for the 15 October 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique. It was jointly funded by Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Portugal, UK and Norway. Election observation is a transparency check and aims to promote accountability and deter fraud, contributing to a reduction in violence and thereby encouraging greater civic participation. The EU has been deploying EOMs since 2001. Finland considers an EOM to be an important tool in promoting democracy and good governance, helping improve citizens' rights and contributing to the empowerment of voters.

- **Good governance programme (2015–2018)**

Finland's Good Governance programme provisionally identified four components; the promotion of quality social and economic development research; policy research and capacity building for governmental policy analysis; civil society empowerment, and; strengthening parliamentary oversight of natural resources management and inclusive growth.

- i. The first component is addressed through a continuation of support to the **Institute for Social Studies (IESE) (2016–2018)** (see section 3.3 above). The IESE is an independent social and economic development research institute based in Maputo with a geographical focus on Mozambique

and Southern Africa. It was established in September 2009 with support from Finland, DFID, Ireland, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland channelled through a Common Fund. Finland provided EUR 2 million to the Institute's second four-year development strategy 2012-2015. The CS indicates funding of a further EUR 1 million over 2016 and 2017.

The IESE was established to meet the need for fundamental socio-economic research on key issues facing Mozambique, and uses research findings to stimulate public policy debate with the aim of strengthening the linkages between civil society and the process of policy development. IESE's research is divided into three thematic areas: Economy and Development, Citizenship and Governance, and Poverty and Social Welfare, with a new theme of Emerging Powers taking shape.

- ii. A second component of the programme is support to scaling up research by the Helsinki-based United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (**UNU WIDER**) and the Directorate of Economic and Financial Studies in the Ministry of Economics and Finance, together with the University of Copenhagen and the University Eduardo Mondlane. Through joint funding with Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, this research and capacity building programme is intended to increase analytical capacity in Mozambican institutions and address four policy areas: employment creation and protection of vulnerable groups; attaining and maintaining long-term macro-economic balance; furthering structural transformation; and improving socio-economic information systems for monitoring and evaluation. This four-year initiative is launching in 2016 following finalisation of the necessary protocols between the multiple partners.
- iii. Thirdly, Finland aims to provide support to the Parliament and Provincial and Municipal Assemblies. The objective of the programme is to strengthen parliamentary capacity and law-making to promote transparency and accountability in the governance of natural resources, in order that citizens might benefit from income produced by the extractive sectors. The programme seeks to engage elected representatives to oversee the ways and means by which the extractive process is managed and also to perform their legislative functions effectively. However, agreement was not concluded with the provisionally identified implementing partner - **The Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA)** - and at the time of the evaluation the project awaits retendering. Finland has budgeted a total of EUR 2 million over 2015-2018.
- iv. Finland also aimed to provide support to civil society to contribute to democratization and social justice. The objectives were to strengthen the credibility and transparency of the civil society players and to promote a credible, transparent and vibrant civil society that contributes to the democratization of the state and public space and stimulates social justice. Planned support to the Mecanismo de Apio de Sociedade Civil (MASC - Mechanism to Support Civil Society) could not be concluded and at the time of the evaluation this also awaited retendering. Finland has budgeted EUR 750,000 per year between 2015 and 2018, channelled through a basket fund modality.

The total CS budget for the 2014–2017 CS was foreseen as EUR 82.83 million (see Table 4 below).

Table 4: Initial CS budget 2014–2017 (from 2014 CS)

	2014	2015	2016	2017
Agriculture and forestry				
PRODEZA I & II, Zambézia Province rural development project	2 000			
ADPP Farmers' Club Project	1 200 000	2 000 000	2 200 000	1 800 000
Forecas (ICI)	500 000			
Education and science, technology and innovation				
Support to Education Sector (FASE)	7 000 000	9 000 000	9 000 000	9 000 000
Science, Technology and Innovation (STIFIMO)				
Human rights and governance support				
Institute for Social Studies (IESE)	500 000	500 000	500 000	500 000
Other governance support		940 000	1 500 000	1 500 000
General budget support				
GBS	6 000 000	6 000 000	6 000 000	6 000 000
TOTAL BILATERAL BUDGET	19 693 000	22 140 000	20 000 000	21 000 000


4.3 CS theory of change

The theory of change highlights the importance of the interplay between direct interventions and the policy influencing work of the Embassy.

The theory of change (TOC) presented in Figure 3 is used to provide a framework for the evaluation. The TOC outlines the understanding of the evaluators of how Finland's interventions are expected to contribute to achieving the hierarchy of objectives expressed in the CS. The TOC is based on, and consistent with, the intervention logic described in the annex to the CS annual report. However, it adds value to the logic model by identifying the processes and assumptions that explain the links between the inputs, SOs, FOs and DRs.

More specifically it helps to unpack the critical step of how the package of inputs, instruments and resources is expected to translate into the expected SOs. Making this explicit can help the evaluation to understand why targeted results were not achieved - or equally analyse the conditions for success. What emerges from this analysis is the importance of the interplay between direct interventions and the policy influencing of the Embassy.

Figure 3: Mozambique Country Strategy theory of change



Several assumptions are contained in the text of the CS. Other assumptions have emerged through the evaluation process that can help to understand the linkages in the TOC. These are collated in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Assumptions in theory of change

<p>1. Assumptions about the capacity of Finnish actors and implementation partners to enable outputs and the causal linkages</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Embassy has adequate resources to participate effectively in policy dialogue in existing effective forums.
<p>2. Assumptions about the adequacy, timeliness of disbursements, sustainability of MFA budgets</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money is disbursed on time and MFA budgets continue.
<p>3. Assumptions about complementary inputs from government, other development partner actors, beneficiaries to enable the intermediate and specific objective results</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GoM maintains planned levels of finance to the education and other sectors. • Farmers trained are willing to practice best agricultural practices and change their nutritional habits. • Farmer groups are committed to selling their crops together according to the principles of the cooperative or farmer group. • Markets exist for products and services that the rural entrepreneurs are capable to offer. • Civil society and media are allowed to act for transparency and accountability and GoM is responsive to the concerns raised by the CSOs.
<p>4. Assumptions about the relationship between direct interventions and policy dialogue</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GoM is willing to continue an open dialogue with its EU and G19 development partners. • The various projects and instruments complement each other, building on their respective synergies and comparative advantages, and the portfolio and other interventions are coherent and make an effective contribution to the objectives.
<p>5. Assumptions underlying the choice of outputs (interventions) and which support causal links from direct interventions to specific objectives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The intervention portfolio is strategically and logically formulated; there are logical and feasible links between projects and instruments, and the CS objectives and development results areas, i.e. a feasible impact pathway implying also a good match between the scale of inputs and the level of ambition set by the objectives.
<p>6. Assumptions about direct interventions and policy influence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectoral cooperation and policy dialogue complement each other.
<p>7. Assumptions underlying causal link from specific objectives to the development results</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GoM has the political will to invest in the improvement of PFM and fight against corruption as well as to enhance wider transparency and accountability.
<p>8. Assumptions underlying causal link from development results to development goal</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GoM commits itself to inclusive growth. • Information flows and learning allow the strategy and its components to be improved if other assumptions falter.

The validity of the TOC and its assumptions has been assessed as part of this evaluation. Related findings and conclusions are presented in section 5.8.

5 COUNTRY STRATEGY EVALUATION FINDINGS

This Chapter presents the main findings on the Country Strategy against each of the main evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, sustainability, coherence, complementarity and coordination). The evidence underpinning these findings comes from the reports and data sources referenced in the report and stakeholder interviews in Helsinki and Mozambique. Additional findings are given on the contribution of the CS in promoting the DPP priorities of human rights, gender, equity and climate sustainability; the validity of the Theory of Change and specific evaluation questions raised in the TOR regarding Mozambique.

5.1 Relevance

The evaluation assessed the extent to which the CS and the constituent programmes and projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient state and donor. Specifically, the evaluation examined the relevance of Finland's development cooperation in Mozambique to Finnish development policy priorities and principles; to the priorities of targeted beneficiaries; to country development policies, priorities and programmes; and to the priorities of donor partners in country.

5.1.1 Overall CS Relevance

The CS is highly relevant to **national policy as expressed in the PARP**. The CS directly references the long-term development goal given in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARP 2011-2014) through the Country Development Goal “to fight poverty and promote a culture of work, with the aim of achieving inclusive economic growth and reduction of poverty and vulnerability in the country”.

Finland's Objectives defined within the CS are consciously aligned to the PARP objectives, namely: increased agricultural productivity and improved rural livelihoods; improved education; and enhanced state society accountability. The equivalent PARP general development objectives given as the basis for budget support are: (i) to increase output and productivity in the agriculture and fisheries sectors; (ii) to promote employment; and (iii) to foster human and social development, while maintaining a joint focus on governance and macroeconomic affairs and fiscal management. However, interviews with government stakeholders suggested that the PARP did not fully reflect current government priorities. Indeed, the level of national ownership of the PARP is debatable and several stakeholders felt that the primary ownership lay with the donors rather than government. The GoM decided not to develop a new PRSP after the last PARP expired at the end of 2015 - perhaps reflecting this lack of ownership. The main GoM policy reference is now taken as the 2015-2019 Five Year Plan (Plano

The CS is highly relevant to national policy as expressed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARP). However, the extent of national ownership of the PARP is debatable.

The Government indicated a preference for donor support to promote economic growth.

The poverty reduction goal, and focal sectors in the CS, are consistent with the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups.

Quinquenal do Governo) and this document does not include poverty reduction as a specific objective.

Government officials interviewed referred to the need for more donor support to promote economic growth. Repeated references were made to the need for support to small and medium enterprise (SME) development, as well as the desire to see increased commercial ties with, and direct investment by, Finnish companies.

The desire for different partnerships with development partners is reflected in the increasing role of new donors that bring new economic opportunities, including Japan, China, India and Brazil. The GoM has been actively developing a range of investment, trade and development partnerships with governments and companies from these countries.

Direct donor support to the social sectors was judged by Government representatives across the Ministries consulted to remain relevant and is valued. However, policy statements appear to prioritize economic growth that acts indirectly on poverty, through increasing employment, incomes and potentially social transfers through sustained increases in government revenues.

The official attitude towards the inclusion of Good Governance in the CS appeared mixed, despite its formal inclusion as an objective under the PARP, with some ministries notably more enthusiastic than others.

The Country Development Goal and Finland's Objectives were found by all informants to be highly relevant to the **national development context**. The poverty reduction focus of the CS is logically consistent with the priorities of a majority of citizens, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. Mozambique remains one of the world's poorest countries, ranking 180 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index in 2014 and the last national poverty survey (GoM 2010) found 54.7 percent of the population below national poverty lines.

Significant attention has been focused by donors on the sustained growth rates and potential revenues from the anticipated exploitation of natural resources. Several of the donor country strategy papers suggest that Mozambique may be in a position to transition from the need for development assistance in the near future. However, as one respondent remarked *"it is easy to show such impressive growth rates when you are coming from such a low base"*. The recent fall in global natural resource prices has seen the GoM experience a liquidity crisis demonstrating the fragility of public finances and the continuing need for donor support.

At the sector level, Finland's objectives also appear grounded in the development context. The lasting legacy of the extended civil war is still seen in the low average level of formal education and the poor quality of the education. As the CS rightly notes, these educational challenges hinder the possibilities for inclusive economic growth and limit the livelihood opportunities of people.

Poverty in Mozambique is predominately rural and there is strong consensus - at least amongst development partners - that improving rural livelihoods is a critical strategy for overall poverty reduction. However, there is a tension

between the priority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA) in supporting agri-business and commercialisation and an alternative objective of enhancing the food and nutrition security of smallholder farmers. While the implicit objective of Finland appears to be the latter (which is in line with a rights-based approach), the phrasing of the objective as “improving agricultural productivity” appears to be more closely aligned to MASA’s implicit priorities. The immediate relevance of improved agricultural productivity to food security can be questioned, in part as the poorest are unlikely to have the resources or capacity to participate in increased productivity. Smith and Haddad (2002) found investments in female education and improved health and nutrition practices to have a greater impact on food security than increased agricultural production.

MASA perceived that the most relevant contribution from Finland in agriculture came in the forestry sub-sector. Several other actors interviewed also highlighted the relevance and high-quality design of the forestry projects and programmes that Finland has financed in Mozambique - alongside the potential to link to Finland’s industrial expertise in this sector.

There is wide agreement that systems and institutions of governance still offer inadequate standards of accountability, transparency and integrity. Whilst the last few years have obviously been difficult, the changes following the election are generally regarded positively and there is renewed optimism about the political environment within Mozambique. A credible argument was made by several donors of a ‘window of opportunity’ to influence the standards and institutions of governance, before large-scale revenues commence from the exploitation of natural resources.

Finland takes into account the **priorities of other donors** and this process is reinforced through strong coordination mechanisms (see section 5.6.1). Finland’s bilateral aid is aligned with the main OECD DAC partners to avoid overlaps - as demonstrated by the decision to withdraw from the health sector - and to promote added value. Other donors regard the interventions funded by Finland as being highly relevant in adding value - in particular, Finland’s involvement in the education sector was frequently referenced and commended. As one donor stated: *“There is no question about the relevance and importance of support to education in Mozambique...but it’s more than just relevant. It is a ... catastrophe if something does not happen soon to improve education”*.

The CS is closely aligned to the **Finnish Development Policy Programme (DPP)**. The 2012 Development Policy Paper includes four priority areas: (i) a democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights; (ii) an inclusive green economy that promotes employment; (iii) sustainable management of natural resources and environmental protection; and (iv) human development. Within these four priority areas the CS is most relevant to two priorities: democracy and accountability, and human development. With the limited resources available it may be unrealistic to expect the CS to systematically address all four DPP priorities. A broader question - beyond the scope of the country evaluation - is how inclusively the DPP goals are addressed across Finland’s development cooperation as a whole.

The apparent priority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA) lies in supporting agri-business and commercialisation rather than support to smallholder farmers.

There is a ‘window of opportunity’ to influence the standards and institutions of governance, before large-scale revenues commence from the exploitation of natural resources.

The comparative advantages of different strategic approaches to improving the quality of education in Mozambique - including bilingual education - is unclear.

A broad range of interventions - beyond promoting agricultural productivity - was relevant to the goal of strengthening rural livelihoods and food and nutrition security.

5.1.2 Relevance of the CS Portfolio

At a secondary level the evaluation looked at the relevance of the interventions within the CS, examining how interventions were designed and implemented, and whether the activities and outputs of the programme were consistent with the intended impacts and effects.

The **education specific objective** of the CS fits well with core GoM priorities. The GoM is strongly committed to improving access to, and standards of, basic education - close to a quarter of GBS was allocated to education in 2015.

Within the overall education sector Finland places a particular emphasis on bilingual education and early childhood development - in line with its global policy priorities. An additional annual contribution of EUR 2 million has been provided to FASE¹² specifically to support the bilingual education strategy. Bilingual education is proven to contribute to improved educational outcomes, and is one of the key strategies for promoting education from a rights-based approach, particularly in meeting the rights of more marginalized groups of society.

However, a number of stakeholders highlighted the need to consider the comparative effectiveness of focussing on bilingual education, compared to alternatives such as improved school management, to improve the quality of education in the short term. The limited capacity of the Ministry to pursue an ambitious and resource-intensive bilingual agenda - with a significant investment in developing materials and training of teachers - was noted.

The science and technology component included under the human development objective - which was addressed in the first iteration of the CS through the STIFIMO project - appears to have been a political project driven at the Ministerial level in Helsinki and was judged by the STIFIMO MTR to be poorly aligned with the local needs or context. While the Ministry of Science and Technology was canvassing for donor support in this area, these were on a more modest scale, and the Ministry was found by the MTR to lack the absorptive capacity for the scale and ambition of STIFIMO.

Interventions in the **agricultural sector** were much broader than increasing agricultural productivity *per se*, including a range of water, sanitation and literacy interventions. This package of interventions appears broadly relevant to a broader objective of strengthening rural livelihoods and food and nutrition security, which in turn is more relevant to the DPP criteria, including rights-based approaches, than the stated policy priorities of government.

The four elements of the proposed **good governance programme** were widely judged by stakeholders as relevant and appropriate. Several commentators welcomed the attempts to build accountability outside Maputo in the Provinces and Districts, for example the planned component on building the accountability of municipal and provincial assemblies. The argument given is that while these bodies do not currently possess significant powers, under decentralisation they may become increasingly important.

¹² In principle, sector budget support does not permit earmarking of donor funds. However, in this case the Ministry acceded to Finland's request

5.1.3 Contribution of the CSM to the relevance of the CS Portfolio

There is a reasonable expectation that the introduction of the CSM should contribute to the improved relevance of the CS. The process of formulating a Country Strategy implies an opportunity to improve the strategic choices being made. The effectiveness of the CSM in this regard can be informed by examining the changes between the CEP and CS, and several observations emerge.

There is clear evidence of a strategic approach to the use of bilateral aid prior to the introduction of the CS. The sectors and many of the interventions already present in the CEP were carried forward into the CS and share the same degree of relevance. The CS naturally assesses country context and shows that the strategic choices are relevant to it, but the same assessment and relevance would presumably have been ensured without the CSM. Four-yearly country negotiations would have addressed (with debatable effectiveness) the relevance of Finland's proposed interventions even if the CSM had not existed.

Mixed opinions were expressed on the usefulness of the CSM in influencing the relevance of the portfolio. The opportunity to conduct a periodic reflection on the country context and assessing how the programmes contributed to addressing the development challenges was generally welcomed. However, a weakness in the process is that the discussion is internal and led by sector staff who may lack the knowledge or objectivity to examine innovative intervention areas. Therefore there is a built-in bias towards maintaining the status quo. The CSM process does not encourage improved external consultation with partners in country (government, other donors, civil society, implementing partners) or draw on other sources of technical expertise (such as academia, expert opinion or in-house specialist resources in MFA). The very limited interactions with key national stakeholders in developing the CS mean that the CSM made little difference in ensuring strategic choice relevance to them. It does appear that a more critical dialogue around relevance may have been useful in helping to shape the education and agricultural sector interventions. Finding an appropriate mechanism to tease out the most relevant priorities for the GoM is challenging, given the breadth and depth of needs. The country dialogues, held every four years, are not seen as a particularly effective way of engaging the government in dialogue as an input to formulating the CS. Instead the dialogue appears to have been used to communicate Finland's decisions on which sectors it has already decided to support.

There has been a fairly substantial evolution of the bilateral aid portfolio over the scope of the evaluation, but most of these changes do not appear to have been driven by the CSM per se and would probably have occurred in the absence of the CS. The potential of the CSM to generate major strategic shifts was constrained as most of the money was already tied up in ongoing programmes and consequently there was little room for introducing new priorities. There are also good reasons for maintaining consistent support to selected priority sectors.

Several interventions were dropped due to poor performance - including poor fund management - rather than due to a lack of relevance, including PRODEZA II, SUNAFOP and the Tribunal Administrativo. The addition of new elements

The CSM encouraged a useful periodic reflection on relevance, but major changes in the bilateral aid portfolio were largely driven by other considerations.

An evaluation of GBS in Mozambique found it to be broadly effective, notably in improving aspects of fiscal governance.

such as the Good Governance Programme and the ADPP Farmers Club - was not directly linked to the CSM process but to a critical reflection led by the then Ambassador of Finland to Mozambique. The more recent decision to withdraw support to GBS was not based on relevance but largely based on the consideration of where it was feasible to make large cuts quickly. One strategic decision closely associated with the CSM process was to allocate an additional EUR 2 million to the education sector in Mozambique.

5.2 Effectiveness

The evaluation assessed effectiveness at two levels. Firstly, it assessed whether the interventions that make up the CS Portfolio achieved their planned purposes. At the second level it assessed whether these intervention results could be argued to contribute to the CS objectives.

5.2.1 Effectiveness of the CS Portfolio interventions

This section discusses the extent to which the constituent interventions achieved their purpose.

General budget support

There is a continuing debate in the MFA concerning the effectiveness of general budget support. The evaluation of GBS (to which Finland contributed) up to and including 2012 considered GBS in Mozambique to be broadly effective, notably in various aspects of fiscal governance. However, it noted that "*budget support is no longer exerting a significant influence on the overall effectiveness of aid*", although some informants feel that this trend has been reversed with the increased dependency of the government due to reduced oil prices. Stakeholder opinions broadly concurred with the continuing validity of the earlier evaluation findings, with the proviso that subsequent contextual developments may have improved the current aid effectiveness of GBS.

Concerns were expressed by some informants that the engagement in GBS has been too technical, with donors tending to focus on arguments over appropriate monitoring frameworks. Opportunities may have been missed for more meaningful policy dialogue, such the prioritization of different sectors within the state budget.

Agriculture and forestry

Zambézia Province Rural Development Project (PRODEZA II). No final evaluation had been produced at the time of this evaluation mission. As noted in section 3.3, the 20013 MTR found very disappointing results. The project was slow to start up and failed to establish good relationships with the district or provincial authorities. Results were mainly observed in the MTR as local level impacts on a limited number of individuals, such as literacy training. Interviews with stakeholders in the course of this evaluation did not provide any evidence of sustained impact.

ADPP Farmers' Clubs. ADPP is due for an MTR later this year. Field visits by the evaluation team to project sites found that ADPP is performing well at the out-

put level; the NGO is well established in the country and has good standing with the government, facilitating an efficient start-up. This was supported by the view of Provincial and District level government officials. SNV - an implementing partner - was found to bring complementary competencies in the area of value chain development. There is some perception that ADPP's agricultural expertise is limited and trial plots are not well organized/presented for learning. Implementation has been disrupted by floods, drought and political unrest in the region and will negatively impact project results.

Gender equity is promoted with two female beneficiaries for every male beneficiary. Activities have been adapted to accommodate the participation of women, such as adjusting the timing of training sessions to fit with their schedules. The higher illiteracy rates among women make the development of business plans challenging. Information on outcomes is expected from the Mid-Term Evaluation planned for later this year.

National Forestry Sector Programme (SUNAFOP). No formal review or evaluation was conducted of SUNAFOP. The opinion of a variety of stakeholders was that the project was well designed in terms of objectives but failed to achieve significant results. This was partly attributed to the management structure which gave a private sector consultancy company the lead for technical assistance within the Ministry, but responsibility for budget disbursements remained within government financial systems. Ultimately the project was terminated due to concerns over the misuse of funds. Overall, the government referred to support in the forestry sector as an important area of added value provided by Finland.

Forecas (ICI instrument). This is a relatively minor project which appears to have progressed relatively smoothly, apart from some delays in financial disbursement on the part of Finland, which caused some logistical challenges in implementation. It achieved its purposes in terms of improved research, training and the rehabilitation of laboratory facilities and has now been concluded.

Education and science, technology and innovation

Support to Education Sector (FASE). Progress has been recorded against the Specific Objectives: reduced regional disparities; decreased gender disparities; and increased bilingual education. However, sector studies indicate a major concern over the very poor overall quality of education. Programme monitoring shows that: gender is a clear success story in the education sector with a large growth in female enrolment (see section 5.2.2), but drop-out rates for girls remain very high; and sanitation is still a challenge, but is being addressed. A FASE sector review was on-going at the same time as this evaluation, but results were not yet available.

Disbursements were halted from FASE temporarily due to an internal fraud in the Ministry. The problem was acknowledged rapidly by the Ministry and donor funds were reimbursed, allowing budget support payments to resume.

Support to Ministry of Science and Technology – STIFIMO. The 2013 MTE concluded that STIFIMO failed to achieve the objectives set down in both the initial and revised Programme Documents and was highly unlikely to do so before the end

The Institute for Social Studies is making a valuable and high-quality contribution to public policy debates.

of the project. Several reasons were advanced for the poor performance, including the unrealistic and over-ambitious plans, doubts that Finland actually had any added value in this sector, the limited capacity, absorptive capacity and commitment from the (new) Ministry, and a lack of private sector partners. However, the Ministry of Science and Technology did benefit from the institutional capacity they gained during the project.

Human rights and governance support

Tribunal Administrativo. Interviews suggest that the Tribunal has significantly increased the number of audits conducted, improved the transparency of results, and released the findings in a more timely way. It is now studying the possibility of working with civil society to investigate conducting joint audits, and there is a sense that a culture of accountability is being established. However, political interference including the replacement of the head of the Tribunal in 2011 has impeded its ability to conduct audits of politically sensitive issues. The Tribunal also suffered itself from poor internal governance and administration. A negative audit led to the cessation of Finnish aid to it in 2014.

The consequence of Finland terminating support is a reduced capacity within the Tribunal Administrativo, with most audits focused closer to Maputo, and the remaining donors perceive that they have a reduced leverage when talking to government.

Electoral Observation Mission (EOM). Support to the 2014 election observer mission can be judged qualitatively as effective with interviews suggesting that the EOM contributed effectively to electoral transparency. The mission was unable to obtain any analytical reporting on the performance of this intervention (which was a Finnish contribution to a joint donor effort). The effectiveness of such an activity could in any case only be assessed qualitatively; informants state that the Observation Mission was organised later than it should have been, but did a useful job in difficult political circumstances.

Institute for Social Studies (IESE). Available reporting (including 2014 MTR) is either qualitative or output-based; no data are available on progress towards outcome targets. IESE is judged by informants to be making a valuable and high-quality contribution e.g. on pensions policy, exploitation of natural resources.

The Institute has been widely heralded as a success. Between 2008 and 2010, IESE grew from two to 15 researchers, published ten working papers, six books, various short reports and polemical pieces as well as coordinating two international conferences. IESE's staff members are closely linked with the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane and they participate regularly in public debates and media discussions.

5.2.2 Contribution of the CS Portfolio to the CS objectives

Three Specific Objectives are specified which are expected to contribute to the result of **improved agricultural productivity**:

- Increased small-scale rural entrepreneurship in Zambézia and Sofala Provinces

- Improved food security for farmer families in Zambézia and Sofala Provinces
- Enhanced value chain for agricultural products, including increased production and improved market access in Zambézia and Sofala Provinces.

In practice these Specific Objectives - and the indicators used to monitor them - are drawn directly from the interventions funded under the CS: PRODEZA II and the successor ADPP Farmers Clubs project. The indicators used to report progress were changed after the transition from PRODEZA to ADPP. Performance at the Specific Objective level is synonymous with the performance of the interventions and as formulated there is no 'contribution gap' between the interventions and progress towards Specific Objectives.

Data are only monitored and reported at the project level, and not for the Province as a whole. Specifically results are reported for beneficiary households and communities. In addition to process indicators (relating to implementation of business plans and involvement of women) data are provided on increases in crop sales, improved diet diversity and reduction of hunger months. The performance of these interventions is discussed in more detail above (see section 5.2.1).

There is no attempt to monitor changes at the Provincial level, nor is it clear how policy dialogue in this area is expected to contribute to results at this level. At best it appears that Finland's interventions in the agricultural sector register amongst individual beneficiary households. In the current design it is hard to describe plausible pathways that demonstrate links between Finland's interventions and possible contributions to outcomes at the District level - let alone the Provincial or National levels.

The development result area of **improved education** is addressed through the specific objectives of:

- Improved quality and reduced regional disparities in basic education
- Decreased gender disparities in basic education
- Increased bilingual basic education

National data indicate progress in reducing regional disparities and in girls' access to education. According to the ministry data the share of untrained primary school teachers in the worst performing Provinces has fallen from 38.5 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2015. Net enrolment of girls at Year 6 has increased from 71 percent to 81 percent over the same period, and is close to the boys' enrolment rate of 84 percent in 2015. Drop-out rates when entering secondary school remain high. A bilingual education strategy has been developed with MINEDH, but has yet to be rolled out.

Supporting the FASE fund managed by government is the most appropriate and effective way to improve education at the national level as no other actor can have the impact in education that MINEDH has. Some stakeholders observed that contributing financial resources to MINEDH should be complemented by capacity building assistance that would assist the Ministry to use these funds more effectively.

Finland's agricultural interventions demonstrate results amongst direct beneficiaries, but plausible pathways to higher level aggregate impact are lacking.

Progress has been made in reducing regional disparities in the quality of education and in girls' access to education.

There is some evidence of progress in improving public financial management and audit functions of key state institutions.

The overall effectiveness of Finland's CS is dependent on the ability to 'leverage' the relatively modest bilateral aid contributions to influence the decision-making of the GoM and other donors.

Enhanced state-society accountability is approached through three Specific Objectives in the CS:

- Improved public financial management and audit function
- Strengthened oversight and monitoring mechanisms
- Increased civil society organisation and media participation

Selecting quantitative indicators to monitor progress against these Specific Objectives has proved challenging in the absence of the good governance programme, and reporting has so far concentrated on the first specific objective.

Whilst imperfect, some progress can be seen in improving public financial management and audit functions. This includes evidence of improved functioning of key state institutions, including improved performance of aspects of audit functions of the Tribunal Administrativo. The number of audits conducted per year, the delay in delivering judgements and the transparency of findings have all improved. However, at the same time stakeholders saw a degree of political control which inhibits the Tribunal Administrativo's capacity to investigate politically sensitive cases.

Other information - from Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) monitoring and stakeholder opinion - indicated that it is possible to observe the impact of the G19 on the development trajectory within Mozambique as a whole, by demanding accountability from the Mozambican government. As one respondent stated "comparing the long-term situation with now... I really notice that the strengthening of the financial management systems makes the visibility of weaknesses become much more apparent. It is a positive that the visibility of corruption cases are increasing ... as long as we can show that we are contributing to strengthening the system and that the changes we are making are irreversible... then we are on a good path".

There are plausible pathways from the Finnish support to good governance impacts, through policy dialogue and support to civil society helping to achieve policy influence and, ultimately, impacts in the fields of improved PFM, accountability, transparency and participation by strengthened civil society structures, including media. However, as implementation is yet to start there is no basis for assessing the effectiveness of this component yet.

5.2.3 Assessing the impact of policy influencing

The overall effectiveness of Finland's CS is dependent on the ability to 'leverage' results from the relatively modest amounts of bilateral aid. The TOC identifies the main pathway for achieving leverage as coming through policy dialogue and advocacy, where policy influence is defined broadly as including influencing a range of formal policies, strategies and approaches - and down to the level of the allocation of resources. Leverage is successful when Finland is able to influence the decision-making of others - both the GoM and other donors - to make a more effective use of their respective resources.

Judging the effectiveness of Finland's policy influence starts with examining Finland's policy influence goals. The CS itself provides very little detail on the content of the policy messages. The intervention logic systematically mentions

policy dialogue with the respective Ministries in each sector, and participation in donor forums, but gives relatively little specification of the precise messages to be communicated. Consequently, it is hard to evaluate the effectiveness of policy influencing work. While the CS annual reports may discuss policy changes it is not always apparent to what extent these were targeted and promoted by Finland. The main exception to this is in the education sector where bilingual education and early childhood education are specified in the CS as ‘influencing’ priorities, and the Embassy has an advocacy plan for the education sector.

The fieldwork found that some policy positions and influencing strategies emerged over the course of the CS. For example, an analysis by the Embassy identified the absence of a poverty reduction goal in the GoM’s Five Year Plan and weak participation and accountability structures. Consequently the Embassy implemented a strategy to advocate for relevant indicators to be introduced in the government’s monitoring framework.

Working through budget support modalities - either GBS or sector BS - has generally proved a more effective means of influencing the government than bilateral projects. In the case of GBS and FASE budget support has successfully opened up channels of communication and policy influence directly with the Ministry. For this reason stakeholders perceive the shift from bilateral education projects to sector support as far more aid-effective. However, this depends on the willingness of key counterparts in government to engage in dialogue. Stakeholders and evaluation findings indicated that sector support in agriculture did not provide a meaningful channel for either policy influence or the effective use of donor funds.

GBS has been a relevant tool in seeking some level of state accountability, particularly given the weakness of institutional and civil society accountability mechanisms. The influence of GBS is judged to have declined in line with both the overall decline in ODA flows¹³ and the decreasing share of ODA channelled through budget support. However, as noted above this trend has reversed more recently and donor dependency is increasing due to a liquidity crisis - increasing the effectiveness of GBS on policy dialogue.

Leverage has been further capitalized through active membership of budget support coordination bodies. Where Finland is able to influence the opinion of other donors it can build a more persuasive collective position in dialogue with government. Finland has been working within the framework of the G19 group of Programme Support Partners (PAP), which includes agencies providing a proportion of their funding as budget support - and which Finland is scheduled to leave in July 2016, following its final GBS disbursement in September 2015. This grouping emerged in the early 2000s to promote better donor coordination and became the main focus for annual bilateral negotiations with the government (the Joint Review process) on a whole range of policy and programming issues, with sector working groups across most main economic and social sectors, plus cross-cutting groups working on human rights, good governance, gender etc.

¹³ ODA has decreased over the period 2008-2013 from 18.4 - 14.5 percent net ODA/GNI (World Bank)

Working through budget support modalities – either GBS or sector BS – has generally proved a more effective means of influencing the government than bilateral projects.

The quality of Finland's development cooperation staff is as a key driver of Finland's ability to exert influence and 'punch above its weight'.

Sector programmes do not generally exploit opportunities to integrate national level approaches with local level projects, to maximise policy influence.

Many respondents echoed the words of one respondent that *"what matters in these coordination forums is not the size of the financial contribution of the donor but what they bring to the discussion"*. Given the one member one vote system in budget support mechanisms Finland is potentially able to exert a disproportionate influence through these coordination mechanisms. The GoM clearly expressed to the evaluators that it treats the dialogue with all partners to GBS seriously, irrespective of the size of their contributions.

Linked to the previous observation, the effectiveness of policy influence is closely associated with the quality of advisors and staff placed in the Embassy. Stakeholders complimented the general quality of Finland's development cooperation staff and saw this as a key driver of Finland's ability to 'punch above its weight'.

Policy influence is seen to have been multiplied when Finland has taken on formal leadership roles. Finland is currently able to effectively leverage its education contribution by providing sector leadership which influences the much larger amounts contributed by the World Bank and other multilaterals. Other donors noted, and welcomed, Finland's willingness to take on leadership responsibilities, with a frequency that is seen as in excess of what might be expected from its staffing levels.

Finland has also influenced the actions of other donors by demonstrating leadership outside formally defined contexts. For example, it increased its contribution to the education sector at a strategic time, at a point when other donors were reducing their contributions. This was highly valued by the Ministry and other prominent FASE members, as Finland was seen to send an important message to other donors encouraging them to stay in the sector at a difficult juncture.¹⁴

Successfully leveraging policy influence from bilateral project interventions is more challenging. A diffuse form of policy leverage can be assumed, but not usually proved, through the advocacy that IESE have been explicitly funded to engage in towards the government; an exception cited by the mid-term review is IESE's influence on policy, legislation and regulations for the extractive industries. Policy effectiveness is harder to see where CSOs/NGOs are funded to undertake direct service provision in the absence of an advocacy capacity or objective. For example, there is no clear pathway for the ADPP Farmers Club Project to influence government programmes and approaches. MASA anticipate any scale-up through replication of the project in each district by donors - not through adaptation and integration in their own systems.

Direct interventions and efforts to achieve policy influence are in theory mutually reinforcing and should potentially offer opportunities for leverage. Attempts to integrate these dual approaches in Mozambique have had limited success and current sector programmes are concentrated either at the national level (e.g. GBS or education) or direct service delivery at the local level (agriculture), rather than both simultaneously.

¹⁴ The timing of Finland increasing its funding to FASE, and taking on the leadership of the FASE Troika, came at a moment of much insecurity in MINEDH and FASE due to the change in national government and the newly released and surprisingly negative national statistics revealing the country's poor quality in the education sector.

5.2.4 Contribution of the CSM to the effectiveness of the CS Portfolio

There is a logical expectation that the introduction of a systematic RBM approach through the CSM should contribute to more effective aid programming. Respondents confirmed that it has introduced a greater focus on the results of bilateral aid.

The contribution of the CSM was assessed by the extent to which the CSM has helped to drive decisions on portfolio content that progressively eliminate the less effective interventions and increase the more effective components. A number of changes are evident in the interventions present in the CEP and CS. Some of these changes were directly related to negative audits (e.g. the conclusion of support to the SUNAFOP Forestry Programme and the Tribunal Administrativo), but other decisions were driven by the goal of increased effectiveness. This included the termination of the PRODEZA project and initiation of the ADPP Farmers Club project in the agriculture sector, the termination of the STIFIMO project in the (originally titled) education, science, technology and Innovation sector, and the initiation of the Good Governance Programme.

Each of these changes has increased, or is expected to improve, the effectiveness of the sectoral programmes. Interviews with stakeholders involved in these decisions suggest that to a large extent these changes might have taken place independently of the introduction of the CSM. However, the CSM was specifically credited with the decision to 'let go of STIFIMO' between the first and second versions of the CS.

Effectiveness is dependent not just on choices of what to fund, but also on how interventions are managed and implemented. In relation to this, several implementing partners suggested that key to effectiveness was advisors being able to fulfil a more strategic role focusing on the delivery of results and being less preoccupied with the administrative demands of fund management. Key to this are questions of aid effectiveness and aid modalities - areas where the CSM did not demonstrate strong influence.

The CSM is a process rather than just a product. Part of this process has been an improved emphasis on monitoring the effectiveness of interventions over time. Therefore, the contribution of the CSM to improved effectiveness may be best judged not in the changes between the CEP and initial CSs, but between any changes that occur between the initial CS and subsequent iterations, including the forthcoming one.

5.3 Impact

5.3.1 Overall CS Portfolio impacts

The evaluation examined the impact of the CS - defined here as the upper end of the results chain from Finnish Specific Objectives (SOs) to Finland's Objectives (FOs), and from FOs to the Country Development Goal (see Table 3 above).

The **country development goal** is aligned with the PARP goal to *"Fight poverty and promote a culture of work, with the aim of achieving inclusive economic growth*

Effectiveness is dependent on questions of aid effectiveness and choices of aid modalities – areas where the CSM did not demonstrate strong influence.

and reduction of poverty and vulnerability in the country". This is monitored and reported on through indicators including poverty and inequality data and indexes on human development, democracy and corruption.

A lack of recent, key data makes it hard to draw conclusions on progress towards the Development Goal. The most recent data on national poverty lines date from 2009. An updated survey was conducted in 2014 but the results have not yet been released. Furthermore, even when updated figures become available, the interpretation may not be straightforward. For example, the 2009 poverty data is a source of controversy with some commentators contending that the figures were distorted by the food and fuel price crisis of 2008-09 and could not be used as a reliable basis for drawing conclusions on poverty trends.

Informants expected that the new survey would show an improvement in poverty rates, but in the absence of data this conclusion appears speculative. Other data sources show marginal improvement - for example, Mozambique's Human Development Index ranking has improved from 185th (out of 187) countries in 2012 to 180th out of 188 in 2014.

Finland's objective in **the agriculture sector** is to "increase agricultural production and improve rural livelihood strategies". Annual reporting on this uses official statistics on the growth of the agricultural sector and chronic malnutrition rates - although malnutrition data are not available annually. These data do show a significant year on year increase in agriculture, growing by 5.1 percent in 2013, 8.8 percent in 2014 and 5.6 percent in 2015 (Embassy of Finland, Mozambique 2015).¹⁵ However, further analysis (Jones & Tarp 2015) suggests that this growth is almost entirely accounted for by an increase in the area under cultivation and there has in fact been little improvement in rural livelihoods. This finding was reinforced by the opinions of all development partners in the agricultural sector, with one noting that "*we have so far failed to get agriculture moving*". Expanding market-orientated production has been particularly challenging.

Finland's objective in **the education sector**¹⁶ is very broadly to "improve education". The CS monitors progress at this level through the donors' Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators of the ratio of pupils to teachers and the percentage of third graders achieving reading and writing competence. Whilst the ratio of pupils to teachers has shown minimal improvement (63 to 62.5 between 2013 and 2015) this has to be judged in a context of a doubling of student and teacher numbers in the last decade. However, quality of education remains a major concern. A joint World Bank / African Development Bank 2016 survey found disturbingly poor literacy and numeracy results, mainly attributed to poor teaching.

One FASE member pointed out that what FASE has accomplished successfully is a total expansion in the platform in education, i.e. in numbers and access. Now that the quality is lagging behind, it is easy to point out the failures. However, as elaborated: "*you can say that all this money has been wasted, but that is*

¹⁵ Data to 3rd quarter of 2015.

¹⁶ Science, technology and innovation was included in the 2012 version of the CS, but dropped with the closure of STIFIMO.

the wrong way to read it. Now we have all these kids in the classroom, all this opportunity. Now we need to focus on what happens in the classroom... This is not the time to withdraw. It is time to see what next, to improve the quality."

Finland's objective in **good governance** is to "enhance state-society accountability". Monitoring includes the use of various indexes including governance, safety and rule of law, and participation and human rights. These indicators show no improvement in governance and human rights and a decline in the rule of law over the 2012-2015 period. Stakeholder perceptions were consistent in identifying a decline in governance under President Guebuza and this is mirrored by sharper declines in other governance indexes (see section 2.1). The ability of the current government to reverse the declining governance situation remains unproven.

The evaluation of GBS to 2012 found that there had been positive results - which we may reasonably call impact - on many aspects of the development funding, management and implementation processes, and that "the major contribution of GBS funding has been support to the expansion of public spending".

In the absence of reliable and timely data on higher-level results it is not possible to analyse empirically any potential link between observed changes against Finland's Objectives and changes at the level of the Country Development Goal.

At a general level the CS TOC pathway does support a plausible contribution between Finland's Objectives and the Country Development Goal. There is a conceptual link between improving education and declining poverty levels. This is supported by the general literature, although no specific evidence was found specifically relating to Mozambique. However, the effects are obviously long-term and would take time to realise. Similarly, the case can also be made that increases in agricultural productivity will lead to declines in rural poverty. However, this does depend on assumptions about the extent to which the growth is pro-poor. There is no particular analysis of the relative efficiency of increasing agricultural productivity in Mozambique to reducing poverty.

The most problematic links to establish - at either the conceptual or quantitative levels - appear to be between Finland's Specific Objectives (see section 5.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of what has been achieved) and Finland's Objectives. In the case of agriculture in particular there is a large 'contribution gap' - where the project level interventions reported at the Specific Objective level are disconnected from broader, macro higher-level objectives.

In the case of education, a critique can be made of the conceptual approach. Whilst progress has been achieved at scale towards several of Finland's specific objectives, the overall quality of education remains very weak. In addition, while enrolment numbers have improved greatly (giving the impression that number of students being educated is on the increase) drop-out rates (especially for girls) remain high. This suggests that the intervention logic misses key drivers of the quality of learning and retention in schooling, which are now coming to the fore, including school management, teacher policy, quality of teaching, parent involvement, sanitation, family planning and awareness-raising.

In the absence of reliable and timely data on higher-level results it is not possible to analyse empirically any potential link between observed changes against Finland's Objectives and changes at the level of the Country Development Goal.

The evaluation identified a number of good practices and innovations that positively contributed to the efficient use of resources in Mozambique.

5.3.2 Contribution of the CSM to the impact of the CS Portfolio

The CSM attempts to define a results chain that specifies the linkages from the interventions, to Finland's Specific Objectives, to Finland's Objectives and ultimately the Country Development Goal. The Results Monitoring Framework, appended to the annual report, reports on changes to key indicators to analyse progress.

Data limitations prohibit annual monitoring of, and linkages between, progress at the level of Finland's Objectives and the Country Development Goal. Even if this data were available, the relative scale of Finland's contribution and time lags in response (e.g. to improvements in education leading to impacts on poverty) mean that an annual analysis at this level is unlikely to be particularly meaningful.

A further gap lies in establishing the contribution from SFOs to the respective FOs. Data availability at the level of FOs can also be problematic on an annual basis. However, it may be more realistic to expect the CSM to monitor, analyse and report on linkages at this level.

The CSM appears to require or encourage a strategic analysis of the relative contribution of the selected priority sectors to poverty reduction, and SFOs to FOs in the CS. Such an analysis could draw on both the general and the Mozambique specific literature to demonstrate that the choices made at both FO and SFO level are optimal in terms of contribution to higher level results.

5.4 Efficiency


5.4.1 Efficiency in use of resources to deliver CS results

The evaluation identified a number of good practices that positively contributed to the efficient use of resources in Mozambique both at the level of specific interventions and in the overall delivery of the CS:

- The lack of fragmentation contributes to increased efficiency as administrative overhead costs tend to be reduced given a smaller number of larger interventions. Finland has a consolidated portfolio of interventions in Mozambique in the CS, although this process of consolidation clearly predated the introduction of the CS.
- The CS has moved away from contracting bilateral aid programmes managed by for-profit companies. For example, the decision was taken not to proceed with funding an anticipated bilateral programme on early childhood education and instead to concentrate funds within the FASE programme. The bilateral project modality has tended to be inefficient with a high proportion of funds being used on staff salaries and costs (cf PRO-DEZA MTR).
- Under the CS Finland has piloted the direct contracting of CSOs/NGOs to implement bilateral aid programmes as an alternative and more efficient delivery channel. This was an innovative approach not just in Mozambique but across Finland's bilateral development aid.

- Funding for other project interventions (Tribunal Administrativo, IESE) is provided through common basket funds. These reduce administration costs for implementing partners, as donors accept a standard funding plan and progress report. However, some partners noted that in practice each donor makes its own reporting demands and Finland is seen as particularly demanding in its requests for additional information.
- Finland’s staff resources are relatively modest compared to other donors in terms of the number of technical experts they have available at Embassy level. However, partners commented on the efficient use of their limited resources, as seen in the ability and willingness to chair various donor coordination groups.
- The Ministry of Economics and Finance gives generally high scores to Finland in its ongoing evaluation of GBS partners, but notes that the predictability of its contributions has been declining. The execution rate of funds channelled through FASE is high - 90 percent.
- Disbursement rates were relatively good in Mozambique. Against an available budget of EUR 22.6 million in 2014, actual disbursements were EUR 17.7 million - a disbursement rate of 79 percent of total funds available (MFA 2014a). Over the three years of country strategy implementation, however, average disbursement was slightly lower than over the previous three years.¹⁷

Figure 4: Budgeted and disbursed bilateral support 2012–2015



Source: MFA 2016. Note: Pre-2010 data not available in the same format.

¹⁷ Financial Annex to the Annual Reports for 2014 on implementation of the Country Strategy.

Heavy, rigid and slow procedures are evident in appraising and approving new projects and programmes.

The respective responsibilities of the Embassy and MFA Helsinki based staff are not always clear, leading to delays and loss of efficiency.

Conversely, several sources of inefficiency were identified within the CS:

- Heavy, rigid and slow procedures are evident in appraising and approving new projects and programmes. Work on identifying component projects in the new Good Governance programme started in 2013 and only two of the four interventions have so far been agreed. Negotiation with one partner was abandoned after two years with a loss of significant invested time and money due to inflexible legal constraints. Approval processes in other sectors have been similarly lengthy.
- These rigidities are particularly stark given that the small budgets of these good governance projects make the overhead transaction costs particularly disproportionate. If Finland wishes to further develop this type of cooperation it is worth considering how to adapt these procedures.
- It was not always clear - to MFA staff and partners - what the respective responsibilities of the Embassy and MFA Helsinki based staff are. The consequences were in some cases protracted discussions that further contribute to delays and loss of efficiency. One example was the delay in approving implementing partners for the Good Governance programme.
- As the size of the budget at country level contracts, the overall efficiency of the CS will inevitably fall. Some savings are planned through a contraction of staff numbers - for example in the reduction from three to two Counsellors per country. Other overhead costs are relatively fixed, such as other costs associated with the operation of an Embassy. Consequently, the overall ratio of MFA staff costs to aid disbursed is increasing and the cost efficiency of Finland's aid - defined as the ratio of administrative costs to the value of transfers ultimately received by beneficiaries - will deteriorate.

5.4.2 Risk management

The CS risk management section identifies a number of risks to implementation including:

- Social and political instability
- Extreme weather conditions
- Corruption and problems with fund management

Each of these risks has been realized during the implementation of the CS. There has been a resurgence of violent conflict in 2016, significant floods in 2015 and an exceptionally severe drought in 2016, and the reported misuse of common funds reported both at programme and project level. These risks have in turn caused major disruptions to implementation; concerns on the misuse of funds led to termination of support to the Tribunal Administrativo and SUNA-FOP and interruptions to the flow of funds through budget support, while natural disasters and conflict have both impacted on the results in the agricultural sector.

The risk mitigation strategy outlined in the CS is somewhat cursory - with key risks presented as unpredictable and to a large extent unmanageable.¹⁸ However, the evaluation found cases where the design and implementation might benefit from an improved risk analysis.

The risk that weak administrative standards in CS beneficiary institutions may lead to accounting and corruption problems in Mozambique is extremely high. The related problem is that standard Finnish procedures tend to handle such cases by stringent direct action, potentially leading to the end of the cooperation - as happened in the case of SUNAFOP. Several commentators argued that the termination of support was regrettable given the positive potential and results and questioned whether the decision was a proportionate response to the severity of the problems identified in the audit report.

Several opportunities to strengthen risk analysis around the misuse of funds were noted that could help to smooth aid disbursements:

- A mitigation plan could consider in advance how to react to negative audits in ways other than terminating assistance. If handled appropriately by all parties, such cases can be seen as an opportunity of identifying weaknesses in the system and opportunities to rectify them. The way that the fraud case in education has been handled (both by MINEDH and by the Finnish Embassy) is a very positive example that led to government-wide reforms in strengthening procurement processes.
- Alternatively, if Finland acknowledges that it has a low tolerance for 'corruption' it may be appropriate to reconsider which partners and interventions to support. Norway took the decision to withdraw from GBS given the high probability that frauds would occur and that Norway would react negatively.
- As stakeholders noted, this risk spans all institutions. It is not confined to government. Civil society has its own weaknesses in terms of integrity, accountability and corruption and these risks need to be better appraised and managed as well.

The risk of natural disasters could have been better mitigated in the design of interventions. For example, agricultural projects could have considered risk minimisation rather than focusing purely on maximising productivity. During implementation strong forewarnings of drought associated with the El Niño phenomenon probably should have been taken more clearly into account in adapting the project implementation model.

5.4.3 Contribution of the CSM to efficiency of the CS Portfolio

The Embassy appears to already have an awareness of the need to promote cost efficiency. In theory the increased attention to results in the CSM should further incentivize improved efficiency. In practice many of the steps taken to improve aid efficiency, including consolidating the portfolio and careful selection of aid modalities, were initiated prior to the introduction of the CS.

¹⁸ The main exception to this being common approaches to the misuse of funds within budget support programmes.

The design and implementation of the programme could benefit from an improved risk analysis.

The main area where the CSM could contribute to improved efficiency is through strengthened risk identification, mitigation and management. However, so far the contribution of the CSM has been limited. Interviews with MFA indicated that managers acknowledge that risk management is still ‘under development’. None of the three annual reports for Mozambique appended the prescribed risk matrix.

5.5 Sustainability

It is too early to draw conclusions regarding the sustainability of the CS results. However, the evaluation found that the design and implementation of the CS has adopted approaches in each of the sectors which were designed to promote sustainability:

- In the education sector Finland has wholly integrated its bilateral support to government, with the implicit assumption that results will be sustained in the institutions of government. This reflects the reality that the provision of basic education is a core government responsibility and alternative players - such as the private sector - have at most a peripheral presence, for example in providing nursery facilities in urban settings.
- The approach in Good Governance is also based on the strategy of triggering (sustained) improvements in government institutions, processes and capacities. One track of support works directly with government, including through the G19 dialogue and support to the Tribunal Administrativo (until 2014) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance.¹⁹ A second track works with CSO intermediaries - including IESE - but with the same goal of influencing the behaviour and operations of government.
- Attempts to build sustainable capacities in the Ministry of Agriculture have been ineffective. Therefore, a decision has been taken to shift to a project focus where results are sustained at the level of beneficiary households.

In practice there is little evidence on either the actual sustainability of interventions or the extent to which the CSM has contributed to the probability that the CS results will be sustained. In theory it can be argued that the CSM promotes an improved contextual analysis and that this in turn promotes sustainability. However, the evaluation found no specific evidence that the decisions listed above which are linked to improved sustainability were linked to the CSM process per se.

5.6 Coherence, complementarity and coordination

5.6.1 Coherence, complementarity and coordination in the CS Portfolio

In the context of this evaluation the terms coherence, complementarity and coordination are used with a precise meaning:

¹⁹ Through the UNU-WIDER research project

- Coherence refers to the internal coherence the CSs - both inter and intra-sector.
- Complementarity refers to the relationship of the CS and CS interventions with other (non CS) Finnish development cooperation. Coordination refers to the coordination of the CS with other development partners and alignment of the CS to government systems.

The **intra-sector coherence of CS interventions** was found to be generally strong. In agriculture and education the sector is effectively synonymous with one project/programme - ADPP and FASE respectively - meaning that coherence is not a major issue. The possible exception was the forestry FORECAS-ICI project that continued in the agriculture sector after the closure of the SUNAFOP programme.

There is an arguable degree of coherence between the three good governance elements of the CS to date, namely GBS, support to IESE and former support to the Tribunal Administrativo, interrelated interventions in government and civil society processes that could be seen as coherent.

The new package of four good governance interventions developed following a thorough and thoughtful identification mission in 2014 would be a step away from the detailed engagement in government's PFM and development management processes that GBS offered; but it would be a strongly complementary set of activities that might indeed add up to more than the sum of its parts. However, this is speculation, particularly since there have been serious and potentially fatal delays in the commissioning of two of the four activities - support to civil society through MASC, and support to democratic bodies through AWEPA.

There is relatively little **inter-sector coherence** between the different result areas within the country strategy. The main coherence is achieved through participation in GBS which offers an important opportunity to elevate the discussion above the sectoral ministry level. This has been very effective in increasing budget allocations to the education sector, which have progressively risen from 17.6 percent of GBS in 2013, to 22.8 percent in 2015. This high-level entry point has also been used to effectively advocate for gender equality in education. In contrast the GBS platform has not helped to resolve a continuing policy debate about the appropriate balance between support to smallholder agriculture and commercialisation.

The CS interventions are found to have limited **complementarities to, or with, other forms of Finnish development cooperation**. In particular, there appears to be strong potential for mutual reinforcement between the CS and Finnish NGO projects and the various trade and commercial instruments.

Several of the Finnish NGO projects managed directly from Helsinki have potentially important interactions with the country strategy. For example, using the NGO funds ADPP²⁰ has established a large-scale teacher training operation. An estimated 16,000 teachers, or 15 percent of the total number of teachers in the country, have been trained in these institutions and at a signifi-

²⁰ Using funds channelled from Humana People to People (UFF)..

The intra-sector coherence of CS interventions was found to be generally strong.

The CS interventions are found to have limited complementarities to, or with, other forms of Finnish development cooperation. In particular, there appears to be strong potential for mutual reinforcement between the CS and Finnish NGO projects and the various trade and commercial instruments.

cantly higher standard than national training institutions (Alberts & Sitefane 2009). This is a significant contribution, given the pressing need to increase the number and quality of teachers in country. However, it is neither strategically integrated with the CS nor captured in country-level reporting. A second example is that support to CSO organisations in Mozambique is already provided through KEPA. The planned support to CSOs through MASC under the good governance sectors appears to have significant similarities and raises questions about whether a closer integration of KEPA expertise and commitment to this is appropriate. This disconnect is especially apparent as the Embassy discontinued its own Funds for Local Cooperation (FLC) in 2010 and lacks a flexible tool to directly finance NGO and civil society projects in country.

There is very little attention given - either strategically or practically - to links with Finland's private sector support instruments. The problem is twofold: on one hand opportunities of using commercial instruments to further the development agenda are not being pursued, whilst on the other the potential of development cooperation to further the overall MFA objectives is not being realized.

So far Finland's commercial activities in Mozambique have been limited. Finnfund is supporting two forestry projects in Mozambique. Finland organised a conference to introduce Finnish entrepreneurs to Mozambique that was seen as a good initiative, and the Mozambicans would like to continue along this line. The fact that the responsibilities of senior Embassy staff span both bilateral aid and these commercial instruments suggests that these activities might be brought together. The priority given to private sector development in both Finland's 2016 DPP and the GoM's Five Year Plan suggests that these instruments must be brought together more prominently in the next CS.

It was also noted that Finnish Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) have been an important contribution to Mozambican development. . For example, one JPO attached to UNICEF was credited with driving the early childhood development agenda. This was perfectly complementary and added value to the work being done under the bilateral programme. However, JPOs are solely accountable to the UN and not a national agenda. There is also surprisingly little complementarity with Finland's bilateral programmes in other countries. For example, there was no evidence of a substantive exchange of lessons between the education and agricultural programmes operating in other focal countries in the region or beyond. There are clear advantages in coordinating Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI) inputs with the bilateral aid portfolio and reporting on the ICI contribution.

The tangible links of the CS to other development cooperation instruments may be more challenging to realize. For example, the CS and multilateral aid have very different management lines. There appear to be valid reasons why the Embassy has no direct responsibility for multilateral assistance instruments - such an approach would impose unsustainable transaction costs on both donors and multilaterals. Donors share common management approaches and work through their HQs directly with their multilateral partners. The exception to this might be multilateral funds earmarked to a project at country level.

However, as the major part of Finland's development aid is to multilateral channels and multilateral aid forms a significant part of total ODA to the country,

there are logical arguments why Finland might want to at least capture multi-lateral contributions in a consolidated country report.

The CS is strongly **aligned to government systems**. The GoM annual assessments of donor performance find that Finland's performance has been outstanding in terms of alignment to government priorities. During the CEP 90 percent of total Finnish aid is estimated to have been disbursed to government and aligned to government programmes and priorities. There is a recent shift to alternative modalities and the termination of GBS has further diminished CS alignment to country systems. An indication of Finland's commitment to aid effectiveness principles is that it stayed engaged with budget support to agriculture longer than nearly all other donors and alongside Austria was the last remaining donor working in support of the Agriculture Sector Programme (PEDSA).

There is an evident effort to work closely with government even outside budget support channels. Embassy staff are viewed by ministry officials across all sectors as very communicative. MASA acknowledged the continuing engagement and dialogue of Finland and the continuing attempt to align the ADPP project with the national strategy.

Finland participates regularly and effectively in a range of **donor coordination structures**. Coordination of donor approaches to engagement with the government on overarching economic policy and PFM occurs through Finland's membership of the G19 group which will continue until July 2016. Finland is also an active member of sectoral coordination groups in each of its main results areas, including: the education coordination structures associated with FASE, the agricultural and rural economic development coordination group and the good governance platform. Other relevant coordination bodies that Finland participates in include technical exchanges held within the EU, EU Article 8 political dialogue with the GoM and coordination on inclusive development within the Nordic Plus group of donors.

Membership of these various donor coordination groups ensures that the CS's specific objectives and interventions are well coordinated with inputs from other development partners and represent an appropriate division of labour with other development partners in country. An example of this was seen in the decision to exit from the Health sector in 2010, given adequate coverage by other donors, which allowed Finland to concentrate in other sectors. No overlaps or replications of other donor activities were noted.

However, it was apparent that donor coordination in the agricultural sector does not function well. There are obvious disagreements amongst donors in strategic priorities, between donors more interested in the expansion of commercial agriculture and those interested in improving the food security of smallholder households. The dominant donor position in favour of agri-business promotion has been determined by the larger and more influential donors, despite the best Finland advocating for direct action on rural food insecurity in line with the DPP policy objectives.

Stakeholders indicated that there is little appetite for European joint programming in Mozambique as pressures on member states for national visibility pre-

There is an evident effort to work closely with government even outside budget support channels.

Finland's specific objectives and interventions are generally well coordinated with inputs from other development partners.

So far the CSM has demonstrated limited effectiveness in improving the complementarity of the CS bilateral development aid with non CS development cooperation.

clude fully integrated programmes. While this process is still ongoing, it is not envisaged that it will progress beyond a light common strategy document and division of responsibilities.

At the operational level Finland coordinates with other donors through a number of basket funds, for example for IESE, the EU election mission and (previously) the Tribunal Administrativo

A common platform to discuss overarching donor coordination issues, beyond those appropriately discussed within the GBS framework, is still missing. The Mozambique government is resistant to establishing a wider donor coordination framework. However, this is viewed as increasingly necessary given that the major donors to the country are outside GBS (US and Japan) and that the number of GBS donors is declining. The UN, which arguably has the mandate to do so, has not stepped in to fill this gap in coordination.

5.6.2 Contribution of the CSM to coherence, complementarity and coordination in the CS portfolio

The CSM mechanism makes a limited contribution in the areas of coherence, complementarity and coordination. Intra-sector coherence is already strong, given that each sector is managed by one individual. There appear to be only modest opportunities for inter-sector coherence to add value. Country strategies do not appear to be a major element of inter-donor co-ordination and communication. Donor partners have little acquaintance with Finland's CS, although one EU forum has had a system for member states to present their CSs in turn. While donors are reasonably familiar with Finland's bilateral aid programme, this information came from other sources than the CS.

So far the CSM has demonstrated limited effectiveness in improving the *complementarity* of the CS bilateral development aid with non CS development cooperation. The CS makes brief reference to the Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI), support to Finnish NGOs managed from Helsinki, contributions through multilateral aid channels, the regional Aid for Trade programme, Finnpartnership and Finnpro. However, the CSM does not provide an effective platform for developing more meaningful complementarities.

5.7 Rights-based approaches and cross-cutting objectives across evaluation criteria

The 2012 DPP maintained Finland's commitment to human rights as an anchor to development in all countries. The DPP also requires that three cross-cutting objectives must always be taken into consideration: (1) gender equality; (2) reduction of inequality; and (3) climate sustainability.

The CS acknowledges the importance of Human Rights-Based Approaches (HRBA), gender, equality and climate sustainability in underpinning the goals and objectives. These commitments are reflected to varying degrees in the actual interventions.

The 2004 Constitution reinforced the rule of law, broadened the scope and protection of human rights, and reformed the justice administration system. The

legal framework and the adoption of international human rights conventions, strategies and action plans are relatively advanced in Mozambique. More needs to be done to put the laws, agreements and plans into practice.

Human rights-based approaches underpin the core goal of poverty reduction selected in the CS – rather than the CS adopting alternative goals of economic growth or promoting Finnish national interests. Within the CS the governance objectives are aligned with the DPP’s objective of “a democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights”. A focus on social sectors of education, and to some extent agriculture, can be interpreted as aligned to the progressive realization of human rights.

Access to public services has improved, particularly in education and health, although the quality of services remains low. The G19 annual review process, which monitors non-discrimination, participation/inclusion, transparency, and accountability as well as enhancement of the rule of law, shows that gradual improvement has taken place particularly in relation to the legal framework. The focus on governance has helped the CS to focus on the rights and priorities of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, including the more marginalised and vulnerable.

Targeted action toward **gender equality** is evident in Finland’s approach. There is a strong commitment to equal access to education and participation in the agricultural project. The approach has gone beyond basic target setting and engaged with striving to change ‘mind sets’. GBS was used as a platform to encourage political commitment at a high level, as Finland and the other G19 members sought to take gender more clearly into account in the budget support evaluation framework (PAF). Project partners also reported that engaging with Finnish aid has encouraged them to reflect on their own institutional approaches and embed more ambitious gender strategies.

The CS includes cross-cutting commitments to **reducing inequality** in all three result areas. The reduction of inequalities implies particular attention to the rights and opportunities of groups that are particularly vulnerable and easily marginalized and is in line with Finland’s long-term commitment to human rights. Programme benefits are consistently targeted to the poor and vulnerable even where GoM policy promotes alternative priorities.

Climate sustainability receives relatively superficial treatment in the CS and no interventions are actively addressing this issue. While this is phrased as a cross-cutting objective, given the strategic choices in the CS, there appear to be relatively few opportunities to meaningfully contribute to climate sustainability outside the agricultural sector.

It is hard to judge to what extent the CSM process has promoted the incorporation of HRBA and the cross-cutting objectives. The DPP itself was reported to provide the key reference text for the development counsellors and would clearly influence programming in the absence of the CSM. The CEP already included reference to these cross-cutting objectives. However, stakeholders suggest that what was lacking was not an awareness of these principles but examples of their practical application. Here the CSM does not appear to be designed to fulfil this purpose.

5.8 Assessment of the validity of the TOC based on the evaluation findings

The findings against the key assumptions given in the TOC (see section 4.3) are summarized below. This comparison helps to explain key reasons why elements of the CS failed to achieve the anticipated impact.

Assumptions in TOC	Findings
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Embassy has adequate resources to participate effectively in policy dialogue in existing effective forums. 	Quality of Finland's contracted staff is often excellent. However, experience in development cooperation not always taken as a required competency in selecting senior Embassy staff.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Money is disbursed on time and MFA budgets continue. 	Disbursements have been timely, but MFA budgets have not been maintained with the recent large cuts to the bilateral aid budget.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoM maintains planned levels of finance to the education and other sector. 	GoM has increased finance for education but not to food security.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoM is willing to continue an open dialogue with its EU and G19 development partners. The various projects and instruments complement each other, building on their respective synergies and comparative advantages, and the portfolio and other interventions are coherent and make an effective contribution to the objectives. 	<p>Openness of GoM has reportedly increased after the 2014 elections.</p> <p>The intra-sectoral coherence of the CS is high, but there are limited opportunities for inter-sectoral coherence.</p> <p>Complementarity of the CS to other Finnish Development Cooperation instruments is weak.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Farmers trained are willing to practise best agricultural practices and change their nutritional habits. Farmer groups are committed to selling their crops together according to the principles of the cooperative or farmer group. Markets exist for products and services that the rural entrepreneurs are capable to offer. Civil society and media are allowed to act for transparency and accountability and GoM is responsive to the concerns raised by the CSOs. 	<p>The assumptions relating to farmer behaviour will be answered after the MTE of ADPP.</p> <p>Space for civil society has been maintained although pressures continue.</p> <p>Some branches of government have expressed a willingness to engage with civil society.</p>

Assumptions in TOC	Findings
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The intervention portfolio is strategically and logically formulated; there are logical and feasible links between projects and instruments, and the CS objectives and development results areas, i.e. a feasible impact pathway implying also a good match between the scale of inputs and the level of ambition set by the objectives. 	<p>This varies by sector. For education and good governance there are logical and feasible linkages along the results chain. In agriculture there is a 'contribution gap' between interventions targeting a small number of beneficiaries and the higher level objectives.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sectoral cooperation and policy dialogue complement each other. 	<p>Sectoral cooperation and policy dialogue are not complementary. Influencing goals are weakly articulated or of questionable relevance.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoM has the political will to invest in the improvement of the PFM and fight against corruption as well as to enhance wider transparency and accountability. 	<p>This remains uncertain although some improvements have been noted since the 2014 elections.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoM commits itself to inclusive growth. Information flows and learning allow the strategy and its components to be improved if other assumptions falter. 	<p>GoM appears committed to economic growth over poverty reduction.</p> <p>Learning has remained largely at the level of the individual interventions rather than the CS as a whole.</p>

5.9 Country specific issues

The TOR highlighted a number of country specific issues to be addressed within the evaluation process.

Firstly, the TOR asked to what extent the Country Strategy has responded to the changing country context in Mozambique. This question was addressed by the findings on relevance (see sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) which found both the CS and the CS interventions to be relevant to the country context. The periodic updating of the strategy has helped in ensuring the continuing relevance to a constantly changing country context. Whilst the interventions included in the CS were found to be broadly relevant there is an additional implicit question on whether the portfolio should have adapted to include other more relevant interventions. The main emerging finding is the opportunity to support enterprise development and to further commercial and trade relations.

Secondly, the TOR asked whether the Country Strategy is balanced enough in terms of the chosen priority sectors. The evaluation did not find obvious synergies in operating simultaneously in multiple sectors and there seems little intrinsic advantage in terms of added value. Rather the findings suggest that key criteria to deciding the scope of the CS are the ability to achieve meaningful leverage. This in turn is likely to depend on whether Finland is able to provide a meaningful financial contribution in the sector and the sufficiency and expertise of the human resources it has available to support the programme.

Finland was not perceived to capitalise on sectoral expertise across countries. Added value derives mainly from the competencies of national advisors.

There is no guarantee that Finland would be able to use resources more effectively in new and additional sectors, compared to established sectors of operation.

Thirdly, the TOR asked to what extent the Country Strategy complements the work of other donors and what the value added is. As shown in the earlier sections (see 5.6.1) considerable attention is paid to ensuring donor coordination in Mozambique, and Finland is an active participant in these forums. Development partners were asked their opinion on where Finland adds specific value. The most consistent perception is that Finland contributes through leading donor coordination. This was most visible in the education sector and Finland's coordination role is coupled with a significant financial contribution.

There was a more ambivalent position on whether Finland adds value in a specific technical sector. Finland was not perceived to have a specific technical expertise that it was able to apply across countries. For example, whilst Finland has an international profile in forestry the extent to which related skills were relevant to Mozambique was questioned. Technical added value appeared to accrue from experience gained through a sustained sectoral engagement in country, as well as residing in the competencies of the individual advisors.

Finally the TOR note that as the donor dependency of Mozambique is decreasing, the evaluation should give medium-term strategic recommendations for Finland's cooperation in Mozambique. This is understood as a request for specific recommendations and is addressed in section 8.1.

6 CSM EVALUATION FINDINGS

Key findings on the CSM process, as opposed to the consequences of the process on the CS and CS interventions discussed in Chapter 5 are given below.

6.1 Relevance of the CSM

The CSM is **relevant to a range of needs of managers in the country teams** related to country programming and management of CS Portfolios. Firstly, the CSM was perceived to fill a gap in presenting a more coherent and strategic programme. At the most basic level managers - especially those removed from the field - lacked a comprehensive overview of the country portfolio prior to the introduction of the CS.

Secondly, the CSM is seen as instrumental in encouraging staff to look beyond individual project- and programme-based responsibilities and engage in a more strategic dialogue. Staff welcome the contribution of the CSM in providing the opportunity to reflect on the broader national development context and priorities, and examining the value and appropriateness of the Finnish contribution. The CSM is also relevant to enabling staff to question whether synergies might be developed between different sectors.

Thirdly, from a managerial perspective a transparent strategy is relevant to improved decision-making. Clarifying what falls inside and outside of the scope of the CS is seen as relevant in helping to limit consideration of investments to a narrow set of sectors. The inclusion of an indicative budget allocation was viewed as particularly helpful in ensuring predictability.

The CSM process is relevant to decision-making and communication between the Embassy, the MFA regional department and senior managers in MFA. More synthetic and strategic reports are more relevant to the needs of senior MFA managers, who in consequence can be more actively engaged in bilateral aid decision-making. The annual report is particularly relevant in enabling structured dialogue between all levels on key management decisions.

Fourthly, the CSM is seen as relevant to improving accountability. Staff are well aware of their responsibility to be accountable for the use of development aid and acknowledged the role of the CSM in discharging this responsibility. Beyond this there was an appreciation of the relevance of the CSM in increasing the visibility of development aid in Finland as a way of protecting a declining and vulnerable area of expenditure.

Finally, the relevance of the CSM to the key design purpose of RBM is uncertain and MFA staff had mixed opinions on the relevance of the tool to this purpose. Demand from managers with well-established RBM processes, especially where

There is very little evidence of involvement of stakeholders outside the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drafting the country strategy.

The CSM was found to have made a positive contribution to improved results reporting and there is a perception that the CS had contributed to improved accountability to Helsinki and in Finland.

there are PAFs for budget support, was light. The CSM was seen as more relevant by managers of bilateral projects.

6.2 Effectiveness of the CSM

Effectiveness of introducing the CSM

Embassy staff involved in the **introduction of the CSM** and original drafting of the CS also recalled that “it wasn’t clear who was in charge and whose opinion counted”. Ultimately key decisions on the CS content appear to have been taken in Helsinki. Examples of this included drafting a less negative contextual analysis, a decision not to partner with the UN on good governance and a decision not to extend support to higher education.

There is very little evidence of involvement of stakeholders outside the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drafting the country strategy. It was very much an internal Embassy/Helsinki exercise and this did not appear to be controversial. The process itself was reported to consist of the team sitting with flipcharts and analysing the national development policy, Finland’s DPP, and the specific interventions.

The CS process was seen as a step change from the previous process of developing CEPs. CEPs were reported to be very quick and drafted in just a few weeks. In contrast the CSs conducted a far more rigorous analysis of context, defining objectives and indicators. One stakeholder commented that *“it was very tough to get started from zero to drafting the first CS. However, each iteration has and should become better. It was hard getting people involved at the start and explaining why they had to do this”*.

Effectiveness of the CSM processes

The contribution of the CSM to **accountability and RBM** was mixed. The CSM was found to have made a positive contribution to improved results reporting and there is a perception that the CS had contributed to improved accountability to Helsinki and in Finland. The country strategy process was credited with introducing a ‘serious reporting system’. There is some evidence of effectiveness of the CSM in terms of communicating results within Finland, although it was not seen to have been used at the country level to communicate results.

However, opinions were more mixed on the extent to which the CSM provides a basis for managing by results. On the positive side several respondents saw it as a useful instrument for following up on progress in the programmes and more than just a bureaucratic reporting tool. One respondent noted that *“It may have changed the mentality of staff. Rather than just copy pasting general reports year after year they had to provide evidence backing up statements”*. Another interviewee commented that *“I think it’s a good process. I like bi-annual and annual reporting, but what we are missing there is did we do the right things? Perhaps it should be more analytical, how should we go forward and why? But we are not given enough time.”*

As well as the reports themselves the CSM has introduced the system of processing these reports, an output of formal guidance to the countries and what

to do and not to do. The annual reports are reportedly discussed with the country teams in a meeting chaired by the director of the department – a level of manager in MFA that did not previously engage in development cooperation. It is an improvement that the country team now get feedback from senior levels of MFA on an annual basis.

Other respondents pointed out the limitations to applying the CSM for RBM. Several of these have already been discussed earlier in the report. There are practical problems regarding reporting against indicators on an annual basis, especially for higher level results. Attribution is challenging – linking the performance of interventions with the results indicators specified as Finland’s Objective level or above has proved tenuous at best. The CSM struggles to capture policy influence in the results framework where data are not available or even impossible to collect. As one respondent noted, *“it is not just what can be counted that counts”*.

The summary mode of RBM currently used – the matrix of indicators appended to the annual CS report – is not a substitute for thorough mid-term and final evaluations of each constituent project, carried out with rigorous adherence to standard evaluation criteria.

The general finding appeared to be – as stated by one respondent – that *“it does not give sufficient or credible evidence of results to drive decision making”*. An example of this limitation was given where the MFA regional department were not able to use the reporting as a basis for a request to the Minister to increase funding to a well-performing instrument. But as another respondent stated, *“it is not a question of whether or not to use results-based management, but rather a question of how to use it in a relevant and sophisticated way”*. Key to the effectiveness of the CSM as an RBM tool is how results are targeted, monitored and reported.

One need articulated at the country level is that the CSM should serve to insulate the CS portfolio from politically imposed development projects. In practice ‘parachute projects’ have not been a recent phenomenon so it is somewhat unclear whether the CSs have been an effective tool in this regard. Managers were pragmatic in their expectations on the extent to which the CS would be considered as a binding plan at senior levels in the Ministry.

6.3 Efficiency of the CSM

The **efficiency of the CSM process** was found to differ between the strategy development and the annual reporting. The initial development of the CS was an iterative and somewhat inefficient process – perhaps understandably given this was a new process. There were significant differences of opinion between the Ambassador and the Ministry in Helsinki. This made the drafting of the country strategy a rather time-consuming process with frequent exchanges between Helsinki and Maputo.

Embassy staff reported that they were tasked with preparing a first draft of the CS, initially with very light guidance. There was a sense that the MFA was not clear on the products that they expected. More prescriptive guidance was

Key to the effectiveness of the CSM as an RBM tool is how results are targeted, monitored and reported.

recalled as being introduced during the process as new staff became engaged in Helsinki, requiring subsequent revisions in the text.

The possibility of annual updates - used in 2013 - introduces a further cost element within the CSM. The initial CS development did create some efficiencies by drawing on analyses conducted to support joint programming by the EU, to inform the contextual analysis. Overall it is unsurprising that developing the CS was relatively inefficient given that this was a new and untested process, and a better measure of the costs of strategy development may come in the next iteration.

In terms of the reporting, the processes associated with the CSM are not seen as particularly onerous by staff and it is not clear that they impose any additional costs over alternative report formats. Reporting largely consists of *“putting down on paper what is already known, rather than collecting new information”*. The time taken in developing annual reports was estimated at five days for the Head of Cooperation and two days per sector. Staff did not view this as unreasonable in relation to the need to provide accountability.

6.4 Sustainability of the CSM

Adopting the results-based management approach requires a continuous investment in **capacities for RBM at the country level**. Stakeholders found the CSM human resource capacity building and guidance broadly adequate. However, a continuous investment in refresher training is also needed to allow for usual annual turnover of staff. The evaluation also found that further investment is needed to reinforce problematic areas of the process: the formulation of objectives, results chains and indicators and risk management.

The annual regional seminars have proved a useful opportunity for exchange of learning on the CSM. Other donors suggested that in-built mechanisms to enable learning on CSM could be reinforced. One donor with CSs in Mozambique commits to a routine mid-term review and end-of-cycle evaluation to capture learning and promote adaptation of the subsequent CS.

7 CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Conclusions on the Country Strategy

1. Overall Finland's bilateral aid portfolio, as contained the Country Strategy, is judged to have been both relevant and effective to Mozambique. A significant degree of variation was found in the relevance and effectiveness between sectors, interventions within sectors and even years of implementation within an intervention - but there is sufficient evidence on which to draw a largely positive conclusion. Furthermore, the political, economic and social context of the country suggests that bilateral development aid remains needed. Taken in conjunction with the degree of proven effectiveness, Finland's continued presence in Mozambique as a development partner remains justified in the medium term.
2. However, Finland's new DPP, the interests of the Mozambique Government and the economic context suggest that a much stronger emphasis should be placed on economic development. A new country strategy will need to place a stronger emphasis on the goal of private sector development and on strengthening the economic and trade relations between Mozambique and Finland.
3. GBS has proved to be relatively effective in fostering dialogue on governance and improving PFM. Finland's contribution has been appreciated and has been greater than the financial contribution. The role of GBS may well be in long-term decline - due to both domestic and global influences. However, given the pressures created by falling global fuel prices on government liquidity, the importance of GBS has increased in the medium term. Consequently, there is an important 'window of opportunity' to use GBS to influence governance and build the institutions of accountability.
4. The decision of Finland to leave the GBS group will diminish the visibility and influence of Finnish aid. Given its past contribution, Finland's absence will also be felt by other donors. However, it is not strictly necessary to be part of the GBS group to be an effective player in strengthening good governance - and Finland will continue to work through civil society organisations. As part of the EU, Finland still has access to political dialogue with the government to Mozambique through the Article 8 framework.²¹

²¹ This is a purely political dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance does not participate.

Finland's continued presence in Mozambique as a development partner remains justified in the medium term.

A new country strategy will need to place a stronger emphasis on private sector development and strengthening the economic and trade relations.

Finland's support to the education sector has been particularly effective.

A long-standing engagement in the agriculture sector has failed to deliver meaningful results at an acceptable scale.

5. Finland's support to the education sector has been particularly effective. Working through sector support is appropriate - as government is the principal partner in delivering this service - and the Ministry of Education and Human Development performs comparatively well. It is easier to demonstrate results for sector budget support than for general budget support. At this point the priority remains improving equal access to quality, basic education. Working beyond these core responsibilities to develop more innovative educational approaches should be determined by the limits of the absorptive capacity of the Ministry.
6. The continued investment in governance systems is relevant to building accountability, transparency and integrity. Therefore, good governance is a strongly valued and important component of the CS. Being a smaller donor gives Finland certain advantages in supporting governance through civil society. Larger donors typically want to disburse larger amounts of money through structures that cannot necessarily absorb or manage such funds. However, constraints also need to be considered in Finland's engagement with civil society: established administrative and bureaucratic processes have not been sufficiently flexible and the developing management capacities of civil society may involve significant risk exposure and the need for risk tolerance.
7. A long-standing engagement in the agriculture sector has so far failed to deliver meaningful results at an acceptable scale. Whilst the relevance of working to improve the food security of rural households is very high, numerous constraints and an unfavourable institutional setting make prospects for short-term results and sustainability of impacts very poor. The priority for the GoM is support from Finland to the forestry sub-sector, including links to commercial Finnish interests in that sector. The reallocation of responsibilities for part of the forestry portfolio within the new Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER) offers opportunities for a more constructive policy level dynamic.
8. Combining sector financing with (broadly defined) policy influence is essential to achieving leverage and impact. In turn, influencing depends on experienced, well-qualified and effective technical staff. The ability of Finland to 'punch above its weight' as a donor rests on the credibility of development professionals managing the CS interventions. Consequently, given staff cuts in the Embassy maintaining the current sector spread is likely to lead to reduced effectiveness and efficiency. Finland has recruited and posted many excellent staff to Mozambique; however, experience of development aid is not a required competency for assignment to key positions within the MFA with implications for the effectiveness of bilateral aid.
9. Inefficiencies are apparent in the use of bilateral funds and the overall efficiency of aid is expected to decline further with a shrinking budget. GBS has been criticized for both high transaction costs and inefficient use of funds. Inefficiencies have also been generated through Finland's internal procedures with cumbersome and occasionally unproductive project appraisal and approval procedures and poorly defined delegation

of decision-making responsibilities to embassies. A more comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation plan could have helped reduce the number of interventions terminated early.

10. The complementarity between Finnish development cooperation instruments is inadequately established. Integration of Finnish NGO projects into the objectives and implementation of the CS could create synergies and reduce overlaps and inefficiencies. NGO operational experiences and perspectives are an important input to developing the policy positions and advocacy work undertaken by the Embassy. Equally, some significant overlaps are evident in support to developing civil society capacities through these parallel channels.


7.2 Conclusions on the Country Strategy Modality

11. The CSM process has contributed to an improved strategic vision of the objectives of Finland's bilateral aid. It encourages alignment with the evolving country context and clarifies the scope and objectives of Finland's aid in-country. However, the CSM process does not encourage improved external consultation with partners in country (government, other donors, civil society, implementing partners) or draw on other sources of technical expertise (such as academia, expert opinion or in-house specialist resources in MFA). Furthermore, a largely internal discussion favours continuity over strategic innovation.
12. The CSM process has systematized the reporting of results and increased the visibility of Finland's aid within MFA and possibly beyond. However, the limited scope of the CS reporting means that the reporting does not create visibility for the full breadth of Finland's development contribution to Mozambique. Major components of the overall in-country assistance are not captured including Finnish NGOs, multilateral aid, trade and private sector development.
13. The CSM has had limited impact as a tool for RBM. The process has introduced a welcome, regular dialogue between the Embassy and more senior managers in MFA. However, inherent limitations in the design and implementation mean that it does not yet give sufficient or credible evidence of results to drive decision-making. The emphasis on quantitative indicators in the CSM gives less visibility to results that are harder to measure in absolute terms, but are a critical element of the effectiveness of the CS. The CSM processes do not yet provide a framework to clarify the targeting, monitoring or reporting of policy influencing work that is intrinsic to achieving leverage and the overall effectiveness of bilateral aid. A time-scale issue makes RBM challenging for interventions that clearly need more than one or two years to show any results (as in the case of improving quality in education).

A more comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation plan could have helped reduce the number of interventions terminated early.

The CSM process has contributed to an improved strategic vision of the objectives of Finland's bilateral aid.

The CSM has had limited impact as a tool for RBM.

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14. The current RBM approach may incentivize an inappropriate shift to bilateral project modalities. Maintaining direct control of project level outputs and outcomes increases the probability of short-term, reportable results. However, the search for tangible results can discourage Finland from addressing the more difficult development challenges, where results are less assured but conversely there is the potential for greater long-term benefits.
 15. The CSM was not found to be a particularly relevant tool to promote deeper learning processes or any sort of substitute for evaluation processes. Such learning is critical in helping to identify why interventions have been effective or ineffective and the necessary corrective actions to take. However, the CSM can provide a platform to ensure that evaluation results are systematically integrated into management decision-making.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Recommendations on the Country Strategy

- 1) **The number of sectors supported in the CS should be reduced to maintain meaningful levels of finance and ensure adequate technical capacity to engage in policy influence.** Finland should maintain bilateral development cooperation under a revised CS that capitalizes on, and provides continuity with, the most successful elements of the existing programme. However, the scope of the CS - in the number of sectors supported - should be consistent with the available budget and human resources. Given reduced resources, the scope of the CS should be narrowed to maintain meaningful levels of finance per sector and the associated technical capacity to engage in policy influence. (Ref conclusions #1 & 8))
- 2) The following recommendations are made on support in existing focal sectors:
 - a. **The education sector should remain at the core of the bilateral aid programme,** principally through a continuation of sector support to the Ministry of Education to promote equal access to quality, basic education. The strategy for supporting the delivery of bilingual and early childhood education should be carefully calibrated to the absorptive capacity of the Ministry of Education. (Ref conclusion #5))
 - b. **Support to good governance should be continued along the lines of the previously identified programme components,** with the proviso that Finland is willing to take the risks associated with supporting emerging CSOs. (Ref conclusion #6))
 - c. **Support to the agriculture sector should be phased out** following the completion of existing contractual commitments. (Ref conclusion #7))
3. **Finland should carefully consider re-engaging in GBS with a primary objective of maintaining high-level policy influence with the GoM in promoting good governance and human rights.** The primary objective of this engagement should be to maintain high-level policy influence with the GoM in promoting good governance and human rights. The budget commitment should reflect that the purpose is to achieve policy influence, not the disbursement of funds per se. This decision should be contingent on (i) having sufficient technical capacity to provide a meaningful technical and political contribution to the functioning of the donor coordination group, and (ii) a willingness to tolerate the risks associated with GBS. (Ref conclusions #3) & 4))

4. **The new CS should prioritize a comprehensive private sector development plan that clearly states how trade and commercial instruments should work in conjunction with bilateral aid.** This plan should include attention to the close integration of other trade and commercial instruments including Finnfund, Finnpartnership and regional trade project. While the CS should not be a platform for directing or managing all the private sector support, the CS document should clearly state how the interventions it does manage interlock with these other instruments, so as to give a full rationale and a convincing picture of the totality of Finnish engagement. (Ref conclusion #2))
5. **The embassy should consider reintroducing the Fund for Local Cooperation.** The FLC mechanism should selectively finance NGO projects in Mozambique that provide important synergies with CS objectives and activities. However, this decision should take into account the staff capacity in the Embassy. (Ref conclusion #10))
6. **Risk management processes within the Country Strategy should be strengthened.** This would involve improved risk identification and developing contingent risk mitigation plans. This would contribute to increased efficiency of the CS. (Ref conclusion #9)
7. **Development cooperation experience should be introduced as a core selection competency for appointing relevant MFA positions within the Embassy.** . (Ref conclusion #8))

8.2 Recommendations on the Country Strategy Modality

The recommendations provided in relation to adapting the CSM mechanism are based on the perspective of the findings from Mozambique. They should therefore be taken as provisional suggestions - final recommendations will be provided in the synthesis report drawing on findings across all six countries.

The recommendations are based on an appreciation of a context of declining human resources available to manage bilateral aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a number of competing priorities and any recommendations have to be cognizant of these countervailing demands.

8. Reinforce strategic relevance and impact of the CS by: (Ref conclusion #11))
 - a. Considering separating the CS from an annual operational plan into a strategy paper (to be updated on a fixed four-yearly cycle). The strategy paper should be of an appropriate length to engage senior decision-makers, including the Minister, limited to 5 pages.
 - b. Providing clear guidelines on the minimum expectations for a structured consultation process including government and other key stakeholders, so that the CSM becomes a more inclusive process.
 - c. Involving MFA Helsinki-based sector specialists in drafting the country strategy.

- d. Using external facilitators in developing the country strategies to encourage reflection beyond established sectors of operations and helping transition out of established sectors and into new sectors.
 - e. Routinely conducting a CS evaluation towards the end of the CS cycle and using the evaluation findings as a primary input to designing the next iteration of the CS.
9. Improve the use of the CSM as a tool for RBM by: (Ref conclusions #9), 12) &13))
- a. Removing the requirement for annual reporting against the impact level objectives (CDG and DR). Progress against these goals should be reviewed when revising the CS to provide a contextual understanding, not to manage Finland's interventions.
 - b. Balancing quantitative and qualitative indicators to reflect that not all results can be measured in numbers.
 - c. Defining targets for, and report on progress against, strategic influence objectives.
10. Use the CSM process as a platform to strengthen the complementarity of CS interventions with other Finnish development cooperation instruments. Consideration should be given to the following practical measures: (Ref conclusions #10) & 12))
- a. Involving MFA staff responsible for managing closely related instruments (Finnish NGO projects, the trade and private sector) in the process of drafting the country strategy.
 - b. Developing an annual report that reports on - and gives visibility to - the totality of Finland's aid at country level including bilateral aid, Finnish NGO projects, trade and private sector development and multilateral aid.

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THE EVALUATION TEAM

The Mozambique evaluation was conducted by a team of evaluators. Nick Maunder served as the Country Team Coordinator. He is an experienced independent evaluator with over 25 years of experience, principally in east and southern Africa. His responsibilities included:

- Primary contact point with MFA and the Finnish Embassy in Maputo
- Desk review of documentation and preparatory interviews with MFA Helsinki Advisors
- Coordinated and participated in evaluation mission to Mozambique.
- Thematic lead on agriculture and rural livelihoods sector and overarching aspects of the Country Strategy and Country Strategy Modality
- Responsibility for Country Evaluation Report
- Ensuring coherence and linkages between the Mozambique Country Evaluation and the overarching CSM evaluation and the other Country Evaluations, member of Evaluation Management Team

Aili Pyhälä served as senior evaluator. In addition to holding a PhD in Development Studies, she also has a background of 12 years of consultancy in project/programme evaluation and management, principally in northern, central and east Africa, as well as in South and Central America. Her responsibilities included:

- Desk review of relevant documents, interviews with MFA staff and other stakeholders in Helsinki
- Participated in evaluation mission to Maputo
- Thematic lead on education; science, technology and innovation systems and forestry
- Drafting of inputs to the Country Evaluation Report

Stephen Turner is also a senior evaluator. With an extensive background in natural resource management, rural development, nature conservation and land reform, notably in southern Africa, his experience includes a range of global and country-level thematic and programme evaluations in many parts of the world.

His responsibilities were to:

- Participate in evaluation mission to Maputo
- Thematic lead on good governance, macro-economic policies and public financial management
- Drafting of inputs to the Country Evaluation Report

Zoe Driscoll and Fran Girling provided research support to the team and contributed to:

- Preparation of a country-specific team library
- Desk review of relevant documentation and preparation of country dossier
- Administration and logistics of field mission
- Support to drafting the country evaluation report

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Evaluation of Finland's development cooperation country strategies and country strategy modality

1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

Over time, Finland has established long-term development cooperation partnerships with seven developing countries. These countries are Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) has had a specific policy and implementation framework for planning and managing the development co-operation in these countries. These management frameworks have been called with different names over the times, but in practice, they have defined the Finnish country strategies in the long-term partner countries. The **Development Policy Programme 2007** introduced Country Engagement Plans (CEP) for each of the long term partner countries which were followed from 2008 until 2012. The current country strategy planning and management framework (hereafter Country Strategy Modality, CSM) was based on the **Development Policy Programme 2012** and implemented in partner countries from 2013 onwards. Currently, about half of the MFA's bilateral and regional development funding is channelled through the CSM. Now, the latest country strategies and the CSM will be evaluated in accordance with the annual development cooperation evaluation plan 2015, approved by the MFA.

Previously, the country strategies or programmes have been evaluated only on individual country basis. Countries evaluated within the last 5 years are Nicaragua, Nepal, Tanzania and Kenya. The other partner countries may have been evaluated earlier or covered only by policy evaluations or project evaluations.

All published evaluations: <http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

A synthesis of eight partner countries programmes was published in 2002. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=50666&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

A separate evaluation study will be conducted as well as a country report drawn up from the following country strategies: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. Kenya's country strategy was evaluated in 2014, and these evaluation results will be integrated into the context analysis and the synthesis of the evaluation. Similarly, the country strategy of Nicaragua that was terminated in 2012 during the evaluation period, can be taken into account in the context and the synthesis analyses based on the previous country and strategy evaluations.

2 CONTEXT

Country Strategy Modality

In 2011 the MFA commissioned an evaluation on results-based approach in Finnish development cooperation. The evaluation recommended, among the other recommendations, MFA to re-organize the system of country-level planning to identify more measurable objectives and indicators. As a result of the recommendation, and as a part of the Result Based Management development work (RBM) MFA decided to develop country strategy model that is more in line with the results base approach as well as the Development Policy Programme 2012. New guidelines for the country strategies were developed for the country teams in the second half of 2012. New country strategies were adopted country by country in 2013. New instructions for follow up and reporting were developed during the course, based on learning from experience. New versions and updates of the Country Strategies have been done annually.

According to the MFA's first internal guideline on Country Strategies in 2012, the Country Strategy is a goal-oriented management tool for managing the Finnish development cooperation in a partner country. The strategy provides guidance for planning and implementing the cooperation as well as for reporting on the progress. The Country Strategies answers at least to the following questions:

- How the partner country is developing?
- Considering the situation in the country, Finland's development policy, resources available, the coordination and division of the work with other development partners as well as the best practices in development aid, what are the development results that Finland should focus in the partner country, and with which tools and aid modalities?
- What are the indicators that can be used to follow up the development of the partner country as well as the results of Finland's development cooperation?
- What are the indicators that can be used to follow up effectiveness and impact of Finland's development cooperation?
- How the progress should be reported?
- How the information from the reports will be utilized in the implementation of the strategy?

One of the goals of adopting the current Country Strategy Modality in 2012 was one of the steps to increase the effectiveness and impact of Finland's development policy and cooperation at the country level. Following the good practices of international development aid, Finland's strategy in a partner country supports the achievement of medium-range goals of the partner country government in three priority areas or sectors. Country strategy also takes into consideration as far as possible the work done jointly with other donors (for example, the EU country strategies and multi-donor development cooperation programmes carried out jointly with Finland). The country strategies are approved by the Minister for International Development of Finland. However, the content is consultatively discussed together with the partner country government and other major stakeholders.

The aim was to keep the country strategy process light and the process flow loose to acknowledge the different country contexts.

Separate instructions have been developed for Country Strategy planning, follow-up and reporting. Some of these instructions are in Finnish.

Country Strategies to be evaluated

The country strategies were formulated in 2012 for each long term development partner country with the option for annual revisions in the case of changing environment. The country teams have reported the progress and results of the country strategies annually in the Annual Country results reports on Development Policy Cooperation by country development result and by Finland's objectives and specific objectives. The original country Strategies were updated in 2014,. These versions can be found from the MFA web site. The links are provided below. The updated versions may contain of some different information compared to the original ones, but provides sufficient information for tendering purposes. The original copies as well as other relevant internal documentation will be provided during the inception phase.

Ethiopia:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Ethiopia 2014-2017:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274547&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Zambia:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Zambia 2014-2017:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274537&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Tanzania:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2014-2017:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274539&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Mozambique

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Mozambique 2014-2017:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274551&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Nepal:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Nepal 2013-2016:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274553&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Tanzania:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2013-2016:

<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274544&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

3 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence based information and practical guidance for the next update of the Country Strategy Modality on how to 1) improve the results based management approach in country programming for management, learning and accountability purposes and 2) how to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. From the point of view of the development of the country strategy modality the evaluation will promote joint learning of relevant stakeholders by providing lessons learned on good practices as well as needs for improvement.

The objective of the evaluation is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the Country Strategies 1) by assessing the feasibility of strategic choices made, progress made in strategic result areas, validating the reported results in the annual progress reports and identifying possible unexpected results of Finland's development cooperation in each of the long-term partner countries; and 2) by aggregating the validated results and good practices at the MFA level and 3) by assessing the feasibility of the Country Strategy Modality for the purposes of results based management of the MFA.

International comparisons can also be used when assessing the Country Strategy Modality. Comparison countries may be, for example, Ireland and Switzerland, whose systems have been benchmarked in the planning stage.

4 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Temporal scope

The evaluation covers the period of 2008 - 2015. The results-based Country Strategy Modality with new directions and guidance was designed in 2012, and implemented from 2013 onwards in all the Finland's long-term partner countries. However, a longer period, covering the earlier modality is necessary to take in consideration, as most of the individual projects constituting the country strategies started already before 2013. Many of the projects and interventions were actually developed based on Country Engagement Plan modality that was the precursor of Country Strategy Modality and was adopted in 2008. In 2012, the interventions were only redirected and modified to fit better to the new structure of Country Strategy Modality and the new Development Policy programme. In order to understand the strategies as they are now and to evaluate the change and possible results of current country strategies, it is essential to capture the previous period as a historical context.

Similarly, when evaluating the feasibility of the Country Strategy Modality at process level, capturing a longer period is essential. Therefore, the period 2008 - 2012 will be analysed mainly on the basis of previous evaluations with a particular interest to give contextual and historical background for assessing the change that the new Country Strategy Modality introduced.

Content scope

The evaluation covers the following processes and structures

1. The Country Strategy Modality, including the process transforming Country Engagement Plans into Country Strategies
2. In each of the countries, a country-specific context from 2008 to 2015, consisting of the Finnish bilateral assistance contributing to partner country's own development plan, Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole in the country and Finland's role as part of the donor community.
3. Current Country Strategies; achievement of objectives so far taking into account the historical context of the strategies and possible changes in the objectives 2013 onwards.

5 ISSUES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following issues by evaluation criteria will guide the evaluation. Priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. In order to utilize the expertise of the evaluation team, the evaluation team will develop a limited number of detailed evaluation questions (EQs) during the evaluation Inception phase. The EQs should be based on the priorities set below and if needed the set of questions should be expanded. The EQs will be based on the OECD/DAC and EU criteria where applicable. The EQs will be finalized as part of the evaluation inception report and will be assessed and approved by the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11). The evaluation is also expected to apply a theory of change approach in order to assess the relevance of strategies as well as expected results and impact.

The Country Strategy Modality will be evaluated using the following criteria:

Relevance of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess how the country strategy modality has ensured the relevance of Finland's strategic choices from the point of view of partner countries, including beneficiaries, Finland's development policy and donor community
- Assess the extent to which the country strategy modality is in line with agreed OECD DAC international best practices.

Effectiveness of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess the results of the country strategy process at the corporate level/development policy level
- Assess the effects of country strategy process on accountability and managing for results: the reporting, communication and use and learning from results for decision making

Efficiency of the Country Strategy Modality

- Assess the quality of the country strategy guidelines, including their application including the clarity and hierarchy of objective setting, measurability / monitorability of indicators, appropriateness of rating systems etc.
- Assess the process of developing the strategy guidelines especially from process inclusiveness and change management point of views
- Assess the leanness of the Country Strategy Modality, including the resource management (human and financial) securing the outputs at country level

Complementarity and coherence of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess the extent to which the country strategy modality has been able to complement / take into consideration of other policies and Finnish funding in the partner countries and vice versa
- Synthesize and assess the best practices / challenges on complementarity in the current strategy modality.

Country strategies will be evaluated in accordance with the following criteria

In individual country strategy evaluations, the strategic choices of Finland will be evaluated in accordance with the following OECD DAC criteria in order to get a standardized assessment of the country strategies that allows drawing up the synthesis. In addition, each criterion may also consist of issues / evaluation questions relevant only to specific countries. In each of the criteria human rights based approach and cross cutting objectives must be systematically integrated (see UNEG guidelines). The country specific issues/questions are presented separately in chapter 5.1.

Relevance

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has been in line with the Partner Country's development policies and priorities.
- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has responded the rights and priorities of the partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, including men and women, boys and girls and especially the easily marginalized groups.
- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has been in line with the Finnish Development Policy priorities

Impact

- Assesses and verify any evidence or, in the absence of strong evidence, "weak signals" of impact, positive or negative, intended or unintended, the Country Strategy has contributed.

Effectiveness

- Assess and verify the reported outcomes (intended and un-intended)
- Assess the factors influencing the successes and challenges

Efficiency

- Assess the costs and utilization of resources (financial& human) against the achieved outputs
- Assess the efficiency and leanness of the management of the strategy
- Assess the risk management

Sustainability

- Assess the ownership and participation process within the country strategy, e.g. how participation of the partner government, as well as different beneficiary groups has been organized.
- Assess the ecological and financial sustainability of strategies

Complementarity, Coordination and Coherence

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy is aligned with partner countries' systems, and whether this has played a role in Finland's choice of intervention modalities.
- Assess the extent to which Finland's Country Strategy in the country has been coordinated with development partners and other donors
- Assesses the complementarity between the Country Strategy and different modalities of Finnish development cooperation in the country including NGOs, regional and targeted multilateral assistance (multi-bi) to the extent possible
- Assess the coherence between the main policy sectors that the country units and embassies are responsible for executing in the country.

5.1. Special issues per country

The evaluation aims to facilitate inclusive evaluation practice and learning between the partners at the country level. Following issues has been identified in discussions with the country representatives and/or the country reference group of the evaluation. The country specific issues will be integrated with the overall evaluation matrix where feasible, and recommendations made where evidence and justification found.

Ethiopia

- Assess the strategic value of
 - the sector approach for Rural Economic Development and Water.
 - SNE programme and possible mainstreaming to GEQIP II.
- The evaluation should make justified recommendations on
 - how to extend strategic support to new sectors in the future, as needs of Ethiopia is changing following the economic growth and increasing domestic revenue?
 - how technical cooperation between institutions (for instance ICI) could be formalized as part of Country cooperation framework?
- The field phase in late January-February 2016

Zambia

- Zambia is in a process of transitioning to the lower middle income country level. Therefore the evaluation should make justified recommendations on
 - how to advance broad based partnerships especially in trade and private sector development including interaction with civil society and public sectors in the future.

- how the Country Strategy programming could better utilize existing processes like country/ sector portfolio reviews for advancing the collaboration between Zambia and Finland
- What has been Finland's value added on the sector coordination in agriculture, environment and private sector development.
- The partner country has expressed an interest to participate to some of the evaluation activities during the field mission
- The field phase in January-February 2016

Tanzania

- Tanzania is in a process of transitioning to the lower middle income country level. Therefore the evaluation should make justified recommendations on:
 - how to advance broad based partnerships especially in trade and private sector development including interaction with civil society and public sectors in the future.
- The field phase in January-February 2016

Mozambique

- To what extent has the Country Strategy responded to the changing country context in Mozambique?
- Is the Country strategy balanced enough in terms of the chosen priority sectors?
- To what extent does the Country strategy complement the work of other donors and what is the strategy's value added?
- As the donor dependency of Mozambique is decreasing, the evaluation should give medium term strategic recommendations for Finland's cooperation in Mozambique.
- The field phase in January-February 2016

Nepal

- Nepal is a fragile state in many aspects. In this context the evaluation should give medium term strategic recommendations for Finland's cooperation in Nepal.
- Finland's Country Strategy and the programmes in Nepal were audited in 2015. The results of the audit can be utilized by the evaluation. The audit reports are in Finnish.
- The field phase must be in December 2015

Vietnam

- Vietnam is a lower middle income country and the economic development has been quite rapid in last few years. Therefore the evaluation should analyse how the country strategy has been able to adapt to the rapid transition of the economy, and how agile the strategy has been in responding the needs of private sector and other relevant stakeholders in the country.
- Recommendations should be given on how to broaden the strategic portfolio to new, mutually beneficial areas such as education and research, university and industry cooperation as well as increased trade ties.
- Private sector instruments like Finnpartnership and Concessional loan has played a role in the Country Strategy. The strategic role of these instruments in transitioning economy should be assessed, and possible best practices reported.

- Finland's Country Strategy and the programmes in Vietnam were audited in 2015. The results of the audit can be utilized by the evaluation. The audit reports are in Finnish.
- The partner country has expressed an interest to participate to some of the evaluation activities during the field mission.
- The field phase must be in December 2015

6 GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Evaluation is carried out and tendered as one large evaluation. The evaluation team leader is responsible for the synthesis and the evaluation methodology. Country evaluations will be carried out by country evaluation teams which are coordinated by a country coordinator together with the team leader. Coordination of the whole process and overall quality management of the evaluation will be the responsibility of the contracted evaluation consultancy company.

Evaluation will produce a synthesis report, as well as separate country reports on Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. These are also the reports that will be published.

Management response will be drawn up at two levels/processes: the synthesis report will be responded in accordance with the process of centralized evaluations and country reports in accordance with the process of decentralized evaluations as described in the evaluation norm of the MFA. The country reports will be discussed with partner countries and the management response drawn up on this basis. The follow up and implementation of the response will be integrated in the planning process of the next phase of the country strategy.

The approach and working modality of evaluation will be participatory. The evaluation will take into account the recommendations of the OECD/DAC on collaborative aspect of country evaluations where possible. Representatives of partner country governments will be invited in meetings and sessions when feasible. A possibility of integrating one evaluation expert representing partner country evaluation function will be made possible, where the partner country is willing and financially capable to provide such person. There is also a possibility that a representative of MFA and/or the partner country will participate in some parts of field missions with their own costs. The evaluation team shall contact the partner country representatives during the inception period for possible participation arrangements.

Mixed methods will be used (both qualitative and quantitative) to enable triangulation in the drawing of findings.

The country strategy result framework is based on logframe approach, but the evaluation team is expected to reconstruct a theory of change model of the framework describing the interaction between the elements in the logframe and dynamics of the intended result chains and prepare more elaborated evaluation questions as well as sub-questions based on the change theory approach. The Approach section of the Tender will present an initial plan for the evaluation including the methodology and the evaluation matrix for each of the countries as well as the Country Strategy Modality. The evaluation plan will be finalized during the inception period and presented in the Inception report.

During the field work particular attention will be paid to human right based approach, and to ensure that women, vulnerable and easily marginalized groups are also interviewed (See UNEG guidelines). Particular attention is also paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable the real participation as well as sufficient collection of information also from sources outside of the institutional stakeholders (e.g. statistics and comparison material). The field work in each of the country will preferably last at least 2-3 weeks, and can be done parallel and take in account the availability of the stakeholders during the visit. Adequate amount of time should also be allocated for the interviews conducted with the stakeholders in Finland. Interview groups are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance. The MFA

and embassies are not expected to organize interviews or meetings with the stakeholders in the country on behalf of the evaluation team, but assist in identification of people and organizations to be included in the evaluation.

Validation of all findings as well as results at the country level must be done through multiple processes and sources. The main document sources of information include strategy and project documents and reports, project/strategy evaluations, Finland's Development Policy Strategies, thematic guidance documents, previously conducted country strategy and thematic evaluations, development strategies of the case country governments, country analyses, and similar documents. The evaluation team is also encouraged to use statistics and different local sources of information to the largest possible extent, especially in the context analysis, but also in the contribution analysis. It should be noted that part of the material is in Finnish.

Debriefing/validation workshops will be organized at the country level in the end of each of the fieldtrip. Also a joint validation seminar will be organized with the MFA regional departments after the field trips. Embassies and the MFA will assist the evaluation team in organizing these seminars.

If sampling of documents is used, the sampling principles and their effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately.

During the process particular attention is paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team. The evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to diverse communication needs, gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs with all stakeholders. The evaluators will respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, but only anonymously and when the interviewee cannot be identified from the quote.

The evaluation team is encouraged to raise issues that it deems important to the evaluation which are not mentioned in these ToR. Should the team find any part of the ToR unfeasible, it should bring it to the attention of the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) without delay.

7 EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

Evaluation of competitive bidding will be completed in July 2015, and the Kick-off meeting with the contracted team will be held in August.

It should be noted that internationally recognized experts may be contracted by the MFA as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole evaluation process or for some phases/deliverables of the evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (technical evaluation plan, evaluation plan, draft final and final reports). The views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

An **Inception phase** is September and October 2015 during which the evaluation team will produce a final evaluation plan with a context analysis. The context analysis includes a document analysis (desk study) on the country strategy modality as well as a context of each of the country strategy. The evaluation plan also consists of the reconstructed theory of change, evaluation questions, evaluation matrix, methodology (methods for data gathering and data analysis, as well as means of verification of different data), final work plan with a timetable as well as an outline of final reports. MFA will provide comments on the plan and it will be accepted in an inception meeting in November 2015.

The **Implementation phase** can be implemented in December 2015 - February 2016. Country-specific debriefing meetings will be organized at the end of each of the field visit. A joint debriefing and validation meeting can be arranged in Helsinki in the end of February/ beginning of March 2016. The validation seminars work like learning seminars based on initial findings, but also for validating the findings.

The outcomes and further findings drawn up from seminar discussions can be utilized when finalizing the country reports as well as the synthesis report.

The **Reporting and dissemination phase** will produce the Final reports and organize dissemination of the results. Final draft country reports will be completed by the end of April and the final draft synthesis report by the end of May, 2016. Country reports can be sequenced on the basis of the field phase. If the field phase is in December, the draft report shall be ready in February, and if in February, then the draft report shall be ready in April. Due to the scope of the evaluation reports, enough time must be left for feedback. The final reports shall be ready in mid-June. Due the Finnish holiday season in July, a public presentation of evaluation results, a public webinar and other discussion meetings will be held in August 2016.

The evaluation consists of the following meetings and deliverables in each of the phases. It is highlighted that a new phase can be initiated only when all the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by EVA-11. The reports will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats. Time needed for the commenting of the draft report(s) is three weeks. The language of all reports and possible other documents is English. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the content and language.

INCEPTION PHASE

I. Kick off meeting

The purpose of the kick-off meeting is to discuss and agree the entire evaluation process including the content of the evaluation, practical issues related to the field visits, reporting and administrative matters. The kick-off meeting will be organized by the EVA-11 in Helsinki after the signing of the contract.

Deliverable: Agreed minutes prepared by the Consultant

Participants: EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session); reference group and the **management team** of the Consultant **in person**. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

Venue: MFA.

II. Inception meeting

A meeting to present the evaluation plan (incl. agreed minutes of the meeting), MFA and Peer Review comments/notes discussed and changes agreed.

Participants: EVA-11; reference group and the **management team** of the Consultant (responsible for chairing the session) **in person**. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

Venue: MFA

Deliverable: Inception report

Inception report **will constitute the final evaluation plan** that specifies the context of the evaluation, the approach and the methodology. It also includes the final evaluation questions and the final evaluation matrix. The sources of verification and methods for collecting and analysing data are explained in detail, including the methods and tools of analyses, scoring or rating systems and alike. The final work plan and division of tasks between the team members are presented in the evaluation plan. In addition, a list of stakeholder groups to be interviewed will be included in the evaluation plan. The evaluation will also suggest an outline of the final report(s).

The inception report will provide a **contextual analysis** based mainly on written material. It is based on a complete desk analysis of all relevant written material including, but not limited to project/strategy related documents, previous evaluations, policy documents, guidelines, thematic/regional program-

ming, and other relevant documents related to development and development cooperation in partner countries identified by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Tentative hypotheses as well as information gaps should be identified in the evaluation plan.

It will also present plans for the interviews, participative methods and field visits including the identification of local informants (beneficiaries, government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and other sources of information (studies, publications, statistical data etc.) as well as an outline of the interview questions and use of participative methods according to the interviewee groups in each of the field visit countries.

The Inception report will be submitted to the EVA-11 and is subject to the approval of the EVA-11 prior to field visits to case countries/regions and further interviews in Finland. The report should be kept analytic, concise and clear.

IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

IV. Field visits to partner countries

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the findings and assessments of the desk analysis. The field visits may partly be joint missions with MFA and /or partner country representative participation. The length of the field visit(s) should be adequate to ensure real participation of different stakeholders and beneficiaries. The evaluation team is expected to propose the suitable timing of the visits, preferably at least 2-3 weeks.

Deliverables/meetings: Debriefing/ validation workshop supported by a PowerPoint presentation on the preliminary findings. At least one workshop in each of the partner countries, and one in the MFA related to all countries.

The preliminary findings of the visits will be verified and discussed with relevant persons from the Ministry, embassies, partner country government and relevant stakeholders, also beneficiaries including marginalized groups. The validation workshops are mandatory component of the evaluation methodology. The workshops will be organized by the Consultant and they can be partly organized also through a video conference.

After the field visits and validation workshops, it is likely that further interviews and document study in Finland will still be needed to complement the information collected during the earlier phases.

Participants:

Country workshops: The whole country team of the Consultant (responsible for inviting and chairing the session) and the relevant stakeholders, including the Embassy of Finland and relevant representatives of the local Government **in person**.

MFA workshop: EVA-11; reference group and other relevant staff/stakeholders, and the **management team** of the Consultant (responsible for chairing the session) **in person**. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION PHASE

As part of reporting process, the Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control was addressed during the evaluation and how the capitalization of lessons learned has also been addressed. The Consultant will also submit the EU Quality Assessment Grid as part of the final reporting.

V. Final reporting

Deliverables: Final draft report and final reports on CSM Synthesis and six partner country strategies

The reports should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and the logic between those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be subjected to an external peer review and a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors instead of rewriting the findings or adding new content.

The consultant will attach Quality Assurance expert(s) comments/notes to the final report, including signed EU Quality Assessment Grid, as well as a table summarizing how the received comments/peer review have been taken into account.

The final reports will be made available by 15th June 2016. The final reports must include abstract and summary (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The reports, including the Finnish and Swedish translations have to be of high and publishable quality and it must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation.

The MFA also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

VI. Dissemination presentations

A MFA management meeting / a briefing session for the upper management on the final results will be organized tentatively in mid- June 2016 in Helsinki. It is expected that at least the Team leader and the Home officer are present in person, and the other team members via VC.

A public presentation will be organized in Helsinki tentatively in mid- August 2016.

It is expected that at least the Management team of the Consultant are present in person.

A Webinar will be organized by the EVA-11. Team leader and country leaders are expected to give short presentations in Webinar. Presentation can be delivered from distance. A sufficient Internet connection is required.

Optional learning sessions with the regional teams (Optional sessions funded separately. Requires a separate assignment by EVA-11)

8 COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM AND EXPERTISE REQUIRED

There will be one **Management team**, responsible for overall planning management and coordination of the evaluation from the Country Strategy Modality perspective, and six **country evaluation teams**. The evaluation team will include a mix of male and female experts. The team will also include senior experts from both developed and developing countries.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the **Team leader**. The whole evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation. The Team leader will work mainly at global/CSM level but will be ultimately responsible for the quality of all the deliverables.

One senior expert of each of the country teams will be identified as a **Country coordinator**. Country coordinator will be contributing the overall planning and implementation of the whole evaluation from a country perspective and also responsible for coordinating, managing and authoring the country specific evaluation work and reports.

The Team leader, Country coordinators and the Home officer of the Consultant will form the Management group of the evaluation Consultant, which will be representing the team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the evaluation results.

Successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding and expertise on results-based management in the context of different aid modalities. It also requires understanding and expertise of overall state-of-the-art international development policy and cooperation issues including programming and aid management, development cooperation modalities and players in the global scene. It also requires experience and knowledge of HRBA and cross-cutting objectives, including UN resolution 1325, and related evaluation issues. Solid experience in large sectoral/thematic/policy or country strategy evaluations or large evaluations containing several countries is required. In addition, long-term hands-on experience at the development cooperation and development policy field is needed.

All team members shall have fluency in English. It is also a requirement to have one senior team member in each of the country team fluent in Finnish as a part of the documentation is available only in Finnish. Online translators cannot be used with MFA document material. One senior team member in each of the country teams shall be fluent in a major local language of the country. Knowledge of local administrative languages of the partner countries among the experts will be an asset.

The competencies of the team members will be complementary. Each country team will consist of 3 to 5 experts. One expert can be a member of multiple country teams, if his/her expertise as well as tasks and the time table of the evaluation make it feasible.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (ITT).

9 BUDGET AND PAYMENT MODALITIES

The evaluation will not cost more than € 950 000 (VAT excluded). The payments will be done in all inclusive lump sums based on the progress of the evaluation.

10 MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION AND THE REFERENCE GROUP

The EVA-11 will be responsible for overall management of the evaluation process. The EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the Ministry and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

A reference group for the evaluation will be established and chaired by EVA-11. The mandate of the reference group is to provide advisory support and inputs to the evaluation, e.g. through participating in the planning of the evaluation and commenting deliverables of the consultant.

The members of the reference group may include:

- Representatives from relevant units/departments in the MFA forming a core group, that will be kept regularly informed of progress
- Representatives of relevant embassies
- Representatives of partner countries governments

The tasks of the reference group are to:

- Participate in the planning of the evaluation
- Participate in the relevant meetings (e.g. kick-off meeting, meeting to discuss the evaluation plan, wrap-up meetings after the field visits)
- Comment on the deliverables of the consultant (i.e. evaluation plan, draft final report, final report) with a view to ensure that the evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the subject of the evaluation

-
- Support the implementation, dissemination and follow-up on the agreed evaluation recommendations.

11 MANDATE

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the end result under Creative Commons license in order to promote openness and public use of evaluation results.

12 AUTHORISATION HELSINKI, 6.5.2015

Jyrki Pulkkinen

Director

Development Evaluation Unit

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

ANNEX 2: ADDITIONAL METHODOLOGY DISCUSSION

Overview and approach

The Inception Report described the methodology for the overall CSM evaluation, including the country evaluations. It included an annex on Mozambique which gave a preliminary description of the Mozambique context and of Finland's successive strategic documents (CEP and CS), and developed a preliminary theory of change for Mozambique. It also presented an overview of documentary material available and additional material sought, and set out an detailed evaluation plan and timetable for the Mozambique country study. This annex was reviewed by the Mozambique country team and refined in light of their comments.

Main evaluation questions

The Inception Report included a full evaluation matrix which was used and adapted for the country evaluations as well as the overall CSM evaluation. Table 6 below shows the main evaluation questions and sub-questions; these are sequenced according to the main evaluation criteria. Under each evaluation criterion questions address both the CS Portfolio evaluation and the evaluation of the CSM's influence on the programme, but separate these out clearly. The evaluation matrix includes judgement criteria.

Table 6: Evaluation matrix

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 1: How relevant are CSs and the CSM?		
CS evaluation sub-questions		
<p>EQ1.1 How relevant are CSs to partner country contexts?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To country development policies, priorities and programmes? To the rights (economic, social, political, civil) and priorities of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries – especially the easily marginalized groups? To donor partners? 	<p>The strategic choices made in the CSs in terms of interventions and how they are undertaken</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> are aligned to country development policies, priorities and programmes target development objectives that are a priority / issues for country stakeholders and beneficiaries, especially easily marginalized groups take into account what donor partners perceive as priority take into account the development context of the country are aligned with aid effectiveness commitments / principles are aligned to the objectives and principles of the 2012 DPP and take appropriate account of sector / thematic guidance / papers and other Finnish guidance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partner country development strategy and policy documentation, national sector/thematic, ODA policies/frameworks Finnish DPP, guidance documentation and sector/thematic guidelines CSM documentation (instructions, templates) CSs, engagement plans and related results reports CS planning/updating process documentation Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme, and other Finnish evaluations, reviews and reports Country development statistics Secondary literature on country development status and priorities
<p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ1.3 How relevant is the CSM to MFA management and country programme2 managers' needs?</p> <p>EQ1.4 How has CSM ensured Finland's strategic choice relevance to key stakeholders and development country contexts?</p> <p>EQ1.5 Is the CSM aligned to OECD DAC/ international best practices?*</p>	<p>The CSM fulfils the needs of senior management in MFA and country teams related to country programming and management of country programmes</p> <p>The CSM – through its approach, rules, information requirements and processes – contributed to the relevance of CS strategic choices as measured (see all CS evaluation sub-questions)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CSM is flexible in responding to different country context, e.g. countries in transition/phase-out of bilateral aid vs fragile countries <p>The CSM – through its approach, rules, information requirements and processes – facilitates the alignment of country programmes with aid effectiveness principles as measured</p> <p>The CSM is aligned to OECD/DAC country programming best practices</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews Studies and reviews from other sources Documentation on country programming practices of selected bilateral donors Interviews with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) with other relevant government officials with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners) with country implementing partners with country stakeholders/programme beneficiaries, incl. also private sector, civil society, academia & the media as relevant with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 2: Are Country Strategies and the CSM effective?</p> <p>CS evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ2.1 What are the actual interventions undertaken by the Finland country programme as framed by the CS?</p> <p>EQ2.2 Did the CS interventions achieve their planned purposes?</p> <p>EQ2.3 What development results are observed relevant to CS interventions, intended and unintended?</p> <p>EQ2.4 What contribution have CS interventions made to the specific development objectives and development result areas?</p> <p>EQ2.5 How aid-effective is the country programme as framed by the CS?</p> <p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ2.6 How effective is the CSM/CSM processes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was the introduction of CSM managed inclusively (including key stakeholders), and well? What are CSM programming, monitoring, reporting and accountability practices, in principle and in practice? Do these present effective RBM: do they facilitate learning and accountability? Does the CSM contribute to better targeting and measuring of results by MFA? <p>EQ2.7 Has the CSM contributed to more effective (including aid effective) country programming?</p>	<p>Effectiveness assesses the contribution of the CS interventions to Finland's specific objectives</p> <p>Planned interventions took place and their purposes were/are being achieved as evidenced by existing reports, reviews and evaluations</p> <p>The Theory of Change causal chain implied by the Country Strategy from these target results to specific Finnish objectives, and the underlying assumptions is valid, taking into account social, political and institutional factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution can be argued from the Finnish interventions (targeted at policy influence and direct interventions) to the specific objectives targeted, given other factors <p>The Finnish country programme as framed by the CS is aid-effective: the programme facilitates the leveraging of project and programmatic intervention results towards development effectiveness against the specific objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Direct interventions and efforts to achieve policy influence are mutually reinforcing <p>The management of the switch to CSM from CEPs at country level was inclusive and contributed to more effective CSs as measured. Change management was effective.</p> <p>The CSM contributes to effective results-based management in MFA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reporting and management responses against the CSs is regular, accurate and appropriate for learning & accountability The CSM facilitated the selection of appropriate indicators, given targeted results in CS At country & MFA level the CSM facilitates learning & accountability The CSM has facilitated more effective aid management at a corporate level and better upstream results reporting within MFA 	<p>CSs, engagement plans</p> <p>Annual and semi-annual (results) reports, synthesis reports</p> <p>Possible upstream results reporting</p> <p>Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme</p> <p>Project annual report/completion reports</p> <p>Other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports</p> <p>Country development statistics and secondary literature on country development status and priorities</p> <p>OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews</p> <p>Comparison of the quality of CSM and country engagement plan guidance and annual results reporting</p> <p>Studies and reviews from other sources</p> <p>Interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) with relevant government officials with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners) with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant with programme beneficiaries with country implementing partners with other in-country development partners

Evaluation criterion: Effectiveness

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 2: Are Country Strategies and the CSM effective?</p>	<p>The approach, rules, information requirements and processes of the CSM has facilitated a feasible Theory of Change results chain / country programme logical model taking into account country social, political and institutional circumstances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CSM has contributed to appropriate targeting of results and objectives given Finland's (small) relative financial contribution as a development partner • The CSM has contributed to better results-based thinking on on-going interventions at the time of the CS, and has resulted in appropriate (past, current, expected) changes to the country programme • The CSM has contributed to better incorporation of the findings of project/programme monitoring reports, reviews and evaluations in CS review, reporting • The CSM has contributed to appropriate implementation of aid-effectiveness commitments and principles 	<p>Evaluation criterion: Effectiveness</p>

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 3: What is the impact of the CSs and does the CSM contribute to this?</p> <p>CS evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ 3.1 What are evidence or signals of impacts from CS interventions?</p> <p>EQ 3.2 To what extent does the CS TOC pathway support likely contribution to impacts?</p> <p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ3.3 Do existing CSM instructions and templates provide adequate guidance to build feasible CS impact pathways and to identify and report on appropriate impact indicators?</p>	<p>Impact assesses the upper end of the result chain, from Finnish specific objectives to the development goal</p> <p>Impact is accurately reported</p> <p>In the absence of timely data against relevant impact measures, documentation and key respondents highlight signals of evidence of impact</p> <p>The implied pathway from specific objectives to the development goal in the Theory of Change and underlying country programme logic model is feasible.</p> <p>The CSM guidance and its implementation have contributed to better country team thinking on impact, and best pathways to impact.</p>	<p>Evaluation criterion: Impact</p> <p>Country social and economic statistics</p> <p>Independent secondary articles, reports, reviews and evaluations relevant to the Finnish country programme, as framed by the CS.</p> <p>Finnish country and relevant regional and global reports, reviews, evaluations</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>CS documentation, including reports and management responses</p> <p>CSM guidance documentation</p> <p>Interview with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level • with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) • with relevant government officials • with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant • with programme beneficiaries • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 4: Are CSs complementary, coordinated and coherent and does the CSM contribute to this?</p>	<p>Evaluation criteria: Complementarity, coordination and coherence</p>	
<p>CS evaluation sub-questions</p>	<p>CS interventions are implemented using country systems to the maximum extent</p>	<p>CSs, engagement plans and all reports against strategies</p>
<p>EQ4.1 Are CSs/CS interventions aligned to country systems?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Including systems for planning, budgeting, disbursement, implementation, reporting, monitoring/reviewing and auditing 	<p>Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme</p>
<p>EQ4.2 How well coordinated are CSs/CS interventions with other development partners?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If systems are not used directly, comprehensive and timely information on Finnish country programme is available to country partners 	<p>Other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports</p>
<p>EQ4.3 How complementary are CSs/CS interventions to non-CS Finnish development cooperation in long-term partner countries?</p>	<p>Finland participates regularly and effectively (in terms of the resulting degree of coordination of the Finnish country programme) in donor coordination structures</p>	<p>Country development statistics and secondary literature on country development status and priorities</p>
<p>EQ4.4 How internally coherent are CSs (inter- and intra-sector)?</p>	<p>The CSs specific objectives and interventions are well coordinated with inputs from other development partners, in other words they represent an appropriate division of labour between the MFA and other development partners in country</p>	<p>OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are CS interventions mutually reinforcing so that the sum of CS intervention results is more than the parts? 	<p>CSs and CS intervention take into account and complement other (non-CS) channels of Finnish development cooperation, and vice versa so that they contribute coherently to DPP objectives, including the CS development goal</p>	<p>CSM guidance documentation</p>
<p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p>	<p>The CS leverages the results of specific interventions to contribute coherently to the specific objectives targeted</p>	<p>Studies and reviews from other sources</p>
<p>EQ4.5 Does the CSM contribute to better alignment with partner country systems and coordination with development partners?</p>	<p>The country programme as framed by the CS does not (overly) fragment Finnish development resources</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level
<p>EQ4.6 Does the CSM contribute to complementarity between channels/instruments in Finnish development cooperation in country?</p>	<p>CSM guidance and actual CS design, monitoring and reporting processes and documentation appropriately emphasize complementarity with other Finnish aid channels, coordination with development partners, alignment with country systems and internal CS coherence.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) with relevant government officials
<p>EQ 4.7 Does the CSM result in a coherent (inter and intra sector) CS and a CS coherent with other relevant Finnish policies??</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners) with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant with programme beneficiaries with country implementing partners with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 5: Do CSs and the CSM contribute to efficient Finnish Development Cooperation?</p> <p>CS evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ5.1 How well are risks identified and managed?</p> <p>EQ5.2 How efficiently are resources (money, people, partnerships) deployed in the CS country programme to deliver results?</p> <p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ5.3 How efficient are CSM processes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How clear are CSM frameworks & guidance? • How costly are CSM processes to manage CSs given the observed results from CSM? <p>EQ5.4 How has CSM contributed to Finnish development policy implementation efficiency and risk management?</p>	<p>The risks identified in the CS represent a thorough assessment of risks and the management of risks is appropriate given development goals and objectives</p> <p>Disbursements of Finnish resources have been predictable / timely</p> <p>The CS represents the most cost-effective choice of objectives and interventions, given Finnish resources (including financial, human and partnership resources)</p> <p>CSM processes use MFA resources (financial, human, time) efficiently to produce the RBM outcomes observed</p> <p>CSM guidance is clear, comprehensive and coherent, resulting in efficient and effective processes and documentation</p> <p>CSM prescribed processes are appropriate to be fit for purpose in different contexts</p> <p>The CSM has contributed to efficient implementation of Finnish development policy and sound risk management, i.e. balancing risks and benefits of intervention choices appropriately</p> <p>CSM has contributed to the selection of interventions with most value-for-money considering expected impacts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSM has contributed to resource-constrained planning and targeting of results 	<p>Evaluation criterion: Efficiency</p> <p>Country strategies, engagement plans and all reports against strategies</p> <p>Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme + other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports</p> <p>CSM guidance documentation</p> <p>Studies and reviews from other sources</p> <p>Interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level • with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) • with relevant government officials • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 6: Do CSs and the CSM contribute to sustainable results from Finnish Development Cooperation?</p> <p>CS evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ6.1 To what extent do specifically local partners/stakeholders own the CS and participate in CS interventions?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How inclusive was the process to develop the CS? • Is there sufficient participation by local partners/stakeholders across programme/project cycles to support sustainability? <p>EQ6.2 How sustainable are interventions and their results (ecologically, financially, politically, institutionally)?</p> <p>CSM evaluation sub-questions</p> <p>EQ6.3 Does the CSM contribute to more sustainable Finnish DC?</p> <p>EQ6.4 How sustainable are CSM processes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is CSM human resource capacity building and systems adequate? • Are there in-built mechanisms to enable learning on CSM? <p>EQ6.5 Does the CSM ensure CS responsiveness to better ensure sustainability in changing contexts</p>	<p>The Human Rights-based approach is integrated into the CS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The process to develop the CS, as well as processes to report on and revise the CS are inclusive of local partners and stakeholders • Beneficiaries, particularly marginalized groups, participate in Finnish country programme processes across the project/programme cycle so that local ownership is built • The country programme as framed by the CS contributes to rights awareness and the ability of rights-holders to claim their rights, and country duty bearers to fulfil the rights <p>The results targeted and achieved in the country programme as framed by the country strategy are sustainable, given institutional and financial factors.</p> <p>The Finnish country programme and its interventions as framed by the country strategy is ecologically sustainable and contribute to ecological sustainability</p> <p>CSM guidance and implementation prioritise sustainability (ecological, financial, institutional) of Finnish Development Cooperation results</p> <p>Capacity building at MFA and country level has been sufficient to sustain CSM processes</p> <p>Result information management systems are well developed, build on national development/result indicators to the extent possible, and will sustain CSM</p> <p>The CSM is flexible and has adapted to implementation experience, changing country contexts</p> <p>The CSM has contributed to better reporting on results from Finnish aid, which has supported the sustainability of Finnish DC</p>	<p>Evaluation criterion: Sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Country strategies, engagement plans and all reports against strategies – Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme, and other Finnish evaluations, reviews and reports – Studies and reviews from other sources on country programmes – Interviews • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level • with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) • with relevant government officials • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant • with programme beneficiaries • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 7: What improvements to CSs and the CSM are necessary to improve Finnish DC?</p> <p>EQ7.1 What improvements are needed relative to country priorities and changing contexts, <i>inter alia</i>**</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on sector/programme choices and strategically extending development cooperation to new sectors or thematic areas? • in modes and mechanisms of cooperation? • In transitioning and phasing out/maintaining/scaling up bilateral aid? • to advance partnerships and cooperation in non-state sectors of the economy? <p>EQ7.2 What improvements in the CSM modality are necessary to ensure more relevant, effective, impactful, efficient, coherent complementary and sustainable CSs?*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What improvements are necessary? • Who should make these improvements? • When should improvements be made? • How should improvements be made? 	<p>Improvements that will make the CS and related country programme more relevant, effective, impactful, efficient, complementary, coordinated, coherent, sustainable.</p> <p>Improvements to the CSM that will ensure that it contributes better to country programmes and to RBM in MFA.</p> <p>Improvements in the CSM that will make it more relevant to MFA needs, more efficient and more sustainable.</p>	<p>Country CS evaluation data and analysis</p> <p>Country CSM evaluation data and analysis</p> <p>Validation with key country and CSM actors and stakeholders</p>

* These questions are not answered in the country evaluations

** This question is not answered in the synthesis report

Table 7: Mozambique-specific questions

Mozambique-specific question from TOR	Relevant EQ	Comment
To what extent has the Country Strategy responded to the changing country context in Mozambique?	<p>EQ1.1 How relevant are CSs to partner country contexts?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To country development policies, priorities and programmes? 	The evaluation examined whether the strategic choices made in the CSs take into account the evolving development context of the country.
Is the Country Strategy balanced enough in terms of the chosen priority sectors?	<p>EQ7.1 What improvements are needed relative to country priorities and changing contexts, inter alia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> on sector/programme choices and strategically extending development cooperation to new sectors or thematic areas? 	The evaluation identified Improvements that will make the CS and related country programme more relevant, effective, impactful, efficient, complementary, coordinated, coherent and sustainable.
To what extent does the Country Strategy complement the work of other donors and what is the strategy's value added?	<p>EQ4.2 How well coordinated are CSs/CS interventions with other development partners?</p>	The evaluation assessed whether the CSs specific objectives and interventions were well coordinated with inputs from other development partners, in other words they represent an appropriate division of labour between the MFA and other development partners in country.
As the donor dependency of Mozambique is decreasing, the evaluation should give medium-term strategic recommendations for Finland's cooperation in Mozambique.	<p>EQ7.1 What improvements are needed relative to country priorities and changing contexts, inter alia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> in modes and mechanisms of cooperation? In transitioning and phasing out bilateral aid? to advance partnerships and cooperation in non-state sectors of the economy? 	The evaluation examined the role that the Finnish private sector can play and the extent to which MFA is engaging with prominent national companies – for example, are there examples of Finnish companies who are looking to engage in development-related partnerships who could support aspects of the existing Country Strategy? What are the linkages of the bilateral aid portfolio to the full range of Finnish development instruments – and related aspects of commercial and political actions?

Evaluation criteria and other terminology

Table 8 shows the definitions used for the main evaluation criteria. Table 9 below explains other key terms, namely aid effectiveness, results-based management (RBM) and the human rights-based approach (HRBA).

Table 8: Evaluation criteria

Evaluation criterion	Definition
Relevance	The extent to which the CS objectives and its implementation are consistent with the priorities and rights of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries; partner country development policies and priorities; and Finnish development policies. The extent to which the CSM has been relevant to OECD / DAC best practices.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the CSM's and CSs' objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance, directly and indirectly.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, etc.) are converted to results.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from an intervention after major assistance has been completed. The probability of long-term benefits. The resilience to risk (ecological, financial and institutional) of the net benefit flows over time.
Impact	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the CS or likely to be produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Coherence	The consistency of policy/programme elements of the CS with each other (do they complement each other in a positive, mutually reinforcing way?), as well as the consistency of the CS with non-development cooperation policies of Finland, such as trade, foreign and security and human rights policies, as appropriate.
Coordination	The complementarity, cooperation and division of labour of the CS in relation to other donors
Complementarity	The degree to which the CS complements and/or takes into consideration other instruments of Finnish development cooperation that are not incorporated into the strategy

Table 9: Terms associated with approaches to development cooperation

Term	Definition
<p>Aid effectiveness</p>	<p>Aid effectiveness is about delivering aid in a way that maximises its impact on development and achieves value for aid money.</p> <p>A narrow definition of aid effectiveness would refer simply to the relationship between aid and its outcomes, in other words aid effectiveness is an assessment of the effectiveness of development aid in achieving economic or human development. In common usage however, the term is strongly associated with the key principles in respect of how aid is delivered to achieve this outcome. These principles have been agreed between partner countries and development partners through a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness and include ownership, alignment, harmonisation, a focus on results, and mutual accountability. The evaluation will use the term to refer to the application of these principles towards effective use of development aid. This is in line with the MFA Evaluation Manual, according to which an assessment of aid effectiveness would focus on evaluating the implementation of Paris Declaration principles</p> <p><i>Source: Killian, B, 2011: How much does aid effectiveness improve development outcomes, Busan Background Papers, OECD DAC; MFA Evaluation Manual</i></p>
<p>Results based management</p>	<p>The MFA guideline on results-based management defines it as follows: Results based management therefore involves shifting management approach away from focusing on inputs, activities and processes to focusing more on the desired results. OECD/ DAC defines RBM as “<i>A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts</i>”. In conclusion, results based management in development cooperation is simultaneously:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An organizational management approach, based on a set of principles; • An approach utilizing results based tools for planning, monitoring and evaluating the performance of development projects and programs. <p><i>Source: MFA, 2015: Results-based management in Finland’s Development Cooperation, Concepts and Guiding Principles, MFA.</i></p>
<p>Human rights based approach</p>	<p>HRBA means that human rights are used as a basis for setting the objectives for development policy and cooperation. In addition, it means that the processes for development cooperation are guided by human rights principles.</p> <p>Finland’s human rights-based approach is in line with the UN Statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming (the Common Understanding) adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in 2003, which stipulates that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments; • Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process; • Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights. <p><i>Source: MFA, 2015a: Human Rights Based Approach in Finland’s Development Cooperation. Guidance Note, 2015</i></p>

ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

N.B. Titles and positions reflect the situation that prevailed at the time of the interviews in 2016.

FINLAND

Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland

Laura Torvinen, Director of KEO-50 the Unit of Financial Institutions

Saana Halinen, VIE-50, Communications Counsellor, External Economic Relations (former Head of Cooperation, Embassy of Finland, Maputo)

Kari Alanko, Deputy Director General, ALI

Marjaana Pekkola, Senior Advisor (Agriculture) KEO-20 (former advisor for rural development at the Embassy of Finland, Maputo, during 2006-2011)

Arto Valjas, Senior Advisor, ALI Department of Africa and Middle East

Tuulikki Parviainen, Mozambique Team Leader

Juhana Lehtinen, Desk Officer (Mozambique Team)

Other

Matti Kääriäinen, Former Finnish Ambassador to Mozambique

Klaus Talvela, Freelance consultant (formerly Deputy Director and Stifimo home coordinator, Niras)

Pamela White, Project Director, FCG

Jorma Peltonen, Director, FCG

MOZAMBIQUE

Embassy of Finland in Maputo

Seija Toro, Finnish Ambassador to Mozambique

Markus Heydemann, Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Cooperation

Anni Mandelin, Counsellor (Agriculture)

Pauliina Mulhovo, Counsellor (Governance)

Sirpa Sinervää, Counsellor (Education and Innovation)

Hélder Nombora, Coordinator, Education sector

Elina Penttinen, Coordinator, FASE, Education sector

Odilia M. Marques, Coordinator, Economy and Trade

Government of Mozambique

Albertina Alage, Deputy Director, Directorate of Rural extension, Ministry of Agriculture and food security

Raimundo Matule, Ministry of Agriculture and food security

Ismael Nheze, Director, National Institute for the Development of Education (INDE)

Manuel Rego, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Human Development (MINEDH)

Sheila Santana Afonso, Permanent Secretary, MITADER

Yolanda Milena Mangore Goncalves, Director of Planning and Cooperation, MITADER

Momade Nemane, Director of International Cooperation, MITADER

Nastercia Tivane, Deputy Director of Co-operation, Ministry of Economy and Finance

Vasco Correia Nhabinde, Director of Economic and Finance Studies, Ministry of Economy and Finance

Mety Gondola, former STIFIMO coordinator, Ministry of Science, Technology, Higher and Technical Professional Education and

Natercia Tivane, Deputy Director of Co-operation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Orlando Penicela, Directorate of Cooperation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Joseé Mercias, Directorate of Cooperation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Antonio Luis, Directorate of Cooperation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Victor Monteiro, Directorate of Cooperation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Taiena Baulane, Directorate of Cooperation, Ministry of Economics and Finance

Berta Cossa, Director: Europe and the Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Donors

Alicia Herbert, DFID Country Representative

Jemima Gordon Duff, DFID Governance specialist

Anita Sandström, Swedish Head of Cooperation

Robert Backlund, Swedish Programme Manager, Public Sector Reform

Jesus Alfredo, Swedish Cooperation with Tribunal Administrativo

Antoon Delie, Belgian Head of Cooperation

Claudine Aelvoet, Belgian Counsellor for International Cooperation (Agriculture)

Mamunune Nordine Agy, Senior Programme Officer, Belgium Development Agency

Kevin Colgan, Head of Cooperation, Ireland DFA

Diarmuid McClean, First Secretary, Development, Education, Health, Gender, Ireland DFA

Caroline Ennis, Economist, Ireland DFA

Innocencio Macuacua, Good governance lead, Ireland DFA

Cornelia Batchi, Pro-Education, GIZ

Cristina Gutiérrez, Spain Head of Cooperation

Javier de la Cal, Counsellor, agriculture and rural development , Spain
Cristina Manzanares, GBS lead, Spain
Erasmus Saraiva, Counsellor for agriculture and rural development, Austrian Development Agency,
Riccardo Morpurgo, Italian Head of Cooperation
Paolo Mistè, Italian agriculture sector lead
Jose Capote, Advisor Economist, Norway
Paula Pereira, GBS lead, Portugal
Raquel Baptista Leandro, Technical Sector of Cooperation, Portugal
Susan Jay, Governance and civil society lead, USAID
Sven Stucki, Governance lead, Switzerland
Telma Loforte, Economist, Switzerland
Sylvie Estriga, EU Political Section (EOM)
Enrico Strampelli, EU Head of Cooperation and GBS lead
Ton Negenman, First Secretary, Economic Affairs, Food Security and Private Sector Development, Netherlands
André Almeida Santos, AfDB Principal Country Economist (GBS)

UN agencies

Iris Uyttersportprot, Education, UNICEF
Private sector
Eufrigina dos Reis Manoela, Executive Director, Mozambique Debt Group
Humberto Zaqueu, Programme Manager, Mozambique Debt Group

NGOs

Birgit Holm, Executive director, ADPP
Professor Jaime Alipio, Coordinator AFOTALECER
Ritva Parviainen, KEPA Consultant and former KEPA Country Director
Lucia Jofrice, Climate justice, natural resources, sustainability, KEPA
Mário Machimbene, Politics and development cooperation and corporate justice & advocacy work in civil society, KEPA
Leopoldino Jerónimo, Programme officer for strengthening civil society, governance, democracy, KEPA
Morgen Gomo, Interim Country Director and agriculture sector lead, SNV
Rens Verstappen, Consultant, SNV
Simião Simbine, Regional Coordinator for Southern Africa, Finnish Trade Union Solidarity Centre (SASK)
Eufrigina dos Reis Manuela, Executive Director, Grupo Mozambicana da Divida
Humberto Zaqueu, Program Manager, Grupo Mozambicana da Divida

Academic and research institutions

Finn Tarp, Director, UNU-Wider

Egas Andrade, FORECAS counterpart, University of Eduardo Molane

Nelsa Massingue da Costa, Director of Planning, Resources and Administration, IESE

Luis de Brito, Research Director, IESE

Carlos Muianga, Research Assistant, IESE

Angela da Cunha, Administration, IESE

Antonio Francisco, Research Director, IESE

Antoniao Leao, University of Eduardo Mondlane and former STIFIMO coordinator

Esperanca Chamba, FORECAS counterpart, Agrarian Research Institute of Mozambique

Others

Thomas Selemane, political economist

Soila Hirvonen, Consultant

Sofia Chaichee, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Office of the UN Resident Coordinator

ANNEX 4: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH MOZAMBIQUE

Year	Month	MFA engagement	Other events
1975			Mozambique independence.
1984		Finland enters into development cooperation with Mozambique.	
1987		Mozambique becomes one of Finland's main recipient countries.	
1998		Finland begins support to the education sector.	
2002	September		First MoU for support to FASE (Mozambique's Education Sector Support Fund) was signed in September 2002 and later the same year the first disbursements were made.
2003			Agenda 2025 adopted by the GoM in 2003.
2005	Late	Finland begins supporting the PROAGRI sector programme	
2006		Finland begins support to inclusive rural development in the Zambézia province through the PRODEZA project (Support to Rural Development in the Zambézia Province) implemented in Mocuba and Maganja da Costa districts. First phase 2006–2010.	
2008		Finland one of three co-chairs on the agriculture sector donor group.	
2009		Finland one of three co-chairs on the agriculture sector donor group.	Start of National Forestry Programme 2009–2014, which aims to boost the sustainable use of natural resources, good governance, development of the local forest industry and adaption to climate change.
	May	Finland chairs budget support donor group until April 2010 (involves 19 donors).	
	March	Country negotiations with Mozambique result in decision that Finland would continue to pursue programme cooperation in the education and agriculture sectors in Mozambique and budget support would also be continued. Finland's Development Cooperation programme in Mozambique 2009–2011 is produced.	

Year	Month	MFA engagement	Other events
2009		Finland begins support to the forestry sector through the Forest Sector support programme (SUNAP/APRONAF)	
2010		Last year that Finland funds the health care sector programme (a lot of donors active in the health care sector).	Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA 2010–209)
		Finland's support to the implementation of the Mozambican National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy (MOSTIS) begins – Programme of cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation between Finland and Mozambique (Stifimo).	
	December	Start of Prodeza II, which was designed to focus on encouraging local economic growth through the development of agricultural value chains, while also supporting local food security for poorer members of the rural community in the target districts and promoting good governance and decentralisation.	
2011			National Poverty Reduction paper, PARP 2011–2014, key framework document for external assistance to Mozambique.
2012	May	Nordic Conference on 'Inclusive Growth – Opportunities for Mozambique: Sharing Nordic Experiences' held in Maputo. Finland committed to supporting the promotion of inclusive growth and private sector development, including public-private partnerships in Mozambique	Vision of Public Finance published, with GoM planning to end aid dependency by 2025.
			New Education Sector Plan 2012–2016 (ESP III)
2013	February	Finland's Country Strategy 2013–2016 derived from the Government of Mozambique's Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2011–2014 (PARP). It is structured under three Country Development Results (CDR).	
		A mid-term evaluation of Stifimo was carried out. Its main findings were that the programme had been poorly designed and it was too ambitious for the Mozambican context.	
		Mid-term evaluation of Prodeza II conducted.	
2014	April	Finland joined the FASE coordination troika in April 2014 and will lead the troika from April 2015 to March 2016.	
	June	With the support of the MFA, Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo (ADPP), initiated a 4 year project, the "Farmers' Clubs for wealth creation among smallholder farmers".	Mozambique approves a National Development Strategy (ENDE 2015–2035) to guide country's development over the next 20 years.
	December	Stifimo programme ended, as planned.	

EVALUATION

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MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF FINLAND