

EVALUATION REPORT

January 2020

unicef 

for every child

UNICEF Contribution to Education in Humanitarian Situations

■ **Volume I:**
synthesis of evaluation findings

EVALUATION REPORT

January 2020

UNICEF Contribution to Education in Humanitarian Situations

- Volume I: synthesis of evaluation findings

Evaluation of UNICEF contribution to education in humanitarian situations

© United Nations Children's Fund, New York, 2020

Three United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
January 2020

The publication of evaluations produced by the UNICEF Evaluation Office fulfils a corporate commitment to transparency. The reports are designed to stimulate a free exchange of ideas among those interested in the topic of the evaluation, and to assure those that support the work of UNICEF that organization embraces the imperative to examines its strategies, results and overall effectiveness rigorously.

The contents of the report do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of UNICEF. The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on the legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of frontiers. The text has not been edited to official publication standards and UNICEF accepts no responsibility for error.

The copyright for this report is held by the United Nations Children's Fund. Permission is required to reprint/reproduce/photocopy or in any other way to cite or quote from this report in written form. UNICEF has a formal permission policy that requires a written request to be submitted. For non-commercial uses, the permission will normally be granted free of charge.

For further information, you may write to the Evaluation Office at the address below to initiate a permission request.

Evaluation Office
United Nations Children's Fund
Three United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
evalhelp@unicef.org



PREFACE

Since its inception in the aftermath of the Second World War, UNICEF has been an important global humanitarian actor, responding to emergencies all over the world. This long experience has served the organization well in its efforts to meet the needs of children affected by crises worldwide. Yet the humanitarian landscape is constantly evolving, presenting new challenges and demanded new ways of working – a reality that has been thrown into stark relief with the COVID-19 crisis. Several of the ongoing emergencies also present an education crisis, threatening the right to education of millions of the world's children. Ensuring that UNICEF is delivering the best possible education response for children affected by crisis has never been more urgent.

Launched in 2019, the evaluation of the UNICEF contribution to education in humanitarian contexts was designed to determine the extent to which the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts is 'fit-for-purpose' to deliver equitable access to quality education in humanitarian contexts. The evaluation was particularly timely in light of global normative shifts around equity, inclusion and quality of education.

The evaluation examined education in emergency programmes in the period 2014 to 2018. It concluded that UNICEF had adequately discharged its responsibilities as the lead agency for education in emergencies, advocating successfully for the importance of education as a core component of humanitarian response and contributing significantly to strengthening the global architecture for education in emergencies. It also found that the organization had taken the first steps toward strengthening the links between humanitarian response, development and national goals in education. UNICEF programmes had increased access to learning opportunities for a variety of learners in compliance with the organization's Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action and offered education programmes that were appropriate and effective in during the early stages of rapid onset emergencies. At the same time, the evaluation noted that UNICEF education in emergencies programmes were not as successful in protracted crises.

The evaluation recommends that UNICEF pursue the following actions: (a) Equip leaders with adequate capacities and tools to reflect the commitment to deliver education as an essential part of the humanitarian response; (b) ensure learning opportunities are equitable and promote gender equality and disability inclusion in humanitarian contexts; (c) lead key education partners at the country level to develop, implement at scale and share innovative and impactful learning solutions for children affected by acute emergencies, protracted crises and public health crises; (d) strengthen technical capacities for staff and partners in a variety of skills, including targeting the most marginalized children, priority-setting, knowledge management and monitoring and evaluating programmes outcomes; and (e) strengthen engagement with education sector partners and strengthen the role of local and national actors in the education response as a way to reinforce accountabilities to affected populations.



The evaluation was executed by Mokoro, Ltd. On behalf of the Evaluation Office, I would like to thank Muriel Visser for her leadership and guidance, and to acknowledge the contribution of the evaluation team consisting of Christine Fenning (Research Coordinator and Evaluator), Allison Anderson (education in emergencies specialist), Arran Magee (education in emergencies specialist), Nick Maunder (humanitarian specialist), Beth Hodson (survey specialist), Zoe Driscoll (researcher/evaluator) and Liam Bluer (project assistant). I would also like to acknowledge the role of Stephen Lister and Paul Isenman, who provided quality assurance and support.

At UNICEF headquarters, conversations with Robert Jenkins, Linda Jones, Lisa Bender, Lisa Deters, Rachel Cooper, Wongani Taulo, Mattheu Brossard, Daniel Kelly, Yacouba Abdou, Nicolas Reuge, and Manuel Cardoso enriched the evaluation. The contributions of additional colleagues from UNICEF Programme Division, Office of Emergency Programmes and DAPM (Anna Azaryeva Valente, Anthea Moore and Suguru Mizunoya, respectively) as well as from colleagues in regional offices (Sayaka Usui, Adrianna Vogelaar, Urmila Sarkar, Carmen van Heese, Francisco Benavides, Dominik Koepll and Erin Tanner are gratefully acknowledged.

Field-based data collection and analysis was supported by Dina Batshon, Olad Farah, and Pemba Tamang (Nepal). National consultants enriched the evaluation with their extensive knowledge of critical education sector issues and national perspectives, as well as making connections with key institutions and interlocutors in each of their countries. We are grateful, also, for their expertise. Colleagues in UNICEF country offices under the leadership of Phuong Nguyen (Somalia), Marilyn Hoar (Nepal) and Hide Tsuruoka (Jordan) provided invaluable inputs and received vital support and cooperation from government and other education sector partners.

My colleagues in the Evaluation Office also deserve recognition for their work in seeing the evaluation through. Kathleen Letshabo conceptualized the evaluation approach, managed the evaluation and brought her own expertise in education to bear by providing extensive inputs to finalize the evaluation report. Adrian Shikwe provided technical support, while Dalma Rivero, Celeste Lebowitz and Geeta Dey provided strong administrative support throughout the evaluation.

I commend the efforts of everyone that was involved in the evaluation and believe that colleagues in UNICEF and the vast network of partners will find the findings, insights and recommendations herein useful and timely.

George Laryea-Adjei
Director
Evaluation Office
UNICEF



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations	viii
Executive Summary	x
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1 Overview	2
1.2 Evaluation objectives and scope	2
1.3 Context for UNICEF engagement in education in humanitarian contexts	4
Chapter 2. UNICEF work in education in humanitarian contexts	8
2.1 UNICEF global humanitarian response and coordination	9
2.2 An overview of UNICEF engagement in education in humanitarian contexts	9
2.3 Coordination and partnership for ducation in humanitarian work	16
Chapter 3. Methodology	19
3.1 Theory-based approach	20
3.2 Contribution analysis	25
3.3 Gender and human rights	26
3.4 Evaluation process	26
3.5 Evidence collection methods	27
Chapter 4. Evaluation findings	29
4.1 Appropriateness of UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts	30
4.2 Results of UNICEF work in education humanitarian action	39
4.3 Internal coherence and coordination	57
4.4 External coherence and coordination	66
4.5 Contribution to the triple nexus	75
4.6 Factors affecting the results	89
Chapter 5. Summary assessment, conclusions and recommendations	97
5.1 Assessment on the assumptions of the theory of change	98
5.2 UNICEF contribution to global advocacy and in-country education emergency response	101
5.3 Assessment on the adjustments required in humanitarian programming	102
5.4 Main conclusions	103
5.5 Recommendations	106
Bibliography	111



continued: TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tables

Table 1	Main evaluation questions	3
Table 2	Stakeholder analysis summary	4
Table 3	UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action – Education	10
Table 4	Types of emergency and post-crisis interventions (UNICEF Education Strategy 2007)	12
Table 5	UNICEF Strategic Plan commitments for education in humanitarian contexts	12
Table 6	UNICEF support to access to education in emergencies 2014-2018	16
Table 7	Theory of change assumptions	22
Table 8	Evaluation questions and sub-questions	23
Table 9	Selected country case studies	28
Table 10	Regional office initiatives for EiE advocacy and learning	43
Table 11	Education solutions in case study countries	50
Table 12	Theory of change assessment	99

Figures

Figure 1	Global humanitarian funding for education, 2010 to 2018	7
Figure 2	EiE funding as percentage of total humanitarian funding	7
Figure 3	UNICEF humanitarian and EiE funding, 2010-2018 (US\$ million)	15
Figure 4	UNICEF education staff by region 2018	15
Figure 5	Inferred Theory of Change	21
Figure 6	Contribution analysis	26
Figure 7	Evaluation process	27
Figure 8	Other Resources Emergency – Education Expenditure, 2014-2018 (in US\$)	34
Figure 9	UNICEF education expenditure by region, 2014–2018	38
Figure 10	UNICEF donors' total EiE expenditure by region, 2018 (in US\$ and cumulative share)	38
Figure 11	UNICEF staff perception on integration of education and WASH in humanitarian contexts	59
Figure 12	UNICEF staff perception on integration of education with protection in humanitarian contexts	60
Figure 13	Areas for improvement of education programmes in humanitarian situations	66
Figure 14	Level of the organization with the greatest need for dedicated EiE staff	66
Figure 15	Success factors for UNICEF programmes in EiE	90

Boxes

Box 1	6+1 Cluster Core Functions	11
Box 2	The Global Education Cluster's Strategic Plan: responding to paradigm shifts	17
Box 3	Understanding UNICEF contribution to education in humanitarian contexts	25
Box 4	Examples of UNICEF recognized contributions and outcomes to global advocacy	32
Box 5	Selected education strategy survey findings on staff capacity	36
Box 6	Examples to demonstrate impact of global and regional level partnerships on UNICEF work	42
Box 7	UNICEF as Provider of Last Resort in CAR	48
Box 8	Examples of the UNICEF role as Provider of Last Resort	49
Box 9	Barriers to education for children with disabilities	53
Box 10	UNICEF Jordan country office upstream advocacy work for disability	54
Box 11	Upstream work in Somalia	56
Box 12	Country examples of cross-sector work by UNICEF	59



Box 13	Syria Example	61
Box 14	Selected examples of support that was provided	63
Box 15	Areas where further support is needed (survey respondents)	63
Box 16	Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands – approach to training and capacity development	65
Box 17	EiE guidance materials for UNICEF staff and partners	70
Box 18	Stronger planning and prioritization through education coordination in Syria	71
Box 19	Liberia: EiE challenges when an epidemic closes schools	72
Box 20	Country examples of resource use decisions that enhanced complementarity and coherence	74
Box 21	UNICEF commitments on humanitarian and development programming	78
Box 22	The six commitments under workstream 2 of the Grand Bargain	79
Box 23	New Way of Working in Nepal	82
Box 24	UNICEF contribution to the EiE response in Somalia	101
Box 25	UNICEF contribution to the EiE response in Nepal	102

Annexes (in Volume II)

Annex 1	Terms of Reference
Annex 2	Background – Education in Humanitarian contexts
Annex 3	Timeline of Education in Emergency
Annex 4	UNICEF engagement in EiE — timeline
Annex 5	Previous evaluations/studies
Annex 6	Annotated description of methodology
Annex 7	Stakeholder analysis
Annex 8	Survey
Annex 9	Evaluation process
Annex 10	Case study findings
Annex 11	Gender and inclusion
Annex 12	Reporting and monitoring
Annex 13	Education solutions in Nepal, Jordan and Somalia



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa	EMOPs	Office of Emergency Programmes
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance	EPP	Emergency Preparedness Platform
AoR	Area of Responsibility	ERT	Emergency Response Team
C4D	Communication for development	ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
CADRI	Capacity for Disaster Reduction Institute	ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
CAR	Central African Republic	EQ	Evaluation Question
CCC	Core Commitments for Children	EU	European Union
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency	GADRRRES	Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector
CEC	Community Education Committee	GCPEA	Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
CLA	Cluster Lead Agency	GEC	Global Education Cluster
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child	GEMR	Global Educating Monitoring Report
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework	GPE	Global Partnership for Education
Danida	Denmark's development cooperation	GRIP	Guidance for Risk Informed Programming
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)	HATIS	Humanitarian and Transition Support
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
EAPRO	East Asia and Pacific Regional Office	HEA	Humanitarian Education Accelerator
ECA	Eastern Caribbean Area	HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ECARO	Europe and Central Asia Regional Office	HLSG	High Level Steering Group
ECD	Early Childhood Development	HQ	Headquarters
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid	HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ECW	Education Cannot Wait	IASC	inter-Agency Steering Committee
EEPCT	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme	ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
EFA	Education for All	IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
EiE	Education in Emergencies	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (8 countries in east Africa)
EMIS	Education Management Information System		



IIEP	(UNESCO) International Institute for Educational Planning	RIP	Risk-Informed Programming
IM	Information Management	RO	Regional Office
INEE	Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies	ROSA	Regional Office for South Asia
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization	SCI	Save the Children International
IRC	International Rescue Committee	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
IRRM	Integrated Rapid Response Mechanism	SHARP	Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
LACRO	Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office	SMQ	Strategic Monitoring Question
LEG	Local Education Group	SP	Strategic Plan
LNGO	Local NGO	TCI	Turks and Caicos Islands
LTA	Long-Term Agreement	TLM	Temporary Learning Materials
MDG	Millennium Development Goal	TLS	Temporary Learning Structure
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office	ToC	Theory of Change
MoE	Ministry of Education	TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
MPS	Minimum Preparedness Standards	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism	UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
NWOW	New Ways of Working	UNGEI	United Nations Girls' Education Initiative
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ODI	Overseas Development Institute	UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
PBEA	Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy	UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (now UNDRR)
PCA	Programme Cooperation Agreement	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
PLR	Provider of Last Resort	WCARO	West and Central Africa Regional Office
PSS	Psycho-Social Support	WFP	World Food Programme
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association	WoS	Whole of Syria



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

E1. Humanitarian crises pose a critical threat to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 4 which calls for inclusive and equitable quality education for all and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. As of 2018, approximately 128 million children and young people living in crisis-affected countries were out of school globally, 67 million of whom were girls.¹ The already dire situation grew even more critical in light of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), with an estimated 1.29 billion children in 186 countries affected by school closures as of May 2020. The right to education is under threat as never before, requiring a predictable, timely and effective response that ensures children have equitable access to quality learning in all contexts and at all stages of education.

E2. Sustainable Development Goal 4 represents a paradigm shift for the global education community, from a focus on ensuring access to primary education in the era of the Millennium Development Goals, to ensuring access, participation, equity and learning for all stages of education. Across the Sustainable Development Goals, there is an emphasis on strengthening the link between humanitarian and development work; this requires attention to building safer and more equitable education systems, while ensuring well-coordinated national, regional and global systems to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

E3. The World Humanitarian Summit, held in 2016, also injected new life into the global education architecture with the establishment of Education Cannot Wait, a new global fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises. The birth of this fund and a package of reforms on humanitarian financing known as the Grand Bargain² represented a renewed commitment to education in humanitarian contexts, although funding levels remain significantly short of what is needed.

E4. Within this overall framework and as part of its mandate for children, UNICEF work in education in emergencies is guided by its corporate strategic objectives, its education strategy, and the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action. For a part of the evaluation period, UNICEF work in education in emergencies fell under the UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2014–2017. Another part of the evaluation period falls under the subsequent Strategic Plan, 2018–2021, which is aimed at responding to the paradigm shift noted above, wherein the focus on access to primary education was expanded to ensuring access, equity and learning for all ages and stages of education.

Evaluation approach: scope and methodology

E5. The overall aim of the evaluation was to determine the extent to which the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts is “fit-for-purpose” to deliver equitable access to

¹ Plan International, “Left out, left behind: adolescent girls’ secondary education in crises” (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2019).

² As a major actor in the humanitarian sector, UNICEF endorsed the 32 commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit (2016), which includes a package of reforms known as the Grand Bargain on humanitarian financing and shoring up national capacities. UNICEF has since filed annual progress reports to the Grand Bargain secretariat.



quality education. In keeping with the purpose, the scope of the evaluation was broad, both thematically and geographically. It included UNICEF work at the global, regional and country levels and examined all components of the education response, from operational to policy levels, including coordination and cluster roles. The evaluation covered the period 2014–2019, spanning the UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2014–2017 and the first two years of the Strategic Plan, 2018–2021.

E6. Data were collected through a mixed-methods approach, including a detailed documentation review, key informant interviews and case studies (six desk-based and three in-country), supported by triangulation and iterative feedback. A survey supported the validation of the emerging findings. Case-study countries were selected to be representative of the range of settings and types of emergencies in which UNICEF operates. A contribution analysis perspective was applied at the global level and in country for three of the nine country cases — Jordan, Nepal and Somalia — to examine three

themes: education solutions and results; coordination and the leveraging of partnerships; and the link between humanitarian, development, and peace programming, respectively.

E7. The overarching question the evaluation sought to answer was: “What has been the UNICEF contribution to education emergency response and programming, and is UNICEF succeeding in strengthening its contribution to education outcomes for various groups of children that are susceptible to different humanitarian crises?” Six key evaluation questions were identified, as shown in Table E1.

Selected findings, conclusions and recommendations

Appropriateness of education work in humanitarian contexts

E8. In addition to whether the programmes are tailored to the needs of children in humanitarian contexts, appropriateness addresses the question of whether UNICEF is investing in the right strategies. To that end, the evaluation found that

Table E1: Key evaluation questions

Key evaluation questions
EQ1. How appropriate has the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian situations been, taking account of UNICEF mandate and objectives?
EQ2. What are the identifiable results of UNICEF work in education in humanitarian situations? Are there discernible patterns in these results? Do the results match UNICEF objectives and mandate?
EQ3. How coherent and coordinated have approaches to education in humanitarian situations been within UNICEF?
EQ4. Has UNICEF work in education in humanitarian situations been coherent and coordinated with that of external partners?
EQ5. To what extent has UNICEF work in education in humanitarian situations strengthened linkages between humanitarian and development programming?
EQ6. What factors account for the success or setbacks of UNICEF work in education in humanitarian situations?



the strategies were appropriate. Strategies that UNICEF deployed to offer access to safe learning environments and providing life-saving information and psychosocial support, were considered to be appropriate, coherent and clear. However, not much was available in terms of practical guidance to assist country offices in making difficult choices on what to prioritize, or on how to tailor strategies to specific contexts. Also, questions were raised, both within the organization and externally, on what additional actions are required to improve the quality of education and learning in humanitarian contexts, especially in acute emergency contexts. A key input would be to clarify the additional measures, beyond minimum quality standards, that should be taken to improve learning outcomes in emergency contexts and the additional capacities that are required (e.g., funding, staffing, corporate guidance).

E9. The evaluation also found that UNICEF education programmes in humanitarian contexts generally adhered to the organization's Core Commitments for Children and the minimum standards for education preparedness, response and recovery.³ However, case studies for this evaluation and a synthesis of humanitarian evaluations⁴ highlighted the need for greater contextualization of the Core Commitments to different types of emergencies (e.g., protracted crises, public-health emergencies, slow or rapid onset). The revision of the Core Commitments has taken many of these concerns these into account.

E10. At the country level, UNICEF education in emergencies programmes were found to be broadly relevant to the education needs of children in humanitarian contexts. However, two challenges were identified. First, UNICEF work in education in emergencies was generally more appropriate in natural disasters than in

complex, protracted crises. Second, UNICEF was not specific enough in targeting children most in need. Across settings, targeting of education in emergencies interventions was affected by weaknesses in data collection, disaggregation and reporting.

Resources

E11. UNICEF expenditure on education in emergencies increased significantly, from \$242.5 million in 2014 to \$718.8 million in 2018, signalling success in the advocacy efforts, and an increased commitment to EiE on the part of donor nations. However, EiE accounted for only 10 per cent of the humanitarian funding received by UNICEF and remained short of needs. Moreover, the increase in funding was not evenly distributed, with over half of education in emergencies expenditure going to the Middle East and North Africa region.

E12. While UNICEF was successful in providing surge support in crises through the global education cluster Rapid Response Team, UNICEF regional offices, UNICEF rapid response teams and standby partners, staffing capacity for education in emergencies was found to be insufficient. For instance, the global work plan at UNICEF headquarters (in New York) was implemented by a few staff members, who expansive tasks of providing oversight for the Learning for Peace programme; supporting partnerships and networks; participating in the establishment of Education Cannot Wait; developing guidance on risk-informed programming; and supporting the Ebola response, among other areas of work. Consequently, UNICEF headquarters was perceived (internally and externally as expressed across key informant interviews) as reactive and responding in an ad hoc manner rather than strategic manner. This also had consequences for internal coordination and quality of support.

³ Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies, Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery (2010).

⁴ UNICEF, Towards improved emergency response: synthesis of UNICEF evaluations of humanitarian action 2010–2016 (2017).



Results of UNICEF work

E13. The evaluation found that UNICEF substantially contributed to the evolution of the global architecture for education in emergencies. For example, the organization had a pivotal role in the establishment of the Education Cannot Wait fund, and through advocacy and active participation in the Global Partnership for Education. While it is impossible to quantify the organization's contribution, stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team were consistently of the view that UNICEF played a major and critical role in positioning education in emergencies more centrally in the education and humanitarian landscapes, in collaboration with key partners.

E14. UNICEF also demonstrated effective representational, advocacy and technical leadership within several temporary working groups to influence new global humanitarian and development frameworks, and as a founding member of the various key networks that make up global education in emergencies architecture, including the global education cluster, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector, and the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative. Regional offices provided leadership for various initiatives that advanced education in emergencies, often despite funding constraints, even though the work was found to be ad hoc. The recent enhancement of capacities for knowledge-management communication is expected to improve the sharing of lessons between the global, regional and country levels.

E15. At the country level, the evaluation found that UNICEF made significant progress towards the benchmarks of the Core Commitments for Children, and in increasing education access at all levels, from early childhood through adolescence. In collaboration with implementing partners, UNICEF offered non-formal education services for out-of-school children and, to the

extent possible, remedial education to prepare children for re-entering formal schooling. With the new education strategy, the organization is taking additional steps to strengthen its focus on learning outcomes and skills for active citizenship and employability.

E16. The education package UNICEF typically implements as part of the education emergency response consists of the provision/construction of temporary learning spaces. This approach was found to be effective in acute emergency settings and critical to ensuring access to and the continuity of safe learning opportunities for boys and girls. For more protracted emergencies, UNICEF requires a greater focus on building internal understanding and technical capacity as well as partnerships to shift focus from supplies to quality teaching and learning. It also requires a better understanding of practical actions to align humanitarian and development programming and financing, strengthen work and communication on innovations and develop a more robust approach to applied learning across levels.

E17. As co-lead for the education cluster, UNICEF is designated as provider of last resort, conferring the responsibility to ensure predictability in the education cluster response and the coverage of all populations that need assistance (Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 2018). Drawing from examples in country case studies, the evaluation found that UNICEF discharged its responsibility as provider of last resort, often filling gaps by delivering assistance in remote and hard-to-reach areas, in collaboration with local partners. However, it also found that UNICEF has not always been successful in its responsibilities as provider of last resort in countries with serious funding gaps.

Coherence and coordination

E18. **Internal coherence:** The evaluation found that water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and child protection were generally well integrated into education in emergencies activities.



This success was linked to the UNICEF role as cluster lead in these areas. Coherence and coordination with other sectors was variable. The evaluation noted that, across case studies, intersectoral work in country offices was stronger in acute emergencies. It also noted a need for better coordination between headquarters, regional and country offices. At the country level, the evaluation pointed to the need to strengthen communication and teamwork, more user-friendly technical guidance for the benefit of implementing partners and strengthening of the knowledge management function. The evaluation also found that there was room to improve coherence between the UNICEF education team at the global level and the global education cluster, which were reported to often work in parallel.

E19. External coherence: At the global level, the evaluation found good coordination and coherence with other actors on advocacy and policy and in marshalling the inputs to strengthen the education in emergencies architecture. In countries with weak education capacities, there was strong alignment with the Government and ministries of education as principal partners. UNICEF also promoted coherence through its cluster co-lead role. The evaluation observed a growing complementarity and cross-sectoral coordination between partners working on education in emergencies, WASH and child protection, mirroring the complementarity between these sectors within UNICEF. Bilateral coordination with partners was not as strong, with organizations often duplicating similar in areas of work.

E20. UNICEF played a role in enhancing the effectiveness of EIE by supporting the strengthening national systems and coordination structures and building the capacity of Governments, progressively working towards the handover of responsibility to them. More attention should be paid to building capacity at the subnational level, however. Relatedly, while UNICEF is channelling an increasing proportion of funds through local

NGOs in most of the case-study countries, the organization should systematically prioritize building the capacity of local NGOs. Limitations in the capacities of these key partners may limit UNICEF contributions to systems-strengthening and sustainability.

Strengthening resilience and linking humanitarian and development programming

E21. Linking humanitarian and development programming is a stated priority for UNICEF. The evaluation observed that the organization took the first step by issuing guidance through an internal UNICEF procedure issued in 2019. More work is required on practical tools for contextualizing and operationalizing the global guidance for the different country contexts and programme sectors, including education.

E22. In most of the countries, UNICEF advocated successfully for national institutions to integrate education in emergencies responsibilities, and in supporting national systems to be more responsive to and resilient in emergencies.. Relatedly, UNICEF was successful in promoting the mitigation and prevention of risk in national education systems. This work was strongest with respect to natural disasters and, to a much lesser extent, conflict. Other hazards, such as health crises and economic crises, were less well anticipated, monitored and responded to. Also, UNICEF was recognized to have invested heavily at the corporate level in developing strong guidance to support multi-hazard risk-informed programming and preparedness planning. Progress was most evident with regard to preparedness and mitigating the effects of natural disasters, but these need to be scaled up and prioritized further. However, improvements are necessary in packaging and applying this guidance to the education sector.

E23. Overall, the short-term nature of most humanitarian funding was an impediment to integrating the longer-term planning required



for programmes to mature and transition into the development phase, including peacebuilding. However, positive impacts of pilot projects linking education to peace were reported, even though programmes were not taken to scale or sustained within national systems or UNICEF country-office priorities. In the absence of a strong corporate focus, the extent to which peacebuilding approaches were included in education programmes was often a reflection of commitment from office leadership or of individuals, particularly those who were exposed to the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme (PBEA).

Gender equality and disability inclusion

E24. Overall, gender was consistently mainstreamed in needs assessments, planning and reporting and in global tools and frameworks. The evaluation found that staff were generally aware of and making efforts to address gender-related inequalities, and a review of UNICEF planning documents across the country studies found consistent examples of gender mainstreaming. The most visible work of UNICEF on gender was around attention to the enrolment and retention of girls in schools (e.g., the Central African Republic, Jordan, Nepal, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic). Other areas of work included menstrual hygiene kits and the provision of separate latrines in collaboration with the WASH sector/clusters. In Nepal and the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, this meant providing WASH-integrated and gender- and disability-friendly schools (Syrian Arab Republic) and transitional learning structures (Nepal). In Nepal, menstrual hygiene management was also integrated into education services.

E25. Nonetheless, mainstreaming gender into education humanitarian response in line with the Gender Action Plan needed strengthening. Across countries, the evidence suggests that the organization missed opportunities to adequately contextualize guidelines, to reflect more deeply

on gender gaps and to apply lessons learned and good practices across sectors, including education. For example, project proposals committed to addressing gender balance in all activities in Dominica; however, these commitments were not followed through in reporting. For instance, in Liberia, Ebola had a disproportionate effect on girls because barriers that affect them were not addressed during school closure. Relatedly, gender mainstreaming and gender-based violence were featured in subsequent teacher-training efforts even though subsequent reporting did not establish the effect of these activities.

E26. Even though there was commendable progress with regard to programming for children with disabilities in a handful of countries (e.g., Jordan), evidence suggested that such vulnerable groups as children with disabilities, children in pastoralist communities, over-age students and girls facing child marriage were not sufficiently prioritized in programming. The need to build a variety of technical capacities to incorporate disability inclusion in planning and reporting was identified.

Conclusions

E27. Conclusion 1: Over the evaluation period, UNICEF consistently advocated for the importance of education in emergencies as part of the humanitarian response and played a strong leadership role at the global level in furthering the education in emergencies agenda. Education is more strongly recognized as a necessary part of the humanitarian response, which is in itself an achievement. Consequently, funding to education in emergencies has increased and larger numbers of children have been reached. However, continued advocacy is needed to ensure that education is consistently and immediately prioritized at the same level as other elements of the response and that funding



is provided in ways that allow UNICEF to link humanitarian and development programming towards long-term education solutions.

E28. Conclusion 2: Guided by the Core Commitments for Children, the evaluation concluded, by and large, that UNICEF made a difference in humanitarian contexts by providing continued access to safe educational opportunities and continuity of learning, mostly by erecting learning spaces that offer primary education and non-formal education services. However, the evaluation also indicates that, due to resource constraints and a shortage of technical capacity, planned coverage has often fallen far short of the needs, especially in protracted crises. The strengthening of technical capacities in monitoring and needs assessments will increase the effectiveness of UNICEF and partners in targeting children most affected by emergencies, in particular children with disabilities, and in priority settings, in line with the UNICEF Gender Policy, Gender Action Plan and UNICEF Guidance on including children with disabilities in humanitarian action. In addition, more work is needed to prioritize adolescents, ECD and the most vulnerable children, many of whom are out of school, as well as to report systematically on progress in reaching targets.

E29. Conclusion 3: UNICEF education solutions have generally been more appropriate to earlier stages of rapid-onset emergencies than to protracted crises. The availability of standardized supply-driven education solutions has allowed UNICEF to respond at scale to sudden-onset emergencies. Several best practices were identified that should allow UNICEF to further adapt and improve its education solutions in protracted crises. These include the improved design and management of temporary learning spaces; more locally adapted learning materials; stronger and more comprehensive teacher training and professional development; systems strengthening; stronger linkages across sectors; and longer-term planning and financing for

linking humanitarian and development work. Moving forward, UNICEF should build internal knowledge management of and capacity for adapting emergency education solutions from the standard supply-driven packages to more nuanced, longer-term solutions informed by a context analysis.

E30. Conclusion 4: As a cluster lead agency, UNICEF was instrumental in bringing together humanitarian actors to plan and implement a coordinated and collective response. These efforts have contributed to the achievement of collective results and have promoted efficiencies across contexts, such as better joint planning, targeting and prioritization, stronger coverage of gaps and the leveraging of the collective resources of partners. Strong sector coordination has also enabled UNICEF to serve as provider of last resort, although the extent to which this could be achieved has been limited by resource constraints in many contexts, especially in protracted crises. There are opportunities to increase collaboration and coherence between the UNICEF global work on education in emergencies and the work of the global cluster in ways that benefit the response at the country level and to leverage the UNICEF comparative advantages in each context.

E31. Conclusion 5: Within UNICEF headquarters and regional offices, staff capacities and the resourcing of education in emergencies was not commensurate with the growth of the portfolio, in terms of both its size and significance. Additional staff are required to strengthen the knowledge management function and coordination between different levels of the organization, across sectors, regions and countries. Opportunities also exist to strengthen joint work, clarify roles and responsibilities and learn across countries and regions, not least by tapping the experience of national UNICEF staff, who represent institutional memory and often have first-hand experience in emergency response.



E32. Conclusion 6: Country-level capacities for education in emergencies were strengthened over the evaluation period. Also, several corporate directives, frameworks and guidelines were developed, some of which were acknowledged as very useful. However, existing guidelines and frameworks should be consolidated into an integrated framework and a package of resources developed to support staff involved in education in emergencies. This package should incorporate the priorities of the new education strategy, which reflect a stronger focus on the quality of education and learning. The Education Strategy, 2019–2030 recognizes the importance of building UNICEF staff capacity. This is particularly important, as linking development and humanitarian work requires programming and leadership skills to address constantly changing needs while building adaptable systems and capacities for longer-term responses. Stronger investments are needed for UNICEF staff as well as for local and national partners.

E33. Conclusion 7: UNICEF has made good progress in linking humanitarian and development programming. As a first step, its work in helping to establish education — traditionally viewed as a development priority — as a critical priority in humanitarian response is itself a contribution. UNICEF has also made progress in developing corporate directives on linking humanitarian and development programming, although more reflection is required on the organization's roles and comparative advantages vis-à-vis partners. Strong contributions have been made in supporting Governments to integrate education in emergencies into education-sector policies and institutional capacities, and UNICEF work on preparedness and risk-informed programming has made a significant difference in internal and external preparedness to respond to crises. This includes UNICEF upstream work with Governments to include disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding in national policies and strategies.

E34. Conclusion 8: A range of good education practices exists in many countries that are implementing humanitarian programmes. However, limitations in UNICEF systems for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management have reduced the organization's capacity to learn and to improve its programming. While UNICEF headquarters has been increasingly involved in identifying and supporting innovations in education in emergencies, the flow of information and knowledge from that work could be improved. In addition, information flows in UNICEF concentrate on aggregate corporate reporting, which is not optimal for systematically collecting information on innovations, good practices or lessons learned at the regional and country levels.

E35. Conclusion 9: At the country level, UNICEF registered achievements in building the capacity of Governments and implementing partners. An important area of progress has been its upstream work with Governments to integrate education in emergencies into sector policies and the introduction of preparedness and risk reduction in country education plans. UNICEF has also increased its funding and engagement with NGOs in line with the localization agenda, although this needs further strengthening. Across different contexts, communities were effectively involved in awareness-raising initiatives, although this did not always translate into the voices and opinions of beneficiaries being taken into account in the design of the interventions. In addition, capacity-building at subnational levels has received less attention, despite its obvious importance. UNICEF needs to be more deliberate and systematic in capacity-building with front-line responders, communities, local NGOs and subnational government officials.



Recommendations

Recommendation 1: UNICEF should equip leaders (including Representative, Deputy Representative, and Chief of Education and Emergency Officers) with adequate leadership capacities and tools to work in a manner that reflects the organization's commitment to education as an essential part of the humanitarian response, across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus.

E36. UNICEF has contributed strongly to positioning the education sector at the centre of humanitarian response at the global, regional and country levels, and has achieved recognition for advocacy and for strengthening the global infrastructure for education in emergencies. The organization needs to reinforce these gains by better equipping country leadership teams with capacities and tools to strengthen the prioritization of education in humanitarian programming at the country level and to make informed decisions for humanitarian response, working across development and humanitarian programming and advocating for the education cluster in the country team and with Governments and partners.

E37. Education also needs to be consistently prioritized at the same level as other sectors in humanitarian action and funding needs to be provided in ways that allow UNICEF to link humanitarian and development programming towards long-term education solutions. While the evaluation found that education in emergencies funding increased both in absolute terms and as a proportion of overall education funding, it also found that education in emergencies still accounts for a small proportion of the humanitarian funding received by UNICEF and that it is unevenly distributed among the regions.⁵

E38. As the lead agency for education in emergencies, with additional accountabilities such as provider of last resort, it is incumbent upon UNICEF to champion the cause of education and to actively advocate for allocating more resources to education in humanitarian action. Relatedly, allocating resources to activities such as education preparedness planning is not only a step towards building resilience; it is also a necessary safeguard to mitigate future emergencies. Recommendation 1 therefore challenges UNICEF to invest in developing such tools as country investment cases for education in emergencies to support stronger advocacy for resources, partnerships and, ultimately, better results for children.

Recommendation 2: Recognizing the priorities of the education strategy, UNICEF should promote equitable learning opportunities in humanitarian education response, with particular emphasis on gender equality and disability inclusion.

E39. The evaluation found that UNICEF work in humanitarian contexts made a difference by providing continued access to safe educational opportunities and continuity of learning, mostly by creating learning spaces that offer primary education through formal and non-formal education modalities. It also concluded that UNICEF should pursue more effective equity approaches and tailor interventions to the specific needs and characteristics of the children. One constituency that must receive attention is girls, who are ordinarily and disproportionately disadvantaged due to social norms that impede their access to and participation in school. These disadvantages are amplified in humanitarian situations, where girls and young women are at a heightened risk for many other harmful practices, including gender-based violence and forced marriage.

⁵ Over half of education in emergencies expenditure was in the Middle East and North Africa region because of the Syrian Arab Republic crisis.



E40. Similarly, children with disabilities are almost always among those most in need of assistance, as they are at a heightened risk for similar abuses. Since both these groups are disproportionately excluded from educational opportunities, one of the key actions for promoting gender and/or disability inclusiveness and equality should be to seek out girls and children with disabilities, understand their barriers, views, priorities and capacities and ultimately ensure their participation in all levels of education.

Recommendation 3: UNICEF should lead key education partners to develop, implement at scale and share innovative and impactful learning solutions suited to the needs of children affected by acute emergencies and protracted crises, including public-health emergencies.

E41. One of the most daunting education challenges today is the “learning crisis” — the fact that **children** in most parts of the world have fallen behind in terms of mastery of age-appropriate knowledge and skills. Overall, the evaluation concludes that UNICEF education solutions are effective in the earlier stages of rapid-onset emergencies and credits this success to the availability of standardized supply-driven education solutions that often provide country offices with the capability to act swiftly and to roll out the response at the desired scale. However, the UNICEF solutions for education in protracted crises were assessed as much less effective. This conclusion also points to a limited emphasis on knowledge management, monitoring and evaluation, which has reduced the organization’s capacity to distil lessons to improve programming.

E42. Recommendation 3 challenges UNICEF and a range of partners in education in emergencies (traditional and non-traditional) to focus in a significant way on innovative solutions that produce tangible learning outcomes, well beyond the current dominant focus on access to safe learning spaces. These may include the improved design

of the content and management of temporary learning; the development and adaptation of locally sourced and culturally appropriate learning materials; innovative ways of capacitating a learning workforce in instances in which the professional teaching force is depleted; and the use of information and communications technology for instructional purposes, such as interactive audio instruction. These solutions should also cover the needs of children in their early years as well as adolescents, especially girls, well beyond the current focus on children in the primary school age.

E43. Recommendation 3 also calls attention to the need to assess the efficacy of learning solutions and to validate them for different types of emergencies, learning contexts and learning modalities and platforms in order to extend access and coverage to a variety of children and to determine the scalability of the learning solutions. To that end, UNICEF partners need to embark on a systematic and sustained effort to build a range of capacities at the individual and institutional levels, based on the comparative advantages of partners.

Recommendation 4: In implementing the Core Commitments for Children on education, UNICEF should strengthen capacities of staff and partners with responsibilities for education in emergencies in the identification and targeting of affected children and the monitoring and reporting of interventions and outcomes to ensure that education in humanitarian action reaches the most marginalized children.

E44. The recently revised Core Commitments for Children outline programmatic commitments for education and associated benchmarks in six areas, namely: leadership and coordination; equitable access to learning; safe learning environments; mental health and psychosocial support; strengthening education systems; and community engagement for behavioural and social change. However, the benchmarks



indicated for each commitment communicate the absolute minimum, considering the extensive needs of children in emergencies, and the expectations implied in UNICEF education in emergencies objectives and work plan.

E45. The evaluation notes the progress that UNICEF has made in building capacities among staff who implement education in emergencies programmes. This effort has however not kept pace with a growing education in emergencies portfolio and/or UNICEF humanitarian footprint, resulting in gaps in the technical expertise of staff around core elements of humanitarian programming in general, education in emergencies and the education humanitarian response. As a result, the evaluation recommends a systematic capacity-building approach organized around meeting the six relevant commitments of the Core Commitments for Children and the IASC- and Sphere-endorsed INEE Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery as well as implementing the Education Strategy, 2019–2030, and that pays particular attention to providing the skills required to support Governments in their transition from humanitarian to development programming, including peacebuilding and resilience.

Recommendation 5: UNICEF should strengthen its engagement with the education sector (Government, private sector and civil society) by ensuring that the design and implementation of education in emergencies interventions capitalizes on national capacities, to strengthen the localization agenda and reinforce accountability to affected populations.

E46. UNICEF holds the responsibility and privilege of being the lead United Nations agency for education in emergencies, co-lead of the global education cluster and the designated provider of last resort in IASC-coordinated responses. In this context, UNICEF should further advance the commitments on accountability to affected

populations, reinforce national and local systems, invest in local capacities and pursue programmes in a manner that links humanitarian and development programming.

E47. The evaluation concludes that, while most programmes had a community engagement component which included awareness-raising initiatives on several components of the education response, the voices and opinions of affected children and their families were not always taken into account in the design of interventions. Furthermore, UNICEF needs to invest more in the capacities of front-line responders, including community representatives, local NGOs and government officials at the subnational level. The recommendation is for UNICEF to build on the progress noted by the evaluation by strengthening community consultations in the planning, design and implementation of programmes, facilitating systematic communication and dialogue by creating feedback loops to fulfil mutual accountabilities.



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION



CHAPTER 1

1.1 Overview

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the UNICEF contribution to education in humanitarian situations.⁶

The evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office and carried out by Mokoro Ltd.⁷ This introductory chapter summarizes the overall objectives and scope of the evaluation and provides an analysis of the context for UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts and hence the subject matter of the evaluation. Chapter 2 describes UNICEF work, while Chapter 3 describes the evaluation process and the methodology. Findings are presented in Chapter 4 against each of the six main evaluation questions, while the closing chapter outlines overall conclusions and recommendations. Annexes provide supporting evidence as relevant and are available in Volume II of the report. The report has a companion volume which contains all annexes (Volume II), as well as case study reports for Jordan, Nepal and Somalia.

1.2 Evaluation objectives and scope

The overall aim of the evaluation was to determine the extent to which the UNICEF is ‘fit-for-purpose’ to deliver equitable access to quality education in humanitarian contexts and to determine whether UNICEF has made the necessary adjustments to increase its efficiency and effectiveness as an organization with a growing

footprint in education humanitarian action.⁸ The evaluation also examined achievements of results for education in emergencies (EiE) response and programming, both for accountability purposes and to learn from more recent experiences.

Scope of the evaluation. The evaluation covers UNICEF work from 2014–2019, spanning UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017 and the first two years of the new Strategic Plan (2018–2021). The evaluation covers all components of the education response in line with the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) and considers the UNICEF coordination role at country and global levels. The evaluation also focuses on a range of modalities for support, including direct implementation and implementation through government partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations.

Geographic coverage. The evaluation is global in scope. A desk-based review was conducted in nine countries, covering Eastern and Southern Africa Region (ESAR), Middle East and North Africa Region (MENAR), South Asia Region (ROSA), West and Central Africa Region (WCAR) and Latin America and the Caribbean Region (LACR). The desk-based review and in-country case studies did not include any countries in

⁶ Two terms are used in this report - education in humanitarian contexts and education in emergencies (EiE). Education in humanitarian contexts is a term that describes the programme of work that is implemented when a humanitarian emergency occurs, while EiE is commonly used to describe the sub-sector.

⁷ Terms of Reference (TORs) for the evaluation are presented as Annex 1 in Volume II of this report.

⁸ The evaluation team added “with regard to education in humanitarian contexts” to this statement from the TORs as the scope of our work is this universe, not the entire humanitarian portfolio.



Europe and Central Asia (ECAR) or from the East Asia and Pacific Region (EAPR) as indicated in Chapter 3, even though interviews with stakeholders from these regions were conducted.

The overarching issue - ***whether UNICEF education emergency response and programming in 2014-2019 contributed to the improvement of education outcomes for various groups of children that are susceptible to different humanitarian crises*** - was investigated through six main evaluation that are presented in Table 1.

Three themes were identified for amplification in each of the three countries which hosted a field-based data collection mission, namely:

- The humanitarian-development-peace nexus: examines how UNICEF is strengthening the linkages between its humanitarian and development mandates for education in humanitarian contexts.⁹
- Education solutions/packages/interventions: examines the relevance and effectiveness of education services and support that UNICEF offers to beneficiaries during humanitarian action.
- Partnerships and coordination: examines the lead role, accountabilities and commitment to coordination of UNICEF within the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) Education Cluster and other coordination bodies as well as UNICEF global, regional and national partnerships, including the role of UNICEF with partners in shaping the EiE architecture.

Table 1: Main evaluation questions

Key Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria
EQ0. What has been the context for UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts?	appropriateness
EQ1. How appropriate has the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts been, taking account of UNICEF mandate and objectives?	appropriateness, coherence, coordination
EQ2. What are the identifiable results of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts? Are there discernible patterns in these results? Do the results match UNICEF objectives and mandate?	effectiveness
EQ3. How coherent and coordinated have approaches to education in humanitarian contexts been within UNICEF?	internal coherence and coordination
EQ4. Has UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts been coherent and coordinated with that of external partners?	external coherence and coordination
EQ5. To what extent has UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts strengthened the humanitarian-development-peace nexus? ¹⁰	connectedness
EQ6. What factors account for the success or setbacks of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts?	effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, coordination

⁹ This includes a review of programming and intended to mitigate risks, build resilience and strengthen systems that deliver essential services to the most marginalized populations so that no one is left behind.

¹⁰ Humanitarian-development-peace nexus is used throughout in this report as this is the terminology of the TOR. However, it is understood that the terminology of humanitarian-development nexus is now more currently used within UNICEF.



- In line with the evaluation questions these themes were examined across the portfolio. In addition, the themes received particular attention in the three countries which were covered by field visits, with Somalia focusing on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, Jordan on education solutions, and Nepal on partnerships and coordination.

A wide range of stakeholders played a role in the evaluation process. Table 2 summarises the broad groups of stakeholders, while additional details about the stakeholder analysis are provided in Volume II Annex 7.

1.3 Context for UNICEF engagement in education in humanitarian contexts

This section describes the global humanitarian context and important developments in the global normative framework that influenced the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts over the evaluation period. A full review of the evolution of approaches to education in emergencies and a detailed chronology of global developments are provided in Annex 2 and Annex 3 of Volume II, respectively.

Table 2: Stakeholder analysis summary

Stakeholder groups
GLOBAL STAKEHOLDERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UNICEF staff• Evaluation Advisory Group• United Nations agencies and representatives, and multilateral institutions• Donors, funds and funding initiatives• Humanitarian response and coordination bodies and key EiE partners working across the triple nexus• Global EiE-related networks, institutions and initiatives
REGIONAL-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UNICEF Regional EiE Focal Points and Education Advisors, as well as regional humanitarian advisors• Regional EiE initiatives and UN and NGO advisors• Regional inter-governmental education bodies
COUNTRY-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UNICEF country office staff• Ministry of Education and related national government departments• Country-level humanitarian and coordination leadership• Country-level education stakeholders, including de facto education providers in conflict situations• Country-level education donors• Country-level beneficiaries



1.3.1 Global humanitarian context

The humanitarian landscape has seen considerable change over the six years covered by this evaluation (2014 – 2019). According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 witnessed humanitarian action on a scale larger than in any previous year since the founding of the United Nations, while more than 134 million people across the world needed humanitarian assistance and protection in 2018 (OCHA, 2018). In 2018, UNICEF and partners responded to 285 humanitarian situations, of which 80 were natural disasters. In 2018, there were 22 inter-agency Humanitarian Response Plans, compared with 12 in 2008. In addition, the average length of humanitarian crises has increased from 5.2 years in 2014 to 9.3 years in 2018, warranting concurrent response plans for many years. Moreover, the 2019 Global Humanitarian Overview (OCHA, 2019) states that humanitarian crises affect more people over longer periods than a decade ago.

Crises pose a crucial threat to prospects of achieving SDG4, which calls for inclusive and equitable quality education for all and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. As of 2016, over 75 million children aged 3 to 18 living in countries facing war and violence were in need of educational support, which is recognized as essential to providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection (ODI, 2016a). The situation for children and adolescents in humanitarian crises is expected to worsen, with a recent forecast that by 2020 there will be an estimated 550 million children aged 3 to 18, from 64 countries whose education is under threat from war, endemic high violence, or environmental hazards (Theirworld, 2018). By 2030, this number is expected to rise to 622 million. It is expected that

22 percent of these children will not complete primary school and 54 percent will not complete secondary school.

1.3.2 The evolving global normative framework

During the period under review there have been important developments in the broad UN strategy and global normative framework, in particular, the shift from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¹¹ to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030.¹² The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development commits to ‘leave no one behind’ and ‘reach the furthest behind first’; it specifically references people affected by humanitarian emergencies, recognizing that targets will not be reached without concerted efforts in conflict-affected and fragile states. The SDGs also represent a paradigm shift for the global education community: – from a focus on ensuring access to primary education, to a focus on access, equity and learning for all ages and stages of education. Across the SDGs there is a focus on strengthening the link between humanitarian and development work; this requires attention to building safer and more equitable education systems while ensuring well-coordinated national, regional and global systems to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

In parallel, other events and initiatives have aimed to strengthen links between humanitarian and development interventions, and to address risk reduction and resilience. These include the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (2015), the World Humanitarian Summit’s Grand Bargain and New Ways of Working (2016), and the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) (2016). The Sendai Framework commits to strengthen disaster risk

¹¹ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/news.shtml>

¹² <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>



governance at the national, regional and global levels and to enhance disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‘build back better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both the New Ways of Working (NWOW) and the Grand Bargain commitments seek to transform the way humanitarian action is delivered, coordinated and financed, by: reinforcing, rather than replacing, national and local systems; anticipating, rather than waiting for, crises; and transcending the humanitarian-development divide by incorporating development (or at least a path to development) in humanitarian action. This involves by working towards collective outcomes based on comparative advantage and over multi-year time frames. The CRRF is essentially ‘a new way of working’ on refugee response, emphasizing collective outcomes and initiating long-term planning for durable solutions from the first stages of an emergency. Ultimately all of these new commitments seek to put in place more comprehensive, coherent, predictable and sustainable responses that enhance local capacity and resilience.

The World Humanitarian Summit also led to a change in the global education architecture with the establishment of Education Cannot Wait (ECW), a new global fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises. ECW is a response to inadequate attention to the education response in emergencies and the very low share of humanitarian funds allocated to the educational needs of people affected by emergencies and conflict. It was explicitly designed to address the obstacles that have prevented humanitarian and development actors from delivering quality education. The mandate of ECW is to “generate greater shared political, operational and financial

commitment to meet the educational needs of millions of children and young people affected by crises, with a focus on a more agile, connected and faster response across the humanitarian development nexus in order to support sustainable education systems.”

UNICEF played a leading role in the establishment of ECW. Its launch at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 reflected a major effort in advocacy for the humanitarian relevance of education, but progress in increasing humanitarian allocations to the sector remains slower than what is needed. Nonetheless, notable progress has been made, among others with a much stronger accent and higher levels of funding by the European Commission to education as part of the humanitarian response after it won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and dedicated the monetary awarded to the launch of the EU Children of Peace Initiative. The total amount spent by the European Commission on education in emergencies reached €201.4 million between 2012 and 2017, including €34 million through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey and €23.5 million through the Emergency Support Instrument. This Commission has also earmarked an increasing percentage of its annual humanitarian budget to education in emergencies, which reached a new target of 8 percent in 2018.


1.3.3 Global funding for education in humanitarian contexts

Global humanitarian funding for education in humanitarian response has increased in absolute terms over the past years, as illustrated in Figure 1 which shows amounts towards appeals only, as well as appeals and non-appeal related funding.¹³

¹³ ECW estimations based on OCHA Financial Tracking System data with values adjusted to constant 2018 prices using OECD-DAC deflators. OCHA’s Financial Tracking System depends on voluntary reporting by organizations, so these figures are estimates rather than hard fact.



Figure 1: Global humanitarian funding for education, 2010 to 2018




Source: ECW Annual Report 2018, Figure S2.3 (ECW, 2019).

However, education remains low as a proportion of the overall humanitarian funding. On average, education has been included in 80 percent of humanitarian appeals since 2010 and in 83 percent of humanitarian appeals in 2018 (ECW, 2019). The Education Cluster, however, has

been one of the worst funded clusters, though this is changing with the support of ECHO¹⁴ and ECW. Figure 2 shows a slow but steady increase in EiE funding as a percentage of total humanitarian funding over the last few years, reaching 4.3 percent in 2018.

Figure 2: EiE funding as percentage of total humanitarian funding



Source: ECW Annual Report 2018, Table S2.4 (ECW, 2019, p. 31).

¹⁴ European Commission humanitarian aid.



CHAPTER 2

UNICEF WORK IN EDUCATION IN HUMANITARIAN CONTEXTS



CHAPTER 2

This chapter describes UNICEF education in emergencies portfolio at the global, regional and country level, how the work is framed, policies and strategies that drive it, and how it has evolved over the evaluation period.

A review of the work was undertaken in nine countries (Volume II, Annex 2), which included a timeline of milestones in education in emergencies (Volume II, Annex 4).

2.1 UNICEF global humanitarian response and coordination

The mission of UNICEF is to promote the rights of every child. UNICEF is singled out explicitly in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989) as a source of technical expertise and advice on children's issues. The Convention recognizes education as a legal right for every child on the basis of equal opportunity and guarantees free compulsory primary education for all (articles 28 and 29). In every humanitarian action that the organization engages in, UNICEF operationalizes those rights through the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) which are the agency's central policy to uphold the rights of children affected by humanitarian crises (UNICEF, 2010). The organization works in partnership with governments, humanitarian organizations, civil society and a variety of other education stakeholders, mobilizing both domestic and international resources (UNICEF, 2010). UNICEF humanitarian response and coordination work is also guided by humanitarian principles and other internationally agreed norms, standards and commitments.

2.2 An overview of UNICEF engagement in education in humanitarian contexts

UNICEF strategic result within education CCCs is to ensure that girls and boys access safe and secure education and critical information that enhances their well-being. Indicated in Table 3, the newly revised CCCs link outlines six core commitments and performance benchmarks for education in humanitarian contexts.¹⁵



¹⁵ The 2010 version of the CCCs were under revision when the evaluation was being undertaken. A rollout for this new version is planned for 2020.



Table 3: UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action – Education

Strategic result	
Children and adolescents have access to inclusive, quality education and learning in safe and protective environments	
Commitments	Benchmarks
1: Leadership and coordination Effective leadership and coordination are established and functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Education sector/cluster coordination and leadership¹⁶ functions are adequately staffed and skilled at national and sub-national levelsCore leadership and coordination accountabilities are delivered
2: Equitable access to learning Children and adolescents have equitable access to inclusive and quality learning opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Formal and non-formal education programmes, including early learning and skills¹⁷, are available and usedInclusive access to education opportunities is ensured with a specific attention to girls, children with disabilities, refugees, displaced children and other marginalised or vulnerable childrenTeachers and other education personnel are trained to provide quality learningLearning is measured to monitor the quality of education
3: Safe learning environments Children and adolescents have equitable access to safe and secure learning environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Preventive measures are taken to make learning environments safe and accessibleLearning environments are free from sexual harassment, abuse and violencePreventive measures are taken to make learning environments healthy and free from disease outbreaks
4: Mental Health and Psychosocial support Mental Health and Psychosocial support for students, teachers and other education personnel is available in learning environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Gender- and age-appropriate mental health and psychosocial support programmes are delivered in schools and learning environments
5: Strengthening education systems Education systems are risk-informed to ensure inclusive, quality education and safe and protective learning environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Education plans, budgets and programmes are informed by risk and conflict analysisContinuity of education for all children is ensured, with a specific attention to girls, children with disabilities, refugees, displaced children and other marginalized or vulnerable children. Vulnerable groups are factored into education plans, budgets and programmes
6: Community engagement for behaviour and social change Children and caregivers have timely access to culturally appropriate, gender- and age-sensitive information on educational options and other social services, and are engaged in interventions creating a conducive learning environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Children, their caregivers and communities are aware of available education services and how and where to access themTimely information on social services is available through learning environmentsChildren, their caregivers and communities are engaged in preparedness actions and design of the programmes

¹⁶ UNICEF is the Cluster Lead Agency at country-level and the co-lead at the global level, through a MoU with Save the Children.

¹⁷ Including foundational skills, transferable skills, digital skills, and job-specific skills. See [UNICEF Education Strategy 2019-2030](#).



In addition to the CCCs, UNICEF work adheres to the minimum standards that are promulgated by the Inter-agency Network of Education in Emergencies, the Dakar 2000 Education for All goals and the Sphere Project's Humanitarian Charter. The Global Education Cluster (GEC)¹⁸ adopted the INEE Minimum Standards as a baseline for guiding its humanitarian programming. It employs 6+1 Minimum Requirements for National Humanitarian Education Coordination Platforms, based on the IASC core functions for cluster coordination ad indicated in Box 1.

The UNICEF Education Strategy 2007 (UNICEF, 2007) defined UNICEF support to national efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 2 and 3. Four main global partnerships were included in the strategy, with one related to EiE, namely the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster for Education in Emergencies, which is tasked to coordinate efforts to restore schooling to populations affected by emergencies.¹⁹

The focus of the strategy was on access, and UNICEF committed to being a first responder for education in emergencies, working with partners to restore access within the context of protection, while rebuilding the education system²⁰ (UNICEF, 2007, p. 6). Examples of support measures are provided in Table 4.

UNICEF has since launched a new Education Strategy 2019–2030)²¹ which focuses on quality of education and includes education in emergencies and fragile contexts as one of six priority areas: Improved learning and protection for children in emergencies and transitions through: 1) prevention (resilient systems) and 2) response (education in emergencies). The strategy commits UNICEF a) to continue to provide global leadership on EiE, b) to continue to provide direct services and supplies, c) to promote social cohesion and peace-building, d) to deepen integrated approaches in promoting girls' education in emergencies and protracted crises, e) to support the recognition of

Box 1: 6+1 Global Education Cluster Core Functions

1. Supporting service delivery by providing a platform for agreement on approaches and elimination of duplication.
2. Informing strategic decision-making of the Humanitarian Country Team for the humanitarian response through coordination of needs assessment, gap analysis and prioritization.
3. Planning and strategy development including sectoral plans, adherence to standards and funding needs.
4. Advocacy to address identified concerns on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
5. Monitoring and reporting on the cluster strategy and results; recommending corrective action where necessary.
6. Contingency planning/preparedness/national capacity building where needed and where capacity exists within the cluster.

+1 In addition to these six Core Functions, the IASC added "Accountability to Affected Populations" as a key area of work that Clusters should focus on (IASC, 2014; IASC, 2015).

¹⁸ The Global Education Cluster was established in 2007 as a forum for coordination and collaboration on education in humanitarian crises. The Education Cluster responds to major emergencies when called upon to do so by the Humanitarian Coordinator/Humanitarian Country Team and where the scale of the emergency is beyond the response capacity of national authorities. The Education Cluster provides support depending on the expressed needs of individual country clusters, global priorities and the availability of resources. (from <http://educationcluster.net/about-us/>).

¹⁹ The other three were: Education For All Global Action Plan (EFA – GAP) coordinated by UNESCO, the EFA Fast Track Initiative (EFA – FTI) which was subsequently renamed the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI).

²⁰ This is an implicit reference to the humanitarian-development nexus, programming with a longer-term view.

²¹ Although this new strategy was developed during the evaluation period, it falls outside the current evaluation scope, but will nonetheless be referred to when appropriate.



learning, certification, mobility, accreditation and transition of displaced and migrating children and adolescents, and f) to deliver the organization's education commitments within the CCCs, the Global Compact for Refugees, the Grand Bargain/New Ways of working, particularly accountability to affected populations.

Overall on the corporate side, UNICEF work in education in emergencies fell under the Strategic Plan (2014–2017). The subsequent and

most recent Strategic Plan (2018–2021, UNICEF, 2017e) addresses quality education in the SDGs through a focus on every child learning and ensuring increased access to skills for empowerment, citizenship, employability; learning outcomes; and, to reach the most marginalized through inclusive, equitable quality education and gender-responsive programming, among others. The key priorities of the two strategic plans are highlighted in Table 5.

Table 4: Types of emergency and post-crisis interventions (UNICEF Education Strategy 2007)

Type of support measure
Create safe learning spaces for children and provide basic facilities and supplies for quality learning and other basic needs
Improve prediction and prevention, and intensify preparedness for emergencies in countries that are prone to natural disasters or conflicts
Build capacity by providing education and training to help with prediction, prevention and preparedness for emergencies (within countries and agencies that work on education in emergencies)
Mount back-to-school campaigns as part of the peace dividend in post-conflict states and as the first stage of helping countries to 'build back better' education systems
Strengthen cluster approach for education in emergencies and develop surge capacity for partners to respond to emergencies rapidly, effectively and efficiently

Source: UNICEF, 2007, p. 9.

Table 5: UNICEF Strategic Plan commitments for education in humanitarian contexts

Strategic Plan	Education Goal	UNICEF output results for education in humanitarian contexts
UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014-2017	Improve access to a good-quality inclusive education	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. UNICEF-targeted children in humanitarian settings access formal or non-formal, including pre-primary/early childhood learning spaces2. In humanitarian contexts, country cluster coordination mechanism for education meets CCC standards for coordination (see Box 1 above and UNICEF, 2010)3. Countries with an education sector plan/policy that includes risk assessment and risk management
UNICEF Strategic Plan 2018-2021	Girls and boys, in particular the most marginalized and affected by humanitarian crisis, have access to inclusive and equitable quality education and learning opportunities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Increase and sustain access from early childhood to adolescence2. Increase learning outcomes for girls and boys3. Increase access for girls and boys to the skills for learning personal empowerment, active citizenship and employability



2.2.1 UNICEF global activities on education in emergencies

At the global level, UNICEF activities in education in emergencies during 2014–2018 focused on providing surge technical capacity to Country Offices and Regional Offices and also providing support to education programming and planning in fragile and conflict-affected countries. This has included strengthening Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming (UNICEF, 2018g), as well as support to integrating education in emergencies into emerging priorities, such as the production of an integrated programme guide on early childhood development in emergencies (2014).

Prior to 2016, policy development, capacity building, evidence and knowledge generation around peacebuilding was also a focus. Preceding the current evaluation period (from 2007) UNICEF collaborated with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and later the EU on the Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT) programme, which was designed “as a sector-wide, multi-stakeholder effort to put emergency and post-crisis countries ‘back on track’ to achieve quality basic education for all and development goals more generally” (UNICEF, 2009). This programme later transitioned into the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme, which focused on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and social cohesion in different contexts. However, it was discontinued in 2016 when UNICEF shifted its focus to other key priorities²² and conflict was subsumed within the Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming as one type of hazard/shock (UNICEF, 2018g).

UNICEF has also played a leadership role in the broader landscape for education in humanitarian contexts through its roles in coordination,

advocacy and partnership engagement at global, regional and country levels. These are discussed in the following section.

2.2.2 Key coordination, advocacy and partnership roles

Following the 2005 UN Humanitarian Reform Agenda,²³ a cluster approach was introduced to enhance the predictability, accountability and partnership of coordination in emergencies when government coordination capacity is limited or constrained (IASC, 2015). UNICEF was named cluster lead agency (CLA) for the Global Education Cluster in 2006.²⁴ This role has come with strong accountabilities in humanitarian actions as part of the IASC. UNICEF has enshrined these accountabilities in the CCCs. The coordination role of the cluster lead agency includes both the staffing of the country-level coordination mechanisms and the additional accountability role of being “Provider of Last Resort” (PLR).

The GEC – which is based in the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) in Geneva – supports the establishment of national coordination mechanisms that aim to provide effective leadership and guidance to the education sector during emergencies, with a particular emphasis on ensuring that the education cluster can support the delivery of predictable, timely, effective and appropriate education humanitarian emergency response. In this partnership body (and contrary to other clusters where it is the sole lead), UNICEF is global co-lead alongside Save the Children International (SCI), with shared responsibility for leading strategy formulation and preparation of guidelines. UNICEF also leads the Nutrition and WASH clusters and the Child Protection Area of Responsibility (AoR). Thus

²² including ECW, UNICEF response to the Ebola crisis, the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction), and school safety.

²³ http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/2006_annualreport/html/part1_humanitarian.html

²⁴ <http://educationcluster.net/>



UNICEF leads one third of the IASC clusters, giving it significant influence within the IASC to contribute to policy, advocacy and response.

In addition to its coordination role, UNICEF established and engaged in partnerships for global, regional and national agenda-setting and advocacy for the right to equitable and inclusive education and the protection of education. It is a member of the inter-agency networks like the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector (GADDRES), the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) and INEE, among others. The role of UNICEF in these and other global, regional and national networks and partnership initiatives also extends to developing shared policy as well as good practice knowledge products and tools.

UNICEF also engaged in partnership with regional initiatives like the No Lost Generation initiative in the Middle East to ensure that children and young people affected by the crisis in that region have access to holistic education, protection and well-being services, and with regional Education Ministerial bodies to elevate policy dialogue and innovations on risk reduction, resilience and protection through education. Moreover, in addition to its leading role in the establishment of ECW, UNICEF is represented on ECW's High-Level Steering Group (HLSG) and on its Executive Committee, working to ensure that ECW succeeds in its goals, and UNICEF is also serving as ECW's host organization during ECW's incubation phase. UNICEF often also plays a lead role in the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) which is providing support in some humanitarian contexts (e.g. South Sudan).

At country level UNICEF also plays an important and often prominent role in development-focused education coordination mechanisms, often called Local Education Groups (LEGs). In most countries the Ministry of Education chairs the LEG and determines governance and leadership arrangements (Ruddle et al, 2018). LEGs provide space for dialogue between government and development partners, including donors, around education sector planning. UNICEF as a partner within such coordination groups frequently plays a key role, including as a rotational chair or co-chair, working alongside government to address key planning, implementation and monitoring challenges in the education sector. UNICEF is thus able to play a role of technical support to, and influencer of, policy decisions affecting the education sector.

2.2.3 Financing of education in emergencies

Global humanitarian funding for education has increased, but remains low. Figure 3 shows UNICEF humanitarian funding for education between 2010–2018, and compares it to overall UNICEF humanitarian funding. The graph shows that throughout the evaluation period, EiE accounted for not more than 10% of UNICEF humanitarian funding.


UNICEF EiE funding has increased over the last few years, particularly since 2016. In 2018, approximately forty-five percent of education expenditure went to emergency funding (ORE). In the same year, EiE expenditure was US\$583 million, across the three results areas of learning, skills and access (UNICEF, 2019h, UNICEF, 2019i).²⁵ Approximately US\$46 million was spent on risk-informed programming and peacebuilding education (UNICEF, 2019h). However, a significant amount went to one specific emergency, namely the Syria crisis, each year.²⁶

²⁵ There are slight discrepancies between the data presented in the UNICEF annual reports and the raw data provided by UNICEF Finance.

²⁶ This is further discussed in Section 4.1 (Figure 11).



Figure 3: UNICEF humanitarian and EiE funding, 2010-2018 (US\$ million)



Source: OCHA Financial Tracking System (accessed 11 December 2019). OCHA uses data reported by UNICEF. Actual expenditure may not all take place in the year that funding is received.


2.3.4 Staffing for EiE

In 2018 UNICEF had just over 790 education staff across 144 countries, up from 750 in 2017, even though it is unclear how many were dedicated EiE staff (UNICEF, 2019h). EiE specialists are part of the wider team in the Education Section (Programme Division at UNICEF headquarters). Until recently the EiE team consisted of two and a half staff, with the lead position for the EiE team (senior advisor) being vacant for one and a half years of the 6 years of the evaluation period (in 2016 to 2017). In 2018 the senior adviser position was filled, and an two additional team members were recruited, one of whom was a full-time Emergency Response Team (ERT) member responding to requests for support from country and regional offices. At the regional level each of the seven offices either has, in addition to the regional education advisor, a dedicated EiE focal point, or a regional education advisor who has EiE as part of her/his portfolio.

Figure 4 shows a breakdown of education staff by region. In a handful of countries that are implementing a programme that is predominantly humanitarian, all staff are functionally EiE staff. While qualified to operate in the education

sector, this does not mean that all staff in such instances are necessarily well equipped with skills to operate effectively in the humanitarian context, especially at the beginning of their tenure in a duty station that implements humanitarian programmes.

Figure 4: UNICEF education staff by region 2018



Source: UNICEF, 2019h, Figure 5 (p.12).



2.3 Coordination and partnership for education in humanitarian work

UNICEF has supported an average of 8.7 million children per year between 2014–2018, which was about three quarters of its target of 11.7 million children each year. Table 6 shows the number of children supported by UNICEF and its partners against the targets of the organization and the targets of UNICEF and partners.²⁷ Data on the number of children by region and disaggregated by sex were not available.

In 2018 UNICEF supported basic education for 6.9 million children in humanitarian situations, ranging from Rohingya children fleeing Myanmar to children in protracted crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Lake Chad Basin and South Sudan, and to children in the Eastern Caribbean affected by natural disasters. According to UNICEF reporting, the organization together with partners supplied 11.3 million children with individual learning materials and

helped raise the proportion of the poorest quintile of primary school-age children attending school to 76 percent, with roughly equal gains for girls and boys (UNICEF, 2019h, UNICEF, 2018).³⁰

UNICEF country-level work covers a range of direct interventions, tailored to different settings, which may include:

- Providing access to formal and non-formal learning in spaces that are safe, protective and inclusive with integrated psychosocial, health and water and sanitation services;
- assisting boys and girls to develop skills to deal with disaster as well as to reduce risk exposure;
- supporting governments to strengthen their education systems through risk-informed programming and development of policies that help to build resilience and strengthen coherence between humanitarian and development programming;
- providing teacher training and learning materials.

Table 6: UNICEF support to access to education in emergencies 2014-20¹⁸²⁸

Year	Number of children (in million) supported by UNICEF (percent of target)	UNICEF target (million)	Number of children (in million) supported by UNICEF & partners	Targeted by UNICEF & partners
2013 (baseline)	5.98 (59%)	10.2		
2014	8.6 (64%)	13.4	10.4 (51%)	20.4
2015	7.5 (70%)	10.7	11.0 (59%)	18.5
2016	11.7 (84%)	13.9	15.2 (67%)	22.6
2017	8.8 (73%)	12.0		
2018 ²⁹	6.9 (79%)	8.7		16.1
Total 2014–2018	8.7 (74%)	11.7		

Source: UNICEF Annual Reports 2014–2018

²⁷ The evaluation was unable to obtain information on the number of children supported by region. No disaggregated data by sex and age were available to the evaluation team.

²⁸ It was not possible to obtain the data to fill the gaps in the table or to obtain gender-disaggregated data.

²⁹ New baseline is 2017.

³⁰ These figures can be placed in the context of the overall number of persons in need of assistance (135 million in 2018, of whom 97 million received assistance) see: <https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/>.



2.3.1 Coordination and partnership at country level

At country level, education humanitarian response is led by a coordination mechanism such as the education cluster or an EiE working group. Where government capacities have been weakened, UNICEF leads the coordination mechanism or co-leads with another agency, in partnership with the government. At the end of 2018 there were 23 countries with an Education Cluster or EiE working group formally activated, where UNICEF had Cluster Lead Agency accountabilities. Beyond those formal groups, there were also ‘cluster-like’ coordination mechanisms in 16 countries. These use the same tools and mechanism but without the same system-wide, inter-sectoral accountabilities as coordinated by OCHA (ODI, 2019). Some countries, such as Nepal, have maintained standing education groups where Government takes the lead as a strong partner. Box 2 highlights the role of education clusters in humanitarian contexts and

the importance that is accorded in the Cluster’s Strategic Plan to ensuring that humanitarian work is connected to longer-term development.

In refugee contexts, UNICEF works closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on education interventions in humanitarian contexts. Moreover, where a government’s capacity to lead a Local Education Group is weak within fragile development contexts, UNICEF also frequently plays a lead role as coordinating agency or grant agent for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). In this role, UNICEF works closely with the national government/education authority as well as other United Nations and partner agencies, such as UNESCO, the World Bank and GPE in the development, implementation and financing of national education sector plans for both in humanitarian and development contexts. Thus, in any given context, UNICEF may be coordinating and/or playing an active role within multiple education coordination

Box 2: The Global Education Cluster Strategic Plan: responding to paradigm shifts

The Global Education Cluster’s *Strategic Plan 2017–2019 Revision* emphasizes that while the role of the cluster is focused on acute humanitarian needs, it has a simultaneous role to play in strengthening coordination between humanitarian and development actors in the education sector. One of three strategic pillars in the Strategic Revision is the humanitarian-development nexus. Key actions that education clusters are expected to take to programme across the links across:

- Engaging the government in EiE from the outset to ensure ownership and sustainability;
- Aligning humanitarian strategic objectives to the respective education sector strategies;
- Integrating EiE and Conflict/Disaster Risk Reduction into Transitional or Education Sector Analysis and/or Plans;
- Integrating the Education Cluster into education sector strategies within Local Education Groups;
- Integrating the Clusters at both national and sub-national levels into pre-existing coordination mechanism;
- Strengthening working relationships with Ministries of Education and sharing office space.

The Education Cluster’s new strategic planning process [GEC, 2018] includes guidance on how to align with (and influence) other sectoral and inter-sectoral plans, tools to enhance accountability, and benchmarks for transition. Education Cluster Strategies are intended to facilitate planning amongst cluster partners on medium- to long-term objectives, capacity building and preparedness activities which are sometimes discouraged from yearly inter-sectoral Humanitarian Response Plans (ODI, 2019).



bodies. This often means that UNICEF staff are double-hatting, taking on coordination and leading roles for education coordination bodies in addition to their regular UNICEF roles. This often means that UNICEF staff are double-hatting, or taking on roles to lead coordination planning and response on behalf of the sector in addition to UNICEF-specific programmatic roles, which can be very challenging, requiring time and skills to navigate these responsibilities and potentially impeding the neutrality of the coordination role.

2.3.2 Building capacities for EiE work

During the EECPT, ESARO spearheaded the development of a training package for ‘frontline responders’ that provided national and local level staff with tools to better prepare for and respond to emergencies. The training package was subsequently adapted and used in other regions, training more than 1,600 professionals in 47 countries, the majority government staff but also UNICEF staff and other partners.

(UNICEF, 2009). And while there was a large focus on country-level EiE capacity building as part of the EECPT and a focus on capacity building within the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) work, this deliberate focus had considerably decreased during the evaluation time period in part due to the termination of the EEPCT and PBEA projects.

Subsequently, INEE and the IASC Education Cluster created the EiE Harmonized Training Package, combining training materials from the INEE Minimum Standards, the UNESCO Institute for International Education Planning (IIEP) and the Front Line Responders training packages in 2010. These materials were adapted by national and sub-national clusters to train education ministry staff, local and international NGO partners as well as UNICEF and other UN staff. The adequacy of subsequent EiE capacity building for UNICEF country staff and partners is discussed in Section 4.4.





CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY



CHAPTER 3

This evaluation used a mixed-method, theory-based approach.

The key elements of the methodology were: a) an inferred theory of change, which drew on b) a stakeholder analysis, and fed into c) a detailed evaluation matrix reflecting the questions that the evaluation seeks to answer, with evaluation criteria addressed in each question (Volume II, Annex 6). A contribution analysis perspective was adopted, recognising that UNICEF characteristically works jointly with others. A detailed description of the methodology is presented in Volume II of the report (Annexes 6 – 9).

3.1 Theory-based approach

Informed by UNICEF strategic plans, a documentation review of UNICEF activities in education in emergencies, and interviews at the inception stage, a theory of change was developed retrospectively for this evaluation and shared with the reference group for validation. The agreed theory of change is shown as Figure 5 (see Annex 6 in Volume II for more detailed versions for the global and country levels).

The theory of change reflects six common outputs across UNICEF, and includes key assumptions (listed in Table 9). Interrogating the assumptions was a critical part of the evaluation³¹ hence Table 12 includes an assessment of the degree of validity of each assumption. Theories of change that approximate programming in each

of the countries that were visited were developed and used in the evaluation enquiry. These are reflected in each of the country case study reports. The **stakeholder analysis** (Volume II, Annex 7) captures the roles of multiple partners at global, regional and operational levels. The stakeholder analysis underpinned the selection of key informants for the interviews conducted. A list of interviewees is included in Volume II, Annex 9.

Evaluation matrix. The theory of change underpins the evaluation matrix which provides the guiding framework for the questioning and data analysis for the evaluation. The evaluation matrix elaborates on each of the six main questions the evaluation seeks to answer and presents sub-questions, indicators and sources of evidence for each. It ensured a structured approach to the data collection processes and a focus on triangulation of evidence. For each of the country studies, as well as for the global and regional components of the evaluation, the evaluation matrix format was used as a template for capturing the main findings (and corresponding sources) and conclusions. In drafting the evaluation report the team was able to read across the different evaluation matrices to synthesize the main evidence and corresponding conclusions. Table 10 shows the sub-questions; the complete evaluation matrix is at Annex 6).

³¹ By systematically examining the assumptions and establishing to what degree they hold, the evaluation sought to get at why and how the observed results were achieved. This allowed us to make judgements about UNICEF contribution. The evaluators recognised that few of these assumptions can be expected to hold or not hold in a binary way. In many, if not most, cases they represent conditions for effectiveness of UNICEF action, and part of UNICEF efforts will be directed towards responding to constraints and seeking to relax them. For example, the first assumption invited the evaluation to consider UNNICEF's effectiveness in raising and in managing financial resources for education programming in humanitarian contexts.



Figure 5: Inferred Theory of Change






Table 7: Theory of change assumptions

ToC level	Assumptions	EQs
Inputs to activities		
1.	UNICEF has the ability to raise adequate financial resources to fund EiE interventions and to manage these resources well.	EQ4 + EQ6
2.	UNICEF has the ability to recruit personnel who have the capacity and expertise to participate effectively in and/or (co-)lead EiE activities at global, regional and national levels.	EQ1
3.	HO and ROs have the human resources, the capacity and expertise to support country offices.	EQ1 + EQ4
4.	Regular situation analyses include assessments of the risk of humanitarian crises (exposure to hazards, shocks, stresses with consideration of vulnerabilities and capacities)	EQ1.5
Data is available, including		EQ6
5.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> there is good collaboration/coordination and data sharing between EiE stakeholders there is sufficient capacity at the relevant levels to collect data, maintain databases, and analyse data 	EQ6
6.	UNICEF programming and policy/strategy formulation is informed by lessons learned through reviews and evaluations, at global, regional and national levels. The views of the affected populations are taken into account through existing feedback mechanisms and channels to engage.	EQ6
7.	UNICEF has made necessary adjustments in its programming in line with GRIP to address potential hazards, shocks and stresses (biological shocks & stresses, violence, social unrest, instability & migration; economic shocks & market instability; severe pollutants & hazardous materials (see GRIP, p.47) and UNICEF Country Programme Documents (CPDs) include a commitment to risk reduction commiserate with the country's risk profile (GRIP, p.20)	EQ1.5, EQ5
8.	International principles and normative guidance are consistent and are reflected in UNICEF policies and strategies, which aim at balancing efficiency and coverage.	EQ1, EQ3, EQ4
Activities & outputs		
9.	UNICEF at global, regional, and country levels works in an integrated approach across its portfolio (linking EiE programming with WASH, child protection, social protection, nutrition, capacity building, C4D...) with a focus on the cross-cutting issues of equity and inclusion, gender and sustainability. Inter-sectorial planning and strategies are used to mainstream cross-cutting issues and apply standards (INEE, CPiE, GBV, etc.).	EQ4
10.	EiE response is aligned with Core Commitments to Children, particularly the most marginalized, including girls, children with disabilities, refugees, migrants, ethnic minorities, IDPs....	EQ1.3
11.	EiE response is aligned with humanitarian principles and international norms.	EQ1.1, EQ1.4
12.	There is willingness and capacity at global, regional and country levels for partnership and collaboration/coordination, in line with efforts to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus.	EQ5
13.	UNICEF Country Programme Document's strategy is appropriate and effective in fostering resilience and/or peace (GRIP, p.20).	EQ3, EQ5
14.	UNICEF at global, regional, and country levels works in an integrated approach across its portfolio (linking EiE programming with WASH, child protection, social protection, nutrition, capacity building, C4D...)	EQ3
Outputs to outcomes		
15.	The context permits UNICEF and its partners to implement its programmes/support.	EQ0, EQ1, EQ6,
16.	There is political will and capacity to lead education sector analysis and planning, incorporating EiE/risk-informed programming as well as political will to use evidence and lessons learned in sector analysis and planning.	EQ2, EQ4, EQ5, EQ6
17.	UNICEF staff have the capacity and expertise to implement EiE interventions and to participate effectively in and/or (co-)lead the Education Cluster and/ or other coordination mechanisms/groups. Additional training is provided as and where necessary.	EQ2.1, EQ3, EQ5
18.	Education stakeholders and partners, including UNICEF, are willing to work in partnership and have the capacity for collaboration and coordination.	EQ5
Outcomes to impact		
19.	The political and economic situation in country is conducive to service delivery. There is political will to make institutional and management changes that ensure effective management and implementation of the national implementation strategy at all levels. UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes in country systems.	EQ0, EQ6
20.	Access for children in humanitarian settings, particularly the most marginalized (girls, children with disabilities, ethnic minorities, refugees, migrants, IDPs...) to education/vocational training in safe and secure learning environments is granted and causes learning outcomes to improve. UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes.	EQ2, EQ6
21.	Girls and boys affected by humanitarian settings, particularly the most marginalized (children with disabilities, ethnic minorities, refugees, migrants, IDPs...) continue to access education/vocational training with minimal disruption. UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes.	EQ2, EQ6



Table 8: Evaluation questions and sub-questions

Evaluation Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions	Sub-questions
appropriateness	EQ0. What has been the context for UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts?	<p>0.1 Who are the major international players in education in emergencies, alongside UNICEF? What differentiates UNICEF from the other players (as perceived by UNICEF and by others)?</p> <p>0.2 What have been the key developments in the international humanitarian landscape and architecture during the evaluation period?</p> <p>0.3 What are the normative frameworks against which UNICEF contribution to education should be judged in humanitarian contexts?</p>
appropriateness, coherence, coordination	EQ1. How appropriate has the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts been, taking account of UNICEF mandate and objectives?	<p>1.1 How has UNICEF contributed to the evolution of the international architecture and normative frameworks for education in humanitarian contexts, and how has the UNICEF mandate and roles in education in humanitarian contexts been influenced by external developments? Has UNICEF contribution reflected its mandate and maximised its value added to combined international efforts, including as cluster lead agency for education humanitarian action and Provider of Last Resort (PLR)?</p> <p>1.2 How has education featured in UNICEF strategies, budgets, expenditures and personnel deployments in humanitarian contexts? How has UNICEF education portfolio evolved in humanitarian contexts and what results were pursued from activities? How has it leveraged its cluster lead role? How appropriate are the proposed education solutions?</p> <p>1.3 Is UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts aligned with its mandate, objectives, humanitarian commitments and UNICEF-specific accountabilities, including with its role as Provider of Last resort?</p> <p>1.4 Do UNICEF education activities in humanitarian contexts meet appropriate normative standards?</p> <p>1.5 How well aligned is UNICEF work to different humanitarian contexts? Has a context and or risk analysis been conducted and has this in turn informed planning and programming?</p> <p>1.6. Do UNICEF activities and approaches reflect the needs of affected populations?</p>
effectiveness	EQ2. What are the identifiable results of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts? Are there discernible patterns in these results? Do the results match UNICEF objectives and mandate?	<p>2.1 ... in terms of UNICEF participation and (co-) leadership in global and regional education partnerships?</p> <p>2.2 ... in terms of general UNICEF activities at country level, including by looking at the effectiveness of the proposed education solutions and how UNICEF CLA responsibilities for coordination and being 'provider of last resort' influence prioritization of programming decisions in education humanitarian action/response?</p> <p>2.3 ... in terms of specific packages delivered by UNICEF at country level?</p> <p>2.4 Have there been unintended results of UNICEF education approaches and activities in humanitarian contexts?</p>
internal coherence and coordination	EQ3. How coherent and coordinated have approaches to education in humanitarian contexts been within UNICEF?	<p>3.1 Coherence education approaches/activities for development and humanitarian programming, at global, regional, country level?</p> <p>3.2 Coherence with UNICEF humanitarian approaches in other sectors?</p> <p>3.3 Coherence with UNICEF role as the Provider of Last Resort?</p> <p>3.4 To what extent has relevant guidance, methodological support and capacity development been provided between different levels and departments of UNICEF, including the education cluster?</p> <p>3.5 Has UNICEF communicated its education approaches and policy positions clearly to its staff involved in humanitarian programming?</p>



◀ Table 8 (cont'd)

Evaluation Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions	Sub-questions
external coherence and coordination	EQ4. Has UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts been coherent and coordinated with that of external partners?	<p>4.1 Has UNICEF communicated clearly its approaches and policy positions for education in humanitarian contexts?</p> <p>4.2 Has there been effective coordination and has UNICEF education work in humanitarian contexts been complementary with that of its principal UN and other international partners (including through the education cluster and other coordination mechanisms)?</p> <p>4.3 How efficient was inter-sectoral collaboration in ensuring synergies between education emergency response , WASH and protection, among others?</p> <p>4.4 Have UNICEF human and financial resources for education been applied where they can make the most difference during humanitarian emergencies? (complementarity and comparative advantage)</p>
connectedness	EQ5. To what extent has UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts strengthened the humanitarian-development-peace nexus?	<p>5.1 How well is UNICEF contributing to international and national efforts that follow from the World Humanitarian Summit, Grand Bargain, New Ways of Working, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework etc.</p> <p>5.2 How well are UNICEF education programmes in humanitarian contexts linked to UNICEF support to strengthening the national education systems?</p> <p>5.3 How effective is UNICEF support in contributing to the prevention or mitigation of hazards/risks?.</p> <p>5.4 How effective has UNICEF work been in contributing to peace-building and to social cohesion (e.g. 2012-2016 PBEA programme)?</p>
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, coordination	EQ6. What factors account for the success or setbacks of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts?	<p>6.1 How effective are UNICEF data and evidence functions (e.g., research, monitoring and evaluation), and what was their utility for decision making on processes and education solutions and on resource mobilization in education emergency response and programming?</p> <p>6.2 How adequate were education sector emergency preparedness scenarios, and what was their effectiveness in education emergency response?</p> <p>6.3 Has UNICEF allocated human and financial resources efficiently to education in humanitarian contexts?</p> <p>6.4 Have UNICEF partners been willing to support and to fund education in humanitarian contexts?</p> <p>6.5 Has UNICEF been effective in dialogue with partners at different levels? How effective have global, regional, national and local partnerships been, and how effectively has UNICEF cluster lead agency role leveraged?</p> <p>6.6 Does UNICEF have adequate mechanisms for monitoring education in humanitarian contexts, ensuring accountability to affected populations and that their voices are included in design, planning, and response, and learning from experience?</p> <p>6.7 Has UNICEF had the capacity to identify the responses that are most appropriate to each context?</p> <p>6.8 Has UNICEF had the necessary capacities to work effectively education in humanitarian action? Is there sufficient synergy between its EiE work and its education portfolio?</p> <p>6.9 Have UNICEF internal management structures, processes and functions supported effectiveness and efficiency in education humanitarian action, including the cluster lead agency role (CLA)?</p>



3.2 Contribution analysis

A contribution analysis perspective was applied at global level in examining leadership and coordination, and across the three in-country case studies (Jordan, Nepal and Somalia) in looking at country leadership and coordination.

In this context, UNICEF actions at global level can include:

- Convening or contributing to global partnerships related to education humanitarian action;
- Thought leadership, including developing or influencing policy for education humanitarian action;
- Advocating for education humanitarian action where there is a lack of attention to it, or lack of funding.


UNICEF also performs these same functions at country level in support of government, and often via the education cluster (or another education sector coordination mechanism). Almost invariably, UNICEF is collaborating with other stakeholder towards joint outcomes. As indicated in Figure 9, the contribution analysis began by defining the contribution problem and drafting a theory of change which illustrates through which pathways UNICEF sought to bring about change. In the next steps evidence was collected and assessed against the contribution story, and assessing the contribution story by comparing and contrasting the inputs over the period with the outcomes and making a considered assessment of the strength of the 'contribution story', if necessary by seeking additional evidence that might back up the contribution story or otherwise explain the changes that have taken place and revising the contribution story accordingly. As a result, each of the country reports outlines the contribution problem that was examined and provides, together with overall conclusions, the evaluation's assessment of the strength of the contribution story.

Box 3: Understanding UNICEF contribution to education in humanitarian contexts

<p>Leadership at global level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Normative/ policy• Partnership engagement• Advocacy <p>Leadership at country level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Normative/ policy• Partnership engagement• Advocacy	<p>Coordination Global level (GEC)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Convening• Deployment• Training <p>Country level Cluster/sector</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Convening• Coordination• Information management• Advocacy• Provider of Last Resort
--	---



Figure 6: Contribution analysis



3.3 Gender and human rights


The evaluation methodology mainstreamed human rights and gender into the processes and approach for organising this evaluation. Accordingly the evaluation was participative and inclusive, showing respect to all stakeholders. The team consulted a wide range of stakeholders, aiming to the extent possible to include those groups/individuals who are most likely to have their rights violated, which often includes women, children and persons with disabilities.

3.4 Evaluation process

The evaluation process included an inception phase, a desk phase, a primary data collection phase and a data analysis and reporting phase, as depicted in Figure 10. More details are included in Annex 9, which includes an evaluation timeline, a list of people consulted and countries and locations visited.



Figure 7: Evaluation process



3.5 Evidence collection methods

Data were collected through a detailed documentation review (see bibliography and also Annex 5: previous evaluations), key informant interviews (based on a sampling of key stakeholders from the stakeholder analysis),³² and case studies (desk-based and in-country), supported by triangulation and iterative feedback. A survey (see Annex 8) supported the validation of the emerging findings. Mixed methods facilitated the triangulation between sources.

Global and regional-level key informant interviews. The evaluation stakeholder mapping resulted in the identification of global and regional stakeholders whose views were deemed critical to the evaluation. In total over 670 informants were interviewed, including over 60 global and regional stakeholders (the list of interviewees is included in Volume II, Annex 9).

Survey An online survey of selected UNICEF staff was conducted and gathered additional information on a number of preliminary findings. There were 116 full responses, representing a response rate of 30 percent. See Annex 8 for more details on the survey instrument.

Country case studies were a central focus of the work. Nine country case studies were conducted as part of the evaluation: six³³ were remote studies and three included two weeks of in-country field work. Countries were selected to be representative of the range of settings and types of emergencies that UNICEF operates in. Annex 6 provides more details on the criteria for case study selection, while Table 11 shows the countries selected and highlights the range of contexts that they represent.

³² Stakeholder analysis at both global and country levels was used to support purposive selection of interviewees, with the aim of (a) extracting maximum value from the limited number of interviews that was feasible, while (b) ensuring a reasonable spread across stakeholder groups.

³³ Technically the evaluation team reviewed ten countries, however, Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands were conducted as one case study.



Table 9: Selected country case studies

Regions	Countries	Justification for selected country in brief
ROSA	Bangladesh	Protracted crises, complex setting (conflict, displacement, natural disaster). Significant work with the government on curriculum development. Recent evaluation work that can inform this evaluation.
	Nepal (field study)	Large, sudden onset natural disaster case study (response to earthquakes and floods). Example of EiE preparedness work to natural disasters. Also peace-building work, following civil war
MENARO	Jordan (field study)	Country responding to the Syria crisis, a complex conflict situation, as well as hosting longer-term refugees from other countries. Work in education and peace-building. Example of a middle-income country. Presence of UNICEF regional office.
	Syria	Long protracted crises of conflict, high threat environment and complex operating environment with a Whole of Syria (WoS) approach. Cyclical health emergencies.
ESARO	Somalia (field study)	Long protracted crises of conflict, instability and environmental vulnerability. High threat environment and a highly complex operating environment. Example of strengthening government capacities for humanitarian responses through education.
	South Sudan	Long protracted crises with ongoing conflict. Example of peacebuilding and advocacy programming. Wealth of rich evidence from recent M&E, cluster assessments, evaluations and other studies.
WCARO	Central African Republic *CAR)	Long protracted crises with ongoing conflict. Focus on formal and non-formal education for out-of-school children, including accelerated learning programme. ECW support a multi-year programme. Seen as a forgotten education crisis.
	Liberia	Example of UNICEF response to the Ebola (L3) emergency, which included distance learning programmes and operationalisation of guidance on safe and protective learning environments.
LACRO	Dominica and Turks and Caicos Islands	Example of small island states, highly vulnerable to external shocks and the effects of climate change, illustrating the response to hurricanes Irma and Maria (2017).

The desk-based country studies were documentation-based and were supplemented by up to ten carefully selected remote key informant interviews for the purpose of triangulation. The desk studies followed the same questions as the field studies. Findings from the desk studies were shared with the countries in the form of brief PowerPoint presentations. In-country case studies involved documentation and data analysis, as well a two-week field visit with interviews and field visits to intervention sites.

In each country a self-reflection workshop was organized to get the views of UNICEF staff views on strengths and weaknesses of UNICEF work. A debriefing at the end of the country visit revisited the assessment of the self-reflection workshop and provided an overview of preliminary findings and emerging conclusions. Findings from the in-country case studies are captured in a separate report for each country, while Annex 10 summarises findings from the desk studies.



CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION FINDINGS



CHAPTER 4

This chapter presents findings against each evaluation question.

It covers the evaluation findings with respect to the appropriateness of the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts (section 4.1); the results of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts (4.2); the internal and external coherence (sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively); UNICEF contribution to the humanitarian – development – peace nexus (4.5); and, the factors explaining and contributing to the success and challenges of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts (section 4.6). Each section starts with a summary of key findings followed by a more detailed exploration of the evidence. A number of the annexes in Volume II of this report provide additional depth to the findings.³⁴



4.1 Appropriateness of UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts

The appropriateness criterion is defined as the extent to which UNICEF humanitarian activities in education are tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, and accountability (consistent with UNICEF policies and global priorities).³⁵

This section (linked to EQ1) seeks to answer the following key questions: How appropriate has the UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts been, taking account of the UNICEF mandate and objectives concerning education in humanitarian contexts? How were global developments reflected in UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts? How well aligned is UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts to different humanitarian contexts? Do UNICEF activities and approaches reflect the needs of affected populations? Have UNICEF approaches remained appropriate or been shifted according to changing contexts?

UNICEF commitments are documented in its Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (UNICEF, 2010),³⁶ and strategic plans 2014–2017 (UNICEF, 2013) and 2018–2021 (UNICEF, 2017e). The first evaluation question explores the extent to which UNICEF education emergency response appropriately took account of these commitments.

³⁴ Annex 10 summarises findings for each of the desk study countries; Annex 11 provides an overview of findings on gender and inclusion; Annex 12 provides more detail concerning reporting and monitoring; Annex 13 highlights findings on education solutions from Jordan, Nepal and Somalia; Annex 14 provides the evaluation's assessment of the validity of the assumptions underpinning the theory of change for UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts.

³⁵ This evaluation uses the ALNAP definitions (ALNAP, 2016). Appropriateness replaces the relevance criterion used in development evaluations.

³⁶ UNICEF is currently in the process of updating the CCCs.



● KEY FINDINGS: _____ ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE UNICEF APPROACH

- a) UNICEF substantially contributed to the evolution of the global education in emergencies architecture, playing a leading role in global advocacy and dialogue around prioritization of and funding for education in the humanitarian landscape.
- b) UNICEF work in education in humanitarian contexts was mostly aligned with the Core Commitments for Children and global Strategic Plan 2014–2017. Alignment to the most recent strategic plan (2018–2021) and SDG4 is at the beginning stages, but there is insufficient internal capacity and guidance on how to design programmes to meet the priorities of learning for all, on how to adapt the design of education solutions in acute crises to protracted crises, and on linking across the humanitarian-development nexus.
- c) Appropriateness has been much higher in situations of natural disasters than in complex protracted crises. UNICEF has supported regular and/or ad hoc assessments to identify needs and to develop joint strategies on how to address them (Jordan, Liberia, Nepal, Somalia), but in some contexts lack of data hampered a good understanding of what was needed (Syria), and overall UNICEF lacks capacity to identify and appropriately target the most vulnerable beneficiaries.
 - » While gender has been consistently mainstreamed in needs assessments, planning, and reporting, as well as in global tools and frameworks, some vulnerable groups remain excluded. These include children with disabilities, children in pastoralist communities, over-age students and girls facing child marriage (e.g. in South Sudan).
 - » Voices/opinions of beneficiaries have not been systematically taken into account in the design of the interventions. A combination of lack of specific directives/guidance, challenges in access, lack of data, low capacity at community level and in some cases urgency (e.g. Ebola) explain much of the gap in obtaining such perspectives.

Strength of evidence:³⁷

Evidence for most of these findings is strong and has been triangulated with findings from the survey.

4.1.1 Role in global advocacy and contribution to the global and normative architecture

The evaluation found that UNICEF played a key role in the evolution of the international architecture for education in humanitarian contexts. Section 2.2 above has described the UNICEF contribution to the evolution of the international architecture and normative frameworks for education in humanitarian contexts and how this

involvement shaped UNICEF policies and strategies. UNICEF has been prominently present in the key developments and forums that have shaped and strengthened these structures and ways of working. While it is impossible to quantify the organization's contribution, stakeholders who were consulted by the evaluation were consistently of the view that UNICEF played a major and critical role in positioning EiE more centrally on the education and humanitarian landscapes.

³⁷ See Annex 6 for an explanation of criteria for assessing strength of evidence.



UNICEF worked on this in partnership with other education stakeholders such as the GPE, UNESCO, UNHCR, the UN Special Envoy for Education, and Save the Children.

UNICEF contributed significantly to increased prominence of education in humanitarian responses, leveraging its influence through advocacy, dialogue and its role as Education Cluster Co-Lead, especially in terms of bringing actors to the table to think about education investments differently in humanitarian contexts. Box 4 highlights the main efforts and successes revealed by analysis of documentation, interviews, and the country case studies. Box 4 also points to some challenges that have arisen as a consequence of this focus.

4.1.2 UNICEF mandate, accountabilities and objectives in humanitarian emergencies

The UNICEF approach to education in humanitarian contexts generally adhered to the organization's Core Commitments to Children in humanitarian settings (CCCs) but there have been some practical challenges in alignment. Both Strategic Plans (UNICEF, 2013, UNICEF, 2017e) are aligned with the CCCs (UNICEF, 2010): SP 2014–2017 with its focus on access to safe education and information sharing as critical to wellbeing, and SP 2018–2021 following the focus on inclusive and equitable quality education and learning in the SDGs and highlighting the importance of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus, with emergency and development work

Box 4: Examples of UNICEF recognized contributions and outcomes to global advocacy

Evaluation evidence highlighted strong consensus about the following UNICEF contributions:

- UNICEF played a leading role in the **establishment of ECW**, in partnership with GPE, the UN Special Envoy for Education and others, including behind the scenes where UNICEF worked to create a joint sense of ownership. Key contributions included:
 - » A partnership role in the Education Cannot Wait campaign within the UN Secretary General's Global Education First Initiative (2012–2014);
 - » Leadership from the Executive Director, who brought in senior and experienced staff from different areas of UNICEF to work on design and governance issues. UNICEF participation in Task Team and Working Group. UNICEF acted as a steward of multiple inputs from donors, stakeholders to Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and stepped up as interim host for ECW (2015–2016).
- **GPE:** UNICEF work within the GPE Board has influenced GPE expansion of financing from a focus on education in traditional development contexts to funding for education in humanitarian contexts.
- Through its involvement in the governance of both **ECW** and **GPE**, UNICEF has worked towards ensuring complementarity in their contributions to education in humanitarian contexts across the nexus.
- UNICEF provided support to UNESCO IIEP for the drafting of **guidance on Transitional Education Sector Planning**.
- **UNICEF led Education Cluster commitments as CLA and PLR**, which resulted in global goods that are appreciated sector-wide. Further work is still needed but there has been a clear evolution of financing, staffing and advocacy.
- **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**: UNICEF is credited for the inclusion of an indicator on attacks on schools. UNICEF also played a central role in ensuring education (equity and quality) were a central focus of SDGs.
- **Safe Schools Declaration**, launched in Oslo in May 2015. UNICEF was an active and prominent part of the advocacy and drafting of the declaration which spearheaded stronger efforts around ensuring safety of schools in emergency situations.



integrated. A recent synthesis of humanitarian evaluations found practical challenges of alignment with CCCs.³⁸ These challenges were also evident in the country case studies and highlight the need for greater contextualisation of the CCCs to different types of emergencies (e.g. protracted crises, public health emergencies, slow or rapid onset). The ongoing revision of the CCCs should already be taking these into account.

UNICEF has had an acknowledged role and added value in emergency situations through the Education Cluster/Inter-Agency coordination under CCC 1. Under CCC 1 UNICEF as Education Cluster Co-Lead Agency has substantially invested in the function of the cluster coordinator; this is seen by key informants as a real contribution. Investment in cluster coordinators (with large emergencies having a cluster coordinator at L4 level) has also enhanced the coordination work within the cluster partners. Furthermore, support to country clusters through standby mechanisms and the deployment of Rapid Response Team Cluster Coordinators and Information Managers was positively assessed in terms of supporting timely and adequately staffed responses, including in the Nepal earthquake response and in the Ebola response.

However, there are challenges with the Provider of Last Resort (PLR) role. In countries with serious funding gaps, the concept of PLR has been inherently, difficult to implement. In such contexts UNICEF Country Offices (e.g. Somalia or the Central African Republic) focus on appropriate prioritisation of the limited resources available rather than attempting to fill every gap, while making efforts, together with partners, to reach the most vulnerable in remote and hard-to-reach areas. Its size and logistical capacity make UNICEF well placed to do this, but

nonetheless there are difficult choices when it is not possible provide relevant services to all those in need.

UNICEF Strategic Plans were developed alongside Gender Action Plans which cover the same periods and seek to ensure that gender mainstreaming occurs across the UNICEF portfolio. The Gender Action Plan 2018–2021 (UNICEF, 2017c) draws on lessons learned from the previous plan. Staff are generally aware of, and making efforts to address, gender-related inequalities. The review of UNICEF planning across the country studies found consistent examples of gender mainstreaming. Nonetheless, mainstreaming gender into UNICEF education programming in humanitarian contexts in line with the Gender Action Plan needs strengthening (see Annex 11). Country-level evidence shows that gender has been a lens for needs assessments, analysis, reporting/monitoring and evaluation (indicators disaggregated) (e.g. Syria, Nepal). Gender is also well integrated in UNICEF global tools and frameworks. However, across countries, the evidence suggests that the organization has missed opportunities to adequately contextualize guidelines, to reflect more deeply on gender gaps, and to apply lessons learned and good practices across sectors. In Dominica for example, project proposals all stated that gender needs would be addressed and gender balance promoted in all activities, but these commitments were not followed through in reporting. In Liberia, the needs of girls during school closure were not addressed and Ebola had a disproportionate effect on girls. With schools reopening there was a focus on gender-based violence and gender overall through training of teachers, but subsequent reporting has not established the effect of these activities.

³⁸ Betts J. & Huls,V. 2017 Towards Improved emergency response: a synthesis of UNICEF evaluations of humanitarian Action 2010 – 2016



4.1.3 Implications of global developments for UNICEF (strategies, finance, personnel)

The international evolution of education in emergencies is reflected in the UNICEF Strategic Plan (UNICEF, 2017e) and more recently in its new education strategy (UNICEF, 2019), with education in humanitarian contexts as described in Section 2.2 (Table 6).


The strategic plan appropriately includes new commitments to address gaps in programmatic approaches and capacity in education in humanitarian contexts. In reviewing and drafting the new strategic plan UNICEF has included commitments to early childhood development, adolescents, skills development and learning outcomes, substantive/comprehensive teacher training ,and curriculum work, all of which are appropriate in light of SDG4. However, their implementation is still a challenge.

The Education Strategy (UNICEF, 2019) appropriately strengthens the focus on the quality of education and also includes education in emergencies and fragile contexts as one of six priority areas. It also widens the range of beneficiaries to explicitly include early childhood development and adolescents. This is in line with international

developments (SDG4) and commitments, and is coherent and appropriate given the proportion of funding for EiE and the growing frequency of humanitarian crises around the world. However, the strategy-- and accompanying tools and training to strengthen staff capacity to implement this new strategy-- are perceived at country levels by UNICEF education staff as insufficient to guide the organization in making difficult choices between priorities (and to identify what is most appropriate in specific contexts). Identical concerns were voiced by some of the regional UNICEF staff.

The strategy and accompanying tools therefore do not aid country offices in making decisions about where to focus. In addition, the choice to emphasize learning outcomes has clearly raised questions from within and outside the organization as to whether this should be a dominant concern, in particular in sudden onset and acute emergency contexts. A key gap in this respect is to clarify what learning means in a crisis context. Other imperatives, for example, the importance of offering access to safe learning environments, providing life-saving information and psychosocial support are considered coherent and clear, but the focus on learning outcomes as a dominant priority in such contexts is being

Figure 8: Other Resources Emergency – Education Expenditure, 2014-2018 (in US\$)



Source: Based on data provided by UNICEF Finance on 13 February 2019.



questioned in terms of its feasibility, particularly given the lack of staff capacity and associated corporate guidance on this new priority.

The steady increase in expenditure on EiE between 2014–2018 is an appropriate trend and a reflection of the increased recognition of EiE as a legitimate humanitarian priority. This growing trend is shown in Figure 11 above and demonstrates an increased commitment by donors to fund education in emergencies, which in turn reflects advocacy efforts of which UNICEF was an important part. Nevertheless, education remains a small proportion of total humanitarian funding, below 4 percent until 2018 (see Figure 2 in Section 1.3).

UNICEF headquarters has had a well-staffed education section over the evaluation period, but staffing for education has not been prioritized by UNICEF management when mounting a humanitarian response. The numbers of staff in the education team who were dedicated to analysis, data and evidence grew over the evaluation period, but the team dedicated fully to EiE remained small compared to the task and the budget. For much of the evaluation period, one and a half staff were balancing the PBEA programme,³⁹ partnerships and network governance, ECW, Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming, and the Ebola response, among other areas of work. In addition, no senior EiE specialist/advisor was deployed to UNICEF headquarters between mid-2016 and 2017, at a time when the education humanitarian portfolio within UNICEF was growing exponentially. For this reason UNICEF headquarters was perceived (internally and externally as expressed across key informant interviews) as reactive and responding in an ad hoc and opportunistic rather than strategic manner, which affected the internal coherence and quality of support for the

different levels. However, new recruitments to the EiE team in 2018 and 2019 resulted in significant improvements to the staffing situation.

Skills development of UNICEF education staff for their roles during education humanitarian action were not sufficiently prioritized. UNICEF staff did not feel well equipped for the agency's strengthened focus on quality of, in addition to access to, education. Moreover, staff are reported to lack a technical understanding of appropriate responses in protracted crises, which involve shifting from a supply-driven emergency response to include a focus on quality teaching and learning and on longer-term planning and financing, aligned, where possible, with development responses. In preparation for the new education strategy, a survey was conducted in 2018 (279 responses, internal staff (61 percent) plus external partners – government, civil society). A few selected findings are summarised in Box 5. The evaluation found that there is limited systematic capacity development. The Global Education Cluster provides a one-week training for the Cluster Coordinator as part of the Cluster Core Skills training, which includes the most important Education Cluster partners. UNICEF education staff at country and zonal office levels experience limited technical education or emergency preparedness capacity development.

In spite of staffing limitations, UNICEF generally and appropriately provided surge support to emerging crises through the Global Education Cluster Rapid Response Team, UNICEF Regional Offices and UNICEF Rapid Response Team and Standby Partners. Country Offices reported that they had received appropriate surge support upon declaration of an emergency, though this process worked better in some countries than in others and quality and duration of the surge support are often noted as challenges.

³⁹ Learning for Peace was launched in 2012 and implemented in 14 countries: Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, the State of Palestine, Uganda, Pakistan and Yemen.



Box 5: Selected education strategy survey findings on staff capacity

The survey showed that UNICEF is an established global leader in education but only 30 percent of internal and 20 percent of external respondents believed that UNICEF is staffed and resourced for purpose and only 42 percent of internal and 38 percent of external respondents believed that UNICEF staff have appropriate skill sets (data/analytical, managerial, sector policy, thematic experts, including skills to deliver education in humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict)

Recommendations stemming from the survey included:

- Invest more in technical staff
- Focus on equity, the most disadvantaged and prioritize where UNICEF has a comparative advantage
- Put more emphasis on evidence and use of data.

Source: Education Strategy Survey Findings (UNICEF, 2018f).

In Nepal, upon declaration of an L2 emergency, a cluster coordinator was nominated immediately and was able to mobilise the necessary information management expertise and convene partners without delay. Nepal has a standing education cluster and, compared to other countries, exceptionally good collaboration between partners, which was an asset for the organization of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in 2015. A key development has been the introduction of internal human resource rosters within UNICEF of staff willing to respond to emergencies (deployed for example in the 2019 Mozambique response).

4.1.4 Appropriateness of UNICEF work at country level

The appropriateness of UNICEF work varied across different humanitarian contexts but has been broadly coherent with the needs of emergencies although not specific enough in terms of its targeting of those most in need. Annex 10 includes findings across different country studies, including in terms of appropriateness of education emergency response, and found that overall UNICEF has made choices that were broadly coherent with the needs of emergencies.

Responses in protracted crises have been less appropriate as it has often taken too long for staff to pivot to more nuanced responses, including linking to and aligning with development actors.

Through its EiE work, UNICEF supported regular and ad hoc (joint) assessments, including those conducted by the education cluster, to identify the needs of affected populations and to develop joint strategies on how to address the needs. In this regard the EiE programmes sought to be evidence-based and often succeeded (Somalia, Liberia, Nepal, Jordan), although in some cases there were significant information gaps (as in Somalia). In some contexts, especially active conflicts, the lack of data has been a serious obstacle to a good understanding of what is needed (as for Syria).

Across settings, targeting of EiE interventions has been affected by weaknesses in data collection, disaggregation and reporting which has reduced the extent to which UNICEF has been able to focus its efforts on those most in need. This reflects corporate weaknesses that are not specific to the EiE portfolio and that have affected humanitarian responses generally, as documented in the 2019 Evaluation of Coverage and



Quality of the UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (UNICEF, 2019g). The lack of adequate data collection, disaggregation and reporting has affected UNICEF capacity to reliably calculate its coverage in relation to need and to accurately determine whether those whose needs are the greatest are being reached as opposed to those easiest to reach (e.g. children in camp locations). In this context it can be noted that the case studies demonstrated that some vulnerable groups remained excluded from education activities, in spite of UNICEF commitment to reaching the most disadvantaged and hard-to-reach. Across the range of countries there was limited evidence of attention to children with disabilities, children in pastoralist communities, over-age students and girls facing child marriage (e.g. in South Sudan). This suggests a need to significantly strengthen data systems and to be more innovative in terms of data sourcing and collection, with UNICEF drawing on some of its own experience in this respect as well as that of other organizations.

UNICEF, together with other partners, appropriately focused its education activities in humanitarian programming on primary education, but in most contexts did not take sufficient account of other levels of education where there are also EiE related needs, such as early childhood development, secondary school and TVET.⁴⁰ This meant that in some contexts education activities failed to cover and/or prioritize groups of beneficiaries with important needs (e.g. early childhood development and out of school in Liberia). With the shift in focus both in the Strategic Plan and in the new Education Strategy to include the

bookend, early childhood development and adolescents (up to 19 years old) – there will likely be a stronger focus on education activities for these age groups (for example in Jordan, see the Jordan case study volume).

Voices/opinions of beneficiaries have not been systematically taken into account in the design of the interventions. In line with the Grand Bargain Participation Revolution⁴¹ and the organization's commitment to accountability to affected populations (UNICEF, 2013, p. 11ff, UNICEF, 2017e, p. 15), UNICEF is committed to include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives, including through communication for development (C4D) and platforms for adolescent participation. Difficulty of access, lack of data, low capacity at community level and in some cases urgency (e.g. during the Ebola crisis) explain much of the gap in obtaining such perspectives. In all case studies the evaluation found that a systematic feedback loop is also missing; that is, the reasons for programming decisions, for how communities' feedback/complaints were addressed and next steps are not (systematically) communicated back to affected populations.


Education expenditure humanitarian programming has benefited certain regions while other regions with real needs have not received adequate funding. Over half of EiE expenditure has been in the MENA region (see Figure 12). A year by year break-down over the evaluation period shows that there is a significant and visible increase of expenditure in the MENA region only, whereas the other regions have not seen proportionate increases of the same kind.

⁴⁰ For example in South Sudan UNICEF had started work on ECD. In some cases, where PBEA programmes were integrated into the country programmes, some skills building for young people has been in place.

⁴¹ <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/a-participation-revolution-include-people-receiving-aid-in-making-the-decisions-which-affect-their-lives>



Figure 9: UNICEF education expenditure by region, 2014–2018




Source: Based on UNICEF financial data provided on 17 April 2019.

The allocation of the majority of funding to one region reflects donor priorities and disbursements. As shown in Figure 13, almost 60 percent of all donor EiE expenditures have been to the MENA region. The Syria crisis is one of the largest humanitarian crises over the last few years – though by no means the only one – affecting not only Syria, but also five refugee host countries

(Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey). The Syria crisis attracted significant political attention, and substantial funding, some of which came as a result of the *No Lost Generation* campaign, led by UNICEF. However, the political dimensions of the crisis were also found to pose difficulties in identifying the right response, in some cases even limiting effectiveness of the response.

**Figure 10: UNICEF donors' total EiE expenditure by region, 2018
(in US\$ and cumulative share)**



Source: Based on financial data provided by UNICEF Finance on 13 February 2019.



The unevenness of the funding distribution between regions invoked questions about whether UNICEF is doing the right thing, or making the right choices. While the Syria refugee crisis has brought enhanced importance to education for refugees in the global humanitarian discourse and therefore positively influenced the importance accorded to education in humanitarian contexts (interview evidence), it also highlights the extent to which donor funding does not align with actual needs across different types of emergencies. For UNICEF this has implications in terms of meeting the needs, given that a significant proportion of its funding was earmarked funding.⁴²

4.2 Results of UNICEF work in education humanitarian action

The effectiveness criterion is defined as the extent to which UNICEF activities on education in humanitarian contexts achieve their purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs.

This section (linked to EQ2) attempts to summarize UNICEF results across the education portfolio on a variety of topics from influencing and fundraising to implementation, and to generalise across varied contexts, in order to answer the following questions: What are the identifiable results of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts? Are there discernible patterns in these results? Do the results match UNICEF objectives?

There is wide consensus that UNICEF has significantly contributed to these changes in the global education architecture through advocacy and active participation, for example in the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), in the development of the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund and through the Global Education Cluster, as well as through the organization's education programming and coordination in humanitarian settings on the ground. In the following sub-sections we will explore in more detail the effectiveness of UNICEF contributions at various levels.

"Following years of efforts to improve the level, effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid, the World Humanitarian Summit [in 2016] was a turning point and also helped draw attention to education in emergencies, including for refugees." (GEMR, 2019). The success in changing the global education architecture has given education a higher profile in the humanitarian response. There is generally more acceptance of the importance of education, though this is by no means a given and continued advocacy for EiE is still a necessity, including within UNICEF. On a strategic level UNICEF has been successful in helping to raise the profile of EiE and played a major role in making education an important part of the response in humanitarian action, particularly through the leadership of the Global Education Cluster.

⁴² Using earmarked funding less is one of the donor commitments under the [Grand Bargain](#).



● KEY FINDINGS: _____ RESULTS AT GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS

- a) The global humanitarian and education architecture and policy landscape has changed significantly over the last few years, particularly with the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and the launch of Education Cannot Wait (ECW). There is broad consensus that UNICEF contribution to the design and launch of ECW was significant and has further raised the importance of education as a humanitarian response and ensured more stable finance across the humanitarian-development nexus.
- b) UNICEF has played a sustaining, supportive role in the networks and multi-stakeholder partnerships for EiE, including the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES) and the United Nations Girls Education Initiative (UNGEI), whose work has contributed to global knowledge management, tool development and advocacy.

Results at country level

- c) Effective (co-)leading within the Education Cluster benefits UNICEF education emergency response, partnerships and the capacity of the sector, and enables the organization to be Provider of Last Resort. The Education Cluster has raised the profile of education in emergencies and helped to prioritize and fund education as a key sector in humanitarian response, but the advocacy for allocating resources to education humanitarian action continues, both within UNICEF and externally.
- d) UNICEF work at scale on supply-driven education solutions (education kits; back-to-school/ learning campaigns; WASH and protection integrated Temporary Learning Spaces; teaching and learning materials and training) are effective in acute emergency settings and have been critical to ensuring access to and continuity of safe learning opportunities for boys and girls.
- e) UNICEF education initiatives were found to be supply driven and less effective in protracted crises (and also less appropriate given the new UNICEF Strategic Plan (UNICEF, 2017e) and the SDG4 focus on inclusive and equitable quality and learning for all). EiE programmes, and the funds that UNICEF provides to NGO partners, are not sufficiently focused on quality teaching and learning.
- f) UNICEF system strengthening work across different contexts, including in protracted crises and across the nexus, has contributed substantively to the development of policies and capacities in governments and, in some cases, NGO partners who are responsible for much of the education delivery. Innovation in education humanitarian action is modest. The few initiatives that were under consideration were not being shared widely.

Strength of evidence:

Evidence for most of these findings is strong. However, systematic outcome data are not available and robust global aggregation of UNICEF EiE results is not possible. The online survey provided further evidence and corroborated many of the findings from the country case studies.



4.2.1 UNICEF participation and (co-) leadership in global and regional education partnerships

UNICEF has demonstrated effective representational, advocacy and technical leadership within several temporary working groups to influence new global humanitarian and development frameworks, including for instance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Refugee Compact (UNGA, 2018) and the Safe Schools Declaration.

UNICEF was one of the founding members of three main networks that are part of the EiE architecture, as well as a driving force behind the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI). It played a supportive and sustaining role during 2014–2018, including through governance, though there was a staff gap at headquarters between 2016–2017 and only project-based funding was available post-PBEA, therefore no core UNICEF funds were available for staff/Secretariats, from 2016:

- **Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA):** UNICEF provided representational, technical and financial support, which several interviewees described as “invaluable”, for example through an Education Under Attack 2014 seminar, a conference on Promising Practices in PEA in 2015 (HQ and country office), or research and guidance on How to Protect Teachers and Communities. UNICEF has been a major advocate for and supporter of the Safe Schools Declaration (2017) and has helped to get government endorsements,

messaging to senior leadership and to move forward the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM)⁴³ with regard to attacks against schools.

- **Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE):** UNICEF provided representational, technical and financial support for the production of Guidance Notes on Conflict-Sensitive Education (2013–2014), in INEE Global Consultations on a common platform/ECW (2015–2016), for the production of a Background paper (2016) and Guidance Notes (2018) on Psychosocial Support and social and emotional learning and also played an important role in the area of knowledge management for the field.
- **Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES):** UNICEF offered representational, technical and financial support for the Comprehensive School Safety framework (2017), linking to Sendai, Climate Change Adaptation, Climate Change Mitigation. UNICEF also provided knowledge management for risk reduction and disaster risk reduction.
- **United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI):** UNICEF is the lead agency and Secretariat for this multi-stakeholder partnership which is committed to improving the quality and availability of girls' education and contributing to the empowerment of girls and women through transformative education.

⁴³ In 2005, with the adoption of resolution 1612, the Security Council took the unprecedented step of establishing a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations committed against children in times of armed conflict. The purpose of the MRM is to provide for the systematic gathering of accurate, timely, objective and reliable information on six grave violations committed against children in situations of armed conflict (see <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/tools-for-action/monitoring-and-reporting/>).



Although UNICEF HQ staff have significantly contributed to these global and regional partnerships, the knowledge and guidance produced by those field-wide partnerships, and the innovations and lessons generated, were taken up by regional offices and country offices in an ad hoc way, i.e. by those individual staff who are members of each network, receiving listserv messages and taking time to reflect on the new knowledge and guidance coming out of the networks in relation to their work. This was due to a confluence of factors, particularly the lack of clarity of roles between global, regional and country offices with regard to targeted communication, knowledge management, and technical support;

insufficient EiE staff at headquarters, especially during 2016–2017; and the lack of a systematic approach to knowledge management, learning and technical capacity building. A few examples of the impact of global and regional level partnerships on UNICEF work at country level are included in Box 6.

At regional level, the evaluation found that progress has been made in some regions in terms of leadership through various initiatives that have advanced EiE, also making use of the organization's convening power. MENA, LAC and ESA regions stand out from the examples that are captured in Table 10.

Box 6: Examples to demonstrate impact of global and regional level partnerships on UNICEF work

In Nepal the 'Comprehensive School Safety Framework' is a result of the work of the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES). Furthermore, Nepal translated the INEE Minimum Standards into the Nepal context years ago and incorporated those standards into the cluster preparedness work and contingency plan.

In Syria INEE's materials have been used to help create a common language across partners on quality education in emergencies. For instance, in 2015, the Education Sector Coordinator organised a training of trainers on the INEE Minimum Standards as part of capacity development of 42 MoE officials, UNICEF and NGO staff members. In 2016 in Syria, the Education Sector Coordinator provided an orientation to 417 education practitioners, including MoE staff, on the INEE Minimum Standards to build a common language around EiE work and policy. Also, the [Syria Crisis Education Information Management Package](#), which has helped to bring coherence to and improve data and measurement in Syria, uses the INEE Minimum Standards within its indicator guidance and definitions.

Across different countries: INEE's work in early 2016 to facilitate field-wide consultations on ECW has had an impact on the ground and specifically for UNICEF country office education programmes and education clusters, given the funding now coming to education clusters and the sector from ECW. More than 500 people participated in the INEE global consultation process: more than 315 people participated in in-person consultations and online discussion forums, and 192 individuals from 53 countries responded to the online survey. Face-to-face consultations were held in (among others): Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Uganda, involving representatives from UN agencies like UNICEF, education clusters, international and local NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), donors, government officials, private sector and business representatives, academics, teachers, students, and members from crisis affected countries. The consultation focused on gathering reactions to the platform's proposed conceptual framework, functions, and scale and were incorporated into final recommendations to high-level policymakers to ensure better and more effective support and financing for education in emergencies.



Table 10: Regional office initiatives for EiE advocacy and learning

Regional Office ⁴⁴	Initiatives
ROSA ⁴⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convened a Child-Centred Disaster Risk Reduction and School Safety roundtable in 2014; developed guidelines, adopted by South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Countries; revisited in 2016 to see results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » South Asia Regional Symposium on Sustainable Peace and Education took place in 2016. For the first time conflict, peace and education were discussed at a high-level, high-profile event, which helped to ‘open dialogue’ and constituted a ‘big change’. » Technical assistance and surge support were provided to Bangladesh for the Rohingya crisis and to respond to the Nepal earthquake in 2015.
WCARO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convened a regional meeting to define and design protective learning environments vis-à-vis different risks within the region (nutrition, epidemics, attacks against schools, etc.), contextualising risk-informed programming and INEE Minimum Standards (INEE, 2012). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » WCARO developed regional indicators and all country offices report against the same indicators. » WCARO organized the Pan-African Symposium on Education, Resilience and Social Cohesion in 2016 (WCARO, ESARO and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)): huge MoE involvement; indicator of success: Education ministries that had not been part of PBEA were integrating peacebuilding by 2016–2017. » PBEA as entry point to work on preventing violent extremism → programming + guidance, country results. » WCARO resilience discourse: UNICEF introduced into paradigm: resilience from disasters and conflict.
MENARO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The region shifted to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) integration of most internally displaced persons and refugees into public education systems (versus parallel, camp-based education), using the crisis as an entry point for systemic change and system-building with Ministries of Education. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Has played a leading role in the No Lost Generation initiative: cross-sectoral partnership for programming and funding for adolescents, education and protection. » Coordinated/led with Save the Children on the development of the <u>IM package for the Syria crisis response</u> (Save the Children et al, 2019), providing in-depth guidance on aligned indicators (access, quality, system strengthening); supported coherence across countries in planning and response. » The Dutch partnership Prospects – focussing on education, skills and employment has resulted in more attention to adolescents in emergency contexts – both host communities and refugees.
EAPRO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The region has focused on addressing climate change impacts with a focus on strengthening resilience and creating synergies between development and humanitarian assistance. This has included supporting all country offices to design risk informed plans and to support disaster preparedness and response. The regional office also carried out regional and in-country trainings. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » EAPRO supported country offices to integrate education in emergencies into national response mechanisms. As of 2017, 18 governments in the region had improved capacities to safeguard the right to education in humanitarian contexts.⁴⁵ In 2016 education and peacebuilding plans were developed in the Philippines, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea. EAPRO also supported Myanmar, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Pacific Island countries to convene EiE clusters to response to various emergencies. ▶

⁴⁴ ECARO was excluded from the scope of this evaluation.

⁴⁵ EAPRO ROAR 2017



◀ Table 10 (cont'd)

Regional Office	Initiatives
EAPRO (cont'd)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">» EAPRO assisted Pacific Island countries to integrate conflict analysis and DRR through the comprehensive School Safety framework and child-centred assessments.» UNICEF, UNESCO and SEAMEO INNOTECH (the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization) collaborated to strengthen the conflict/DRR micro-planning module for a training package aimed at seven high-risk Pacific Island Countries (2017).» Regional office conducted a study 'Emergency Preparedness and Response in the changing context: an experience from Cambodia, Philippines and Indonesia' (2017).» EAPRO provided quality assurance of the Early Warning Early Monitoring (EWEA) system of the country offices, advocated as a mechanism to help ensure preparedness measures are in place, and achieved corporate compliance standard in 2016.
LACRO	<p>Strengthening capacity of LACRO country offices and Governments on disaster risk reduction and preparedness, including development of various tools, e.g. Schools Safety Index Tool.</p> <p>Working with local suppliers for the procurement of education supplies, as very expensive to get school-in-a-box procured from the outside to the LACR region.</p>
ESARO	<p>Strengthened the capacity of ESARO country offices on peace-building, risk-informed and conflict-sensitive preparedness, planning and programming through remote and on-site missions, research and events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Co-organized the Pan-African Symposium on Education, Resilience and Social Cohesion in 2016 (WCARO, ESARO and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)) and was involved in EiE research including PBEA Lessons Learned for South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi (UNICEF, 2015d).• Developed a free online Education in Emergencies eLearning course using Agora, which is an eLearning platform that UNICEF put in place. The facilitated course is designed not only to build capacity of UNICEF staff but also for government counterparts, partner organizations and donors and has been piloted successfully with 10 country offices.• Commissioned a series of Education Think Pieces by leading researchers and practitioners, including one on <i>Navigating the humanitarian-development nexus in forced displacement contexts</i> in order to stimulate dialogue and new ways of thinking to address educational challenges facing the region (Mendenhall, 2019, Chakera & Tao, 2019). <p>ESARO partnerships include joint advocacy with UNESCO (UNICEF, 2019b); the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education (IGAD and UNHCR); improving preparedness and responses in emergency contexts in partnership with Save the Children, World Vision, Global Education Cluster; and enhancing girls' participation and learning outcomes through gender-responsive education sector planning and development of the gender-responsive pedagogy teachers' toolkit with UNGEI, GPE, the African Union-International Centre for Girls and Women's Education in Africa, the UNESCO International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa and the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). It also includes the Dutch partnership Prospects – focussing on education, skills and employment (together with MENARO) for stronger attention to adolescents in emergency context – both host communities and refugees.</p>

Source: Key informant interviews, regional office annual reports.



While Regional Offices have been very active, often despite funding constraints, the evaluation found insufficient coherence across headquarters, regional office and country office levels. For instance, lack of clarity about the regional role and how it interacts with HQ and COs, particularly in terms of targeted communication, systematic learning and knowledge management, has resulted in loss of opportunity for applied learning.

4.2.2 UNICEF activities at country level, including responsibilities as cluster lead and provider of last resort⁴⁶

Funding notwithstanding, at country level UNICEF advocacy and actions have importantly resulted in more emphasis on education in humanitarian contexts. The UNICEF Country Representative has the responsibility to represent the Education Cluster on the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and thus EiE interests, as well as the other clusters that UNICEF is leading. This can potentially lead to a conflict of interest, in which competing requests for funding from different clusters might put the UNICEF Country Representative in a potentially difficult situation. However, the fact that education has been explicitly recognised as a humanitarian response within UNICEF country office leadership and HCTs is an achievement in itself and needs to be further strengthened. Key informants emphasised the importance of continued advocacy and capacity building within UNICEF to ensure that all UNICEF staff, from senior leadership to technical staff, have a good understanding of education as a humanitarian response and are able to adequately represent the Education Cluster's interests in the HCT.

In addition to advocacy on the importance of education as a humanitarian response, UNICEF has made an effort to improve its implementation through specific initiatives. For example, the PBEA programme (2012–2016), also known as Learning for Peace, has had a strong impact on the discourse in the field beyond UNICEF. It led to an unprecedented focus on tools, processes and partnerships for education and peace: 75 research products, manuals and reports were produced. The materials are used at different levels across the sector and across stakeholders. Examples include a Guide to Conflict Analysis (2016); Programming Guide: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding (2016) (INEE & UNICEF, 2012-2016). Also UNICEF commissioned the University of Amsterdam, the University of Sussex and Ulster University formed a Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding to generate and apply evidence and knowledge related to education, conflict and peacebuilding during the same time period. Current risk-informed programming work at UNICEF builds on this PBEA research and work.

Innovation in education humanitarian action is modest but initiatives are ongoing. UNICEF, DFID and UNHCR have formed the Humanitarian Education Accelerator (HEA), a DFID-funded partnership between UNHCR and UNICEF that was launched in November 2015. The HEA is “designed to generate evidence that can support the design and delivery of high quality education at scale for children affected by humanitarian crises” (HEA, 2019a, HEA, 2019b). The HEA identified five innovations that address the education needs of children living in protracted crises and is supporting five organizations in implementing their programmes: Kepler (Higher Education for All, with a focus on tertiary education), Libraries without Borders (Ideas Box, with a focus on

⁴⁶ Data requested from UNICEF on the type of beneficiaries covered by country, by activity and by gender were still outstanding at the time of writing this draft report.



children and adolescents), World University Service of Canada (WUSC) (Equity in Education with a focus on girls' education), War Child Holland (Can't Wait to Learn with a focus on out-of-school children, as well as lower primary students in formal and accelerated education programmes) and Caritas Switzerland (Essence of Learning Programme, with a focus on psycho-social learning support) (see HEA, 2019a).

Essentially the HEA is funding research to show what works, with a view to scaling up proven interventions (UNICEF & UNHCR, 2019). However, country office staff and partners are generally unaware of this work and practical applications of the research. The lack of innovation is also an unintended consequence of the UNICEF culture/hierarchy and lack of incentives around innovation, as well as staffing shortages, lack of systematic sharing of lessons across the different emergency contexts and the lack of circulation of information on innovations between the different levels of the organization (this is a consequence of incoherence between global/regional/country office levels.

UNICEF also used SMS-based technology to communicate with affected communities/schools and find out what their needs are. The use of text messaging to collect data on needs, to send out alerts or receive information from the community during a natural disaster or other crisis, for example through U-Report⁴⁷ or EduTrac,⁴⁸ was found to be particularly helpful in areas that are inaccessible due to the volatile security situation (e.g. in the Central African Republic or in the berm area in Jordan) or the remoteness of an area (e.g. immediately following the Nepal

earthquake), although reliability may be an issue. A challenge with any SMS-based system is of course the potential lack or instability of phone networks. However, the use of mobile phones has allowed UNICEF to respond more quickly to needs in areas that were otherwise – at least temporarily – inaccessible, or to at least provide information to the affected population.

The evaluation examined the UNICEF education in emergencies response in very different crisis contexts. It is important to be mindful that UNICEF works in some of the most difficult environments, characterised by highly volatile security situations and instability and often is faced with chronic underfunding, which necessitates difficult decisions on programme priorities. All of this creates a high-stress environment, often along with various health challenges due to the climate and poor medical infrastructure (e.g. in South Sudan, Somalia, or the Central African Republic). In several of the case study countries children face tremendous risks of exploitation and other harmful practices such as the accusation of witchcraft, recruitment into armed forces, involvement in criminal activity, Gender Based Violence (GBV), or separation from family. Girls especially face sexual abuse, female genital mutilation, child marriage⁴⁹ and early pregnancy.

Using data harvested from nine desk-based studies, the evaluation assessed UNICEF activities against the criteria of timeliness of the response; coverage; equity in access to safe, high-quality learning environments for the most marginalized; continuity; access to learning environments; quality – relevant and

⁴⁷ U-Report is a messaging tool that empowers young people to engage with and speak out on issues that matter to them (<https://www.unicef.org/innovation/U-Report>)

⁴⁸ EduTrac, an initiative that allows quick and direct communication via text messaging, is used in various countries. It was introduced in the Central African Republic in 2015 and has particularly been used to connect with school principals to share information on the status of schools, whether schools are open, under attack etc. – it also serves as an emergency alert system. This system is co-managed by UNICEF and the MoE. (Note conceptuelle EduTrac CAR, UNICEF, 2018j)

⁴⁹ UNICEF definition of child marriage is as follows: any formal marriage or informal union between a child under the age of 18 and an adult or another child. This is the definition that has been adopted in this report.



age-appropriate learning and life skills; and the provision of child protection and psychosocial support. Aggregating findings and generalising across countries is difficult but there are some common points across the evaluation portfolio, as described next.

Education Cluster. A humanitarian-led education cluster was activated for the coordination of emergency situations in all countries, though in some more promptly than in others. For example, in Nepal an education cluster coordinator was nominated promptly following the 2015 earthquake and started to work on the response within a day, drawing various stakeholders together and bringing in the necessary cluster information management expertise, which facilitated the coordination immensely and was highly appreciated by all stakeholders (Key Informant Interviews, UNICEF, 2015c). In Liberia, on the other hand, the education cluster was only activated in late November 2014, almost four months after the state of emergency was declared and two months after the other clusters were activated (Skovgaard, 2015).

The evaluation found that the activation of education clusters in emergency situations has in some settings put in place parallel structures, with limited or no alignment with education sector plans (e.g. in Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan).⁵⁰ In Nepal the situation differs from the other countries, as Nepal has a standing education cluster. A level 2⁵¹ emergency was declared in Nepal and the education cluster received surge support, but no parallel mechanism was put in place. This was helpful in guaranteeing a coordinated response and transition from the emergency phase. Informants noted that the Global Education Cluster guidance and support

is largely designed for emergency situations without strong government leadership. Tools and support have been less useful for standing clusters with strong government engagement and leadership as is the case in Nepal. This gap in guidance for situations where standing clusters exists needs filling to ensure the guidance acknowledges and builds on the specific nature of these situations .

Provider of Last Resort. This commitment of cluster leads “to do their utmost to ensure an adequate and appropriate response” is intended to ensure that there is predictability in the cluster response and as far as possible, that the response covers all populations that need assistance (IASC, 2008). The evaluation found that UNICEF responsibility as provider of last resort generally informed its programming decisions in the country case studies. Through the 3Ws (4Ws or 5Ws)⁵² education response activities by all partners are mapped and UNICEF is committed to filling gaps to the extent possible. This means delivering assistance in remote and hard-to-reach areas, often in collaboration with local partners (e.g. in CAR, Nepal, Jordan, South Sudan), though at times limited by government approval processes for where aid could be delivered (e.g. in Syria). Ensuring that all gaps are covered in fragile states and conflict settings poses a significant challenge, particularly with chronic underfunding as is the case in CAR, South Sudan or Somalia. Box 7 illustrates UNICEF efforts to follow through on its responsibility as provider of last resort using the example of the CAR which shows the limitations it may face in conflict settings. Box 8 provides examples of UNICEF playing the role of provider of last resort in other case study contexts.

⁵⁰ Discussed in more detail in Section 4.5

⁵¹ A conscious decision was made to declare a level 2 rather than a level 3 emergency to avoid creating parallel structures and work through existing mechanisms, bringing in the necessary surge support.

⁵² Who does What, Where (and When and for Whom)



Box 7: UNICEF as Provider of Last Resort in CAR

In CAR, UNICEF created three zonal offices in 2014 to establish a greater field presence. Staff from the Bangui office also mobilised to camps for internally displaced persons and local levels to monitor and support implementation.

In 2018, following the attack on the Batangafo camp for internally displaced persons by armed groups, UNICEF responded to the acute child protection and education needs, alongside the Rapid Response Mechanism's non-food item intervention. As soon as the security context allowed – and in the absence of immediately available partners – UNICEF field office staff, alongside the Security Advisor and an Emergency Specialist, deployed to the camp for internally displaced persons (UNICEF, 2018k).

The security situation in country is precarious and infrastructure is poor, which makes access to remote areas difficult. In early 2018 a UNICEF staff member and five other education staff, including two MoE officials, were killed in an attack in a remote area of CAR, where they had planned to train teachers. The high risks that humanitarian workers face in their daily work makes efforts to serve the most marginalised in hard-to-reach areas even more challenging.

Chronic underfunding adds to the barriers to fully meet the PLR responsibility and the CAR CO faces the difficult task of prioritising how to use the available funding. The country office is making use of innovative approaches such as EduTrac or U-report to reach areas that are (temporarily) inaccessible remotely.





Box 8: Examples of the UNICEF role as Provider of Last Resort

Bangladesh: Strong leadership, quick decision-making and timely deployment of the UNICEF team to Cox's Bazar at the beginning of 2017, followed by a surge from country office from September onwards, enabled UNICEF to be responsive to the sudden influx of Rohingya. Pooled funding mechanisms, in particular the Emergency Pooled Fund drawn from UNICEF HQ, proved vital in their ability to respond.

Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands: UNICEF presence in the Eastern Caribbean Area, where many actors are not present, enabled a quick and timely response to major hurricanes in 2015 and 2017, targeting communities where services were much needed. UNICEF was committed to supporting education to resume quickly following the disaster in both the Turks & Caicos Islands and Dominica with School in a Box, tents and WASH supplies. As Provider of Last Resort (PLR), UNICEF saw the critical gap in the need for psychosocial support in the response and advocated with both the Turks & Caicos Islands and Dominica governments to address this need.

Syria: the UNICEF co-lead role of the Education Sector Working Group at national and subnational levels has enabled better information management and a more comprehensive identification of needs; mapping of capacities, gaps, partners, funds and implementation activities for the sector has supported UNICEF prioritization processes and allowed UNICEF to act as PLR. For example, the Education Sector Working Group identified gaps in response for eastern route evacuation during summer 2018 (huge number of school children, huge needs) and UNICEF stepped in as PLR with resources to support resumption of education services, ensuring accountability to humanitarian principles and continuity of educational service delivery.

Liberia: Where other organizations were not available to deliver, UNICEF took responsibility for delivering, using helicopters where the terrain was not favourable and going the last mile. UNICEF also played a very important role by negotiating with its main donors to re-direct funding to the emergency response. This mobilized resources which would otherwise not have been available, and allowed needs to be covered that would otherwise have been unmet.

Nepal: UNICEF responsibilities as Cluster Lead Agency led to improved sector coordination and information management. This enabled the comprehensive identification of needs, mapping capacities, gaps, partners, funds and implementation activities for the sector, which in turn has supported UNICEF internal processes to prioritize education in humanitarian contexts and allowed for UNICEF to effectively act as Provider of Last Resort. In doing so UNICEF has had to make strategic decisions and prioritize based on available resources.

Somalia: With massive gaps between needs and available resources, the concept of PLR has limited relevance in Somalia. The PLR concept was not referred to as an obligation by UNICEF or cluster staff. The challenge is the appropriate prioritisation of limited resources, rather than an expectation that all gaps might be filled. The closest approximation of UNICEF acting as a PLR was the decision to fund all three cluster secretariat staff in 2016, when Save the Children as the co-lead were unable to support these positions.

South Sudan: A clear indication of UNICEF PLR commitments was seen in the IRRM⁵³ missions which have allowed UNICEF to reach people who cannot otherwise access education services in locations where it has no established service delivery partnerships (Darcy et al, 2019). However, similar to other protracted crises, the challenge is the appropriate prioritisation of limited resources, rather than an expectation that all gaps might be filled.

Source: Evaluation case studies.

⁵³ A key strategy in South Sudan was the innovative Integrated Rapid Response Mechanism (IRR) developed in partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP). This allows the reaching of hard-to-reach populations for a short duration with a mix of health, WASH, nutrition, education and child protection services. UNICEF deploys education experts and dispatches supplies to enable the start-up and/or resumption of education activities. The IRR aims to re-open humanitarian space as a basis to re-establish regular humanitarian programmes, reaching otherwise inaccessible locations with services including education.



The cluster lead (or co-lead) responsibilities are found to be critical in enabling the PLR actions (see Nepal). Specific approaches can facilitate the PLR role, e.g. renegotiation of priorities with donors early in the Ebola response, and the IRRM response in South Sudan (though the latter has not been sufficiently strong in bridging to development).

The PLR role also extends beyond the 'pure' educational delivery to other domains which reflect the need for coherence with other sectors, such as psychosocial support. In Liberia and the Eastern Caribbean this area had not been identified by others as being critical.

Ultimately, UNICEF was not able to fully meet its accountabilities as Cluster Lead Agency and Provider of Last Resort, as the effectiveness of the PLR role is limited in resource-strapped contexts (e.g. Somalia, CAR) because there are no resources to ensure complete coverage of the beneficiaries and/or regions that are being left out even when the gaps are adequately identified. This also highlights the difficulties arising from short-term funding and the earmarking of funds, as well as the often short notice of funding which hampers planning and timely

communication, both internally and externally (section 2). Furthermore, stronger analysis of coverage versus need versus available funding would help UNICEF to reach clear strategies on how to reach those most in need, particularly out of school children and adolescents.

4.2.3 UNICEF education solutions at country level

The country fieldwork and desk-studies enabled a closer look at UNICEF education solutions in humanitarian settings, including how they have evolved over time and how they are designed for specific contexts. The education solutions found in Jordan, Nepal and Somalia are summarised in Annex 13 and further analysed in the country case-study reports. In addition, Table 11 gives a summary and overview.

UNICEF has made significant progress in education humanitarian action by implementing the CCCs and UNICEF 2014–2017 Strategic Plan objectives (UNICEF, 2013). As a result - from early childhood through adolescence – access to education services during humanitarian action has increased. However, progress was limited with regard to learning outcomes and skills for active citizenship and employability.

Table 11: Education solutions in case study countries

Education solutions	Countries
Provision of temporary learning spaces (tents, temporary, semi-permanent structures), including WASH facilities, furniture...	Bangladesh, CAR, Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands, Jordan, Nepal, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria
Provision of psycho-social support, health, nutrition	All countries
Supply of teaching and learning materials (school kits, early childhood development kits, recreational kits, school in a box, school in a carton)	All countries
Provision of non-formal education services , remedial education	All countries
Provision of (aspects of) teacher training , including basic pedagogic skills, classroom management and psychosocial support training	All countries
Provision of child cash grants	Jordan, Somalia, Syria
Capacity building activities for government and NGO counterparts	All countries

Source: Evaluation desk reviews.



Typically, the education package that UNICEF implements as part of the education emergency response is supply-driven and consists of the provision/construction of temporary learning spaces, including WASH and protection components, kits (student, school, recreational, or early childhood development), the procurement and supply of teaching and learning materials, and teacher incentives and training (see Table 8 above). This approach is effective and adequate in acute emergency settings; but it is not adequate for protracted crises, given the UNICEF new strategic plan (UNICEF, 2017e) and the SDG4 focus on learning and quality and linking of humanitarian and development programming.

The focus on skills and learning outcomes is a newer priority for UNICEF and the wider EiE sub-sector. UNICEF is not alone in grappling with issues about types of learning, how to measure learning, and how to achieve or improve learning in humanitarian contexts. A greater focus is required, to build technical capacity and partnerships to shift focus from supplies to quality teaching and learning. Improvement are required to develop practical actions to align humanitarian and development programming, strengthen communication on innovations, to develop a more robust approach to applied learning across levels. Commitment to longer-term planning and financing is also required.

Temporary Learning Spaces.⁵⁴ In all but one of the case study countries (Liberia)⁵⁵ UNICEF supported the education humanitarian response with the provision of temporary learning spaces. These are put in place on a temporary basis for teaching and learning when formal schools are not available because they have been damaged or otherwise made unsafe, occupied by armed forces for example, used for political rallies, or

as shelter by local communities. The idea is to establish temporary learning spaces quickly to ensure continuity in education, while also laying the foundation for out-of-school children to enrol/attend. These temporary learning spaces come in various shapes and sizes, from tents to temporary to semi-permanent structures, made with a range of (locally available) materials.

UNICEF also conducted structural assessments and physical improvements (light rehabilitation) of existing schools or learning spaces. Following the earthquake in Nepal UNICEF organized the structural assessment of schools to determine needs and assist the Government in deciding which schools were safe to be used again immediately, which ones needed light repairs and which ones were unsafe.

These temporary facilities are crucial, particularly in the first stages of an emergency, providing children and adolescents with a safe space, a sense of normality and critical and life-saving information for themselves and their families. Following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, for example, many schools were damaged or destroyed and the provision of temporary learning spaces, and later on transitional learning structures, was critical in ensuring children had somewhere safe to go to and were able to learn what to do in the case of an earthquake and how to behave in the numerous aftershocks and potential future disasters. UNICEF supported (and continues to do so) the training of teachers, facilitators and School Management Committees (SMCs) on psychosocial support and disaster management, with life-saving messages about disaster preparedness, protection, sanitation and hygiene promotion, nutrition and health (Key Informant Interviews, UNICEF Nepal Self-Reflection Workshop, Page, 2015, DARA,

⁵⁴ A UNICEF rapid review of temporary learning spaces in education humanitarian response is currently being conducted by a team of three independent consultants and is expected to be completed in early 2020.

⁵⁵ In the context of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia schools were closed to avoid the risk of infection. Because of this, no temporary learning spaces were created. UNICEF and partners instead focused on distance learning by radio, and when schools were re-opened on ensuring that teachers were trained to deal with psychosocial issues and that the infrastructure and materials were in place for re-opening the schools (including provision of kits for students and teachers).



2016, UNICEF, 2015e; UNICEF, 2015c, UNICEF, 2016c). In other countries similar activities and training were organized for the education response.

The quality of temporary learning spaces/structures varies and some changes have been effected. Temporary learning spaces (TLS) are made out of a variety of materials, ranging from tents to semi-permanent structures. In countries such as the Central African Republic or South Sudan, cost of procurement, transportation and construction of TLS can be very high due to the poor infrastructure, the volatile security situation or the remoteness of affected areas, particularly compared to the relatively short duration of the TLSs, some of which do not even last half a year (due to extreme weather conditions, poor building materials or standards, or overcrowding). Implementing partners in the two countries have advocated a change in approach, suggesting the building of slightly better structures for somewhat higher costs and engaging communities to contribute labour and be trained in the maintenance of these spaces, particularly as temporary learning spaces are often the only learning spaces and therefore turn into permanent ones.

Recognizing this dilemma, in the recovery phase in Nepal, UNICEF supported the construction of 900 semi-permanent Transitional Learning Structures; students said this created an environment that is “much better for learning” and parents noted that the semi-permanent structure encouraged their children to “want to come to school” (see Nepal case study). In Somalia an added challenge is the fact that internally displaced persons lack assured land rights in camps and can be evicted, and schools can be demolished, at short notice.

Through the Core Commitments for Children⁵⁶ (UNICEF, 2010) UNICEF is also committed to providing health services and nutrition as appropriate. Therefore temporary learning spaces usually include a WASH component, providing water and separate latrines/toilets for girls and boys. In Nepal and Syria, for example, this meant providing WASH-integrated and gender- and disability-friendly schools (Syria) and Transitional Learning Structures (Nepal). In Nepal, menstrual hygiene management was also integrated into education services. With regard to the provision of WASH, health, nutrition and protection services, there is a particular need within UNICEF to work coherently between sectors in order to implement activities effectively and in a timely manner. It is important to mention that when there is no water or toilet/latrine available to students or teachers, attendance is reduced. This is particularly true for girls who are menstruating. Similarly, examples from Jordan, South Sudan and other countries show that school meals are an incentive for children to attend, to the extent that children might move on to other places where food or cash are handed out. This was reported repeatedly in Jordan, where Islamic centres offer food, clothes or during Eid even hand out cash, for example; so instead of attending Makani⁵⁷ centres, children move to where there is more on offer. This may be an exceptional situation in Jordan where there are many providers and a comparatively high level of funding.

In addition to providing access to safe temporary learning spaces, UNICEF together with partners has been offering non-formal education services and/or remedial education to ensure that out-of-school children can catch up with their peers and receive the extra support they need to succeed in the formal schooling system.

⁵⁶ The CCCs are currently being revised; a draft version was presented at the UNICEF Executive Board session in September 2019 and a final revised version is expected to be published in early 2020.

⁵⁷ Makani meaning ‘my space’ is UNICEF flagship programmes in Jordan. It is a platform that offers a package of integrated social protection services, including life skills, psychosocial support, learning support, WASH, outreach and referral services (UNICEF, 2018h).



Ultimately UNICEF is trying to support the return of students to the formal education systems. This is a challenge particularly for over-age students who are at an increased risk of drop out or children who are known to participate in (seasonal) labour (e.g. in Jordan) and who therefore are unable to attend school regularly throughout the year. These informal learning opportunities were highly appreciated, particularly as the student-to-teacher ratio is often much lower than in the formal school system and teachers have received training (pedagogical skills, classroom management, psychosocial support) and additional support in the form of materials, mentoring and a salary.

Difficulties arise where informal learning opportunities are seen as competing with formal education systems. When students drop out of formal schools to attend other non-formal education services instead, rather than in addition, these services are seen as competition to the formal education systems and their legitimacy is questioned. In Jordan, for example, the Government and partners question the UNICEF Makani⁵⁸ centre approach and would prefer to see UNICEF supporting the government system instead (see Jordan case study).

While UNICEF has made significant progress in offering safe access to education opportunities, some vulnerable groups remained excluded.

This includes children with disabilities (see Box 9 and Box 10), children in pastoralist communities, over-age students and girls facing child marriage. These groups still face significant access boundaries, particularly in low-income, conflict-affected countries such as South Sudan, Somalia or the Central African Republic (Hussein, n.d.). However, even in upper-middle-income countries barriers are still prevalent; for example, in Jordan 19 percent of Syrian refugees with disabilities (aged 13 and above) never enrolled in school and cannot read or write, with higher levels for girls and women (UNICEF, 2018i). Bullying and violence in schools and on the way to school affect both boys and girls (e.g. Jordan, South Sudan). UNICEF aims to address such disparities appropriately in its programming and to raise awareness among communities.

Girls often do not transition to the next level of education and other related opportunities. Across countries this is due to cultural norms, child marriage, economic situations and the lack of female teachers. Through its Gender Action Plan UNICEF is making an increased effort to ensure gender-sensitive programming across its portfolio. For education this entails the provision of segregated latrines/toilets, the provision of sanitary/dignity kits, and making an effort to increase the number of female teachers to encourage girls to attend school, as well as community awareness raising activities.

Box 9: Barriers to education for children with disabilities

In South Sudan barriers for children with disabilities prevail. In 2015, children with disabilities accounted for only 1.7 percent (approximately 21,300 students) of total primary school enrolment, which is below the WHO norm of 5 percent.

The three main barriers preventing children with disabilities from accessing education are long distances to school (84 percent), negative attitudes (52 percent) and lack of teacher experience (42 percent). Teasing and bullying were also mentioned in 24 percent of cases.

Source: South Sudan Education Sector Analysis, 2016 (MoGEI South Sudan et al, 2016).

⁵⁸ An evaluation of Makani centres was conducted in 2019 but has not been made available to the team yet.



Box 10: UNICEF Jordan country office upstream advocacy work for disability

In 2017 the Government of Jordan passed a Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. UNICEF worked with the Ministry of Education to establish the Higher Council for Persons with Disabilities to produce the Ten-Year National Strategy on Inclusive Education. UNICEF and Mercy Corps partnered to support the establishment of two model inclusive education schools. UNICEF has been working on upstream advocacy to ensure the MoE has the capacity to take over these two schools and further scale up inclusive education efforts across the country.

Source: UNICEF Jordan Country Office Annual Report 2018 (UNICEF, 2018i).

Where young people do not see a future they are less likely to take advantage of learning opportunities, formal or informal. This is particularly the case for refugee children and children in camps for internally displaced persons who, even if they have the opportunity to complete both primary and secondary schooling or vocational training, do not feel motivated to participate if they do not see a future pathway for themselves. Discussions around this challenge are pertinent in countries (such as Jordan) where restrictions in terms of mandatory quotas and/or some sectors not open to foreigners mean that the national system does not yet allow the full participation of all refugees in the labour market. In line with its new strategic plan (UNICEF, 2017e), UNICEF is engaging more with these challenges and, for example, in Jordan launched the Youth Engagement Pathway in 2018 to better equip and engage youth (see e.g. UNICEF, 2018i).

The provision of psychosocial support is a commitment under the CCCs and its importance is widely recognised. It is an integral component of UNICEF education emergency programming, implemented in collaboration with the Child Protection unit. In three country case studies, the psychosocial support component was reported to be a critical activity, the positive effects of which were mentioned by a wide range of stakeholders. Psychosocial support increased

perceptions of safety and promoted psychosocial wellbeing and helped students, teachers and the wider community to deal with respective disasters and crises. In Liberia a focus on community information and the mobilization and use of teachers for information dissemination were very important for psychosocial support.

Various country case studies found that UNICEF engages communities in implementing various aspects of its programming. For example, in Liberia, UNICEF developed communication, teaching and learning materials and trained 15,000 teachers on the implementation of protocols for school re-opening, which included a focus on the provision of psychosocial support which was considered essential to deal with the trauma experienced by students, teachers, parents and the community at large. In addition, 4,270 PTA members were also trained on psychosocial support. In Liberia young people, and particularly girls, were very pro-active in their communities. The PBEA programme had youth workers who changed from peace workers to “life-saving engines”. They spread information and the kit, which was done very effectively at a local level because they knew the local context and key people. As in Dominica, psychosocial support was in the end integrated into regular teaching at the school. Generally, the evaluation found that where UNICEF worked with a



community-focused approach, this increased the impact of its activities, particularly psycho-social support.

UNICEF work at scale on the supply pipeline for education in humanitarian contexts (educational and recreational kits and other materials) has evolved and is well recognized. Efforts to procure items locally where possible add benefits in terms of timeliness and sustainability. (South Sudan is one of the countries studied where education kits have been procured locally.) The ability to work at scale is a comparative advantage as it means improved quality and diversity of kits (school, early childhood development, recreation), more hubs and long-term agreement (LTA) arrangements (ensuring quicker and more localised delivery); it also enables UNICEF to work with governments on education advocacy campaigns to bring children back to school, encourage enrolment by those who have been out of school or never attended, and encourage those who are dropping out to stay in school. However, distributing school and recreational kits is not sustainable in the long term and it includes UNICEF branding, which is not always appropriate (e.g. school in a box had to be reassembled without any branded material for the berm area in Jordan, as otherwise it would have put people at risk in this politically very sensitive area).

In Nepal the number of kits that could be procured locally through the existing LTAs UNICEF Nepal had in place was too low to meet the needs. Therefore additional kits needed to be procured internationally, which brought with it challenges of content, e.g. teaching material was in the wrong language. Nimbleness is also lost at scale and modifying the kits, e.g. when instructional material is provided in the wrong language, and distributing them becomes time consuming and leads to delays. Teaching and

learning material is a valuable resource, particularly at the onset of a disaster, but content needs to be carefully selected. Improvements of kits focus mainly on logistical considerations and specific innovative thinking around the content of the educational and recreational kits is lagging behind.

The provision of teaching and learning material through a centralised approach to procurement (through Copenhagen) has been perceived as a limitation, with a shift to local procurement noted in several countries.⁵⁹ As well as improving timeliness of the emergency response, this encouraged the development of local supply chains with longer-term development benefits.

A further element of EiE responses has been the inclusion of teacher training. Activities varied widely from the provision of context-specific skills to experienced, regular teachers, to rapidly expanding the availability of teachers to staff the TLSs, through the rapid on-boarding of volunteer teachers. The short duration of teacher training offered in an emergency context, often limited to a few days, was widely noted to limit its effectiveness. In situations where the training was being used to induct newly recruited teachers, this clearly had consequences for the quality of EiE interventions. The main finding is that short-term training cannot substitute for proper teacher training programmes. However, many teachers did express appreciation for the training received. In some contexts the opportunity of working with refugee children (for teachers who are not themselves refugees) was reported to have enormously enhanced teachers' own general development (Jordan). Some progress has been made in linking the training curricula used by NGO partners to elements of the national teacher training curriculum, as one stakeholder reported in South Sudan, "*Initially*

⁵⁹ The evaluation team was unable to obtain further detailed information for trends on central supplies over the evaluation period.



different NGOs approached teacher training as they saw fit. Now it is standardised, linked to Government and delivered by NGOs”.

Overall, as the contexts in which UNICEF is operating— more and longer protracted crises and across the nexus— have changed, so have the education needs of affected populations. However, supply-driven education solutions have not evolved in tandem with the evolving needs for a more flexible range of education solutions linked to longer-term planning and financing, including a more comprehensive focus on student learning and teacher professional development, including the assessment and transferability of learning and/or training attained by students and teachers.

Systems strengthening is a critical activity for which UNICEF has a comparative advantage and is an outcome of education work in humanitarian settings , even when it is not an explicit objective. In most countries UNICEF has a trusted relationship with the education authorities and is therefore able to advocate for education as well as support governments’ policy work and build or strengthen government capacity in relation to education in humanitarian contexts. The case studies have illustrated how UNICEF contributed substantively to the development of policies and capacities in government, e.g. in Nepal, Syria and Somalia. Positive examples of UNICEF support to systems strengthening in Somalia are provided in Box 11.

Box 11: Upstream work in Somalia

- UNICEF Somalia supported the drafting of the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) for 2018–2021 and influenced the inclusion of EiE. EiE is now an integral part of sector plans, budget provision and support which it was not in earlier versions.
- UNICEF also supported the establishment of an EiE Unit at the federal level of the Ministry of Education. The unit serves as a focal point of EiE with the Ministry and coordinates the activities of the EiE Working Group. The EiE National Response Plan was developed through concerted efforts of MoE Federal and Education cluster members, including UNICEF. The Emergency Response Plan (3 year work plan) was also developed through UNICEF support. However, the Unit has only one staff and lacks equipment and resources to run the unit effectively. It also lacks staff at the Regional State level to oversee and coordinate EiE activities.
- UNICEF also provides continued support to the Education Management Information System (EMIS) which is critical for planning and determination of priorities. EiE data are being integrated into the EMIS system in 2019. UNICEF lends support to school supervision and monitoring by regional and district education officers. UNICEF also provides capacity development for local NGOs responsible for education delivery, including annual training exercises on EiE.
- UNICEF supported and strengthened the education cluster coordination at the national level, has funded all cluster secretariat staff (since 2016), and provided technical support to the cluster. It also supported the establishment of sub-national education clusters at the regional states level. This has enhanced information sharing, increased funding opportunities and built synergy among implementing partners. The Somalia education cluster is in fact considered a model of good practice globally and clearly addresses the 6+1 responsibilities (as set out in Box 1).

Source: Key Informant Interviews, UNICEF Annual Reports



UNICEF also works with a range of NGO partners who are responsible for much of the delivery of services. The positive impact of UNICEF support was widely acknowledged by a range of stakeholders who appreciated specific training sessions, strong relationships with UNICEF staff and active dialogue between the parties.

Similar examples were found in UNICEF work in Nepal, where the UNICEF country office is working closely with the Government and partners on disaster risk reduction, preparedness and comprehensive school safety (see Nepal case study). In the Central African Republic UNICEF has encouraged the Ministry of Education to found a Cellule d'Urgence to improve the Government's coordination and preparedness within the education sector in a way that is sustainable; i.e. while the education cluster is still in place the Cellule d'Urgence works closely with the cluster, and when the education cluster is longer in place there will be a continuing mechanism to coordinate activities.

Partners expressed some frustrations regarding long processes to establish and renew Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs); these led to delays in implementation or put a burden on the NGO to provide funds so there would not be an interruption in the education programme pending a new agreement. However, there were also reports that UNICEF had made efforts to improve such processes and communicate in a more timely manner. In South Sudan, for example, UNICEF decided to have zonal officers in specific areas of the country so

that the PCA processes with local NGOs would be quicker and joint monitoring and communication would improve. This was reported to have worked. It should be noted that UNICEF has clear simplified procedures which are applicable in an emergency, but it seems that in some instances country office staff are not familiar with these procedures or are risk averse and thus delaying processes unnecessarily.

4.3 Internal coherence and coordination

Coordination and coherence are defined as the extent to which UNICEF activities in education in humanitarian contexts are harmonized internally across sectors and the extent to which UNICEF has provided guidance, methodological support and the necessary capacities.

This section examines internal coherence and coordination of UNICEF education programmes in humanitarian contexts. It reviews assesses the guidance,⁶⁰ methodological support and capacity development for UNICEF staff, including the education cluster, in support of the implementation of education priorities in humanitarian contexts. The role of UNICEF as provider of last resort is discussed from the perspective of coherence. Similarly, alignment between education priorities in humanitarian contexts and UNICEF work on education in general – another important aspect of coherence – is discussed in Section 4.5.

⁶⁰ This includes both sub-questions 3.4 and 3.5 from the evaluation matrix, i.e. guidance, methodological support and capacity development at different levels, and the internal communication of education approaches and policy positions in humanitarian contexts.



● KEY FINDINGS: _____ ON INTERNAL COHERENCE AND COORDINATION

- a) WASH and protection are generally well integrated into EiE activities, and this is linked to the UNICEF role as cluster lead in these areas. Coherence and coordination with other sectors has been variable and there are no corporate strategy, guidelines or milestones to promote integrated work across sectors.
- b) Coherence and coordination between the different levels (HQ, regional office, country office) is insufficient, but stronger when an L2 or L3 emergency is declared. In particular, knowledge management, cross-country and cross-regional learning and sharing of lessons need significant improvement.
- c) There is need for strengthening of staff and staff capacity for EiE inclusive of the new priorities of the UNICEF strategic plan (learning for all) and the transition from service delivery to system strengthening and resilience in protracted crises and across the nexus. This applies in particular at country and zonal office level.
- d) The level of coherence and coordination between UNICEF HQ and the Global Education Cluster is insufficient.

Strength of evidence

Evidence for most of these findings is strong. The survey ,which focussed strongly on internal coherence, validated the findings of the country studies very well.

4.3.1 Coherence between sectors

As highlighted in evidence from interviews and the survey, the UNICEF mandate for children is holistic and comprehensive enough to allow for coordinated work across a spectrum of priorities for children covering education, protection, health, and WASH. The evaluation finds a mixed picture with respect to integration of education with other areas of humanitarian work. In general, internal coherence between the different areas of work was found to be stronger when dealing with acute emergencies, especially where the education cluster was activated. In Dominica, Turks & Caicos Islands and Nepal, for example, UNICEF strongly promoted integrated cross-sectoral approaches among its interventions, which has also led

to inter-sectoral initiatives by Government partners. In protracted crises (Somalia, South Sudan, and to some extent Jordan) coordination was less strong, which affected coherence. Box 12 presents selected examples of collaboration between sectors.

By and large, WASH priorities were well integrated within the education response. Figure 11 indicates that over half of the survey respondents considered the work between the education and WASH sectors as well coordinated. The scope and continuity of the WASH activities will in practice be conditioned by the availability of resources (e.g. South Sudan, and Jordan for parts of the response).



Box 12: Country examples of cross-sector work by UNICEF

In Dominica - A joint effort between the child protection and education sectors resulted in teachers being trained on psychosocial support.

In Liberia - Joint efforts with protection saw teachers being trained on psychosocial support ahead of schools re-opening after the Ebola crises. This ensured important outreach and support to communities to reduce tensions and ensure parents were comfortable with schools re-opening.

In Jordan - Protection and education sectors have worked closely together. The most recent work-plan includes a joint theory of change for protection and education. UNICEF also introduced joint child protection and education oversight of Makani centres.


In the Central African Republic - An evaluation of UNICEF humanitarian response fed into the new Country Programme Document and resulted in a stronger focus on synergies. At the time of that evaluation, effects of this more integrated approach were reported in terms of progress in peace-building, reconciliation, inter-confessional dialogue and conflict resolution. Education and Protection were also reported to have worked together in providing protective TLS, which integrate psychosocial support, WASH, health and nutrition services.

In Nepal - UNICEF education in emergencies response has been well integrated with child protection and WASH, and across the evaluation time period, coherence and capacity have been strengthened through preparedness activities such as contingency planning. UNICEF and the Education Cluster integrated cross-sectoral lessons learned from the earthquake response in the early childhood contingency plan and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in order to strengthen preparedness and response to the 2017 floods and Schools as Zones of Peace work. For instance, UNICEF deployed a WASH focal point along with education staff during the 2017 flood response, which was reported to make a significant impact in terms of more timely and quality integrated response.

In Syria - UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts evolved during the evaluation timeframe with strengthened linkages with child protection in terms of mine risk education and psychosocial training for teachers; WASH in terms of the rehabilitation of schools and updating standards of safe and protective school environments; and adolescent participation, non-formal education and life skills based education.

Source: Evaluation case studies.

Figure 11: UNICEF staff perception on integration of education and WASH in humanitarian contexts



Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff; n=116.




Protection, including psychosocial support, was also relatively well integrated with the education response as indicated in Figure 15 and Box 12. Integration was evident in a number of the country cases studies, and is reflected in the UNICEF package (kits, TLS) which include psychosocial and protection elements and a focus on teacher training and referral mechanisms for protection, which favour the integration.

Coordination and coherence are not, however, uniformly strong. For example, in Bangladesh during the Rohingya crisis, 2016–17 was marked with challenges in coherence between child protection and education. Child friendly spaces and learning centres had been established, often alongside each other, and partners, including government partners, struggled to make clear distinctions between the two. In 2018, a document drafted by Cox's Bazar education sector established a Learning Competency Framework Approach to provide greater clarity.

There was little evidence of consistent work across other sectors, such as Health and Nutrition (e.g. South Sudan). There is no corporate strategy, guidelines or milestones to promote integration between the sectors or that guide collective results across sectors (although there has been some recent work in drafting guidance such as UNICEF ESARO's Concept Note supporting inter-sector coordinated responses⁶¹). This contributes to making success in this area optional, especially in settings where L2 and L3 emergencies have not been activated. In practice this has meant that inter-sectoral collaboration within UNICEF has rested on personal relationships, as accountability for performing in this area has been weak. The stronger links to protection and WASH are likely aided by the fact that UNICEF is cluster lead for these two areas (which is not the case for other sectors). Under the NWOW of the Grand Bargain, partners, including UNICEF, commit to work towards collective outcomes. It will be important to demonstrate this commitment internally as well as externally.

Figure 12: UNICEF staff perception on integration of education with protection in humanitarian contexts



Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff; n=116.

⁶¹ Schools as Integrated Service Platforms is also one of the background papers of the new Education Strategy.



4.3.2 Coherence and coordination between different levels of the organization

Internal interviews highlight a significant disconnect between headquarters, regional offices and country offices, with some interviewees speaking of a ‘massive disconnect’. Across countries EiE and education staff at country offices generally report insufficient attention to regular communication and team work, insufficient support and guidance, weak lesson learning across the organization and limited face-to-face regional meetings and interactions (see Box 13 for the Syria example). The evaluation found that various interconnected issues and weaknesses have played a role in this, including insufficient staffing at HQ to provide guidance and to encourage lesson learning, corporate systems which are not conducive to exchange and lesson learning, and insufficient attention by UNICEF management to education as an integral part of in humanitarian action.

In recognition of this gap, various efforts have been made to improve dialogue, for example through calls between all regional offices and headquarters on a quarterly basis, which has improved sharing of information. Some regional office Education/EiE focal points have played a role in translating headquarters guidance and directives for the country office staff, as well as in aligning country office plans and proposals with global and regional guidance. This is perceived as helpful, but nonetheless most of the

country EiE teams reported that they do not feel sufficiently supported or feel they are reinventing the wheel rather than learning. It is somewhat ironic in this context that country offices express a need for clearer guidance on priorities while at the same time evidence reviewed suggests there have been too many guidelines and priorities. This highlights a critical gap in that the support and guidance which is given (through training, lesson learning and sharing, on-the-job support, access to resources, etc.) clearly falls short of needs that staff have for answers and solutions in what are often high pressure and challenging circumstances of work.

The support provided by regional offices when an emergency is declared (and clusters are activated) is often critical and useful. Thus, in the L2 earthquake response in Nepal, the UNICEF country office appointed a dedicated staff member with cluster coordination experience for immediate cluster coordination and the regional office brought in two global Education Cluster Rapid Response Team Members (RRT), including an information management expert to support the cluster coordination. Similar levels of (useful and valued) support were reported to have been mobilized in other countries when emergencies were declared.

Day-to-day support from regional education teams and the global EiE team to education country teams varied by context. For instance, the Somalia country case study highlighted

Box 13: Syria Example

In Syria, the Whole of Syria (WoS) mechanism has improved cross-line coherence and information management support (alignment on collective objectives and outcomes in the humanitarian response plan for the Syria crisis response), supporting coherence across the affected countries in assessment, planning, response and monitoring. However, there is still a lack of clarity around the roles of WoS and the regional office (MENARO) on education humanitarian action and funding issues vis-à-vis country office accountability and support, especially given gaps in staffing in WoS.

Source: Evaluation case studies.



that rather than being proactive, the regional office was available as an on-call resource,. As a result, that country case study concluded that the country strategy and programme was mainly been driven by the country team itself. The fact that the country office is able to shape the programme was acknowledged as an important and positive characteristic of the decentralized way of working of UNICEF. However, UNICEF invests substantive resources and the global and regional levels with the potential to increase coherence in education humanitarian action in all levels of the organization.

Similarly, for Nepal, the ROSA office provided helpful and effective support during the earthquake but were otherwise found to have provided only limited relevant targeted support. Selected interviewees suggested this was at least partly be due to a lack of dedicated EiE experts at the regional offices throughout most of the evaluation period. Similarly, other country offices reported challenges in obtaining the level and type of specialist support that they were expecting from regional offices. The disconnect appears even bigger between country offices and the global education team, where communication was reported to be weak.

Evidence from key Informant Interview indicated limited coherence between UNICEF Education and the Global Education Cluster; at times they have worked in parallel or in silos, example being the work on protecting education from attack, and the establishment of Education Cannot Wait. Weak collaboration was partly attributed to the fact that the two teams work out of different locations - with the global EiE team is based in New York headquarters and the Global Education Cluster working from the Geneva headquarters.⁶²

Other reasons which appeared to hinder the smooth functioning of the Education Cluster included scarcity of cluster capacities in francophone countries, both in terms of personnel and education materials to guide education work. Relatedly, the evaluation found that there was no clear career path for cluster coordinators. Out of approximately 60 UNICEF staff that are employed as cluster coordinators, approximately 14 were on fixed-term contracts, while a large majority were employed on a temporary basis (as consultants or under TA arrangements). Some are only 50 percent cluster coordinators, and double-hatting on other aspects of the UNICEF education portfolio, which led to conflict of interests, be it perceived or actual.

Overall, the evaluation found untapped potential to leverage the role UNICEF plays in the Education Cluster and Local Education Groups to align across the nexus and strengthen the integration of EiE priorities into overall education responses. These findings do suggest a need for a better balance between country office responsibility and the regional office/HQ advice and support, so that the country office has sufficient support in this decentralized setting.

4.3.3 Guidance, capacity and support

This section brings together key findings with respect to clarity on education approaches and policy positions in humanitarian contexts, staff capacity as well as guidance and support to country offices. Box 14 provides examples of support that country office staff received from the regional office, HQ and the education cluster.

⁶² Geneva is a hub for all humanitarian agencies – United Nations related and others.



Box 14: Selected examples of support that was provided

- Education Cluster Core Skills Training and EiE training, including training on CCC.
- Face-to-face mentoring of experienced colleagues as part of the surge team, particularly on use of technology, data-base, etc. in an L3 emergency.
- Consistent, quality and rapid responses to email questions and requests for support.
- EiE, disaster risk reduction and climate change training and risk-informed programming approach.
- Needs assessment and contingency planning.
- Support to resource mobilization (writing of proposals for donors).
- Surge support.
- Support with conducting of School Needs Assessments.

Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff.

These examples notwithstanding, the survey also highlighted – as did the country studies – a need for more consistent support to country offices in a range of areas. As can be seen from Box 15 this includes support and guidance that is better tailored to different types of emergencies, that addresses needs of first line responders, and that encourages exchange and lesson learning in a more systematic manner. In addition, the feedback obtained also suggests a need for a stronger focus on coaching and opportunities for gaining experience from different emergency settings.

To be useful in future support to countries, these suggested areas of support to staff with responsibilities for education in humanitarian contexts would require prioritization on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that the support is tailored to needs. This suggests a need for more deliberate and joint planning on a number of key activities between regional office and the global level (EiE team and global cluster) in support country office needs, and periodic follow-up to assess and draw lessons about the effectiveness of such support.

Box 15: Areas where further support is needed (survey respondents)

- More and regular experience sharing among first level responders.
- Sharing of practical examples on specific areas e.g. linking emergency and development, innovative strategies for awareness generation by parents on education.
- Opportunities and support for capacity building of counterparts.
- More training opportunities for national staff and first line responders.
- One-on-one coaching with regular intervals by senior EiE expert
- More timely guidance & context specific guidance.
- Training that is better tailored to a range of emergencies i.e. EiE during natural disasters, conflict, refugees, climate change, etc.
- Opportunities to be part of Surge teams to share and gain experience.
- Standardization/simplification of tools and monitoring.
- Support for developing proposals and fundraising.
- More pro-active regional office steering.
- Speedy recruitment of vacancies.
- Quicker mobilization of financial resources.

Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff.



The evaluation found that knowledge on education approaches that are effective in humanitarian contexts evolved from practical experience and trial and error, rather than systematic knowledge generation and lesson sharing. Corroborating findings from earlier evaluations (EEPCT, PBEA, 2016), the evaluation highlighted the need to strengthen monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

With several ways of representing education results in the EiE landscape - results frameworks, reporting frameworks, UNDAF frameworks, donor-specific frameworks – was a possible explanatory factor for the weak monitoring and evaluation and lesson learning is the lack of conceptual clarity and/or consolidation. Many of the available tools were not suited to collecting information that is essential to represent knowledge in the humanitarian landscape, or to work across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, all of which are essential to UNICEF with its role as CLA/PLR and in gaining an appreciation of the ‘universe’ within which UNICEF operates.

Another explanation was limited technical capacities, incentives or time for reflection, and reporting requirements that do not reward deep analysis and reflection on the meaning of the data, and limited information management capacities. For instance, only 50 percent of education clusters had an information management function, and only 20 percent of staff in were dedicated to the function, with the rest being focal points. Data and information management are critical to all functions, commitments and roles that UNICEF is charged with as the lead agency in education in emergencies. For instance, there is a need for data to identify and understand of needs so that education clusters can direct resources to where the need is greatest, as well as to monitor collective outcomes and to make decisions. A weak information management function undermines

delivery as cluster lead agenda and provider of last resort and ultimately affects UNICEF programming and performance.

Another limitation highlighted by the evaluation was that instead of accommodating the ecosystem in which the organization operates, UNICEF planning, monitoring and evaluation processes were specific to the organization. A contrast was made between UNICEF and other organizations such as USAID and DFID that have heeded to the lessons to create flexible reporting mechanisms that are part of programme management and align better with the nature of the coordination and response in humanitarian contexts which requires more adaptability, flexibility and agility.

Capacity building of education staff, particularly at country level, is not sufficiently comprehensive or systematic and has not met the needs of country offices. While there are capacity building initiatives under way, such as ESARO’s Education in Emergencies eLearning course, country office support from HATIS on risk-informed programming, and GEC training, they are ad hoc and disjointed across UNICEF departments and levels. In general, across country studies respondents emphasized a need for stronger training and guidance. The example of Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands highlights the challenges in terms of training and support to countries. UNICEF staff at country level also expressed the need for guidance on how to adapt UNICEF programmes to practically align to the new focus on inclusive and equitable quality and learning for all, including learning outcomes, particularly in humanitarian settings. Staff highlighted that while there is clear guidance on how to develop a PCA, for example, there is no clear understanding of how education outcomes can be improved and monitored. The new education strategy (UNICEF, 2019c) recognizes the need for capacity development to an extent. However, there is to date no systematic plan on how to improve this.



Box 16: Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands – approach to training and capacity development

Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands findings from the Evaluation Country study:

- There has not been a coherent approach to training and capacity building in the UNICEF ECA office, with inadequate training made available on EiE for staff.
- The LAC region is not given high importance by UNICEF globally, with very little opportunity given to the ECA office to share lessons from the 2017 hurricane response widely or for the ECA office to attend UNICEF training and other events globally.

Source: Evaluation case studies.

Dedicated education staff capacity is identified by UNICEF staff as the area most in need of attention in humanitarian contexts. The survey underscored that the greatest need for dedicated staff capacity is at the country office and zonal office levels (identified as the priority by 80 percent of the respondents, with only 20 percent suggesting that the greatest priority was at headquarters and regional office levels – see Figure 17).

The case study of Dominica and Turks & Caicos Islands underscored the challenges of insufficient staff resources. In that case, the limited staff resources for education in emergencies in the ECA and a heavy reliance on surge staff and consultants sometimes meant that UNICEF did not communicate consistent messages on procedures and programming priorities to partners, and also limited ability to drive the preparedness agenda forward with the Turks & Caicos Islands Government.

Other case study examples also underscore the staffing challenges. For example in Syria the case study highlighted that subnational staff have not always been well-informed about roll-out of a new focus on recovery and resilience or the scale-up with education partners, nor have they been systematically involved in design discussions where their knowledge of local context would be beneficial. Across case


studies there was an evident gap, with education staff having limited EiE and humanitarian expertise and experience. Interestingly, education staff in one country pointed out that they did not realise the gap in technical expertise until an education expert was hired.

Monitoring and evaluation is an area with considerable weaknesses. Multiple evaluations (Novelli & Smith, 2011, UNICEF, 2013b, Avenir, 2015) note the need to strengthen monitoring and evaluation and the need to generate evidence to improve education outcomes. This is linked to the technical capacity of staff to conduct sector analysis and monitor learning outcomes in an efficient and meaningful way.

There has not been a clear strategic vision, plan and corresponding monitoring framework for education programmes in humanitarian contexts. The lack of an education strategy for the better part of the evaluation period (2015–2019) has been detrimental in this respect. While the new education strategy (UNICEF, 2019) puts higher priority on EiE, various interviews suggest there is still not sufficient prioritization among the multiplicity of different types of actions and priorities that are part of the new strategy, e.g. safe schools, learning passports, the Accelerated Education Working Group, GADRRRES, INEE, GCPEA, ECW, risk informed programming.




Figure 13: Areas for improvement of education programmes in humanitarian situations



Source: Analysis of survey results by the evaluation team; n=116.

Figure 14: Level of the organization with the greatest need for dedicated EiE staff



Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff; n=116.

4.4 External coherence and coordination

External coordination and coherence are defined as the extent to which UNICEF activities on education in humanitarian contexts are in synergy/aligned with the work of other actors on in education and with opportunities for aligning with other sectors (externally) and the extent to which UNICEF has sought to create clarity on priorities for education as part of the overall dialogue with and efforts of partners.

This section (linked to EQ4) examines the coordination and complementarity between UNICEF and other actors;⁶³ the extent of inter-sectoral collaboration between the different sectors in the emergency response; and the comparative advantages that UNICEF brings to EiE work.

⁶³ This includes UN partners, other international partners, CSO, private sector and Government.



● KEY FINDINGS: _____ ON EXTERNAL COHERENCE AND COORDINATION

- a) At global level UNICEF has communicated well. There has been good coordination and coherence with other actors on global advocacy, policy and in the evolution of architecture. However, within UNICEF there is still insufficient understanding of the difference in mandates and roles across coordination and financing actors and there has been insufficient strategic thinking on comparative advantage and complementarity vis-à-vis the work of partners, with some areas of overlapping work in evidence. There has also been insufficient attention to developing operational markers or protocols based on mandates to help guide actors at regional and country levels to ensure complementarity rather than duplication.
- b) At country level, there is strong coherence with government/ MoE as principal partners. UNICEF has also promoted coherence through its cluster co-lead role (supporting mapping/studies, coordination of EiE activities, information sharing and synergy); bilateral coordination has been weaker. There has been growing strong complementarity and cross-sectoral coordination between partners working on education, WASH and Child Protection. In this area (as was also the case internally) being the (co)lead of the WASH, Protection and Education clusters is an advantage for UNICEF.
- c) Across levels, greater awareness and sensitivity are needed concerning communication and coordination given the multiple hats that UNICEF wears and associated power dynamics.
- d) UNICEF has increasingly focussed on strengthening national capacity. Capacity/coordination at sub-national levels on comprehensive preparedness and response has received less attention, while critical in situations of devolved governance.

Strength of evidence

Evidence for most of these findings is strong.

4.4.1 Effectiveness of communication, coordination and complementarity with the work of other actors

At global level UNICEF is found to have played an important and useful role in various coordination forums where it has participated consistently over time (GEC, INEE, GCPEA working group meetings, etc.). At times, participation has been affected by the very small staff contingent in headquarters dedicated to EiE (see also sections 4.1 and 4.3 above), whereas wider participation, for instance by regional staff, could have had more far-reaching effects. Nonetheless, UNICEF has been very influential, testifying to the effectiveness of its engagement in these circles.

At global level, UNICEF has communicated well and with consistent messaging on the importance of education in humanitarian programming. This has included the work to establish ECW and joint advocacy and lobbying at various international events (World Humanitarian Summit). UNICEF quality and visually attractive advocacy materials have supported these communication efforts. UNICEF has worked in coordination with efforts by other partners on advancing the EiE agenda (creating stronger support for education's role in the humanitarian response) and has also worked in synergy with other partners on strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. UNICEF has used these opportunities to share its approaches and policy positions and has



provided relevant updates of its own work from the field, including sharing tools and guidance materials.

However, the work that UNICEF does at global and country level is not always aligned in a way that clarifies what the organization's priorities are. For example, the work at global level is shifting to learning outcomes, but UNICEF does very little on this at country level, where it is often perceived as not being feasible due to competing priorities, chronic underfunding, challenges of implementing such an agenda in what are often extremely challenging circumstances, and limited best practice on improving learning outcomes. And as highlighted in the internal coherence discussion, because of weaknesses in linkages between the different levels at which UNICEF works, UNICEF has not been able to bring to these global coordination efforts the full range of lessons that could be learned from the work that it does in different settings.

UNICEF has engaged in areas of work that are similar to those of others; a lack of strategic reflection on and dialogue with partners about division of labour based on comparative advantage (in line with the NWOW) has contributed to the perception of overlapping mandates, duplication and reduced efficiency. There has been insufficient communication and strategizing around the comparative advantage that UNICEF brings to global efforts, and duplication of efforts as a result. Examples of this include planning tools, UNICEF having developed Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming, IIEP focusing on risk-sensitive sector planning and USAID on Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA). UNICEF and UNHCR also have overlapping mandates in mixed contexts with internally displaced persons and refugees (UNHCR for refugee coordination and UNICEF through the IASC Education Cluster). This has reduced complementarity of work and underscores the need to examine operations and capacities in the field

and to think strategically about and explicitly clarify roles, responsibilities and ways of working based on comparative advantage.

At both country and global levels, UNICEF has to manoeuvre between its different roles . This sees the organization at times acting both as the supervisor and the implementer of education funding in humanitarian contexts. Examples are situations where UNICEF is both the GPE grant agent and a donor, partner and implementer. or with ECW where UNICEF is both hosting the fund and is one of the main implementers and is then also (co-)leading on cluster coordination. This requires savvy manoeuvring and clarity in communication – which partners on the ground have at times found lacking.

Generally, at country level UNICEF has performed a key role in the coordination of education in emergency situations. Across the case study countries, UNICEF is consistently reported to have played a lead role in coordination of the education humanitarian response through its role in education forums and as cluster co-lead for education and its leadership of other clusters, and to have generally worked in a complementary manner. In some contexts, there are few partners to coordinate with, as the Dominica case study underscored, but in these contexts UNICEF still worked with available partners. Thus, in Dominica a strong complementary partnership was brought about between UNICEF, IsraAid and the Ministry of Education to provide technical in-country expertise and enable innovative and adaptable programming building on lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane response, working with the government and often focusing on the upstream role of strengthening policies and capacity to act.

In various contexts UNICEF has also engaged and coordinated with regional bodies, e.g. in the Caribbean with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), a regional inter-governmental agency for disaster management who were important in leveraging



support for effective disaster risk reduction in the education system and in maximizing efficiency in a generally resource-strapped region. Other examples of regional collaborations include ESARO's work with the eight countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in partnership with UNHCR, on the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education; ROSA's work with the Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to develop and implement guidelines on Child-Centred Disaster Risk Reduction and School Safety; and MENARO's work with the No Lost Generation initiative and regional working group to facilitate partnerships and cross-sector programming, advocacy, knowledge management for the areas of child and adolescent protection, well-being and education in the Syria response.

UNICEF has developed tools and resources, such as the Education Cluster strategies, that facilitate its coordination role. Carrying out a mapping of needs and available resources (3W, 4Ws or 5Ws) contributes to enhanced complementarity, as does the pre-positioning of non-food items (interviews and survey). For example, in Liberia, UNICEF worked with partners to conduct a comprehensive mapping which was all the more critical because the country's EMIS system had been dysfunctional for a number of years and there was no up-to-date information about the location and number of pupils/teachers in each school. Other country studies (e.g. Somalia) also support the importance of the mapping exercises in bringing about complementarity. In Liberia, UNICEF is also credited with having used its lead/coordination role to bring about enhanced complementarity by an early renegotiation of its funding with donors to enable re-allocating of existing budgets to the Ebola response. The mapping was then used to assist in determining priorities. The resources that were mobilised in this manner helped strengthen the overall response and the participation of actors through which UNICEF works (in particular NGOs).

Coherence was enhanced by success in convincing donors to allow re-programming to align with the needs resulting from the Ebola crisis.

The country studies present a mixed picture of the bilateral coordination of UNICEF with partners. In addition to coordinating through the cluster, UNICEF also coordinates at a bilateral level. For example, in South Sudan UNICEF has been working closely with other United Nations agencies on refugee education (UNHCR), school meals (WFP) and life skills (UNESCO). In Nepal, there is strong collaboration and coordination among EiE partners within the education sector and UNICEF has helped to create and strengthen this coherence through its co-leadership of the Education Cluster and its roles in the Development Partners Group, including leadership of the Technical Working Group on Comprehensive School Safety. However, the country studies are not uniformly positive about the coordination. In Jordan, for example, various bilateral partners were critical of insufficient clarity and commitment of UNICEF in the context of a changing EiE response. In Somalia, the country study highlighted untapped opportunities for more strategic engagement between UNICEF and UNHCR, and most UNICEF-supported schools were not targeted by WFP for school meals. The Syria study noted limited complementarity with some donors and local NGOs working at community level with the most marginalized.

Capacity building efforts linked to the EEPCT and PBEA are noted, but these had tailed off before the period now being evaluated. Capacity building of implementing partner staff is particularly important to ensure appropriate and timely education responses, particularly when UNICEF staff are not able to be on the ground. Box 18 demonstrates that UNICEF has prepared multiple guidance materials for its own staff and partners, but interviews and survey responses indicate that country level staff consider that more, and more tailored support should be provided.



While country level UNICEF staff have benefited from trainings and guidance, involvement for EiE staff at country level has not been systematic and nor has it been tracked in a comprehensive way. (This has reportedly changed in 2018 and 2019 with the implementation of the Cluster Core Skills materials where the inclusion of local and international members of country cluster is key.) In responses to the evaluation's survey (Annex 8), only 31 percent of UNICEF staff

respondents felt that they had received adequate support, and many expressed that further technical support tailored to specific contexts would be useful. Support that would be useful ranged from initial to refresher training on EiE programming and implementation in a variety of contexts, capacity building on disaster risk reduction, cross-country/region sharing of good practices, support with linking development and humanitarian programming and others.

Box 17: EiE guidance materials for UNICEF staff and partners

UNICEF HQ has developed a number of guidance materials to support in-country education and EiE staff. UNICEF guidance notes cover: preparedness (a UNICEF guidance note on Preparedness for Emergency Response in UNICEF prepared in 2016 and the Emergency Preparedness Platform (EPP) Procedure issued in 2018); peacebuilding (a Technical Note on Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity from 2012, a Guidance Note on Peace Building through Early Childhood Development, Child-Friendly Schooling for Peacebuilding 2014 and Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Programming Guide 2016); on programming in fragile states (2018 guidance on "Integrating humanitarian response and development: programme framework for fragile contexts"); risk-informed programming (2018 Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming); inclusive education (2008 guide on Inclusive Education in Emergencies); and WASH (2015 Resource Guide for WASH in education efforts). While there is no apparent comprehensive training strategy for staff implementing education in emergencies programmes, the Humanitarian and Transition Support team (HATIS) in Programme Division has provided targeted capacity-building support to UNICEF staff and partners on the risk-informed programming package when requested, including field support on conflict and risk analysis, conflict sensitivity; and design, implementation and monitoring of peacebuilding and risk-informed programming.

UNICEF Regional Offices are engaged in providing technical support and capacity building to country offices and partners; for instance, WCARO created region-specific training and tools to support capacity building on risk-informed programming and the convergence of education, protection and resilience, but has often lacked funding to support this work. MENARO developed an information management package for the Syria crisis together with regional partners (Save the Children et al, 2019), providing in-depth guidance on aligned indicators (access, quality, system strengthening) for the Syria Crisis Education Response. ESARO has developed the UNICEF Education in Emergencies eLearning course using Agora, the UNICEF eLearning platform, and drawing on the INEE Harmonized Training package, INEE Conflict Sensitive Education Training package, UNICEF Frontline Responders Training and UNICEF Risk-Informed Education Planning Training. The facilitated course is designed to build capacity not only of UNICEF staff but also of government counterparts, partner organizations and donors, and was piloted in 2018 to "strong, positive feedback on the course as a product which is meeting a current need/gap in the field of EiE" (Newby & Hodgkin, 2018). However, because the eLearning course is facilitated and involves peer-to-peer learning, the course is run during set months, scheduled over a minimum four-month to maximum seven-month period. Thus, many staff have not had the opportunity to take part in it. Moreover, without a clear capacity building strategy from UNICEF headquarters linked to innovations work and learning and knowledge management across levels, UNICEF capacity building efforts have been disjointed and ad hoc, and as a result capacity at country level is often dependent upon the experience of the individual.



UNICEF has played a role in enhancing effectiveness of the education humanitarian response by working towards strengthening national systems and coordination structures and building capacity of government, and it is progressively working towards handover of responsibility to governments. The country studies illustrate the efforts that have been made and highlight that in various contexts UNICEF has encouraged the ministries of education to start their own emergency coordination groups (e.g. CAR, Jordan, Liberia and Somalia) which have continued beyond the direct emergency that had led to the initial establishment of these coordination structures.

In Liberia, three years after the Ebola crises, these structures continue to be in place. In some countries this work has extended to strengthening government capacity at sub-national levels (e.g. in Somalia where UNICEF has been working with federal and regional governments and supported coordination, and similarly in Syria). The evaluation concludes that the UNICEF lead

coordination role has been able to benefit from the work that the organization has been doing globally in education on upstream work (UNICEF, 2014c) and therefore also from the efforts that education partners, collectively, have put into strengthening coordination in education, e.g. in Nepal.

In coordinating, UNICEF has been able to build the established relationships, credibility and recognized expertise it brings to the table from its education work in countries around the world. In many countries UNICEF is a key partner in education, with strong established links with the education ministries and with governments more generally and participation in different working groups. In Jordan, for example, UNICEF had been doing acknowledged work on violence in schools even before the Syria crisis. Bangladesh is a case in point: in the Rohingya response⁶⁴ UNICEF not only efficiently co-led the two education working groups (national and Rohingya) but also facilitated connections for others.

Box 18: Stronger planning and prioritization through education coordination in Syria

Complementarity and coherence across sectors and partners in Syria has been strengthened through the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP)/Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) providing collective vision, objectives, indicators and targets as well as a monitoring framework. A variety of networks, forums and programmes support these coherence efforts, including initiatives in which UNICEF plays a key role, such as the No Lost Generation Initiative and the ECW-funded Education Dialogue Forum.

Moreover, the co-lead role of UNICEF in the Education Sector Working Group at national and sub-national levels in Syria has enabled better information management and a more comprehensive identification of needs, mapping capacities, gaps, partners, funds and implementation activities for the sector, which has supported UNICEF prioritization processes and allowed UNICEF to act as provider of last resort.

Source: Evaluation case study.

⁶⁴ While Bangladesh has hosted Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and UNICEF has offered support throughout the evaluation period, August 2017 triggered the largest and fastest refugee influx in Bangladesh history. An estimated 745,000 Rohingya—including more than 400,000 children—fled into Cox's Bazar (JRP, 2019).



When the education cluster is activated, this has generally strengthened a coordinated response and ensured that all relevant partners are part of the response. The cluster activation, and the emergency response more generally, brings the imperative of coordination and may also bring into the group of education partners other actors who normally do not sit at the coordination table. In Liberia, this was the case for NGOs who had not been part of the education dialogue prior to the Ebola crisis but became part of the cluster response and beyond the end of the crisis have continued to be active partners.

A key element of added value for UNICEF in the education humanitarian response is its convening capacity in combination with its mandate as cluster co-lead, which was evident across the case studies and strongly supported by survey responses. This capacity makes it possible to coordinate, identify gaps and lead effectively. UNICEF capacity to convene partners manifests itself across a range of different areas of importance, including:

- Linking to a range of partners, including CSOs and NGOs as well as different levels of government.
- Connecting humanitarian and development actions/actors.
- Linking different types of emergency programming including child protection, WASH and education (internally within UNICEF and externally).

However, UNICEF has not always been swift enough to instigate its leadership of education in emergencies. In Liberia, UNICEF did not initially play the role it should have in the education response to Ebola, as illustrated in Box 20. The Liberia case also illustrates a disconnect in terms of internal coordination and leadership on EiE.

UNICEF has not always been transparent and communicative enough, including when making programmatic changes that affect the way it engages. In Jordan, with the initial emergency shifting to a long-term protracted crisis, UNICEF shifted its focus away from working through NGOs and CSOs in refugee camps to a

Box 19: Liberia: EiE challenges when an epidemic closes schools

It was initially extremely challenging to draw attention to education as part of the Ebola response. Interview and documentary evidence highlights that the initial response was health-driven. There were strong concerns that schools (and other public places) would be hotspots for contamination and there was lack of understanding and a reluctance on the part of senior UNICEF management at headquarters to move forward with an education response. The Liberia country case study highlights that the adequacy of the response was affected by the lack of preparedness globally and in country, by the late activation of the Education Cluster and the time it took to get recognition for the role of education in the overall response.

However, informants at country and HQ levels considered that UNICEF and partners are now better prepared for this type of emergency. Though the Ebola crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not subject of the current evaluation, UNICEF seems to have learned from its experience in West Africa and in addition to responding in the DRC itself, the organization is working with governments and partners on preparedness actions in DRC's neighbouring countries.

Source: Evaluation case study.



stronger role for the private sector⁶⁵ and a stronger focus on Government under its new country programme document. There have been some positive gains as a result (e.g. better contractual conditions for Syrian teachers), which were acknowledged by UNICEF partners from the education group. However, these shifts were perceived as not well communicated and not sufficiently consultative and therefore a poor reflection of the UNICEF role as a coordinator and promoter of complementarity. According to various interviewees, as UNICEF made these decisions, it also reduced its own participation in the coordination structures; this contributed – according to external respondents – to a reduction in the number and the effectiveness of coordination meetings. In addition, as reported by other agencies, skills and experience were lost with the transition to private sector operators.

The change also brought direct challenges to UNHCR as the camp manager, because it created significant tensions with Syrian refugees who were concerned about their jobs as teachers and the continuity of the education services. In a number of other countries communication challenges that were highlighted related to the reliance on surge staff and consultants who did not have a clear understanding of the context and did not engage (sufficiently) with existing national staff; this meant that UNICEF did not always communicate consistent messages on procedures and programming priorities to partners (e.g. Liberia, Dominica).

4.4.2 Efficiency of inter-sectoral collaboration in ensuring synergies: education, WASH, and child protection

There has been progress in complementarity and cross-sectoral coordination between partners at country level working on education,

WASH and child protection over the evaluation period. The dynamic between these three clusters has enhanced coordination internally across sectors. It was also generally helpful to external coherence or UNICEF to be the (co-)lead of the WASH, protection and education clusters, although experience has been different in different countries.

For example, in Liberia the activation of the education cluster opened the door to coordination with other sectors and integrated education into the overall humanitarian response, although as that country case study illustrated the education response was subsumed into a health response which did not (sufficiently) prioritize the educational needs of children. In Nepal there has also been strong complementarity and cross-sectoral coordination with partners working on education, WASH and child protection. An Information Management (IM) expert provided useful support to all partners in the education humanitarian response, with various external organizations reporting that the data and systems had been very helpful to their decision making.

4.4.3 Extent to which UNICEF human and financial resources were applied to promote coherence and complementarity

Across country case studies, the evaluation found examples of UNICEF applying resources (human and financial) in ways that have benefited coherence and complementarity. Various specific examples from the country studies (Box 21) illustrate this. Investment in country systems and capacity is considered a very important choice, as are the resources dedicated to coordination.

⁶⁵ In Jordan, UNICEF had contracted a private profit-making company to assist with the management of Syrian refugee camp teachers. This company took over part of the work that was previously done by INGOs.



Box 20: Country examples of resource use decisions that enhanced complementarity and coherence

CAR: UNICEF has deployed limited human and financial resources to strike a reasonable balance between responding to the most urgent needs of a population in extremely poor circumstances and building national capacity and systems – primarily for meeting those urgent needs.

Eastern Caribbean: The UNICEF focus on technical assistance and advocacy in the Eastern Caribbean Area (ECA) to support the regional Safe School Framework, as well on country level emergency preparedness and response planning (especially since 2017), has enabled UNICEF to apply human and financial resources where they can make the most difference. Increasing synergy between development and humanitarian programming has also enabled the ECA office to maximise limited resources and efficiency. In a resource-strapped environment UNICEF has also been innovative and has made the most out of limited human and financial resources, for example, by working with volunteers from PTAs, teachers, students in the EiE initiatives. Similar examples were found across other countries (e.g. Liberia).

Nepal: UNICEF has engaged in advocacy, policy and technical work to support the development of the Comprehensive School Safety Master Plan and Minimum Package. This is a clear example of strong collaboration with external partners across the education sector in Nepal, as well as an example of UNICEF applying its human and financial resources for education in humanitarian contexts where they can make the most difference based on UNICEF comparative advantages (leveraging respect, trust and relationships with government, donors, NGOs for alignment on collective outcomes across the nexus).

Syria: UNICEF investment (resources, time) on coordination (Whole of Syria mechanism and Education Sector Working Group) have strengthened complementarity and coherence across sectors. This has helped to increase efficiency, reduce duplication and strengthen effectiveness and reach.

Source: Evaluation case studies.

There is strong evidence of many effective choices, but inefficiencies and missed opportunities were also clear from the country studies,. These included delays in decision making (e.g. Liberia), slow decision making and delays in responding to feedback from the ground (e.g. CAR), challenges in integrating government officials more fully in the work (e.g. CAR), limited systematic focus on building technical capacity of national staff and national NGO partners which hindered sustainability (e.g. Syria, South Sudan, Liberia and generally in all countries), and challenges related to UNICEF staff (turn-over and delays in critical appointments) which affected the building and maintenance of relationships with governments and partners (e.g. Syria, Jordan).

It is important that EiE actors have a common understanding of and terminology for EiE challenges and programming good practices – essential for ensuring consistency and standards across actors. UNICEF has supported this through its participation in global networks which also give UNICEF staff an opportunity for professional development. In this context, at the global level, network global goods seem good value for money; research, guidance and tools have been used by UNICEF staff and partners at global, regional and country levels to create a common understanding of definitions, good practices and lessons learned which help to align practice and policy across organizations and ultimately strengthen education (e.g. GCPEA: Safe Schools Declaration; INEE: Guidance Notes on Psychosocial Support and on Conflict Sensitive



Education; GADRRRES: Comprehensive School Safety Framework). Interview evidence and the analysis of funding trends suggest it is unlikely that significantly more funding will be made available. This necessitates innovative thinking, collaborative working and equipping staff to be more versatile. The implementation of NWOW needs to be strengthened.

4.5 Contribution to the triple nexus

Given scarce development action in many contexts where vulnerability is the highest, there has been a long-standing discussion around better linkages between humanitarian and development efforts. Work on the humanitarian-development nexus was given impetus by the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that set out not just to meet needs, but to reduce risk and vulnerability.⁶⁶ More recently the “triple nexus” has emerged that refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actors. This recognises that sustainable development and durable solutions to displacement are not possible without peace, and humanitarian relief, development programmes and peacebuilding are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time.⁶⁷

This section of the report (linked to EQ5) reviews to what extent UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts strengthened the humanitarian–development–peace nexus over time. It reviews UNICEF work in this area and considers how well UNICEF is responding to



international commitments, how well UNICEF work in education in emergencies links with national longer-term development work in education, whether progress is being made in terms of preparedness and mitigation of hazards and risks at country level, and to what extent peace building and social cohesion are served by UNICEF programmes.

⁶⁶ <https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-development-nexus>

⁶⁷ <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/14973644>



● KEY FINDINGS: _____ ON UNICEF CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEXUS

- a) UNICEF is well placed to work across the nexus because of its dual mandate, its established country presence ‘before, during and after’ a crisis, and its strategic position representing the education cluster and other sectors within the Humanitarian Country Team, (co-) leading the education cluster and serving on and/or often coordinating the local education group. While UNICEF has made good progress at the corporate level in guidance for more consistent and systematic linking of humanitarian and development programming, there is insufficient understanding of and guidance for assessing and operationalising UNICEF-specific comparative advantage and complementarity among partners in different settings, regions and countries.
- b) In line with the localisation agenda, UNICEF is channelling an increasing proportion of funds through local NGOs (except for Jordan). However, UNICEF has not systematically prioritized building the capacity of local NGOs and limitations in the capacities of local NGOs may limit UNICEF contributions to system strengthening and sustainability.
- c) UNICEF has invested heavily at the corporate level in developing strong guidance to support multi-hazard risk-informed programming and preparedness planning. However, it remains early days and there is still some way to go in applying this guidance to education. Progress is most evident towards preparing for and mitigating the effects of natural disasters, but this needs to be scaled up and prioritized further given UNICEF global and strategic commitments related to climate change.
- d) Mitigating conflict remains highly challenging and the prominence of peacebuilding activities appears to have diminished sharply, especially at field level, over the evaluation period. Pilot projects linking education to peacebuilding are reported to have had some positive impacts on direct beneficiaries, but have not been taken up and sustained within national systems or within UNICEF Country Office priorities.

Strength of evidence

Evidence for most of these findings is strong.

4.5.1 Global Commitments and Frameworks

Strengthened approaches to working across the humanitarian–development divide featured prominently as a global priority over the evaluation period. This dialogue built on the preceding Millennium Development Goals and the Hyogo Framework for Action, to advocate for more holistic and integrated approaches. These global frameworks have framed the UNICEF approach, with key commitments and frameworks including the following:

- The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognized the need to focus directly on reaching those furthest behind first – who are themselves disproportionately vulnerable to, and affected by, the impacts of crisis.
- The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 addressed the prevention of new crises and the reduction of disaster risk related to various shocks and stresses, with a focus on human vulnerability.



- The Paris Agreement linked mitigation and adaptation goals in the global climate effort, with risk reduction through comprehensive risk assessments and more coherent management of multiple threats.
- The World Humanitarian Summit 2016 galvanized commitments towards a ‘new way of working’. The Agenda for Humanity demanded that the success of international interventions be measured by the year-on-year reduction in human vulnerability and risk – not the proportion of acute and urgent needs met.
- A 2017 vision statement by the United Nations Secretary-General advocated a ‘culture of prevention’, working across different types of crisis – natural phenomena, violent conflict and other man-made or social shocks and stresses – and including peace and security within a triple nexus.

4.5.2 UNICEF Corporate Strategy and Guidance

UNICEF recognized the need to strengthen the humanitarian–development nexus within the 2010 CCC in Humanitarian Action. This acknowledged the link between humanitarian action and development, and provided an explicit focus on disaster risk reduction. The scope of this included preparedness for rapid response, commencing early recovery in parallel with humanitarian response, and supporting self-initiated recovery actions by affected populations.

UNICEF has continued to refine its strategic approach. The nexus was further examined in a 2016 UNICEF study on linking development and humanitarian programming (UNICEF, 2016e). This argued that development and humanitarian interventions would have to become more complementary to address the root causes of crises

while protecting development gains. Elements of longer-term risk assessment, preparedness and capacity-building needed to be introduced into humanitarian responses, and elements of emergency preparedness and response into development programmes. This study found that UNICEF was very well placed to work across the nexus because of its dual mandate and its country presence ‘before, during and after’ a crisis and its knowledge of, and partnerships with, government and NGOs.

The UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2018–2021⁶⁸ (UNICEF, 2017e) articulates a strengthened commitment and institutional accountability framework for strengthening the linkages between its humanitarian and development mandates. The Strategic Plan commits to fostering the coherence and complementarity between humanitarian and development actions and to strengthen policies and programmes related to climate change, disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding, with the aim to mitigate risks and build resilience for children and their communities.

An update on UNICEF humanitarian action with a focus on linking humanitarian and development programming was presented to the UNICEF Executive Board in February 2019. Following this, guidance was issued to all UNICEF offices to encourage more consistent and systematic linking of humanitarian and development programming through the “UNICEF Procedure on linking humanitarian and development programming”, issued in May 2019. This document draws together the emerging consensus on how a commitment to the nexus can be actioned under five headings (see Box 22). The guidance provides limited specific guidance for each sector, with an annex outlining a small number of indicative examples of the types of adjustments that would strengthen the nexus.

⁶⁸ The previous Strategic Plan 2014–2017 addressed the linkages between development and humanitarian mandates and stressed the importance of preparedness both for programming and for national strategies, plans and systems.



Box 21: UNICEF commitments on humanitarian and development programming

UNICEF commits to the following actions

1. Building local capacity, including that of individuals and communities, and strengthening or establishing systems from the onset of humanitarian action, including:
 - Promoting participation of affected populations.
 - Strengthen national institutions as part of response plans.
 - Incorporate innovation into humanitarian action.
2. Improving immediate emergency responses through preparedness as part of country programming.
 - Develop and update preparedness and contingency plans using the new Emergency Preparedness Platform and meet the Minimum Preparedness Standards.
3. Review quality of the linkages of Humanitarian and development Programming through regular quality reviews of intervention strategies for linking humanitarian and development responses.
4. Risk Informed Programming
 - Conduct risk assessments of natural and made-made hazards (climatic events, conflict and fragility, natural disasters, economic shocks etc.) and adjust programme implementation to mitigate risk and build resilience.
 - Reallocate resources.
 - Focus development programmes on mitigating risks and humanitarian programmes on building capacities over the long term.
 - Where appropriate include robust conflict analysis, ensure conflict sensitive programming and address the causes of conflict and violence through appropriate peacebuilding approaches.
5. Work in partnerships to bring additional capabilities and resources to crisis affected countries.
 - Adapt resource mobilization strategies to recognize the important role of host Governments, the private sector and local partners.
 - Work with partners to undertake their relief work in a manner that contributes to building local capacity and strengthening systems.
 - Leverage coordinated risk and needs assessments and joint humanitarian-development planning processes.
 - Advocate for innovative, predictable and flexible multi-year financing.

Source: UNICEF Procedure on Linking Humanitarian and Development Programming (UNICEF, 2019d).

The guidance is a substantial step forward, in that it lays out a clear vision of how to link humanitarian and development programming, and it meets a need. In Jordan it was noted that understandings of UNICEF strategy towards the nexus varied – hopefully the new corporate guidance will provide greater clarity on the overall strategic approach.

As the May 2019 guidance is very recent, it is not appropriate to use it as a single framework to evaluate country level performance over the evaluation period. However, it still provides a useful point of reflection on the actions that UNICEF has taken in addressing the nexus in the various study countries and how it might strategically progress.



4.5.3 Linkages between UNICEF objectives in EiE and national education priorities

The evaluation identified a sharp increase in the number of EiE projects across the case study countries, responding to a range of natural disasters, complex emergencies, economic shocks and epidemics. In the broadest sense UNICEF has supported work on the nexus by embedding education responses as a commonly accepted part of the emergency response. Thus the first stage has been to establish that education is not purely addressed as part of development but straddles the humanitarian–development nexus.

The evaluation found that the initial focus of EiE had been strongly on establishing a humanitarian identity for the education sector. Consequently,

the focus was on immediate delivery, to ensure continuity of education for children displaced from education by a sudden-onset disaster and to increase educational access for children excluded in situations of protracted crises. Over time, in line with the nexus, greater attention was placed on strengthening capacities and existing systems. For example, in CAR a systematic approach to strengthen government and NGO capacities emerged in 2016–17 under a new Country Programme Document.

A key decision shaping the ability to link EiE responses with national systems has been UNICEF ability to choose the right partners. At a corporate level these choices have been influenced by the six commitments under workstream 2 of the Grand Bargain (see Box 23).

Box 22: The six commitments under workstream 2 of the Grand Bargain

Aid organizations and donors commit to:

1. Increase and support multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response and coordination capacities, especially in fragile contexts and where communities are vulnerable to armed conflicts, disasters, recurrent outbreaks and the effects of climate change. We should achieve this through collaboration with development partners and incorporate capacity strengthening in partnership agreements.
2. Understand better and work to remove or reduce barriers that prevent organizations and donors from partnering with local and national responders in order to lessen their administrative burden.
3. Support and complement national coordination mechanisms where they exist and include local and national responders in international coordination mechanisms as appropriate and in keeping with humanitarian principles.
4. Achieve by 2020 a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transactional costs.
5. Develop, with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and apply a ‘localisation’ marker to measure direct and indirect funding to local and national responders.
6. Make greater use of funding tools which increase and improve assistance delivered by local and national responders, such as UN-led country-based pooled funds (CBPF), IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and NGO-led and other pooled funds.

Source: ICVA, 2017.



A strong argument of stakeholders is that local NGOs have a well-established presence and are better placed than international NGOs (INGOs) both to respond to future crises and to provide continuity of support to schools and communities in the post-crisis period. For example, in South Sudan, while INGOs evacuated, many national partners continued operating in areas such as Jonglei or Upper Nile, which allowed UNICEF to continue the implementation of activities. In practical terms UNICEF committed in 2016 to allocating at least 30 percent of humanitarian funding to local and national actors. In 2017, UNICEF met this target, with transfers to local and national responders accounting for 31 percent of humanitarian expenditure. The country studies confirmed that the volume of funding channelled to local schools is being purposely increased.⁶⁹

At the same time, questions were raised on the limited effectiveness of this strategy. The technical and financial capacities of many local NGOs are limited and there was little evidence of investment in the capacities of the NGOs themselves, rather than more money to fund EiE activities. Consequently the effectiveness of local NGOs in a system-strengthening role – as partners to Government – was questioned. As recognized by UNICEF, there is a need to adopt a more systematic approach to localization to maximize its impact.⁷⁰

4.5.4 Linking EiE solutions to national systems

A number of lessons and best practices were identified in terms of linking the EiE education solutions with longer-term approaches

and systems. Strong similarities existed in the education solutions offered under EiE, typically including the construction of Temporary Learning Structures (TLS), the provision of Temporary Learning Materials (TLM) such as “School in a box” kits, aspects of teacher training, pupil enrolment and encouraging parent participation.

Temporary Learning Structures have often been constructed at very low cost using materials with limited durability, such as tin sheets or tents in South Sudan.⁷¹ The durability of schools has been further compromised where enrolment exceeded the design capacity – in some cases by a very large factor. Consequently TLS structures in some situations were reported to last less than a year. However, in protracted crisis situations the EiE structures were filling a gap in provision and potentially have become the basis of more permanent facilities. Site selection was also an important consideration, as uncertain land ownership and the potential for further displacement could undermine the transition to a more established facility. Overall, there are good arguments for adopting flexible design standards and considering how the TLS siting and design can link to the establishment of a more permanent structure.

Several relevant lessons emerged in composition and sourcing of the various educational kits provided through EiE projects. In several countries UNICEF has supported the development of national curricula and learning materials. EiE projects provided a valuable opportunity to distribute these materials to significant numbers of learners. This was particularly valuable

⁶⁹ As an example of the commitment of UNICEF to partnering with national organizations, the South Sudan country programme transferred US\$55 million to 149 civil society implementing partners in 2017 (two thirds of which are local or national partners). UNICEF South Sudan also focused on increasing the number of partnerships with local civil society organizations in 2017 to reach children in previously hard-to-reach areas and build civil society capacity to deliver essential community-level services. *Update on UNICEF humanitarian action with a focus on linking humanitarian and development programming (2019)*

⁷⁰ Update on UNICEF humanitarian action with a focus on linking humanitarian and development programming (2019)

⁷¹ In the context of Jordan more sophisticated structures were observed, with much better equipment, reflecting better funding to that response.



in protracted crises – such as Somalia – where, in the absence of nationally agreed curricula, a plethora of alternative curricula has emerged to fill the gap.⁷²

A common thread across EiE interventions has been building the capacity of teachers to support the needs of children who have experienced trauma. An introduction to psychosocial support was widely integrated into teacher training, encouraging teachers to identify and refer cases to specialised services. According to informants to this evaluation, the focus on psychosocial support and the development of tools and materials on this in various contexts has been strongly supported by UNICEF but has been the result of the collective effort of numerous agencies including Save the Children, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the IRC, Teachers Collect (Columbia University) and INEE. In several countries, including Liberia, CAR and the Eastern Caribbean, the emergency provided an entry point to embedding this competency within regular teacher training programmes. In Dominica all teachers were trained in psychosocial support to enable the long-term sustainability of the activity.

UNICEF has a strong commitment to promoting the participation of affected populations. An implicit assumption has been that community participation would improve the sustainability of EiE activities. The evaluation found that parent and school community bodies – variously called Parent Teacher Associations, Community Education Committees (CECs) or School Management Committees (SMCs), were commonly integrated as part of EiE interventions by UNICEF. For example, in Liberia PTAs were heavily involved in responding to the Ebola crisis.

The evidence questions the effectiveness of the mechanisms UNICEF employs for community engagement in design of interventions and identification of priorities. For example, CECs in Somalia had limited understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Stakeholders in South Sudan reported that the involvement of affected populations was perceived to be minimal, especially in the early stages. In Nepal activities were noted to have been developed with school management committee input, but feedback was missing. Poor beneficiary consultation was also noted in Liberia and the Turks & Caicos Islands – although it was strong in Dominica, but mostly due to the role of the on partner the ground rather than UNICEF. Sustainability has also been challenging, with CECs in Somalia, for example, lacking the potential and resources to sustain EiE interventions, with similar concerns being expressed in Liberia.

4.5.5 Building system resilience

Alongside efforts to adopt longer-term approaches within the emergency response (discussed above) there have been parallel efforts to make national systems more responsive to and resilient in emergencies.

In many of the countries studied by the evaluation the response to a rapid-onset or protracted crisis provided the trigger or opportunity to embed emergency response as part of national responsibilities and systems. For example, during the Ebola crisis the focus was on a pure-emergency approach, focussing almost exclusively on ensuring that schools were safe for the reopening. However, the Ebola crisis raised awareness and capacity of the MoE at different levels in terms of emergency response and the need to integrate this into plans and systems.

⁷² Discussions on refugee education and a debate about engaging in curriculum work are ongoing, particularly in the MENA region.



UNICEF has been working with demonstrated results in encouraging national institutions to integrate EiE responsibilities. An entry point for UNICEF in many countries has been working with the government to integrate EiE into education sector policies. For example, UNICEF CAR contributed to the development of the 3-year Education Sector Transition Plan (2015–2017). In Jordan UNICEF played a strong advocacy role on policy reform around protection of children. In Bangladesh, EiE has been integrated into the Education Sector Strategic Plan for 2018–2021. In Nepal, UNICEF has integrated preparedness, response and resilience within the School Sector Development Plan (Box 24).

There is broad agreement that UNICEF adds value in capacity building for government directly and indirectly. Stakeholders widely recognised the comparative advantage of UNICEF in supporting education policy development given their long established presence in-country, strong links with national Ministries and the technical competencies within the organization.

Policy innovation was also accompanied by helping to establish EiE units within Ministries of Education, for example, establishing a permanent Education in Emergencies committee

in Liberia, and the creation of an Emergency Group (Cellule d’Urgence) at the MoE in CAR. In Somalia UNICEF supported the establishment of an EiE Unit in the federal Ministry of Education. However, the unit lacks staff and resources. Resources were also noted to be a constraint in other contexts (e.g. Liberia).

At the same time challenges remain. The integration of EiE into national policy is still a work in progress, with further inputs needed, for example to reflect moves to federal structures in Nepal, Somalia and South Sudan. In Jordan progress has been made but cannot be attributed to UNICEF in a major way as the work has been led by UNESCO and others.

Establishing joint humanitarian–development planning processes was highlighted as a commitment in the UNICEF Procedure on linking humanitarian and development programming. However, the evaluation found that emergency and development planning typically occurred under separate leadership. Separate emergency coordination structures were commonly established, with a humanitarian-led education cluster existing alongside education sector coordination groups, e.g. in South Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Bangladesh and Jordan.

Box 23: New Way of Working in Nepal

Following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, UNICEF leveraged its role and partnerships within the Education Cluster and the Education Partners Development Group, as well as with the Government, to align collective outcomes such that the School Sector Development Plan focused education policy and planning not only on strengthening equity, quality, efficiency and governance in the education sector but also on resilience. UNICEF and partners provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Education to support the development of a Master Plan for Comprehensive School Safety, using multi-hazard risk-informed analysis to integrate risk reduction, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into education preparedness, humanitarian response and school sector development. The Master Plan is aimed at rapidly making schools and learning centres—and the students and teachers within them—resilient to disasters as well as to non-natural hazards, such as conflict. In effect, Nepal is institutionalizing risk reduction and resilience education so that children, teachers and other education personnel can assess their environment for risks and quickly minimize human and education sector loss during disasters.

Source: Nepal case study.



In theory the Education Cluster develops strategies that align, to the extent possible, with the education in emergency response of the government education sector plans. However, while there was some cross-representation in these different coordination groups, assessment, analysis and planning of education activities were often carried out independently. For example, in South Sudan operational coordination between key development projects has happened in the joint steering committee, whilst humanitarian projects – financed by the same donor agencies and implemented by the same partners – are coordinated through the ‘Education Cluster’ and there “was no evidence that the cluster is aligning its work with sector plans in South Sudan” (Summative GPE country programme evaluation, Republic of South Sudan).

In Liberia, under the Education Cluster there was a “pure-emergency” approach, while in Sierra Leone and Guinea a formal Education Cluster was not launched, but the emergency focus was combined with important development issues in education, such as quality learning and increased access (Begue-Aguado, 2016, p. 8). In Somalia it was contended that EiE contributes little to the overall education goals/strategic plans and is not aligned to the developmental goals of the ESSP. In Nepal the education cluster developed a strategy, led by the Government, to build back better and linked with the Development Partners Group to align humanitarian and development outcomes for long-term sustainability and resilience. However, it was noted by Nepal EiE staff that much of the Global Education Cluster guidance and support is modelled on acute emergency and protracted settings without a strong government leadership, and thus such guidance was not particularly useful for the Nepal education cluster.

In some cases this separation of leadership was justified by a principled requirement for ‘humanitarian independence’ – although it was not always clear which humanitarian

principles were at risk through bringing EiE under Government-led coordination structures. In Somalia the Government called for fully integrating cluster coordination forums as part of the Government-led sector coordination as soon as possible. In Liberia a post-crisis transition plan put in place permanent emergency coordination mechanisms internally in the MoE.

Joint planning was also compromised by the lack of reliable data across many countries. In several countries the EMIS systems need to be strengthened and facilitate analysis at decentralized levels of government to generate disaggregated data so as to help better understand the unique context at various levels, as a basis for nexus planning. Consequently UNICEF prioritised investment in national data systems that included emergency-relevant indicators (South Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, CAR and Syria).

Fragile states. Unsurprisingly, concrete progress in building linkages has been strongest where the national education system is itself strong. Where national education systems are fragile and compromised, such as in situations of protracted complex emergencies, there is an obvious challenge to establishing meaningful linkages across the nexus. As one interviewee stated “Building for the future is difficult when even temporary schools get destroyed and education staff are in danger for their lives.” The findings show that it is a very different proposition attempting to develop a nexus approach in Somalia compared to the Eastern Caribbean.

UNICEF has recognised and responded to this challenge through the development of the 2018 guidance on “Integrating humanitarian response and development: programme framework for fragile contexts”. This proposes four priority areas: better analysis, addressing root causes, forming new and innovative partnerships and adapting internal procedures. However, the evaluation found that in practice working across the nexus remains extremely challenging in fragile states. While progress in institutionalisation has



been made in a variety of contexts, including situations of fragile governance, the capacity to implement EiE-related policy is ultimately dictated by the capacity of the Ministry.

In some of the fragile states examined, UNICEF has maintained siloed approaches across the country, concentrating on EiE in some areas and system development in others.

- In South Sudan there is a division in the South Sudanese education sector, with humanitarian actors focused on internally displaced persons and conflict-affected areas whereas development actors have had to fight for space for system-building and maintenance in government-controlled states (ODI, 2016a).
- UNICEF CAR has divided the country into three zones: a) acute emergency zone, b) an emergency zone with some development activities and c) development zone. This highlights the significant and specific challenges of developing a successful nexus approach in a protracted emergency.

The biggest challenge is inevitably in ensuring the sustainability of EiE initiatives/programmes in fragile states. In CAR, Somalia and South Sudan there were questions over the short-term nature of some interventions and overall sustainability, particularly with the challenge of chronic underfunding. In Somalia there was no accompanying plan to ensure sustainable access to education beyond the six-month timeframe of most EiE interventions.

Refugee crises. A specific EiE-related policy challenge has been addressing the nexus in relation to the educational needs of refugees. At the global level the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, with commitments in the accompanying Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) to respond to the needs of refugees

and asylum seekers with innovative and more developmentally aligned approaches. Under this agreement refugees should be allowed to live among host communities and benefit from national services including education through ensuring the involvement of development actors from an early stage.

In practice, several countries have been resistant to following through on their international commitment towards the New York Declaration. The nexus in terms of the Rohingya crisis proved challenging, due to government insistence that refugees could not use Bangladeshi language or curricula, which would in other circumstances facilitate channelling of funding and support into government structures.

In Jordan, most refugees are integrated in public schools (around 90% of those engaged in learning). Makani centres run parallel to formal schooling and also target many children that are in public schools. The Makani approach remains controversial due to doubts over its sustainability and whether the spending contributes to system strengthening, and it was not clear to what extent the strategy was aligned with the CRRF commitments. However, in a strategic attempt to reconcile these tensions, UNICEF has shifted programmatic focus towards a vulnerability-based approach aiming to reach all vulnerable children regardless of status or nationality.

Resourcing. Resourcing activities across the nexus remains challenging. Some changes in the funding environment were noted by the evaluation. There has been a large increase in funding available to support EiE. In so far as humanitarian funding remains short-term, this was understood as an impediment to integrating longer-term approaches into EiE responses. Overall, EiE remains chronically underfunded in protracted crises including CAR, Somalia and South Sudan. Cuts in funding led to the abrupt end of several initiatives in countries including



Jordan⁷³ and Somalia and were also mentioned as an important constraint in the survey responses. In Jordan, donor funding throughout evaluation period has been primarily short-term, conditional and provided at short notice, having ripple effects that negatively impacted all actors across the sector.

Increased flexibility was noted in several countries, with a willingness to redirect funding from development programmes to address emergency needs. As noted earlier in the report, UNICEF played a very important role in terms of negotiating with its main donors to re-direct funding to the emergency response in Liberia. However, in Somalia stakeholders highlighted how donor projects were repeatedly interrupted, either closed entirely or re-packaged from development to humanitarian funding, due largely to the ongoing crisis. Several donors partially or entirely retreated from funding ‘development’ education work after 2014. In CAR UNICEF had to reallocate funding earmarked for development to emergency programmes. The severity of the humanitarian situation and the fact that it is worsening, in addition to significant funding limitations, has led to the need to pull back on development work. In the survey, and across interviews, the short-term nature of donor funding, and its prescriptive nature (often reflected in donor conditionalities) were highlighted as a considerable constraint. The UNICEF staff survey brought out a consistent message about insufficient long-term funding leading to abrupt ending of programmes and insufficient transitioning to regular education work.

There was evidence of donors providing multi-year funding to UNICEF. However, multi-year funding for UNICEF did not always translate into longer-term funding arrangements with partners, who have frequently received only short-term grants and could not build capacity.

Flexible, multiannual funding has also been on the agenda of NLG advocacy for the last few years. ECW has been actively promoting multi-year educational funding to encourage work across the nexus, but interviewees noted that this is not always helping as it can be seen as parallel to HRP, Transitional Education Programming, and Education Sector Programming. And while preferable to short-term grants, multi-year humanitarian funding remains humanitarian and is not a substitute for bringing EiE activities on budget. In Jordan limited resources and a lack of clear handover strategy from UNICEF-funded NGO partners to MoE caused concern and uncertainty over sustainability, amongst others in terms of follow-up of children for whom there were protection concerns.

Donor restrictions also hampered attempts to work across the nexus. For example, in Syria the EU provided EUR 4 million for education humanitarian response, but only for NGO partnerships, not government. In Somalia the limited duration EiE project time frames are donor-driven, as donors do not want to commit to longer-term programmes. A 2016 study (UNICEF, 2016e) found that, despite some innovation in funding flexibility by some donors, there was little funding for risk reduction, preparedness and recovery that will facilitate the systematic implementation of linking humanitarian and development actions.

4.5.6 Effectiveness of UNICEF education support to the prevention/ mitigation of hazards/risks

At the World Humanitarian Summit UNICEF declared its “commitment to risk-informed programming that promotes resilient development” and suggested that it is “making risk analysis a core element of its planning processes”. Through risk-informed programming UNICEF aims to adopt longer-term, “development” approaches

⁷³ The cut of funding in Jordan reflects a cut in funding through UNICEF, although the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) remained well funded. It demonstrates a shift towards systems strengthening in the education approach in Jordan.



to address vulnerabilities and reduce exposure to hazards, strengthen systems and infrastructure and build national response capacities. At the same time, UNICEF aims to enhance its own “emergency” preparedness to support authorities and civil society in responding to a crisis. UNICEF has a long-standing commitment to integrate Disaster Risk Reduction in School Curricula (Selby & Kagawa, 2012) and has developed a guidance note with case studies illustrating multiple pathways for integrating disaster risk reduction in schools. Moreover, UNICEF played a leadership role in the development and implementation of a comprehensive school safety framework to advance the goals of the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES) and to promote school safety as a priority area of post-2015 frameworks. Multi-hazard risk assessment is the foundation for planning for Comprehensive School Safety, which rests on three pillars: 1) Safe Learning Facilities, 2) School Disaster Management, and 3) Risk Reduction and Resilience Education (UNISDR & GADRRRES, 2014). This framework has been applied by UNICEF and partners in Nepal. Guidance for risk informed programming has evolved.

Over the evaluation period UNICEF has invested heavily at the corporate level in developing guidance to support risk-informed programming and accountability frameworks, both internally and to support the introduction of risk-informed approaches in national systems. The UNICEF 2018 Guidance for Risk-Informed Programming (UNICEF, 2018g) provides detailed advice on identifying and addressing the root causes and drivers of risk, including vulnerabilities, lack of capacity, and exposure to various shocks and stresses. It includes a comprehensive risk analysis and encourages government and other partners to be involved in the design or adjustment of programmes to reduce risk. This guidance has been specifically adapted and elaborated for the education sector in the UNICEF 2019 “Risk-informed Education Programming for Resilience Guidance

Note” UNICEF also has a long-standing commitment to integrate disaster risk reduction in school curricula). A guidance note was developed with case studies regarding multiple pathways for integrating disaster risk reduction in schools (UNICEF & UNESCO, 2012).

Risk analysis and preparedness planning. While still in early days, there is limited evidence so far on the effective application of guidance on risk-informed programming to either UNICEF strategies or plans, or in concert with Government. Some UNICEF interviewees at country level acknowledged the potential usefulness of this guidance going forward. Challenges included the lack of capacity, in both time and skills, to carry out a robust risk assessment. The findings on the challenges of addressing some of the more infrequent hazards, or new emerging risks such as climate change, reinforce the potential of conducting a more rigorous risks analysis to inform planning.

At a corporate level UNICEF has also promoted a second main approach to mitigate risk through preparedness planning to identify preparedness gaps, actions and support requirements from regional offices and headquarters. There is clear guidance for this: a UNICEF guidance note on Preparedness for Emergency Response in UNICEF (2016) defined a sequential process of risk analysis and scenario definition linked to UNICEF response and preparedness actions.

This was further elaborated in the Emergency Preparedness Platform (EPP) Procedure issued in 2018, outlining an accountability framework with countries scored on their Minimum Preparedness Standards (MPS). The MPS scoring indicated that preparedness had improved at least on paper, with the average preparedness score globally increasing from 72.5 per cent in July 2018 to 87.9 per cent in November (UNICEF, 2019f).

Preparedness plans were reportedly established in all countries by the end of June 2018. With UNICEF support, preparedness plans have



also involved partners – for example organized through the education cluster at both national and local levels. In Nepal the education cluster contingency plan is annually updated. In Bangladesh, the 20 lowest-performing and vulnerable districts were supported to prepare emergency preparedness plans at the local level with community participation in 2014. In 2018 UNICEF supported the Turks and Caicos Islands by recruiting a consultant to mainstream resilience principles, as well as supporting school authorities and community to lead the preparedness and response plans at school level.

However, feedback at the country level on the relevance and effectiveness of these preparedness plans was somewhat mixed. Some staff felt that the immediate emergency responses had been improved, including by identifying potential hotspots and relevant partnerships (Liberia, Dominica, Bangladesh). However, there is still some way to go in developing robust preparedness plans. In several countries it was noted that the focus of preparedness planning had remained within the humanitarian community. From a nexus perspective there is perhaps a missed opportunity to increase ownership amongst development actors. In Somalia, South Sudan and Syria there had been limited progress on sector preparedness and contingency planning work within the government. In some cases stakeholders called for more concrete elements such as the inclusion of prepositioned supplies and stand-by agreements.

Risk informed policies and programmes. To various degrees UNICEF has been able to promote the mitigation and prevention of risk into national education systems. The evaluation encountered several examples where there was strong evidence that national approaches had adapted with support from UNICEF.

- In Nepal, UNICEF worked across sectors to strengthen local capacity of government officials and NGOs on disaster risk reduction and management and continually built

capacity within the standing Education Cluster. Risk reduction materials and training were provided to the school community. In addition, schools have been constructed to disaster-resistant standards. In Nepal, UNICEF supported the construction of 900 disaster-resilient semi-permanent TLSs.

- In the first quarter of 2017 both Turks & Caicos Islands and Dominica signed the Antigua and Barbuda Declaration on School Safety in the Caribbean at a meeting co-convened by UNICEF. The declaration has a road map for mainstreaming disaster risk management at the policy and school level. In Dominica school principals and teachers were trained in disaster preparedness and response, and a focus has been put on rebuilding damaged schools to be resilient to future hurricanes.
- In Bangladesh, disaster risk reduction was integrated into educational key policies. Government capacity has also improved and UNICEF are seen as active in the space; high staff turnover in government positions and in teacher positions has hindered efforts. UNICEF provided training to field-based staff members and 52 officials from relevant ministries of the Government of Bangladesh in disaster preparedness planning and response.

The most progress has been made in contexts of natural disasters and to some extent conflict. In contrast, preparedness for other types of shocks has been lower. There was a widespread under-preparedness for the Ebola crisis in West Africa – the first time a crisis of this kind and size hit the world – although there is reportedly now much better preparedness with learning from that experience. In some settings planning for natural disasters has not been sufficiently prioritized in complex emergencies – for example, despite frequent floods here is little attention to disaster risk reduction in the context of South Sudan.



Economic crises have also been less well anticipated, monitored and responded to. For example, the collapse of the South Sudan economy in 2016 led to the effective collapse of a whole range of Government services, including education. However, the minimal response to this crisis contrasted strongly with the preceding and following conflict crises. At a policy level, shock responsive social protection systems have been advocated as a mechanism to mitigate the impact of economic shocks, including cash transfers and fee abolition. However, the evaluation found few examples (Jordan, Somalia) of the introduction or extension of education-related social protection mechanisms over the evaluation period.

Effectiveness in contributing to peacebuilding and to social cohesion. UNICEF has a long-standing commitment to support peacebuilding through education, and this was a specific corporate focus over the first half of the evaluation period. This included the development of strategies, guidance and country pilots. Corporate documents included the Technical Note on Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity (2012), Child-Friendly Schooling for Peacebuilding (2014) and Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Programming Guide (2016). More recently, peacebuilding has been integrated into the Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming alongside other risks.

The underlying argument is that education plays a critical role in conflict contexts, as it can help “to stitch back the social fabric destroyed by war, and support the building of cultures and structures of peace.” (UNICEF, 2016f). The UNICEF guidance proposes entry points at both policy and state level, alongside community-level entry points. Key actions include equity and non-discrimination, community consultation, adaptation of policies, curricula and teaching methods and student-led initiatives.

Programme experience: the PBEA. A major programme initiative was the Netherlands-funded Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme. This operated between 2012 and 2016 and included 14 country pilots. A number of stand-alone assessments have been conducted of UNICEF contributions to peacebuilding, including: Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Conflict Analysis Summaries, 2012–2015; Learning for Peace: Narratives from the Field – A compendium of programme strategies 2012/2016, (2018); and UNICEF, Lessons Learned for Peace (2019).

This evaluation’s scope included a select number of countries where peacebuilding activities had been conducted and a number of good practices were identified, including:

- In Nepal, UNICEF work in support of Schools as Zones of Peace (SZOP), in partnership with the Children as Zones of Peace coalition, is aimed at strengthening child rights, protection of learning spaces and the school community; it has contributed to a decrease in the number of days that schools have been closed due to elections or political violence and to the use of children in political violence. It has also contributed to a greater understanding among communities of the importance of education.
- UNICEF South Sudan trained education personnel and PTA members to promote peacebuilding using various community outreach strategies. Life skills and peacebuilding education are being mainstreamed into the national curriculum, teacher training and national textbooks. Peace clubs were rated as particularly effective in reducing violence. Based on the views expressed by case study participants inside Protection of Civilians (PoC) Camps, conflict and violence were often avoided due to the availability of PBEA interventions, though



proof of what did not happen is impossible to produce (Forcier & Search for Common Ground, 2017).

- In Somalia, UNICEF initiated a Peace Building project and Youth Empowerment Project that played critical roles in creating opportunities for both young people and women. The project ended after two years. While the individual beneficiaries gained a lot from the projects, the public education system lacked the capacity to replicate the good practices and lessons learnt (Hall, 2016).
- In Liberia, UNICEF worked to sensitize teachers and community groups to reduce stigma and discrimination, with guidance incorporated into training for teachers. Peacebuilding audio lessons were included in the educational programmes aired while schools were closed. However, the radio programming was very late starting and was ultimately discontinued by UNICEF, with funds re-programmed.

With the end of the PBEA programme the prominence of peacebuilding activities as part of the EiE programming by UNICEF appears to have been only selectively continued and in some cases diminished sharply, especially at field level. Stakeholders at country level rarely referenced peacebuilding work in interviews or identified it as a priority in focus group discussions. Examples where it has been sustained include the incorporation of peace building approaches into sector plans and teaching (e.g. Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan). Some CPDs and education programmes also incorporated peace building approaches into their strategies (e.g. Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Burundi). Overall the evaluation found that in the absence of a strong corporate focus, the extent to which peace building approaches have been included in education efforts has been a reflection of

commitment/understanding of office leadership or of individuals, including those who moved laterally within the organization and had been exposed to the PBEA work.

There are, however, potentially worthwhile initiatives to learn from, such as the MENA Life Skills and Citizenship Education (LSCE) Initiative which represents a country and regional collaborative endeavour towards the achievement of SDG4 (to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all). It seeks to reformulate traditional understandings of life skills and citizenship education in the region, while recalling fundamental questions about the purpose and role of education in societal development that are relevant to the current context. The initiative puts forward four dimensions of learning and citizenship education: 'Learning to Know' or the cognitive dimension, 'Learning to Do' or the instrumental dimension; 'Learning to Be' or the individual dimension; and 'Learning to Live Together' or the social/ethical dimension that underpins the vision for citizenship education in MENA. The programme adopts a human rights-based approach consistent with democratic and social justice values and principles, and it constitutes the ethical foundation of the three other Dimensions of Learning (Cognitive, Instrumental and Individual). The citizenship education dimension aims to be relevant in MENA by engaging with the most poignant challenges facing the region.

4.6 Factors affecting the results

EQ6 asks: *What factors account for the success or setbacks of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts?* This section explains the various internal and external factors that were identified by the evaluation as having most influence on the achievement of results.



KEY FINDINGS:

Internal factors that have affected UNICEF results include strengths of partnerships and collaboration; quality of internal leadership; UNICEF internal staffing and capacity; quality of guidance materials; internal management structures, processes and functions; and evidence and lesson learning.

External factors include government engagement, issues related to access insecurity and stability, and funding.

Strength of evidence:


The evidence is strong.

4.6.1 Internal factors: strengths of partnerships and collaboration

Over the evaluation period, UNICEF partnerships with other education stakeholders, including ECW, Save the Children, UNHCR, UNESCO and GPE, enabled the positioning of education more centrally in the humanitarian ecosystem. This includes UNICEF advocacy and dialogue with education partners, in particular to bring actors to the table to think about investments in EiE differently.

As indicated in Figure 18, which reflects the perspective of the respondents to a survey of UNICEF staff, the most important factors in the success of UNICEF work on education in humanitarian contexts are related to elements of external coordination: partnerships with Government, with NGOs and CSOs, and with development partners and agencies. Global interviews by the evaluation, as well as the country case studies, confirm this overall finding.

Figure 15: Success factors for UNICEF programmes in EiE



Source: Analysis of results from survey of UNICEF staff (n=116).



The role UNICEF also played in the three main networks that make up the EiE architecture (GCPEA, INEE and GADRRRES) has been important for generating research and guidance on EiE. Partnerships have also been critical to UNICEF capacity building. For example, the UNICEF Education in Emergencies eLearning course was designed with inputs from INEE training packages.

At the country level, strong partnerships and collaboration with government, NGOs and CSOs have been drivers of successful outcomes for EiE, and draw on UNICEF convening power. The ability of UNICEF staff to build and maintain such partnerships has been a critical determinant of success facilitated by its cluster (co) lead role and its reputation and mandate for children.

In different settings, robust partnerships and strong collaborative capabilities have helped UNICEF mitigate difficulties when these have arisen. For example, where there have been issues with UNICEF staffing (as in the ECA), or a lack of data (as in Somalia and Syria) these were addressed through collaboration with others. The combination of partners is important: as noted by one of the survey respondents “one cannot replace the other”. Thus, partnerships with local NGOs, such as in South Sudan, have enabled UNICEF to respond to crises and provide continuity of support to schools and communities in the post-crisis period. Partnerships with government have helped ensure the transition from emergency response to preparedness and have ensured that there has been work on integration of refugee populations in education responses.

UNICEF has worked closely with Government to integrate EiE into education sector policies, with demonstrable results (e.g. Bangladesh, CAR, Dominica, Jordan, Liberia, Nepal,). However, engagement with local NGOs in different contexts has been affected by the UNICEF approach to working with local partners: local partners are

asked to implement programmes that they have not been involved in the design of and there is limited evidence of purposeful efforts to build the capacities of the local NGOs themselves.

Experience has shown that partnerships with communities have been critical (e.g. Liberia). The success of community participation has depended on successful coordination of the voluntary engagement. In Dominica, UNICEF and its implementing partner were able to build community preparedness and sustainability of activities through the use of volunteers, who assisted in the establishment of child-friendly spaces and the implementation of ‘Return to Happiness’ programmes. However, in Nepal the use of volunteers was less positive, due to a lack of coordination. In some settings the involvement of young people (e.g. Liberia) and/or women has been specifically sought and has enhanced the relevance, uptake and effectiveness of the EiE work.

However, UNICEF does not monitor or have an accountability framework for partnerships. Evidence in this evaluation shows that there is a need for a much better understanding of power dynamics between partners and skills to manage them, particularly given multiple UNICEF roles in coordination. There is also a need for more clarity on the comparative advantage of UNICEF and complementarity among partners in particular settings, regions and countries.

Quality of internal leadership. The country case studies highlighted various examples of country leadership (Country Representative and/or Chief of Education) driving successful implementation of education in programmes during a humanitarian emergency. Examples of strong leadership include effective coordination at the country office level; leadership in making the case with HCs/RCs and within HCTs on the importance of EiE, expert guidance in technical areas; relationship-building with key partners, including governments; and the capacity and skills to



align education outcomes across humanitarian and development-focused education working groups or clusters.

For example, in Nepal the Chief of Education leveraged the UNICEF relationship in both development and humanitarian working groups to integrate comprehensive school safety into the education sector plan; in Syria the Chief of Education's relationship-building skills were crucial in gaining the Ministry of Education's trust and approval of UNICEF activities on education in humanitarian contexts; and in Liberia a senior UNICEF representative in the Liberia Education Cluster prioritised and advocated for education, making an important difference to the level of attention that was given to education in an emergency response that was primarily health-driven, and pushing for the activation of the cluster.

However, UNICEF as an organization has not consistently been able to provide this kind of leadership because of a lack of understanding of the importance of EiE and UNICEF accountability for EiE as a CLA. There have been challenges in particular at the level of senior country office management, as well as senior HQ management. At different levels there has been insufficient leadership on the importance of EiE, as illustrated by this quote from one of the survey respondents: *"The successes of the education cluster/education in emergencies programmes are highly contingent upon the capacity of the UNICEF Representative, Deputy Representative, and Chief of Education and their willingness and capacity to advocate for EiE. This can make or break education in humanitarian contexts for the entire response and set the tone for the cluster/HCT/government".*

Recognized mandate, expertise and role in multiple forums. As an organization, because of its clear mandate focused on child rights, its size and presence across many countries, UNICEF has capacity to leverage funding and expertise in emergencies and cover some of the biggest

gaps. In many developing countries UNICEF has an established presence (e.g. in the education sector and in other sectors) and relationships that it leverages to facilitate dialogue with partners in humanitarian settings, building on work that it has already been doing and on its recognized reputation. The position of UNICEF in country as a trusted partner and leading technical authority on education in emergencies was referenced across different countries as giving it important legitimacy to lead and bring partners together.

As highlighted in EQ4, UNICEF wears many hats in the implementation of education in humanitarian contexts, where it is not only implementing its own programmes but also plays a lead role in coordination across different sectors and working groups, as well as in different humanitarian clusters. However, in such contexts, UNICEF staff have not always been clear about what hat they are wearing at different times, which has been confusing to partners.

Staffing and capacity. Across all levels, staff capacity, in terms of time and technical proficiency, has been strongly linked to the success of EiE activities. Staff at the front line of humanitarian responses are acknowledged to have been critical in reacting to emergencies, and as can be seen from Figure 18, UNICEF staff themselves rate the capacity of such individuals as an important factor affecting the results. Survey responses as well as interviews underscored important characteristics of UNICEF staff which explain success on the ground, including high levels of dedication, going the extra mile, an exceptional level of commitment to the UNICEF mandate, among others. The ability to draw upon a pool of talented and experienced staff for surge support has been invaluable for attaining successful outcomes. This has been seen during acute periods of crisis response in South Sudan, CAR and the Eastern Caribbean; during the 2017 hurricane response in the latter, the capacity and experience that the extra personnel brought



were recognised and seen as important by all partners. UNICEF has also successfully recruited a staff member who is mobilized for immediate emergencies and has provided very critical inputs to setting up the EiE response.⁷⁴

However, the low EiE staffing levels at UNICEF HQ have meant that communication of UNICEF' approaches to education in humanitarian contexts and policy positions internally and externally has not been systematic or effective. As noted under EQ4, there has been relatively consistent communication and presence at the global level but staffing levels have simply not been enough for other components of UNICEF education work, such as clear guidance on how programmes can contribute to increasing not only the access but also the quality of education. In addition to numbers of staff, there has also been a critical lack of EiE expertise, at country level and also among the staff that are expected to provide guidance/support. Also, there was insufficient capacity and skills for working across the nexus at country and regional office levels. This has led to country offices in need of specific guidance being disappointed and frustrated with the support provided by regional offices, which have not been able to respond to the specific requests that have arisen out of the work in which countries are engaged.

The country case studies also brought out various other staff-related issues, including a lack of senior staff with EiE expertise and/or training on education across the nexus, short-term contracts for emergency staff, overworked EiE staff, insufficient training for national staff and staff at sub-national levels, education teams with insufficient understanding of EiE and challenges in finding staff with the right profiles to make the shift to working across the humanitarian-development nexus. It was also noted that in

some cases, such as the 2019 Mozambique cyclone, the roster of staff has been limited (due to challenges in getting Portuguese speaking experts), slowing down the response. In the case of the Eastern Caribbean, it was also highlighted that there is a limited pool of surge staff to draw on because of the lower number of English-speaking staff in the Latin America Region. In some cases, emergency surge staff were found to not have accorded sufficient weight to education as part of the humanitarian response.

High staff turnover – which is typical of humanitarian situations – has contributed to a loss of key capacities, continuity of communication, learning and institutional memory, as with Syria and South Sudan. In various countries reviewed, turn-over of the Chief of Education has been particularly frequent, e.g. in Jordan, Somalia and Syria. This affected internal strategy, guidance and leadership of the education team as well as roll-out of work on the ground.

The issue of cluster coordinators being on temporary or special service agreements⁷⁵ and a lack of willingness to create long-term positions, even in countries with protracted crises, has impacted on communication and coordination within UNICEF and with other partners. In Bangladesh, a cluster coordinator was called away as surge support elsewhere, during an important time in the country, and in South Sudan a six-month gap was seen between recruitment of cluster coordinators.

Guidance material: Multiple guidelines were cited by survey respondents as a considerable source of inefficiency overall for the EiE work. Tools have been too complex, were reported to have limited/no coherence among them, and frequently staff on the ground are not aware of

⁷⁴ This staff member of the HQ EiE team spends approximately 70 percent of her time on the road. Various interviewees suggested that much more of this type of support is needed.

⁷⁵ We were unable to verify whether cluster coordinators are issued temporary or special service agreements.



what tools exist. Survey results underscored a “*need for tools that can be quickly and effectively adapted and used to respond to any emergency without a lot of capacity (i.e. make tools simple), such as data collection tools, monitoring tool, proposal costing tool, education sector costing and modelling tool, planning tool, assessment tool*”.

In addition, across countries and other levels there has been insufficient attention to the need for staff time for reflective thinking and discussion on good practices, lessons learned and capacity building opportunities to learn how to apply and contextualise these tools.

Internal management structures, processes and functions. Respondents in several countries highlighted bureaucratic processes as impediments the success of education programmes in humanitarian contexts. In South Sudan slow renewal of Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) has left schools unsupported for months at a time and delays in fund disbursement of up to four months were reported. Similar concerns regarding internal processes were reported in Liberia with respect to procurement and logistics.

In Syria adherence to multiple reporting frameworks and the need to deliver on UNICEF-specific commitments left little time to reflect on lessons learned. Similarly, an excess of corporate guidance, frameworks and directives in Syria, Nepal and the Eastern Caribbean was cited as a barrier to success and a source of confusion amongst staff. For example, multiple guidelines on rapid assessments meant staff in the Eastern Caribbean Office did not have a clear idea of which to follow, resulting in confusion and hindering success.

Quality coordination and programming across the nexus has been limited by internal silos between emergency and development programming, across the organization, by staffing limitations, as well as a lack of clarity on the nexus approach in some case study countries.

Evidence and lesson learning. Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning have been a significant weakness for education humanitarian programmes, but this is also a weakness of UNICEF systems generally. Monitoring and evaluation is done at country level mostly through the cluster mechanisms which in themselves have weaknesses as only 20 percent of education clusters have dedicated information management specialists and only 50 percent of education clusters have information management specialists that are shared across clusters. In addition, information management work calls for specialised skills which most EiE focal points do not have. There is no joint reporting mechanism across the nexus. M&E reporting mechanisms and tools are different for humanitarian and development contexts.

Across the countries there has been lesson learning; for example, the analysis of the Ebola response in Liberia was translated into guidance for future emergencies. However, there has not been enough sharing of innovations and good practice within or between regions. Important lessons learned came out of the PBEA Programme, due to financing specifically for research and analyses. This allowed the peace-building concept to become better understood through the research, helping to evolve the discourse. Results of the evidence and lesson learning collected through the PBEA programme include the production of a Guide to Conflict Analysis (UNICEF, 2016) and a stand-alone Programming Guide on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding (UNICEF, 2016). However, the evaluation found that much of this work has not seen continuity at country level, i.e. there have been missed opportunities to integrate it.

4.6.2 External factors

Government engagement. This plays a significant role in determining whether or not conditions within which UNICEF works are favourable for the implementation of EiE. In the case of Dominica, close relationship with the Government, built



over time, as well as a strong in-country presence through partners, enabled UNICEF to start discussing and implementing long-term next steps with the Ministry of Education to build a more resilient education system in the wake of the 2017 hurricane response. This contrasted to the Turks and Caicos Islands, where limited presence in-country and over-stretched resources in the UNICEF Eastern Caribbean Office, meant that it has taken much longer to build a relationship with the Ministry of Education, although concerted advocacy efforts by UNICEF have seen slow progress being made in moving forward the preparedness and disaster response agenda in the education system. Conversely, in some situations Government engagement may also have less positive implications for education humanitarian response.

In Bangladesh during 2017, the election campaign led to heightened attention on education as part of a push to demonstrate fulfilment of political promises, with interference in ways that impeded delivery of services and delayed the policy and legislative processes. In Syria, government control has placed considerable constraints on the implementation of activities of the education emergency response, with delays related to denials of permits and delays in delivery of supplies, which affected the timeliness of delivery, restricted operating space and prevented agility. Government engagement is largely beyond the direct control of UNICEF; however, where UNICEF has long-established relationships this can make a difference. Partners indicated that the UNICEF reputation and mandate make a crucial difference to getting access or having conditions to engage that other partners do not have.

Government and partner capacity has major implications for the work of education in humanitarian contexts, and in particular strengthening systems for working across the humanitarian and development continuum. In Jordan, the handing over of a number of protection related

tasks resulted in concerns about a reduction in follow-up, and various other processes have been held up because of limited government capacity. Personnel changes in government structures have affected the work in various contexts (Nepal, Bangladesh, Syria), as has poor national governance (CAR, Somalia, South Sudan).

The country case studies highlighted challenges in partner capacity to varying degrees in all the countries. NGO capacity has been critical and both the Liberia and Jordan case studies highlight the importance of the work of INGOs and NNGOs and challenges when this work is either less well funded or phased out to other partners. Interviews and evidence from these case studies underscored the critical importance in these contexts of actions that UNICEF and partners can take to strengthen partner capacity, including: providing guidance and capacity building support (including clear guidelines); providing regular, flexible and predictable funding; holding organizations accountable; and working collaboratively.

Access, insecurity and instability. Insecurity and instability are inherent features of many humanitarian contexts and the disruption of basic services that results is often at the root of the need for education emergency response and/or interventions in the first place. Not only do insecurity and instability have far-reaching and long-term impacts on populations, they also frequently frustrate UNICEF efforts to provide assistance.

UNICEF potential for success in education in humanitarian contexts was affected variously through restrictions on staff movement and location access, weakened education and transport infrastructure and threats to staff safety and mental wellbeing. Access to remote areas may also be related to poor roads and seasonal weather conditions, as in CAR, and the geography of certain locations, such as the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean. In such locations, the cost of logistics, as well as the effort



required to reach beneficiaries and to achieve results, often exceeds what is planned, as observed through the complications in distributing School-in-a-Box kits between the islands of TCI. The security situation in South Sudan between 2014–2017 placed extreme limitations on in-country movement of UNICEF staff. Staff depended on charter flights to move essential supplies, which significantly increased operational costs and delivery timelines. Furthermore, in conflict zones infrastructure such as schools and learning spaces may be actively and systematically targeted for destruction. When this occurred in CAR during 2018, UNICEF was forced to change partners during the implementation of an emergency project and was faced with the dilemma of working with a limited pool of national non-government organizations with weak capacity, or international non-government organizations that were prone to staff evacuation and interrupted assistance.

In addition to operational disruptions, the safety and wellbeing of UNICEF staff when working in insecure contexts is a major concern. In CAR during 2018, UNOCHA reported 396 attacks against humanitarian aid workers. In areas where staff safety is threatened, humanitarian presence, and thus the possibility of providing assistance, is inevitably reduced, and the psychological impacts of working under such conditions can negatively impact performance, management and general wellbeing of staff. These situations often put a particular stress and responsibility on the local staff who are not in a position to be evacuated and then take on additional responsibilities.

Funding priorities and conditionalities. As noted against EQ1, significant proportions of donor funding have been short-term, conditional and provided at short notice. This reflects donor priorities and agendas and is contradictory to

the commitments that donors have been made in global forums. This situation hinders the success that UNICEF and partners seek to achieve through joint needs assessments and planning and coordinated responses. On the reverse side, where donor funding has been multi-year and provided in a timely manner without (too many) restrictions this has allowed UNICEF to be reactive and effective in meeting needs and to align with priorities identified through the coordination at country level.

Progress in the Central African Republic, for example, has been continually inhibited by chronic underfunding; the delivery of critical services has been hindered and the country office has been forced to utilise funds in ways contrary to plans in the CPD. Funding gaps have reduced UNICEF CAR's capacity for humanitarian response and EiE is one of the main areas of work to have suffered as a result. Meanwhile, much donor funding in Jordan has been short-term, restricted, or provided at short notice. The survey highlights that donor conditionality has been increasing; so do the country studies. In addition, there are efficiency issues related to overlapping processes – i.e. the overlap between GPE and ECW which is reported to be confusing and “eats up valuable time” (survey respondent).

Unpredictability of funding constrains the ability to plan activities and spend money efficiently, and restricted funds earmarked for very specific purposes do not enable the flexibility often necessitated by humanitarian contexts, where the capacity to respond in a timely manner and to changing needs can be critical. The value of flexible funding was evident in Liberia: here donors permitted funds committed to development initiatives to be reprogrammed to humanitarian response, which helped fill gaps and allowed the education partners to fill the gaps that were identified as part of the mapping of needs.



CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



CHAPTER 5

This section presents a summary assessment of the contribution of UNICEF education in emergencies programming from a global perspective, based on a theory of change that was developed retrospectively for the evaluation.

It begins with an assessment on whether the assumption of the theory of change held true, examples of UNICEF contribution at global and country levels, and the adjustments that are required as UNICEF continues to evolve and embrace significant roles in humanitarian programming. Nine conclusions are offered, followed by recommendations.

5.1 Assessment on the assumptions of the theory of change

Assumptions are enabling factors about the programming context and resources, and pre-conditions that are required for the success of a programme or intervention. If they do not hold true they can have a detrimental effect on how the program works, and on its success. A discussion and assessment of assumptions during the development of the theoretical framework/theory of change can strengthen the case for the choice of some pathways and expected results compared to alternative pathways. Table 12 reflects an assessment of the theory of change assumptions against the **evaluation theory of change⁷⁶** offered in Figure 8 (Section 3.1), applied only to country programmes covered by the evaluation.

The evaluation concluded that only a few of the assumptions about the programming contexts held true in all of the country offices that were reviewed in this evaluation. Regular situation and/or conflict analyses were conducted to inform programming; programmes policies and strategies upheld international humanitarian principles and international norms, and were aligned with the CCCs; and, in all country offices, UNICEF had strong partnerships that were ready to engage in the education response. On the other hand, the biggest impediment to the success of programmes was assessed to be the weak capacities to collect and analyse data, and to monitor efforts to strengthen the education system, as well as monitoring learning outcomes. And while country offices were actively pursuing the objectives on emergency preparedness and resilience, peacebuilding programming did not feature in most programmes beyond what was achieved with the PBEA. Many of the assumption held only partially true, signalling the need for UNICEF to be conscious of constraints and seeking to mitigate them/adapt accordingly.

⁷⁶ While these assumptions were attached to a retrospectively constructed evaluation theory of change, they were validated with UNICEF stakeholders during the inception phase.



Table 12: Theory of change assessment

ToC level	Assumptions	EQs	Assessment
Inputs to activities			
1.	UNICEF has the ability to raise adequate financial resources to fund EiE interventions and to manage these resources well.	EQ4 + EQ6	UNICEF was able to raise funds and increase expenditure for the education response in most emergencies. However, funding levels still fell short of needs, with some regions and countries being chronically underfunded
2.	UNICEF has the ability to recruit personnel who have the capacity and expertise to participate effectively in and/or (co-)lead EiE activities at global, regional and national levels.	EQ1	UNICEF has staff in place with responsibilities for education in emergencies, but staff expertise is still insufficient, especially in the area of linking humanitarian development and peace objectives.
3.	UNICEF HQ and ROs have the human resources, the capacity and expertise to support country offices.	EQ1 + EQ4	For most of the period the staffing at HQ was chronically insufficient. The regional level was better resourced, but expertise fell short to support the expressed needs of countries
4.	Regular situation analyses include an analysis of the risk of humanitarian crises (exposure to hazards, shocks, stresses with consideration of vulnerabilities and capacities).	EQ1.5	UNICEF produced good guidance on risk-informed programming over the years, including conducting conflict analyses which were routinely used in conducting situation analyses.
5.	Data is available, including - data sharing between EiE stakeholders - capacity at the relevant levels to collect data, maintain databases, and analyse data.	EQ6	Data systems and sharing are insufficient and there is not a good link between the multiple forms of data sources and reporting and decision making.
6.	UNICEF programming and policy/strategy formulation is informed by lessons learned through reviews and evaluations, at global, regional and national levels. The views of the affected populations are taken into account through existing feedback mechanisms and channels to engage.	EQ6	There is evidence of lesson learning and good practices through PBEA. However, lesson learning is not systematic. Where views of beneficiaries are taken into account feedback loops were often missing.
7.	UNICEF COs made adjustments in its programming in line with GRIP to address potential hazards, shocks and stresses (biological shocks & stresses, violence, social unrest, etc.). CPDs include a commitment to risk reduction commensurate with the risk profile	EQ1.5 EQ5	This varies greatly by country and is work in progress. Improvement was observed in the more recent CPDs
8.	International principles and normative guidance are consistent and are reflected in UNICEF policies and strategies, which aim at balancing efficiency and coverage.	EQ1 EQ3, EQ4	UNICEF periodically updates policy guidance to reflect international norms and practice. For instance, the updated CCCs include the Grand Bargain and AAP commitments.
Activities & outputs			
9.	UNICEF at global, regional, and country levels works in an integrated approach across its portfolio (linking EiE programming with WASH, child protection, social protection, nutrition, capacity building, C4D, etc.) and cross-cutting issues of equity and gender and disability inclusion, etc.	EQ4	Varies by country; work in progress. While there is a strong push for gender inclusive programs (aided by the GAP and structures around it, the focus on disability inclusion need to be systematic and expanded.
10.	EiE response is aligned with Core Commitments to Children, particularly the most marginalized, including girls, children with disabilities, refugees, migrants, ethnic minorities, IDPs....	EQ1.3	Well aligned



◀ Table 12 (cont'd)

ToC level	Assumptions	EQs	Assessment
11.	EiE response is aligned with humanitarian principles and international norms.	EQ1.1 EQ1.4	Well aligned
12.	There is willingness and capacity at global, regional and country levels for partnership and collaboration/coordination, in line with efforts to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus.	EQ5	Varies by country, but overall good commitment by partners to partnerships
13.	UNICEF Country Programme Document's strategy is appropriate and effective in fostering resilience and/or peace (GRIP, p.20).	EQ3, EQ5	A majority of programme documents included a general objective on working across the humanitarian and development nexus without any specific outcome on resilience and/or peace.
14.	UNICEF at global, regional, and country levels works in an integrated approach across its portfolio (linking EiE programming with WASH, child protection, social protection, nutrition, capacity building, C4D...)	EQ3	Varies by country, works better with some sectors than others, usually WASH and child protection and C4D, there is room for improvement.
Outputs to outcomes			
15.	The context permits UNICEF and its partners to implement its programmes/support.	EQ0, EQ1, EQ6,	Varies by country context. For instance, UNICEF implementation is greatly affected by contextual factors in CAR, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria
16.	There is political will and capacity to lead education sector analysis and planning, incorporating EiE/risk-informed programming as well as political will to use evidence and lessons learned in sector analysis and planning.	EQ2, EQ4, EQ5, EQ6	While in countries, government has taken a strong lead (e.g. Liberia); in others the effort is ad hoc
17.	UNICEF staff have the capacity and expertise to implement EiE interventions and to participate effectively in and/or (co-)lead the Education Cluster and/or other coordination mechanisms/groups. Additional training is provided as and where necessary.	EQ2.1 EQ3 EQ5	Some training and support was provided, but more leadership training is required at the country level.
18.	Education stakeholders and partners, including UNICEF, are willing to work in partnership and have the capacity for collaboration and coordination.	EQ5	Most countries present a good environment for the cluster mechanisms to work effectively.
Outcomes to impact			
19.	The political and economic situation in country is conducive to service delivery. There is political will to make institutional and management changes that ensure effective management and implementation of the national implementation strategy at all levels. UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes in country systems.	EQ0, EQ6	Conduciveness of the political and economic situation varied by country. Also, even though the evaluation did not investigate political will per se, anecdotal evidence suggested the need for a serious consideration/analysis of the political economy and how to incentivize behaviour change
20.	Access to education/vocational training in safe and secure learning environments is granted, particularly for the most marginalized (girls, children with disabilities, ethnic minorities, refugees, migrants, IDPs); UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes.	EQ2, EQ6	By and large, access to safe learning environments is provided. However, programmes are not tailored to the needs of the children - one-size fits all education implemented in most countries
21.	Active monitoring of learning outcomes; UNICEF is working to incentivize such changes.	EQ2, EQ6	Work on monitoring of learning outcomes is weak, and learning achievement lags behind

Legend: **GREEN** = the assumption held true in most programmes; **ORANGE** = the assumption was partially true in most programmes; **RED** = overall, the assumption did not hold true



5.2 UNICEF contribution to global advocacy and in-country education emergency response

Assessing UNICEF contribution is clearly challenging given the multiplicity of contexts across which the organization operates, the nature of its participation in the humanitarian landscape, and the range of partners. All these factors make it difficult to estimate the contribution of any one actor, let alone to generalize. Nonetheless, using contribution analysis at the level of UNICEF engagement in EiE at the global level and through the three country case studies, the evaluation is able to identify some clear areas of contribution.

At the global level there is evidence of a significant contribution by UNICEF towards ensuring that education becomes a part of first line emergency responses. Advocacy has resulted in more funding to education, and UNICEF played a key role in advocacy at country level, including as cluster lead, as well as at global level, including its role in the establishment of ECW. So UNICEF

can also be credited with mobilising increased financing for EiE. UNICEF has also contributed to improved and more effective inter-agency coordination and partnerships. However, from the country level perspective there are still challenges in terms of understanding how the many different mechanisms for coordination and delivery interact – including UNICEF roles in and across the mechanisms that support EiE programming and financing on the ground. At country level, UNICEF has made a clear contribution in strengthening of partner coordination (and therefore capacity to respond) through its cluster coordination role, as illustrated by the conclusions of the evaluation's Somalia case study in Box 24.

UNICEF is also contributing to approaches to working across the nexus, with notable progress through the work that has been done on multi-hazard risk reduction and illustrated through the Nepal case. However, work in this area is beginning and further efforts and capacity are needed to make this a consistent part of UNICEF programming.

Box 24: UNICEF contribution to the EiE response in Somalia

In Somalia, the evaluation found that UNICEF has played an important role – through its financial resources and education solutions – in increasing access to primary education, even though important challenges remain in terms of ensuring continuity of education. The UNICEF role in advocacy for education as part of the humanitarian response has brought more funding and therefore created educational opportunities for large numbers of children displaced by drought and conflict, and to a lesser extent other natural disasters. UNICEF also contributed to improved girls' enrolment through a focus on creating conducive learning environments. In both these areas UNICEF did not work alone, but played a decisive role through making available the facilities for education and through facilitating complementary inputs of partners in schools and in priority setting as part of its cluster role. Working on policy strengthening is similarly significant but remains constrained by limited government and local partner capacity.

Source: Somalia case study.



Box 25: UNICEF contribution to the EiE response in Nepal

In Nepal, this evaluation found that UNICEF has played a significant role in contributing to education humanitarian response in Nepal through its education solutions, cluster coordination and work to link humanitarian and development policy and programming. Partnership and coordination have been critical in each of these achievements.

What is important for other UNICEF country offices and partners to learn from this experience is not only the focus on multi-hazard risk reduction and resilience within the education sector but also how strong partnership and effective coordination within the country have supported this achievement. In Nepal, UNICEF has helped to create and strengthen coherence among education partners within the education sector through its co-leadership of the Education Cluster and its roles in the Development Partners Group, including leadership of the Technical Working Group on Comprehensive School Safety. These strong partnerships have in turn yielded a greater impact. It is an example of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts in an effort to realize the Agenda for Humanity by meeting people's immediate humanitarian needs while simultaneously reducing risk and vulnerability. The joint focus of humanitarian and development coordination groups to align the collective outcome of comprehensive school safety and risk reduction within the School Sector Development Plan is an illustration of the "new ways of working".

Source: Nepal case study.

Other areas of the EiE Theory of Change emerge as needing continued work. This includes the development of more resilient country systems where a range of strategies would need attention including continued work on building capacity with a focus on decentralized levels as well as on government capacity for planning and effective implementation. More work is also needed to ensure that both adequate and context appropriate tools and mechanisms to implement EiE interventions are tried out, and scaled up where relevant. Data and M&E systems also remain weak.

5.3 Assessment on the adjustments required in humanitarian programming

The overarching questions this evaluation sought to answer relate to whether UNICEF made appropriate adjustments given its growing role in humanitarian programming. As is evident from the analysis above, the evaluation found that UNICEF has taken key steps to increase its efficiency and effectiveness as an

organization through: its engagement with and leadership role in advocating for education as a priority response to humanitarian situations at global and country levels; the development of directives and guidelines for emergency preparedness, risk-informed programming and linking humanitarian and development programming; emergency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and logistics to deliver education supplies at scale in acute emergencies; and hiring and training education cluster coordinators and information specialists to coordinate timely responses.

However, insufficient attention and priority has been given to equipping UNICEF internal structures and systems to address issues of capacity, communication, linkages between levels of the organization, monitoring, evaluation, accountability, learning, and innovation. Staff capacity at different levels – including country office leadership – needs to be further built, and accumulated experience drawn on, to support relevant and effective advocacy and programming, in line with the priorities of the new education strategy.



5.4 Main conclusions

Conclusion 1: UNICEF has successfully raised the importance of education as a humanitarian response at global, regional and country levels. However, education is still not consistently acknowledged as a priority in the humanitarian response. Moving forward, continued prioritization internally and continued advocacy externally are needed.

Over the evaluation period, UNICEF appropriately gave increased priority to advocacy on the importance of EiE as part of the humanitarian response and played a strong leadership role at global level in furthering the EiE agenda. Education is now more strongly recognized as a necessary part of the humanitarian response, which is in itself an achievement. Consequently, funding to education in emergencies has increased, and larger numbers of children have been reached. Nonetheless, a number of regions and countries which are highly affected by climate-related disasters and other emergencies (migration) are not receiving sufficient resources.

Despite this positive evolution, internally within UNICEF education in emergencies is still not consistently prioritized by decision-makers and senior managers. More broadly, across different countries challenges were noted related to short-term funding and donor conditionalities. There is a need for continued advocacy internally within UNICEF and vis-à-vis partners and donors to ensure that education is consistently and immediately prioritized within humanitarian response at par with other elements of the response, and that funding is provided in ways that allow UNICEF to work across the nexus towards long-term education solutions in line with the priorities of different crises and contexts.

Conclusion 2: UNICEF has played a significant role in providing access to primary education across a range of emergency contexts in line

with its Core Commitments to Children (CCCs). UNICEF should strengthen targeting of children and information systems to ensure understanding about overall needs and increase provision of targeted programming in alignment with the equity agenda.

The evaluation found that UNICEF work has made a difference in many crisis settings in terms of providing continued access to and continuity of safe educational opportunities, mostly through primary education and non-formal educational opportunities for an increasing number of girls and boys. In protracted crises, the planned coverage has fallen far short of needs due to resource constraints and lack of technical capacity. Overall UNICEF adhered to the Core Commitments to Children, and its work has mostly been relevant. However, UNICEF targeting has been challenged due to insufficient understanding of the universe of overall needs. As a result, targeting has been insufficiently precise and UNICEF has not consistently supported and reached those most in need. UNICEF has not sufficiently prioritized adolescents or, in most cases, the most vulnerable out of school children, which should be a priority in particular when their numbers are high. Moving forward UNICEF needs to improve its technical capacity to have a broad view of all education needs and to use this to work with partners on identifying priorities and specific areas of focus for UNICEF, and to systematically report on progress in reaching these.

Conclusion 3: UNICEF education solutions have generally been appropriate to the earlier stages of rapid onset emergencies than to protracted crises. Based on lessons learned, UNICEF should further develop and share the innovative education solutions for protracted crises and build capacity to ensure timely adaptation of programming to the changing specific needs and priorities of each context.

The availability of supply-driven ‘standard’ education solutions has allowed UNICEF to respond at scale in sudden onset emergencies.



These solutions have allowed for quick response to immediate needs and have constituted an important contribution. In protracted crises – often characterized by a range of challenges – selected innovations have been made, more rapid analysis of changing contexts is required to ensure changes in response are tailored to be appropriate, durable and sustainable, and meet the equity and learning agendas outlined in the education strategy..

A number of lessons and best practices were identified which should allow UNICEF to further adapt and improve its education solutions in protracted crises. These include improved design and management of temporary learning spaces, more locally adapted learning materials, stronger and more comprehensive teacher training and professional development, work on system strengthening, stronger linkages across sectors, and longer-term planning and financing linking humanitarian and development sectors.

Moving forward UNICEF will need to build internal knowledge management of and capacity for adapting emergency education solutions from the standard supply-driven packages to more nuanced, longer-term solutions that are informed by a context analysis; nimbly adapt to changing needs and opportunities; and make the transition from emergency response to recovery and resilience; and focus on inclusive and equitable quality education.

Conclusion 4: As a cluster lead agency UNICEF was instrumental in bringing together humanitarian actors to plan and implement a coordinated and collective response. Improved coordination has meant that UNICEF has become better at fulfilling its role as 'provider of last resort'. This comparative advantage should be leveraged in different contexts.

At country level, UNICEF successfully contributed to the inclusion of education as part of the humanitarian response, including through its function as education cluster co-lead. In

this role, UNICEF has added value in getting all stakeholders on board and in coordinating the response. Engagement across the full range of actors in country at different levels, has been critical to the reach and coverage needed for the education in emergencies response, i.e. involving governments, national and international NGOs, communities and others. These efforts have contributed to the achievement of collective results, and have, across contexts, promoted efficiencies such as better joint planning, better targeting and prioritization, stronger coverage of gaps, and leveraging of collective resources of partners. Strong sector coordination has also enabled UNICEF to take on its role as provider of last resort. However, the extent to which the latter could be achieved has been limited by resource constraints in many contexts, especially in protracted crises. There are opportunities to better link UNICEF global work on EiE and its cluster work, in ways that benefit its response at country level. There is also a need to focus more consistently on UNICEF comparative advantages in different contexts.

Conclusion 5: Staff capacities for education in emergencies was highly inadequate in Headquarters and regional offices during a period when the portfolio was growing significantly. Additional staff are required to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in coordination, knowledge management and collaboration between different levels of the organization, across sectors, and across regions and countries.

For most of the evaluation period the EiE portfolio was managed by a small team at HQ, which was stretched between global advocacy and policy, developing programme guidance and providing support to regions and country offices. And while the global advocacy on education in emergencies was mostly found to be strong, connection of this work between and across different levels (HQ, regional offices and country offices) were not as strong. This was reflected in communication challenges resulting



in lack of information sharing and learning, insufficient guidance, and misalignment of approaches. Opportunities to coordinate work-plans and support for country-level responses between UNICEF HQ and the Global Education Cluster staff were missed. Across the levels of the organization, opportunities exist to clarify roles and responsibilities, to improve the flow of information, to strengthen joint work, and to learn across countries and regions, not least by tapping the experience of national UNICEF staff who represent the institutional memory and often have first-hand experience in emergency response.

Conclusion 6: Capacity for education in emergencies within at the country level was being progressively built over the evaluation period but gaps remain. Stronger knowledge management, guidance and support are needed to apply the priorities of the new Education Strategy and to produce the step change that is envisioned.

A range of corporate directives, frameworks and guidelines have been developed for the education humanitarian response, some of which are recognized as being very useful. However, the volume of directives and guidelines has left staff feeling overwhelmed and has reduced the effectiveness of education in emergencies. From an institutional perspective, the new Strategic Plan (2018–2021) has added priorities to the EiE agenda, in particular, engendering a stronger focus on quality education and learning.. Effective rolling out of the new Strategic Plan requires clear communication on priorities that reflect comparative advantages across partners as well as the needs and specific characteristics of different settings and types of crisis.

There is a need for all education staff to be able to understand, contextualize and apply education in emergencies and nexus good practices and lessons learned in their work. UNICEF internal knowledge management and learning systems across regions and countries have not been a systematic focus, nor have they been

consistently conducive to capacity strengthening. The new Education Strategy (2019–2030) recognises the importance of building UNICEF staff capacity. This is particularly important as working across the nexus requires flexibility in systems, skills, programming, and leadership to address constantly changing needs while building systems and capacities for longer term responses. Stronger investments are needed internally and externally to develop these skills.

Conclusion 7: UNICEF has significantly advanced the triple nexus agenda through its engagement in education in emergencies and in particular through its work on preparedness and risk-informed programming. Moving forward UNICEF should continue to strengthen this work in education in emergency programming.

Education has made exceptional progress vis-à-vis the nexus by establishing that it has a critical role on the humanitarian side of the divide. UNICEF has appropriately made progress in developing corporate directives for systematic linking of humanitarian and development programming in line with the humanitarian-development nexus, although there needs to be more reflection in such guidance on multiple roles across the nexus and comparative advantages across partners. While a strong contribution has been made in working with governments to integrate EiE into education sector policies and institutional capacities, the integration of refugees into national education systems has remained politically challenging.

In terms of bridging the humanitarian–development continuum, the most prominent change over the evaluation period was UNICEF work on preparedness and risk-informed programming, which has made a significant difference to internal and external preparedness to respond to crises, especially recurring, cyclical natural disasters. This includes UNICEF upstream work with governments, resulting in the inclusion of disaster risk reduction and conflict mitigation and preparedness in national policies and strategies.



UNICEF work on risk reduction and preparedness is now showing its first fruits; its importance is widely acknowledged and it will need continued attention. Valuable experience was also gained on the peace dimension of the nexus, especially through its PBEA programme. However, this work lost momentum once the PBEA programme concluded. To some extent, the work on peacebuilding and investments such as the PBEA contributed to the guidance on risk-informed programming and made sustained impacts in research and programming outside of UNICEF. However, accumulated experience should be more consistently and effectively sustained and capitalized on internally within UNICEF.

Conclusion 8: At country level, a range of good practices exist. A systematic focus on knowledge management and sharing of good practice will increase UNICEFs effectiveness.

While HQ has been increasingly involved in identifying and supporting innovations in education humanitarian programming, the flow of information and knowledge from that work has not circulated in a systematic way to regional and country office level. Systematically collecting information on innovations, good practices or lessons learned at regional and country level is necessary to improve learning across levels.

Conclusion 9: At country level UNICEF continues to build capacity of government and implementing partners and has moved to increase its funding and engagement with NGOs in line with the localization agenda. These practices required further strengthening.

Capacity building at country level of government and implementing partners has been the right choice. It needs intensified prioritization and focus moving forward. An important area of progress has been in building capacity of government through upstream work to integrate education in emergencies into sector policies, and in the introduction of preparedness and risk reduction

in country education plans so as to advance the work across the humanitarian-development continuum. Across contexts, communities were effectively involved in awareness-raising initiatives. Capacity/coordination on comprehensive preparedness and response at sub-national levels has received less attention, although it is critical in situations of devolved governance. UNICEF should be deliberate and systematic in capacity building with front-line responders, communities, local NGOs and subnational government officials.

5.5 Recommendations

The overall recommendations that arise from the evaluation are presented below, providing a rationale for each recommendation as well as details on suggested actions. Suggested timelines and responsibilities within the organization are also provided.

The recommendations are mutually supporting and interconnected, and do not suggest a radical change of direction. Rather, they focus on “**doing business better**” and seek to strengthen on-going work on education in emergencies by focussing on broad areas leadership and advocacy; improving UNICEF capacities for education humanitarian action; planning, programming, monitoring and learning; and, improving support to governments and partners.

Recommendation 1: UNICEF should equip leaders (Representative, Deputy Representative, and Chief of Education and Emergency Officers) with adequate leadership capacities and tools to work in a manner that reflects the organization’s commitment to education as an essential part of the humanitarian response, across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus.

Rationale: Conclusion 1 asserts that UNICEF contributed strongly in positioning the education sector at the centre of humanitarian response at



the global, regional and country levels, and has achieved recognition for advocacy and strengthening the global infrastructure for in education in emergencies. The organization needs to reinforce these gains by better equipping the country leadership teams (Representative, Deputy Representative, Emergency Officers and Chief of Education) with capacities and tools to strengthen the prioritization of education in humanitarian programming at the country level and to make informed decisions for humanitarian response working across the nexus and representing the education cluster on Humanitarian Country Teams.

It is also important for the organization to create the space and incentives for the Chief of Education to assume some level of risk in testing new and innovative solutions for more effective education emergency programming. Also, while shorter and more flexible CPD planning cycles will remain as relevant and necessary tools in some contexts, UNICEF should consider reorienting its CPD planning processes to achieve a dual focus – that of maintaining emphasis on immediate needs of children in the earlier stages of the education emergency response, and to support countries to deliver on the goals of their national education development plans/strategies, through structures such as the Education Sector Working Groups, and other education sector planning processes.

Responsibility and timeline: This recommendation requires consideration from PD with support of Regional Education Advisers and DPAM.

Recommendation 2: Recognising the priorities within of the education strategy, UNICEF should promote equitable learning opportunities in humanitarian education response, with particular emphasis on gender equality and disability inclusion.

Rationale: The Strategic Plan (2018-21) and new education strategy ([Education Strategy 2019-2030](#)) have placed a strong emphasis on inclusive and equitable quality education and learning for all children, while Conclusions 2 of this evaluation highlights the relevance of equity approaches and in tailoring interventions to the specific needs and characteristics of the children. In a humanitarian emergency, girls and children with disabilities are often among those most in need of assistance as they are at heightened risk of violence, exploitation or abuse. They are also the populations that are disproportionately excluded from education opportunity, hence the first step at being gender or disability inclusive is to seek for the children, count them, understand their capacities, barriers, views and priorities.

Another consideration would be to put in place a working group involving staff from countries that are implementing humanitarian programmes and regional offices and a consultative process to develop practical strategies and achievable objectives in disability inclusion and equitable quality education and learning in education emergency programming, and to advocate for inclusion of these objectives in national education strategic plans (NESPs). The proposed exercise can benefit from establishing a panel of experts who will provide oversight and periodic feedback on progress and also provide suggestions for UNICEF and partners on how to expand and deepen its work on equitable and disability inclusive education in contexts where there is less incentive to seek out the most marginalized.

Responsibility and timeline: primarily, this recommendation requires action by PD and the Global Education Cluster, and Regional Education Advisers, to be implemented through the remainder of the current Strategic Plan period.



Recommendation 3: UNICEF should lead key education partners to develop, implement and share, at scale, innovative and impactful learning solutions that are suited to the needs of children affected by acute emergencies and protracted crises, including public health emergencies.

Rationale: Many emergencies caused by conflict often degenerate into protracted crises. The evaluation found that UNICEF has played a significant role in providing access to primary education across a range of emergency contexts in line with its Core Commitments to Children and has reached large numbers of children through its education in emergencies programming. The evaluation observed, in Conclusion 2, that UNICEF has not been able to identify, target, reach or consistently support the most vulnerable beneficiaries with appropriate education solutions. Rather, many programmes offer supply driven education solutions, seemingly more suited for natural disasters and other acute emergencies than to protracted crises (Conclusion 3).

In pursuit of sustained access to quality education and improvement of education outcomes, UNICEF and key actors in the education in emergencies programming space (such as Save the Children and INEE) can contribute a number of lessons and good practices. These include improved design and management of temporary learning spaces, development and adaptation of locally sourced and culturally appropriate learning materials, innovative ways of capacitating a rapid learning force in instances where the professional teaching force is depleted, use of ICTs for instructional purposes such as interactive radio instruction, to mention a few. These can be tested further and be adapted into a package of solutions education solutions to be used in different types of crises.

Recommendation 3 attempts to inspire UNICEF and partners in countries with education humanitarian programming to perform a diagnostic of

education systems and model what it would take to move countries from 'vulnerability/fragility' to the required quality standard. Using their experience and technical capacities, UNICEF and partners can then adapt emergency education solutions from the standard supply-driven packages to more nuanced, longer-term solutions that are informed by a context analysis; are nimbly adapted to changing needs and opportunities.

Responsibility and timeline: To be implemented through the remainder of the current Strategic Plan period, this recommendation requires action by PD and education technical experts country offices, collaboration with key external partners, as well as Regional Education Advisers.

Recommendation 4: In implementing the CCCs on education, UNICEF should strengthen capacities for staff and partners with responsibilities for education in emergencies in the identification and targeting of affected children, monitoring and reporting of interventions and outcomes, to ensure that education in humanitarian action reaches the most marginalised children.

Rationale: The evaluation notes, in Conclusion 6, the progress that UNICEF has made in building capacities among staff who deliver education in emergency programmes. However, it notes also, that the EiE staff complement has failed to keep pace with a growing portfolio and/or the organization's humanitarian footprint (Conclusion 5), and that there are significant gaps in technical expertise of staff around core elements such as priority setting, and working across the nexus, as well as identifying the most vulnerable beneficiaries and developing targeted programmes for them, in line with the UNICEF Gender Policy and Gender Action Plan.

As a result, the evaluation identified the need to update capacity building strategies to include mandatory and systematic training on



key components such as beneficiary identification targeting and programming that upholds the(revised CCCs, UNICEF role as cluster lead agency for education, emergency preparedness and response, working in protracted crises, and working across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus. Strategies should also cover a variety of country contexts, including situations where government engagement and leadership is strong. Relatedly, UNICEF should learn from and capture the experience of staff (both IP and national) who have been involved across different emergency situations and input this into stronger context specific approaches and working across the nexus.

UNICEF investments in identifying and disseminate innovative approaches in education humanitarian action, including data collection on beneficiary characteristics and needs were acknowledged. Other possible actions for consideration would be to draw on UNICEF evidence function and expertise to build stronger processes and consistency for identifying the needs of affected populations and link evidence to programming, and to monitor coverage and quality of programmes more consistently, including changes in the country-specific contexts and priorities over time to ensure the continuing relevance of UNICEF assistance.

Responsibility and timeline: This requires collaboration between education staff in PD, the Global Education Cluster, and EMOPs, to be implemented through the remainder of the current Strategic Plan period.

Recommendation 5: UNICEF should strengthen engagement with the education sector (government, private sector and civil society) by ensuring that the design and implementation of education in emergencies interventions capitalizes on national capacities, to strengthens the localisation agenda and reinforce accountability to affected populations.

Rationale: Despite the strong contribution that UNICEF is credited for in positioning the education sector at the centre of humanitarian emergency programming, education in emergencies is still fighting for legitimacy in humanitarian response. Conclusions 7 and 9 have highlighted the need to strengthen the link humanitarian and development programming through national involvement in risk-informed programming, and to support sustainability by reinforcing national capacities. In line with the humanitarian-development-peace[building] nexus, the procedure on linking humanitarian and development programming, and the opportune moment refining implementation plans for UNICEF Education Strategy (2019-2030), more attention should be given to building back in a more sustainable way by strengthening education ministries/departments, and local NGOs, partners with whom UNICEF typically continue to engage when INGOs and other external actors move on to the next humanitarian emergency.

One consideration would be to make a deliberate investment in the entire education eco-system by building capacities of local NGOs/CBOs beyond financial sub-granting. And although community consultations do occur to some extent during the design and planning phase, systematic communication of decisions back to the community and keeping up a dialogue would go a long way in fostering accountability. Local NGOs/CBOs routinely engage with communities, including different constituencies of children and young people, and often have more legitimacy with affected populations. Collaborate with them in programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EiE activities within UNICEF to enhance their appropriateness and sustainability, and to align with UNICEF commitments on accountability to affected populations.

Responsibility and timeline: To be led by the education team in PD and the Global Education Cluster in collaboration with the regional and country education teams.



ANNEXES (packaged as Volume II)

- Annex 1 Terms of Reference
- Annex 2 Background – Education in humanitarian contexts
- Annex 3 Timeline of Education in Emergency
- Annex 4 UNICEF engagement in EiE — timeline
- Annex 5 Previous evaluations/studies
- Annex 6 Annotated description of methodology
- Annex 7 Stakeholder analysis
- Annex 8 Survey
- Annex 9 Evaluation process
- Annex 10 Case study findings
- Annex 11 Gender and inclusion
- Annex 12 Reporting and monitoring
- Annex 13 Education solutions in Nepal, Jordan and Somalia



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Short reference	Full reference
Agenda for Humanity, 2016a	<i>Initiative. Grand Bargain.</i> Agenda for Humanity: 2016. https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861
Agenda for Humanity, 2016b	<i>Initiative. New Way of Working.</i> Agenda for Humanity: 2016. https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/5358
Agenda for Humanity, 2016c	<i>World Humanitarian Summit Documents.</i> Agenda for Humanity: Istanbul: May 2016.
ALNAP, 2016	<i>Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide.</i> Margie Buchanan-Smith, John Cosgrave & Alexandra Warner for ALNAP: October 2016.
Avenir, 2015	<i>Evaluation of UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA). Evaluation Report.</i> Brian Majewski, Anna Seeger, Covadonga Canteli, Katherine George, Kerstin Tebbe, Nick Petten and Zehra Rizvi. Avenir Analytics for UNICEF: November 2015.
Barakat et al., 2010	<i>Programme Review & Evaluability Study (PRES). UNICEF Education in Emergencies & Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT) Programme. Final Report.</i> Sultan Barakat, Frank Hardman, David Connolly, Vanita Sundaram & Steven A. Zyck. UNICEF & The University of York: New York, USA & York, UK: May 2010.
Begue-Aguado, 2016	<i>Review. Education Response to the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.</i> Alberto Begue-Aguado for UNICEF WCARO: 20 June 2016.
Betts & Hüls, 2017	<i>Towards Improved Emergency Responses – Synthesis of UNICEF Evaluations of Humanitarian Action 2010 – 2016. Synthesis Report.</i> Dr. Julia Betts & Volker Hüls: June 2017.
CDEMA et all, 2018	<i>Caribbean Safe School Initiative. Learning Together.</i> CDEMA, EU, Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector, IsraAid, ECS, UNESCO, UNISDR: Barbados, May 2018.
Chakera & Tao, 2019	<i>Innovative Thinking for Complex Educational Challenges in the SDG4 Era.</i> UNICEF Education Think Piece Series. Chakera, Shiraz and Sharon Tao for UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office: Nairobi, 2019.
CRC, 1989	<i>The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.</i> General Assembly Resolution 44/25: 20 November 1989.
Culbertson et al, 2015	<i>Evaluation of Emergency Education Response for Syrian Refugee Children and Host Communities in Jordan.</i> Shelly Culbertson, Tom Ling, Marie-Louise Henham, Jennie Corbett, Rita Karam, Paulina Pankowska, Catherine Saunders, Jacopo Bellasio and Ben Baruch: 2015.
DARA, 2016	DARA Evaluation Team. <i>Evaluation of UNICEF Response and Recovery Efforts to the Gorkha Earthquake in Nepal – Final Evaluation Report.</i> June 2016.
Darcy et al, 2019	<i>Evaluation of the UNICEF Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in South Sudan. Evaluation Report.</i> James Darcy, Hisham Khogali, Volker Huls, Ramlat Musa Ali Wani and Alimure Awuda Amena for UNICEF: New York, January 2019.
Dette et al, 2016	<i>Technologies for monitoring in insecure environments.</i> Rahel Dette, Julia Steets and Elias Sagmeister, SAVE (Secure Access in Volatile Environments), Toolkit, September 2016.



Short reference	Full reference
ECW, 2018	<i>Education Cannot Wait. Results Report. April 2017-March 2018.</i> ECW Secretariat: New York, 2018.
ECW, 2019	<i>Education Cannot Wait. Annual Report 2018.</i> ECW Secretariat: New York, 2019
Forcier & Search for Common Ground, 2017	<i>Combined Final Evaluation for “I Love My Country”: Strategic Communications for Peace Building in South Sudan” & Baseline Evaluation for “I Love My Country”: Promoting Localized Understanding and Peaceful Coexistence in South Sudan”.</i> Forcier & Search for Common Ground: 2017.
GEC, 2018	Global Education Cluster, <i>Guide to Developing Education Cluster Strategies</i> , 2018.
GEMR, 2019	<i>Global Education Monitoring Report (GEMR). Migration, displacement and education: building bridges, not walls.</i> Second edition. UNESCO: Paris, 2018. http://gem-report-2019.unesco.org/
Hall, 2016	<i>Evaluation of the Youth Education Pack (YEP) Programme in Somalia.</i> Samuel Hall for UNICEF Somalia: 26 September 2016.
HEA, 2019a	<i>Humanitarian Education Accelerator (HEA). Scaling Education Innovations in Complex Emergencies. Learnings.</i> 2019. Made available at UKFIET Conference 2019 and will be released by October 2019 on the HEA's Medium publication: https://medium.com/he-a-learning-series
HEA, 2019b	<i>Humanitarian Education Accelerator (HEA). Blog. Six key themes for scaling humanitarian education innovations: Learning from the Humanitarian Education Accelerator (HEA).</i> 2019. Made available at UKFIET Conference 2019 and will be released by October 2019 on the HEA's Medium publication: https://medium.com/he-a-learning-series
Hussein, n.d.	<i>Inclusive Education in South Sudan.</i> Presentation by Odur Nelson Hussein, Director of Alternative Education Systems. Hussein, no date.
IASC, 2008	Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC). <i>Operational Guidance on the Concept of ‘Provider of Last Resort’.</i> 20 June 2008.
IASC, 2014	<i>Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring. Guidance Note.</i> Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): January 2014.
IASC, 2015	<i>Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level. Revised version.</i> Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): July 2015.
ICVA, 2017	<i>The Grand Bargain: Everything you need to know.</i> An ICVA briefing paper. ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies), a global NGO network for principled and effective humanitarian action: February 2017.
Incheon Declaration, 2016	<i>Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the implementation for Sustainable Development Goal 4. Education 2030:</i> 2016.
INEE & IFRC, 2008	<i>Companionship Agreement between the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</i> concerning formally recognising the INEE Minimum Standards as Companion Standards to the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. INEE & IFRC: 2008.
INEE, 2012	<i>Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery.</i> International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE): 2012.



Short reference	Full reference
INEE & UNICEF, 2012-2016.	<i>Learning for Peace Collection</i> : From 2012-2016, UNICEF and the Government of the Netherlands undertook a multi-year partnership entitled Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA), also known as "Learning for Peace". Resources from this programme are archived at: https://archive.ineesite.org/en/learning-for-peace
JRP, 2019	Joint Response Plan. <i>Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis January – December 2019</i> .
Mendenhall, 2019	<i>Navigating the humanitarian-development nexus in forced displacement contexts</i> . UNICEF Think Piece Series: Education in Emergencies. Mary Mendenhall for UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office: Nairobi, 2019.
Metzler et al, 2015	Metzler, J., Savage, K., Yamano, M., and Ager, A.. Evaluation of Child Friendly Spaces: An inter-agency series of impact evaluations in humanitarian emergencies. Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health and World Vision International: New York and Geneva, 2015.
MoGEI South Sudan et al, 2016	South Sudan Education Sector Analysis, 2016: Planning for Resilience. Ministry of General Education and Instruction, IIEP-UNESCO and UNESCO South Sudan: 2016.
Mokoro, 2019	<i>Evaluation of UNICEF Contribution to Education in Humanitarian Settings. Final Inception Report</i> . Mokoro: 8 May 2019
Newby & Hodgkin, 2018	Newby, Landon. and Hodkgin, Marian. ESARO <i>Education in Emergencies eLearning Course: Final report on course pilot</i> . December 2018
Novelli & Smith, 2011	<i>The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A synthesis report of findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone</i> . Mario Novelli & Alan Smith: University of Sussex and University of Ulster: December 2011.
OCHA, 2018	OCHA (2018) <i>Global Humanitarian Overview, 2018</i>
OCHA, 2019	OCHA (2019) <i>Global Humanitarian Overview, 2019</i> https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO2019.pdf
ODI, 2016a	<i>A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises. Evidence paper</i> . Overseas Development Institute (ODI): May 2016.
ODI, 2016b	<i>Education Cannot Wait: Proposing a fund for education in emergencies</i> . Overseas Development Institute, May 2016.
ODI, 2019	<i>Strengthening coordinated education planning and response in crises: Global mapping report</i> . Overseas Development Institute: 2019.
Oslo Declaration, 2015	<i>Oslo Declaration. Education for Development</i> . Oslo Education Summit: 6-7 July 2015.
Page, 2015	Kent Page. <i>Responding to the psychosocial needs of children</i> . UNICEF Nepal Blog: 24 July 2015. https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/nepal-earthquakes-responding-to-the-psychosocial-needs-of-children/
Rand Corporation, 2016	<i>Evaluation of the Emergency Education Response for Syrian Refugee Children and Host Communities in Jordan</i> . Shelly Culbertson, Tom Ling, Marie-Louise Henham, Jennie Corbett, Rita Karam, Paulina Pankowska, Catherine Saunders, Jacopo Bellasio, Ben Baruch. Rand Corporation for UNICEF: Santa Monica, California and Cambridge, UK.
Research Consortium, 2014-2016	Research Consortium <i>Education and Peacebuilding</i> . UNICEF, University of Amsterdam, University of Sussex and Ulster University: https://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/rp/research-consortium-education-and-peacebuilding/



Short reference	Full reference
Ruddle et al, 2018	<i>Effective and Efficient Partnership: Examination of key actors' roles in GPE's country-level operational model towards GPE2020 delivery. Inception Report.</i> Volumes I and II. Nicola Ruddle, Georgina Rawle, Andrew Wyatt, Veronica Chau and Ying Yeung for Oxford Policy Management (OPM) and Dalberg: March 2018.
Save the Children, 2014	<i>Hear it from the children: why education in emergencies is critical. A study on the role of education for conflict-affected communities in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia.</i> Save the Children: 2014.
Save the Children et al, 2019	<i>Syria Crisis Education Management (IM) Package.</i> Save the Children, UNHCR, UNICEF, No Lost Generation: January 2019.
Skovgaard, 2015	<i>Sara Skovgaard. Final report. Education Cluster Coordinator Liberia:</i> November 2015
Stern et al, 2012	<i>Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluation.</i> DFID Working Paper 38, Elliot Stern (Team Leader), Nicoletta Stame, John Mayne, Kim Forss, Rick Davies, Barbara Befani, April 2012.
Theirworld, 2018	<i>Safe schools: The hidden Crisis. A framework for action to deliver Safe, Non-violent, Inclusive and Effective Learning Environments.</i>
	Report prepared 2018 by Theirworld. Research and contributing author: Kate Moriarty.
	https://s3.amazonaws.com/theirworld-site-resources/Reports/Theirworld-Report-Safe-Schools-December-2018.pdf
UN Security Council, 2011	<i>Resolution on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict.</i> UN Security Council: 12 July 2011.
UN WOMEN, 2005	<i>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.</i> Beijing+5 Political Declaration and Outcome adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995. UN WOMEN: 2005
UN WOMEN, 2015	<i>How to manage gender-responsive evaluation.</i> Evaluation Handbook. UN WOMEN Independent Evaluation Office: 2015.
UNEG, 2008	<i>UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.</i> United Nations Evaluation Group, March 2008.
UNEG, 2011	<i>Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance.</i> UNEG, 2011.
UNEG, 2014	<i>Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations.</i> UNEG: 2014.
UNEG, 2016	<i>Norms and Standards for Evaluation.</i> United Nations Evaluation Group, June 2016
UNEG, 2017	<i>Norms and Standards for Evaluation.</i> UNEG, 2017
Selby & Kagawa, 2012	<i>Disaster Risk Reduction in School Curricula: Case Studies from Thirty Countries.</i> David Selby and Fumiyo Kagawa for UNESCO & UNICEF: 2012.
UNGA, 2010	<i>The right to education in emergency situations.</i> Resolution A/64/L.58. UN General Assembly: 30 June 2010.
UNGA, 2016a	<i>New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (A 71/1).</i> UN General Assembly: New York, NY, 2016.
UNGA, 2016b	<i>Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: ensuring a better future for all: Report of the Secretary-General.</i> A 72/50. UN General Assembly: 2016



Short reference	Full reference
UNGA, 2017	<i>Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: our promise for dignity, prosperity and peace on a healthy planet.</i> Report of the Secretary-General. UNGA: 21 December 2017.
UNGA, 2018	<i>Global Compact on Refugees:</i> United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): 17 December 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf
UNHCR & OCHA, 2014	<i>Joint UNHCR - OCHA Note on Mixed Situation: Coordination in Practice.</i> UNHCR & OCHA: 2014.
UNHCR, 1994	<i>Refugee Children. Guidelines on Protection and Care.</i> UNHCR: 1994.
UNHCR, 2010	<i>Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.</i> Geneva: UNHCR
UNHCR, 2013	<i>UNHCR Refugee Coordination Model: Adaptation of UNHCR's refugee coordination in the context of the Transformative Agenda.</i> UNHCR: 2013 Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/56753.pdf
UNHCR, 2017a	<i>UNHCR's Strategic Directions 2017-2021.</i> UNHCR: Geneva, 2017.
UNHCR, 2017b	Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program: <i>Standing Committee Update on Education.</i> UNHCR: 2017 Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/593917957.pdf
UNICEF & UNESCO, 2012	<i>Disaster Risk Reduction in School Curricula: Case Studies from Thirty Countries,</i> UNICEF and UNESCO, 2012
UNICEF, 2002	<i>Children Participating in Research, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) – Ethics and Your Responsibilities as a Manager.</i> Evaluation Technical Notes No. 1. UNICEF Evaluation Office: April 2002.
UNICEF, 2005	<i>Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies.</i> UNICEF: 2005.
UNICEF, 2007	<i>UNICEF Education Strategy 2007-2015.</i> UNICEF: June 2007.
UNICEF, 2009	<i>Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition. Consolidated 2009 Progress Report to the Government of the Netherlands and the European Commission.</i> UNICEF, 2009.
UNICEF, 2010	<i>Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action.</i> UNICEF: April 2010. https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/CCCs-Pamphlet_EN_092710.pdf
UNICEF, 2013a	<i>UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014-2017.</i> UNICEF: 11 July 2013.
UNICEF, 2013b	<i>Basic Education and Gender Equality. Thematic Report 2013.</i> UNICEF: 2013.
UNICEF, 2014a	<i>UNICEF Gender Action Plan 2014-2017.</i> UNICEF: 15 April 2014.
UNICEF, 2014b	<i>Revised Supplementary Programme Note on the Theory of Change for the UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2014-2017.</i> UNICEF: 6 May 2014.
UNICEF, 2014c	<i>UNICEF Upstream Work in Basic Education and Gender Equality 2003-2012.</i> New York, 2014
UNICEF, 2015a	<i>UNICEF Procedure for ethical standards in research, evaluation, data collection and analysis.</i> Document Number: CF/PD/DRP/2015-001. UNICEF, Director, Division of Data, Research and Policy (DRP): 1 April 2015.
UNICEF, 2015b	<i>UNICEF Procedure for Quality Assurance in Research.</i> Document Number: CF/PD/DRP-2015-002. UNICEF, Director, Division of Data, Research and Policy (DRP): 1 April 2015.
UNICEF, 2015c	<i>UNICEF. Nepal Country Office Annual Report 2015.</i>



Short reference	Full reference
UNICEF, 2015d	<i>Knowledge for Children in Eastern and Southern Africa. 2015 Publications Catalogue.</i> UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa.
UNICEF, 2015e	<i>Nepal Humanitarian Situation Reports 1 + 2 2015.</i> UNICEF: 26 + 28 June 2015.
UNICEF, 2016a	<i>Towards Improved Emergency Responses. Synthesis of UNICEF Evaluations of Humanitarian Action 2010 – 2016.</i> Synthesis Report. UNICEF Evaluation Office: June 2017
UNICEF, 2016b	<i>Towards Improved Emergency Responses. Synthesis of UNICEF Evaluations of Humanitarian Action 2010 – 2016.</i> Synthesis summary. UNICEF Evaluation Office: June 2017
UNICEF, 2016c	<i>Nepal Earthquakes: One Year Later. Moving On.</i> UNICEF Nepal Country Office: 25 April 2016.
UNICEF, 2016d	<i>Enhanced Programme and Operational Support in Fragile Contexts.</i> Report prepared by Programme Division (HATIS) in collaboration with EMOPS. UNICEF: 21 November 2016.
UNICEF, 2016e	<i>UNICEF study on linking development and humanitarian programming.</i> Final report. Vine Management Consulting for UNICEF: January 2016.
UNICEF, 2016f	<i>Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Programming Guide.</i> UNICEF: November 2016.
UNICEF, 2017a	<i>Global Evaluation Report Oversight System. Summary UNICEF Staff Handbook.</i> Version 3.2. UNICEF Evaluation Office: June 2017. https://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/GEROS_Handbook_FINAL_summary.pdf
UNICEF, 2017b	<i>UNICEF-Adapted UNEG Evaluation Reports Standards.</i> Updated June 2017. UNICEF Evaluation Office: June 2017.
UNICEF, 2017c	<i>UNICEF Gender Action Plan 2018-2021.</i> UNICEF: 13 July 2017.
UNICEF, 2017d	<i>Theory of Change Paper, UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2018-2021.</i> Realizing the rights of every child, especially the most disadvantaged. UNICEF: 18 July 2017.
UNICEF, 2017e	<i>UNICEF Strategic Plan 2018-2021.</i> UNICEF: 16 August 2017.
UNICEF, 2017f	<i>Evaluation of the Coverage and Quality of UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex High-Threat Environments. UNICEF-internal Scoping Report.</i> Simon Lawry-White and Volker Hüls. UNICEF: April 2017, updated 14 July 2017
UNICEF, 2017g	UNICEF Integrated Budget 2018-2021. Informal Briefing to the Executive Board. UNICEF: 22 August 2017.
UNICEF, 2018a	Discussion Paper: <i>2018 Revised Evaluation Policy for UNICEF.</i> UNICEF Evaluation Office, 30 January 2018.
UNICEF, 2018b	<i>Annual Report 2017.</i> UNICEF: June 2018
UNICEF, 2018c	Annex B – <i>Terms of Reference for the global evaluation of UNICEF WASH Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises, 2014-2019.</i> UNICEF: 2018.
UNICEF, 2018d	<i>Evaluation of UNICEF Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh.</i> Evaluation Report. Volume 1. November 2018.
UNICEF, 2018e	<i>Evaluation of UNICEF Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh.</i> Evaluation Report. November 2018.



Short reference	Full reference
UNICEF, 2018f	<i>UNICEF 2019-2030 Education Strategy. Survey Approach and Key Findings.</i> UNICEF: December 2018.
UNICEF, 2018g	<i>Guidance on Risk-Informed Programming (GRIP).</i> UNICEF: NY, April 2018.
UNICEF, 2018h	<i>UNICEF Jordan Country Programme Document.</i> UNICEF: February 2018.
UNICEF, 2018i	<i>UNICEF Jordan Country Office Annual Report 2018.</i> UNICEF Jordan: 2018.
UNICEF, 2018j	<i>Note stratégique. Programme de coopération RCA-UNICEF 2018-2021. Composante Education.</i> UNICEF Central African Republic: 2018.
UNICEF, 2018k	<i>UNICEF CAR Country Office Annual Report 2018.</i> UNICEF Central African Republic: 2018.
UNICEF, 2019a	<i>Education in Emergencies expenditure 2014-2017.</i> UNICEF: 13 February 2019.
UNICEF, 2019b	<i>UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office Annual Report 2018.</i> UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office: February 2019.
UNICEF, 2019c	<i>Every Child Learns. UNICEF Education Strategy 2019-2030:</i> September 2019.
UNICEF, 2019d	<i>UNICEF Procedure on Linking Humanitarian and Development Programming.</i> Document Number: PD/PROCEDURE/2019/001. UNICEF: New York, 3 May 2019.
UNICEF, 2019e	<i>UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update. Core Commitments to Children.</i> Presentation by Manuel Fontaine, Director Emergency Programmes at UNICEF Executive Board Session: New York, 11 September 2019.
UNICEF, 2019f	<i>Update on UNICEF humanitarian action with a focus on linking humanitarian and development programming.</i> UNICEF/2019/EB/3. UNICEF: February 2019.
UNICEF, 2019g	<i>Evaluation of the Coverage and Quality of the UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.</i> Volume One. Main Evaluation Report. UNICEF: New York: January 2019.
UNICEF, 2019h	<i>Goal Area 2 Every Child Learns. Global Annual Results Report 2018.</i> UNICEF: 2019.
UNICEF, 2019i	<i>Annual Report 2018.</i> UNICEF: June 2019.
UNICEF, 2019j	<i>Evaluation of Innovation in UNICEF Work: Synthesis Report,</i> UNICEF Evaluation Office, February 2019
UNICEF & UNHCR, 2019	<i>Scaling Education Innovations in Complex Emergencies: Learnings from the Humanitarian Education Accelerator.</i> Presentation at UKFIET Conference 2019. Presented by Juan Pablo Giraldo (UNICEF), Rebecca Telford (UNHCR) and Thomas de Hoop (UNICEF). UNICEF & UNHCR: 17 September 2019.
UNISDR & GADRRRES, 2014	<i>Comprehensive School Safety. A global framework in support of The Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector and The Worldwide Initiative for Safe Schools,</i> in preparation for the 3rd U.N. World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015. Published 2014. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/31059_31059comprehensiveschoolsafetyframe.pdf
Van der Veen et al, 2015	<i>Evaluation of UNICEF Psychosocial Support Response for Syrian Children in Jordan.</i> Albertien van der Veen, Reem AbuKishk, Shadi Bushnaq, Orso Muneghina, Reem Rawdha and Tineke van Pietersom from Antares Foundation, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: 2015.



Photo credits

page 1: © UNICEF/UNI6712/EI Baba
page 8: © UNICEF/UNI6750/EI Baba
page 9: © UNICEF/UN0344184/Onat
page 18: © UNICEF/UNI280742/Vincent Tremeau
page 19: © UNICEF/UNI281106/Herwig
page 29: © UNICEF/UNI280372/Tremeau
page 30: © UNICEF/UN0326968/Brown
page 48: © UNICEF/UNI326947/Albam
page 75: © UNICEF/UN0326960/Brown
page 97: © UNICEF/UN0326961/Brown









For further information, please contact:

Evaluation Office
United Nations Children's Fund
Three United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

evalhelp@unicef.org
www.unicef.org/evaluation